global problems. the global problems is not achieving growth where the majority production is now done in one part of the world and the majority of the consumption is in another part of the world. some people might say the answers for this part of the world to increase consumption. but i city answer is for people in the other part of a world to >> people who have worked very hard in china and india, that is where the breakthrough is were there is global growth and it can happen. i believe that with good will, the chinese objective in the stated document is to take millions of more people out. that is what the purpose of the government is.

that is the export policy being pursued. the truth is, china went to pursue the policy there would have to be increased consumer spending. the would-be the position for the rest of the world. consumer spending is 75%. it is 35% of the u.s. economy. it is possible to imagine china moving to 45 to 60. . it is true of india of japan to increase consumer spending. i think it is in our interest to

be of mutual benefit to asia and europe. >> we will take two more questions. >> the for your presentation. if the united states and united kingdom continue to fall behind china in production become of their futures.ggte i am sorry, i am a bit nervous. people are worried about the jobs it is true that america has not risen for many years. it is true that we to ensure higher b of living the question i how to you to this if you're thinking of the next

of the you would do, it is car that the volume is for > the volume. it is clear that e market in the future will favor those companies for custom built goods, not just goods, but also services that can be sold to the rest of the world. that is ere the future lies. you to invest in education and technology and industry. people do not see that there is sufficient demand. you have large numbers of peoplehat are not investing because they cannot sethe market to make profits. if we can see world demand and of america is ll pced with

high technology, then in a few years time, we can come to a glob agreement. i think is powerful argument. i think that the american dream that every generation will do better than the lascan be newed by ensuring that people have the skillof the education and technology to benefit fro what will be a changing world market in years to come. yet to go into a race to the bottom. you can compete on high skill and there is no country that has got betteross that c surpass us. >> this will be the last question. >> i think we will do one more.

i am actually a second ar reing in history student. i am also an aive member in the liberal party. i hope to see you in a conference next week. >> the queio >> ireland's economy shrank by 1.2% in the second quarter. of course, their austerity measures are championed by m cameron. what ds that say about how other countrieshould go about reducing their debt burden? >> you have to ask again what is the big problem we face? if deficit is the biggest problem of allthen you wl reduce the deficit at the cost and expense of everything else. if you think it is because of lack of growth and jobs and an econy that can produce tax venues androduced jobs for people who do not have to rely

on social security and unemployment benefits, then you will concentrate ogetting ur economy growing again. that is really the message that i take to countries aroundhe world. there is insufficient evidence that the economy wl grow fast enough in the advaed industrial economies for us to take risksn the recovery. it is importanto recognize that, overhe next few months, you will s unemploymt rising in some countries, rather thanalling. the resources in the economy are being pressured at a time when there'not sufficient growth. you caeither take the exit strategy for this global recession, which will eventually somehow lead to a rise in private investment in a few ars to come or you can look at the evince and said a private investme will not rise without sufficient consumer

demand. therefore you draw the concsion that, if we dnot have an exit strategy that i am taing about, expanding world trade and expanding world demand, you will be in low- owth dayed for years to come. if the problem is growth and unemployment and you have to deal with th first, then it means that you have to make sure that the reurces and the poor economy are sufficient. >> this has en a wonderful wide-ranging conversation. i want to ask the audience for very good questions. join me in thanking gordon brown. [alause] thank you very much. [applause]

>> tomorrow, on washington journal, the preview of the supreme court's 201session. also, john park with the u.s. instite of peace on u.s. relationwith north korea. then an update on the tubled asset relief program with rebecca christie of bomberg news. that is live at 7 milli eastern europe c-span. -- 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c- span. >> tomorrow, gregory schneider on the conservative movement in

the 20th century. also, a look at his latest book, from reaction to revolution. watcliveovaghere on c- span2 at 5:30 p.m. eastern this weekend on c-span3, veiling the mysteries of a ship uncovered a the world tre center site. discovering what the esidential alexians of 1824 and 1828 were not only important, but ao to of the most scandalous. also, the 19th amendment still has an impact on race and gender relations in ameri. 48 hours of people and events telling the american story, all weekend, every weekend. that is on c-span3. >> now, senate armed serces chairman carl levin talking about the afghanistan war. he defds strikes in afghantan and says that the pakistan government is

supporting those strikes th is one hour. >> good morning and welcomeo all of you to today's council on foren relations meeting. a coup of housekeeping reminders before i start. please turn off all cell phones, pagers, beepers etc.. not because it is disturbing to the audience but the wireless system. to the press in the back, today's meeting is on the record. >> now, you telme >> aughter]

>> our speaker today is senator carl levin, democrat. is a series of words that strikes fear in commands and litical appointees called to teifbefore him. in the congress that veers tord partisanship and away from values that many of this would like them to adhere to, the senatoemains in high- value. the our expertise and sacrifice. ashairman of t senate armed services comttee, he is among the most respected voices on miliry affairs, not just to his party, but to his nation and around the world. it is a greaton for me to turn the floor over to senator carl lin. pplause]

>> ank you, t,or a really nice introduction. some introductions i get a very long and not nearly as meaningful as that one was. ank you to the council for inviting me to speak to you, and also to thom shanker for moderating. the council plays an invuable role in provina forum for discussing se of the most difficult and important issues our nation faces, and i hope i cacontribute in somema way to that msion. i'd like ttalk this morning about the u.s. sttegy in afghanistan about how it's working, and what i believe is a key to its suess. there were two main elements to

the strate the president announced at wt point in december. fit, he called for aurge of 30,000 u.s. troops t lt of which are just now arriving in ahanistan to seize the initiative and build the capacity of the afghan security fces. the strategy is to "clear, hold, build and transfer" with transfer to strengthened afghan security forces bein the essential addition to the familiar "clear, hold and build." sential addition tthe familiar clear hold and build. second, the president annnced thatfter 18 months, beginning in july of 2011, we will begin to rede u.s. forces in afghanistan an aelerate a transfer of respsibilitieso the afghan goverent. so how is itoing? the picte very mixed. there's been significant progress in surin previously

taban-held areasnd in killing or capturing insurgent leaders. but the overall security situation is still troubling and efforts to clear some areas have met greater resistance than expected. training of afanecity forces is ahead of schedule. afghanros are more ofte planningndeang operaons especially in the sou where the fighting is most intense but there is mixed evidence about those trpseffectiveness. while ivate contractors are a necessary part of operations in afghistan, our contracng practis have often detracted from our missiony powering warlords and power bkers. the arm services committee will soon release a report addressing ju that issue. despite spodic atmpts to rootut corruption, it remains deeply embedded in the afghan govement and pice.

in pakistan, which is is lind toafghanistan, officials have taken some steps to rein in extremisgroups that threaten stability in pakistan. but th have so far failed to take the ste to address major threats to afghanistan from within pakistan. small groups of low level taliban fighters are laying down thei weapons and commanders say prospects forheir reintegratiointo civil society are real. but the "new york times" reports that the reiegration program erl has stalled u. -- has stalled. i uld spend all ofy time on any one of those tics but i want to focus on e second fundenl element of president obama's afghan strate, the july, 2011, date for the giing of u.s. troop reductions.

the publicationf bob odward's latestoohas broutttention to the pressure president obama faced in establishing th sategy. and the president continues under pressure from inside a outside the militar to build flexibility intohat july 2011 date i want to tell you why i believe that stickg to that date is the key t success and why president obama shod t and i lieve will not modify the july 2011 date. the time the administration was conducting its afghanistan strategy review last fall, iid not suppo a surge of u.s. combat troops into afghanistan. my concern was and remains today a that a lgeoreign combat trp presence cou play into thhands of th taliban whose propaganda proclaimshat the united stend its allies are seeking to dominate afghanistan.

i also believe large additional deployments would make it less likely that the afghanistan people, government and cuty foes would urgently prepare to secure their nation's future. excuse me. so i called for additional airsnd othernablers to build theapit of afghan secuty forces so they could become the principal srcof security in afghanistan. once the psident announced his decision, i focused my effts on what ielieve is essential to success in afghanistan. building t afghan army's capability and getting afghan troops to take the lead in operations. that belief is based on my conviction that it will be upo the afghan fces and peoe to succeed in this conflict ifhey want a better futur than the grim prospect the taliban offer.

that is why have pushed so hard for training and equipping the afghan security forces and why i have personally prsed president kari and defense minister wzak on numerous occasions to put more afghan troops in the area where the fighting ithhighest. when marines launched a msion in helma province there were ve marines on the ground for ery one afghan soldier. that ratio is now 1 to 1. and we finally are seeing afghan forces lding some orations in other districts around and near kandahar. hang afghans lead these operations is the taliban's rst nightmare becau it gives the lie to the taliban propagan that portrays stern troo as hostile okay pyres. afghans themselves wl be more effective than our troops

winning the trust of the ahan people. it's been said by some who oppose the july, 2011, date that e taliban have an expression. that the west has the watches but we have the time. that ishe taliban are more patient and will simply wait us out until july, 2011. well, i do hope they hide and wait. becae at the end of their wait, they will face a much larger, much strongeafghan force. time is not on the side oth taliban unless thefgn leadership squanders the time between noand ju 2011. crits much u.s. strategy say that setting a date toeduce our troo shows a lack of

resolve on our country, the purposef that dates to strengthen afghan resolve to take the steps necessary for success. and oucommitment endures. the presidentha adopted a realisc, long-term strategy of presence in afghanistan and in other parts of theegion. but that doesn't requiren unsustainabl open-ded commitment to an arbitrar number of u.s. troops. the yardstick against which progress should be measured in the months ahead, whether relating to security governance or economic development is the extent to which afghans take the lead and acceptesponsibility for their security and their country's future. standing bthat july, 2011, date is the key to that progress, a crucial incti for the afghans to apoach their task with urgency.

if the date wobbles, so does the see of urgency. and as secretary gates said just this week, quote, all of our efforts must build the trust and self-reliance the afghans will need tgovern and protect themsees over the long term. and then he notably added, and this he said very clearly for theirst time, in my memory, quote, encouraging that self-reliance is why beginning a responsible drawdown next summer is so important. and i'm convinced after talking to president obama and to high adnistration officials that the president will not waffle in his decision to begin reducing our force levels by july, 2011. i kn there's going to be lots of pressure to do so. e publication of bob

woodward's book made clear that e decision to establish that date was subject to great debate within the administration. the bo h fueled that already was a contest in theedia. a search for daylight between the president and the pentagon. setting up does one dare to think even rootingor the conflict between the two. let's face it, such a conflic would make for great copy. top pentagon officials have appeared for the arm senate committee i've asked them directly whetherhey support and agree with the present's policy including the july, 2011, date. secretary gates, admiral mullen, general mcchrystal and general mattis and general petraeus all do. there's been se fraying at t edges.

some effor to reduce the certaintof the president's order. general petraeus has referre to july 2011 as a date when ductions are scheduled to begin. or that lack certainty. he said that his agreement with the date was, quote, based on projections on conditions in july, 2011. he suggested that ose projections might be fault general petraeus' commes lt mont rsingheosbity that he may recommend agns any reducon nt july got ont page lead story cora in the "w rkim." neral conway the outgoing marine commandant said, que, wl be a f yrs bore e maris n nd ovean territy t afghans. d odrd quotes genal trus as telng lutant general do le ath whi hoe,uote, all we haveo is begin t sw proes a

that will beufcit add meo the ock. anwe will get what wneed no is tru ttomof the these statemen ae iar tetsoeaur lde i th regionhathe unid at wl not abann afghisn arting nexju. ant'perfectly natural d detaab. fo mity commander t sk mamu fxilityn rrng t ordndo vce their we-kwneltae he firm deain. butheomnt also inser biitin what was designed theredent as an unambiguou signal to the afghans that they must move urgently. and i have tried everywhere i could to build resistance to the pressure to turn a date certain

into a goal or something based on conditions rather than what it is, the commander in chief's decision and order. i think open-ended commitments encourage drift and permit inaction, firm timelines demand attention and forced action. we can look back several decades to the war in vietnam for an example of how open-ended military commitments reduce incentes to host governments to take necessary and often difficult steps for their nation's future. thankfully, we avoided that trap in iraq. while some in washington argued that we should maintain an open-ended commitment to high troop levels, the bush administration established a wiser course, fixed deadlines, first for the withdrawal of international forces from iraq

cities and later for the withdrawal of all u.s. forces, established a timeline that has guided iraq's governmt and our own, forcing the iraqis and you say to build iraq's own security forces and government to the point where they can secure their own nation. some of the events in afghanistan itself already illustrate the value of firm timelines. litenant general bill caldwell, who heads our efforts to train afghan security forces, has told me more than once that the president's announcement of the july 2011 date was a major factor in improved afghan recruiting success. the date he has said focused afghan leaders on the need to speed the growth of the afghan army. president karzaieeds prodding, believe me.

he prefers to see himself as the head of a united people and not as the commander in chief of a military that at must at times use force against some of those same people. general mcchrystal h to press president karzai to take ownership of a campaign in helmand seeking unsuccessfully for far too long his approval of the start of those operations. president karzai's approval. it also took too long for president karzai to meet with elders in preparation for the campaign in and around kandahar city. and en president karzai speaks out publicly about coalition military operations, it is more often to criticize civilian casualties than in support of our operations and his own army's operations. that is a more powerful reason to stick to the july 2011 date

for accelerating the transaction to afghanistan security responsibility. namely, that transition is what the afghan people want. as president obama has said, make no mistake. this transition will begin because open-ended war serves neither our interest nor the afghan peoples. thefghan people wantheir own security forces and not international troops to protect them. i saw this more a year ago, excuse me. i saw this here me than a year ago when i visited a gathering of pastun elders in a provincial town -- sorry. in a pvincial town in province. when i aed how long they wanted international troops to

stay in afghanistan, they said we should remain as long as it took to epi. -- to help train their own army and then leave. plans adopted at the natial peace conference in jurga and in kabul, beyond the wishes of the afghan people we should stick to the july 20 date because of the political message that it sends to the karzai government. the afghan people are growing increasingly disillusioned with a central government that they perceive is controlled by corrupt and predatorpower brokers and warlords. this disillusionment threatens to damage afghanistan's nationa

institution, the army. because if the afghan people begin to perceive the army as protecting a corrupt and ineffective national government, that respect that the afghan people have for their army will wane. sticking to the july 20 date keeps the pressure on the karzai government to earn support for a national consensus against the return of taliban domination by curbing monstration of effectiveness of the afghan government. i also do not that think we can ignore public sentiment here at home. increasingly, t american people across party lines question theost and precious lives and in dollars of maintaining a large presence in afghanistan. a gallup poll in august showed

that a large majority favored setting a timeline for reductions in u.s. troop levels. failure to adhere to the timeline that we have set can only undermine public support for the afghan mission. while this factor helps bui the case for firmness on the deadline, i do not believe that president obama's firmness is motivated by politics. he believes as i believehat setting a july 2011 date and sticking to it is our best chance of success in afghanistan. rather, signaling t president karzai that he can postpone the some uncertain time of the difficult steps he must take to secure his nation's future. perhaps the afghans will not succeed.

despite some promising recent signs to build security forces large and effective in us to secure their own country. perhaps afghanistan will not resolve the enic and geographic divisions and grievances that threaten to fracture a much battered nation. perhaps president karzai and his government, despite all of our prodding will not build the kind of government that can gain the confidence of the afghan people. none of those are easy tasks but it would be far riskier to signal to president karzai that he has an unlimited amount of time. let me close with a reminder. this discussion is not an academic exercise. i received a letter not long ago from a michigan marine who now

leads a platoon in onef the most dangerous areas of afghanistan. the struggles of the bravery a sacrifice of the men that he leads. his letter was a powerful reminder of how much we owe him and the other brave men and women serving in afghastan. and one of thehings that we owe them is the best decisions that we can humanly make. here in washington, we too often measure our decisions by poll ratings or by positive or negative media coverage. on the battlefield, decisions are measured by whether missions are accomplished and whether lives are saved or lost. the stakes are too high. for us to give anything less than our most thoughtful deliberation in crafting the policies that we ask those who serve to carry out.

you are part of that process, that deliberative process. and i'm grateful for your invitation to join you in it. thanks so much. and i'd be happy to try to answer some of youquestions. [applause] >> thank you very much for some very thought-provoking comments. before i open the floor for questions i would like to invoke the authoritarian power of the chair to ask a couple of things that have been on my mind and those of colleagues. senator, you warned about the danger of ambiguity surrounding the july 2011 withdrawal date set by the president. but isn some of that ambiguity -- well, conscious or planned by the administration to speak to different audiences? the day after the west point speech in which the president laid that out, there were senior officials at the white house, at state, at dod saying we're not going to rush for the exits.

it's going to be conditions-based. these are officially sanction comments so what's going on? >> i think there is ambiguity. and one of its conscious or subconscious purposes is to transmit the message of commitment to afghanistan and to the region. at the same time, there's a message of determination on to transfer responsibility for security andovernance to the afghan government. that is an inherent ambiguity. that's a med message almost built in. and so the answer is, yes. as a matter of fact, you mentioned the day after the speech at west point there was already a statement about not rushing for the exits. a number of people, including general petraeus, including the

president himself, has said that the pace of the reductions is going to be conditions-based. the fact that it's goi to begin is not conditions-based. that set. for the reasons that i gave. the pef reductions is said to be conditions-based. at the same time, those leaders have said it's going to be gradual. well, if it's conditions-based, then you don't decide how -- whether it's gradual or rapid in advance. there's ambiguity right in that very statement. and everybody has contributed, i think, to that ambiguity. the leaders have contributed including the president who has both said the pace is conditns-based at the same time he said it's not going be rapid. it's not going to be quick. so the answer to your question is, yes. and there are different audiences tt leaders need to speak to and do eak to.

hopefully trying to make both points simultaneously and i think they're both legitimate points by the way, but there is some inconsistency and ambiguity. >> as youe watching the potential redeployments next july is there a number or a size that will satisfy you as sufficient? what is the metric that senator levin will sa yes, the president has made good on his promise to begin withdrawing? >> what, the number -- what the mantra is, is something that i happen to think is the right one, which is keep that date. don't create an ambiguity for some of the reasons that i gave. but stick to the point that the speed of reductions and the location of reductionsy e way is going to be bed on conditions at the time. those are totally consisnt positions. and th is the position that i take.

in other words, when someone the her day said the taliban is going to be - if they want to hide and wait, that's fine with whoever the speaker was. i think it was the marine commandant but whoever said it because they're going to really be disheartened, the taliban, when they wake up in august of 2011 and see, hey, we're still here in large numbers. that will really dishearten the liban. ...

>> or the locations, i do not have a metric. >> fair enough. you mention in your talk earli that the recent disclosures that only reaffirmed what was reported a year ago, there were deep divisions, not surprising. perhaps will be surprising is the level of viciousness of some of the ialogue. when you look at what counterinsurgency requires, lot of troops, a lot of money. do you think the strategy that emerged after this rather vicious internal fight is going to be successful, or has it been so hobbled by compromise and internal dissent that it can't work? >> i think the strategy resulted amid widely obviously, if you don't accept that, conversation exactly, there was a lively

private and also public debate. and there should b the reason i gave a the end, the troops deserve our best. our best equipment, our best training, our total support. they are getting that, by the way. they are getting that. at least the intent is to give them that. there's no division among the american people, regardless of the division of th policy, there is n divsion of both getting our troops total support. and our veterans by the way,s we saw in the walter reed event, the public reaction to how those veterans were being treated. but the troops als deserve a lively debate and discussion as to what the right policy has. when they see congress debate, or when they read showing a lively debate, i hope their reaction is that these are ople who want to succeed. regardless of what the outcome of the policy is.

whether success lie in this direction or in the direction i outlined. people want us to succeed. think the american people want us to succeed. and the fact there are differences as to how it's healthy, and i believe is someing which is part of our obligation to give our troops the best we've got, both not just equipment, training and so forth, but also in terms of deliberate thinking >> between now and julydate for the redeployment, the administration has promised a review of the strategy. as we talk to senior officials involved they have taken the same, they expect maybe to jiggle the antenna but not to change the channel on he strategy. so they are accepting and oving forward. guess just ask again, is the strategy sound in its fundamentals, given the rather compromised and somewhat hobbled debate that formed it, are you satisfied that we don't need to

reconsider the point strategy? >> i think the strategy is sound but i so think it is useful to challenge that strategy, and those that believe it's ehe not working or thse who believe it wasn't und to begin with, should have that opportunity. to make a very strong challenge. i believe that's healthy. i don't think people and policy positions take it personally. they shouldn't. these are critically important policy decisions. i hope that those wo feel the policy either isn't working or wasn't sound to begin with will have that opportunity. we shouldn't prejudge what the outcome o december is, en though i happen to believe it is the right strategy. and there's some evidence that progress, but it's essential of the importance of keeping that day to help it work. i think we are to welcome people who want to callenge that conclusion. >> i have one question before i opened up to the floor. you mention in your comments that the lessons of iraq,

applying a deadline, was very helpful. and i don't want iraq to be the forgotten war, even today. ere are 50,000 american troops there, and the loss of those. secretary gates recalled the final scene of the movie charlie wilson's war, about afghanistan wher after spending billions of dollars to support anti-soviet forces, we had victory. the soviets left. so did america. no more money, nor my intention. the result was 9/11. do you see the same risk in iraq in future years? congress is already cutting a billion and a half dollars from the state department's request to operate in iraq at exactly the time the mission is going from a military to a civilian leader. what are the risks and dangers? >> i think it's a mistake to reduce the support for the diplomic, economic, soft power, sometimes called -- i happento support reducing the

amnt of money going to the iraq by the way. i think they can affd it. and we should not be putting the requests of $2 billion this year, which is actually more than last year, forthe iraq army. buyou believe we should not reduce the aun of support on the other areas, the nonmilitary areas that are so important log term to our success. and i think to iraq's succes >> thank you very much. i invite members of the audience. audience. please wait for the microphone. identify yourself and your organization. and please keep the question short sweden get to as many as possible. yes, ma'am. >> thank you so much for your remarks. my name is christine. i'm with georgetown university. i the question really looking beyond the date described a pulling out, and that is, as you know the afghan national security for is arenot sustainable, certainly long-term horizon for afghanistan to ever

being able to pay those forces is a long ways away. so given our budgeting process, what guaraee do we he that we built this lrge bnsfthat we be around to pick up those bills that afghanistan can't have. and related to that, it seems that we do need some sort of strategic vehicle with afghanistan. because our interests, al qaeda, are not going diminished even as we returned from this coin commission in our terest in afghanistan. so how do we, thinking about our relationship with afghanistan movingorward after the july 2011 da? >> the second half of your question is that we should be negotiating oer this period of time, a long-term strategic relationship with afghanistan. we are going to be there and should be there for a long time. with military capability by the way. focusing on special forces and a few other parts of it, and this is not a rush to t exits.

it's got to be a clear staement to afghantan about the responsibility, b the alternativ to that isn't a rush to the exits. it's the continuing of the relationship and all of its components. in terms of the cost of maintaining the afghan army the cost of maintaining that army is such a tiny part of the cost of maintaining 100,000 troops in afghanistan, that i think he relative, i won't call it a bargain, that's the wrong wo, the relative value, upporting the afghan army, troopare paid to a $3000 a year. may be one, whatever fraction it cost us to maintain our own troops is very good value. and i think it will b seen by congress agood value over a long period of time. i'm not too concerned actually

about that. when we look at how long we stayed in various parts of the world, including korea, and much greater cost with our own troops. i thinkthe alue of the support fothe afghan security forces wi be seen as something which is clerly worth the support. >> one more here in the front. >> good morning, mr. chairman. i'm u.s.army retired. i want t thank you for your long tradition of support for our men and women in uniform. troops overseas deployed, and also for your leadership on the senate armed services committee. my question, although fferent thing. thank you r your remarks related, given the long history of bipartisanship on the setor armed services committee and in bottom a importance of th authizion ill that's been still imaging in the senate right now,s you all know.

what are your thougs and what you see as prospects of being able tget a bill that is obviously very important t support for our troops this year through the congress? >> i was disappointed that there was an unwillingness on the rt of the republicans to pceed with the bill. and i don't want to say anything which will make it more difficult for us to return to it in our lame-duck session. otherhan to say i was obviously dippointed by it. so i don't want to engag in any rhetoric which will make that cost more difficult. but i thik the prospects are good. it's going to take obviously bipartisan cooperation, which is a tradition on our committee. i think every chairman has worked hard to maintain that tradition, and i surely am.

so in answer to dirtly answer your question, i think with a reasonable chance. i've talked to send or read that we can come back to the bill. and as you know, because of your background, one of the challenges is not just working out differences in the senate on the floor, but in working out differences with the house and simply a challenge of physically putting together what the house diand what the senate hopefully will do in a lame-duck, takes a lot of work and time, i don't know having thousands of pages. buyou've got to go over paragraph by paragraph. and i'd like to find some way that we could get that process going in advance. it's not easy to do obvious he. we haven't acted on the bill. but even if we succeed in the senate, which i hope we will housing the bill, in november.

you still have hat process of conference which is not just a bunch of people getting together working out differences. it's a huge staff project physically, getting thousands of paragraphs that aren't in contest worked out. that's as much of a challenge, frankly, that time problem is tting the bill done. of course, and i wanted to say i made a reference to a report. i think it's going to be coming out on the contracting issue, and that is a bipartisan report. it's important that it be, and it is. so a deadline for troop withdrawal is want to focus the mind of the afghan government, on the budget, and congress. >> i knew it was coming. perfectly fair. >> wait for the mic phone, please. >> frank oliver from cq.

how you doing? you have been a strong proponent from this timeline. have been some difficulties for usaid to keep with the pace of the coin operation. we saw that in can car with the plan, the military decide to go ahead with a serb proposal. is the timeline -- and by the way, security has been a real problem. contract hashes are very high right now. so the question is is this time when having a very negative impact on usaid's ability to do what they need to do in the short timeframe, given the security circumstances? >> the problem with security, that's the fundamental issue. the question is how do you achieve security. so it's going to come right back to the question, how do you best achieve security. our busy, our troops have a role, but they are also targets. they also give the taliban their propaganda. so if getting the afghan forces, particularly the army, increased

in size and capability is the best way to achieve security, then that kind of answers your question. there's an immediate need for security while this process is happening. and by the way, the afghan army is going to begin, is going to begin to secure our convoys. just the way they are securing afghan convoys, particularly our fuel trucks. so if we build up the afghan army and help that process move more quickly, and it's moving at great speed, kind of delay on the officers side of the army, but nonetheless, the more we can speed up process up, the way i analyze i the faster we're going to get the security. and the faster we get the security, the faster we will be able to get to the soft power, the aig and the other kind of

econic development nations which are so important. >> nancy schaefer from the center of strategic and international studies. senator, my experience deadlines in south asia after 30 years of the foreign service, mostly in the area come is quite different. i don't think that either the pakistanis or the afghans react well to deadlines. but we're tuck with that were because they have truly interpreted it the way you said. but my question arises from that, and it's about pakistan. do you believe that pakistan's expectations that we are on the way out and going to be more decidedly on the way out, next july, effectively constrains us to accept pakistan's concept of what afghanistan ought to look like after we're gone?

we've worked for half a century with close relationships through pakistan that are based in part on the verge of judges and their priority, clearly, is to minimize or eliminate indian influenc in afghanistan and are concerned about al qaeda's presence is, at best, a secondary issue, i believe, for pakistan. >> i think there is a reaction in pakistan to that date, which is inaccurate. because i think there was some feeling that that reflects the decision to head for the exits. it doesn't. there's been a big ever since that speech in pakistan to show the afghans -- excuse me, the pistan leaders that it does not reflect the abdonment of e region, or a rush to the exits, since it doesn't.

but that reaction is something which is need to be dealt with, and has ben. with only some success. obviously. recently i met with th afghan, with the pakistan foreign minister, and i think there's a recognition in pakistan, at least among the learship, that, in fact, there a strategic relatiohip which we are trying to build up in the region. there's a staying power in the region. we are not heading for the exits. that a gradual awareness. the sooner they accept it, the better off we willall be. the bigger problem, i think in pakistan, is the public reaction to the drone attacks, whether they are accurate or inacurate. and that is creating, i think, a much greater problem for u than

overcoming the false reacon, the setting of the day to begin reduction of u.s. troops in afghanistan. but the answer to question is yes, it is a challge to overcome that inaccurate reaction to the setting of that date you. >> jiminy. >> have you been, jim? >> good to see you again. >> building on the comment about pakiani'd first like, i spend a lot of time in afghanistan the peace corps. i couldn't agree more than what you said. the drone policies are causing a huge blowback against us. just where did we authorize this? these killings of individuals, and in some else's country which is not part of our regular military mission. i think the cia has got to be brought into the policy debate here about this sort of thing. it's causing a hge reaction

against us. and if we become as i'm sure you do, the hearts and minds of the region are the most important thing. you can't solve things militarily in the long run. it's a case of measurable, we kill mr. x. company unmasurable we will get 14 of the people we weren't even trying to hit. and in that culture you killed my uncle, have to try to kill you. so it's a huge cause. i'm not sure we are measuring, we c't measure the unmeasurable. we know it's real. we are looking at the measure we have, mr. x. thank you. >> the drone attac,they are and obviously at military targets, targets of people who are out to kill us nxt door. i believe are legitimate. attack your enemy, and if they are out, wherever they're hiding come if they're out to kill you, you can go after them unless

there is a very, very strong opposition to it on the part of a country wherethose targets are present it like we went to afghanistan we didn't ask permission of afghanistan to go after al qaeda. they were there. now we are in afghanistan. we arefighting, would you agree with what we're doing or not. we are there. people who are attacking us are coming across the border, many instances, not exclusively, from pakistan. it is legitimate to talk of the people are targeting you. now, the reaction inside pakistan is, first of all, there's a significant improvement in the accuracy. the minister, the foreign minister of pakistan acknowledged this yesterday t me. there are mistakes. there is a huge improvement in

the accuracy and the reduction of mistakes. finally, we pay a price. i have to agree with you. there's a price, so you've got to weigh your price. i've got to today, i've been critical of the pakistan government for publicly going after us when we are accurately hitting omebody, whether it's the economies or whether whoever it is. we are accurate, there is still public criticism, or was until a few months ago. and i have real problems with the pakistan government publicly attacking as wn we accurately hit a target when it is clear that they don't object privately, they don't object. they object when we make mistakes. they do.

we have pakstani to us by mtakes, appently the other day, a as a strng blowbk which is underndle. but ithen a mistke is not made, whentheargetis hi cute, at i've got problems it the pblic attack, whhthe ctes thhuge anosygast us when it is,numr one,on wi atle t acicee of t pisn veme. heasn aintoo t ve me.sna . bde th'vg ansibito te. vi cri o t spsili y, t aleher

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then and the discussions that we held in the early part of the yearhawould continue to hold. it became clear to us over the urse of this summer and particularly in late summer following the submission of megrahi's request for compassionate transfer the scottish authorities were considering that option and that is why we reached out and again reiterated our opposition but also as my colleague has noted also clarified if they were determined to go forward spite our opposition they should at ann embrum -- at a minimu undertake a comprehensive medical exam i believe this committee is asking for and ensure megra stayed within scotland. >> cente if i may to that

department of justice perspective as the invesr has noted through the first half of 2009 the issue was one of prisoner transfer since the agreement had been concluded with the psonetransfer agreement entered into the force and application had been made by libya for the prisoner transfer at the beginning of may. the calls made by the attorneys general holder and by securing clinton were part of the series of communications to the scottish authorities tall levels on this issue. the attorney general's call took place june 26 the following the application for the prisoner transfer. he had a conversation with justice minister mccaskill and the conversation as reflected i justice minister mccaskill's statement at the time of decided prisoner transfer issue was ear as he said the justice

said the attorney general was, quote come at a measure into been given to the united states government that any person convicted would serve his sentence in scotland. many of the american families spoke of the comfort they played on these assurances over the past ten years. but clearer undersnding was reiterated to me by the u.s. of state, hillary clinton. the conversation was then a direct and forceful one in which the attorneys general put forth the position megrahi should not be transferred back in the under circumstances. that time no application had been made by megrahi for compassionate release and the issue came up the decision was that any discussions about tha could be taken -- to place at a later time when scotland considered the issue under its own law. >> one thing i want to discuss further because it brings into question the content of the conversation and where the assurances were made and whether they were provided in a way that

i think was appropriate. there's a letter dated here july 3rd, 20009 georgeletter tod nations secretary general on the initiative before the trial creates a commitment in relation to the place of future and

present of speak 13. u. whether there were any additional commitment given to the united states government in this regard and then the author goes on to analyze what commitments were given to the u.s. government and the author concludes our position which both articulate it was very specifically given. we've concluded during discussions of the united states was prior to following the joint u.s. u.k. letter to the u.n. and the government was committed to ensure the locker be accused were tried before the scottish court in the netherlands and if convicted they would serve sentences in scotland and of course wit the law we wasted by this line in our dealings with the united states acting as intermediate. while at the time we consider the prisoner transfer agreement with libya most likely in our relations with the government today in conjunction with the than the lord advocate was keen to ensure any political assurances given to the u.s. would not bind the hands of

success or government. we could not at the time ruled out the possibility of our relations with libya might want a chance. the u.k. government consequently did not give the u.s. and absolute commient in relation to the future and present of the locker be accused. without the assessment is that consistent with conversations you are aware of that no mmitment was given at the time and this letter goes on to say that finally you undertook to hold any information we passed to you grateful for this assurance. this letter was not intended to be made public but i would like to delve into a little more if you u.k. overnment was not specific in its assurances to us or if they werand went back on their word because this really goes to the heart of the question what happened between the conversations with the us. government and when a decision was mae for the compassionate release based on changes with relationship from libya because it is based on changes with relationship with libya and i want to know if it is economic in nature and based solely on interest of drilling.

>> i will have the investor address the latter part of that question but this is the case in the discussions that took place regarding the the plates of trial and how long the prisoner would serve the united kingdom was unwilling to buy and future governments with regard to possibility there might be a prisoner transfer agreement at the time of course the discussions took place in 1998 there was no prisoner transfer agreement with libya and as a result there is no as we mentioned internationally binding agreement in this regard with regardo the service of the sentence. nonetheless, it is also made clear as we have reiterated where there was a political understanding that megrahi would serve his time in scotland. the entirety of the sentence and again, referring to justice minister mccaskill statement as he points out in that

statement while the u.k. declined to provide a full explanation of discussions it appears to me the american families and government have an expectaon or led to believe there would be no prisoner transfer and the sentence would be served in scotland. some of the last letter i want to cite to inform this discussion is written two weeks later july 17th 2009 from lord [inaudible] to mccaskill, and he does raise the issue that this is going to create issues with regard to the relationship with u.k. will be a relations. is this man and by emphasizing this principal of course for humanitarian reasons but also because of the shadow which may otherwise fall over the u.k. libya relations and especially the interest of the scottish

members and indeed others which is the plebeian economic relationship working group. what does it standfor? the all ec members, for good with it stands for but i think it's an economic group. >> thank you very much for making reference to both of those letters. let first and briefly touch on the july 3rd letter and the caliber of the commitment between the united states and the united kingdomand just o reinforce their was we sought but did not conclude eighth legally binding agreement in 1998. so there was no legal impediment on the basis of a legally concluded agreement between us.

but it was our very clear understanding that we had a political commitment that megrahi's transfer to libya would not happen. we proceeded on the basis of the understanding that while at some point in the future it might be a theoretical possibility in practice it would never happen. and i think that is our understanding. that is what is clear in the 98 document. that is what is made clear in the 09 letter that he made reference from july 3rd, 2009 and also in the argumentation that we made over the course of these many years we pointed of it wasn't simply the commitment that we felt we had a shared understanding that we felt we had, but also the gravity of the crime. whether the commitment were there or not, the judgment about

whether it was right to release him given the circumstances of the crime we argued it was not. secondly, on the letter from, and i also apologize if i mispronounced the name, an invidual, the letter of july 17, 2009, which understanding is from a member of the british parliament who is also the president of the business council that exists between libya and te united kingdom. i have seen that letter. i have also seen mccaskill's response to that letter in which justice minister mccaskill says the decision rests with the scottish authorities and the decision will be made solely on the basis of judicial concerns without economic or political considerations. >> let me go through a around

and pick up where you finished. it is clear however while the statement is made the scottish officials who stated they oppose a broad prisoner transfer agreement that would apply to al-megrahi at the same time made a decision to release amonghe compassionate grounds essentially accomplishing the same goal is that true? they knew that the libyans wanted al-megrahi. they knew about this whole debate upon how the prisoner transfer agreement would be constructed, and they also knew they had the opportunity to release him on a compassionate grounds so there were parallel tracks. >> senator, i would go further and say had al-megrahi been transferred under the terms of the prisoner transfer agreement, . .

compassionate release, he is a free man today. >> in that respect then, i look at the scotland act of 1998, which has been introduced into the record, scott d as a result of that has jurisdiction over the matters of criminal justice. however, the united kingdom retains powers under foreign policy, immigration and national security. despite th little fact both the united kingdom and scotland publicly maintained the decision to release al-megrahi was solely in the hands of the scottish authorities. however, if you look at the scotland at the united kingdom reserve the power as i said of the foreign policy national security and even air travel. so let me refer specifically to part two of the act entitled

specific reservations, section home affairs, subsection b6 entitled immigration and nationality. in it, the scotland act of 1998 notes the united kingdometain the authority over matters dealing with, quote, immigration, including asylum and the status and capacity of persons in the united kingdom who are not british citizens. later in t same section the act refers to reserve united kingdom power over, quote, travel documents. so, given the fact that al-megrahi is not a british citizen, doesn't that mean that even if they decided to release him from a scottish jail on compassionate release the united kingdom retained power over his power from scotland to libya?

>> senator, i am not an expert on the u.s. constitutional law we, and so i believe the only people who could answer that question definitively are u.k. and scottish attorneys. it is my understanding and this has been stated publicly by both scottish and british authorities that the authority for taking the decisionon megrahi's compassionate release rested with the scottish authorities based on the evolution, the devolution of arrangements you've explained. it is also my understanding as you've noted that the united kingdom, the government in london retains responsibility. i can speculate about whether the united kingdom could have closed the border or somehow prevented megrahi's physical return to libya had they chosen to do so at a time, but the

government in london than u.k. government said this is a decision that rests with the scottish authorities. we will respect and observe their decision. >> mr. swartz, did the justice department notice of scotland act of 1998? >> mr. chairman, i, too, but have to say that the complexities of the dilution are ones we are not perhaps expert to comment on, but would note in addition to the investor's pnt of course this prisoner transfer agreement which was the impetus for the first consideration of the transfer was of course negotiated by the united kingdom under its authorities foreign policy authorities and the decision as the investor pointed out, compassionate release was under devolution one for the scottish minister to make and the first instance but again, one that we believed would

involve the release within scotland and therefore not oppose issues regarding transfer >> seems to me that unless somebody reads the act in a different way certainly this was in one respect of foreign policy decision after the compassionate release to allow mueller to physically least, and certainly travel circumstances a reserved to the united kingdom seems to me that could have respect of the scottish government to allow compassionate release, and then ultimately still however retain him by virtue of their powers. i don't think it takes a rocket scientist to figure it out. >> let me ask a final question. as you said that, there was -- you were not able to get a legally binding agreement, but had these political understandings that were about

as significant to our government at the time. why is it we could not conclude, explain for the record why we could not conclude a legally binding agreement, concern about how prosecution would take place and the lack of coming to an understanding? >> mr. chairman, the position taken by the united kingdom was one that the current government couldn't find a future government on these issues and therefore was not prepared to enter into a legally binding under stood agreement as opposed to an understanding megrahi woulserve his sentence. of course of the time the 1998 initiative of the united states and united kingdom was the tenth as the ambassador pointed out to overcome the intransigence with regard to the trials to accused to the pan am 103 bombing and we believe that part of justice and the colleagues athe department of state to secure these circumstances and again as the

ambassador noted we believe the nature and the gravity of the time would add to that political understanding and would lead to the service of the entire sentence in scotland and in accordance with scottish law. >> so in essence it was our desire to seek prosecution that had us makes a determination based upon what the british were lling us tt this was the best way to move forward to seek a prosecution. is that a fair statement? >> yes mr. chen and we believe this was the best most efficacious way of moving forward obtaining the u.n. support for this approach. >> and the final question, mr. ambassador, you know, you both have said it is a very strong and unequivocal position of the united states that al-megrahi should not be released, certainly not allowed to return to libya. yoboth said there is a very clear in the absence of an absolutely lally binding commitment and a very clear political commitment and understanding between our

respective countries and understanding for their strength by the gravity of the crime committed here. so however that understanding did materialize as we thought. what political recourse do we have or what does this teach in terms of a breach of trust for the future? >> senator, as you know, this administration expressed its deep regret an outrage about the decision. following the decision, we called for megrahi to be returned to scotland to serve out his full sentence, and we continue to do that. we have also called on both the u.k. and scottish authorities to make all information available to ensure we have full clarity about the circumstances that led

up to this decision. those are efforts we are committed to continuing as we have been connected committed to ensure justice is brought in this case for over two decades. >> do we believe, does the state department believed that the desire for an independent inquiry conducted by the british government has promised to cameron suggested when he was the opposition leader that something would be desired? >> as you know, president obama said he wants all of the event information brought to light. primm mr. cameron also committed to you and committed to the president and he will undertake additional examination of u.k. government documents to see such an inquiry i justified and should be conducted. we are waiting to hear from the u.k. about the results of that examination.

>> thank you very much. we apprecia it and your time. >> thank you. now let me introduce the second panel of experts who will be a testing medical issues as well as instruction between libya and the united kingdom. i would ask them to step forward as we introduce them. first we have dr. james mueller. correctly associate director and senior vice president for translation of research at croswell center in buffalo new york he is a highly respected oncologist who will provide insight into the diagnosis and treatment options. he's the chair of the national comprehensive cancer network skype wan panel for prostate cancer. the guidelines are the gold standard for prostate cancer, diagnosis and treatment. he's also called and written extensively on the subject and we want tothank him very much for being with us this morning. dr. oliver is the second member of the panel and a respected

authority on issues respecting prostate cancer. he is the professor of cancer research and medical director of the department of medicine and urology at tulane medical university, medical center and the last 20 years his research and political inerests have focused primarily on prostate cancer. he's published extensively on the subject ranging from genetic studies on prostate cancer to the clinical trials of experimental agents the past chairman of the integration panel for the dpartment of defense medical research program in prostate cancer and we thank you for coming today to the committee. our third panelist is jeff porter. dr. porter is a consultant, consult on the middle east and africa and spent a career as an analyst with extensive experience in the international investigative community. he's lived and worked in the middle east and bought africa and was an authority of middle eastern history and libya and holds a b.a. in islamic studies and an m.a. in arabic and ph.d.

in middle eastern studie from new york university. dr. porter, thank you for joining as well. as with previous panel, i would urge you to summarize your statement in about five minutes or so. you're false statements will be included in the record and with that we will start with dr. mohler. >> thank you. i'm honored to come before you today to provide my expert opinion about the compassionate release granted to mr. al-megrahi into those of five. i believe the time of his release he hadn't received proper treatment, nor did he have less than three months to live. in fact i am not tall surprised he appears alive and well today almost 14 months later. i'm qualified to offer these opions because i'm a professor of three institutions, board certified urologist, 23 years of experience and have treated over 2,000 men with prostate cancer.

i published over 200 review articles an a book on prostate cancer. i and chair of the department of urology at roswell which is one of the nation's 40 designated comprehensive cancer centers. particular expertise reflected by my chairmanship of the national comprehensive cancer network that you referred to. what was mr. al-megrahi's status of the time of his release from prison? to understand this, we must review his postate cancer diagnosis and treatment. according to the medical report released by scottish authorities, mr. al-megrahi was diagnosed september, 2008 with prostate cancer that was in terrible because it had spread to his bones. fortunately for him, advanced prostate cancer can be put into remission and almost all men and by starving the cancer of the male hormones it needs to grow

and spread. he responded to hormone treatment is response was short-lived and he had the rapidly growing prostate cancer and has some bone pain in july 2009. up until that point, mr. al-megrahi's treatment was standard of care, but then things bame very confusing. scottish officials released him for compassionate reasons because he was believed to have three months or less to live. in my 23 years of experience, caring for more than 2,000 prostate cancer patients and reading clinical studies that evaluated thousands of patients and similar conditions, there is no conceivable way a cancer specialist or anyone familiar with the treatment of prostate cancer could have given mr. al-megrahi a three month survival prognosis. let me explain why. a patient with prostate cancer with an accurate three month

prognosis would have to be almost bedridden. but dr. free sure's medical reports said mr. al-megrahi's cancer did not restrict or remove his ability to carry out any particular task and he walked down the stairs from the airplane upon his arrival in libya as you saw in the video. a patient with prostate cancer with an aggregate three months prognosis would be given palliative or and of life care focused on pain management and makingthe patient as comfortable as possible. however, scottish officials, doctors and mr. al-megrahi himself reported in july, 200 that i quote, different treatment options had been discussed and a new treatment had been embarked upon. this new treatment m have been a new hormone treatment or chemotherapy. but the effectiveness requires at least six weeks to evaluate an evaluation that would not

have been possible prior to his release. so if mr. al-megrahi had three months to live, why is he alive today? in order to understand why he is alive, we must learn what happens to men like him who receive chemotherapy. and every three week outpatient chemotherapy treatment program was shown to reduce pain and extend survival on to weld on the study is reported on the new england journal of medicine in 2004. in fact, men just like mr. al-megrahi survived an average of 17 to 19.2 months from the start of chemotherapy in those two studies. today and one year ago when mr. al-megrahi was reeased, men had many other options, even if they failed hormone teatment and chemotherapy the prostate cancer can be managed with three

other forms of treatment, another ki of chemotherapy or radiation. finally, he could benefit from any of three classes of drugs which include immunotherapy which has been in the news recently, better drugs that prevent the production of male rmones from a week or loans made from the adrenal glands such as [inaudible] or a small molecule that works better than the drug mr. al-megrahi received. in fact,it was discovered in london and new evidence from the large trial in the united states suggested extends life and men like mr. al-megrahi. so if his cancer didn't respond well to hormone treatment, why is he alive today? mr. al-megrahi's sayliyah meant that his cancer was aggressive. as such is prognosis was worse than others who responded more favorably to the hrmone

treatment. however, his prostate cancer rapid growth actually made the response to chemotherapy all the more likely since chemotherapy works best against rapidly dividing cells. therefore i am not tall surprised he may be alive and even a well more than 14 months after beginning chemotherapy or other treatments such as abiram dimond for his rapidly growing prostate cancer. i also believe in a physician with training and experience in prostate cancer would find a three month prognosis for a patient in mr. al-megrahi's condition difficult to believe and possible even ridiculous. in short, ladies and gentlemen, i am not the least bit surprised that mr. al-megrahi is alive day and it should come as of so we no surprise to the cancer specialists who cared for mr. al-megrahi either. i sincerely thank the committee for the opportunity to provide this statement. >> thank you very much.

dr. sartor? >> thank you, mr. chairman, ladies and gentlemen. thank you mr. chairman, ladies and gentlemen. i'm pleased to offer my opinion with medical prognosis to mr. al-megrahi, and i think we really need to go back to the 2009 and look no further than the report issued by the scottish government. they did bring in some specialists. with the specialists were not able to conclude as he had a prognosis of three months or less and in fact they were not willing say that. and i believe from my many years of political experience and expertise medical science would not pport a prognosis of three months or less. my name is dr. oliver sartor, have a long list of qualifications some of which you have red, medicalirector and the head of the prostate cancer program at tulane university medical center, and i focus on patients with advanced prostate cancer for over 20 years. i treated thousands of patients

and published over 100 articles as well as many book chapters as well. as you are well aware, when he was released for his, quote compassionate reasons and in august of 2009 was stated his lifexpectancy was less than three months to the scene and international television and showed the video today and i will state based on those videos alone i would conclude the prognosis of less than three months was enacted. for patients or going to die in three months particularly bed bound prostate cancer is the disease when it spreads to the bone and causes weight-loss and severe problems and causes pain and this individual was greeted the crowd. i saw the original video just to let you know when i saw it i was a bit befuddled. yes i saw on television, not just the video here. we are thinking why is this man being released? it wasn't clear to me then or

now why he was given a prognosis of three months or less. when we go back to part of the medical report released by the scottish government dr. andrew fraser noted august 10th, 2009, just two days before his release, dr. al-megrahi's condition did not restrict or remove his ability to carry out any particular task. this is very important because we looked at prognosis in part basedn the performance status and given his life restrictions i simply don't understand the three months or less. beyond the images i have alluded to, i also had the chance to review some of h medical data. when he was diagnosed he was treated appropriately and given hormonal therapy and standard erapy. after initially responding to the treatment subsequent began to grow.

that is not unexpected it doesn't cure these type of patient. but at the ime that his hormonal therapy was beginning to fail and he will refer to this, the variety of non-effective therapies approved by the fda and approved in the treatment of the various european countries as well about using chemotherapy for the patience for survival. and if we quote the original data, and i will go back to the fda it was either 18.9 or 19.2 months of expectant survival using chemotherapy for patients such as mr. al-megrahi, and clearly if he was candidate for getting chemotherapy at the time and there were discussions that the was the case we would not even anticipate less than a three month prognosis and that we would have anticipated much more. baseon this iformation, it

becomes difficult for me to understand why he was given that three month or less prognosis. he was considered to be a candidate for chemotherapy and showed the way to the 19 months survival. by the way more studies suggest even longer and why they were saying three months again befuddles me. so, in summarizing i just don't think this was a reasonable prognosis. i think the cancer specialists who evaluated his case actually recognized that because they would not state he had three months or less and his prognosis and furthermore, i take this position independently based on my experience with treating thousands of prostate cancer patient. the fact that he remains alive today is not at all unexpected, and it leaves me quite frankly to be skeptical of the process whereby he was determined to ve this prognosis. thank you. >> thank you, doctor. dr. porter?

>> mr. chairman and distinguished members of the senate foreign relations committee, i would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding libya, its energy sector from its relations with the u.k. and scotland. the release of amegrahi was an importanforeign policy goal for the libyan government, and as pursued for a long time. obviously the issue of his incarceration in scotland colored relations between london and tripoli three negative study north africa and the last six years a specialist focusing on political risk in north africa in the middle east with a focus on libya. more recently i've begun working with investigative firms that deal with fraud and corruption investigations overseas. am i and alice is objective diagnostic, factual based and impartial. thank you. >> it's clear from the outset his release was important and a foreign policy goal for the libyangovernment.

first, the libyan government never recognized the legitimacy of the ruling which led to his incarceration, nor did recognize the ongoing incarceration of al-megrahi. second, the leader colonel muammar qaddafi felt as if he had been duly compensated for his pronunciation of weapons of mass destruction in 2004 and he felt as if perhaps his renunciation of weapons of mass destruction should have wiped he comes from an important guide. one of the ways in which qaddafi retains power in libya is to the manament of politics securing his release was critical for his ability to maintain the tribes support for his leadership and having secured his release guaranteed they would continue to support qaddafi. last, 2009 was the 40th

anniversary of his revolution in libya and his release guaranteed a silvery symbolic event suitable for marketing the location. libya has a history of pressuring the firms to achieve its foreign policy objectis. i will limit myself to a couple examples here for the sake of time. but what i clear is the companies doing business in libya are exposed to the political risk. for example, in 2008, the two employees of the swiss see firm were detained and arrested in retaliation for the rest in geneva of one of qaddafi's sons. he returned to tripoli and this was employees remained in custody in trpoli. in 2009, the canadian firm headed for canada saw its libyan oil production cut in half

following criticism from the canadian prime minister of the celebration that marked his return to tripoli. in 20 representatives of the oil firms doing business were brought in before the government and chastised following comments from the state department criticizing his call against switzerland. so it's clear from these limited examples there are many more doing business in libya is fraught with political risk and libya uses the presence of the firms to achieve its foreign policy objectives. given the government's willingness to squeeze the firms in order to achieve the foreign policy goal and the importance of securing his release, his release from scottish incarceration removed one element of political risk for thfirms doing business in libya. that said, libya is a sovereign state and the u.k. is a sovereign state and each determine its own foreign policy and tries to secure its own

security interest as well as its own economic interest. while u.k. firms may have benefited from al-megrahi's release, there is no evidence that they caused his release to the best of my knowledge. the u.k. companies do not represent the largest block of foreign firms operating in libya. there are also french and italian and german firms that have extensive presence, but u. firms and investnts and libya are high-profile including three large costly oil and gas exploration commitments. it's important to note these investments from the u.k. firms and libyan oil and gas sector predated his release by at least two years. it's likely that al-megrahi's ongoing incarceration in scotland could have jeopardized the u.k. busiesses and tripoli and at the very least his on going incarceration would have posed a threat to their continuing ability to o business. his release reduced that risk, but i have not seen idence that proves that the risk posed

to the u.k. firms caused his release. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for your testimony. we will start a fst round of seven minutes and then have another round of necessary. let me in my first round in going to focus on the two medical experts and come back to you, dr. porter come in the second round. dr. speed -- dr. mohler cony made it clear it isn't medically possible for three months to live prognosis in august of 2009 to be given to mr. al-megrahi; is that fair to say? >> yes. >> you saw the video earlier in the presentation and he alluded to the fact that mr. al-megrahi could walk on the flight of stairs unassisted, does that tell you anything about his medical condition or the accuracy of a free month prognosis? >> i want everyone here to

understand prostate cancer is a very slow growing disease, so we talk in prognosis in terms of often years. it would be very difficult to give a prognosis of three months to a pstate cancer patient who is able to negotiate a flight of stairs not knowing what his laboratory situation is more organs that this was you don't know if there is any threat to his life post except you can presume by is still being alive 14 months later that there was not. the biggest problem here is the scottish authorities in the prisons were still exploring treatment and in fact indicated in the records in july they added a new hormone treatment and in july if they considered chemotherapy and according to george burgess he received his first dose so one would never give a three month prognosis to anne when you were still

trying to act of treatments that are likelto extend survival by 18 months or more. >> as a matter of fact if someone would be considered for chemotherapy treatment or receive it you wouldn't dthat the last three months of their lives. >> of the inception of that treatment. chemotherapy is still rather toxic and to withstand a fourth regiment of toxic year which usually consists of every three weeks treatments for a minimum of six treatments one does have to have what we call performance status and the patient clearly had hat as idenced by his ability to negotiate stairs which is one of the criteria we use but is a good indicator of ability to withstand a regimen of chemotherapy. he clearly was a candidate. >> doctor in a patient with

caer and accurate fremont prognosis with physical condition what we expect that patient to normally be? >> they would usually be unable to walk unassisted. they certainly would not be able to climb stairs and would most often be bedridden. they could be suffering a renal failure from obstruction of the kidneys by the cancer. they definitely would have lost their appetite and would be losing weight and they would look like a prison camp survivor. they would be anemic. they could have liver failure. they would have had to have decided that they would not seek any more active life treatment. they would be someone who is in pain and the physicians would be seeking to he alleviate the pain and would not be exporting any other types of treatment. >> finally based upon your review of the medical records the scottish government released did his physical condition match

someone with an accurate three months prognosis'? >> no, as a matter of fact the final report by andrew frazier that led to his release actually indicates he shouldn't have been released, and i quote, concluding specialists view is that in the absence of a good response to treatment, survival could be in the order of months and no longer many months, so dr. frazier said that without any additional treatment, survival could be months but they were pursuing active treatment, therefore negating the possibility of a three month prognosis. >> thank you. according to the scottish governnt medical report, the cancer and in neurology specialists and consultants did not agree with of the stream of the prognosis on; is that correct?

>> that's correct. >> why do you believe none of the consultants offered to the total 33 month prognosis based on the information you have? >>ertainly first of all they probably have more information than we do today because i have had the full medical records to review including laboratories it coulbe important, but some of he specialists i know are extremely well qualified, typicallin london, and i think that he knew that this was not a patient with a 20 month prognosis and he would not agree, so could we get a panel of experts, not prison doctors but the real experts in the disease, they did not agree with the less than three months prognosis. >> now, it seems based on the medical report and from the discussions my staff has had with the scottish government it appears the three month prognosis came down to a dr. peter que who is a general practitioner and dr. frazier who you referred to is also a general practitioner.

and i have great respect for the general practitioners and we will enter into the record the frazier's medical records without objection and so ordered. in your experience what one wants to rely on a general practitioner to provide a prognosis for a patient with advanced prostate cancer like mr. al-megrahi? >> no, it is a rapidly evolving field. there are new therapies that were eluted to. there is a science behind it. there are ants we can utilize. it's not in the purview of a general practitioner. this is a specialist decision. ..

>> thank you very much mr. chairman. i have a full statement and with permission i would like to-- for this position virologist is there any area in which you disagree? >> i am not aware. >> do you have any way with what you know now and i don't know if you have seen any cent videos of this man, do you have any idea or any thoughts on what his potential lifespan is at this time? >> i don't really have very much information but i understand that he is actually still able to walk and you know the fact

that he isalive today at 13 months after he was given this quote three month prognosis clearly indicates that initial prognosis was wrong but today he might even be living more than three months. it is hard for me to evaluate in all honesty. >> any ideas? >> i would agree with that. i think now that we know that patients getting chemotherapy for symptomatic advanced prostate cancer live beyond the 17 to 19.2 month survival that were used for fda approval of tax it here. probably closer to two years, so if i were going to make a wager, i wouldwager on another year, but i have to remind everyone that contrary to what many believe about physicians we cannot predict the future, and i think here we have a couple of family practitioners who are guilty of predicting the future. >> mr. chairman i just want to concur.

we all have great respect for family physicians. i practiced medicine for 25 years. actually have a letter from tulane accepting me into the urology probe women 1977 so i have great respect for that institution where you train and i looked at it like you did, that there is something wrong with thiwhole thing so i guess the question to mr. porter from a historical sense what really happened here? we are looking at a mission impoible script to say how did we get this guy out of scotland and then back to his home ad let's get them out on the medical and try to fool me folks? what do you think happened here? >> at the risk of speculating i don't have any direct insight into what really to place between the u.k. government, scottish government and the bolivian government but as i said in my opening comments it is clear that securing al-megrahi's release was a top priority for the government in tripoli and it is also clear they were willing to go to great

lengths including potentially strong-arming the u.k. firms in libya in order to secure his release and at appeared to be what transpired. i certainly don't have the expertise my co-panilist have regarding his health or his life expectancy at this point butas you have correctly pointed out, he is alive and well. or, he is alive. i'm not sure how well he is and it appears as if libya has achieved one of its fundamental foreign-policy objectives in this instance. >> mr. chairman i just wanted to commend you for your efforts to continue focusing on this and we wanted to ha hearings during the summer. we were unable to do that and you have additional research done, fols on your team going out to make sure we would get this additional information and i want to thank you for bringing these medical experts and specialists here today. >> thank you senator barrasso. thank you for your insights as well. i have a question i would like to ask dr. porter and i appreciate you being here as well in your own right.

you said that in your testimony i just want to make sure i have the highlights here correct me if a of this is wrong. that mr. al-megrahi was important to qaddafi because of a series of issues. number one, that mr. al-megrahi 's family tribe was politically importantor domestic purposes to qaddafi. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> that would placate hard-liners who might challenge qadhafi. >> that is correct. >> they also believe al-megrahi was innocent? >> yes. >> and he felt he gave up to qaddafi gave up too much in 2003 weapons of mass destruction deal and he wanted something more for what he gave up. is that a fair statement? >> he stated so himself. >> now, when libya gave up its

weapons of mass destruction program to normalize relationships what role did the british government play? >> when libya began to search for ways to return to the international community and come out of international isolation one of the first governments that the libyan government approach to us the u.k. government and i believe that tripoli saw london as a fair and potentially beneficial interlocutor for libya on the international stage. so the initial discussions for libya's national community bean between london and tripoli and then incorporated the broader international community. >> and didn't the british accelerate their normalization with libya at a much faster rate particularly in commercial tribes? >> at what time?

>> when the libyans went to them to say, we want to stop our isolation, we want to be integrated didn't the british at the beginning of that process move for example much quicker than the united states and other governments did? >> while the-- was returning the world was experiencing a spike in oil demand and oil prices and one of the things that libya presents to the global community is abundance, high quality cheap oil and so as the u.k. was beginning to enter into negotiations and discussions with the libyan government many countries, the u.k. included were interested in trying to get into libya in order to secure those l assets. >> dr. porter as the united kingdom was playing an important role in normalizing libyan relations with the west, this also allowed them to establish trade relations with libya quickly and pretty aggressively. it resulted into lucrative deals for oil companies with close ties to the united kingdom, a

513 million-dollar oil and gas exploration deal for shelf and 8,900,000,000-dollar oil and gas deal for bp. both of these deals were announced by the british prime minister in tripoli. besides being quite large deals were they different from other deal struck by western oil companies in libya? >> yes sir. >> how so? >> libya had conducted for open bid rounds foril and gas acreage. normally what happens in an oil company is the acreage they would like to acquire they prepare a bit. those bids are submitted and opened publicly and the awards are allocated and assigned sometimes after the awards have been allocated. neither bp or shell participated in the bids-- neither bp or shell required acreage to bid rounds. instead they acquire their acreage through direct bilateral negotiations with the oil

corporations in the nl see. one of the things that distinguishes the bilateral negotiations from the bid round format is bilateral negotiations result in better terms for the international oil company in this case bp and shell. one of the things that distinguishes bilateral negotiations is the type of projects bp and shell were pursuing were big. they were complex, they were technically difficult. they were very capital intensive. one of the things that allowed bp and shell to pursue these negotiations was that they have the expertise and they also have the capital in order to guarantee or convince the libyan oil corporation that they would be able to manage the projects they had undertaken. it is also worth noting that the only other types of companies that have the capital to be able to pursue these projects are happy expertise to pursue these projects were already in libya. these tend to be referred to as

the super majors. the last two super majors were bp and shell. >> is not also true that their negotiations allowed for greater company share? >> they negotiations allowed for -- the company share of the production of oil that was about four percentage points higher than the arage production and awarded to ioc's that had acreage due to bid for matt. >> okay. >> so you cited a couple of examples. going back to an earlier example, in 1971, libya national bp assets or a foreign-policy dispute. isn't that true? >> that is correct. >> was a dispute involving iran

taking control of several islands as a matter fact. should then bp clearly would have known full well that libya uses its acces its natural resources and oil in the pursuit of foreign-policy. >> that is entirely true. bp as well as any other foreign firm that does business in libya as well aware of the political risks about as you rightly point out vp itself had been the subject of a particular political grievance that the libyans had with the u.k. government in 1971 with the iranian occupation of the islands in the persian gulf. >> so it is fair to say that that'll libyans have the modus operandi of using commecial rewards or recriminations in order to receive their foreign-policy goals? >> yes i don't think that requires any further elaboration. >> given the fact that al-megrahi's release was sch a high priority for libya and on the fact that they libyan government routinely leans on

oil companies to either reward or seek recriminations to achieve s foreign-policy games, would it be surprising if bp did not feel pressured to help libya gained al-megrahi's release? >> i can't comment on that as i don't know what the bp executives were feeling or thinking, but what you can say is i am sure bp was well aware of the risks that al-megrahi's ongoing incarceration in scotland posed to the viability of bps business opportunities. >> it certainlwould have been the pattern release from the libyan government actions up to and cluding that day that they were not reticent to go ahead and use their economic power through their resource to oil to try to make companies make an argument back in their country in support of their ultimate a of you. >> yes.

>> finally, there are commercial connections of significance between the united kingdom and libya that goes beyond energy. do you have any sense of that in your studies about for example the recent ar deals between the united kingdom and libya? e.u. are entirely right that the u.k. commercial interest in tripoli expand well beyond oil and gas including arms deals and infrastructure. i think one illustrative statistic is that the volume or the dollar amount of arms deals between the u.k. an tripoli increased tenfold from 2008 to 2010 so there is clearly a dramatic increase in the dollar amounts of arms that the u.k. sold to tripoli after or in the run-up to and then after

alrahi's release. >> thank you all for your testimony and your insights and from your respective expertise. the committee appreciates it. we are going to leave the record open for 10 days to give members of the committee to submit additional questions and so if you receive any we would ask your cooperation in submitting your answers in in writing as soon as possible and with that we will excuse the three of you. thank you very much. your testimony has been very helpful. let me close in seeing no other members at this time. in summary i think what we have learned in this hearing only raises additional questions. frankly as i said at the outset, i am deeply troubled by the lack of cperation we have received and getting to all of the facts. i am also incredibly troubled that the executives at bp chose not to send a single witness to appear before this committee or answer any of our questions. it seems to me that he would

want to do so in the interest of trsparency, of making your case whatever that case might need and so the absence speaks loudly. but what we have here day is that there were clear anomalies in mr. al-megrahi's care, starting with my staff center views in scotland. we heard a contradiction to the previously released medical reports that al-megrahi did actually receive chemotherapy and today we have for testimony that medical professionals familiar with cancer diagnosis and treatment would not give chemotherapy to a dying man. and even if we settle for the story that the scottish government told in their public document that he did not receive chemotherapy, the medical experts again said that giving the medical record and a video we all saw today of him walking up and down the stairs to cash his victory fly, was not the video of a dying man. given th flawed process used to

certify his release i guess there shouldn't be much surprised that he is still alive today. what is a surprise is that he is free and living in libya. we have learned that the diagnosing physician dr. peter kay a general practitioner and not an oncologist or is the scottish government maintains neither dr. has any specialization in cancer diagnosis or treatment. i ha to say i'm very disappointed that we cannot get the scottish government to answer questions about the issue of chemotherapy or provide any more detailed medical information to clarify a series of discrepancies in their medical release decision. based on what wehave learned today, and in our research leading up to this heang my view is that the scottish government's three-month release process was in this case incredibly flawed if not purposefully manipulated. we have learned as i said in my opening statement at the terms

of the 1998 lockerbie justice raymond have clearly been violated. that agreement specifically states that any prison sentence that were to be served in the united kingdom. it clearly states in my quote, for the purpose of the trial we shall not seek their transfer to any jurisdiction other than the scottish court sitting in the netherlands. if found guilty the two accused will serve their sentence in the united kingdom. the language of the agreement could not be any clearer and i think that the testimony of both the state, department and the department of justice could not be any clearer as ell in terms of what that understanding meant. finally we heard from expert today who testified about commercial concerns that could have influenced scottish and u.k. thinking of mr. al-megrahi's release. the united kingdom had significant commercial interests at stake in their relations with

libya. oil and gas aspiration in particular and libya does not maintain a clear ditinction between the government and the marketplace. we hear that bp was well aware of the political risks of doing business with libya and that the return of mr. al-megrahi was of great importance to the libyan government and was more than willing to use its commercial leverage with the united kingdom to ensure his release. we are the reasons why both scotland and the united kingdom governments could have wanted mr. al-megrahi removed from u.k. soil. we als heard that there are a variety of other commercial motivations and fair-minded of how the libyan government uses commercial interest to penalize a reward countries and nations based on its foreign policy goals. the unanswered questions we are left with are deeply troubling. why was the 1998 lockerbie justice agreement broken? how does the scottish government explained the chemotherapy issue and why was the advice of four of their own cancer specialists

ignored? why was mr. al-megrahi released at all given what we do know and most troubling of all, who if anyone stood to benefit from his release? i am disappointed as i said we have not heard for many officials of bps to their involvement in the case public report. serve ark allen, a former mi-6 british intelligence officer, being hired by bp to make the case to the united kingdom of the importance of the prisoner transfer agreement and we will have heard what else in those conversations took place. in my view, if bp is not willing to cooperate with this committee to get to thebottom of why convicted terrorist was prematurely released in violation of our agreement with the british and scottish governments than perhaps we should make bp paid all claims of two families, fishermen and everyone affected by the gulf

disaster bore any mutual permits are issued to them. it is certainly an option i will be exploring. there is simply too many unanswered questions. i fear we have not heard the truth about mr. al-megrahi's clinical care and we call once again for the full release of his medical file. we also believe that the absence of truth leads to uncertainty and this uncertainty only creates more and more questions in a darker and darker cloud. given what we have for today, given the fact that have come out i would hope the briti government will open their own investigations into what led to the release of a terrorist who killed 270 innocent people. prime minister david cameron said that as the opposition leader before he was prime minister, very clearly something that i fully agree with. he said quote, i don't think we

cannot trust the government to get to the bottom of this so i think the time as come for an independent nquiry led by a former permanent secrary or former judge to find out what more papers need to be released so we can see what the british government was doing in our name. end of quote. i believe he was right then, and i believe it would be right now. so, our efforts here have come not quite to a full close. i can assure the families that we will be issuing a report that will include many of the facts based on our findings and that i hope that that report will put this gross mischaracterizatio of this in perspective for the world to see. i hope it will clearly send a message that we do not expect convicted terrorist to be allowed to be set free because

it undermines our very effort in terms of the national security, our collective fight against local terrorism since all the wrong messages to those who would be terrorist and i think it is incredibly important for us to be able to initialing that report, to hopefully create a greater opportunity for the public pressure to rise to have an independent inquiry by the british government as we asked the prime minister in a meeting with him when he last visited the united states. so that in fact we can get to the truth and get in to the truth will set us free. without seei no other members, this hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

>> today, on washington journal, a preview with adam liptac. live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. today, the first televised debate between ohio senate candidate. running to replace the retiring senator. watch today on c-span.