and lastly, as was suggested by the discovery question to kshemendra's talk, what if information sharing would prejudice judicial proceedings, or what if information proceedings would prejudice ongoing pragues? you may have a -- operations. you may have a good cause to share some of that information with some people, but there are going to be distinct limitations on how broadly it goes, so it seems to me self-evident that there are always going to be legitimate impediments on the sharing of information. if that's the case, that takes me to the second question. how do we best proceed on the implementation of the ise given those constraints and i think it's pretty safe to say the answer isn't to simply flood the system with more information and i think frankly, we've got a little bit of the cart before the horse. i believe that we need to focus first on mission. roles and responsibilities. who does what. should guide who gets what.

in general, i think that means that we need to focus on a more sophisticated definition of what analysis is. it covers a range of responsibilities within the government, not all analysis is the same. for instance, it would seem to me that those who are charged with finding non-obvious relationships between and amongst data sets need the broadest form of access to promote what was discussed earlier, discovery. on the other hand, some analysts are responsible for largely a situation or awareness function. they don't need raw data. what they need is the all sourced finished judgment so they can inform their own risk equation and decide what actions need to be taken. in general, it seems to me if you start delineating between and among the different kinds of analysis, you come up with a reason basis for who should get what information. and in closing, i think what i'll do is take a page from

kshemendra's play book and pose a few additional questions that we all need to address. given the nature of the threat, how do we think about the privacy when the foreign and domestic divide doesn't mean much anymore? extraordinarily difficult question. secondly, what do we mean by domestic intelligence and how do we share it? it's going to be the subject for a major conference tomorrow, as i think you probably know. and thirdly, my own personal bugaboo, how do we go about discovery and funding those non-obvious relationships when you have the sea of data and it seems to me that those are the kinds of questions that are going to bedevil all of us as we go about looking for our shared goal of an improved information sharing environment. thanks very much. :

and under the cities and services, we have a two-folt mission. one is we issue passports domestically. second, and which is an awesome responsibility, is serving americans overseas. that norm -- normally lays the gamut. we never know what is happening

to us overseas frfment a minor mugging that -- from a minor mugging that happens in a city somewhere and they show up at the consulate saying, i am an american. or they are like mumbai two years ago and we come into action. lebanon. action. that's our responsibility. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] from the issue of issuing what we call the travel documents, whether they be passports, we are the first line of defense when it comes to security. if we screw up, we are legally responsible. which to us is really daunting every single day when we are issuing close to two million travel documents a month between the passports and the visas.

every single day of our officers all over the world, 270 locations worldbide, internationally and 30 domestic, that's close to 300 locations worldwide that we serve on a given day. we are a 24/7/365 operation. today, we use biometrics, the multi-modality of it. we cannot issue a single visa today without coming to ise and back. same thing with recognition. we have piloting right now high rates out of baghdad for special immigrant visas. in collaboration talk about information with the department of defense. we cannot do our jobs if it wasn't for information sharing. both ways.

we share information and we need information from other agencies. today, if i talk about our data, so the largest in federal government, our consolidated database today is over 100 terabytes. okay, going out the rate of five to six terabytes a month. to keep ahead of that is also challenging. today, from an informational sharing standpoint, we have 11,000 plus state department users. however, we also have 20,000 non-state department users. mostly dhs. one might say you have users, so what? that we get 120 million hits on the database a month.

having said that, it's an awesome task that we are as good as the information we have in terms of our officers who are due process. go to like shanghai today or mumbai when they are processing 15 and 1600 people a day. interviewing and processing them. it's a very, very challenging and difficult task, and was information sharing is the ultimate way we can do this. we have built our systems today to be able to share the information easily to those 20 plus thousand non-state department users. and the way we have done this is where built a very central system where we can have a book on any person that we know about, whether it's citizen or unknown citizen. what are the difficulties,

right? you talk about privacy information for americans with the passport data. you all know what happened to an half years ago when the presidential candidate, passport information. that's from within. how do we protect that? so there's a legal and policy issue that we face every single day. the other difficulty we face is every time we go and say we need some data to be shared, we are told yet, but you're not law enforcement. technically, that is correct. we are not a law enforcement agency. right? we are trying to now, have the hill designate us as law-enforcement only for data sharing standpoint. we are not going to go armed, officers overseas. it's not going to happen. so these again are the legal and other aspects of that. the other thing we have done is we have built, a sickly so our

architectures is compliant. why? again, to make it easier and follow the omb standards to be able to share data, easier, faster. to protect really our borders. we are the first line of defense. that's all i have. >> thanks, kirit. >> thanks and good morning to everyone. i was intrigued and i will do off course or just a minute by both the questions to kshemendra it also when russert brought up the issues around privacy and civil liberties, because i don't think it gets talked about are focused on enough at times, and having come from the local level for a long, really long career. i think it's important. i served on the national academies panel for about a year and a half, and i would refer you to the book that came out

last year from them on data mining and privacy. i think that was an incredibly powerful piece that secretary perry and the president emeritus of mit, chuck, share. and i think it's very helpful. i came away, by the way, with the conclusion that citizens had really nothing to fear from government, but the private sector with so much more sophisticated, based on your safeway card or your visa transactions, et cetera, about information. the other part that i think that has been lost but is now reemerging is that right after 9/11, everything was fed centric all the time. it was all fed all the time. and i think that there was an incredible amount that i imagine bart could share some of this also, an incredible amount of expertise, experience, knowledge, et cetera, et cetera, at the state and local level. that unfortunately i think was

overlooked. not out of bad reasons, but out of reasons of people just overly pushing the issue of what is this country going to do to protect itself in the future. and i really feel that particularly in the last couple of years that we are looking back at an area of expertise and an area of sophistication at the state and local level that can be actually quite helpful. the other part that has been none of the state and local level with a lot of, i think, success is balancing the privacy and civil liberties area, and the hand shoe agreement in new york, even though changes were made, the intelligence ordinance oversight and audit of the intelligence function of the seattle police department where i served for nine years as chief. we were able to certainly work within those existing laws and still feel comfortable in

gathering information, sharing information, and actually protecting the people of seattle. the other part that a want to stress now, because of the new role that i have that is not so new, about a year have come is that only dcp, we have the high intensity drug trafficking areas. they have been around for a long time. and i truly believe they are an incredible and very successful model for information sharing at the federal, state and local level. information sharing that has gone on for quite a while. that is some of the most sensitive information. truly life-threatening information with ongoing narcotic cases, major cases, conspiracies, et cetera, that if the information was inappropriately released or not properly used it could not just result i would not just result probably in the loss of the

case, or the loss of the loaded, but it could result in the loss of an undercover officer or detective or troopers life. and these have been around sharing in the most sensitive information in a really timely and in a really timely way. the 28 regional are in 50% of all counties of united states. they cover 58% of the united states population. they are in 45 states. puerto rico, u.s. virgin islands and the district of columbia. and have an intelligence and investigative support center so it results not only in information sharing, but also analysis. they have a long history of working with the national guard and others, as you can tell, the focus has been up until the last few years in particular, but the focus has been on drug trafficking organizations. now i would do that particularly

at the state and local level, the issue is about all crimes and at all crimes approach. the other part is, it's not just the issues that are brought forward as far as the cost of the development of the architecture, the computers, the hardware and the software and on and on. i think everyone who manages budget knows where the real money always comes from and always goes to, and that's in your personnel costs. and so when you look at these organizations, after you've purchased this equipment and after you've lease these buildings, et cetera, the real cost is in the body. who's going to staff them, we're going to be the analyst will follow up on the leads, and on and on. oftentimes again that comes from the state and local level. that's why the focus has been on it all crimes approach. the other smart part about i think the changes that have been

made and using hidtas is what i think would be a good helpful information sharing that has occurred for a very long time is that trying to have artificial distinctions between or among transnational organized crime groups, counterterrorism issues and drug trafficking organizations. it becomes very murky, and as you try to put these into silos you find that the site they don't fit into silos very easily. and so looking at the all crimes approach, whether it was cigarette smuggling in charlotte, north carolina, that was funding hamas, weather was a case of health care fraud in st. louis that was funding another or partially funding another terrorist organization, it doesn't make a lot of sense to try to have these things in different venues. it makes an awful lot of sense to consider them in other ways.

i think that working closely with federal agencies and now being a fed for the last year and a half, and having a number of people that have been brought into this administration from, with a lot of experience at the state and local level, has matched very well to help move us forward in a way that makes a lot of sense. not only from the technical difficulty, but also the importance of privacy, the importance of civil liberties, but also the importance of relationships. and it really is, after all is said and done, it really is about relationships and it is about co-location among the questions that was asked kshemendra about culture and trust. and there's nothing that reach the improvement of culture and trust than the collocation of these individuals. so i've been come i couldn't

agree more with also what russ has said in my career to see the amount of information that he shared, but we have to be careful about the information overload issue also. >> thank you, gil. bart? >> good morning, everybody. ozzie, thank you for this opportunity and this conversation that we're having today. you know, couldn't be more relevant and more timely, considering the threat environment that we are living in, the travel advisory that just went out over the weekend. so thank you for that. and not by that, in my position as principal deputy within the office of intelligence analysis, i really believe that we have a true role and responsibility to work with the state and local and tribal components inserted intelligence community to advocate for the information and get that information into the hands of the people that really need it, need it the most. i think it should be pretty clear that we are doing that and very much in partnership with those entities, you know, to

include the fbi, only dcp, dod and nctc and many others. it was interesting to hear kshemendra dr. king strategy. i reminisce as he was talking, and i was in the room when that was released back in october of 2007. and a lot of time and effort and hard work went into that by many of you in this room. and also the criminal intelligence coordinating council that kshemendra spoke about before, that they've been pushing and leading a lot of these initiatives that have led the federal government to rally around the effort. and that's something that we certainly need to continue. in fact the global advisory committee also exchanged well, i see don roy here, and if of the things that are currently underway. so as we build that refresh, i'm sure, i'm confident, given, kshemendra, you've already spoken to the cic see, you write

out that many of the and it's good to see that that integration is continuing. i think it should also be recognizable that the secretary's been very forward leaning as it relates to information sharing. in fact, she spoke about it within one week after taking office. and she's been pushing, very focused every step of the way. she's bringing the department to the next level as it relates to one, dhs, and when you bring the assets of the components together, it is a very formidable whether it's at the nctc or in the field, spoke about that line of defense, they're also the line of defense as trying to identify, interconnected nodes and also try to identify the unknown set may be operating within the country. so we've done a lot, and we need to do much more, and we're so they going to work with all of you to do that. i just really want to touch upon this threat very briefly. i've been with the department

for about 16 months now. it's been extremely busy. i got there on may 16, and this activity started may 18, 2000. had two successful attacks are domestically with us on and carlos bledsoe. we had two near misses, abdulmutallab, the shot, and a number of other incidents that have occurred over the past 16 months which really show and illustrate that we need to operate under the premise that they are here within our borders and they could attack with little or no warning. so really what does that mean? it means that we can't always rely on the fine work of the intelligence community that we really need to focus on the components, fbi and some of the first responder in the form of state, local, tribal deputies, shares, troopers in the field and really give them the information that they need to do their job. and like the director, i spent 32 years in law enforcement, and they are interacting with the public every day, vehicle and

traffic stops. lawful intercept, sources, indicators and worries and have the best opportunity to possibly identify something that could be a mess. so the jt ts do a wonderful job as it relates to investigating something along, but what about the unknowns and who's going to be in the best position to identify, the story, the mixing, traveling traveling, the interaction with others coconspirators to possibly carry out a terrorist attack within the country. so what we're striving to do with our partners is to survey get a better understanding of the threat, the environment, assess it, analyze, and share so they can be better informed to do and protect and support the homeland. so getting back to the national strategy for information sharing, i've read numerous times that i have it all bookmarked and it resonates with me just as it did back in 2007.

but having said that, you know, we have matured, we have grown. there are other things we need to address and look at as we move out. but it is a very strong foundational document, especially as it relates to the homeland security czar make and could come from a number of sources, and it needs to be integrated and analyze, shared with the appropriate individuals that we need to share. so what are we doing about it within the department in partnership with the fbi and the nctc and our other federal counterparts who include the cia -- cicc also. we have established dhs threat task force that brings to bear the assets of the components and all the information sharing they hold to really support the fbi and the ntc t. and the pursuit of these individuals. as it relates to the national network of fusion centers of which there are 72 now, it's involving, maturing. we are so many deploying more personnel to the field. we are providing them

unclassified connectivity, secret connectivity. secret is very important because that allows for the conceptualization of the information that they're looking at in unclassified world and they are trusted individuals with our state and local tribal environment that actually know how to handle the information, how to treat it. another thing we're doing and kshemendra made reference with this is the baseline capabilities in partnership with fbi. we look at the baseline capabilities that came out in the fall 2008, we've already completed a short two years later and overdue, and assessment as to where those gaps are. and identify gaps, filling the gaps and really laying against the ability to receive, analyze, disseminate and the return flow for the suspicious activity reporting. working with the fbi we provided to the field. we have new products, product lines that we're doing a much better job in getting that

information out. the secretary has been very forward looking, without see something, say something. and the need not only to inform our law-enforcement home security partners, but also the public. and once again you have to look at the vendor, on may 1, times square, who actually saw something and said something about a smoking vehicle that could have contributed to the mitigation, the impact, of that attempted attacks. we're working very closely with private sectors. icy linda is here in rome, interacting with private sector, giving them the information. the majority of the private sector out there and had we better share with them, what do we need to deal. so where do we go from here? i think we need to build that trust and collaboration that everybody has spoken about. i believe everybody does want to work together and share the information. but i do still think that we need to better inform and make

the intelligence community aware of the information needs and requirements of the trooper out on patrol, and why something that occurred over in afghanistan or pakistan regarding an ied, how that could help them do their better job at not only a tactical level but also at a strategic level. i believe fully within a fusion centers that national network of fusion centers that is plan a. that's something we've been building. there is no plan b, nor should there be a plan b. because i believe that's a solution given the proper support. and i believe there are people doing it. and they also work very closely, they, the fusion centers, with the joint terrorism task forces in the role to investigate and pursue the individuals operating within the country. so in conclusion, i appreciate the opportunity to be here today. and lott has occurred. we have a lot more to do. and i look forward to all of your questions. thank you very much, ozzie.

>> thank you. well, thank you all for those marks. again, any of you can serve as a keynote of your. i love this panel. i really do. this is an amazing panel here. you know, tweens gil and bar at the end, 70 years long -- law enforcement experts. as a chief of police with a major u.s. city, kshemendra from the state department, state department really was a part of the public dialogue information sharing and tell 12-25. i had no idea the number, amount out of your processing on a daily basis on a monthly basis. of course, russ having showed up at nctc in 2005, your comments are very appropriate and we cannot forget how much partners. i know we were in 2005. i hear we are now, and allow that was because of rust and the team at their and their initiative. we have made progress i think

it's important not to forget how far we have come. so with that act up talk, i would like to turn it over to questions for the audience. who wants to go first? i can't believe they would not be one question. thank you for bailing me out. >> hi. my name is mike german. i'm with the aclu. one of the sort of it seems to be almost accepted, information sharing is a good no matter what, where i think all of us would agree that it's only good if the information is being shared is actually relevant and accurate. and you know what we have seen so often with these information collection and sharing programs is that the information isn't. hidta was the recipient of information from maryland state police spying scandal where 53 political activists with no connection to terrorism were put

into the hidta database and labeled a terrorist. we have a number of fusion center reports that target political groups in the intelligence analysis, and most recently we had a case in pennsylvania were a private company hired by a state homeland security and funded by the homeland security was involved in any appropriate spying on political protest. so my question is, who isn't within this information sharing network that has a responsibility to make sure that the information collected is collected appropriately, that is being analyzed correctly and that is being distributed only to the people who deserve and need to have itcome and have a legitimate right to have it spent starting off with an easy question. bart, you want to go first, and then gil? >> thanks, mike, for that question. first and foremost, you know, i really believe that those are the exceptions, not the rule. having spent 32 years in law

enforcement, you're very much trained about reasonable suspicion, probable cause, that i just can't walk up to an individual and start asking questions. i need to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity could be a foot. if i don't have that level of intervention, i record it, document it, and forward it is where it gets accountable by supervisor and finds its way into the system. so those checks and balances are there. as it relates to who's to lead, i was a dhs has a lead as a result of directive of the white house, but having said that, we are doing it in partnership with the fbi, alastair from odni, and i'm very happy to say that working with riley, that finally all of those activities are being trained, campbell two, documented too, so as it gets into the shared space, that is

more likely to be accurate to prevent what you describe has occurred. and additionally, fusion center policies. we are well on our way, in fact, i think we just cracked a third, so it's greatly accelerated, to have that privacy policies in place to training, candidly, privacy, officers in place. so although there is a risk, and i hope it's a very small risk, we are defaulting on the side, you know, that hey, we have the systems in place and working towards mitigating any activity, innocent, or nefarious which would be accountable as we move forward. >> the question really is, it's a great question, and it's important, couple things that i think are important about hidta, what is there locally control. you look at the most recent gallup poll on who is trusted in the country by the american

public. the united states military, locally owned small business and local law enforcement. the train to our locally managed, locally run. in fact, when i was in seattle i got to assist on that hidta board. and so i don't think there's any better accountability that at that level then perhaps when you're inside the beltway, the accountability issue is a bit more diffuse. the other part is, i think, anyone who's that this length of time in law enforcement knows, and i think we've seen a lot of success, particularly in the last decade on crime in the country, even though a lot of people, the economy isn't doing so well, crime is going to go up. crime, not in every city, not every year, but crime has continued to decrease. i'd love to tell it's because of great police chiefs, but probably a bit self-serving. it's actually because, i think, of the trust of the information

and the work that's been done to gain the trust of the people who give you the information. and who are willing to come forward, people from all walks of life and all languages, all ethnic and racial background. i think it's improved. so damaged that trust is incredibly hurtful in many ways. so i think we have made mistakes. i think we need to be accountable for those mistakes, but i think, i think we've made a lot of improvements. and i welcome the partnership with the aclu in seattle. >> one final point. on the issue of who is responsible, frankly, all of us are. in my case, at nctc i've got responsibly for terrorist identities work, support watchlisting and large-scale data aggregation. alex job is a constant partner with us to ensure that what we're doing is correct, that any of the datasets that we bring in from any department and agency,

we spend extensive amount of time working with the other department and agencies, civil rights, civil liberties, individuals. alex, our attorneys, and so i think it's fair to say that everyone takes exceptionally important we -- importantly. i think we are all on. suspected you want to add anything? >> yet. we take this very juicy. as far as the privacy information is concerned. we deal with lots of information from the americans. 19 million americans own passports today. as i said earlier in my opening remarks, that if you remember two years ago there was the threats from within about the presidential candidates. today we do have a stringent checks and balances in place to

avoid that. need to know, and we track your footprints ever were you have, right to the last keystroke. so if something does go in some it does compromise, there's penalties to be paid. so protecting the privacy, as i say, we have lots of data. and now it's become a bigger issue for us because they know an immigrant or an immigrant coming in, some get naturalize along the way and becomes a u.s. citizen. okay, could very well, the previous visa data was compromised, now he or she is an american. so we take that very seriously. also, the outside users that are non-state department, we control that to the in degree. if things go wrong, just. we have an issue right now that

came up and i'll be very frank about how is the program, employers are supposed to online check against their data. they are going to our data. somebody had somehow gotten into some data that they shouldn't have. but we caught them before it went out, before we were able to have to reinvent -- apprehended and stop them from doing a. so we do take privacy very safety, and we ought to come all this, want to be protected ourselves, right? >> great, thank you for the. the next question all the way in the back. along the wall, please. >> my name is james murray of them president of a software cover. you cdfi, they got into that information. was in the information encrypted? >> right, but it was encrypted. the reason i say this is that,

at going to put our company a little bit here. >> statement, only question. it's a question at the end. what we do is we take, we take encrypted data and this is used for investigation. and we do not need to decrypt the information for investors to find relevant data. it actually matches data shared and data matches information. we've taken is that dhs, and it's a curiosity that you gentlemen don't know about it. i don't understand where the information goes. because if you could use this information every day in your world, i think it would be very useful. again, it's www.software. and let me just say as a question, if you had that kind of tool, and by the way, that took issue a report, and that report picks out the person that actually access the investigation in encrypted format. so a kid you all the information as a manager the point of view, gives you that information.

why wouldn't you want to use that? >> that's the question. i don't think there's a palace after who would not want the data. >> i approach it with the point is coming from. i don't think that they would turn away any useful -- >> but my question is, why don't they know it? someone should be telling these gentlemen about this technology that exists, that they could use. that it would help them i think, right? >> but we do. we placed the private public partnerships. >> how come you're not using my software? >> okay, somebody help me out here and ask a question. in the orange dye, thank you, sir. >> give that guy and extra danish. >> hi, it's can with the "l.a. times." russ, you talk about this yesterday but you mentioned legal impediments information sharing.

is it any thought that some of these laws need to be changed or tweak the way to avoid a provision was placed in the intelligence authorization? is anything that needs to be done in the privacy act that would make your life and your mission easier? >> there are any number of issues to look at, nctc has restrictions now on what size information we can get. and we are approaching our ability to get that kind of information. so as the amphetamines are recognized and there's an established need to have a particular kind of information, then we work it to the system. i would associate myself with whoever asked the question on the first panel kshemendra, has it been in a tizzy accounting of all of the different legal limitations on data, i doubt it. we tend to focus on the dataset that we believe would be a most

assistance to the animals and then we go to the range of legal and policy and technical security and privacy issues that impede our ability to get that day and that we through them. >> if i may, i think i mentioned to you earlier, we are not a designated law enforcement. we have a lot of difficulty as a result because it's a legal impediment to us in terms of that. as i said, we are working with the hill hopefully to change that. >> great. next question. behind the camera their. >> actually, migration policy institute. my question is primarily, i'm wondering about the relationship between information sharing and creating greater efficiencies in the system, specifically when it comes to processing of visas. obviously, we want to create a more efficient system for law enforcement, but what about the

consumer, the services that the government is providing, specifically those who into the u.s. have to go to greater security clearances that may take months, if not longer. and i'm wondering what the potential is for creating an information system, sartre sorry, information sharing system that makes it easier to differentiate between the troublemakers and those who would like to enter the u.s. under more honestly. thank you. >> ask a question. we have embarked on several fronts to address that issue. it's an economic reason. we get beat up by mr. marriott who shows up in his office every two, three months from the hospitality and the tourism industry, okay? it's about studies, that every chinese in the united states spends about 300 plus dollars in duty free shops. okay? and in every $7000 for the

chinese visitor in the united states. okay? brazil right now is soaring, and it's amazing that we were working with disney, also the brazilians were growing middle class wants to visit disney world. what have we done? today, all over these is our applications online. you can apply from anywhere in the world on a web-based system, okay, for a number of reasons now. it easier for the people who apply, but bigger than that, you're right. if i look at china, which is soaring now about 27% increase over last year, our physical facilities, the embassies and consulates have so much capacity, okay? so what are we doing? by going online is not the reduction of the paper, it is automatically prescreening we

can do, so that the officers can faster process those people. that goes back to the same information, same statement i made earlier. we are as good as the frontline of defense of the information we have. to clear those people who are the trusted travelers and don't mean any harm to us, the more information we have, the faster we can online clear them in the system so that our officers or processing 15, 1600 people a day, more information to process them faster and better, and get secure information. so we're doing lots of things right now. we are totally online. i don't know if you we members several years ago, people used to just line up and camp out around our embassy walls, overnight. those days are gone. you sit at your home, own webpage and you make your application. he make an appointment and you show up strictly for your appointment. and we process you.

so we've secured another information that is available, we can process that fast. that's exactly what we're working towards, because there is no way that is going to cut it into the forbid was we got in the, china, brazil and mexico which are so in big time on his. and you're right, the global economy as well. it's not just about people wanting to come here for whatever reasons, but they're coming here in real terms, in terms of the economics as well. >> thank you for the question. >> peter sharf min. as i understood mr. travers was suggesting that if we distinguish among different roles at intelligence analysts may have, some roles call for

more information than other roles for different kinds of information and other roles. this might help solve the problem that there is some information that really shouldn't be made available to everybody, but nevertheless has to get to somebody. i'd really appreciate hearing from bart how he thinks that concept might work in an actual fusion center. >> thanks, peter. you know, come from the state and local background, oftentimes the analysts are overwhelmed with information, information overload. let alone the number of systems out there, whether it's legal, risk and every other thing you need a password for. i agree wholeheartedly with role-based access to informati information. i don't know if we're there yet. i know we're working towards that, but i would say that an analyst would need information,

you know, pass some dhs or fbi or whomever that is relevant to their area of responsibility that will impact on them. so to be able to receive information, look at the information, it really overlaid it against what that information is telling it as relates to a risk associated with a ci kr or potential threat that may be resident within your responsibly. and then really protection allies in it and making sure that it resonates with your community for which you are serving law enforcement private sector or whomever to really see that cycle for suspicious activity so you have a better informed law enforcement officer to respond to that an internet and get it back into the system. i think we have a ways to go, but working with our partners here, many of who are in the room. i think we recognize what the issues are and we really need to focus on it and try to solve that aspect of it. so thanks, peter. >> if i could add a couple of comments. for instance, if before 9/11 the

federal government had issued reports on jihadists interest in new york city, and that could have been put out at a number of local classifications, and if such information had made it to phoenix or minneapolis, then the fbi and local law-enforcement would've had some context for a dot that they uncovered. and the sort of current analog would be things like putting out a report from fbi or dhs, or my own, that there are individuals interested in hydrogen peroxide that men could be used by local law enforcement. and the eyes it is were out there to say hey, we saw something like this. that seems to me to be a far better answer than just letting the system with information. >> suzanne, did you have a question? >> you talk about the diet on the other state and local folks

as tactical collectors and the importance of making sure that analyst at the level get what they need. i'm also concerned about governance at that level. you talk about one of the guys of state and local involvement is that local accountability also, but if you're operating a context in which only a couple of folks come up couple police officers are couple of folks on the shares office have clearances and/or eat at the jt ds or the fusion center, how does that affect the ability of the mayors and chief of police, the sheriff, the city council to conduct that important oversight and ensure accountability at the local level that we are so dependent on? and this is perhaps this notion of role-based access to information which we apply to governors, for example, as opposed to getting clearances to everybody. is that a potential solution? and how does that work out in seattle?

>> i think the thing that was most helpful was that, for instance, the link system as a series of checks and balances as to who can access that system and when it's been access to and actually, there are several disciplinary cases within that seattle region. for inappropriate access for inappropriate use of information. we had lived with an intelligence auditor, an outside independent be appointed individual who would review all of the intelligence gathering within the seattle police department. right after 9/11, we look very carefully at whether we should actually move forward in an attempt to change that. and after some pretty careful analysis, we came to the realization that we could both do our job in protecting the people in seattle and also protect privacy and civil liberties where the law as it existed. this was a law by the way britain, an ordinance written

before the internet, which in seattle was kind of pretty interesting. i think it's kind of a wired area. i think the other part is though that you have to come and i think there's something like well over 300,000 clearances that have now been granted. the federal government has moved much more swiftly to grant clearances to people that needed, because what it was the mayor of seattle or myself, you actually need those clearances, not only for information, but you need it for the city, but you need it so you could install the systems for the checks and balances. and i think it worked pretty well. >> and also as relates to the fusion centers, if you have a look the baseline capabilities, i would encourage you to do that. within the baseline capabilities it speaks to that as it relates to the governance, the process, the memorandums understanding, expectations of the fusion

center from dhs, what am i going to support. what is the fbi going to support and what to expect. and you look also at the 2010 grant guidance where, for the first time, information sharing is being highlighted as a priority, and coupled with that is the mandate that within six months of the execution of that grant award, the fusion center will have to have a privacy policy in place. and if not, you could only use that grant guidance to build a privacy policy there and anything this day forward as relates to mitigating capabilities will be lined up against supporting their gas mitigation sustainment to feel those things like privacy and security and mous and governments to make sure that the governor or the hsa and the cheese and the troopers have a full view of that. so we are here. we've come a long way. we need to get here and we have a path and they plan to do exactly that.

>> the gentleman right here. >> brian with the digital sandbox. there's a lot of experience on the panels i just want to kind of ask you, where do you see all this going? if we took the implementation of information sharing, all the way to its ultimate extension and that means having access to all the information that's available, and i'm just reading the secretary's testimony before congress recent. she was talking about the increase of u.s. citizens who are coming radicalized. and i think it would be so convenient if those were living on a compound in waco, but just recently this guy in ottawa, you know, on canadian idol, with so much a part of the fabric of society, not a part from the fabric of society. how do you see, we're d.c. office going over the next five

years, both a threat and the role of information sharing, the limitation of information sharing? if we had all the information, how are we going to find these guys? >> great question to end on. will take an answer from each of the panelists. bard, we will end with you since it's a homeland issue. ross, we will start with you. you can to either want to answer, too, russ. >> i think we don't know what it's going to end. i'm hoping that started on a far more sophisticated debate about domestic intelligence and privacy and so forth. on issues that are entirely complex. i give all the credit in the issue to the marco foundation who foresaw this six years ago, i think. and try to engineer a debate, didn't get traction.

and to some degree, does okay. people who are radicalized overseas. and the activity was overseas. now, as i mentioned, the foreign domestic divide does not mean very much anymore. and now u.s. citizens, u.s. persons being directly involved, how much of the information do you want people like me, 30 years in intelligence community to have access to. and i don't think there's any, there's not an obvious answer. there does need to be a specific debate in the country that involves the congress, executive branch and body of politics. and i think we're not there yet. >> i would put it two ways. do we have enough information leading to information? it goes both ways. too much information is not going to give you, but in our terms of quality information. so you have to find a balance somewhere. and also protecting the privacy issue.

one of the ways we do that is we go on the red light green light issue. you cannot have access. we're not going to tell you. this is red light or a green light. if you need further information, and i have to go higher up or go to your personnel, however you do that so you avoid that information 50 fatigue, so to speak with the you can say okay, as far as we know it's a green light, not an issue here. or it's a red light, watch out. pass it onto some other authority, if you will. just because of the sheer numbers that we deal with, how do you go about doing that? and also protect privacy and others. so where does this lead to is, you know, sometimes too much information might not be doing you any good. okay? so focusing on the right information and how you go about balancing. >> so here's what i think i would think two things will occur. one is reconciling in my mind from this career in law

enforcement. we have some pretty horrible crimes, an attack on a jewish federation, just awful crimes. a mass murderer of young people after a party. and so oftentimes as a police chief i go to the community meetings. people in this community meetings didn't blame me for the attack on the jewish federation. they didn't blame you for a person taking a weapon and killing a number of people. they wanted to know what we did, how we responded, what we're going to do to move forward and protect the community. and here, on the issue, we seem to have led this cash -- country to believe that we're going to government, is going to prevent all bad things from happening, and it's not going to happen. it didn't happen in the u.k. over 30 years of the terrorist issue. i think that one theme that has been central is that we've all

talked about the complexity of the problem, the difficulty of the problem, and the fact that a bumper sticker like connect the dots doesn't work. connect the dots should probably be passed along with war on drugs, and, frankly, secure the border because i'm not sure exactly what it means and how it works. and i actually truly believe that the american public is ready to understand that you have really smart, dedicated, honest people working very hard every single day, oftentimes many hours, to try to protect them. but, you know, what? it is a big country with a lot of borders, and there are people who want to hurt us. and friendly try as we might, some bad things are going to happen in the future. >> brian, just did a nuts and bolts answer to that one. i've been doing this since september 11 of 2001 as a new york state trooper. and i seen the maturation, the ebbs and flows and supported fully the dhs enterprise and the

people that preceded them. and what has evolved is a much better situation. so to be a new york state trooper, what you need to know is, number one, people who are operating in your responsibresponsibly of area that you need to be concerned about. and support the bureau in those investigations. you need the tools and training and the situational awareness about tactics, techniques and procedures to identify the unknowns that may be operating within your area of responsibility, like shahzad, if he was already protected by the fbi here and then lastly, working with intelligence led policing, you know, community policing. everything that law enforcement has been doing for centuries as it relates to working in a community, knowing the community, in understanding and recognizing a person that may be going down the wrong road and encouraging that person through

civic, church or school or sports or family to get on the proper mode. and that's what the secretary spoke about through homeland violent extremism, by trying to identify the bad guys who are probably already dead, and also countering violent extremism by the good people who may be going down the wrong road and making sure they stay that way. but suffice it to say, the relationship with the nctc and irrelevant the relevant information within the intelligence committee, and how do you should do it all get that information into that young trooper, you know, out on the road, that's the thing that we need to account as. and i think we are well on the road in that construct. so thank you. >> great. let's give this wonderful panel a round of applause. [applause] >> thank you very much. we're going to move to our off the record portion and reconvene at about 11:05. so thank you. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> "washington journal" is next. we'll be live at 1:00 p.m. eastern with margaret ham burg. and our coverage continues live at 7:30 pim eastern with the candidates for the tomas delininkaitis at-large house seat. for the delaware