i came from a very poor family and it was not like i could have gone to college without that. we have increased college tuition in public institutions in state colleges and we have increased the number of student loans. the question inherent in this is whether or not, even if you are taking a reasonable amount of loans, whether college is a good bet. the loan level should be reasonable. $25,000 is about the average amount that students who graduated with have. that is not bad if you're getting a $20,000 increase in your salary. host: our guest has been mark schneider, you can learn more about his study and the cost to taxpayers of college dropouts air.org. thank you for your time this morning.

we enjoyed your calls and enjoy the rest of your saturday and we will see back here tomorrow, every day at 7:00 for "washington journal." our guest tomorrow will be peter baker of ""the new york times." we will look back on what president obama and his aides were thinking about two years ago and we will get a new study on state pension plans and see what kind of conditions the states are in and the cities. eileen norcross of george mason university will handle that. we will look at campaign 2010 and two separate editorial page writers will join us. that is tomorrows "washington journal." we will see you back here tomorrow. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> coming up, a look at the deepwater horizon joint investigation. also, a discussion on terrorism and u.s. foreign policy. after that, the sec chairman talks about high cell phone charges. sunday, the kentucky senate debate between democrat jeff conway and republican rand paul. watch live coverage at 7:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> on sunday, justice stephen brier. >> it is sometimes hard to avoid

your basic values, how you see the country, how you see the relationship between the law and the average person in the country, what you think the law is about. those basic fundamental, legal, and political values, i think are part of view. they will sometimes influence an approach where the question is very open. >> supreme court justice stephen breyer and his new book sunday night on c-span. >> the u.s. coast guard and the bureau of ocean energy management continued their hearings on the gulf of mexico oil spill. in this portion, you will hear testimony from the president of selvage americas. this is two hours and 45 minutes.

>> we're ready for the next i just want to remind you that when called upon to testify under oath, the witnesses subject to federal laws and penalties for making false statements under 18 usc 1001. keeping that in mind would you raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? thank you. >> good morning, mr. martin. thank you for being here. >> good morning. >> where are you currently employed status one more time spent with who are you currently employed? >> i'm with smit salvage america's. what service does smit provide? >> smit is a multi-disciplinary company. it is in the business of marine salvage, fireghting. >> how long have you been with

smit? >> i started in 1997. >> and what position are you serving currently? >> i'm presently the president and general manager of smit salvage america. >> how long have you held that position? >> june of 2008 i was reloaded into that position. >> did you hold any other position with smit before this position? >> yes. i was a salvage master, and i joined in 1997. >> could you briefly describe to us your duties in your current position? >> i'm responsible for the day-to-day operations, in fact,

all attendees for smit salvage americ i also play a role as a senior salvage master in the company as well with regards to its name touring new salvage master's, and our approach towards major marine casualties. >> as president and general manager of smit america, is it unusual for you too, i understand he was involved in the deepwater horizon response. is it unusual for you to have a direct role in terms of the salvage and firefighting effort? >> not at all. i'm very much involved in day-to-day activities, especially with regard to major. >> would you briefly outline your maritime and salvage back on? >> i'm a graduate of the maritime college and graduate in

1983 with a degree, bachelor of enneering degree. i sailed until i joined smit, i presently hold a master unlimited u.s. coast guard license. th was my, my experience as a bluewater, hell prary as chief officer during those working to 15 years at sea. and with smit, my maritime experience has been quite extensive as well. i tried to do a quick estimate of days and summer in the neighborhood of 1500 days with smit, and that's very rough was in command of salvge process. >> yes, sir. which you give us some of the major salvage project you have been involved in? >> i've been involved with most of the big ones that you

probably have heard. let's say, deepwater horizon most recently. i was involved in new carissa, a number of the post hurricane semi submersibles, been involved with the one in the u.k. most of the major brain casualties in the u.s., particularly since 97, i've had some involvement with. >> you consider the deepwater horizon as your biggest case? most challenging. >> very short. >> had you at smit ever perform, train or practice method to being faced with a blowout preventer? do you have any experience with

the blowout preventer? >> we are not will control specialists. >> you consider the b.o.p. intervention, is that a marine firefighting activity, or you have well control activity? >> that's a very key position. the whole process is together. deal p. must be close to be able to start the marine firefighting. that is step one is b.o.p. has got to become have to be secured at this particular case. in my opinion. >> so do you rely as a salvage master and firefighting supervise support, you have to rely on somebody else for the closing of the b.o.p., sir? >> affirmative. >> and who wou that be?

>> that could be a host of other entities. but in this particular case, it wasn't us. >> who was it? >> for closing the deal, as i understood it whn we arrived in transocean, the way was described to me was transocean would take the rig and bp would take the well. and that's the way the division of responsibilities was described to me. >> yes, sir. but the b.o.p. is commonly between the two, right? >> affirmative. >> so how do we know, who do you talk there in terms of the b.o.p. if you want, you know, intervention? transocean or bp? >> well, i can -- i'm not sure that your question reflects the situation this particular case. in that case, there were two incident command centers running simultaneously and their open lines between the two. so there was a lot of dialogue

going on. as i mentioned, the b.o.p. was not within what we were trying to do, other than to initiate that effort. we were very much involved with trying to get that started. but as far as who is going to do it, or how they're going to do that, that was not for, that wasn't, within our scope. >> yes, sir. i just want to understand relationship, how do you interface. so you are called by transocean, but there's some relationship between bp, transocean. so i just want to be clear in my mind what those relationships are. now, i have an e-mail from you to mr. raney lord. i believe he is the company -- easy operations manager. >> yes, sir. i like toprovide is likely to come in this document, as i understand has been provided to all council.

>> council, can -- council, could you state your name for the record? [inaudible] >> thank you. >> could you spell that? [inaudible] >> yes, sir. can you read the e-mail, please? >> okay. it's addressed to a few people. direction for me to transocean rap on site, transocean management. our team be parked with vanguard. result in root. incoming team with vessel standing by bringing them directly offshore. bp interfering, getting rov in the water. working through the issues. >> so, from what i understand, that e-mail, you are interacting with transocean. you're not interacting with the become is that correct? i mean, they give you the order that you have conversation with

transocean, but not with bp? >> that's correct. >> ande'll use that document in a little while. are you fully with the coast guard district one gulf plan, or any contingency plans for the gulf of mexico? >> would you repeat the question of? >> are you familiar with area contingency plans? >> i am not intimately familiar. i know they exist. i don't know the content of the plants in any detailed. >> do you know if salvage and mari firefighting as part of that, at the area continued to play in? >> i'm not that familiar with the area contingency plan. >> has smit ever participate in any planning scenario an exercise with a coast guard unit practice our collective response in offshore well or rig fire? >> offshore rig -- no. >> any exercise to? yeah, certainly for -- for tank vessels and other tranort vessels, but not for, not for a

multi. >> yes, sir. >> so how do you prepare to do with the modu if you never participate in an exercise that involved in a modu? >> the issue with participating in the exercise is an interesting question, but i think that the experience is gained from the salvage is that you're on with the modu's. we haven't quite experienced with arious motives. and that experience -- motives. and that expense, i don't know if the exercise that have gone on where these have been reflected. so the validity of that, i have my, my own question. i don't know how much of those exercises have been undertaken that would reflect that experience. >> y, sir. in terms of relationship, you

salvage, yourhide on a responsible party, and that's who you work for and that's the limit of your involvement with area command, unified area command, is that correct, sir? you end up place with any of the entities in the unified command? >> normally we do. normally we will be part of -- each incident will have its own incident command structure, and that incident command structure will change, depending on the incident. so our client will always be that owner, but sometimes they are inlved and sometimes they are not involved. so we are very much involved with the incident command and the whole structure. so we, we are n outside of any of it any way, shap or form.

we are participating with all of the parties. >> get transocean have a service contract for firefighting and salvage support with smit prior to the incident? >> service contract, no. >> you did not have one? so, so as it a surprise to you when you receive, when smit received a phone call from transocean for service support on that morning? >> yes, but more of the nature of the incident. we, we have done work with all the offshore industry, and quite notable work with high record of success. but whenthe major incident occurs i'm not surprised by that phone call. and two, to contract and to move forward on an emergency is the business that we're in. so there's no, there's no delay. there's no, i don't believe that there's a handicap there we receive those calls.

there's nothing unusual in that. >> yes, sir. but for planning purposes the vessel response plan, my understanding is, it should identify who is sevice out which entity in an event of casualty. so you don't know, have you seen the vessel response plan for the deepwater horizon, sir? >> i have not. >> so you're not aware he was the identifier salvage her for the horizon? >> i am not. >> so you didn't have a service contract with transocean, you receive a call after the incident, for support? >> that's correct. however, we also have contracts in place with transocean from previous activities. so it was not the first time that we had ever met the participants, or had to work within. so it was certainly was a

surprise to have a call about the deepwater horizon on that particular evening. but it was not unexpected that we would be able to pick off where we left, left off with authorities and that organization. we've done significant work within in the the past. >> yes, sir. prior to the casualty were you familiar with the layout, capabilities and operation of the deepwater horizon? >> prior to the casually, no. >> how do you become from it with the layout and operation of the deepwater horizon? >> once we are there, there's an incident command. we ask, we meet with people that are there that know what's going on. we know generically about the types of vessels, and most of the time and falls back upon the experience of persons with, that have been uncertain types of

rigs, ertain stability issues, that you that in the past. and the things to rely on from a wealth of experience. >> yes, sir. the incident occurred around 2200 on april 20. what time did you receive the phone call? >> 0320, give or take a few minutes. >> so about five hours after the explosion and the fire started bere you recve a phone call from transocean, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> so when you say, what time did you arrive at the transocean command center, is that correct, sir, and t receive the focal? >> that's great that the first phone ll i received was, was a heads up. basically, we don't have, don't have direction for you, but about 3:45 more or less, you know, we have this incident and to get started.

and i was embarking at 0450. >> and who called yousir? >> it was robert mcchnie who called me. >> do you know what his position within transocean? >> i'm not sure i would get his title correct, but in principle he's the director of upgrades and major projects. i -- i don't know exactly his title. >> have you dealt with him before, sir? with mr. mckechnie spent i've dealt with the person in his position before, and i have met mr. mckechnie befoe. to the best of my recollection, this is the first tragedy we worked together. his predecessor, i had worked on quite a number of cases. >> but that's the position within transocean that you interfaced with? >> correct.

and those around him were familiar, people as well. but mr. mckechnie had, i think this was the first case we worked together since he had taken the position of. >> and you say you write at transocean command center around 0415 -- >> 450. we were dowsers and we're trying to get into the security guard. i think around 5:00 we were in the incident room, and by 5:15 we are starting to get up to speed with what was going on. >> yes, sir. so what was the, once you arrive at the command center, and once you're in the room, you're talking about, what happened? do you get a brief on what's going on? what happened for you, you know, as far as to get you up to speed? >> well, at that particular time, there was, the situation was not very clear to anyone. especially not to me, what was

going on. i knew that there were significant persons on board the rig, and there was a major casualty. we knew there was a fire. i did not this point that it was a well fire. there was very little information. and when it came into the incident commander, they were very, very concerned with search d rescue. and my feeling was that whatever it was going on, was not going to take resident before the active search and rescue. so we asked and read information. they're working on the search and rescue in incident commander them, and we set up in a room right next door. so we weren't in there with people that were working the incident at the time. >> yes, sir. so you're in a separate room. at what point in order for you to respond, for you to have drawings and and information regarding the vessel status, at

what point did you ask for the information or to transocean provide you with information? and what information was provided to you? >> as a into the incident commander, the number of drawings posted on the bulkhead. as a whiteboard that was full of information. so does a lot of thingsou could pick up just the merely walking through. i spent sometime familiarizing myself with the material that was commonly, sort of jointly available. when w went to the other room we asked for material. when we were called in and requested to respond there, it wasn't clear to anyone what the situation was, or where we were going. the min focus was for what to do wth the rig next. it wasn't to go and deal with the rig at that exact moment. the concern was the rig drifting off and being in the oil field where she can cause damage to other structures. so the first request was to

arrange for, to be able to control the rig. the disussion was never about firefighting, and with all due respect, i don't believe that the issue of this rig is a firefighting issue. it really was much more a well control to be in position to deal with the rig. so the term have a firefighting response, i have my reservations if that's appropriate. >> but firefighting is part of your support to transocean, correct, sir? >> in this particular case, they did not cause andy schleck to go in respond to a fire. they asked us to go take care of the rig and to help save the rig, not to go there because the rig was on fire. the rig, as i understand it, and best to ask those who called, but our discussions was to do with the rig at the next that. we, within hours of being there,

we are talking about shipyard, where were we going to take the rig, how we were going to tell her. specific items towards the next step. we didn't know the extent of the fire, well blowout at that time. once we became aware of it, it was very clear that it was even clear that the well had to be dealt with before anything else cod be done. >> now, parsers objective is to stabilize the vessel, is that correct, sir? stabilize the vessel, whether you, you know, balanced the vessel or firefighting consider an action to stabilize the vessel? >> firefighting to stabilize the vessel? i would say -- >> structural damae, to ensure

stability of the vessel. firefighting, would that be considered one of your action that you need to consider to stabilize the vessel? >> be answered to that is everyone that's involved with the response have got to keep that vessel afloat. and that's the key to success, is to by the time to make sure that the well can be close. so to answer your question, the risk to the rig were twofold. and counterintuitive is to have to attack them. is one, the structural failure due to the heat and engagement by fire. and, two, the soothing effect that brings to the. and so those two have to be balanced very closely. and it has to be balanced by those that are immedialy there. one of the things that i think

can't be oerstated is that in, let's say this battlefield at the moment, the amount of information that's coming back is sketchy, as well as the fact that with search and rescue going on, you don't know that search and rescue isn't being directing that effort to try to preserve life possibly on board. and so, all of these things from afar are something that is reluctant to jump in and start to adjust whenthere are lives at stake. i think that should the first priority. and when there's over 100 people involved from the outset, and a few hours later and they are still missing and an active search and rescue going on, there's a prioritization their needs today, go towards ife, in my opion. >> and i totally agree with you. however, your job is salvaged to provide to transocean.

now, i want to understand what you're saying is that e activities that were going on to protect the vessel, which city to take this vessel to, i think you're much priority on transocean would be stabilize the vessel, you know, firefighting effort would require, stabilize the vessel instd of where to we but where to take the vessel to. >> well, i thinkthe question is low but out of context, with all due respect. and all these things are simultaneously being worked. and what ends up happening is that the report that were coming back and very early stages was the vessel was upright, and so whatever was going on with that, let that continue. there wasn't any report of detrimental. we didn't know was going on. we said what vessel, they didn't know. there waa lot of information. there was not clear. that it did appear that the situation was not deteriorating

in the first hour, so whatever was going on, as soon as we heard reports that that was no longer the case, we inquired about how to proceed. i've lost track of your question so i'm going to stop. [laughter] >> now, by the time you get to transocean command center, it's seven hours after the explosion, the fire started. were you aware of any firefighting efforts which had started? i know the information was sketchy. >> no, no. i understand the question. what i saw, because i did see one picture, this was around 6:00 in the morning. i had asked, when we first got there, what i had asked for, do you have updatesof the situation from the time of the incident? do you have photos? the answer was no.

i asked within the incident command structure, please give information hourly, back to us and let's post it on the walls. because this is very important to see what's happening. this is one of the, as his we got in, what ended up being the case is that there was not a contact point where we can go. transocean, coast guard were in charge. and om my experience the coast guard will take a lead role when search and rescue is ongoing. so as far as firefighting, my experience is that usually not the case. in the beginning you don't know exactly. so in this particular incident, we were looking to get that information. we wanted to surly stabilize, and as soon as there was some discussion, that perhaps there was an issue regarding the stability of the vessel, we then made a recommendation to be careful of down flooding.

and that was rougy at 8:00 in the mornng. and from 6:00 to 8:00 there were a lot of logistics that were just going on. we got both an -- vote on the way. we had people moving. we have backup team under way. we had equipment lowdown from houston. so all between six and a poor many, many steps that have gone on. as we are starting see, summon came in and said that vessel was live. so we try to reach out to the coast guard. and i made a personally to calls because no one could give us contact point. and i called to commander elliott from alveston, just because she's at our local area. and i know him. he had recommended that i call to captain stanton. i called captain stanton, and that's were i was no longer able to reach anybody to make the next link. transocean and said okay, we will continue to reach out to coast guard to see who's

directing and who is out there. at that point, from my recollection, and this may not be exactly correct, but this is the way i think it happened, i believe someone said we have a guy outhere, daun winslow. at which point we said, okay. where is the and i believe at the time we thought he was an, one of theboats. . . there is an e-mail and around that bob sent with my recommendation. that was around 1:00 in the

afternoon. ton john winslow called thback bob mackenzie after the e-mail was sent. that is when we had a chance to discuss it. it was clear it was a concern. >> you say around 8:00 on the 21st, when did you become aware -- can you describe what down flooding means? what is it a question mark what are you concerned about? >> that is when water is applied to a vessel. it ends up inside of the whole -- hull instead of running off the vessel. it can create issues with structure. that would be down flooding. >> if you put water on the column to cool it to get access

to it, that would not cause them flooding. it would have to the water that comes on top of the big going inside the vessel. is that correct? >> yes, but just because water goes on top of the vessel does not mean it is causing down flooding either. okay. >> now by 80800 by the 21st of april you were aware of water, fire water put on the bridge, to the burning rig, is that correct, sir? what -- >> i suspected that was going on. i didn't have firm confirmation that was happening. >> okay. so at what point did you communicate your concern to transocean about downflooding? >> at 8:00, as soon as we realized that was a an issue issue, we discussed it and

we weren't alone t was a number of us in that incident command center which included naval architects from transocean, a host of people working in a team as you would expect to occur. >> so you have, transocean have naval architects employed? >> affirmative. >> okay. are these, have you worked with these naval architects before? >> some of them i have, yes. >> are these design naval architects or naval architect haves experience in salvage operations? >> i don't know the answer to that question you about what i will say from our team, our naval architects were coming in directly behind. so that issue regards to that, as far as i am, in my opinion they were an appropriate and complete first response to be able to art to lay the groundwork. we asked them to start to build some models. we asked them to analyze what was going on as far as

crafts and things like that, so, the end of the story, i don't know what their experience is regarding salvage. >> all right. so you were talking about building a foundation in terms of the models. is that mean that transocean did not have a model for the deepwater horizon that, available before the incident, sir? >> i don't know that that's true. they didn't have a he x-out model which is the mod well we requeed. transocean being reasonably robust organization were able to start that on the sideline. so they had started to a develop a hex out model at our request. >> can you explain what hex out model means? >> i can. apologies for the acronym. >> i know what is mean but i want to be clear for record. >> herbert gearinging corporation damage ability

software is developed for the u.s. navy and now commercially available. >> so smit only work with hex out model, sir. >> negative. we work with all the major models including ghs. ny models. >> so, why do you specifically ask for hexout from transocean? did heavy this any other models available? ? >> the had the short answer is i'm not sure. i do know they had a model for the way that they used rig in day-to-day activities. they had offered it to us and, at that particular moment that one -- i don't know what it was, to tell you the truth. i wasn't familiar with it and it wasn't one that we were able to rapidly bring in. >> okay. so whatever model they have -- what about the naval architects couldn't they use that model and conduct some kind of stability analysis?

did they conduct any stability -- >> i'm going to step out on a, going to mention mething that i think is probably not wha everyone wants to hear. garbage in, garbage out. you have no idea what's on that rig at that point to do a model. and, that's my many comment on that, that nobody can do that analysis. >> i understand that. but the general ship model that is what we're talking about here, we're not talking about the loading condition or the damaged condition on board that vessel at that time. we're talking about just a general ship model, electronic model that can be utilized using any stability analysis software to evaluate condition. was the, was there a model, electronic model of the moud due that was -- modu that was available for analysis. >> i believe so but i'm not positive about that. i'm sure that they did have tron tick -- electronic

model of the rig. >> did they offer that model to you? transocean say, this is what we have? did they offer that to you? >> yes they did. >> and you looked at and you say, it is not, we can not use it or what do you tell them? >> that software wasn't something we could work in. quite frankly before we would get information that was absolutely, that we could have plugged into there, the model would be built. as long as the people that were building the model weren't being detracted from the work that was going on. so there was, if we had information to plug in, transocean could certainly have added information in and helped to develop information from their damage and stability software but, i don't want to talk about what they have because i'm not that familiar with it. i know theyave some. i know it was one that i wasn't familiar with so i don't recall. what the name of it is, i'm sure someone else can fill you in on details of that. >> yes, sir, i understand.

the point i'm trying to nail down here. we have a crisis situation. transocean contact you five hours after the event happen and there is not a model in place for to you use. so they have to build something for you to use? so i'm looking at, you know, we're in an emergency situation re. we need to stablize the vessel, so, the to control the well for whatever reason. we didn't have these things in place before the casualtis? >> i'm going to object. that is not the witness's testimony. he said that there was a model that was available. >> i understand but transocean, but smit did not have awareness that model. that's what he is saying. >> that is inaccurate as well, captain. >> mr. martin, correct my understanding please. >> please ask the question. >> the question is that, transocean has some model that it used for stability analysis. smit has tools that can go in, evaluate, use the model

to run the analysis. that was not there beforehand, is that correct, before the incident? >> before the incident, no, we didn't have that prearranged. >> yes, sir. you say you work with transocean before. was this the same situation in the previous incident, that they provide something to you that you can not use, so they have to generate something that you can use? was that the case? >> i don't tnk that accurately reflects the situation at all. >> okay. but for this incident they have something you can not use so they have to generate something that you can use? >> again, i think we're off base from my perception of it. i, if you ask me a question i will gladly ask it but please be clear. >> you asked for a hexout model. >> that's correct. >> they didn't have it? >> that's correct. >> how do you know if they call you they would require hexout model so they didn't

know that. >> i object to that that calls for speculation. >> just want to remind, one of the positions of the board is to look forward and it could be that we're going to recommend that, for example, these models be made available as a standard matter. maybe there is god reasons they're not. but this witness is dealing with all kinds of vessels in crisis situations. so the captain, the chair is wondering whether or not it's worth while to have an arrangement with companies that you regularly service to have models that you can use when you're calledn an emergency? >> i think that's a different question than what is. my opinion as to setting up models ahead of time or things like that is that it's excellent to have models in place but there are many, many models that we can work from and so, that's one of the things that salvage companies bring

to bear is this. and in the early hours, at 3:00 in the morning, for instance like a shipyard builders model, something as simple as that which, if the ship was built at software we could probably import that and immediately put that to hex yacht. to get those people where the yard is in the morning at 3:00 in the morning or 5:00 in the morning may not be possible and who are those connections. to be able to put thatn a train of being able to get them more rapidly, there may be validity to that. i think the questions you're asking me, i don't have answers other than that. you know, there is something thatould be possibly be done towards expediting at. >> yes, sir. >> at e same time, there was nothing that we would have done with that model at th time that, nothing that could have been done. >> i understand. >> so you know, there was no change in actions. >> now you say the information that, so we don't have a ready model for

you to use. you said the information from the scene coming in was sketchy, is that correct, sir? >> yeah, we had very little information from the scene. >> okay. so during that entire response you had the hexout model you needed and what time would that be, was it that you received the model from transocean? >> we never, we never got to the point where we were in a position to use a hexout model. our naval architects got files from but i don't know when that was. that was with our naval architects and theirs. i'm not sure. >> you don't know whether at some point they have a model that's sitting there waiting for load and condition and damage condition from the scene to come in and so they can run the model? you don't know whether that model was completed before the vessel sank? >> i don't.

>> now, when you arrive on scene, in terms of the loading condition of the vessel, did you have any inrmation on that, how, draft and trim and loading condition of the vessel? do you have any of that information available to you when you come on scene? >> i had some basic information when we arrived as to, as to the draft of the vessel when we got there. >> just the draft? what other information did you receive on scene, information available at the incident command center that you can use to plug in the model? what information was available to you? >> it was draft. i think that -- >> how old was it? >> i don't know. >> i don't think he completed his response, captain? >> what's that? >> i don't think he had completed his response. >> i'm asking, is it draft? >> how hold is that old is

that date at that. >> i don't know. what is told to us the normal condition the rig would be in at tat operational period in their cycle. so i don't think that it was 100% left updates but we would, you know, we knew they would have, you know, a certain percentage of fuel on board. they would keep a certain draft and these were the tanks that normally ballast would be in. that's what we were given when we got there. it was a general overview of how it would normally be. i don't know that the exact situation from the people that were in boats and lifeboats and the rafts had said that to the command center. i'm not sure about that. >> was there like a daily report that is sent from the ship to shore that said, these are our conditions, loading conditions, draft for that day?

>> i'm not, i don't get transocean's daily report. >> no. was such a report provided to you. these are general conditions expected at this particular cycle. >> i didn't get that, no. >> okay. all right. so, besides draft, what do you get from transocean? >> we, really normal drilling draft and typical december eloil on board. -- diesel. general ballast configuration, as far as what would be normal for that time. this was all given verbally i believe. >> verbally? >> yes. there was, in the incident command center was one of the persons that were off rotation from the deepwater

horizon. so they were talking about what would be the normal situatiowhen the incident occurred most likely. so that was, that was the information that i had at that time. >> do you remember who this person was? >> i don't. i had never seen him before or after. he was, it was one of the officers and he was, it was he was off rotation. >> he was off rotation, he was saying based on his knowledge of the status of the vessel in terms of the cycle was in, that these would be the drafts and -- >> i'm not sure. >> but he doesn't know for sure? >> i would say that's, i would, to the best of my knowledge it was not definitive information. >> so it is not definitive mean no value? >> no, that is not it at all. i believe there was good value. and for the broad strokes we were working with at that time, seemed what we needed.

>>o that information, what did you do with that information? >> that information, just goes, there's nothing specific to do with it, to use to compare to observations. that is the main thing you could do at that particular time. later on you could use that to further develop the situation. but at that particular time it was to use to for visual references to the rig. >> what information was coming in from the scene to the command center that relating to what you were doing? >> very, very little and sporadic information. yeah, we didn't have any clear lines of communication until oh, say, the 21st, 22nd, midnight time frame when, when the sea corps

vanguard arrived on site, then every hour we had very accurate information but up until that point it was, we didn't, it was very erratic and inconsistent information that we received up till that time. >> but accurate information, is that with regard to the draft? >> just the, just the condition. when i say accurate, we got regular updates whi appeared to be consistent with, by the reporters, before we wouldet one person calling or, it would be, big changes between the reports we would get from different sources. this was consistent. >> okay. so by that time the information that arrived at the command center, i believe you said midnight of the 21st, 22nd, now that information what do you do with that information? the information that you received from your own

people out on the scene? >> we, what we're looking for, we're looking to see what's going on becae the, what it does it only confirms the necessity to close the well, is what is tellin us, and we're looking to s if it's a deteriorating, steady state or, some reason, if it would be improving, improving would be unlikely. bu certainly we were looking to see that it would be as close to steadystate as possible. f necessary to make some adjustments to what you could control, which was very limited at that time. >> when were you wear of the firefighting effort out on the scene from, from the vessel in the vicinity of the deepwater horizon? when did you become aware of their acvities? >> when, from the beginning we knew that there was

activity going on but i don't believe that we really knew exactly what activity was going on, until around midnight. we knew that there was activity going on. we had offered direction, but in detail, it was sketchy. >> okay. so around, 8:00 on the 21st of april, you communicat your concern of downflooding to transocean. without, a lot of information but is one of those things if you water on top of a vessel, as an expert in this area you would say, hey, this is something you consider about downflooding be careful. is that what you had in mind telling transocean? >> i would clarify that. i don't want to agree with that as it was said although i don't disagree completely. in this particular case

you've got so much fire and heat the necessity to cool was significant. we, at that time, got one of the first reports of list. and it was some erroneously misinformation as it must have been pause it was, i forget wha it was but some very, very exaggerated number and it didn't make any sense what was going on. but then after we tried to get some further detail and it appeared that the vessel was taking on list at this point. so with that, the information we advised them about the risk of downflooding. >> so you couldn't tell whether the listing was caused by damage below or water coming from the top can you at that point? >> perhaps i can go to some of my previous experiences with these, which is what you really need to rely on when you go into a situation

like this. we were, we were contractors for thunderhoe and for thunderhorse you had a situation with a rig that looked similar, excluding the fire where i don't believe that the fire is an issue other than the damage that it's doing but the losing of the rig, it looks similar at this point. and thunderhorse never experienced any catastrophic event or water, external from downflooding. there was no downflooding involved from an external source. that's one. now when you put in explosions in the rig which were heard throughout the whole period and the situation with the opportunities for down plays flooding, not downflooding, migration of ballast.

progressive flooding from damages, all of the things that are possible, those are concerns of mine. there is no way to say but i think that's a very, very high-risk area for starting this evolution and the other one which i think is even as significant is our experience on the development driller 1. on that particular case we had a situation where debris from the rig had fallen and pierd the lower pontoon. and through that single piercing was a progressive flooding situation where that one was also looked a lot like thunderhorse and also looked a lot like deepwater horizon and both of those were successfully intervened by, we were there, that was our contract, by our teams and thunderhorse, i wasn't on site first-hand,

dd-1 i was. so we, my feelings that quite frankly that external sources are far more likely source. but that's my opinion. >> yes, sir. now, transocean didn't have a model for you to use immediately, when you got there. did they provide to you any detailed drawings of the deepwater horizon for you to model the vessel yourself? >> i object to the phrasing of the question. misstates the witness's testimony. >> well the question is the question here which, did they give you any drawings that assisted you? >> excuse me? >> did he they give you, did they give you blueprints or drawings to arrive to assist you in doing your job. >> affirmative. >> did they give you the right drawings to build the hexout model? the right drawings to build

your own hexout model? >> we were given what was asked. the short answer is i'm not 100% sure but they were building that initial model. so we had asked for all the drawings to duplicate that effort. so the drawings that we asked for we received. >> so are the drawings that you needed for your salvage operation, you received from ansocean? >> these are, these are sequential steps. what we needed at the initial stages was general arrangement, basic, basic information and that's what we did receive and that's what we asked for. at this particular part of the operation. >> yes, sir. >> so --. >> understand, you asked for certain things, certain information at acertain stage. did you receive information in a timely manner and the exact information that you asked for? >> all of that was reasonable. i don't rember having a delay for drawings.

i, in gross terms i don't have a recollection of that being an incident. whether they came at the exact time or the ext information i just don't recall. >> did you receive a copy of the vessel response plan from transocean for deepwater horizon? >> i did not. >> do you usually get that information in previous response? >> we, iave never gotten a vessel response plan on any response that we've gotten to and that vessel response plan is not detailed information. it is normally contact information, who to call. so we're already beyond the formation that i've seen in vessel response plans by the time we get there. so my experience is that you get much more detailed information, that you've already passed that stage by the time we show up. that's my experience with that. >> yes, sir. i believe you have a copy of your salvage plan, is that right? can you describe that

document you have in front of you, sir? >> i can. >> [inaudible]. >> this is a a snippet. it is just one page but the, this is where the stage something mentioned. >> [inaudible]. >> so the witness has been provided with the entire document, is that correct? >> it appears to be. >> okay. >> let me check. >> maybe we could state the title of that document for the record. >> yes, sir. the document is titled

preliminary salvage plan, deepwater horizon, mississippi canyon, block 252. >> thank you. >> and the date on that, sir? >> 21st of april, 2010. >> is this, can you describe the contents of this document. iefly. >> yes. it is basically starts off with a very brief narrative and a preamble which states very clearly that this is a plan that is und development and that it's in a very dynamic situation and this is introductory guide document only. that is the very first bold statement. it then goes on to briefly describe the parameters of the deepwater horizon itself, the physica rig. does talk about the present

situation that she's involved in, it talks about that smit is contracted to salvage the rig. okay. then basically it come down to saying that the very first step is to close the, to secure the well. that the primary goal is to control the gas release from the well, by closing the blowout preventer using rods. that is really what it says. says, close the well and ne part of the document to follow. >> did you update this document or is this the only

salvage plan that was provided by smit before the vessel sank? >> this is a that was provided. >> this document here, did you submit this document to anybody? >> to the coast guard. >> to the coast guard? >> yes. i think if you look, it was given to the coast guard and to transocean and the coast guard. this was a request of the coast guard. my comment was we're not up to having a plan other than we're going to take the rig to this location. we're going to come on board with so many people and all the rest which is what it says, but the first step is to close the well. so the plan for closing the well was outside of our, our scope. only to help facilitate, to make sure that that went on as expeditiously as possible. . .

i believe that part of it is necessary to get after it. i'm not comfortable with the play on words, quite frankly. i don't know. it needs to be the well is closed. at that point, our position is that we could then pull the rig further, we could extinguish it further, the fires on the rig, dewater the rig, make it safe for man. we could bring it up to a draft where she could then be repaired in a yard. but those things could only occur once the well is closed. a- the reason i'm, you know, keep going over and over this thing about all the intervention on the b.o.p. is it a

well-controlled activity is that the e-mail that you sent to that you have in front of you, sir, talking about bp, can you read that e-mail again, please? >> certainly. directions from me to transocean on site through transoceaning 34-g9. our teams departed and under way with vanguard. income team with -- [inaudible] bp interfering and getting the rov in the water working through the issues. >> okay. what issues are you talking about? >> okay. that i can address. what had occurred, and this is approximately at 1300-1330 on the 21st, we were discussing many logistical items.

we go back-to-back and forth and i was in the ics and we heard a discussion between bp and transocean regarding the rov launching. it was a surprise to me at that time that the rov wasn't apreifed to be launched, and it was evidently pr my understanding that bp were working on procedures to arthur how to close the bop. furthermore, there was a discussion which i was more comfortable within my o area of expertise regard to the survivability of the rov boat to be able to launch the rov due to the he of the fire, so evidently one of the concerns -- there were two things. one of the procedures of b.o.p. which i'm not familiar with.

i can't comment on that but the second was launching the rov because of the safety of the boat. i spoke to transocean because i had an opinion. i said we can protect that boat with other fire fighting assets. we need the rov in the water quickly to start the process, and that was what i was referring to. >> okay. my understanding is that transocean was controlled from mr. don winslow's testimony and directing the rov activity. is that your same understanding, sir? >> i believe it was don winslow. >> okay. >> he was -- he had some other persons with him, but he was certainly the contact person, and during the

evening, there were ocean people flown out. the way it was always presented to me at transocean when we arrived there was working at handling the rig and the well. i couldn't comment what other information don winslow mayr may not have been getting. >> what was don winslow doing with all of the -- so to shut off the part is that right? >> that was the objective. >> it's a fire fighting network? >> i missed the point on that. it is -- we needed to close the well, and that's -- >> that's what i'm trying to get clear here. was there a bridging document? you may not be able to answer that. bp and transocean may come in and say a bridging document that says in the event of this happening, you know, who has the

lead on the rov intervention on a blowout pventer. i vnt seen -- i haven't seen that yet. don winslow is directing the firefighting effort there. do you kn? >> i have no knowledge about any of those items that you've just referred to. >> okay. do you have any conversation of people from smit conversations? >> no. >> the only one you had discussions with don winslow? >> correct. it was with the transocean team. >> in your previous experiences as a solver, do you interact

with the vessel master because presumably thehave to know the configuration of their vessel and status of their vessel. do you have any interaction with a vessel master in your previous experience? >> very common. >> very common? >> very common to dal with them. >> why is that not the case with the deepwater horizon? >> i don't -- at the time i didn't know if he was one the 11 missing even. i have no knowledge about that. >> okay. you didn't ask where the vessel master is because in previous cases he was calling for you to deal with the vessel master? >> i did not ask. >> okay.

the plan that you have -- so the plan that you have there, this preliminary salvage plan has no firefighting components in it; is that correct? >> that's correct. >> okay. >> we were there to save the rig in its entirety whatever -- >> was any items in this preliminary salvage plan executed? >> item one was to close the b.o.p.es so that part, that answer is no, but we mobilized significant resources, people on site, got backup teams in, we -- so there was a lot of activities

that went on, but as far as what the plan was, step one was never executed. >> did the coast guard approve this document? >> it went to them. it went to them at 2000 and i went back for a few hours at 0400. i don't know. that's when erything deteriorated, so i don't know if the plan was approved or not. i couldn't comment. >> okay. and you could not -- it is to your understanding you could not proceed without a coast guard approved plan? >> i wouldn't agree to that. i don't know what -- >> you can mobilize resources, but in terms of action, don't you have to get your salvage plan approved by the cost guard? >> we were working directly, they were at transocean with us. we were not in a position to implement anything until the

well was closed, so once the well was closed, then we can go further, so we were -- we were in that early stages, so the short answer is we weren't that far along yet. >> but you were not taking any other action until the well is secured. was that the understanding -- was that with the approval with that staff, was that ever approved by the coast guard? >> i mentioned before i don't know if it was approved or not. >> now, in your previous- so do you know who was responsible for the overall coronation of firefighting efforts?

>> [inaudible] . >> could you repeat the question? >> well, was that shifted from somebody? in your previous experience who was in charge of the overall coordination? >> previous experience not the deepwater horizon? >> yes, sir. when there's a fire, who has the overall effort of a coordination? >> the salvage master on site. that's the way you normally -- >> yes. not the vessel master for the overall coordination. >> it depes clearly on the situation. you know, we go to vessels that are abandoned for instance. other times we show up to a vessel alongside the pier, so they are very, very different types of situations. typically the salvage master is in charge of operations,

however, if the captain is there, and he maintains command of his vessel which would be contract chiewlly determined, then it could be the captain. >> so the smit i assume the overall coordination of the firefighting effort? >> for the deepwater horizon? >> yes, sir. >> no. >> do you know mr. winslow assumed the overall coordination firefighting effort from captain kuchta? >> i don't know the answers to your question there. >> but you were aware that mr. winslow was directed firefighting? >> i didn't know that the captain was out there. >> yes, sir. can you repeat --

>> can you reit the question -- can you repeat the question you asked me prior to mr. winslow relieving from the captain? >> yes, sir, in previous experiences, did you ever deal with a vessel? >> certainly. >> who initially has the overall coordination for the firefighting efforts? i was referring to a question in between those two. there was one question in the middle there which i answered too quickly. could someone -- >> can you read that back? i would appreciate it. >> i just would like to get it right and -- [inaudible] >> the one before that.

[inaudible] >> okay, that, we never did. that's fine. the answer's very good. >> yes, sir. thank you. d you have a qualified fire officer? >> i don't know what a qualified fire officer would be. >> okay. >> i, i don't bieve there's a definition to that. >> oka >> that i know of anyway. >> do you have somebody on your team with the same qualifications as a fire marshall? >> we do have professional firefighters on our team. >> what was his qualification?

>> he is an instructor at al fred which is a loyal fire training facility. >> does he have any marine firefighting experience? >> we bring moo rein firefighting to the tail. these are together efforts and that's why i preambled in saying it's a complicated area that we're getting into here. my own view is that the task of the capturing what you're trying to capture is very, very difficul the salvage master goes with a host of experience including salvage firefighting, stability issues that all of these things that he needs in his team, people advising him about the details of the fire, and that person has to be an advis, and so that's the way that i think

an effective firefighting response is brought to bear. >> you say yourself that you not a marine firefighter; is that correct, sir? are you a marine firefighter? >> can you define that? in my experience -- >> are you qualified to lead a marine firefighting effort? >> i think i am, yes. at the same time, i say that with the support of a proper team, and that this is key to what needs to be addressed. i certainly have been involved in command of numerous firefighting exercises with a professional team under my command. >> yes, sir. >> there's a lot to the questions here without getting into it, but i'll leave it at

that. >> well, you know, i mean, we have a catastrophic casualty here, and we try to, you know, not only determine the cause, but try to find information that prevents this from happening in the future, and, you know, your answer is a very complicated situation, and some of the testimony that we have received from you so far paints a picre of things # -- things are not what i would -- what the average person like me would expect that very complex operation. we have plans in place. we things that clearly define in terms of relationship, in terms of how to execute, what we're going to have when something happen, and i'm just seeing gaps. that's what i'm asking about as fire officer. i'm, you know, if it's not clear to you in defining what that

qualification is in your opinion is a team thing and a team of qualified officers. that's two totally different understandings, and we don't want it to come to just like all the intervention onhe b.o.p. thate have a discussion whether it's a firefighting activity or a well control activity. we want everything clearly identified and laid out before something like this happen, and i just, you know, this is the area we try to go into and it's a complicated issue that doesn't make me feel comfortable we're ready for the next one. that's what i'm saying. >> captain, i object. >> i understand. >> the principle you left out in the first part is the monitoring and resisting, and that's where the filling in should have been, so you haven't given the witness that bit of information. >> okay, we can continue with the questions. we did just have a coast guard

witness teching as -- testifying as to what they were doing and not doing out there. >> are you aware of any structural failures during the casualties? >> repeat the question, please. >> are you aware of any holes or structural failures with any report of structure failure on the deepwater horizon? >> yes, there were. >> what were they? >> from the pictures and descriptions were in the text box around the stern, i belie, if you look at the exhaust manifold there was a line that ows significant deterioration and failure at that point. they also had a number of fires in the water coming down from the stern where that may have been generating from off the

stern of the vessels may have been through structural failures as well which is speculative, but there's indicators there that there's something wrong and the rig was no longer straight. this was one of the issues which i believe was the case when you would try to check visual references against the draft. they were all not correct. this is one of the reasons why it's talked about in consistent information. someone would say there's a bumper or something here and you try to plot it out and say they're looking at a list. it just didn't match. i believe there was definition of the rig. >> do you know if either pontoons were damaged? >> i don't know. >> do you know if any the columns were damaged? >> i don't know. >> do you know if water provided to the main deck entered the hole? >> i don't know.

>> do you know if theeck drain system drains into the hole? >> i was told that that was the case. i don't know that definitively. >> if so, what would the drain system would drain into the hole? >> i understood it was a 0 discharge pollution measure that rain water closes the side,ut again, that's what i was ld. >> do you know, were you told whether if the deck drain system was open? >> no, i wasn't told. >> did it collapse? >> we were told it collapsed and laid over to the side which adds to the concern about the list, the potential for four items to go through the pontoon and the

whole sequen of events that it is one indicator and itas reported. >> do you know exactly what time the deepwater horizon began to list? >> i don't. >> okay. do you know whether it ever leveled off at the water surface? >> i don't know that. >> if it did level off at the water surface, what would cause the leveling of? >> can you -- >> i have answers for you, but please tell me where you think this may have occurred and i can -- >> this is just general information here base the on what you experienced. the motor was lifting over if it was coming back up and leveling off, what would cause that to happen? >> i will speak as general information. >> yes, sir.

>> because i can't comment about the deepwater horizon. this is one of the reasons why personally 100% i believe that -- i don't believe that down flooding was the contributing factor. if you look at all the things we've all looked at, come nine o'clock when that rig was sitting in this position for a long time, and she started to go, we heard a large explosion, and then by 10:20 she was gone. it was a matter of continuing do flooding. you'll find that you'll have a large reaction thoroughly because you're in the water plain of the columns. as your water plains start to increase, you expect the deterioration of the sichtion to slow down. that wasn't the case. in fact if your deck box is going in, you may find you're

leveling out because you're increasing the water plane. that didn't happen based on my knowledge, so it's, you know, we're in a situation that i'm uncomfortable to speculate, but at the same time, outside of the details of what went on in a situation like that if you submerge a hole, that's what you would expect. >> yes, sir. now, do you know whether deepwater horizon capsized? >> i don't. >> it's listed and then it's -- >> if i understand the question, i understand subsequently that it's on the bottom upside down, but i don't know that through anything during the period of this that we're talking about now. >> yes, sir. >> subsequently, and i don't know that 100% either, but that what i believe to be the case. >> yes, sir. how long did smit stay on

location? >> we left fairly quickly. we felt that our part was finished, and we were then asked to remain on site for a little longer, and we did, but quite frankly, our role ended, and we were all disappointed. we were all asked to stay, and many of us looking back forget that there was about a 24 hour period when there was no oil spill that was associated with the sinking, so we had stayed there for a little while, and everything was appearing okay, and then we left. it wasn't, that one day gap in between is we forget that now. >> were you as part of your contract, were you required to submit, i goes, an --

i guess, an action report to transocean? >> an action report? we supplied day distracted -- daily reports. >> yes, sir. at the end of your involvement, were you required to document everything that you were involved in and any lessons learned? >> we were not. >> okay. how about internal smit process? do you have a hot wash of your particular operation to see if any lessons learned for the future? is that something of practice for smit? >> we have a round table discussion about that. it's not our practice to document for future remp -- reference or anything? >> i think -- we did not in this case have a document for lessons learned.

we did have a discussion about it amongst quite number of us. >> how do you decide whether to document a response or not in terms of lessons learned? do you just -- when you -- after you have an informal discussion, is it your practice that if it needs to be documented it does or you don't? how does that work? >> we roll through a critique, but they don't necessarily occur immediately thereafter. as this process is still going on, our critique will be finish ed in due course. it's -- at the moment it's only a discussion. it was a very short period of time that this was involved with and as we have mentioned, it was really the well had to be secured, so from our

perspecte, we had to not make -- from our perspective, we had an excellent response, and we were very happy withthe way we responded to the incident. we couldn't control the well, and that was unfortunate, but our view of it is we took very, very positive steps. yes,>> yes, sir. in enhancing the safety of oil production, do you have any recommendation for the board? i know i asked questions about prepared pes and ready availability of plans and contract in place that we can execute clear, you know, bridging documents between the lease operators and vees m operates and how to deal with the intervention with the b.o.p. and these questions i have been asking you. what i'm trying to get to is the

preparedness for response. do you have any recommendation in that regard, sir? >> probably nothing that fits within a reasonable timeframe with the short precise answer, so i think that my comment would just be that i'm not a proponent of a lot of regulations. iike clear, direct, concise regulations. that's my comment. >> yes, sir. thank, mr. martin, i don't have any further questions at this time. >> thank you, captain. >> i have a few questions. earlier in your testimony you mentioned about a salvage of the dd1. do you recall that? were you involved -- >> yes. >> when and where was that? >> it was one the post hurricane, i think it was hurricane rita.

>> i want to move on to now when you arrived at transocean's office in houston. i believe you said you tried to contact a commander, elliot at eight o'clock and the commander stanton shortly thereafter, and you were not able to make the next link. were you able to get in any contact with the mr. stanton? >> i spoke with the man earl at about nine o'clock i believe i spoke with him. it was eight o'clock we were dealing with the down flooding, but i did not reach commander stanton, i spoke to a secretary or a woman -- i did speak to a live body who said he was out of the office. >> did anyone after that message you left with secretary from the united states coast guard contactou or smit? >> no, but we were in direct contact with coast guard representatives at transocean, so coast guard had sent staff

person to traocean, so there was a direct communication with coast guard. >> and when did they arrive? >> i don't recall, in the morning of the 21st. >> do you know if they had an actual incident command structure in place at transocean? >> i'm not sure -- >> i'd like to just to make the question clear and give you this document right here. >> that would be helpful. >> i'll give you the base number. it's bp-hcn-001364. it's pulled from the vessel response plan pretty much a section going over the shore base responsive activities and in regard to any incident. there's two volumes in transocean emergency response. responsible for those in the

rig, and the other part is for those offshore. this is a -- this is a unified command structure that was approved in their plan, and i believe earlier in questions you were asked about who was in role and responsility for coordination. you said the salvage master on site was coordinating the event, is that correct, sir? >> not exactly. there's -- the question was on a situation of a fire excluding the deepwater horizon, who would be in charge, and that answer was a salvage master. with regard to your question which is, i think, now a few questions. >> uh-huh. >> first i'd like to comment about thisganagram.

without being involved with the aspects, there was a incident command in place at the office where i was. it's the exact structure i couldn't comment on, but they were workingogether in an incident-command style. >> who did smit report to in the structure you participated in? >> directly to bob mckechnie, which would be, i assume that would be operations and some planning. >> okay. my question is you said the coast guard; is that correct? >> it was a coast guard officer. >> okay. at the very top of that chart there's a title called ic state osc. to your recollection is there any person in charge of the federal or state levelith the unified command sructure at transocean's office? >> what i --

>> i think that to answerour question, i don't know. >> okay. >> there was a complicated incident command strucre in place because bp we running with an i.t. structure parallel and they werelinged by an -- they were linked by an open phone line through the two, so i don't know that -- i don't know how the two -- i don't know. >> and that's my follow-up question. we know there was an incident command at bp, were you involved at any time with the merger of the incident command between transocean and bp? >> i was aware of it. i certainly overheard discussions between the two. the room was open, and i was there, but i don't know that the answer -- that's my answer. it did exist. >> okay. once they did merge, who then was either the federal or state

ofc? >> i don't know. >> okay. do you know who the operatn section person would have been identified as either between bp ortransocean that you direct lid reported to once they merged? >> there -- there was -- there was a guy in the incident command center. i don't remember his name who sat there, who ran the ope line communations back and forth. i'm not familiar enough with this structure as the people were to comment in detail about it. there was a nation that ran through these and this may or may not be the case, but there's a preamble that this is representative as how a response will go. these are most effective by being adjusted to the case, so i'm very, very reluctant to take the one page out of context and even make an opinion of it

because that's not normally the way they work from my experience. >> yows absolutely correct. -- you are absolutely correct because they are broken into sections and going into general. that's just a snapshot of the actual plan approved and in place at transocean. >> my comment would be i saw an incident command structure in place, but i don't know how it was adjusted to that situation because i didn't know what the original was, but ty were operating under a modified, and maybe even exactly this, but i don't know the answer. there was a structure. >> just to get my understanding of how smi operates, i believe you testified to the fact when there's a discussion going on about hot stabbing with the rov and the limits the rov had due to heat, you believed you could protect with other bolts. what other boats would you use? >> we were only making

recommendations. we didn't have boats. i didn't know what boats were out there, but at this point i knew thereas boats putting water, not excess, just water, but there was excessater capacity. that could have been redirected. i didn't know the details of that. >> thank you, i have no further questions. >> thank you. >> i have one further question. you said bp was interfering. could you define interfering? were tey telling you to stop or threatening you? that's pretty vague comment. >> certainly. the message was internal message amongst our own which is just, you know, obviously, here. i don't have a problem describing it, but what i was referring to was that they -- what i had heard was a discussion regarding

calculations for the heat on to the boat that was to launch the rov, and whether or not it would be safe to launch the rov due to the sustainable heat load that would be on the boat during this period. this was one the issues that appeared to me, and that was delaying or slowing down the process. it was a procedure that was in place, and i felt the rov needed to get in the water quickly as possible, and the reason that they -- the reason i had an opinion about that is because they are very -- i commented earlier about the models which i am a strong supporter of engineering along these lines not to go off track of that, but you have to have real data to base engineering on that. that's why in lack of that, it's important to have experience until you bring the two together that they come.

in this instance, wn they wanted to calculate the heat load onhe boat, said how do you know how hot that fire is? i have a very hard time believing data was available at that moment in time to do that calculation, and that's why i suggested keeping the boat cold in using common sense tools, get the rov in the water. >> so, so they were asking you to come up wth some analytical tool or something to calculate that? >> no. it wasn't us they were asking. it was apparent bp was doing those calculations, and the incident command center we were at, and when it was somedaying -- delaying, it was part of the process to get approval, and i felt at that time that part of the process coul be expedited because it was a matter of an emergency by getting that rov in

the water by not calculating that. to me it didn't make sense, and now it was the interference i was referring to. >> what approval were you looking for? approval from the bp to launch or the coast guard or what? >> from my understanding, and again this wasn't where, i was there, we were discussing, and at that point i -- the way it was described was it was bp weren't permitting the unch of the rov at that time. they were still waiting for the process of approval. >> but, and i think i've asked you this once, but i'll repeat. they were waiting approval from whom? bp? >> it wasn't to us. it was to the rov boat. >> oh,kay. >> it was an open li. >> bp wasn't giving approval to the rov boat to launch because

they hadn't made calculations yet? >> not that they weren't going to. they hadn't done it. why haven't we got approval to launch the boat? there were calculations going on and procedures being developed and reviewed and gone through a committee, and then being looked at and to go out to the boat, so i'm a practical person. when we spoke to the men on the rov boat saying do you kw what to do? they said we know exactly what to do. i felt we needed to streamline this process. that's what i was saying. streamline. wasn't given directions on how, just working through the issues to get the rov in the water because that was the only key to success from my viewpoint. >> # and the rov boat was working for you? >> negative. it was not working for us. this is why i was only at that

point giveing my opinion. >> so it was probably working for bp? is that what you're saying? >> i believe that's why they had the ability to tell the boat to launch or not. that's an assumption. >> okay. thank you. >> sir, my understanding from your testimony is it the first step to the firefighting was to secure the fuel sources? >> that's correct. >> who is spoom for securing -- who is responsible for that in your understanding? >> my understanding as it was described to me when i arrived is bp would take care of the well, transocean the rig, and it's my understanding that the sub component there. >> it was to secure the well, and that was the responsibility of bp; is that correct? >> i don't know that i'm the one to comment on that. that would -- i don't know who -- this is what i was told whh

was not -- it was just told to me that this is the way it's dived. bp the well, we take care of the rig. i can only interpret it like you. >> as your response in the salvage, you had to secure the fuel flow? >> this washy i was adamant to be involved with getting the rov to launch. it couldn't eer be successful at least the rov had to get in the water. >> right. once we secure the fuel flow, then we direct the firefighting efforts on the rig itsel is that right? >> at that point, the fire is going to be disappearing by itself. the fuel source will be done. you actually have time on your side. you now nee to regain buoyancy. you just need to get on board and begin to gain free board. this whole --

there wasn't -- there was nothing left on the rig to burn after you saw that immense fire. once you shut the fuel off, there would be maybe some cooling, probably you needed protective commitment because it's -- equipment because it's low oxygen areas, but the firefighting aspect of this is really a minor component of something that looks huge. i know that's -- anyway. >> from your perspective when you arrived at the incident command st, who was directing the firefighting effort on scene? was it -- do you know who was directing the firefighting? >> my feeling -- i don't know. >> who did who communicate was directing the firefighting efforts on scene? >> this is hours after we arrived. the first question was when we arrived. later we had --

don winslow was identified as being a guy that could be reached to, so as a person in a grave or unfortunate spot, depending how you look at it, he was the guy who could be reached out to andontacted, and that's why he was. it was a matter of what he could make, and-available. >> was it your perspective he was the one directing on scene? >> we asked don winslow to put the word out to the boats there, so at that point we were hoping he would. >> okay. the role the smit -- smit was not responsible for the firefighting effort or the raw closure effort; is that correct? >> we would have been responsible for all of the activities once the well was closed. >> okay. so because w never got the well to that stage before the vessel sank, smit's responsibilities really didn't come intolay in

the salvage; is that correct? >> we certainly were -- >> you're assisting -- >> we were -- i mean, when you have an incident like that, you are there, and you are a large participant in it, but we did no have control of the first step which was to close the b.o.p. or secure the well. >> and you also said you didn't, you were not the ones directing the firefighting efforts either; correct? >> we -- there's only one response in my opinion, and so the one response is to the deal. we were -- we were advising to avoid down flooding. when our boat was there and we had people on site, we also made sure that they minimized the risk of down flooding, cooling

as much as possible, and that was the role that we played at that time. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. >> mr. martin, i want to go back to your e-mail with respect to the rov in the water. was this the first attempt to get an rov in the water for the well control intervention? >> it was. it was. >> okay. you're not aware of any other rov activity prior to this one that occurred sometime after 3:10 tm on the -- 3:01 on the 21st? >> my knowledge is it launched around 1600 and could have been as late as 1800. at 1800 the rov was at the

b.o.p. stack. i think there are plenty of laws around, but from my recollection that's approximately the timeframe. it wasn't eight o'clock in the morn or noon. >> and you felt one way to mitiga the issue with the heat calculations is put a fire water monitor on that vessel to cool that vessel? >> i think it had to be monitored as that was occurring. for instance, -- >> i'm talking about the rov vessels. >> i understand. >> okay. >> what we often do when working with unknowns is you work slowly. you bring your bring your boat in slowly towards and cooling it and lo at your paint, the steaming, look if you can touch the side. slowly you come in, and then all the sudden, hey, we're at the location of the well. we can launch or at a position where the rov is close enough to go. yes, the idea was to start cautiously, not to say you can

be on that spot, but to be on the path. >> okay. thank you. >> thank you. >> just have one follow-up question. now, waiting for the well to be secure, was there any other action you were contemplating in terms of getting away from the fu source? for example, you had a couple, i understand, handling boats out there. would you have connect two, linked them to the and wrap around the rig above the pontoon and rip the rig away from the fuel source? is there any action contemplated to save the vessel or anything? >> not the action you described. >> all right. >> but the opportunity to save the veel would have required taking it off by some manner whether it would be cut the

riser, whether it's pulling it off. there's some mechanism to do that. quite frankly, if you have a well blowing like that, and you know the b.o.p. is not closed, do you make that recommendation knowing what the environmental impacts would be? i'm not a shy guy, but i don't think i could have made that recommendation. >> i understand. that was something that was fered to me when during this course of investigation, and i was wondering if there's other action you were contemplating to get the vessel away from the fuel source beside carrying it down there. >> we certainly would have taken the rig off by any means possible if the well was closed. because what we were also as a possibility which may or may not have been -- you don't know what if.

that's a dangerous scenario. when we went out there, you have to be prepared for as many events as possible. we were concerned if the weather was not as nice as it was, it's very unlikely that riser acting as an anchor would have been able to do that. we would have had an invuntary release. no one knowshat that outcome would have been, but you want to control that rig. that's why we came out with vanguard outfitted with expensive chains, ad hoc living arrangements so that we could potentially lasso for instance. >> any other questions? should we take a recess before the flag state questions? >> yes, sir, a 10 minute break and reconvene at 11:45. >> thank you.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] louisiana. this is 50 minutes. >> thank you, your honor, and

thank you mr. martin. i represent the republic of the islands which was the flag amrgs for the -- administration for the deepwater horizon. the board earlier received testimony from don winslow regarding this incident, and he testified that transocean had a contract with the company named o'brians for salvaging response. do you recognize that name? >> i do, and -- i do. >> he testified it was his understanding that it was o'brians that engaged smit to become involved in this incident? is that the relationship as best you understand it in >> i can offer some guidance between the

relationship of them. not only in this case, but in general. >> all right. >> o'brines are a spill response contractor, and they are not salvors or engage salvors, so that is not accurate, so we will work often at the same location even within the same incident command system, but we don't work for them or vice vice versa. we are two separate entities in time of a case wallty. >> so were their rentives from -- representatives from the command center as well as best you recall? >> not -- they -- i didn't see any of the o'brine's people where i was. >> all right. you testified as i understand it sir about eight o'clock in the

morning on april 21st was the first time that you had become concerned about the potential risks from down flooding; is that correct? >> that's -- that, that -- i would say that is correct. >> and that you had recommended that the people on the scene be careful to avoid down flooding; is that right? >> i did recommend that. >> and can you tell us what that meant? how were they -- how had you advised them or what was that advice translated to people on the scene to avoid that risk? >> okay. the description that went during discussion was to apply water to the columns, to the underside, but not across and directly on

to the deck with heavy flows. you know, there, one thing that is important is that salvage is not to be directed from behind o desk or a document. you have to smell it, feel it, and be there. don winslow was the man on site, and so it's a guided system and that's where it was to direct most of the efforts towards the deck box and the underside and the columns. >> and in your judgment, the fire -- i'm sorry, the water that was being separated on this -- sprayed on this rig, was that part of a firefighting effort or was it primarily to cool the rig and prevent structural damage secondary to a fire? >> it's only structural cooling. you could not attack that fire with the intention to extinguish

it once you realized it was flowing from the well. that was structural cooling. >> you also wouldn't fight a petroleum fire with water like that; is that correct? >> say that again, please. >> another reason you would not consider this firefighting effort is that you would want to use other materials other than water in order to fight a petroleum fire; is that correct? >> i would disagree with that discussion. it would be much, much more in detail with that. you don't have large volumes of oil contained as you would in a tanker or something like that where you can have other means to fight it, so in this particular case, had the well been closed, the residual fires and stuff would have been handled reasonably with water and maybe some other agents would have been used for residual oils that may have been found in places, but water was

the best medium. .. >> yes, i did say that. >> and you said you were given misinformation orally. did you write that information down anywhere? >> we had on the whiteboard in the command center.

>> all right. do you have that information available? >> i believe it was 20 meters was a drilling depth. i think if you look at the drawing, it's run 20. buy america was 23 meters, and roughly, roughly 52000 tons of displacement. some key parameters, that's my recollection. >> all right. and do you remember anything regarding the information you received about the configuration of the rig? >> i don't have any specific recollection about anything unique about it. no. >> all right.

you testified that he did have, i believe i heard you say, that you did have with you at the incident command center on your team a professional firefighter, is that correct? >> that is not correct. the professional firefighter was on the vanguard with the team that was going to the site. >> and was he a smit employee? >> he was not. >> okay. who was that professional firefighter? >> he was from a company -- >> and do you know to whom that person was giving advice regarding the firefighting effort? >> he was with our salvage master on site. and he was an adviser to him spirit and hoosiers knowledge master on site? >> -- and who was your salvage master on site? >> jim weight.

>> jim white. and when did they actually get on scene? >> approximately maybe midnight, the 21st, 22nd. and do you, do you know what advice the firefighter was giving to your on scene salvage master regarding the firefighting effort? >> they were feeding information to me, and i was getting advice back for it. there was sort of green cards all the way. and in agreement. so he was strictly, he was not directing. he was, he was there to advise when we asked him. and we always would run, make sure we were all doing the same

thing. so again, all of that was coming to me. in gross terms, i would've bounced that back. the go ahead ahead and forward it as a teen. we would make sure that we were making the decisions. >> okay. to whom were those decisions forwarded then? >> to the salvage master on si site. >> and what advice then was being given regarding firefighting operations at that time? >> the same as we given in the morning, which was avoid the adirondack. >> now, i believe i also heard you testify that, based on everything you saw during the day and have you involved in this incident, that it was your judgment that down flooding was not a contributing factor.

and i presume from the context of your response, that unit was not a contributing factor to the loss of this vessel, is that what, is that your -- >> no. that was not my statement. what i said was i don't think that was the cause. all of these things, in the blend of circumstances, so in order to go inside, you're not improving the situation. maybe you are. it's evaporating and cooling, but you say it wasn't contributory, i couldn't say that it was or wasn't that i don't think that was the reason for the loss of the rig. >> okay. that a place to become and maybe i'm wrong in this, but it implies to me that there's something else that you do believe was the cost with a loss of the rig. can you share that with this? >> what i believe occurred was

internal shift of weight, or the shift of weight, plus potentially damage. the continuous explosions which are very, very large are quite, i think that's a significant area to be concerned about. i think, i think altogether it's unknown, but i don't believe that the reason for the lift and sinking was solely because of water that was there. >> and when you say, when you reference the continuing explosions, are you talking about explosions occurring on the 21st and on the toy second? >> no. i mean, from the time when our guys were there they had been through the night. with a major one around 9:00 in the morning and another one thereafter. with debris flying, and there were coming in reports of

subsequent explosions throughout the incident. so, you know, to ignore that is being something that could easily be a source of water ingress and transfer of internal weight and fluids, it seems like that's a pretty high possibility of a area to look. >> so those events suggest to you a more likely cause for the loss of this rig than the water that may have gotten onto the deck, do i understand that correctly? >> i'm not very comfortable speculating beyond. this is what i observed, in my opinion is that those into explosions, possibly a just transfer from the bowels failing, both kids failing, --

valves failing. when they start up a hit pressure on them, for the water type compartments. plus we know the pipe rack went over the starboard side around 9:00 as well. >> 9:00 -- >> in the morning on the 22nd. >> okay specs we believe that that occurred. >> same direction as the derrick? >> correct. so all of those caused concern, and towards structural damage of what could've been another source of ingress. >> were smit personnel taking photographs on the scene? >> we did. >> and had he made all of those photographs available to the board? >> i believe we have, yes. >> all right. i would like to request at a convenient time if we could

obtain a copy of those come of this cd containing those photographs. it would be very helpful to our investigation. do you know, sir, whether or not any video footage was taken on the scene by your personal? >> it was. >> and has that also been made available to the board? >> it's all been handed over. >> and likewise, captain, if we could obtain a copy we would appreciate it. >> i would like to as mr. marty these are the only photographs available? >> oh, no. we sent over -- know, there's a big electronic file that was sent with a lot of photographs and video. so there's much more than this. >> my understanding is it's at least one cd containing photographs and possibly more, is that correct a? >> correct. significant amount of electronic

photographs. >> and viacom all right. >> thank you. bp? >> may i proceed, captain? >> sure. >> thank you. i represent bp. >> good morning. >> at any time did you ask to see the firefighting plants that

transocean had for the deepwater horizon? >> i did not. >> duno whether transocean had a firefighting plan for the deepwater horizon? >> i -- i never had that discussion with them. >> have you ever seen a firefighting plan before? >> i have not been involved with the firefighting plans. >> when i say that, i've been involved with the fire control plan. as far as the document which is what i assume you mean, i've not seen a repair document which outlines more than, say, fire control plans which i am the money with. >> thank you. do you know how many boats were surrounding or other vessels were so many the deepwater horizon pouring salt water in an effort to cool the structure and fight the fire on the 20, 21st

and 22nd? >> i don't know the exact number. >> do you know the number of our the amount of gallons per hour of salt water that was being poured on the deepwater horizon started on the 21st for the next day and half? >> i did not. >> do know the total tonnage of the deepwater horizon was? >> which tonnage are we referring to? >> let me rephrase it. have you heard that over 6000 tons of sea water were being poured up her hour on the deepwater horizon with five boats surrounding it on the 21st? >> now i haven't heard that. >> now, one concern that fighting far you said was getting control of the well, correct? >> that's correct. >> but in terms of fighting a fire and other concerns not making matters worse, right? >> this is what we've said all along. i don't think that's anything inconsistent to what we been talking about this morning. >> right. and when you're pouring salt water of the deck of a vessel, you're having a number of rather

untoward effects of fighting oil pollution, or oil fire? >> i think it's quite clear the objective and the direction was not to be doing that. so during the period that we're aware of, that was minimize. i, i'm not sure which period that you are speaking of. >> okay. prior to the time that you gave your advise early in the morning around 8:00 in the morning or so on the 21st, to reduce the flow of seawater on board the deck of the deepwater horizon, you're aware that the fire boats, the firefighting equipment were pouring water dragged onto the deck of the deepwater horizon? >> the situation wasn't clear at that point. what we did know was there was a search and rescue operation ongoing, and that so we had, we were not looking to interfere with any life-saving operations that were going on. it became clear as the morning went on as to what the situation

was. and we responded to that. >> would you become where the water was being poured by a number of vessels on the deck of the deepwater horizon? >> i'm not sure specs sometime in the morning of the 21st? >> i don't know when, what boats, was in the morning of the 21st. and even then, we don't know what boats when. >> and one of the ff supporting salt water onto an array, which oil was burning on, is to spread the oil around and cause more fires, right? >> i wouldn't, i wouldn't agree with that statement. >> you haven't read anywhere, that when you spread water around on an oil fire you are spreading fire around the? >> you -- i fail to see the significance of what that question bears because at the end of the story, you don't have a contained amount of oil that's

burning, in my opinion. you have this this thing that's going on, and the gassing that is burning off, and to apply that there's a free flowing oil situation spreading fire, i would, i wouldn't agree with that. i just don't know what that situation was, but i think that's a far-fetched. >> down flooding changes the way distribution of the vessel's? >> down flooding -- it does. >> reduces the buoyancy of the vessel? >> yes, it does. >> costs is left to the vessel? >> it could. >> images the structural support because of the unbalanced we conditioned? >> it can add extra. >> can internally shift? >> say that again, please. >> it can internally shift the balance is, right?

>> right. >> doesn't change the center of gravity? >> it does. >> how much down flooding would change the center of gravity or cause a list, did you do any tabulation? >> as soon as you add weight to a comedy change the center of gravity. and to what extent, i don't know offhand what that number would be. >> is it customary to fight a fire with seawater, or with chemical retardants? >> repeat the question, please. >> sure. is it customary to fight an oil rig fire with seawater, or instead with chemical retardants? >> in this particular case, there was not an attempt to fight that fire. this was structural cooling which would be done with seawater. >> setting aside this particular case on what happened here, is it customary when firefighting efforts are engaged to put out a fire on and on the rig to use a

seawater thomas frei from a five different directions, or to use chemical by retardants? do you know? >> actually, what you do is you secure the source of the fuel. that's how you secure and well fire. >> well, if you sink the vessel before you secure the source until it becomes somewhat irrelevant, right, serves? if the process of fighting the fire sank the vessel before you can secure the source of the fuel, it becomes somewhat irrelevant, right? >> whatever would have -- it needs to be secured, one way or the other. i mean, you're not going to secure, not going to do with a fire with that source of fuel continually coming under

pressure, regardless. so that's what you have to do with. >> are you going with use of chemical retardants to put out a fire on board rick? >> on all of that check on board a rig or in engine room? i am player with the chemical. >> but they weren't user, right? >> there were no chemicals used. >> let's talk about, get the e-mail which you wrote about bp and affairs agenda getting the rv in the water? >> yes, i didn't. >> as i understand your testimony, the interference was that bp was engaged in performing calculations to determine how close the rov council with its personnel, its human person on board can get to the rig to launch the rov, right? >> that is correct. and i didn't have any criticism over the attempt to safely conduct that operation. as i said, the concern is what

input would you have to make that calculation, and that's where my concern was. and it was an advisory role. and i don't -- anyway, that's -- >> let's make sure we have the facts straight. you're not criticizing bp from taking the time to do calculations so they didn't send him into a burning inferno, are you? >> what my criticism was that -- >> you need to answer the question. >> i didn't? >> you're not criticizing bp for giving safety calculations so that wasn't sending men into harm's way, are you? >> i am not criticizing bp for the way you described the question. my concern was that the information that was being used in the calculations was unobtainable. so that it was not feasible to do those calculations and expect an accurate result spent and the

total length of time between when you expressed your concern to the time the rov was launched was about and our? roughly. >> probably a few hours, but i think that's a good thing. i'm not, i'm not being critical of anyone. this is an internal that came out of this was what the point was. so please, i'm happy to answer any questions. >> and in your experience you have, in fact, read about or seen about where people didn't take the time to do the safety calculations, and the people sent in to do the rescue operations were sent in to arms way. you're aware of prior situations like that, right, sir? >> i've not been involved in that situation. >> never read about piper alpha? >> are messing it hasn't happened that i think i was not involved in piper alpha. >> and you know that at the end of the day the rov effort was not successful, right?

write the rov effort to activate the b.o.p. was not successful at the end of the day. you are aware of that, right? >> it did not secure the sources spent by the way, do you know who's b.o.p. was by the way? >> i'm not sure. i want to read in the news and read speculation, but no. >> no told it was transocean's? >> that the -- >> you people was transocean's? >> typically i understand they are normally rig equipment. so that would be, that's what i would have assumed. >> no for the questions. thank you. >> thank you very much. >> transocean. >> thank you very much.

>> daniel johnson for transocean. good afternoon, mr. martin. >> good afternoon. >> just to be clear, you were on site providing assistance to transocean, approximately seven hours after the incident occurred. to have a time frame approximately right? >> personally when you see on site, i wasn't at the casualties i. >> fair enough. in their emergency response center. transocean's emergency response center. >> that's correct. i was there at 5:00 in the morning, so whatever that comes out to. >> in terms of formal processes or procedures, was transocean flexible so that smit could get started and it's advising as quickly as possible? >> i would say yes. >> did the process of

contracting slow smit's response in a way? >> no, not at all. >> and you typically do get calls after the incident, right? you don't get sow which goes before an explosion, is that rice was no, that's great. and, in fact, united states ask uniquely with some of the preplanning. so we are very similar with responding elsewhere, just as we did here. it's a normal solid response. >> you mentioned some calls that you made i believe to the coast guard. where those calls made in an effort to clarify the coast guard's role? >> what i was trying, i was trying to find out a number of items. one, the clarification of the commit at the time and the concert of search and rescue, because we're trying to find out what boats were out there. and also to get some contact point. because at that point we still didn't have connection with the

daun winslow. so we had zero direct link to the field at that point. so that was our thought was through the coast guard. >> mr. martin come how many companies in the world have the resources and expertise to respond to an event like this as smit did? >> it would be a limited number to be able to bring the expertise necessary for all of the steps, just a handle. >> for our five be accurate in your expense of? >> that would be, maybe less. >> okay. being one of the few companies and individuals that have experience dealing with situations like this, and the background being involved in situations like this, do you have any criticisms of transocean's response to this incident? >> i don't have, i don't have

any criticisms, no. >> now, i think you've mentioned that smit was hired to deal with the rig, once the well was control. that didn't stop you from providing some expertise to assist in the well control process though, is that right? >> that's correct. i mean, we were contracted, and it was -- i would love to just a 100% it was clear that was, once the well, but the truth is always to save that rig, that's what we were there for. and if it would have meant all of the things necessary, we just needed to save the rig, which at that point was both the b.o.p., so we did have all of the follow-up immediately behind to go in there once that was don. >> let me ask you. i think you talk about the

balance between overusing water and under using water for cooling, and also balancing and the risk of downloading. if this will wasn't controlled with a vessel, ultimately, was going to be lost either way? >> could you repeat that question? >> absent control of the well, with the vessel have been lost either because of steel integrity problems or because of down flooding, trying to cool the rick? >> considered the length of time we know that that will remain open for, it was -- i personally do not believe there was any way that she could have sustained. she would've had to come off, off of the source to have any chance. >> if you came off of the b.o.p. in a way that wasn't mechanically planned, would you risk damage to the b.o.p.? >> certainly you would be in uncharted territory. you would know what to expect.

>> now, there was coast guard representatives and transocean, coast guard representatives at the. coast guard representatives on site. and the coast guard offer any assistance or take any role in trying to provide you information that would assist you in your advising the firefighting efforts? >> we were one, mentioned were involvement with the firefighting exercise. >> fair enough to. >> to start with. but that aside, the coast guard were helpful as best as the information they had. and what their particular role was, this was as claiming, my understanding was that the information stream that was going further and further up the chain of command needed assistant. and said they were trying to make sure that, i believe that

the time, at landry was starting to come online, but this was a significant event. and so they want to make sure that there was no delays in getting information. so we were, we were there, they were liaisons as far as i was aware. but there wasn't a lot of information coming in from them. but they certainly were assisting in every way that they could. >> do you have any criticisms of daun winslow's actions, as far as you're aware of those actions? >> no. he did come in my opinion, he was one of the heroes in this case, in that particular instance to step forward and -- no, i have no criticisms of daun winslow. >> now, the word directing has been used a lot. you know that daun winslow was transocean, one of the transocean representatives who was on the phone talking to the

emergency responders, is that right? >> yes, he was. >> just because he was on the phone and relaying advice or instructions, does that necessarily mean he was directing the entire event? >> no. i would say that that does not mean that he was. >> okay. >> okay. he was certainly the point of contact so we were grateful to get information that we had. i commented we have sketchy information that it was a lot better than no information that we had before. before we had daun winslow out there. >> i want to ask you, i think you mentioned, you started to get some pretty clear information from some of the smit representatives out there. specifically, the time to read on the choice second between early morning midnight and let's say, to 9 a.m., would you getting what you felt like were

accurate readings in terms of listing and draft from smit representatives? >> yeah. i felt that they were representative of the situation. >> during that eight or nine hour period was the vessel steady during that time period of? >> yes, it was. >> what happened -- and i know he testified to this earlier but i want to put into context. what happened after that nine or 10 hours of steady stability? >> it degenerated rapidly, and we lost the rig after a series of explosions spent that's what i want to get. after that nine or 10 hours of stability, your understanding is that there were some significant explosions that occurred thereafter, is that right? >> that is correct. >> and the vessel sunk roughly an hour and 20 minutes after that, is that your understanding? >> that's my understanding. >> you ask some questions about i believe the hacksaw model.

having had this model for the time you walk in transocean's door, would have changed the result of this incident? >> there was nothing that we could have done with that model at this point. that would have been a subsequent step. a would've been very, very helpful, but later. we never got to the point that we had any, the was anything different that we could have done. >> this model, to be taken consideration ongoing explosion aboard a vessel. >> that's not modeled as far as i know. >> in its regulatory capacity in approving as a response plans, has to coast guard ever come to you or smit and asked for its recommendations as to what types of things should be in the best response plans in accordance, for example, what type of models ought to be present? >> i personally am not involved with that aspect, but we do get involved with it.

and we have a joint venture company which is intimately involved with the vessel response plan and the regulatory process. so my experience is very limited with that, with that aspect, other than when we need to respond. then i am deeply engaged. >> and i think he testified that you express with vessel response plans is that they are not that detail, is that correct? >> might express with vessel response plans is that they don't address salvage primary. what they do is at best identify a salvage contractor. a new regulations will have greater information with the salvage and expect but there's no salvage and eggs even in the regulations. they have essentially phone number to who to call. and that's, that's, that in my

opinion is actually a very, very good thing. and as we get further down the road, we have to be very careful. >> understood. based on your experience, was transocean prepared and ready within a reasonable amount of time to engage in rov intervention efforts? >> yes. i believe they were. >> you mentioned that whenever you first started getting some reports, that's when you learned of the vessel listing, is that right? >> repeat that questions. whenever you first started getting reports about the condition of the vessel, you found out that it was listing, is that correct? >> not exactly correct. we had very, very different reports from no list to significant lengths, to many, many as a metaphor where the smoke, there's fire. so when we heard there was

discrepancy in the report comes we didn't think everything was just fine. >> if there was any initial listing prior to the direction to redirect the water for cooling the columns, you don't know whether or not that listing was caused by downplaying, our weather was caused by any number of other conditions? for example, the derrick falling, materials shifting on the rig, or even the condition after the initial explosion, would that be accurate? >> that is correct. there's no way to no. >> thank you, mr. martin. >> thank you. >> thank you. halliburton. >> no questions, your honor. >> weatherford? >> no questions. >> m-i slagle? >> no questions. >> anadarko? >> no questions. >> douglass brown? >> no questions or are.

>> dril-quip? >> no questions. >> good afternoon. my name is kyle and i represent captain kuchta captain of the deepwater horizon. sir, you said that you arrived at the headquarters at transocean roughly five in the morning? >> that's correct. >> and you said there was a lot of activity at that time, correct? >> there was. >> and the principal preoccupation at the time was with search and rescue? >> absolutely. >> that was to save peoples lives, is that right? >> that's correct spent and what about the rig an asset once it was resolved we could save everyone we can, correct?

>> i would say even one step further was let's start unparalleled path but not to enter with search and rescue. so everything was moving forward. there was no spee- spee-2 snow r mice in the effort to save lives? >> absolutely. >> now, you set some point in time, you knows it was a coast guard representative there at the headquarters? >> that's correct. >> all right. with respect, and you don't call the gentleman's name, is that right? >> there was more than one that was there. i want to say -- >> but there was more than one? >> there were. >> and they have blue uniforms on? >> i did know them as coast guard. >> with respect to the firefighting activities that were generally going on, cooling, all these things that are being described, do you recall at any time these gentlemen in the blue uniforms sang, stop, guys. nobody can do anything into we

check with the captain? do you recall them saying anything to that effect? >> no. >> and, in fact, it is a collaborative effort among everyone was it not, sir, at the deepwater horizon fashion answer, transocean's headquarters, to try to do whatever we can to save the rig, correct? >> i would say that does characterize what was going on. >> now, i believe you even said at one juncture you got on the admirals raider, is that right? >> i believe it did. is my understanding, it went notably quickly up to admiral landry. >> and it's admiral landry i believe you sent? >> that's what i was told that i believe, i think she's the responsible admiral for this sector? >> do recall anyone saying admiral landry says that you can do anything unless and until you check with the captain of the deepwater horizon about what you're going to do to save his rig?

>> no. >> in fact, sir, you would do that as a necessary, we do not? >> it didn't occur, and that would -- i don't expect something like that. >> particularly now with a clammy of this site or magnitude, right? >> i would agree with that, yes. >> now, sir, you also mentioned that you had a gentleman working for you all as well who was a specialist in fire control, is that correct? >> that is correct. >> tell me his name against. >> his name was -- he worked for fleck. >> until my mom in this case nevertheless there were people like you that did this kind of work. did you consider yourself to have generally more knowledge in terms of fire control and salvaging vessels than the average captain? >> certainly. >> in fact it's a very specialized area of work, is

that right, sir? >> very specialized area of work. >> and he would consider yourself to have far greater knowledge than the average captain of any modu, would you not, sir? insofar as the salvaging of vessels and the prevention of further calamity, correct? >> regardless whether it's modu or, or a ship being in distress, this is what professional south or stew, and had to bring that to the table. and yes, i do have that experience. >> all right. so europe were also showed a diagram, i don't recall by whom, but essentially it is identified as bp eight cn in the 10001364. and it's and a diagram of unified command structure. >> i assumed -- >> that's correct, the same one i'm looking at. with respect to this diagram and

this command structure that specify there, do you have any opinions as to whether or not this rig sank or there was any additionaadditional damage occasion as result of somebody not strictly adhering to this diagram? >> i would say this is probably not going to thank any of fact on what occurred. >> was it fair to say so that everyone there at the command center was working in a cooperative manner towards one goal, and that was to try to stop this? >> that's a fair statement spent the way turf battle's over who gets to do what? >> not at all. and not between any of the parties that i would use. >> thank you, sir. that's all i have. >> thank you. >> jimmy harrell? >> no question.

>> steve? >> no questions. >> mike william? >> no question. >> pat o'bryan? >> no questions. >> robert khuzami with no questions. >> counselor, is there any questions you like to ask your client? any other questions from the board of? >> just one question. mr. martin, you have a boat license or is that correct? >> that's correct spent a master? >> that is correct. >> is it your understanding, when is it that the master no longer have the over all responsibility and authority for his vessel, when would that be? >> when the master no longer has responsibility for his vessel? >> when captain kuchta stepped off the burning bridge, is that the in is responsible and authority for the vessel? >> i have to object that i think that's gone the scope of this

witness. >> if he doesn't know, that's fine. but he has testified that the salvage master at some point come in opinion, is in charge. and tv can shed some light on when the transition occurs, that might be helpful. >> mr. martin is also a licensed coast guard officer. he has a masters. so you should be smarter with the role and response boat of a master at also and that's why i'm asking you. that's a legitimate question. >> i do have a problem if the questioner can't think of the image. i don't know that i know the answer. there are a number of factors that go into this come into that. so certainly one, the vessel is beyond self-help and professional salvage assistance is required, you start to get into an area where they have to work very closely together. and then do some instances where they have to change. but i don't know the answer to your question. >> but to your knowledge, you don't know whether or when

captain kuchta give up his responsibility and authority for the deepwater horizon? >> object to the form of the question. >> overruled. if you know, you can answer. >> i have no idea. >> is there anything else that you would like to add to your testimony? >> no. just to thank the panel. it's an opportunity to come and talk about something that's significant, and i hope in the end it comes to fruitful results in your investigations. >> council, if we need mr. martin for future innings, but he be available, do you think? [inaudible] >> before we recess i want to remind council will meet at 730 time make in the conference room. and commander and ms. murphy need mature is our questions as soon as possible. >> yes, sir. we will. we will adjourn. mr. martin, your excuse.

>> thank you, sir. >> we are adjourn for a day. we will reconvene at 8:00 tomorrow morning. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> let me start with you by the way i start with every witness, all statements you make are punishable to crime. do you olemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the whole truth, nothing but the so? >> yes. >> thank you. >> before we start questioning, you know, as witness, i

respectfully request that the respective for the pii to exercise, you know, good judgment in questioning mr. guide. he's under a lot of pressure, as you could imagine. the previous testimony of mr. o'brien and mr. sims, his supervisor indicated that he has a lot of responsibility for the well. and everybody know that. we don't need to -- i don't want to have ach attorney has their own style, i think if yu can exercise respect and utmost clarity with mr. guide, i would appreciate it. thank you. >> okay. board members. >> mr. guide, please state your full name and spell your last. >> alexander john guide, g-u-i-d-e. >> i want t discuss the goals

with the performance measures that you currently have at bp. are you familiar with the key performance indicators, sir? >> yes, ma'am. >> i'd like to talk about all well objectives delivered at cost, and cost afv. are you familiar with that? >> yes, ma'am. >> how are you measured? >> the afv is developed by the engineering department. it's set forth, you know, fo the well when it starts. and then we attempt if we can to through efficiency, mainly, to come in a little bit below there if possible. it's one the ways they judge ur performance. >> do you know specifically what percentage? >> no, sir. i'm not exactly sure. >> what about hsc on the deepwater horizon. how do you get measured? >> several ways. there were metrics that were put in place.

but they were part of the spu that all came down from, starting with the vice president and came down through the system. but we september track of all of the safety measures. not just the day-to-day stop cards that we put. the near misses that we had, the stop the jobs. we collected all of the data. then it was really to the disction of your supervisor to see if he thought you were putting the effort that you needed. it was the most important thing, you know? it was overemphasized for all of the people in the country. okay. and the next is the measurement for the deepwater horizon and being aboard. how were you measured? >> basically just efficiency. safer or better way to do something. we tried to make it aseasy as

possible for the people on the rig. you uld see that through the -- actually through the performance matrixes as well. >> i know you said safer and better, was cheaper an option as well? >> no, sir. >> tha's going on to your next performance measure. cost performance. there's a thing that's called every dollar counts. >> every dollar counts was just a careover from really 2008. it was a good logo. people worked in the oil and gas business probably will remember that 2008 began the serious downturn. even though oil went from 35 or $38 a barrel. everyone was still going along the lines of the $140 that was right before that. so what had happened is we had the tendency to start collecting

a bunch of contingency stuff on the rigs in general, i.e. extra finishing tools, extra materials that maybe you'd never use for a yr. so we tried to go through and see whee can we try to be more efficient? it it did not encompass safety or the well planning. we had horded all of the stuff. when they went down, we had to starten to tighten our belt. another good example, if you and your pod mate had the same magazine subscription, cancel one, you share the magazine. >> i know you said they never did, i don't want to put the wordnever, you did not imcompass safety.

never? >> no, sir. >> at any time did you ever review the performance of your well site leaders or did you participate in the performance educations with them? >> yes, ma'am. >> were you aware that they had the same performance measures that i discussed with you about making every dollar count? >> yes, sir. >> were you aware that they met those performances? >> yes, sir. they -- the guys in t deepwater horizon were very diligent about trying to keep track of the coming and going of materials, y know, to keep the cost down. >> okay. earlier i mentioned someone performance evaluation though not related to safety. the individual went as far as documents the spread sheet as far as how he hadsaved bp somewhere in the neighborhood of i think around $490,000. you tracked on how much you saving b?

>> i can't say it's typical. the people that work for me over the span of a whole year might have an individual piece or something that they said they felt contributed to the overall cost reduction. but really didn't say exactly how much it was. really it was the efficiency of the operation, you know, that was really easy for them to track as opposed to like a -- you know, we can't change the drilling contractor day rate. >> another performance evaluation that we reviewed was an individual. i'm going to go through his performance age -- and the percentage that weighed against him. he had to deliver hsse performance at zero incident at 25%. his operation performance, when i say operation performance,

that has been defined in his performance evaluation, his only operation performance was to deliver his complete well under afv. every dollar counts. everything under afv was 40%. every dollar counts was 15%. and behaviors, development and leadership model was 20%. basically you have in operations performance, and every dollar counts coming to a total of 55%. so you have an individual who's being measured against his performanceto lower the cost on the rig and ensure that the well is coming up. do you have any concerns from an employee at bp that you could see how that could potentially impact the safety on what's going on out there? >> i don't think it impacted the safety any way whatsoever. what was happened -- what happened was we have all of the -- a scrunch of rig that -- a

bunch of rigs doing the same things. a rig with the drills and completions, the horizon that was just doing drilling. therewas inconsistency how they were getting the approvals. the wells team leders got together with the wells manager. look, let's come up with a way just so that everyone is sort of being graded the same way. that's really all that was. it had really -- safety was always the number one priority. it was easy to measure -- no, i'm sorry. it was easy to measure on the matrix part. what's difficult to measure is the safety culture on your rig. okay? so whatever the actual well site leaders were ranked, they had to be ranked later on, you know,

safety was always number one. it was arbitrary number. >> okay. continue down the road. when i looked at was documented in the spread sheet. that was the actual performance evaluation of the 13 employees i looked at. do you recall the testimony that you gave after we wnt through the laundry list of which was one safer and cheaper? so is it still your testimony that you don't feel that any pressure is put upon the personnel at bp through the performance evaluations that they are being measured against nually that their decision to not run the tool to circulation full bottoms up. do you think that has any impact on the decision against the rig? they are being measured with it against the afv and coming under the cost save something >> -- cost savings? >> it doesn't. those decisions that we talked about ast time are really

individual well based decisions. and that are thought out. and, you know, it is a business. so, yes, there is consideration for, you know, monetary things. but, you know, like i said before, even though, you know, you can phrase it that way, safety was always the number one priority. and the operation was never -- savings was not compromising the operation. >> we've only had a snapshot of the individuals at bp that we felt were somehow associaed in the decisions on this well. there were 13 employees removed. would you be surprised 12 of the 13 had documentation how they saved bp money? >> that wouldn't surprise me at all. >> i'm not talking $50,000, i'm talking about $100,000, $7 million. >> it wouldn't surpriseme at

all. >> do you think that looking at it from the outside, would you measure your performance based on how much money you are saving bp when you are preaching the safety first concept? >> the reason why it's easy to document that i saved, you know, an example i saved $50,000. because it's a tangible thing. okay. we did this or this or this. we saved the money. and that's probably the reason why it's documented. a lt of other things are a lot arder to document, i.e. how did you improve the safety culture? >> just the well site leader that you had control over, did they at any time address any concern with you about the performance measures that they had put upon them? >> no. >> if they didn't meet the

performance measures that they had signed off on annually, what would have happened if thy didn't save the dollars lik they were suppose to? >> >> i'm sure we would have had to have some kind of a conversation with them. i can assure you if it is an issue with safety, they would have had a much -- much more stern conversation and or evn changed. >> were you aware when you had the chance when mr. kaluza came to the rig, did you have the opportunity to look at his performance evaluation? >> i didn't think to look at his performance evaluation? >> if you requested it, would it have been made available to you? >> yes, ma'am. >> i have -- i don't know if you have the document in front of you. but basically my question that i have is there's an annual individual performance rating at bp.

d it's broken up into be, me, and e. you can have my copy. this was just provided to me before the break. i'm sorry. it's highly redacted. >> oh yes. it's a blank white sheet. >> yes, it is. okay. you have the rating, be, me, and e; correct? >> yes. >> can you please explain to me what these means. b.e. would below expectation, m.e. is met expectations, e.e. is eceeded expectation, and e is exceptional. >> as a well team leader, who would you require the minimum performance rating of your well site laders? >> the -- well, everyone --ou would hope that everyone was

excepional. but that's -- >> understood. but what would you require out of an individual that you expect to lead one of your wells? >> the majority of the people in -- when they g these were met expectations. we had high expectations. there were clear matrix, so to speak, for the grade that you are, most of the well site leaders were grade g. to go all the way across from the way you act, the way you present yourself in public. it was that much. the minimum would be an m.e.. but at the same time, most people got m. e. :

. . . what actually, are you responsible for uploading anything are making sure the data is ther >> no, sir. >> what do you know? >> it is the read time -- real time feed offered by halliburton -- from a the rig. it can come into the office and also come into your personal laptop if you have the right software and the right passwords. >> were you aware of anyone from moex or anadarko that visited

the rig? visited the deepwater verizon? >> i am not sure. >> were you aware of any moex anadarko individuals that have access anywhere that you worked with on a daily basis? >> i didn't work with anadarko or moex. >> or had communication with? >> that was handled through the land department. >> i have no further questions. mr. wall's carlotta stuff but if we have follow-up that all come around. thank you for your testimony. >> any other board members? >> i have a few questions iraq health safety and environment, is that mainly addressed personal safety or how does that work? >> well, there are different components for safety culture. personal safety i would call occupational safety and that

obviously is something that you really, really work hard on the because it affects you all the time. and so that would be the same management planning on the rig. it addresses that so that's for you have a in this case transocean. there are very good at it and i have a system th works all over the world. in and then you have an process safety and then combining that with process engineering. so you have in our particular case, you go through a whole series of stage gates, for to be exact, when you are designing a well the takes about six months. reviewed and peer review, and peer reviewed again to make sure that encompasses the what tries to encompass all the different

rules, regulations plus maid's the well-designed criteria put forth. and so safety is incorporated into that. then you go above and beyond where you have your materials, the way they are packaged and shipped, theay they are handled to minimize -- lifting is a big concern to us so we intentionally package of the stuff that goes to the rig so it's easy to handle. handsfree lifting if at all possible. so if there is an engineering peace we tried to engineer the safety is good and and the occupational peace which is the day-to-day safety of the individuals. >> i understand that. the -- during these hearings, i asked a few questions relating to the 2005 and refinery explosion. and i talked about the inspector's report and in there

talking about process safety management for the refineries and that the safety culture. you are probably aware of that. i wonder whether in terms of the well drilling aspect of it, i understand that about when you design a well you're looking at regulation and all the safety factors and all of that. you look over. terms of the transocean, hsc, occupational safety, i understand what i am looking at here before go into that aspect of it, are you aware of the report? >> i am aware of it. >> this morning i talked to mr. waltz and asked for recommendations of a report applicable to the deepwater drilling operation and he said something about oms. are you aware of any other

recommendations, the report that was given for dewater drilling operation? >> yes, but it wasn't specific to that. bp has rig on a production platform which would be the other courses pt kube holstein mad dog because they also process oil and gas. the learnings from that mainly about the safety of individuals were also passed on to those facilities as well because i worked at holstein and a mad dog. i saw what was done, mainly about taking people out of harm's way, installing additional blast walls and things of that nature. but it was all to do with the actual process facility itself, not really the rig and. >> now, when i look at the moc, th process, i have little

knowledge of that but what i am saying is i have engineers that designed the well and identify things that are needed depending on the condition that it was facing. now, that's not a separate group cause mr. waltz, mr. morel or mr. cocallis, they would do the engineering calculations or whatever. then go into the moc process and i see a bunch of engineers, yourself, mr. wald, and mr. o'brien, but i see a separate group that provides checks and balances. in the chain of command between mr. cocallis and you and mr. sims and o'brien, whatever, 55 percent of that pointed out there is something to juggle but itoesn't seem like you have a separate group that focuses

strictly on safety so you have a check and balance. do you understand? is there a separate safety later in their that refuse when you guys are doing otherwise you have the same person designing and thenetermining it is safe, the same group of people and some of a separate group tt does a second look at its. >> okay. >> you have a separate group to do a safety check on the safety design? >> perhaps we could phrase it this way, is there anybody outside operating making these cost related decisions in the company review those decisions to make sure that even tough they may be say they don't compromise safety? >> it is a peer review. for moc, it is really still in, it falls in the design of the

well and i don't think there is. we have peer reviews during the design of the well would obviously is safety as a big piece but on an individual moc it is required that it still falls in and the well-plannedo to speak here no, not that i am aware of. >> it is not only the competing monetary conversation that may compromise safety but also the fact of the group saying, you have the same groups of people that train and go together and then they miss something and that's what i get to it is, d you have not a peer review but another citigroup that does the check before -- do you have that in place? >> we don't have a separate the safety group that checks but we do have an imbedded that safety person dedicated to safety and the specific the broader horizon

group and he sat in the kube next to me. he helped us go through and make sure that safety was interwoven everything we did. he was specifically for us. >> is the knowledgeable about cementing and centralize service -- centralizers and negative tests and all of that? >> not an expert but definitely he understands. but his role is more occupational. >> that is what i'm trying to get to, you don't have a separate group that is outside the of your -- thank you. >> any other questions? >> i have something i forgot to talk to you about. in. >> let's discuss these weekly cost meetings? did you participate? did you know what they were? >> no, i know that they had cost meetings mainly with the engineering aff and financial.

>> on the financial side or they discussing? >> i don't know, i did not go to the meeting. >> can you refer to number one prize for it in front of you, the very last one in front of you. bp acnmdi19481. okay, since you did not go to the meetings can you please help me determine who did it and it's is a weekly cost meetings: houston-based support staff and bp rig leadership and the rig clerk. i aume the clerk report is due and the leadership reports are you but to is tngineering and support staff? >> well, the rig clerk would report to the well site leader. to the best of my knowledge, the weekly cost reviews really were

with a houston-based engineering and finance folks. and then if they saw there was a discrepay between in the actual open wells, then they would go through and see if there are any corrections necessary to keep the rig costs in line with the actual cost. >> to is theouston-based engineering staff? >> that would have been the people in gregg wallace's group. >> he would know about what happens in these meetings either? who knows what happens in these meetings? >> i didn't go to the meetings. >> i'm trying to find out who i need to talk to who knows what's going on in the meetings. do you have a name? >> mr. sims had it in gregg's job before he did in.

>> with mr. morel or mr. cocallis, is that the engineerg staff? >> it would have been mr. hatefully and the mr. cocallis best mr. morel in this particular case. we have also had a technical group that kept track -- i forgot about that, thank you -- of different things and they kept track of the cost. it would be the tack that would call the rig and say we have a mistake here or there either in the coding and/or the cost. it is not just -- we don't just keep track on a daily drilling costs. it is reportinon the rig and a half two have the correct space allocations and helicopter costs

and stuff like that. >> is the bp rig leadership? >> was again to the best of my knowledge, i don't recall the well site leaders participating in cost meetings. >> this go back to my question i had earlier when talking about compromising safety. i know you told me there's never been a decision you felt that compromise safety, but we have now the weekly cost meetings that i can only assume from this document meeting to reduce cost, performance measures, pretty much challenging your employees to perform to a level to reduce cost as much as possible and th you have the individuals coming under a sc and then i look at stuff like the justification in the moc discussing dollars, discussing time -- i have e-mail's where we

are making decisions about dollars and timon and they still don't think that there is a informant where you are trying to save a buck to compromise safety? >> no server. >> thank you. >> any other board questions? >> very briefly, you testified a almost all were emmy but if you were to put a new well site leader into a circumstance for a very short time on a well he was not familiar with whereo send your best performer to fill in for a situation like that? >> isi tesfied before i believe all leaders are qualified. >> but you're putting this leader into a particular challenging situation with a temporary man and with a crew that he wasn't familiar with relatively short time before the actual evolution took place. is that crect. >> that's, correct >> how long before he replaced

mr. sepulveda did you know that he was leaving? >> yes, i knew mr. supple window was leaving -- mr. sepulveda was leaving a couple of months before. he said in a memo sent i have to go to well control school plessey also have an obligation, his daughter graduating from college. >> so you knew probably two months in advance that mr. sabado that was leaving. >> somewhere around there. >> alfred added gransta to identify who h replacement was going to be so that person could become familiar with the working situation on the rig? >> i'm not sure the exact timing because it was going to -- one of the ways in a false is who is available at the time the. so how long did mr. khosa had to familiarize himself with the operations that were ongoing on board a deepwater horizon and the crew aboard t deepwater horizon before he had to replace

mr. sepulveda on the rig? >> i got an e-mail from the 12th and then we talked at the well site leader meeting on the 14th of april and he also had talked to mr. sepulveda and then he went on the 16th i believe. >> so you knew two months in advance there would have to be someone replacing mr. sepulveda and mr. khosa had approximately five days of advance notice that he was going to be that person. is that correct. >> we met with and knew the person was going to be. >> my question is how long in advance of having to report to relieve mr. sepulveda didn't mr. clues that have to prepare for his duties? >> around five days. >> was the management of change document done with regard to the relief of mr. sapota by mr. khosa? >> no server.

>> wireless that not done? >> i don't believe it was required. >> should there have been a formal turnover of duties between mr. sepulveda and mr. khosa to ensure that he knew exactly what was going on? >> i personally don't believe so because all the well site leaders are qualified. a lot of them perform the same functions. >> do you know how much time as mr. close had with mr. sepulveda to learn his duties on the deepwater horizon before he replace him? >> i don't remember, sari. >> thank you. >> any other board of questions? counsel, do you have it questions of your client? >> bp?

>> may i provide the witness? i apologize. in based on what i am looking at here which are notes that have been turned over to the board long ago, and were not questioned out by the board, i think we are arguing on the r.w. relation to the questions the board asked. in he has been here for seven and a half hours of questioning. theas extensive questioning at the last session about his conversations with mr. close up and i don't think there's anything new in here anyhow and i object because this isn't the time to start over and is completely different areas than the board asked about. >> just for the record, counsel,

what i placed before you and the witness are threpages of handwritten notes for the record. they are bp and hznnb100172324, five and s. my recollection your honor is that these records were not produced until after the witness testified that previously, but even if that is not the case it is definitely the case that we had no understanding until after mr. indicted finish his previous testimony as to whose work appear in i can proper to your honor and the floor i have no intention of going into detail regarding the substance of these notes. there are a couple of some seven questions of like to clarify, but i do believe it is important especially since it mr. close and has not testified that

reestablished the circumstances under which these notes were taken and information that is recorded in them. >> if i could respond briefly. the circumstances were asked about in detail last time, they aren't going to change. the notes pay for themselves, there are 100 percent consistent with a descripon he gave. every ready can read them. there's going to be nothing that is new, nothing in this, judge, it gives me no heartburn whatsoever in respect of protecting my client except this is where the floodgates opened. people think they will get up there and ask about -- >> we understand your point, counsel. >> there is a special status with conducting an investigation in cooperation with the coast guard, so if the area is even if it's been covered before but not clear to the administration of

the vessel in the investigation, i think they and us are allowed to go over the grounds of we are not clear on what it is. so they do have a, a republican of marshall island does have a special status in this hearing. >> i am understand. >> a sovereign christie banaa to set arecedent. >> thank you, your honor. >> we are all with the same time constraints. >> of course, be cked before we turn to these notes, mr. guy.com yo testified in response to the questions by mr. matthews that you believe that all will site leaders are qualified,. is that correct. >> yes. >> any and all will side leaders go through annual performance evaluations to evaluate their performance,. is that correct. >> yes, sir. >> various factors are taken into account and the results are different from what one well

site lder to another year after year, is that correct,. >> sometimes they stay the same from year to year depending on individual. >> but the point is the company understands there is a need to continuously evaluate the performance of a well site leaders? >> yes. >> with regard to the three pages of handwritten notes that i have a place before you, are these your notes? >> yes, sir. >> and as i recall when you're here before you testified that you do recall having a conversation with mr. caluza after april 20th, and my first question is are these nodes connected that conversation that you referenced earlier during a last testimony? >> yes server. >> and there is a date that appears midway down or a third of the way down the first page,

appears to be april the 25th of around 12:15 p.m., is that approximately the date and time when you spoke to mr. caluza? >> yes, sir. >> did do raci mr. caluza iphone? >> yes, sir. >> and was there anyone else that was involved in the conversation? >> yes. >> coup? >> keith paygo. >> was he with you? >> yes. >> what was the duration of your conversation with mr. caluza? >> appximately 45 minutes, if that. >> and just to be fair, after had this conversation and took theseotes, at any time to your knowledge did mr. -- mr. caluza have the opportunity to review these notes and to check them for accuracy or to correct them? >> i don't know. >> as far as you know, you don't

know. >> i don't know. >> for the bottom of the first page, there is the name and randy that appears. near the left hand margin. as you'll recall, is that a reference to randy's al? >> that's who it would have been in. >> the senior tool pusher on the rig,. is that right. >> yes server. >> on the next page near the top of the page you indicated i believe, drill pipe is zero and then noted brandy and bontoc. do you see that reference? >> yes, our. >> you recall that conversation was about? >> no, sir. >> shortly below that, on the right hand margin there is an

indication that mark called if i'm reading this correctly, tell me if i'm not getting it correct, mark called earlier to make sure -- to uc that notation? >> yes, sir. and what was marked -- was that mark keithley, correct? >> was he making sure to call of. >> i don't remember. >> if you take a moment and looking through the notes as a whole, areyou able to identify -- let me ask you first for these nodes taken in a roughly chronological order, for you asking mr. caluza to walk through with you the evidence in chronological order, time order as they occurred on the 20th? >> i have a copy of the inside data for what i thought was the

negative test and that was tried to go through and see what the bells for open and closed at what particular spots because when you have that data you don't know what the set up this. >> are you able as you look at the notes now, are you able to identify where in this nrative and you understood that the negative test to have been performed? take a minute if you would then just look, we're in here mr. caluza was describing the negative tests. >> at the bottom here, switch to the tank on keel wine at .6 barrels, 30-psi, 2.08 barrels, on the panel for 30 minutes. >> was it your understanding that that was the one negative

tests performed or was it the first of two -- tests? >> i believe this was the second of the tube. >> and where is the first in these notes? >> i am not sure. >> do you recall how you came to understand there were too negative tests? >> i would have to speculate, i really don't know. >> turning to the third page if you would and mine near the top of the page as i read in the nose and tell me if i have a wrong, everyone was aware of the pressure and it appears the abbreviation wga t indicator decreasing, did i read that

correctly? >> yes, sir. >> the wgt indicator, is that a reference to the hook loaded on the drill pipe? >> yes. >> and what was your understanding as to why that indicator was decreasing? >> i don't think there was any understanding of that. >> did you as mr. caluza when you spoke with them how mch the indicator had decrease? >> i don't remember. >> did you ask him what he did to follow-up on the that decrease in nook logan? >> i don't recall.

>> there is a drawing that appears near the bottom of of the page. is that you're drawing? >> yes. >> and what is it intended to depict? >> how the negative test was -- what the rig and was on the rig floor end of the b0p stack while performing the negative test. >> am i correct that the horizontal line in the center would be the drill pipe,. is that correct. >> yes, sir. >> the line to the left would be the joe klein? correct? >> yes,. >> on the right hand side you have a kill line going to what is identified as the sea came manifold. >> joke manifold. >> and then there appears to be an ex in line off of the drill pipe heading to what is marked as this emt unit, one is that

depicting? >> is a valve. >> does it indicate whether it is open or closed? >> no, it indicates there is a vowel there. >> this is based on the oral description that mr. caluza provided to you over the phone. is that correct. >> that is correct ..

>> and did you talk with them about the fact that -- you were aware that they had to increase the pressure on a continuous basis to get the equipment to convert, is that correct? [inaudible] >> i went through this in great detail. >> one question. one question that was not important. mr. guide, am i correct there was increasing pressure over time? >> yes. >> did you ever talk with mr. morel but that increasing pressure should have caused the setting ball to have ben caused group the fow tube without having shifted the tube at all?

>> no. >> nothing further. thank you. >> thank you. >> you still do want to ask any questions? >> i just want to remind you the initial comedy rule is over. [laughter] >> bp? >> nothing at this time. >> transocean? >> yes, your honor. [inaudible conversations] >> okay, thank yu. >> welcome back, mr. guide. >> glad to be here. [laughter] >> i remind you, you are underwrote. [laughter] actually, i want to say that mr. stadler told me mr. guide

came back here. while it wasn't the most pleasant duty, he indicated to his lawyer he wanted to be fully cooperative with the board. >> mr. guide, we've established in this record that it was mr. housley that god a call from the raid three or four hours for the blowout and i think the reference call s for mark. you recall that? >> yes. >> typically i belve he is on the engineering side here and you're on here it is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> encyclicals from the wealth of these are for mr. kaluza for mr. latrine would've come for you, am i correct on that? if you are available? >> calls to me? >> calls to the raid. questions. particularly with the negative tests. typically they would've gone to you. >> well, it would depend if it was a clarificationof

something. they routinely called the engineers first. >> okay. so my question then is, did you consider the call to mr. hafle one that would normally be made to him or was it something that typically would've gone to you? that is the type of call questioning the details of this negative test. >> i don't know what they talked about. >> let's assume it was a question from the raid because i think this question is pretty clear from that. there was the question from the rig to the shore. is that what you would expect it to be called over that goatee when operations? >> it would once again depend on what the subject was. >> well, if the wealthy leader said we have a 1400-pound psi on the job type and we have to see it on the kill line, but we're getting easier on the caroline, where would you expect that sort of a question to go? to you or to mr. hafle?

>> i'm going to make two objections. one this is really cumulative of what we've really covered, so they should not be an opportunity if you will to get a seco bite at the apple. and second, i think the question presupposes the call regarding the pressure differentials and i think that it's never been established in this record. >> if i can clarify her objection. i did not understand, counsel, correct them if i'm wrong, your question defamer call earlier to see if i'm sure. it's not within your question but that was the call you just asked about hypothetically. >> becausef it is, i object because it completely misdirects the questioning. >> let me let everyone know the commment of the task. as he walked by, he said he would not be more than four minutes. as he walked by, he said he would not be more than four minutes. as he walked by, he said he would not be more than four minutes. as he walked by, he said he would not be more than four minutes. >> and in i discovered at least

four minutes to suppress any appeal. and i fail at that a lot. so under the either or role, if someone has limited to a short period of time like that, my professional judgment is that we'll trust counsel to cover new territory. but even if he doesn't have the four-minute mark as he stat when he walked by, he will have exhausted time. now i took up 92 seconds saying that, so that won't come from your format. >> it was 98 seconds. the >> thirty-three actually, your honor. >> your honor, i'm going to object sandisk back to the witness appears to be so sort of interview right up a week after the internet with john latrine that i can tell you i've never seen before. and before we give him a three pace single space. >> so why don't we have the question. the >> shorter. your runner, i gave him the

document because i wanted to witness to be clear that the predicate for my question is based upon the interview notes of the interview. so i want to witness to be clear that i'm not making this up. >> every question you may defend good faith. so once you ask them if he hasn't answered, fine. >> when a question from the whole site leader comes to an engineered such as yourself from mr. hafle, which would include -- we've just done a negative test. were given a 1400 psi rating on the drill pipe at zero on the kill ine, this would be an anomaly. this would not be a good make it a test, would it? >> your honor, i want to make clear that it's a hypothetical. it's never been established. >> thank you. you don't have to answer if you don't have an opinion and were

going to salem asking you this hypothetical. you have an opinion >> frankly, he was asked six days to sunday to a bind of that test. and he indiced he didn't have specific information to do so. so this is grnd -- >> i assume f we lt them answer we get the same answer. >> there's too many other details i would need to know. >> next question. >> if there is a question about a negative test and you're not absolutely confident you have what is a good negative test indicating you have a field well, what does an engineer do if there is some doubt about that? what is the next step? >> well, the first would be a discussion on the rig with all the peop involved on the rig which would be the wealthy leader come at alm, toll pusher,

driller, senior toll pusher. if they then have other questions, they would call the engineer and myself and also paul johnson, the rate manager. and then we wod discuss it. >> there was a call. there is a call for mark hafle. let me finish my question before you speak good after mr. hafle gets the call, that's my question. what does the engineer do at that point? >> i'm going to object because now counsel testifies. he knows nothing about the call to hafle. >> sustained. >> judge, in his own mostly refers to a call for mark. now i assume the council is trying to protect his witness. counsel, may i finish? we usually have a role -- >> first of all, can you get more than one of us at a time? there you go. so i get to determine the order. because we've used up to four minutes.

so you've got maybe one queson left. >> come on. >> you have uncovered anything covered by the board in this question, which we agreed before him would be the subject, except for -- >> what about the marshall islands? >> we never agree to that. we said it wasn't presidential and next time to go last. >> judge, were taking more time arguing. >> that's true. >> the question is when an engineer gets a phone call from a rig whether it's you or mr. hafle and there is some and all he or negative test, what is the next past? >> in the object for this reason. it misstates the record. this does not say the engineer got a call from the rig. this is the engineer called the rate underwear says monitor to collide to comply with the permit. >> if counsel wants to ask his question to apply to something that never happened here, then that's his decision.

that's the anser. >> what is the aswer, sir? what does the engineer do at that stage? >> you have to ask it again. >> if you are mr. hafle gets a phone cal from the rate about the 1400 psi differential, what do you do with that information? >> we would discuss it. >> after you discuss it, would anybody call anybody in that situation? >> well, mr. hafle was on shore. >> would he discuss it with? other people on shore? would you then turned your real-time monitor and monitor the well at that point? >> we now have a hypothetical. >> and also there was a tremendous run of testimony last time about thiwhole testing procedure. >> dirges, never asked. i'm asking now -- >> he said i'd wonder question.

i didn't agree to it. >> hey, you promised four minutes. >> i've just been chopped up. i'm trying to get to this final question. i can't tell you how many more objections. question, when an engineer finds out that there is something arrival at the negative test, assuming that is what mr. hafle discernment, died as he typically turn to the real-time data that is displayed in houston and monitor the well? >> once again, i don't know that tucson call. >> next question -- >> if hypothetically -- if hypothetically someone did have a question that they wanted to look at the real-time data and the feed was working, just take a look at it. >> okay, thank you. >> as you know, i've tried not to be mean.

[inaudible] [inaudible conversations] >> okay, halliburton. >> no questions, your honor, thank you. >> cameron. weatherford. m-i swaco. [inaudible] >> hi, mr. guide, i'm dead cursor. don't get worried i'm going to ask you about this. these are the transcripts from the la time he testified and i just wanted to assure you and the board that i was here when he testified and i carefully read and highlighted the transcript to try to be sure that i don't ask you even one

single question that you already addressed. >> thank you, ma'am. the marshall islands asked you about the boat column. and i wanted to clarify something on that. >> a lot of full power questions last time. a.b. anadarko didn't answer or mullinax. [inaudible] >> mr. dykes said we plan at the panel to have a weatherford to address the full-color isses. and so, the subject we should be able to cover with the expert at that point in town. do you want more questions at this point in tme? we would be grateful to pass on that. thank you for your courtesy. >> sure. he testified last time that she got an e-mail from brian morel

said they had full returns from his job, they finished the plug on time and thought to 70 pounds of much pressure. and my bike to ask you today is have you had any time he for or since the incident seen the actual data on the return for the cement job, indicating according to a graph that mr. mathews showed us at the last session db barrels of fluid may have been lost in fact. >> this is an entirely new era. >> she promised four minutes. >> i promise to take the four minutes of everybody who didn't ask any questions. >> well, it's beyond what the board had questions about. >> but it's not a subject he's ever testified about. and it is a venture since tomorrow we're going to be talking about slow wind, flow out discretion. >>t weren't members want to hear this?

[inaudible] >> there you go. >> mr. mathews, do i asked the question. >> you can answer that question. >> , deepwater horizon or any g, do you think the float is an accure reader? >> not necessarily. >> can you please elaborate on that? >> when you showed this to me last time, i didn't know what it was, honestly because i had not seen i. and i did go look. and the flow out meter that sperry sun house, i believe it is an acoustic meter, a flow out meter that transocean has his pal. they're both the relative -- relative reading that are calibrated by, you know, seeing how much pomp and how much goes into the pit. it has to be calibrated.

top right on their commodore flow and is a calculated member. it is not measured here it is catholic from pump strokes and efficiency. the real way that we and the most and if they be not considered high-tech, we asure. you know, we pump x amount of arrows out of the tank and see how many we get back. and that's our definitive way. >> so if you have no true value and flow out, why recorded? >> there's a value and it needs to be calibrated correctly. it also is relative. in deep water wells, the main thing you look for is your quarterback signature that called fingerprinting. so you see, when you make a connection, how might everything tas center using impressionable fluid. he's yelling it takes for the

flow to dissipate and it does go down in the level often anytime this. and depending on the well into her honor whatever it could be two and a half minutes. it could be 10 minutes. so it is important for morel to debate this. so the guys at the deepwater horizon to my knowledge trusted transocean flowmeter better because they thought it was more accurate. every trip i went out there -- and there were many. and you ould talk to any of the folks on the beta, they were always watching the transocean flow out meter. >> in her testimony, i'm not trained to the words in her mouth, but you think even calibrated that the system was not as good as the paddle system that traocean had? >> how was the feedback i got from you guys on the rate. i personally didn't know. they thought it was more

accurate. >> thank you. >> you inspired him. >> thank you. that's one of our hopes that we do inspire a thought by the board. that's the main goal. so mr. guide come you did go back after r. mathews asked to those questions last time and he looked at the data. so as you sit here today, do ou have enough information to either agree or disagree that db barrels have been lost? >> i would disagree that db barrels was lost for two reasons. first, we have an amite report that is the definitive report that tells you it's an accounting system and how many girls are lost and howany are on the big, how many find the key scene. so that's really how we keep track. it's also part of the np est permit that is necessary for discharges and stuff like that

because then my supplies or food compliance. so that is our definitive way. and just one other comment. if you duplicate those and say he lost 80 barrels during the cement job, which you have to vote for the top plug bumped and the bottom because the semesters to go around the corner. so even if that was accurate, if it was, which it's not, but if it was, you only lasted three barrels after cement went around the corner. >> well, that was going to be my next question. if it doesn't show 80 barrels, did you come to a conclusion whether any barrels were lost and if so, how many? >> i came to the conclusion there were no barrels last taste on the amite accounting of the barrels on the rate. >> a he said there were two reasons that she concluded that this assessment was wrong. and he told us one, i don't

think you told us your second reason. >> well i just said. there would be 80 barrels. >> got you. okay. wanted to make sure we have your lancer. moving to a new topic, you mention in your previous testimony that it would've been cheaper not to run a cement signed log and be heard testimony would've cost about $128,000 for slumber j. to run the cbo. >> we have at least an hour's worth of questions out of the nine dealing with abu blog at that time. >> i think her question -- well, the questions today were related to what if any cost related pressures people felt when they were making these decisions. i took the predicate to get towards. >> that's the whole point of the line of questioning was the cost

pressure. i want to know first about whether you agree they would've paid slumber j. 128,000 for cbo? >> it was around that i recollect. >> it would've also taken two or three days every time to run the cbo, wouldn't it? >> you wou have to run a bit and scraper trip before you could run divine law. >> you don't have to. >> you could run a bit time on without a scraper? >> you could. >> is that bp's practice to run cbo without doing a bit and scraper trip? >> iuess it really depends on the circuit stance. >> so do you have an opinion and the circumstance whether it can scraper trip should've been brand for a cement cement by month? >> if i go back to the decision tree, i don't think that it was in there. i think it was going to be, you know, it didn't meet the

criteria set forth that would run. >> but i'm really going towards the time it would take to run divine like and how much time that adds up to since we've heard testimony on a million dollars a day. so how lunch in your opinion would it have ke to run the cement by month. >> it would have probly taken -- if we didn't have any issue. this is a speculation without any problems, 18 hours? 1218 hours? >> you had to wait for the cement to set which would've taken 36 hours? >> not a coursing to the cement test. >> how long did the cement show it would take? >> your honor, i am going to object. this is way beyond. we covered at length of the

setting times for the cement, all of these related issues. and i think we're way beyond cost than anything else. >> the purpose is how long would have taken -- how much time that a million dollars a day and it's more than 12 to 18 hours, but you have to count the cement time. >> okay, mr. dykes reminded me that when the border to have the data on the time, the cost of running the test of the time including the rate time that it would've taken and ultimately if someone wants to make that calculation based on the information that we have an present that as a separate matter to the board, obviously the board is considering, were decisions made -- or to what extent where they made to save time and/or money. and inany respects, time is money. he tells me we actually have that information. >> alright, although fine the vine. he little while ago that safety is the number one priority.

would you consider that wle control as the biggest safety issue out on the rig? >> is obviously a high priority. >> you don't have while control any safety regulations. i'm not dropping things are wearing a hard hat it doesn't hardly mattered, does it? >> well control is obviously a very high priority. >> three follow-up and this is not in detail on t negative test, but she testified previously that nobody called you on april 20th about interpreting the negative test. i want to follow up to skif you obtained information on the 20th about interpreting the negative test from any other source besides the phone call. >> now. >> just to clarify at the time. >> i'm a day of the event. >> never had anything regarding the negative test.

>> used broke briefly a little by little about monitoring real-time data on insight anywhere, but i wasn't clear about whether you monitored by real-time data on april 20th or subsequently went back and let that data. >> i subsequently went back and looked at the data. >> fell on the date of the conducting of the negative test, you were not monitoring the real-time data? >> not turn the negative test. >> do ou know how many times -- have you ever been involved in a well driven 90 day test was conducted 3300 feet you loathe the mud lined? >> not to my recollection. >> were you aware of any other bp wells having been negative test it at that depth below that

mud lined? >> i'm not familiar with all the wealth of bp drill. >> are you familiar with any negative test out anywhere on any well done that far below the mud lined? >> i personally am not. >> so then my question is then use it in your previous testimony how confident you were that the folks on the rig, both bp and transocean folks were coetent to run a negative test. how could you be confident they knew how to run this negative test to win your knowledge and negative test has never been round this deep below the mud lined before? >> the depths that you conducted the negative test on is not relevant. it's do you have -- it is a youtube and, you know, you are just seeing if the youtube causes the well to flow. and now, it's really that

simple. it doesn't depend on the depth. >> there's no circumstances that present themselves becauset's going that far below the mud lined? different pressures, different temperatures that would impact the way it's done and the way to interpret it? >> unless i'm missing something, you would line up to do the test exactly the same way regardless on the depth of lawyer to streamline. >> well, it didn't be opts note that govern the test on april 20th required that the negative test be done at the well head, which was at the mud client and not 3300 feet below the mud lined? >> know, to the best of my knowledge, we were going to do the negative test at 8300 plus feet? >> may i give the witness a copy of the office note dated april 20th? >> yes, an object because we went over this last time and 's far beyond what anybody at

the panel asked. >> okay, the board members would like to hear his explanation. >> the base number is bp hcn 0105. .. does that not indicate the test would be conducted on the well head? >> lipitor, ma'am. what they're going to do is pumped -- no, ma'am. what they are going to do is pumped it down -- pump it