the challenger. >> two former parliamentarians have co-written a book. >> charlie johnson, along with william mckay, you have written a book called "parliament and congress -- representation and scrutiny in the twenty-first century." what is it? >> it's in part a comparison. it's in part an update of a book written 30 years ago by two clerks of the british parliament, ken bradshaw and david pring, called "parliament and congress," but now, totally outdated. but it's also, i'd say, a

comparison. we kind of projected our various segments into each chapter and then wove, as the occasion permitted -- bill is a wonderful weaver of text and context -- between our two versions. but for me at least, more than that, it's a way after 40 years, brian, of being a nonpartisan official for the house of representatives, to be somewhat -- not personally -- but somewhat judgmental institutionally about change, and the extent of change and the impacts of change under house rules -- and senate rules. i had to become, more or less -- or pretend to become -- an instant expert on the senate, which was difficult. because all those years, brian, of frustration in the house, i would always remind myself how much more difficult it would be to be on the senate side. and it was reassuring, constantly. but at the end, we took on a

very ambitious outline, i think. and bill really -- the outline, bill had great ideas. and it wasn't totally set in concrete, but it was so ambitious from the organizational aspects of congress and parliament to the operational aspects, not necessarily the personal aspects, interwoven, at my case at least, with constant references of change, and why change had really emerged in a much more rapid way for 200 and -- well, for 180 years, the house, at least, had more or less operated under its standing rules. nowadays, the house adopts its rules every two years, but constantly waives them or deviates from them, which i think is unique among parliaments in the world. >> william mckay, what's the biggest difference between parliament and the american system? >> i think the biggest difference is that, at the center of the westminster

system there is a paradox. because without a separation of powers you've got members elected to the house whose job individually on the government side is to support the government, but whose job as members of the institution is to criticize the government. this is a riding of two horses, which becomes more or less acute, depending on the political temperature. but it's always there. now, for the past -- oh, i don't know -- 150 years, government has dominated the house. so the voice of criticism and scrutiny have been very muted. now, since -- beginning since 1979, and gathering speed in the last decade, the iron hand of control of government on the time of the house -- because what is really critical is the time-business balance -- the iron control of government on

the time of the house is loosening. and the house is beginning to recover -- the house of commons -- is beginning to recover its role as a candid critic of the government. now, how far that can go, how far government members can on one day, on one part of a day, subscribe to report that the government is getting it completely wrong, and on a later part of the day go into the lobbies to defend the government on a very similar issue, i don't know. we shall just have to wait and see. but it's made even more difficult since the last general election, because we have our coalition. so, on top of the similarities with the congress, on top of the background which, going back to the beginnings, is very similar, i think we're beginning

to perceive the same kind of problems. we've arrived at them from different avenues and we're looking at them from different viewpoints, but we've got very much the same kind of problems. >> let me ask you just about size. how big -- how many members are the house of representatives? how many members are there in the senate? >> there are 435 voting members of the house, and i think now, six non-voting delegates -- the northern marianas just having by statute had a non-voting delegate. and then in the senate, there are 100 senators, two from each state. >> how big are the constituencies of a member of the house on average? >> oh, about between 600,000 and 700,000 persons -- not all voting eligible, but persons. >> how many members are there in the house of commons? and how many members in the house of lords? >> well, the members in the commons is between 646 and 650. it varies from election to election.

the last figure i can remember is 646, but it may be 648 now. in the lords, well, the lords got up to 1,200 to 1,300 in the days before 1992, when the hereditaries -- nearly all the hereditaries -- were got rid of. that brought the size of the lords down to about 700. but as i think we say in the book, before that change, the house of lords was unique among legislatures in that it worked only because of the absenteeism of most of its members. now, what is going to happen to the lords in the future, goodness only knows. from my point of view -- and i think we say, again, we say it in the book -- i would have thought a membership of about 400, however you base membership, is about right. you have got to assure yourself in the lords that you give them a legitimacy, but you don't give them so much legitimacy

that they can challenge the commons. where that pendulum will rest, goodness only knows. i knew it in my water, we would take decades to get the lords right. and that's going to happen. >> how many members in the constituency of the members of the house of commons? >> ideally, between 60,000 and 70,000. but the rules for drawing the boundaries are completely impartial. they have the stated aim of more or less equivalent sizes of constituencies. but the other considerations which you have to take into account when you are drawing constituency boundaries -- historic associations, where does your shopping come from -- have meant that in the worst case, i think the smallest scottish electorate is about 26,000, the largest english

electorate is about 104,000. and both of these totals are arrived at on the same principles; that is, do not split up an island community. so, the isle of wight in the south of england isn't split up, and has 104,000. and the western isles off the western coast of scotland isn't split up, and it has 26,000. >> how did you two meet? >> i think i first went to london in 1998, to begin an exchange. bill had been here on visits quite earlier than that. and our office had been notoriously not visiting foreign countries. but it became apparent that an understanding of comparative forms of government was to our benefit as parliamentarians. and so, i arrived on their a wi, but with a wonderful, warm

reception by several of the clerks. >> when you say clerk, that's clerk in american. >> yes, yes. and it's the combined equivalent here of the parliamentarian, the clerk and the chief administrative officer. >> while you're there, give us your background. where's your home town originally? >> i was born in mount vernon, new york. i lived in scarsdale in new york for most of my life, and most of my youth, and went to amherst college in massachusetts, and the university of virginia law school. and i'm a member of the district of columbia bar. >> how long have you been attached to the house of representatives, and in what jobs? >> on may 20, 1964, brian, i signed a contract and began working as a legal assistant to the parliamentarian, lewis deschler, parliamentarian for 46 years. and 40 years later to the day, may 20, 2004, i resigned.

and my letter of resignation was read to the house. and since then, i've been a consultant to the speaker and to the parliamentarian on the procedural precedence. >> but you did become parliamentarian. >> yes, the last 10 years, from 1994, when speaker foley appointed me, and then two months later was unelected. one of the most important moments, i think, was that speaker gingrich retained my services as the newly appointed parliamentarian, although he was inclined to try to clean house of other officers and officials. and i think that benefited the house, not that our judgment was impeccable, but that the nonpartisanship of the procedural arm of the house was maintained. >> mr. mckay, where did you come from, and all your education, and how long were you the clerk? >> i was born in edinburgh. i was educated in edinburgh. and i do not know nor why i

decided to apply for a post in the house of commons. now, the way of getting a post was to sit the normal civil service examination and then to be vetted -- not so much whether your face fitted, but whether your mind fitted -- by the heads of the department. so, i went along -- having passed the civil service exam -- went along to a nomination interview. and it was the most agreeable event i can remember. for most of the time we spoke about the prospects for the next rugby season. and then someone said, "this is supposed to be a nomination interview." so, i was nominated, and spent 41 years -- very similar to charlie's -- ended up as clerk of the house, which is a nomination by the crown on the recommendation of the prime minister, who's advised by the speaker. >> let me ask you a simple

question that americans know about. if somebody's going to become the secretary of defense or the secretary of state, they have to be confirmed by the senate. what happens with this similar situation? a defense minister in great britain, do they have to be confirmed by anybody? >> no, they don't. not at all. they have to run the usual gauntlet, after nomination, of their adequacy as a performer in the house. and if you are a bad performer, your ministerial career may be shot. but there's no specific nomination -- or confirmation -- of them. >> if you could pick one thing that's in the british system that's not in the u.s. system, that you like, what would it be? >> i think the nonpartisanship of the speaker, his role in the british system. his role is a true nonpartisan,

although he derives from a party. his day-to-day role, his selection of amendments -- his or her. i think, in comparison to the evolution of the speaker's role, which has always been a hybrid role here -- a combination of an institutional nonpartisan, presiding officer and administrator together with party leader and party fund raiser. those latter two characteristics of the speaker here have totally overcome the initial notion that the speaker shall be above the fray. it's difficult for a speaker here in the united states now, from time to time, to play the institutional role when he or she needs to. and so, there's much more of a delegation to people who are not so qualified to do those things. >> how much money does a member of the house of commons make?

>> i think it's difficult to say. the salary is about 70,000 pounds. but as we know, there are allowances on top of that, which has been the cause >> would that be about -- >> about $100,000, something like that, yes. >> but what was the rest of it? >> allowances for all sorts of things, which caused this great tsunami of criticism, which caused the setting of both salary and allowance levels -- indeed, the existence of allowances -- to be taken away from the house entirely. >> who does it now? >> an independent statutory body, because about 18 months ago, the leaking of a whole lot of information about members' claims in the press led to considerable [inaudible], because some of the claims were simply ridiculous. >> can you give us an example? >> oh, the famous duck house. a member claimed for a floating

duck house in his pond. the duck house has just been sold at auction as a great, sort of amusing item of public life. but at the time, that kind of claim was seen to be ridiculous and wrong. and there were, i suppose you would say, even as an impartial official, i would have said there were a good deal too many of these claims. >> how much money does a member of the house and the senate make? >> $174,000, a salary which is, from time to time, adjusted by a cost-of-living formula. but since 1989, congress has avoided the need to vote affirmatively on merit -- they don't give themselves merit increases. but the col has become automatic and are considered constitutional that they're not raising their own salaries

during their terms of office. the twenty-seventh amendment prohibits that under our system. brian, let me just say in response to your last question, that the other -- as i think about it, the relative reliance upon campaign financing and time spent in this country compared to the relatively short time of campaigns and little, perhaps comparatively little attention members give, members of parliament give to fund raising is a huge benefit to the british system. >> well, in the united states, a member of congress can raise how much money in the campaign? >> well, it's virtually unlimited, depending on the source. >> what about in great britain? >> the electoral commission, which is a statutory body, has limits, sets of limits for the contributions which people may make to political parties and individuals, and for the amounts which these individuals may spend on campaigning,

particularly at general elections. there is an attempt, which is continuously being refined, to be as open and transparent as possible in the receipt of party funds. for example, there was a great controversy a couple of years ago, because the rules did not cover soft loans to parties, and it was suspected that some soft loans were coming from sources which were not within the u.k. so, that had to be -- that loophole had to be blocked off. so, on the back of all the expenditure on campaigning that is the old man of the sea of the electoral commission demanding returns for this, that and the next. and it works quite well. every three or four years there

is a row about something. but between the rows, i have an idea that the electoral commission does a good deal of settling down and monitoring. >> is there any taxpayer money spent on the campaign? >> yes. the parties do get some money, but not a lot. the idea of taxpayers' money going to parties as a main support continually bubbles up on the grounds that it would take away many of the opportunities for what might be regarded as shady practices. >> what's the length of terms in both the house and the senate in the united states? >> two-year terms for all house members and delegates, with the exception of the resident commissioner from puerto rico, who, as a delegate equivalent, has uniquely a four-year term under statute. and then, six-year terms for senators, staggered so that no two senators serve the same term from any particular state. so, it's basically a one-third,

one-third, one-third split in the senate. >> why do you think the founders decided that the house of representatives seat would be the only one that absolutely had to be elected by the public? >> when we started this book, i felt that i should go to the federalist papers, which is -- and which our introduction devotes quite a bit of attention to -- and as part of the compromise between this notion of the great compromise between representation of the people and representation of states, because here you had 13 states trying to form a meaningful union. their articles of confederation hadn't been effective. and so, it was clear that the states, in order to ratify this -- you know, they needed two- thirds of the states, three- fourths of the states, to ratify -- needed some unique representation as states,

regardless of population size. so, that was the balance between the house -- although each state gets one representative, minimum, in the house, the rest of it is determined by a population adjustment every 10 years. >> how long are the terms if you're a member of the house of commons? or the lords? >> the lords -- well, in both houses, have a maximum term of a parliament, which is five years. no government really wants to go up against the buffers of a whole five-year term. it conveys a certain sense of desperation. it sometimes has to happen, as it did just before the last election. however, under the present law, a prime minister can decide when to advise the queen to dissolve. so, he has a benefit, political benefit. the present government have introduced legislation to change that, to have a sort of

standing, five-year term, which will be shortened if either the prime minister loses a vote of confidence, or two-thirds -- which is the present figure -- two-thirds of the house vote for dissolution. so, i think the effect of the current legislation, if enacted, will be to reduce but not eliminate the possibility of a less than five-year count (ph). the lords are, like the senators, are a continuing body. so, those who are in the lords in one parliament, the parliament is then dissolved, they come back in the next parliament. >> the length of the campaign in the united states, is there any statutory date that people start campaigning? >> not statutory. but realistically, it's day one, from the first time they're elected until the next election

two years or six years later. there's fund raising going on in all >> can they advertise and continue campaigning, and all that? >> yes. >> what about in the british -- >> i think that mostly -- it would mostly depend on the political climate. we don't have the same imperative of fund raising from day one. but everybody knows from the politics of the day, or, indeed, the elapse of time, when the next election must be. and you can see imperceptibly the temperature going up just before, months before they has to be a general election. >> can they spend money on advertising during the time they're -- >> they do, but i think the real change of gear comes when everyone, politically, sees an election coming. >> each of you must have a moment in your -- how long were you the clerk? >> so much the same as charlie, 40 years. but the clerk of the house for five, but 40 years in the department. >> what moment do each of you

remember that was the most interesting, controversial, where you had to make a decision? and are you the last word? >> some moments come to mind. one particular difficult moment was in 1985, when tip o'neill was speaker. and your office, c-span, was directly involved in his order as presiding officer, as speaker, for the cameras to pan the chamber. >> well, let me just make sure the audience knows quickly that they weren't our cameras. and you know that. >> no, i'm sorry. >> yes, i mean -- >> you still have to feed off the house cameras. but the speaker had been much upset about the growing rhetorical use of gestures and commentary by backbench republicans, led by newt gingrich, who saw a new approach toward gaining a majority; namely, to ridicule the majority -- then-majority --

which turned out to have been in the majority for 40 consecutive years, the democratic party. by the mid-1980's, the conciliatory notion of cooperation between the speaker and minority leader was beginning to give way, although bob michel, as minority leader, was certainly a collegial, compatible, agreeable person -- not always agreeing on policy. but as these special order speeches, after-hours speeches, began to proliferate with rhetorical gestures to yield to a member who was 500 miles away, but the camera only focusing on the member speaking, would lead some of the audience to believe that that member was refusing to engage. and so, tip o'neill, after a time when his best friend, eddie boland, sponsored the boland amendment on iran-contra, had been characterized as being unwilling to participate in the

debate going on, but in fact was miles away, tip ordered without notifying the minority, the cameras to pan the chamber, which he later admitted his lack of notification was a mistake on his part. but the recriminations began immediately. and over the next two weeks, speaker, then-member gingrich, took questions of personal privilege -- and others did, even bob michel -- to decry the lack of fairness on the part of speaker o'neill. finally, speaker o'neill had had enough, and he took the floor to defend his decision to pan the chamber. and he gestured toward mr. gingrich and he said, the reason i did this is because what you did in these rhetorical gestures was, quote, "the lowest thing i've ever seen in 35 years of politics." immediately, trent lott, then the minority whip, jumped up and demanded the speaker's words be ruled out of order -- taken

down, as you say. and the speaker had installed joe moakley, his very close friend from massachusetts, and had alerted him that he was going to be on the edge. >> joe moakley was the speaker in the speaker's chair. >> moakley was speaker pro tem at the time. and so, he had to rule on whether or not saying that what another member had done was the lowest thing he'd ever seen. and the then-parliamentarian, bill brown, my dear friend and i were both there trying to convince mr. moakley that, yes, you can't have members saying that about others. nor can you have a double standard for the speaker. there had never been a speaker ruled out of order in modern history, certainly. but moakley was saying, "no, i won't do that." and we were very nervous about the precedent that would set, if he overruled the point of order and said the speaker is not out of order. so, finally, we imposed upon him to rule, and he said, "but i'm still not going to do it,

because i think it's true." and the truth was the defense, in other words. and i said, "well, mr. moakley, you can't establish that as a basis for ruling, because that, under those circumstances, anyone could call someone a liar. and if he thought it were true, the speaker would overrule the point of order." so, he gently but firmly gaveled the speaker to order. and that was -- that moment was kind of a -- it was kind of a watershed, as it certainly focused on newt gingrich's ascendancy as a backbench dissident. and yet, at the same time, it showed that the parliamentarian's advice, at least -- which was heeded -- was non-partial, or impartial. >> how long did that conversation take between you, bill brown and mr. moakley? >> i'd say 10 or 15 minutes. and they have to transcribe the words, and so we had a little slack time there in order to try to convince mr. moakley.

but there's no direct precedent in point on someone saying that what another member did was the lowest thing. but common sense would suggest that that was a personality in debate to be avoided on a point of order. >> did that get heeded right there among the three of you? >> well, no. only mr. moakley's reluctance to agree with us. >> and what if he hadn't agreed with you? >> well, if he had ruled that the speaker was in order, there could have been an appeal from the ruling of the chair, which nowadays, you probably know, is commonplace from appeals of the ruling of the presiding officer. and this is a big issue in my mind -- and i was interviewed by david rogers several years ago on this very question -- the politicization of appeals, of rulings from the chair. but if moakley had ruled that the speaker was out of order -- or was in order -- the republicans could have appealed the ruling, and there would have been a roll call vote. and presumably, the speaker, the democrats would have supported the chair, but by so doing, establishing the precedent that

calling another member the lowest thing was not out of order. >> so, did you ever hear whether mr. moakley, who is deceased, and the speaker, who's deceased, tip o'neill, ever had a conversation about this? >> yes. and they went public with it, saying that that, in retrospect, proved that the parliamentarian's advice to the chair was appropriate. and as the republicans took the majority in 1995, that was an example -- certainly in mr. gingrich's mind, who had to retain our services -- that, yes, we could give impartial advice. but the politicization of appeals, brian, was what i was trying to suggest. these days, when the chair will make an obviously correct ruling under some obscure rule of the house, only to have -- and it'll usually be on a question of privilege raised by the minority leader or a member on how the house is running itself. just last week there was one on whether there should be an active lame duck session, and the chair ruled that was a rules change and not a question

of privilege. they appealed. they had a roll call vote. and immediately, those votes on the appeal were spun in various districts, majority districts, as votes on the merits of the proposition, should there be a lame duck session, rather than on the correctness of the chair's ruling. and that's wrong. >> mr. mckay, what moment do you remember? >> oh, i remember very clearly. it was the early 1990's. the house of commons was faced with a bill to enact into british law the provisions of the treaty of maastricht, which was a european treaty changing and extending the basis of the european union. the major government was beginning to fail -- not very quickly, but it was losing by- elections. and it didn't begin with a very big majority.

so, when the maastricht bill came along, the first thing that happened was a shower of amendments. the second thing that happened was the danes voted against ratification. so, the bill was put on the back burner. when the danish mind was changed, back came the bill with 650-odd amendments. now, in the british system, the speaker -- or, in the case of a committee, the chairman of ways and means, which this was -- has the right to select some amendments for discussion and to pass over others. this is not a matter of order. disorderly amendments are junked anyway. but the system allows the chair to say, "this is an important amendment. we'll discuss it with that one and that one and that one, because they're in cognate areas. but that's just silly." or, "i

can't make out what this one means." and, of course, in doing that, the chair's advised by one of the clerks -- in this case, me. we used to have a house on one of the smaller islands in the hebrides. and i had faxed to me all the 600-odd amendments on a day when the house wasn't sitting. and i can remember to this day looking out of the window into the fog with 600 amendments and saying, what in the name of peace am i going to do now? because we knew that, if this went wrong, the government might be in considerable trouble, the house would be in trouble, and the chair would certainly be in trouble. so, what i had to do was to group these 600-odd amendments into thematic groups, so far as i understood them. that had to be concealed, too, because there was some which i simply couldn't understand.

so, you always gave the amendment the benefit of a doubt. if you didn't understand the amendment, you put it into the "yes" bowl rather than the "no" bowl. we were right. the major government in the end began to fall as a result of its performance on the maastricht bill -- not, i'm glad to say, as a result of the selection which i advised, but under the test of all these amendments. and we were quite right. we said to the chairman of ways and means at the beginning, "chairman, you're going to get a motion of censure at the end of this whatever you do." and he did. but i'm pleased to say that, after the motion of censure on the chair being defeated, one of the proponents of the censure came to the chair and said, "michael, i hope you don't mind. it was only political." >> this book, one of the things it doesn't have on it that i can find is the price.

it's an oxford book. i have a sneaking suspicion this is not cheap. how much is this book for people that want to buy it? >> well, the one you're holding, it's obviously a gift out of generosity. >> i accepted it, yes. >> but at this point, brian, as a hardback, and in the category that oxford placed it among reference-type text, which they price rather highly, it's -- it retails at $160. but on amazon, it's reduced by $28 down to -- $32 down to $128. >> and how many pounds, bill? >> oh, i can't remember. it's 70, i think >> 85. >> 85, is it? yes. >> how did you two do this? because i can -- as i read along here, i see you interweaving. >> that wasn't easy. >> yes. >> the interweaving wasn't easy, because sometimes the language is the same, but the meaning is different. and sometimes there is no

equivalent in one parliament, when you're trying to compare it with the other. but we did as much as we could. we simply wrote our sections and tried to meld them as far as we could. but weren't, in my view, were advised not to break the sections we were trying to combine down too far, to make the parallel between the big topics, not between the minutiae. it wasn't easy. >> computer back and forth? >> a lot of that, yes. >> how long did it take you to do this book? >> well, from the time we conceived of the idea, which was the time when i was driving bill to dulles airport his last visit in 2003, i'd say five years going back and forth. the creation of the outline, the approval of the outline by

oxford and its referee, so- called, was the first year or so. but the outline, as i said earlier, it was quite ambitious. and so, to be true to it, rather than try to pare it down or make it a different, shorter book, at least i felt that i couldn't do justice to all the topics in the outline. and my propensity to use more words than were necessary became rather apparent. and oxford originally set a word limit of 100,000 on two of us. quickly, they realized they had to double the word limit, and ultimately, they tripled that word limit, which is what emerged and allowed them to put the high price on it, i suppose. >> so, this is close to 600 pages and 300,000 words. >> yes. >> well, none of us would be sitting in this room doing this, if it hadn't have been for the house of representatives going on television. so, excuse me while i read what you say in here about television

in the house, and then i'll read what you say about in the commons. you write -- how strongly do you feel about this? >> i will stick by that. but the "together with" is important. it's not -- i'm just not saying

it's all television. together with the utilization of so-called modified or closed rules that impose time limits and impose limits on the number of amendments -- if any that can be offered. and then, when those -- when the house adopts a resolution from the rules committee, which establishes the universe of permissible amendments, if any, it will allocate the time between one proponent and one opponent. and the members now, because -- partly because they know they're going to be televised -- will prepare, if they want to participate in that debate, will prepare a speech which will -- and then will find out from the manager how much time he or she will be allocated, and then, usually prepare a speech that consumes all of that time, so that they're not -- they don't have to be interrupted, and they don't have to yield to other members. and other members cannot, as i said, seek their own time by pro forma amendments, the old strike the requisite number of words to get a separate five minutes to rebut or question the sponsor or the opponent.

so, the debate is controlled. but i really base that, brian, more than anything on what i observed before television -- the spontaneity with open rules, with the ability of any member to speak as often -- until the house imposed time limits -- to speak as often as necessary. and the willingness to yield to other members on the other side who were not maybe trying to make debating points, but they weren't going to embarrass the member yielding. >> let me read what mr. mckay wrote --

>> yes. i think i would stick by that. debate still is conversational. i really get the impression that very few if any members talk over the heads of the members, their colleagues, to the cameras. i think, and my experience has been, they forget the cameras are there. and what really tests whether debate is good or bad is the individual oratorical ability, persuasive ability of the member. a rotten speech is a rotten speech, because the member perhaps isn't very good at it. it's not a rotten speech because he's not -- he or she -- is not addressing the house, but

rather addressing a wider audience. besides, i am not actually sure how many -- how much of the british -- how many of the british public actually watch the parliament channel. >> well, here we're in 100 million homes. do you have any idea how many homes in great britain can see it? >> oh, i think most of them can, but few of them will. really. it was essential as a piece of democratic machinery, but great television it ain't. they'd perhaps watch a state opening. they may watch a motion of confidence, at the very end. but the longeur of a debate on -- i don't know -- building preservation in the west of england, very few. >> well, as you know, we've carried "question time" on sunday nights, the half-hour "question time," the british parliament. why is there such a big difference between what we see in their debates and what we see in our debates?

>> well, i'm not sure bill would agree that what we see in "prime minister's question time" necessarily reflects the best of their debates. i'll leave it to him. >> that's why i asked that question. >> but, of course, we don't have "question time." and you may remember, sam gejdenson from connecticut introduced a resolution in the early 1990's to allow periodic questioning of cabinet officers on the floor of the house in the plenary session. and that received a hearing in the rules committee but never went anywhere, because the whole notion of separation of powers, the government is not in the house or in the senate. and there are representatives to make a case under our constitutional notion of separation should be witnesses before a committee. so, to that extent, it's the committee forum that becomes the forum for questions to the executive branch. >> you have another little aside in here that i want to ask you about --

and then you go on to say, "the ingenious phenomenon of reverse doughnutting." so explain that. >> reverse doughnutting was most evident when a backbench conservative member stood against mrs. thatcher in the 1990s for the leadership of the conservative party, and this was not popular among his colleagues. so, whenever he was called to speak and rose, there would be a ring of conservative colleagues round him, but at his first sentence they disappeared, thus conveying the view that no one in the house believed what this guy was saying. >> do they doughnut in the house of representatives or the senate? >> no. i mean, unless i misunderstand the term. >> well, where they would have a whole bunch of people sitting around a member or -- you know,

i mean the committee -- the committee benches and the desks in the middle, and all that. do they do that on purpose? >> well, the appearances of solidarity, perhaps, on either side of the aisle, on television, and clearly, the committee staffs and senior members are together making a collective point, if you will, during a lot of the debates. so, to that extent, i suppose that's nothing -- i'd never -- i'd seen the term in what he had written, but never heard it applied here, because the cameras, as you know, will pick up members anywhere in the chamber. >> would we be better off as a country if we didn't have television in the house and senate? >> there's no turning back now, brian. i mean, my original -- what i wrote there was strongly felt when television began, because i saw members changing their styles and their candor. now, they're changing their attitudes about opponents on issues, because very often they're personal, and they don't

want to engage on their time in someone else's attack upon them. but the american people have to see that now, because it's the core, unfortunately, the core of our -- one of the cores of our political operation. they have to see the charts and graphs, even though they realize this is not debate, because they have to see what the house has become in order to properly judge it. so, to just say there'd be no more television would not work. it wouldn't fly with the american people. there'd be some -- and with all the other electronics that are allowed on the floor with cell phones and blackberrys, and what have you, where members -- i've spoken against this -- where members actually communicate outside with special interests. and we had a rule until recently, you know, that no electronic devices were allowed on the house floor. the senate is almost as strict. but members -- the modern member can't live without an

electronic way of communication. but what that does is, i think, give access to lobbyists and others who have an electronic capability into the chamber, where the chamber, as far as jefferson was concerned at least, was a sanctuary for debate among members without direct outside influence. >> what about in the house of commons? would they be better off without television? >> i agree with charlie. there's no turning back. as i said, the impact of televised parliamentary debate is, i think, not great on the movement of politics. so, television will probably do less harm than charlie anticipates it might in this country. >> do the british have a constitution? >> yes. it isn't written down in one place, you understand. but i think we could be said to have constitutional

arrangements rather than a constitution. >> but i read in your book here that, basically, no one has anything to say about what goes on in the house of commons but the house of commons. >> there is a great deal of pressure on the house from -- well, let me give you an example -- from the human rights law. we were -- the house was taken to the european court of human rights by a lady who thought that her human rights were being infringed. and something which our predecessors could not have contemplated, i.e., that we should go to a court outside the jurisdiction and justify parliamentary freedom of speech -- it happened. the court of human rights has got a double stage procedures. we thought -- i thought, anyway -- that the challenge was so

unmeritorious, we would be successful at a first stage. and to my horror, we had to go to the second stage. and although we won, it was a very uncomfortable procedure. and one of the judges said we were wrong, that this lady ought to have more of a recourse against a member speaking in the house. where that will play, i do not know, but it is an open flank. we may be attacked from that direction again. >> chapter six of the book, "the power of the purse." i'll just read the first sentence --

how is that? >> i think, because there's a four-step process in the congress -- the budget process, the authorization process, the appropriation process and the revenue-raising process -- each of which in its own right takes an inordinate amount of time, some never get accomplished. this year there's no budget resolution. this year, so far, there's no appropriation for most of the government. but the complexity of time and issue in each of those stages -- very obviously now, the budget process with its reconciliation component, and then the appropriations process where policy issues can be revisited in the form of limitation amendments -- each of those takes an incredible amount of time.

and it's probably -- the appropriations process until recent years has been the most open as far as individual member presentation. and so, there's no jamming through of a budget in the congress, which i dare say is, in very simple terms, describes the biggest difference, because, i believe bill would say, in the parliament there isn't much open debate and amendment to budget issues. >> well, the great example of difference is the arrangements made for appropriation at westminster. you can't debate it. >> by the way, in case somebody does not know, what do you mean by westminster? >> in the house of commons, you cannot debate the appropriation bill. >> why not? >> because that's what the rules say. because -- i'll come back to the central paradox, that the proposals for government expenditure, whether as budget or as appropriation, come down like the little boys in "the magic flute," from above. and the house may meddle with

them only up to a limited extent. no backbench member may propose an increase in expenditure. >> what about an increase in taxes? >> no. you can't do that either. >> who determines the tax that you pay in great britain? >> the government. and the house of commons may lighten the burden on the people. it may shorten the time during which the burden rests on the people. but they cannot either increase a tax or increase the spending under a bill. these are rules which go back to the 18th century. select committees have got to look at the efficiency, the efficacy, the economy of spending. bills can be amended to limit expenditure, but not to

increase it. and the appropriation bill is really the tag on which the national audit office conducts the audit of government department accounts. >> chapter 11. we're running out of time -- what happened? >> well, it was kind of a watershed time. probably the most important moment was the adam clayton powell exclusion by the house, which was eventually ruled to be unconstitutional by the supreme court. he had been found by a select committee of the house to have improperly diverted funds and made improper tax claims. and he was the chairman of the education and labor committee at the time. he was -- the select committee's recommendation was

to censure him, strip him of seniority and fine him, but keep him as a member. the house in its wisdom, which it proved to be unconstitutional, decided it didn't have to seat him and then expel him by a two-thirds vote, which would have been the appropriate way, but rather deny him his seat by a majority vote. and that was eventually overturned, and he was re- elected. but that was the indication that the house and senate -- the bobby baker scandal in the senate around the same time -- needed to systematize -- needed to have a code of conduct, needed to have disclosure rules and needed to have some restrictions on lobbying, but also needed to have a committee, a bipartisan committee, if you will, that oversaw ethics complaints in a systematic way, rather than have to create special select committees on an ad hoc basis. >> you write, "nine senators and 22 representatives have

been censured as a punishment for wrong-doing." anything like that in the house of commons? >> oh, yes. see, 15 to 20 years after the issues arose in congress, they arose in parliament. and it began as an instance of members were being accused of taking money to ask questions. and from then on, the house paid more and more attention to ethical problems. it has always been -- again, as it had been in congress -- a code of honor. it just couldn't carry on in that way, because the public wanted to be completely assured, i think, that there was no monkey business. and on and on we went until the -- what is it, 18 months ago now -- until the system which had built up in parliament, in the house of commons in particular, for recording the

interests of members, policing them, punishing them, until that system was shown to be unable to cope with the tsunami of complaints about how members had been treating their allowances. and it was as a result of that, that the very difficult problem was addressed, how do you devise an independent means of controlling and punishing members of a sovereign parliament? >> we only have two minutes. what have you found over the years -- just give us one example -- that the public has no idea when they find out -- i mean, you find people are surprised to find out how the congress operates. >> well, i had meant to include -- you asked me earlier, brian, about the one example of tension and difficulty in the office. and it came to mind, you only gave me one option. but the impeachment process was

virtually unknown to the public, because richard nixon escaped impeachment by resigning. but in 1998, the impeachment process and the way it was manipulated in the house, certainly caught the public's attention, as did our role in advising the chair that a censure motion was not a germane equivalent -- or a germane alternative -- to impeachment under our notion of separation of powers. the british have votes of no confidence. we do not. we do not allow censure. >> what's your example? >> well, i think the way members in all parts of the house, in their better moments, agree with each other -- in select committees. the way they are able to sit, as i said, in the morning to make a constructive criticism of the government, and in the afternoon, some of them make a destructive criticism of the

government. it's a very difficult role, but there is a camaraderie still in the house of commons, and much more so in the lords, on which rests such progress as we're going to have to make in improving and sharpening the house. >> very different from our camaraderie, and lack of it. >> and clearly, we have a lot more to talk about, but our time is up. and the name of this book is "parliament and congress: representation and scrutiny in the twenty-first century." our guests have been former clerk of the house of commons, william mckay, and charles w. johnson, former parliamentarian of the u.s. house of representatives. thank you, gentlemen, very much. >> thank you. >> thank you, brian. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> for a dvd copy of this program, call 1-877-662-7726.

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