once the negative pressure test was passed, they plan would have the crew moves into displacement. what happens at this point is they bop is open. there is a straight shot to the bottom. this puts a large premium on the cement job at the bottom and the negative pressure test that tests the integrity at the bottom. if that cement job fails, the only thing you have is the blowout preventer. the blowout preventer depends on a human on the rig. if a human does not notice there are problems here such that the bop should be shut in, then you have a problem. we believe bp in order to lessen the risk of the situation could

have set the cement plug before displacing the riser to create a second barrier, or put in a mechanical plug. but to put in another barrier to flow during this time of the well. the last point i would like to make is a process. what is of additional concern to us is that the procedures for temporary abandonment were changing up until the last minute. on april 14 one of the engineers at bpa sends out the temporary abandonment procedures. as of april 14 the procedure was to run your drill pipe down to 3,000 feet below sea level and set your plug. at that point it would have been a barrier. only once the barrier had been set with their be a negative

pressure test. that is as of april 14. a barrier would be in place. fast-forward two days to april 16. the procedure has morphed. now the negative test is a first. then you go into 8,300 feet. it was a different type of negative pressure test. you monitor the well and then you set the plug. now they have moved putting in the barrier before the displacement to after the displacement. let's fast-forward to april 20. this is the note sent by the engineers on the morning of april 20 setting forth what the abandonment procedures would be. you will see the surface cement plug is being sent last. there have been additional changes.

they are displacing like we talked about, running the negative test and displacing. as it turns out, this is where the blowout occurred. before that cement plug was set. the process point is it is not clear to us why decisions on these procedures are changing in the last week before the blowout. it strikes us -- you have to change things on the fly because drilling conditions change. this type of procedure does not appear to us should have been changing up until the last minute. this is a note from an april 28 interview of one of the pp

leaders out there that evening -- one of the bp leaders. he said it was a different sequence. the team wanted to do something different. they decided we could do the displacement and negative test together. maybe trying to save time. at the end of the well they think about speeding up. it appeared that at least robert was not in on those conversations were told about why these procedures might be changing. with that, i would like to go back to 8:00, at the time the crew was about to start displacing. >> we are running a little bit late. it is important ever want understand this. it is complicated stuff.

i understand the commissioners want to keep going. >> we will take a short lunch break if necessary. >> i said earlier i want to be sure you don't confuse with what i said earlier. i said we see no instance where a decision making person sat there aware of safety risks and opted to give up safety for costs. there are people that made observations about what they thought others might be doing. we do not say everything done was perfectly safe. we are saying people traded to save the $4. we studied the hell out of this. -- we are saying people traded time to save dollars.

we have not seen that. you have to be sure you understand that. now we are going to kick detection. this is transocean's -- they have a volume this deck on how you operate a deep water. they say a kick is when oil gas gets in the wellboard. you will see him sitting in his chair as to continually monitor what is going on. if there is a kick, the driller in to shuiut the well quickly. things really happen fast. what might be 3 barrels of gas by the time it gets to the surface, it is moving like hell. it is powerful beyond belief.

he will see the impact of these gas influxes eroding away carbon steel. this really happens fast. this is the driller. he has a screen in front of him. he can choose what is to be on that screen. the fact that he can choose what is on the screen is important because we don't know what was on the screen that night. because it went down with a rig. we will be asking questions as to what they think it showed,

but we only have a secondary source as to what the evidence really was. here is a better chartres -- better shot of the screen. commissioner murray saw this. if you look here to the side there is another screen. that has -- a driller has the high tech data that is gone. this is a subsidiary of halliburton. it is also available at bp's office. you could have seen this data there. there is nobody in the bp office

that night. everybody has gone home. this is the data. the information as to what was happening when the cement job failed is here. this is the information. what we have done here is to move it sideways because every time bp display is this information they take it sideways and expand it. that is because it is easier to see. here is drill pipe pressure. here is this information. this is a little complicated. we don't know anybody in the

world saw this specific information. it was available in the alberta and schack. it was available in houston. we don't know anybody was looking at it because the driller had this information available but would have been looking at the screen. it is difficult witte -- what this information shows when we don't know anybody looked at it. i try to imagine myself having been there for eight hours in that chair watching that stuff. is this a big deal? it turned sideways and spreads out. the drill pipe pressure is constant. it is increasing.

it is subtle. if the trailer knows that they are displacing heavier fluids with lighter fluid to sea water, then maybe it makes this upward move more significant. one of the points we are going to make is that the system depends on the right person watching this information at the right time have enough knowledge about all the other activities to interpret it the right way and to act very rapidly. it depends on people -- one person getting everything right at the right time. we have talked to a lot of people here about -- i cannot

subpoena people and put them under oath. i wish i could. i think it is dan important. people in the industry have said of course we would have noticed that. i pressed them like i am pressing myself here. people begin to say i don't know about this first one. the second one is interesting because they turn off the pumps totally to perform a test. now the drill pipe pressure is going up quite a bit. they have given us by lot of data and the useful explanations that can explain why some of this happened, but nobody can say the drill pipe

pressure was not going up wendy pumps were off. most people we talked to say that should have been detected and somebody moved fast. the explosion occurred at 9:49. it can be closed in 47 seconds. we will be talking about this later, but when i looked at this i said with all these skills people have isn't there a better way to display this information so that we have algorithms that point when things are heading in the wrong direction. this is unfair because i am talking about this. the data -- maybe the data was a

lot clearer than this. maybe there was digital information that was easier to pick up. i would expect that the screen would be better because it is there rig, but i don't know that. it is a critical thing that would be good to know. one of the issues -- we know there was a kick then and hydrocarbons were coming through that had not been abbreviated we know there was a leak. remember i told you earlier we would discuss where the leak occurred. did it come up?

let's go to the next one. this is a hangar seal. they made this and these guys have some of the best engineers i have ever seen. they say there is no damage to the casing hangar seals at all. if they came up there would be some damage to the seal. remember i told you you would be blown away by the power of this gas under pressure coming up through the riser? this is the way the inside of the casing looks. this stuff is so strong on the inside they have been totally blown away by the force of gas coming up.

amazing the force of this. but the inside is totally eroded. bp agrees -- we are not sure about how the burden. they may say we don't know that come up but that is what we will be doing. we feel their view is that the leak came up the shoe. if the flow had been -- you can see what that pressure will do in a big area. these holes would have been torn apart brand there has been a discussion here of what happened at the very end.

transocean was good enough to prepare this slide for us which shows the activities that have been going on. the negative test took three hours. sean grimsley told you about the discussion. at 8:00 they deem it done wrong way. we have to keep repeating nobody thought they were taking a chance. for one reason or another they convince themselves they faulty tests had succeeded. a critical point in this thing. we will not go through this at length. it shows the activities that were going on when they began displacing the rise in. when you take the sea water out of the riser and put in

seawater, then there is less pressure at the bottom of the formation. we see the different activities going on. it will be up to the commission to decide if those were too many activities. if you should have rules about what activities are going on so everybody knows what is going on. here is the taverna and date separator. remember it that the hydrocarbons come up here. the crew has a choice of sending the stuff coming up. mud is now on the floor because the pressure is pushing the mud up first.

when gas comes up, that is really bad. the crew could send this stuff to the mud gas m separatorgasud sometimes -- mud gas separator. the mud gas separator is a relatively light weight piece of apparatus. it could not have withstood the pressure coming out from the bottom of the well. it did not and there is a question as to whether if the crew had diverted it overboard, instead of sending it to the mud gas they sent it over board, would that have stopped the explosion? we have some information on the burgers. -- information on diverters.

remember, gas is in the rise turnout. the issue is bp says the crew might have done better if they sent it overboard. time is happening rapidly. let's see what the existing knowledge was on diverters. this is the transocean document. if there is rapid expansion of gas in the riser the diverter must be closed and diverted over court. if you look at the manual you are impressed by it. it is a safety experts dream. we will talk tomorrow about it because everything under the sun

is covered. it is hard to see at a particular place somebody saying symptoms of that for this. people have tried like hell to get it, but it may be that when time is short there might have been different ways to make clear what should have been done. there was a report on diversion 1999-2006. the success rate was very high. this is a point we covered before. we all know a little gas at the bottom is a lot of gas at the top. we can cut to the chase. let's just cut to the next

slide. we are now going to the blowout. hydrocarbons' emerge on the brick -- emerged on the rig. that is where the initial explosion is. there has been talk of can you fireproof a rig? production rates are a lot of attention is paid to every light fixture being sealed. drilling rigs are not as fire- protective. anybody with any engineering knows gas and air is perfect. it is a perfect substance for

exposure. to an ordinary person, if you have huge volumes of flammable gas coming up into the riser at extremely high pressures, it is pretty likely something will happen. this is what happened. transocean tried its darndest to be sure that people will that problems could be caused when the wells are under balance. transocean had to have an earlier problem in the north sea. i have agreed with transocean this slide accurately reflects what was learned from that explosion. transocean and they well operator analyze the event.

hi vigilance is required when you have one barrier under ballots. the only barrier we had that night was the cement. it had failed the negative pressure test. people know there was one bear, and that called for heightened hyde vigilance while everybody -- people knew this was something you have to be careful. what is high vigilance? should you have your hands somewhere? we all agreed that the -- that is a lesson they communicated to people. you have to recognize when the well is under balance. you have to have heightened vigilance. a lot of this depends on the

right person with the right knowledge and experience seeing the right information and making a quick decision. finally, remember i showed you this information going up? i said the problem is it gets confusing that that is not what the driller was looking at. one would hope the driller was looking at information clearer than that. transocean nail that they had to highlight -- transocean nknew they had to highlight. there were kick detectors. some were a subtle and again this is a wonderful observation,

but how do you highlight it? these are some of the issues the commissioners will be dealing with. the last two hours. it is 8:02. bp is open. the negative pressure test is over. it has been wrongly interpreted as successful when everybody agrees it was unsuccessful. they begin to remove the heavy mud that allows hydrocarbons to come up. 50 minutes later bp calculates through some software which we have not unpacked yet. we have not figured it out.

we assume it is sensible. i put up bp's conclusions most don't disagree with. the well is under ballots. 50 minutes of putting in the sea water to balance the well. that means if the cement job is failing the hydrocarbons will start entering the well. a little after that we get this subtle increase. the well is under bounced and symptoms are starting to show up again. it is so easy to get confused. we don't know what the trailer was looking at. -- we don't know what they driller was looking at. bp is open. the cement is the only barrier.

hydrocarbons are going to get up into the drill pipe. when they get up there is nothing you can do to stop that. 9:38, bp calculates that hydrocarbons are in the riser. bp is open. if you shut it down you still have a mile of risers full of hydrocarbons. they are going to come out on the creek. you are probably going to have a big explosion. with that have solved some later problems? maybe. coming out on the floor. the hydrocarbons are coming up under enormous pressure.

now the presenter is activated. that is that big tire that shows -- the transocean crew operated at 9:41. bp says this is the first action taken by the crew when they see the mud coming up. we don't know if that is accurate. there are disputes between bp and transocean as to who said what when. there are disputes about who has responsibility for what. we sat down with everybody and we get a lot of arguments. this is where subpoena power would be helpful, because it will be hard to resolve those

unless i can sit people down and cross examine them to find out what is believable and what is not believable. i have no reason to believe anyone said anything they don't believe. but people are at the kits. the annual per venter activate it. a nearby ship. you go out to these wells and there are ships working around them. it looks like a small community out there. the drill crew does exactly the right thing. they say move back, something that is going on. gas comes out on the drill floor. you can see how fast this happens.

eight minutes later the gas is up. the first explosion, a power loss, things happened fast. it is brings to life those last couple hours what was going on. you can see it is when the negative pressure test is wrongly concluded to have worked. they start removing the blood and pressure on the hydrocarbon is released. that is when everything starts going south. i said earlier we would give this group our preliminary technical conclusions. when we began the afternoon i will say it does anybody want to comment on any of days. if they want to comment, find. not commenting does not mean

they agree. they can submit a paper within five days with every kind of idea under the sun. if we ever get subpoena power we will use those to cross-examine people further. it would be the good thing to do. preliminary means we will change them if somebody gives us information that is wrong. i have told all the parties i will tell you what we are thinking so nobody is surprised. you have every chance to tell us how we screwed up. this was exclusively through the casing. the cement may be contaminated and displaced by other materials. the annual space cement is what

-- the hydrocarbons could not get in unless something happened. laboratory data should have prompted redesigned. we look at these differing results. we think maybe more time could have been spent getting consistent results. remember that most of the lab reports show that stuff works better if you stir it for 3 hours before you foam it. yopu foam it and send it down the well. it may be that foaming it -- it gets the same scientific result as the first conditioning. we don't know that. the negative pressure test --

cement evaluation tools might have identified the failure. most operators would not have run the tools on that time. bp can see it in this report that maybe if they had done a risk assessment of all the things we showed the commission earlier maybe they would have run this instead of sending halliburton home. it probably would have shown some. negative pressure test repeatedly showed the primary cement juppe had not isolated hydrocarbons. i think public sam sankar drove that -- i think sean grimsley drove that home. they treated the negative pressure test as a success. abandonment procedures

introduced additional risks. sitting at 3,000 feet reduces the pressure at the bottom of the well. bp had good reasons for doing that. we feel -- i don't want to have anybody saying he missed something, tell us now. we think setting the temporary abandonment plug that low introduced some additional risk. people have told us looking at this that the simultaneous activities and the nature of the monitoring equipment made detection more difficult. if there is something i am less certain about, -- you can argue

endlessly over the effects of moving mud around. that is a preliminary conclusion we are prepared to make. the big indications which i showed you were clear enough that if observed would have allowed the crew to respond earlier. the irony is we don't know what the driller was looking at. i would hope the information would be at least as good as halliburton. once the crew recognized the influx there were options that would have prevented them to lay the explosion. triggering the emergency disconnect earlier might have shot in the well and limited the impact of the explosion.

there are issues as to whether the emergency disconnect would have worked. there is a lot of complexities of this. that is why we say it might have shot in the well. technical conclusions should have waived results. i'm sure you wanted to hear more about the bop. finally, it really is important that you distinguish what i am saying. as we stand here today we don't see where a man or a group of men were making one of these decisions and they had in their minds that if we do it this way it will be safer, we will do it the cheap way instead of the safeway. we know that $1 million a day is

a lot of money. the idea that the delay cost $1 million is overhanging on the heads of people. they don't want to risk their lives, so there is a complex matrix here. the matrix is they want to be efficient and don't want to waste money, but they don't want their bodies to get killed. i have been on a lot of breaks and i don't believe people sit there and say this is really dangerous, but the guys will make more money. i think it is more complicated than that. what we are saying is human beings that made the decision -- we don't see a concrete situation where humans made a trade off of safety for dollars.

thanks so much for your attention. we will be asking a number of questions of panels. >> thank you for that tour de force. we will resume at 1:30-30 minutes. see you then. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> a couple of live events tomorrow morning. the national commission investigating the oil spill continues to meet.

hearing from oil drilling experts in the morning and from oil company executives in the afternoon. our coverage is beginning at 9:00 eastern. at 11:00 eastern, the heritage foundation hosts a discussion on the future of tea party political groups. panelists include the leader of the first coast tea party in florida and radio host. >> with most election results final, use the video library to see what the winners said on the campaign trail. search and share any time, all free. >> this year's studentcam video documentary competition is in full swing. upload your video to c-span before the deadline of january 20 for your chance to win $5,000.

go online to studentcam.org. >> the chief counsel to the national commission on the bp oil spill called on congress to give the panel subpoena power. bp and halliburton executives -- fred bartlit says he was hindered by relying on second- hand information. this was a series of meetings investigating the april 20 gulf of mexico oil spill. today's session three errors in its entirety after 3:00 a.m. eastern. more from today's meeting.

>> thank you. i am the committee manager of the department of energy representing this commission. deputy assistant has appointed me to serve as the dedicated officer for the remainder of this meeting. with that, i called this meeting back to order and turn it over to the chair. >> we will resume with the panel discussion. i will turn its back to you. >> thanks, bill.

>> as i said earlier that we were going to give you a chance to comment on any of the conclusions. if you don't comment that does not mean you admit them. people can add material later within five days. we might talk to you again about it. i just want to go through this again. we know bp agrees with that because we read the report. do you have a position on that? >> can we get more amplification? >> that is unusual. maybe a first for you. is that better? >> it is.

shoesn't up through the track? >> we agreed that that is the most likely path. >> are you doing for their work? >> we continue to look at new evidence as it comes in and when we can come to final conclusions. >> you have looked at the seal assembly that came up? you feel that supports your view that a came up through day shoe track? you both don't have to have opinions. do either of you have an opinion? >> i'm sorry we ask that people speak into the microphone and began when they are the first to answer the question to introduce yourself. >> i am john. i am not in a position to

contest it either way. >> i in the gulf of mexico cementing manager for the region. i do disagree with a conclusion that is drawn. >> do you think the leak came up [unintelligible] what do you base that on? >> there is a few pieces of data that we have that has been shared already. as a result of the cementing operatione believe that gas and oil was pushed up. if you go back before the actual incident -- >> let's put the wrong string up there so we can see what we are talking about. >> if you go back before it was run and -- it was noted there was 1200 units of gas that was circulated prior to them coming out of the whole.

this is with the mud-the -- mud in the hole. doing a bottom up circulation i believe that gas was allowed to coalesce. as they started to pump mud into the casing, that position that those fluids -- what that does is because we indicate there were no losses they take that pressure from down -- you are carrying that up towards the base of the seal assembly. we felt like there was going to be a channel present in the cementing operation which would allow communication for the fluids to continue to flow.

>> let me interrupt to set the stage. bp concluded that there were no leaks from the reservoir either before or during the cement operation. you agree with that? >> there was no leaks. >> the hydrocarbons did not enter the well during the cement operation. >> i disagree with that. i believe they entered the well while we were doing the displacing. the well is very much in balance. we know that gas have coalesced inside the well bore. as we did the >> cement job and displaced it, it was pushing that gas up -- as we did the cement job. >> do i understand how burton's view that when the cement

operation began there were hydrocarbon's here? the cement turned a corner and pushed the hydrocarbons up? >> it is my view as we begin the operation that gas and oil was present. we continue to push that up. you draw that pressure from the base all the way up to the seal assembly. it is roughly 13,000 psi. during the negative test we did the casing test. it was successful. if they casing test was successful and we had had gas coming through you would see anomalies in that test because you would be pressuring up gas that would be at a different rate than liquids. he would have a change in slope,

and we don't see that. i don't think anything has entered inside the casing. >> it is your position that hydrocarbons never entered through the halliburton cement jumped? >> i believe the hydrocarbons made it up to the seal assembly. after the operation week sealed the seal assembly. we do the pressure test that indicates good integrity. we then go into the negative test operations. as soon as you create the negative test essentially what you are doing is removing that pressure. you will create a differential. think about the 13,000 psi, and you have 3600 psi sitting on top.

that results in 9500 psi acting up. when you evacuate that you take off that marchand and now you have a resulting pressure that is almost 11,000 psi. it is acting on that entire seal assembly. it is 237 inches square. you are looking at close to 2.5 million pounds of force that is acting out on that seal assembly. the casing inside weighing down. it weighs roughly 750,000 pounds. you have a force of 1.5 million pounds. the blowout was initiated from gas and oil coming in the negative test with the rapid

influx. you had a failure. which is a weak point. that is when fluids move up into the casing. >> you think hydrocarbon's got in here -- they are sitting up at the seal assembly already. they are sitting up there waiting. once you create that pressure differential, now you have the lift up with a gas and oil coalescing inside the bop area. you thought everything was okay because the gas and oil is already there. you will not have it my great 18,000 feet all the way up that casing and calls the blowout. gas and oil was already present. that is what caused the initial

blow of. >> this is where you are looking? >> yes, that is a rough assessment. >> do you have any comment? >> only to go back to the work we did in our report. this was covered extensively in the report. i was confident in when the report was issued two months ago. that that had been the flow path. we demonstrated that with matching the surface pressure data. reconfirmed it with additional information that became available to demonstrate it had not come up.

since that report there has been further confirming information, not least of which is the picture you have here. >> you understand being made? >> i could not follow the logic of his description. >> i would suggest you give us a written piece on this. i think i get the outlines of what you are saying. it is new to everyone. we'll allow the other parties to examine this and comment and return. our conclusion. the next conclusion is cement potentially contaminated or

displaced materials and in some portion of the bass failed to isolate the hydrocarbon. i know you agree with that. do you? >> presently we have looked at some level of the cement, but it is outside our area of expertise. i will defer to bp to address this. >> maybe you disagree also? >let's put it up again. the cement failed to isolate hydrocarbons. >> i agree that it did not isolate. >> thank you. our next point is they pre-job laboratory data should have prompted -- do you had a view on that?

>> it is worth making a comment on this because there has been new information. when our report came out we signaled we felt this was the case and we did not see evidence that some critical information had been looked at. that was particularly around stability and other matters. that was our view at the time of our report. i was interested to see the letter that came out within the last 10 days that seemed to concur with that. there might have been further information that was not available. >> i have to differ on this point. >>in hindsight today do you agree with that? >> based on the laboratory

results on the job, i believe those results were adequate come up but depending on which lab tests you are looking at, there was a lot working towards the point where we executed the job. >> do you agree or disagree with that conclusion number three? >> i would say we are still looking into it right now. >> the next point is cement evaluation tools might have identified the failure. i don'trst asked -- know if there is sufficient expertise. is it true the to will that sam showed would have been able to identify the >> cement? is that true or not? >> i am not an expert. the experts suggested it might

come up but it is much more reliable to do after. >> bp agrees that most people would do the test later on? you said in your report that if bp had done a risk assessment at the time rather than waiting -- what is the risk assessment bp could have done that you are referring to? >> they criticism we raised was that we did not see any individual point that was wrong. it was a matter of engineering judgement. given the nature of this john, the team could have done a more formalized risk assessment. that may have led to other measures. >> we put up a list of issues pertaining to the nature of this job.

would the formal risk assessment have involved going through those factors as a group rather than taking them one at a time? >> i think a way that the 13 you showed it is not how it would have worked because there were contingencies in those. the first few were to do with the nature of drilling in the gulf of mexico. informed subsequent decisions around the choice of foam cement by the contractor. i think some of those things would be in there, but i don't think this is how someone would have sat down and looked at it. >> i am not familiar with formal risk assessment. is that used with mvp? >> there are a number of different processes.

>> you said in your report that if you had done a formal risk assessment you might have run date cement. can you tell us what would that formal risk assessment have amounted to? there was a number of factors that indicated -- there were reports that said the cement job went well. there is a lot of evidence that things were okay. as my team went back through, they said that was all right but there were some factors here. the difference between lift pressure that was described that we said in hindsight, those could have caused the team to think more carefully.

that was the nature of that area of the report. >> do you have a view on the utility of cement evaluation tools? >> they are good in identifying cement. it will use what they call a cement bond tool to identify cement and they are useful. >> let's turn to -- people may have forgotten why that is important. the bond log may have value in identifying some men. let's look at that. >> while you're looking for that, let's go to the next one.

we will come back to it. this is my fault. - pressure tests repeatedly show that the primary cement job had not isolated hydrocarbons. i take it you agree with that? >> yes. >> despite those results, bp treated the tests as a complete success. in meeting with you, i had seen a difference emerging as to whether your people -- and may be wrong. whether your people did not take a position on it. they wanted to -- that is a lousy question. would you agree that bp co and a

personnel treated it as a success? >> there was a lot of confusion at that time. industry standard is the operator will provide approval or -- bp in this case. our personnel did not have the experience or 32 prove or disprove the negative tests. when the approval came back, there was a good - test, our people preceded ahead on the good faith it was a good test. >> did your people know what a negative test is? >> certainly in the course of normal business, we understand what a negative test is. >> you do them all the time. >> when you look at the structure of negative tests, the operator will design a negative test and we will said that tests up to the design. their interpretation of that test and interpretation reside

with the operator. >> did your people on the well that night have the training and ability to interpret the negative pressure tests? >> interpretation is the responsibility of the operator. >> that was not my question. my question is, did they have the training and experience to interpret a negative test? >> i cannot sit here today and tell you if they did or did not. >> as far as you know, today, you do not know whether the t.o. personal had the experience and training to tell us a negative pressure test is successful or not. >> in this case, there were complications with regard to the negative test which i am sure will get into in some detail. >> with the depth it was being displaced 2 and the complications of the spacer,

when we look at this today, we can tell you that when the test was set up, it was giving correct results. that added confusion and the test became complicated. >> did your people have the training and experience that transocean [unintelligible] and draw a conclusion as to the meaning of it? >> i do not know. we have not been able to talk to those people as to how they were thinking or how they would discuss that situation. >> i think you agree with that second to last bullet. >> we covered this again in some

detail in our attempts to go back and peace the steps. there had been a number of discussions between bp and transocean personnel. they were trying to do this test correctly but they misinterpreted. >> it was bp that was supposed to do the prairie interpretation. if your people saw test the believed had failed, they would say so. >> absolutely. do you have any reason to believe that the t.o. person nnel believe the test was a success? >> they both thought it was a success.

>> this is one of those areas where it would be useful to some people down. i told you i would try to point out areas where we had -- where subpoena power would be useful. this is an example. bp's temporary abandonment procedures introduced additional risk. we did not quantify the risk. do you agree or disagree? >> i do not exactly a great. i and our work, we went through what turned out to be the critical things we thought had contributed causally. we clearly identified the failure and the negative tests and subsequently, the monitoring. we did not see the procedures here as particular to that.

we felt they were covering the other things they described. >> you saw the testimony that at least the people who did testify that it was unusual. the cement was unusual to go down to 3,000 feet. >> i can comment. it seems to me there is two things that happened. one is to set a cement plug in seawater. >> your initial plan was to set it in seawater. >> the initial plan was the one you would have been working on for a long time, isn't that true? the initial abandonment plan? >> i cannot tell you for fact. i was going to remark that setting a plug in sea water is a

common practice and it has a good engineering basis. many would say that is a good way to get a firm plugged. >> you are going to set in mud, right? >> i cannot remember that detail. >> can you put up the sequence? people do set cement plug in mud, don't they? you are the guys who set these? how often do you set in mud? >> we will displace out at 300 feet and set the plug at other areas. we're setting them in mud. >> you set at 300 feet. this was set down to 3000. hominy plugs have you set in

your career? >> many. >> 1000? >> sure. >> can you quantify for the commissioners in some way, how often you set the plug as low as the 3,000 foot the plug was said here? >> i have never seen it said this before. >> in your career? >> my career. -- in my career. >> here is the original e-mail. you are going to set to the cement plug in mud. do you recall that? >> i recall it from this morning's discussion. >> if setting a plug in mud would not work, your guys would not have made the initial proposal, would they? >> i think there is engineering choices you are making through the course of these things. >> was that yes or no? >> i do not know what was in their head. you asked me to speculate about what they were thinking. i can tell you there is engineering choices you make.

sitting in mud is something that happens sometimes. sometimes people choose to set them in seawater. >> who is mr. moralists? is he an engineer? >> he is a bp engineers. -- engineer. who would have been part of the decision to set the plug on and mud? -- in mud? >> the team would have made those decisions. >> if your team who made this decision to set it in mud later changed if there were qualified, we cannot say and it is a mistake to set it in mud. >> i did not say that. >> niu did not. it isn't engineering trade-offs decision. >> people set them in mud all the time.

did the panel get that? >> i agree. >> the reason that you did not set it at 300 feet is because you wanted to hang that pipe on lockdown. >> that is a separate decision. that decision had to do with the depth of the setting as opposed to the decision to set it in seawater. >> moving the upper put down from 300 feet to 3,000 feet did take a lot of the mud out of the well, didn't it? >> it increased it. >> when you replace mud with sea water, that is under balancing the well and increasing under balance. increasing the under balance means there is less force at the bottom of the well holding the hydrocarbons in. as the panel agreed? >> yes. next page of our conclusion.

>> we have not completed the point. what i said was it was more drawdown. there is no reason to believe that increases the risk. if the plug had been set at 500 feet below the mud line, the well would have been under balance. and if the flow indicators had been missed, the same thing would have happened. the point and the reason i have taken an exception to it is it is making a judgment about a small change in risk that i think was not a causal factor. >> there is a small change in risk that you do not think was a factor. >> it is hard to gauge how much of a change in risk there was. it is going to flow of you do

not catch it. if you miss the negative test, botthe same thing will happen. >> the purpose is not to argue or cross-examined. i would be willing to accept the short paper on why there was no increase in the risk by going down 3,000 feet or more. the risk was small and inconsequential. the purpose of this is we told the commissioners yesterday, so you can see the differences that emerged. if we need further work, we will invite commissioners. a number of simultaneous activities made [unintelligible] more difficult during riser displacement. in your report, you said that might have been the case. you were -- said it might happen. transocean was good enough to give us a slide which we used which you prepared. you and your team. here it is.

we will start with mr. vargo. you probably do not have any opinion on whether detection was obscured by all the activities going on. >> i would agree. the number of simultaneous activities would have obscured a lot of the data that would normally be used to evaluate the case. >> i carefully read your report. you do not reach a conclusion on whether the activities. obscure it. your of the opinion it might. you have anything to add to that? >> the primary thrust of our findings and work was we believe that the well was in a condition where it could blow for quite some time, 40 or 50 minutes before the event. indeed was flowing. through the court -- course of

that, for whatever reason, those conditions were not observed and acted on intel quietly into the event. it is possible that the activities were going on may have made it so the crew did not notice. we believe the well was monitor able even with the simultaneous activities. >> you opined a lot was going on. is this routine? >> the term simultaneous operations or activities may mean something different. it is more -- activities you are talking about are sequential. activities required [unintelligible] and the chart that showed that a lot of these things are

sequential and there are necessary steps to making sure we can temporarily abandon the well. >> this is a normal sequence of activities? >> up to the point where we start noting [unintelligible] we do agree the underbalance point happen before 9:00. there were different things happening during that time. >> bp said 852 p.m. 9 >> the -- one of the things she said, you have to get into the heads of the people on the red. we can only suppose what was going through our crew's head. when you look at the trend on a

minute by minute basis with 20- 20 hindsight, you see trends that when the dollar took action, he saw a trend expected to happen. there were points when things were masked. the flow started coming in. it is -- coincidence is not your best friend sometimes. >> he did the necessary thing at that point to put the 14 pound will based mud back into the mud. system. it is unfortunate that at that point, it masked what was the biggest influence at that point. >> that is an interesting point. have you as transocean gibbon

attention since this, you said it was a coincidence and the actions -- have you thought about any different ways of conducting these activities that could avoid an unfortunate coincidence which masked what was going on? >> we have not concluded our investigation. we just as three weeks ago received information that helped us understand what was happening. until that -- we get the facts in, it is hard to make those conclusions. >> before the commission's report is due in january and december, you think more about these and of the well activities and have any concrete ideas for how you could segment them to avoid things like that unfortunate coincidence week heard about. we will receive it and considered. >> will continue to be

cooperative. >> let's go back -- let's go back to the terror that has gone the red -- chart with the red line, the kick chart. this is something we talk about a lot. it is true that t.o. representation on the screen of these events, you do not know what it looks like as you sit here today. it is a very high tech system. you had a good impression of what that looked like. it is very customizable. depending on their operation at the time, the drilling could have been looking at the screens in any one of the different formats. we do not know.

we can suppose that there were looking at something we provided the commission. the t.o. refers to their system as the high-tech system. that is their internal window for that. would you expect the driller to have been looking on your system at some, it might be different. the data might be presented differently. some indication of drill pipe pressure? would you expect him to be monitoring that? --when you look at the test >> why don't you explain the sheen test? >> it was a period where surely

after 9:00, the oil based mud is coming back and they are expecting the 16 lb water based is arriving back. what you are doing is shutting down your pumping operations to look for the interface to make sure you have 16 lb mud at the top of the riser. that is the point where you discharge overboard after that point. shortly after 9:00, the mud pumps were shut down for 4.5 minutes. this is where you have to go minute by minute to understand what you may or may not have seen when it comes to the driller screens. after the mud pumps were shut off, it was almost 60 seconds of constant, steady pressure. the natural tendency and we have talked with drillers on the record that say how would you go about this period of time?

and having looked and seen 60 seconds of constant pressure, that would have told him that things appeared constant in the well. and then when he confirmed that, he may have been turned to do the next step in the process, which was lined up another pump to [unintelligible] >> let me be sure i understand. i appreciate the forthrightness of your remarks. you are saying that people might look at this for 60 seconds and it looked ok, either of these, they might turn to do something else and not be focused at all times on those lines the involved. we do not know that. we're guessing. you are using our judgment based on someone who has been in this business for well. is that what you are telling me? >> we're doing our best to

estimate. >> does everyone agree that in hindsight, he is an expert n thi on this data. we appreciate you coming year. we agree that at a time when you are putting heavier fluid in instead of lighter fluids and the drill pipe is steady, this is a small increase. was it an indication that the hydrocarbons were coming from the reservoir into the well? to you agree? >> the expectation would be if heitor cards were introduced, you would see it decrease while pumping. >> you agree that looking at this, an experienced person like

you would have wondered what was going on down there. what it because to make further inquiry? >> if there were represented in this section and if they had been looking at the screen and concentrating on the pressure, they would have seen that ramp up and might have given pause and pick up the phone. not necessarily an indication of a kick but it would be something to investigate. >> with this second -- would this second period be more of a kick? >> the log you have is the actual log they were launching on the horizon. the standpipe pressure especially on the first increase, it draws a straight line. it is difficult to spot that 100 pound increase over that extended period.

using the presentation. this being unfairly unconventional response to a kick, when you are receiving a kick, you would expect the drop by and pressure due to the lighter hydrocarbons. this increased the pressure so that it is not your typical indicator but it is something to give pause. >> you pointed to something that concerned us as women. engineers but not experts in our business. that is the difficulty of someone sitting there at the end of the eighth hour of the shift and seeing any trans. with the fact the crew is displacing heavy mud with lighter seawater have given more significance to that line? >> you would expect a slight drop in standpipe pressure.

the rate would depend on the flow rate in. i would like to clear up something regarding the data and how you would be watching this. we referred to this as real-time data. it is real time as you're watching it. it is no different than watching a ball game live and seeing the replay. when you are looking at that replay, it is no longer live. well it was collected in real time, we are no longer looking at it in real time. to watch this is different than going back post-job and looking at it. when you are staring at these traces, you will have to wait a significant number of minutes to notice a certain trend. this 100 pound increase. it is not something that would

be -- >> i know we have got one on this one. whenever bp wants to explain this they flipped sideways and stretch it out. do you agree as the expert here that turning it sideways and stretching it out enables you to see things that might not be as a parent in the original trace? >> you can emphasize certain traces, certain responses and make them look more or less significant. >> here is -- what started out here. keep going. this is the first kick line here. that is sort of what you're seeing as the trace down there. >> right.

>> it is your view that that is as clear as it could be. >> the displays you have, turning it sideways and changing the time frame. those will work in situations like this one but they are not conducive to a proper monitoring. the scales that are chosen for displays in the mud lot, i am not sure. the loggers will select a scale and selective presentation that is most efficient for them for identifying certain anomalies. to present that sideways comparison on that reduced scale on the stand pipe pressure would make it difficult for them to track large increases or decreases in standpipe pressure. you would end up with the standpipe reaching the top of the scale. you hit a peak in the flat line

and you do not want to see that when you are monitoring. >> here is the sideways one going more slowly. of course, we know that this is not the way it was presented. one thing i have never been sure of. i should have asked this before. transocean has its own system. why does [unintelligible] to keep separate data? why don't they use the t.o. data? >> most of it was their data. this is actually transocean's data that was stored in our database. most of the data in that database is -- was transmitted to us real time. some of the data that was not transmitted to us, that was the

result of our sensors. the flow out to end there were a couple of standpipe [unintelligible] but the tank volumes, the flow in, the pump stroke indicators, all that was collected by transocean. t.o. has data. what we do not have the data at your side? i am curious. but pay extra to have the group send their data? >> if you look at the totality of what you use, it is not welcomed -- [unintelligible]

there is a lot of things it is used for. that is the reason. >> you know and it is interesting. i have never focused before. this drill pipe pressure i have been focusing on came from transocean. your mud loggerhead the zeros and ones that make up or is it an analog system? >> several of these sensors are transocean. the question we have had is which ones and we have never received the map that says which particular sensors on these charts were being measured from transocean sensors. it is something we have not had. the sensors -- it is standpipe pressure from transocean. one of the things when we talked with nov regarding animating

some of this, they said our system and this is one of the big differences monitors and records things. this is every five seconds. there is a 20 times difference in the sample rate. that is one of the reasons why it is different data in that regard. we still do not understand some of the way it has been presented. it is averaged data. it is not the original points. it is not exactly the same data. exactly certain how it is average store presented. we're using it to the best of our ability. some of it appears to be average. >> let me informed the commission that anybody with a head on their shoulders would say isn't there a way to take the existing data which we know

came from transocean in part and get the transocean model that has been made and put the zeros and ones in there so the commission could now exactly what the driller was looking at. we have been told, some people do not want to do it, others think it is difficult to do. if i were you, i would want to know that. that might be something we want to pay more attention to. i do not have any answers. do you think it is possible from an engineering point of view to take the data and put it in the software that drove the high- tech data so we can get some better look as to what your trailer was looking at? >> it is possible and we have answered -- asked that be done. we have run into some

roadblocks. we're asking that gets done. >> the commission would agree would be worthwhile pursuing this issue after this meeting. maybe the commission could lend some way to resolve this problem. do you think and i am saying this not in a provocative way. if i were the owner of the rig, you guys, i would want my high- tech data to be as the label as possible. we can see, some of us agree that some of these on his data are hard to pick up by a driller. do you have any opinion as to would have.'s system presented this kick information in a clearer or more dramatic or vivid format than the other data was presented? do you have any idea? >> until we can recreate the screens, it is --

[unintelligible] we do not know how the driller would have had it set of. we can only estimate based on other drillers what they would have done in the same situation. it is unfortunate that we will not know what it looked like. with war effort, we may be able to look at it. >> anything the commission can do to back you, we will do within reason. by's go on to the next -- the way. how many different places on the raid -- rig would the data be displayed? >> it was broadcast on the closed-circuit tv. any tv would have had the same data available.

it was in the office, on the drill floor. it was also in the company office. >> do you know -- you investigated this. were there any t.o. employees looking at the data other than the driller in the drill shack? >> we do not know. at this stage. >> your data does not go shoreside. >> it stays on the rig. >> how come? >> this data is important to operators. to maintain historic records of. once we have drilled, the own the data. we have never retained data. for ourselves. >> your data, we have it because

it was sent shoreside. how many different places on the rig that night with this data, how many different screens had this? >> it would have been the same as the high-tech data. it is available on closed- circuit tv. anybody wanting to see this would simply look at the tv and change that. >> have you found anybody, one single person on the rig that night that says i actually saw this data. >> no sir. access to personnel has been limited. >> your answer is the same? >> yes. >> thank you. let's take the point, the kick indications were clear enough

that if observed, it would or -- allow the crew to respond earlier. we are stuck with not knowing what was up. if they agree or disagree [unintelligible] had been observed by someone skilled at interpreting the data, they would have allowed their response earlier. do you have an opinion on that? >> we believe there was indications it could have been observed. >> under the circumstances you outlined, i would agree. >> i would say the indicators would have noted -- been noted. i do not know if i would call them clear. >> clear enough. if there is a better way to

phrase it, if any of you have better ways of raising this deal to get a perfect, submit them to us and we will consider. we will run them by everyone and we will keep doing that. once the influx was recognized, bp says that was a 21-41. do you think it was recognized? >> [inaudible] >> there were several options that might have prevented or delayed the explosion. you saw the information i put up. we know your view. you did not say it would have. you say it might have. this is your company's document. it's as if there is a rapid expansion of gas, you have to divert overboard.

your people know that once gas gets above, everything gets fast. they know there is a time to move fast. correct? people trained to use the diverter and divert flow over board under certain conditions? >> when you look at this case, you have to look and you have outlined it quite well at the beginning. it is speed. this case was a 550 ton freight train hitting a brick floor. things happened very quickly. it was fought by -- fogged by the fuel.

as if a 757 engine of gas was coming out of the rotery. -- rotary. >> it was a dynamic thing. i do not agree with the characterization that was happening very quickly and instantly. hence, the importance of recognizing it came through the bottom of the well and had displaced mud from the bottom up for it to happen. there was indicators for at least 40 minutes before it happened. that to me is that instead. that is a fairly long time in this business. one said got in the riser and began to move, it was a dynamic and loading. dynamic unloading.

>> was mr. [unintelligible] on the well? >> they were both on the rig. >> can you tell the panel about the qualifications of people to become a well site leader? >> i do not remember if there engineers. generally speaking, multiple years of experience working up through the ranks. these fellows have been working in the border -- the border operations for years. >> we pointed out, you heard me say the system depended on a person being at the right place at the right time, looking

at the information and drawing the right conclusions. you will agree. >> yes. >> y instead of having a driller for t.o. being the only person who looked at this, why -- what were they doing at the time and how come they were not assigned to look at the data. that probably they are well trained. why not have them look at the kick information as it comes in? >> the leadership is providing a broad oversight management of the well. making sure the well is delivered to standard. the process of monitoring the well is an active minute by minute activity. it happens through the course of each phase of the drilling operation. as described in and recognized in the industry and described in the transocean book, you need

someone to be actively looking at each minute as you drill the well or circulate fluids through the will or what have you. that is what the purpose of the drill is. >> if the commission is interested, everyone in the industry says the same thing. a lot of people say this. this is really important. why not have -- you have two of these experienced people. why not have two eyes on this data instead of one pair of eyes? >> i can give a view. it is not covered explicitly in the report. >> the rule is that if you -- we

said we're going to stick to the report and a question goes beyond that, you do not have to answer. >> there is a driller and a.d., and the mud logger provides more information. there are multiple eyes that are looking at it on these critical wells. >> do we know if the mud logger was watching? >> he was at his station. i do not know at what point he was looking at that specific display. >> it needed to be made clear to the commission the screens are different all the time. a driller can pick different parameters and display them in different ways. they can pick the things they want to see. they are flexible, almost like a

video game. you can put up what you want. you can make it look the way you want it to look. that is why we have such a hard time. we have talked for hours and we do not get any closer. we want to know what is on their but we cannot know it. the diverter. did the crew ever use the diverter to overboard the hydrocarbons? >> we do not know for certain. yet. we have studied the information. with a great day did go to the separator first. at that stage, we do not know if they ever switched to the full divert. >> is it true that the separator is a fragile piece of equipment.

compared to the in terms of the pressures and volumes, a jet ?scot 's worth of gas >> >> this event accelerated rapidly. what may have been ok initially on the mud gas separator quickly as the floods began to accelerate up the well bore and hit the drill floor would have surpassed what the separator could have handled. what point that would be, it is impossible to say. >> i read through your manual and i impressed by the amount of detail. is there a specific instruction given to drillers that if in doubt, divert overboard? anything like that? what do you want the drillers to

have in their head about when they dumped this overboard and when they use a lesser tactic? >> when you go to the manual, it will reference if you suspect or think that you have gas in the riser, you should go overboard. do we suspect or think that he had gas in the riser? if you look at the steps that he took that we can see in the david towards the end of the event, his initial response was the appropriate first normal response. he did that. >> dewey was in the drill shack. who we lost. >> that was a normal first response. the manual says if you get flow at that point, there is one of two things that could be the problem. either gas is in the riser and -- youing, or your ann

could be getting food. his next action was to close the bore which it can see in the data. that is what caused the pressure increase from 9:47 p.m. onward. >> once the mud came up, they can tell that by looking at the pressures? >> we believe that was likely. >> that was not holding. he closed one of the pipe ramps and that is shown in the pressure. he two tw -- took to actions -- two actions. >> we have no concluded it switched to the overboard. >> my question is this.

if there is mud on the floor, he closes the annular, is it likely that the pressure,th the sand and gas was such that you could not get the annular shut under those conditions? >> we have done an extensive look at the recovered riser joint. and the pieces of drill pipe that came out of that joy. when you look at the toole joint, -- tool joint -- can you put the slide? we believe that it is a lot of force. the flow was quite great. this is what a normal tool joint looks like. this gives you a perception of what a normal piece of pipe

looks like. you can flip to the next one. the eroded area there that you see in the middle, we believe this piece was closed in the upper annular. of the riser, of the pie. this is what happened when they closed the bop. the hook load -- >> please tell the commission with the hook " is. >> that is the -- what you can measure. fluid started moving quickly. this tool joint was positioned between the two annulars, moved upward into the upper annular. when he closed the annular, it is not just the rubber piece,

there are rubber fingers. they caused this erosion to occur. if allowed flow to continue. >> was the annular here and this is the gas rushing past that did this, or is it the other way around? >> that is correct. it would be moving from left to right. >> the annular is here. it is closed but some gases are getting through it. these gases are so powerful they eroded this piece of steel. is this carbon steel? >> it is -- that is 135 psi material. pretty good stuff. this is several minutes. >> this is an idea of what a couple of minutes of sand can do

to steal like this. any more comments on this? >> it goes back to, could he have anticipated or did he know? it is the question we will have for a long time. what was he suspecting was coming out? he took all the actions that were normal and appropriate. it is unfortunate the magnitude of this event overcame him. >> i heard how badly [inaudible] you train your drillers to appreciate the speed at which things can go south. they understand the magnitude. let's go back to our conclusions.

one of our conclusions was diverting overboard might have prevented or delayed the explosion. do you agree? >> you just do not know. i do not know of there is a way you can tell. the magnitude of this event, it was too great. the question is, what the diverter packer which is another large element could have withstood the massive amount of money that was coming in and sea water. -- the massive amount of mud that was coming in and the sea water. we cannot tell you whether it would or would not have. we will continue to look at it and what we have conclusions, we will share with you. >> everyone agrees the final technical conclusions regarding the [unintelligible]

>> we agree. i will share with you, we do believe the bop worked within its design limits. we have to share that with you. >> you have done work that indicates that it worked. the annular close when it was supposed to. the upper annular. yes? >> within its design limits, yes. >> the pipe ramp closed. you did not think that the [unintelligible] was never closed? >> we do think it was but after the explosion andth. e emergency system -- the emergency system. >> when it comes up and now the norwegians are looking at it,

there will be enough left of the upper annular to look at it and figure out what happened? >> we have not been able to look. we know that from the pictures that were taken on the back of the vessel when they took pictures looking downward into the bop, we saw the wash patterns would have expected. >> it was closed and you could see wash patterns? >> you have to consider the drill pipe at that point -- we believe it failed and severed. you would have flowed through that 5.5 inch drill pipe. it is somewhat like skipping a fire hose with a pair of scissors. when you do that and it is under pressure, it will shoot out sideways. they're not designed for that particular condition. that would have eroded away the rubber seals on the side as they

were closing. you saw what it did to meddle. the thought that rubber would have survived that case under these high flow conditions is unlikely. >> you heard me say and i worded it in a specific way. we had seen no evidence that. together man or groups of men making a decision and consciously had a safety focus and chose dollars over safety. we're talking about real people making recisions. have any of you seen any evidence that anybody made a decision which favored dollars over safety? >> no. >> that completes my ground.

sam will ask the questions. it will be glad to talk about cement. let's take a break. it is not my prerogative. 15-minutee a break. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> i do not say where mr. bly was. >> there was a 40-minute break on the schedule and i said 15. >> all of the bp council are gone.

[unintelligible] >> if the commission please? >> yes, sir. >> one last question. there is an issue of subpoena power. some have said that some legislatures did not want us to have subpoena power because we would be hard on you guys are something like that. someone at the break had an idea does say to you three companies

and i know you cannot speak for them, but would you be willing halliburton, transocean, and bp, would you be willing tell people in congress did you support us having subpoena power -- i am not kidding. it will help us get to the bottom of this. we all agree that we owe it to those men and their families to get to the bottom of this. we have to put aside some of our natural trial lawyer and that kind of thing. if you can answer now, fine. but you cannot, we will like to know from the three companies, which you publicly support the commission getting the subpoena power that we need to clean up these areas that we talked about over the last hour and a half? >> unlike can say at this point bank is that i would have to

take that back and discuss it with bp. >> is it ok with you? >> i would have to say the same. i think we have been very open and supportive of your position. >> pretty much the same. we would be willing to meet often and in any way did you like but i couldn't answer for my company in that regard. >> and do any have the position, i sort of a spate you say you have to go back and talk to your clients. i have said that mice alive. -- i so that myself. thank you for your cooperation. >> is the microphone on? i like to take over some of the questioning from fred now we're back from break. let's start with you. you set forth an interesting theory that i do not think any of us have heard before about

the flow path for the hydrocarbons. i believe we can put that slide. i believe you said it was your view that the hydrocarbons, even before the cement job was set, were already being pumped up and the cement was being pumped down, up the annulus. >> that is correct. >> i think you said that they were trapped. but at some point there was a differential pressure that was such that eventually it broke through that sealed. >> that is correct. >> are you familiar with in the process the hanger seal assembly is actually set? >> after the cementing operation is complete. >> at the point in time when the cement job and the hydrocarbons are coming up the annulus, there

is no seal up there, is there? >> noaa, buffalo path is out of the top of the casing. -- no, but flow path is out of the top of the casing. in the operation of placement, we are monitoring pressure on the surface. we are monitoring the actual placement of the cementing operation. i think you are someone else mentioned that you are expected to see cement left at the end of cementing operations. that number, law by evil, there is a trend that goes along with the actual event and the displacement of the operation. you will see at lifting a much heavier fluid in the annulus. and that pressure will gradually increase. on the data from the cementing operation, the pressure continues to decrease which is completely against the trend analysis that the simulation program anticipates. the only way to have pressure drop what you are displacing is

that something is either -- there is a restriction in the annulus or something lighter to continue to allow that pressure to drop. you do not see that trend -- what you expect to see as you are lifting the cement. when you see the pressure decreases in when you end up with 100 p.s.i. at the end of the job. i think that was indicated to bp. the trend does not indicate did you are actually lifting a lot of cement. >> my question is simpler. you say that the hydrocarbons are actually pushed up during the cement job. how long does it take hydrocarbons to get up that annulus to the seal? >> you look at the volume of displacement of the cement the jupon, it is close to the volume of the annulus. you use the marker to indicate at the beginning of operations in circulating the cementing operation that that would put

the top of the fluid right across the b.o.p. you have carried those fluids around the cementing operation of the annulus all the whip to the hangar assembly at the end of the cement job. that is when you set your seal assembly. >> that is what i am curious about. the seal assembly is not actually set at the time of the cement job. you actually need to circulate out of this interface what you are cementing. otherwise the mud has nowhere to go. >> that is correct. >> so why is it if there is no ceiling. during the cement job, when you say that a hydrocarbons are actually coming up to the annulus, that the hydrocarbons do not just go straight through? >> you still have pressure from the mud packing down on the fluids. immediately after the cementing operation, you set the seal assembly. you have a barrier created at that point may. you have essentially set the

seal assembly on top of the casing. >> my understanding, he said the entire volume of the annulus has been circulated by the time this cement job got to the bottom. >>, know as a matter of course of pumping the mud for the spacers and then the displacement, that takes your marker from the base of the well and moves it all the way up the annulus to the point of the b.o.p. stack. that is when the cement job and. that is when you set your seal assembly. >> then the hydrocarbons would have moved right. by that time? >> that is correct. >> when the hydrocarbons are moving up like that, why would that not have been -- >> there is still pressure on that holding back. after the cementing operation, you do set the seal's. >> there was some pressure in the riser to held back the

p.s.i. of the hydrocarbons? >> there was enough there that did not allowed to migrate out. it is see that pressure drop all throughout the displacement of the cementing operation, which is what we would anticipate seeing. something has to allow for the pressure to drop throughout the cementing displacements as opposed to the pressure increase. that is the only relevant data i can see that explains the data. >> your view is that the hydrocarbons had migrated up to where the seal was, and just as the hydrocarbons got there, the casing seal assembly was set. >> that is my opinion. >> and after that time, there was so much pressure on the casing hanger seal assembly that it actually lifted it up. >> once you evacuate the mud out of the riser and you displaces with seawater, you create a higher differential across that seal assembly which was -- could be enough force to actually lift

up the seal assembly, and that allow the gas that had collected to go into the well bore and be circulated douse what you start your swap out of the drilling fluid. >> you are aware that recently in the last month or so, we have actually brought out from the bottom that case there hanging -- a cancer at the casing hanger seal assembly. have you seen those pictures? i would like to show one of those pictures. right here as i understand it, too phalanges, the metal seals of the case here hank -- casing hanger seal assembly. they were sealed inside the well head, and those metal things fit inside other metals. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> if this assembly had been lifted up, those limits would

have gone past other metal? >> whole assembly would have to have lifted up. >> do you see any damage to suggest that those were lifted up? >> i am not an expert on this type of the equipment. i cannot say it is a red is not. but it looks pretty good. cheating you would not expected to look like that if they had been lifted up and dropped back down? >> i cannot say. >> what is a lead impression tool? >> something that is run in the well to get an impression of something so you know how to go back and fish a tool that may be in the hold. >> my impression -- my understanding is that when used is to make sure u.s. sat down and that the case your -- casing hanger assembly is in the spot where you want to be. >> i am not experience with that. >> are you aware that one of the

rigs drilling the relief well, the one that actually pulled up the casing -- casing and assembly seal? they ran a lead impression tool? >> i am not aware that. >> when that second led impression tool was run, it showed that the assembly had been where it should then have nothing had happened? >> let me preface this with their common. i was requested by bp management to go into the operation incident command center and work with bp and their engineers to help solve the problem that we had. i led are cementing team into bp is office for roughly four weeks while we dealt with the incident. i was pretty with a lot of information going on there. when we were looking at the wellhead through the already, from what i could see, and this is my opinion, i could see that

the seal assembly had lifted up. that is what appeared to be in the rov pictures. afterwards, i am not privy to. only when working with bp and trying to solve the problem. that is my opinion, sir. >> would you agree if it turns out there is additional information that these casing hanger sales are not damaged and that the lead impression tool showed the casey -- the assembly was where it was supposed to be? that could call into what questioned the opinion of the flow path? >> we would also have to explain the data that i have just presented with regard to the pressure dropped during that displacement of the cementing operation. when we look in investigate these types of incident, or any incident, we tried a little bit given information provided to us. the solution has to fit all the informations. there is a lot of information that may not have been considered.

i would say that at the end of the day, all of that information has to be explained as to why the pressure dropped occurred during the displacement and potentially why there is not a lot of damage here. what i would say is that i believe personally and this is my opinion that the initiation of the blowout occurred by the lifting of the seal assembly. i do believe that the flow in a continual flow occurred up through the casing. >> there enough. mr. ambrose, a one the u.s. to a question about a conversation you had. i believe these said you did not think that the rig crew was trained on how to interpret negative-pressure test? >> not directly. i do not believe it covers that specifically. >> weren't there rig crew members know how to interpret that? >> i would say in their general experience, they have done so many. they would know what to expect

from them. but the interpretation lies with the engineers and the operator. >> lies with bp in this case. i just want to show you this testimony and ask you some questions about who was jimmy harold? >> he is the zero ibm. operation installation manager. >> is the highest person in charge on the rate during drilling operations? that is opposed to that happened in charge when the rig is moving from one place to the other or an emergency situation. he has provided before the joint investigation board, a coast guard, he was asked this question -- who won the deepwater horizon was interpreting the negative- pressure data? >> who is interpreting a?

>> usually the company man and the tool pusher up there. the tool pusher is a member of the rig crew, correct. >> data is correct. >> for transocean. you expect that the tool pusher and the driller what actually participate in interpreting the negative pressure tests? >> again, when you look at the general way that this words, the typical industry practices that the operator provides the plant, we execute the set up for that plan, and the interpretation resides with the operator. it is a collaborative effort and i can understand where opinions and people statements may be different, but the interpretation lies with the operator. >> deal agreed with don winslow's statement that the pressure test is an important test? >> absolutely. >> it is the last of by a to test before the rate moves on. and it isn't that the only test that has the integrity of the

cementing job. . >> it is the only test that shows the integrity of the cementing job. it is important to get right. you would expect that in your experience, the rig crew would know how to interpret and negative-pressure test so they were not relying solely on the skill of the man they're from bp. >> the interpretation of a negative test rig quark -- resides with the operator. here roles are fairly clearly defined. they call the shots. no different than a positive casing test. they make that call when that task is passed as well. the negative test is no different from that. from the standpoint of who makes the decision that task has passed, that interpretation lies with the operator. >> here is another question from

mr. howard. they wanted to do another one. iraq and nothing wrong with them in a second test to confirm. >> the bp person, he wanted to do a second pass? answer, i did not say that. does this indicate that mr. harold that night in his judgment had concluded that the first negative-pressure test was successful? >> there has been a lot of confusion about first test 10 second test. in our mind after looking at this for several months in 20-20 hindsight, there was nothing moved around and whether he was moving -- referring to the first of the second, we are not sure. at the end of the day the engineers that designed the test need to improve it. if you look at testing going from bp zone personnel he agrees

with that. bp said had been the person that interpreted this. their engineers. >> i want to come to you, mr. bly. do you agree that the bp well site engineers are principally responsible at the end of the date for interpreting the negative-pressure test? >> as we said in our report, what was clear to us is that both parties were actively involved in the discussions and the attempts to make sure that the test was done correctly and to interpret it. in this case, both parties agreed that it was successful. >> i think that brings up the point, when you look to the testimony that mr. bartlit put up, then they did disagree or agree with the discussion. took that back to what we thought was bp. we had reason to believe there was a phone call back to shore

and he had gone in and said that they were doing at -- the second task. there is some discrepancy in that regard but we have not had clarity on it. the u.s. agree to disagree with a conversation? >> yes. we have no way of knowing. >> one of our concerns is looking at what happened last night, there seems to be in finger-pointing. was there a clear chain of command on who was supposed be conducting the test and interpreting it? mr. bly, he was asked, was it their responsibility to determine where the results of the negative test were satisfactory before moving on from that operation? the answer, they were. one of the people who are supposed to determine if the negative test were successful and not. do you agree with that statement >> i think that is a

correct statement from the bp perspective because the -- those are our people on the red. -- on the raid. --rig. >> on the test performed on the macondo, the-test that tested the integrity of the cement at the bottom of the well? >> yes, that is right. >> and mr. vargo, do you agree as well? that was the only test the test the integrity of the cement that night? >> yes, sir. >> i showed up along animation this morning that you are probably watching. did you see anything that was incorrect about that animation that we went for a shutout the pressures went up and down and the decisions that were made? for the negative-pressure test?

>> i could not track you every step of the way and that could not quite talented match with our time line. >> but nothing jumped out anybody. i wanted to make sure that we got it right. >> i did not catch anything. it was quite a lot of detail so i could not sit here and say it is exactly what we showed in our time line. >> there was a lot of detailed in that 2.5 hour period, so i could not tell of the pressure gauges were exactly corrector not. and timing. >> does bp had a policy or did it have a policy in place where it people on the rate should call back with these type of ?ata anomalies during testing >> it is and expectation. if they do not feel they understand, they can call back. absolutely. i do not know that as a policy. it is the behavior that we

expect from people. >> so no knowledge of a policy that this is when you need to call back with these types of situations. >> with particular to the negative-pressure test, as we said earlier, there was not a standardized way of describing how that was to be done. it was to be done and it was generally recognized that you're looking for pressure flow back. one of the things that we highlighted in an hour workout and recommended that that we need more formalized and standardize ways of doing that test, to trigger when someone might need to call backing get additional information. >> given an expectation with bp for certain issues being elevated with a call back to shore, in line with that expectation, this particular issue on this negative-pressure test should have been called back? >> it is hard for me to know what the guys were thinking. it will take it seemed that they felt they had it in good shape

and did not have to consult higher input. >> mr. ambrose, a similar question any policy in place at the time of this event that would have required the men on the rate floor to have elevated concerns that they were having with the data anomalies' 2 high level management, either on the raid or on short question margin no policy. >> was there a similar expectation to transocean -- in transocean with of the anomalies on an important test that it should be elevated of management? >> in transocean, we have to stop the work, stop the job of philosophy. if you have any concerns or are uncomfortable, then anyone can do that. i think jimmy harold demonstrated that when early in the day he thought the negative- pressure test was not even

conducted, he said we were not going to do that. any time there is anomaly that cannot be explained or that people are uncomfortable with, they tend to stop a job and figure out what is going on and elevate that to where it needs to go. to get this type of anomaly in transocean, do you believe it should be called in up the ladder either on the raid or onshore? >> i cannot say. every situation is different. i cannot get into the head of the guys that night to understand what they were thinking. we've lifted the situation and i think there was good faith that a lot of people looked at it, bp is engineers and others interpreting it correctly, and they entered went forward on the recommendation. >> earlier in the presentation we pointed out that bp nor transocean has specific procedures on how to conduct a

negative-pressure test. was that that true that this time for george >> that is correct. jennifer transocean, is that correct? >> i know that mr. bly said that bp is taking remedial steps to pick -- to fix that in the future. is transocean, to your knowledge mr. ambrose? >> as you know, we are in the course of our investigation. s and is we have all of our fax and we conclude on the investigation, we will make our report and decide how to proceed in the best interest. >> do you know, mr. ambrose, or people within transocean to at least trained on how to conduct a negative-pressure test or even what it was part of their training? >> as before, i do not believe it was specifically a negative-

pressure test covered in our program. just general work experience, they may have understand -- may have understood what it was. >> i like to put up on the screen the application that bp submitted to the mms on april 16, setting forth this temporary procedure in which bp discussed or at least set forth the type of negative-pressure test that it expected to perform. mr. bly, a question. is that or does that describe the negative-pressure test that was actually performed on april

20 at the macondo? >> yes, i think it does. yes, it does. >> it says negative test casing or seawater equivalent. from my natural reading of that, the negative-pressure test was going to be performed before displacing that seawater. what is your understanding of the phrase "seawater gradient equivalent?" >> i do not know if i can have a debate with you about this, the technical meetings of the steps in this. there are people they work on my team that could. i will try but i am not sure that i can answer the question. >> the question is whether step

one says that you are actually going to displace mud with water down to 3,000 feet before you conduct the negative-pressure test. >> i do not see the 3,000 feet on there. >> in fact, not until step 2 that the drill pipe is run down to 3,000 feet below sea level. >> that is that 8003 added 67. >> and that is described by the first bullet. . >> it appears to be. >> is this consistent with a negative-pressure test procedure run on the night of april 20? >> i understand your question. on the night of the 20, up they went to -- straight to 8367 to do a test. >> in the permits on april 16, they said they would do the

negative test before displacement. >> correct. >> so that test performed on april 20 it was different from what was said to the mms on at the 16th. >> yes. >> i think there has been some dispute as to whether -- i ask you about calls back to short, whether any were made during the conduct of the negative-pressure test. if mr. ambrose said that there were some made back to bp. bp has said there were no evidence of calls back to shore about the negative-pressure test. mr. ambrose, what is the basis of your statement that there

were calls by one well site leader back to the shore during the conduct of the negative- pressure test? >> just what discussion with people on the raid. mr. kaluza said that they were conducting a second negative- pressure test. on that basis, we questioned whether there was a phone call made back to shore at that point. we have not been able to talk to mr. kaluza or anyone else from bp or other third parties. it is based on testimony or discussions with transocean. >> who are the trans ocean people you've had discussions with? >> i couldn't give them off the top of my head. we've done several interviews. i could give you their names. >> did they say that they actually witnessed the phone call by bob kaluza back to shore? >> that is what i was saying.

we have been asking the question, was a phone call made? the perception of our people seems to be that the phone call was made. >> if it was elevated back to shore, it changes the whole decision making process. you have no direct evidence that any phone call was made. >> there is some discussion we were having with mr. kaluza going back to make a call that they were going to do a second test. if that did or did not happen, that is an open issue and our investigation. >> bp decided to use 400 gallons of displacement during the negative-pressure test. that spacer was made up of the

materials up on the rig floor. >> that is correct. that is what we've gone in our report. it were to they were put together, about 450 barrels. >> this decision was a to use that material less spacer? >> i cannot remember the specifics of how the decision was made. i suspect that the well site leaders were involved. i believe that they ask my company to look at it and see if it was appropriate. >> to you know if anyone on that re had ever used a combination of these two materials as spacer before? >> i do not know. in your investigation, did your team do any analysis of whether these two materials could be combined in used effectively as a spacer?

>> as part of our investigation, we look to what that material would be haven when combined. >> what was your conclusion? >> we did not make that conclusion. we looked at what the material behavior like when it was combined. it was indeed a viscous and heavy. >> i think one of your conclusions -- one of your hypothesis as to why there was zero pressure on the kill line is that perhaps that spacer had leaked into the kill line and claude debt. is that correct or to mark >> that is correct. you outline very clearly this morning that there was this conflicting information about 1400 and the zero. we were very interested in understanding how that could have happened. one possible scenario was that there was blockage in that kill line. our view is that one possible explanation was that the spacer

could have done it, yes. >> looking back, was that it possible to use a spacer made up raw circulation material that might clog up the line? >> i do not know of it was advisable or not. to have the opportunity to block the kill line, it it made no difference. judy and do you agree that it would it been good practice for help the negative-pressure test it once they had recognized there was a leak all of the annular preventer is, such as the spacer getting down below the b.o.p., to let it out before continuing on with the task? >> i can agree with that, yes. >> mr. andrews, what is your view -- mr. ambrose, what is your view -- as anyone at transocean utilize those to

materials as before? those particular, i do not know. >> is there any policy in place that required the transocean rig crew once they realize the head late below the annulus preventer to circulated out and make sure they could get a good baseline for the negative-pressure test? >> i do not think there is a policy for that. >> witted been advisable to circulate out that spacer required -- before that negative-pressure test? >> if you look at the first set up of the negative-pressure test on the drill pipe, whether there was spacer are not in the annulus under the b.o.p., it was not really a factor for conducting the tests so long as the annuler had been closed and sealed. if it gave the correct result in that it did flowback.

when you look to the switch that was made to the kill line in the middle of the plan there, that switch, that assumption that the spacer may not have been a factor was overlooked. and that is then what caused the kill line to be over balanced with the formation with the spacer in the annulus space. >> mr. bly, what was the process of bp by which the decision was made to utilize this spacer? was there a management of change process? was there rader is betting process? or was it at hoc? >> we may have covered this in the report. i simply cannot reform the -- remember the details of your question. >> is that the type of decision that would been subject to rigorous management of change process at bp?

>> not necessarily. that that type of decision where you look at the reasonable basis for people on the rig to make a judgment, we need a spacer, and unit of this does spacer to separate the oil based mud in the sea water that you are circulating out. that material is appropriate for a spacer. let's get a check with the mud people and tested. i think that would be within the bounds of what you would expect people on the rig to be able to make. i do not see that as a decision that would necessarily driven you to a formalized or a highly detailed analysis. >> to be fair, engineers did check with the mud engineers in charge of those fluids, right? >> that is what i remember from our work visit. there was this discussion and it was not thought was at. they ask the right people and

decided it was appropriate. >> mr. ambrose, one last question. in our previous meetings, he suggested that there may have been -- you suggested that there had meant other materials -- other problems caused by the use of this material as a spacer. is that right? >> if you look back to dick 19, when they were displacing that cement, i think halliburton said the plugs, then bumped or they landed in to the area, the mud dump strokes that it took to pump that fluid down to the bottom of the well, but the estimate of numbers of strokes was very close to what actually happened. that would tell you that your mud pumps were running at the expected efficiency.

in our analysis of the mud fit data and what happened when the spacer was being pumped, what we saw were lower. efficiencies then were assumed during the displacement. that likely lead to the spacer being under displaced and set up for the negative-pressure test. didn't you think the spacer may have affected the pump efficiency? >> it looks like it did. we have not been able to do tests with mud pumps, with the same type of spacer. with a loss of circulating material, it could have affected could pump liners and their efficiency. what i can say is that the data shows that approximately 450 barrels of fluid should have been pumped. if you look at the pit data, 422-425 barrels of fluid were

pumped during the course of pumping out the spacer. our conclusion is that the spacer did lead to some inefficiencies in the mud pumps when setting up for the negative test. >> there are inefficiencies with the pumps, later on in other operations you may not have a good view of the amount of fluids you are pumping down into the well, and it may confound the ability to see this. pits,t you're on the mud your volume would be hard to read. >> is the data on this issue that you'd be willing to share with the commission? >> we provided the commission and we're not 100% finished with that. when we complete our report, it will be made public.

>> can we put the slide of the temporary procedures to, april 14, 16, and 20? >> ok, i have got it. so this is a version of a slide i showed earlier during the presentation, showing the

temporary abandonment procedures changed over the weeks leading up to the blowout. mr. bly, you will agree that the procedures did change in terms of what the people and steps were going to be, that teams had a plan, at macondo? >> yes, i do not remember all the details in the report but i will take your word for it that the displacement procedures to change. >> is a typical for something such as a temporary abandonment procedure to be changing this significantly in the last before their planned to be used? >> i cannot speak. i do not know what would be typical for this particular detail. >> the temporary abandonment procedure, is a subject to a management of change process that bp or was it for this event? >> get the was something that

was change that was felt the safety profile of the well, we would see a management of change for that. if it is a minor change, where we did not change the risk profile, then we would say no oil would be informal management change. >> would bp make the decision on whether something was sufficiently risky? >> this would be the typical type of thing that would be worked by the engineering team and the operations team. >> as far as we know, could anyone decided besides the immediate engineering team on the changes on the temporary abandonment procedures before the blowout? >> i do not know. >> can we go to the picture of the displacement with only one barrier? mr. bartlett or for at asking

questions, and i think you had some conversations about that. i would like to ask you about another aspect of the temporary abandonment procedures that we identified as being potentially more risky than necessary. after the negative-pressure test, the crew according to the plan was to open the b.o.p. and then beginning -- began displacing all the mud and the spacer from the riser, ultimately leading -- leaving 8,000 feet of sea water below. do you agree that at this point in time, the b.o.p. opened, the only other barrier is that at the bottom? >> i agree that the only other permanent barrier is the cement job. clearly at that time you have got operational barriers, including monitoring the well,

and that there is an indication that the well as getting out of balance, closing the b.o.p. stack. >> but the only mechanical or physical barrier at that point in time is actually the cement job at the bottom of the well. >> that is correct. >> this design where there is not a second mechanical or physical barrier puts a real premium on both the cement job and the negative-pressure test that evaluates it? >> what you mean by premium? >> the cement job is the only physical barrier. you want to make sure that it is good and tested and proven. >> absolutely. if your point is that the negative-pressure test is important to demonstrate that seal of the bottom, i would absolutely agree with that. >> is a net more important in a

temporary abandonment sequence where there is no plan to put another barrier in place? >> more important than very important? i do not know how to measure that. it is very important. >> ok. bp could have saiet the cement plug prior to displacing the riser, is that right? >> yes, that is a choice that can be made. >> the know the reason why bp chose not to put in the cement plug prior to displacement of the mud from the riser? >> i do not reveal -- remember all the evaluations but i understand it is that, an engineering choice to set the cement plug in seawater. i think that it's fairly common in the industry. the reason is when you do that,

you have a better chance of getting high-quality cement plug. setting the plug in mud, the alternative, can lead to contamination issues. you have a chance of having a lower quality cement plug. >> and people trust cement jobs in these situations more for their dead and seawater rather than mud. isn't it true that there are other types of plugs besides cement plugs? for instance, a bridge plug or other mechanical barrier? >> i believe that's true. >> it bp was concerned about setting a cement plug in mud, he could have put in a mechanical barrier of some sort in mud without having to displace 3,000 feet of seawater. >> you are asking to make about alternative designs which i can only agree, i guess, if you could set a plug in there. >> he did not think this was a

risky design and all things were considered died -- when all things are considered together. >> i do not happen to know if they look to it that. >> we talked about this particular sequence putting a premium on the negative-pressure test in my words. on monitoring from that rig, and again, the only way that b.o.p. gets closed if someone hits the button. is that right? >> as we outlined in the report, there were critical things that failed -- the cement at the bottom, the monitoring, and the time to act today -- activate the b.o.p. i agree with the prelim but they were all important barriers to

have in place. >> there was only one physical barrier and these procedures were perhaps more dependent than others on humans monitoring that test. is that right? >> yes, that is fair. i am clear about what i thought the controls in place were for this operation. those of the things that fundamentally failed to allow the initiation to go to the accident. if you are asking me if it is possible in hindsight to go in create another barrier for safety in here, yes, it may be possible. in fact, if you look at the recommendations that we have made to bp which had been accepted, there clearly things to focus on in the negative- pressure test itself to try to put more protections in here.

if that is the point of your question, i tend to agree with that. >> i think that is where we're going. jeanette, does it make sense to reconsider -- going forward, does it make sense to put a physical barrier in that does not rely on human frailty to protect against problems down. the bottom? >> in the aftermath of an event like this, you have to rethink everything. it's clear that there were many protections in place. i think we demonstrated in my report, which once failed. -- which ones failed. and it is easy to say to go back and put control barriers in place. >> mr. ambrose, any views on the temporary abandonment procedures that were put in place on april 20?

>> from what we have seen, and when you look at the evolution of the plans, there was a lot changing. i think there is a question of oversight and review of those plants along the way. the plant originally outlined that we have seen, and we do not understand the logic behind the changes. we have only seen on a tight out sheet of paper what the plans were, the plan on the 14th much more conventional. those plans were never seen before the one on the wreck on the 20th. -- rig on the 20th. at the one on the 14th then run, the consequences would been much different than what they were at the end of the day.

the evolution and the changes and it goes that this is not about one thing. it is about multiple things and multiple changes along the way. the evolution of those procedures, whether or not it was recognized, the risks that they were changing is one of the questions that we have from our investigation. >> one last follow-up with you, mr. ambrose. at some point, members of the rig crew understood what the procedures would be that day. >> it would of been in the first meeting. they did not include the spacer. that was added -- we do not have evidence, but the spacer was

added in to the plan some time before the meeting and the displacement. >> your folks on the reagan knew that morning but the temporary abandonment procedures and the sequence of events were going to be from that operation that, correct? >> they received it and they discussed it in the would have known about it. >> did anybody to your knowledge from transocean. to any concerns about the riskiness of those temporary abandonment procedures? >> so far those that we have talked to, no. others, i do not know what they thought of the plan. >> as of right now, you have no knowledge of anyone on transocean voice any concerns about the riskiness of these particular temporary abandonment procedures? >> i have no specific knowledge of somebody standing up and saying that. >> all like to turn it over to

questions about the cement. >> i'm going to suggest a five- minute break. if that is ok with the commission. and that is fine. >> five minutes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> i want to return for a moment and talk about the semantic and, just to reorient you. the cement we're talking about is the cement at the very bottom of the well, called the primary cement job. there are cement at other levels of the casing as well. for now we're talking about the final cement job. i want to talk a few questions to get agreement on our general points that we made during the course of the overall presentation. the first one is about cementing in general. many people that we talk to in the industry said that the

primary connect job -- primary cement job should not be complete until it is completely tested, pressure tested, or otherwise of evaluated. can we all agree with that? >> i think the final test are very important, yes. jim i agree with that. >> i would agree. >> i had agreed that you can not conclude until you have isolation. >> your position would be that even the negative-pressure test is not enough until you have a cement on a log. >> it is my opinion that there are two parts to cementing, there is placement and hydraulic isolation of the zones of interest. obviously placement is getting it there, zonal isolation, you

can confirm that with a negative-pressure test and also with the bond lot, and i think that as a better means. >> in many instances, industry operators wait until at least 48 hours before running back? >> i do agree. >> it is not immediately after the cement job. >> that is correct. >> the system of the cement cannot be verified until in some cases 48 hours after the cement job. >> that is correct. >> is that halliburton's view that a primary cement job can never be relied upon until 48 hours after it is done? >> no, sir, it is my opinion that you use the data that you have from the cementing operation to ascertain whether you have a successful cementing job. one of those means is to look at

the pressure involved why you're putting the cement in place. looking at lift pressure, that is one indication to whether you have returns. once you're done with the cementing operation, when you close the floats, the thing you have isolation in the flow of shoots, and eventually when you go back to the production phase to go after the reservoir, then you want the bond log, those of the ways that you properly ascertain the good cementing operation. if you drill a head, you would run and integrity test to test the integrity of the cement job. for the primary cement job. >> i want to drill down this -- sorry about the metaphor. are you saying that you cannot rely on a primary cement job until you have run a cement evaluation log? kidding you cannot rely on zonal

isolation until you run a bond log. >> is that halliburton's position that relying on the primary cement job in this well was itself a problem? >> i think that prior to the operation we had a good indication that we would have channeling during the cementing operation. that would cause problems with zonal isolation. that is my opinion. >> you are suggesting, i think, that even with all the indicators being good, halliburton's position is that a primary cement job cannot be done -- reliant on which cannot be done for 48 hours? .