and we will talk about the start of congress. terence samuel will join us to talk about faces to watch in the new congress. then we will have a round table talking about issues coming out of the g-20 with the martin klingst and robin harding. we will see you tomorrow at 7:00 a.m. for "washington journal." [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> this morning on c-span, a new

report examining u.s.-middle east relations. following that, pakistan's former presidents on u.s. foreign policy toward central asia. then we will continue our international coverage with a look at u.s. strategy in pakistan. our live congressional coverage resumes when the senate returns monday for general speeches. then both republicans and democrats will hold off the floor leadership elections. no roll call votes are expected until wednesday with the 1st expected vote of the week on the use of natural gas and electric vehicles. other possible boats include bills on which discrimination and food safety. watch live coverage on c-span 2 at 2:00 p.m. eastern. also on monday, a house ethics subcommittee hearing on the case against representative charles rangel. he is accused of 13 violations including failing to disclose at least $600,000 in assets and

come in a series of inaccurate financial disclosure reports to congress. that is live at 9:00 a.m. eastern on cspan 3. now a discussion on strategy and policy toward iran. also i look at a new report examining u.s.-middle east relations. the report was issued by the atlantic council iran task force pretty host of this event. this is one hour and 25 minutes. >> i would like to thank our esteemed colleagues.

the south asia center was launched last year under our director. it is almost going on two years now. we lost it because we saw a focus of u.s.-european relations would be dealing not just with afghanistan and pakistan on which people usually connect with south asia in this town but also iran. this has become a central forum and point of contact for policy members and members of congress as well as european and regional leaders. we have had a long string of european officials dealing with these issues meeting with us as well. we do focus on the wider south asia which means the geographical subcontinent as well as the rest of the area. we see this as a whole are you

cannot look at the iran issue without looking it passed a can -- at pakistan and you cannot look at all without looking at iran. iran is of special importance to the center and the council because of the u.s. role with its government and the difficulties we all know about we are also very interested in looking at how the u.s. is looking at around but also how iran is looking at the u.s. and how iran is looking at itself. and looking at its role in the region. we get caught up in our own conversation here that we are not putting ourselves enough in the shoes of others. we have been asking for this task force -- are the u.s. sanctions working? are there any other negotiating options left for the united states? if the reformist regime were in power in iran, would it make any difference to the u.s.-iran relationship? more importantly, how does iran

see itself in this world? who is iran? is it, all -- is mahmoud ahmadinejad on? ? we want to bring people together to have frank discussions in this room to have on the current situations. the issue brief that is released today to you all and prepared by our friend barbara slavin, one of the great experts on iran is a combination of all those meetings. it will be the first of several briefs that we will ride on these subjects looking into this brief and more detail on other parts. we want to thank the plowshares fun for making this possible through their support. before i pass the event, i just want to invite senator hagel and

ambassador eisenstaedt to say few words. >> thank-you, and thank you each for giving us time today. want to thank the leaders of this effort including my much esteemed co-chairman, the all knowing public servants ambassador eisenstaedt, a manager who has had almost every job in government. q very, very much for your personal involvement and commitment to time as you have given this effort. as you will hear today, the essence of this first report which will culminate in a larger

task force product. we think these kinds of trees are important for many reasons. it takes people through, we hope, and informed and educated analysis as to the complications of this issue which there are many, as you all understand, but there are very serious consequences for what ever is the outcome and on this particular issue. as fred had noted, and i think this is particularly important, and i think it is one of the most valuable results of this first report and i anticipate is the emphasis on wise and comprehensive focused by the

united states and its allies on this issue. iran. when i say comprehensive, i refer to not only addressing the iranian nuclear issue but all the other dimensions of this relationship. that would include, of course, what fred just talked about -- who is iran? who is in charge of iran? we know those who will occasionally take time to study history and culture that iran is part of a great product of the middle east, that is the persian heritage and a history that that heritage has brought forth. that is not to be minimized, diminished or dismissed. any of these historical factors are usually when we tried to analyze policy and how we

approach countries and people. i say people in particular because governments don't always represent the people. there are policies of government and there are the citizens of that country. we reflect on that point when i use the term 'wise." we need to be wise and judicious. we need to be judicious in how we use all ournstruments of power military is but one instrument of power. sometimes, it is not the most affected. it is important. using all of the nation's instruments of power in coordination and a combination of a purpose that is worthy of that nation's efforts is what we try to get at in this study. i also want to note the great work note thebrzenski has done i

think mark is in china. that is important to note mark's contribution because he will continue to play a significant role. thank you again and thank you once again to all the participants that helped form and right of this brief. we had many informed and experienced experts in this area who took their time to come before this group and give us the benefit of their background and experience and expertise so we thank them as well let me introduce my co-chairman, prof. eisenstaedt. >> thank you. we have developed a close relationship during the clinton administration. i found him to be one of the most knowledgeable and wise people in the country on foreign and defense policy and it has been a privilege to work with

him on this project. this project is another example of how fred has and should -- and used a sense of energy and direction to the atlantic council since he has taken over. i congratulate you on setting this task force up the fine work you do. i want to leave town for the actual presentation. i want to talk about why we decided to get into this area. as in everything about iran already been explored? we think that this task force has done something unique and will continue to be unique. we start from the proposition that we believe this will be the defining foreign policy challenge of the obama administration and for the united states in the years ahead we also started from the proposition that while many have

look from iran from different perspectives, no one had looked at their domestic reality and what was happening internally and how that affects their view of what the united states and others are doing and how it affects their policy and therefore what we can learn in terms of addressing our own policy to that reality and try to mold it in ways that are acceptable to the united states but ultimately take into account the domestic reality. that is what is new and novel. barbara has done a superb job in her study of doing the first initial roll out for the task force. we appreciate it. without any further ado, i would like to turn it over to her and thank you all for your work and fred for initiating this. >> thank you. let me just give you a quick background on what the task force has done in the first nine months since we started.

our first meeting took place in may. we had a presentation by the plowshares funds a look at the interest of concerned parties which included the united states, the european union, china, russia, israel, turkey, india and pakistan. they tried to crystallize how each of these countries envisage the iran's role and its own interest in iran. the council on foreign relations provided a briefing on what kind of regional role the present iranian leadership is seeking for itself and for their country and talked about the strategic geopolitical aspirations of iran's current leadership. ted koppel, the producer of the discovery channel "iran, the most dangerous nation," provided observations and led the question and answer period. we have another session in july

which focused on foreign policy. we looked on the opposition movement in iran and its similarity and contrast to the current regime on nuclear issues and the views of allies and enemies and on iran in foreign policy. this is a presentation by dr. presentationsikh of columbia university. we also talked about diplomacy. that exchange was moderated by barbara slavin. last month, we looked at nuclear capabilities and strategic goals and we were lucky to get deputy secretary of energy dan poloman. when he met them at the end of 2009, when he met the iranian government, he was the foremost u.s. official to meet them face to face. we were lucky to have ollie

heinenan. in today's brief, we have a very useful some nation of where we stand on the nuclear issue by him. he is a friend and former colleague at the ieae. as the senator said, we will continue our work on iran. we will make it as you make as possible and as comprehensive as possible. we will periodically issued these briefs and we will come up with final policy recommendations in due course. the first brief is being released today. it is also barbara slavin is a well known journalist and author of a great book on iran. before i give the floor to barbara to talk about the brief, i just wanted to remind

everyone that after she finishes and if you wish to speak or ask a question, if you wouldn't mind turning your name tent on its side so i can recognize you and wait for the microphone so you can announce who you are and it can be captured for our audiences. thank you for coming and i give it over to barbara. >> thank you all for coming. this is my maiden average for the atlantic council. i want to thank senator hagel and ambassador eisenstaedt and many others. we did this rather quickly. you can all perhaps understand why iran has been much in the news of late. a lot of people have been giving their opinions about what u.s. policy toward iran today. we thought it was important to

begin to express our ideas and get some context for the discussion. i have tried to do four basic things in the report. first, look at iranian the domestic politics and the divisions that have deepened within the elite since the 2009 presidential election. second, i looked at the impact of those divisions on the nuclear issue and u.s.-iran relations. third, i looked at sanctions and the impact they are having on the iranian economy and iran's foreign-policy. lastly, i make a few very modest suggestions. these are very preliminary prin. but they will be much more fleshed out and detailed recommendations at the end of this process. the bulk of the report is about the iranian domestic scene. ."e word is 'factionalism

the islamic republic of iran has never been unified. it was not before, during, or after the revolution of 1979. when it comes to politics, economics, views on society, those who call a totalitarian state don't know the country at all. this is not a country where the elite are forced to belong to one political party as in china or the old soviet union. whenever one faction appears to have completely vanquished its opponents as seemed to occur last summer after the elections, then that faction immediately splinters. we have seen certainly in the last few months that president mahmoud ahmadinejad has had a lot of problems and clashes with the parliament of the country and other branches of government and even on occasion with the supreme leader, ayatollah

khomeini. he has alienated traditional conservatives and members of the old islamic coalition party. this is a very significant group that still controls the bazaars and has a hold over many important islamic charities and many of its members were very prominent in the islamic revolution and were very important members of the government after words. mahmoud ahmadinejad is on poor terms poorali lari jani who is the former negotiator and he was reconfirmed as speaker of the parliament. he is a member of an old clerical family and his brother is head of the judiciary and was appointed by the supreme leader. mahmoud ahmadinejad has irritated ayatollah khomeini and ultraconservative clerics by promoting a kind of folk =- shiite islam which is full also

priof falsehoods. there have even been indications of some friction with members of the islamic revolutionary guard corps which is the institution upon which the survival of the regime rests. there was an article in an irg publication that criticized mahmoud ahmadinejad up for contending that the parliament was not the most important institution in government and it said that this contradicted the views of the leader of the revolution, ayatollah khomeini who passed away in 1989. i am not suggesting that khomeini is about to get rid of mahmoud ahmadinejad. i don't think that as possible. he called his re-election a divine assessment and he is stuck with him for the time being. there is a modest fortune and

tension and the outlook is for more factionalism especially as iran is now phasing out consumer subsidies in the economy. it is also approaching more elections. they will have a parliamentary election in 2012 and new presidential elections in 2013. the factionalism is intensifying the car -- in part because of the economic situation which is quite poor. this is partly due to sanctions which have tightened considerably this year. it is also partly due to mahmoud ahmadinejad of its mismanagement of the economy. he squandered oil revenues when the price of oil was high. he handed money out to the poor and numerous people but without any kind of real plan. as a result, no jobs, very few jobs have resulted from those and inflation was quite high for a number of years.

revenues are much reduced now and the imf estimates that the iranian economy grew by only 2% last year. growth in the current iranian fiscal year which ends march 31 will be between 1.5% and 2% and that is not enough to provide the sorts of jobs iran's youthful population needs. of the unemployment rate among the under 30 iranians is estimated to be about 30%. 70% of the population is under 30. sanctions are having an impact. they are making it more difficult for iran to sell and buy petroleum products and they are also frightening away investment in the oil and gas sector. i contrast this with the mid- 1990s when the clinton administration approved of so- called secondary sections which

were meant -- meant to penalize oil companies that invested $20 million in the energy sector of iran or libya all of these sanctions were waived because at that time, or shortly thereafter, iran got a reformist president and the europeans were very interested in engagement with iran at that time. now the situation is very different and this is because of what happened in 2009 and the elections and because of the crackdown. the europeans are even more exercised about human rights sometimes than the united states. the europeans have gotten on board. and so have the japanese. nomura international estimates that because of the japanese withdrawal from the iranian oil sector, iran's oil production will drop 15% by 2015 and exports will decline from about

2 million barrels per day currently to 1.5 million barrels which is a significant drop. how does all of this factor into the nuclear negotiations? we are likely to have some talks in the next few weeks. the iranians announced over the weekend that they would like to meet in turkey but they are dancing around each other and eventually we will have some kind of discussion. the problem is that the political divisions within iran are such that it will make it difficult for the government to reach a deal that will stick. we saw what happened one year ago when there was a proposal for iran to send out 2/3 of its low-enriched uranium for fuel for a research reactor which the united states actually provided in the 1960's. this is a reactor that produces medical isotopes. mahmoud ahmadinejad brought this bill back to tehran and he was

immediately attacked by every faction from reformists to ultraconservative is. adjani who had suffered a great deal when he was the nuclear negotiator of iran was the one to cast the first stone. others followed and a supreme leader did not, in the end, back up. the deal fell apart. since then, we have had more sanctions. the obama administration prohibited from the engagement track to the pressure track. there's a sense that i get from talking to u.s. officials that for the first time since 2003, when the u.s. military was filling most successful and the middle east, for the first time since then, the obama administration and the united states feels it has leverage over iran because of sanctions and economic situation. another factor is that the

nuclear clock, so-called, while it is still ticking is taking a little bit more slowly than many people had feared. i direct you to the excellent summary of the status of an iran nuclear program. although iran has managed to produce about 3 tons of low- enriched uranium, theoretically enough for a bomb or two bombs, they iaea would be able to direct the version of this material quickly and iran is having difficulty producing more advanced centrifuges. the ones they use our antiquated model that pakistan provided them with in late 1980's. iran is having design problems and also is having difficulty because of sanctions in procuring the carbon fiber it needs to make these more

advanced centrifuges. this suggests that there is time for diplomacy to work and time for sanctions and engagement to work without having to resort to other sorts of measures. it is hard to be optimistic about engagement and diplomacy given the history of the u.s.- iran relations which many others now painfully well parian the pattern has been that when one side was ready for invasion, the other was not and vice versa. the 2009 elections have complicated the policy for both sides. for europe and also for the united states, the vicious crackdown on peaceful protesters that follow the elections last year have made him an rights a priority. i know that president bush talked about the freedom agenda but for the first time, there is a freedom movement to support in iran. this is no longer a fiction.

for iran, the united states once again looms large as a scapegoat for internal unrest are they can accuse the united states of promoting velvet overthrows an assault revolutions and software or whatever you call it. we have a stalemate. it is important that the united states continues to try to engage if only to put the iranians on the defensive. to show that it is interested in diplomacy i have a few very modest suggestions. the arab -- these are very preliminary. they will be fleshed out when the task force completes its work. some of them frankly i think our no-brainers. some of them are things that the obama administration is already doing but perhaps could do a better job with. one of the things the administration is doing is my understanding from conversations with u.s. officials is that the

u.s. and its allies are updating the offer that was made last year concerning the terror on research -- the teheran-research reactor. we don't have all the details. there have been account in the press. it is still preliminary. we well know until there is -- we won't know until there is a time fixed for a place and time with either the vienna groovup. at the same time, i think it would be wise to update a very comprehensive offer that was made in 2008. this was presented to the iranians in the geneva in the summer of 2008 and it looked at possible areas of economic cooperation, easing of sanctions and so on. this offer need to be looked at again and needs to be refreshed. this is in light of what has happened to the iranian oil

sector over the last couple of years. i am not saying that the u.s. should publicize it or presented as negotiating with ourselves but of the iranian show up and they are actually serious, this is something that the u.s. and its allies should have read it. at the same time, the u.s. needs to intensify its outreach to the iranian people this is very important. because we have a fight with the government does not mean that we should not be promoting educational exchanges and try to get as many iranian students as possible to study in the united states and offering help to iran in areas such as earthquake prediction and treatment of drug addiction and hiv aids where the united states and its ngo's have something to offer iran has accepted this in the past and this is still a possible area for discussion. another area which i highlighted in the report is afghanistan.

this is perhaps the one area where the u.s. and iran are largely on the same page. the basis certainly be talking to each other. i don't know if the iranians will help the u.s. because they have not always been of assistance but they were after 9/11 and getting rid of the taliban at that time. they have a common interest with the united states and stability in afghanistan with drug interdiction and preventing the total return to power of the taliban. there was a recent meeting in rome where an iranian official participated and got a briefing from general petraeus and he was very impressed. this sort of meeting should be repeated and the iranians should be made to feel that we understand that they have a huge stake and what happens in afghanistan. they have had the largest number of afghan refugees in their country for many years and they suffer from the drug problem. finally, the area of human

rights is something that the obama administration got a slow start on but they are moving more on this. u.s. advocates say is very important. senior officials from president obama on down should continue to condemn iranian human rights abuses and they should urge iran to release some 500 political prisoners who are being held in that country this include students, women's rights advocates, and lawyers who were jailed for defending these people. iran is not living up to its international commitments let alone its own laws on human rights which should be pointed out and there has been suggestion that the secretary general of the u.n. could name a special representative on iranian human rights which would be a good idea. penney's to be pressure put on iran. we have noticed that around response to pressure very the incident of the woman who was

sentenced to stunning for adultery. there is a huge cry as she has not been stoned or executed. iran does react when pressure is put on this issue. finally, the u.s. should continue its efforts to help the iranians access the internet and satellite television so they can get unbiased news and they can communicate more easily with each other. ultimately, i believe that history, demography, and the educational level of iranians means that this country will have a more democratic and less onerous form of government in the future. this is up to a iranians to lead this movement very we cannot do it for them. iran has been struggling to achieve a representative government for more than a century and it is frankly a better equipped even now with all the repression that has occurred since last year's elections, it is better equipped to have this sort of government and countries where

the united states has promoted regime changes. in the interim, while this process goes forward in iran, washington needs to exercise strategic patients. this is in the title of my report. we need to do nothing that is going to get in the wake of this politically evolution. ultimately, iran will reassume its rightful place as a major regional power that contributes to the peace and prosperity of its citizens and the wider world. >> thank you, barbara. i will let you take a breather and ask the first question, if i may. i will pose it to our co- chairs. as opposed to strategic patients, there appears to have been within the last week or so, some signs of strategic inpatients -- impatience in the

corridors of washington. a column in ""the washington post," appeared to suggest that ramping up the war or not going to war might be a good thing for president obama to undertake in order to help the economy. senator gramm has been talking about the need to perhaps punish iran in a military maneuver. are the chances of something like this becoming a viable and is it even advisable at this stage to throw out these ideas? >> let me put a question on top of that because i think it is related and that is -- those that argue against strategic peasants would argue that what you are saying is give around the time and space it needs to fully develop its nuclear

weapons capability. is that a potential outcome from strategic patience and can we live with it? >> let me answer in a couple of ways. i think that so long as we can demonstrate that the sanctions are really biting and hear the engage ints to really significant sanctions beyond that which most thought that was on the financial sector are having a really significant impact, it is much more costly to ship goods, to import oil. this is an area where we need to do more work with china and see that china does not fill that gap. i think that iran is not north korea. it recognizes that it has to be

integrated into the world economy. to the extent that there is a real show and demonstration of global solidarity on sanctions, i think it will bring them back to the table. number two, this is a time when that there was ever a need for it, senator vandenberg's view is crucial this is a time when we have got to make sure that we have a bipartisan effort. there is a lot of polarization that will occur and i think this is a time when we need to have an show the united front. thatr three, i don't think barbara is suggesting and i certainly wouldn't that by

strategic inpatients we need indefinite patients. we recognize that each day, even with the centrifuges not operating as efficiently as they can, that more and more enriched uranium is occurring. it is occurring up to a 20 degree level. there is work being done on a weapon as asian and miniaturization and increase missile capacity. patience is important but it is not something that is in finance and the iranians have to see that. i think we will be any better position to know what path to take when we see how these negotiations which are certain to occur this month or next really pan out. are they serious and willing to go back to a sort of geneva +- vienna + process or the will

this be a long and indefinite stalled persi? in terms of military options, that has to be on the table. the administration has kept on the table and the israelis have kept it on the table but it is on the table at this point because it is recognized that there are profound thoughts from that and that the military option can't be done with a single isolated strike as could occur with the syrian reactor or the iraqi reactor 20 years ago. they diffuse their system and put it underground and it would take considerable effort over a prolonged period of time to do great detriment to it. that is not to take off the table. quite the contrary. it is to suggest that before 1 lead to that, one has to look at

all the other ramifications and to give sanctions a chance to work. they are working. they will continue to bite. we have to hope that at some point the leadership is diffused and they will come together to recognize that the cost of pursuing militarization in a military capacity are greater than what the effort is worth. this is something that the administration and others have not quite come to and that is -- what is our goal? is the goal to stop all enrichment? is the goal to simply stop a military capability? or is the goal to stop total weapon is asian? those are very different checkpoints. i think it is important that we try to achieve a bipartisan agreement on what the actual

realistic goal is. >> as usual, ambassador eisenstaedt has framed it exactly right i subscribe to everything stu has just noted. as he has presented that, i would add only this -- as to the use of military force, whether it is for a political motive or not, i don't think i have to remind the public that the united states of america is currently in two wars, two of the long as we have never been in, and before we finally wind our way out of reach, they will be the longest wars. we have ever engaged in. that has come at a very significant cost to this country. i think it has undermined our

interest in the world. don't need to go much beyond asking any general in charge of men and women in the pentagon and their families or any metrical want to apply whether it be suicides, record of courses, record of homeless and all the rest of to but one consequence of taking a nation to war. talking about going to war with iran in fairly specific terms should be carefully reviewed. that is pretty dangerous talk. it is easy to get a nation in a war and not so easy to get out as we are finding out. i am not sure that the american people are ready to go into a third war. second, if you subscribe to what barbour has laid out or at least what the task force has found, in particular, the internal dynamics that are occurring in iran -- why in the world would

you want to get in the way of that? we have some rather significant evidence that sanctions are working and they are working because our government and policies, imperfect, flawed, problems -- every policy has those -- nonetheless, it has accomplished something bigger than sanctions and that is they have broad a consensus together of most countries, the european union, the chinese are involved, the russians are involved. we have a rather significant consensus on this issue up to a point. all you need to do is reflect on the united states -- united nations vote on this which is a good indicator. that alone will not change the dynamics. as barbara has laid out, if you

subscribe to what our task force has come up with, aren't we far wiser to let this play out? aren't we far wiser rather than get ourselves into another very difficult predicament because we also know that words have consequences. most of the time and especially in the world today, they have unintended consequences. they have uncontrollable consequences. we live in an interconnected global community. i think we should factor that in. the last point i would make -- as to the question of are we allowing the iranians to buy time? maybe. we have to recognize that the real world is about risks. you calibrate your decisions and your policy making based on that risk analysis. is it riskier to go to war right

now or is it riskier to pursue the policy that we are pursuing? policy makers have to decide that. they have to sort their way through that and then they come to a decisn. it is my analysis in answering your question that it is far riskier to talk of war and go to war. as the ambassador has noted, we are the mightiest military force on earth. the world has never seen such a military power. that military power must always be tempered with a purpose. the military option is always on the table. of course it is, for any sovereign nation. at the same time, we recognize that that option is there, leaders of our country, the leaders of the world are not

living in an alice-in-wonderland type of world. they're living in the real world. they have to make real decisions based on what they calculate to be the dynamics and the facts as they are today. probably more importantly, what they will be. that is leadership. that is how i would add to the ambassador's question, thank you. >> let me add two sentences for the record about the atlantic council. >senator hagel republican, ambassador eisenstaedt the democrat was not the reason they were picked and decided to do but it reflects that we are after a centrist consistent policy not only on iran but also on all american foreign policy with our allies. when we don't do that, what week -- when we get into the partisan bickering over matters of national interest where it is hard to debate what outcome one

would want in the national interest, our enemies take solace from our partisan bickering -- bickering over this and their friends get frustrated. this is one area where we're working on this to achieve this across the board which is a radical centralism. [laughter] >> thank you for clarifying that. you mentioned alice-in- wonderland. i am picking up on senator eisenstaedt's suggestions as far as to finding one's goals. one of my favorite quotes from alice in wonderland is when you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there. i think we need to decide which road to take. my first question to barbara before the audience joins us is -- is afghanistan going to offer that first opening perhaps because in the and you have to

deal directly with the government? you cannot negotiate with the people of iran. you have to deal with the government that is in power. do you see afghanistan is offering that opening? >> as i was preparing this, i had conversations with administration officials and one said that they don't see afghanistan as the silver bullet that solves our problems with iran. i think they do see it as an area where iran and the united states not only have common interests but really do need to cooperate. it afghanistan is going to be stabilized, it will make all of its neighbors to sign onto whatever coalition government may emerge for peace talks may emerge. it is one area where the u.s. and iran can talk to each other without a lot of baggage or without difficult history.

it is a different government and different president in power now in iran than in 2001. if you look back at that time, not only was iran supporting the northern alliance which was so palpable and getting rid of the taliban in 2001 but the u.s. and iran actually have fairly senior diplomatic talks from the fall of 2001 through may of. 2003 in of they were led by the deputy assistant secretaries of state. this was a. period where people like ryan crocker look back at a golden age -- as a golden age where these were productive talks. members of al-qaida were turned over and extradited, understandings were reached and it is a pity that that ended with a u.s. invasion of iraq. i don't know if we can get back to that but certainly you can include iran in the various

multilateral discussions that will be held. we should do that. >> thank you, barbara. we now opened the floor to questions. who would like to start? please wait for the microphone and please identify yourself for the record, thank you. >> i am with the national foreign trade council. [inaudible] >> if i may just repeat the question for our television viewers -- what about the war in iraq decks >> i did not go into

iraq in this brief period that might be a topic for a second one. everyone has always said that the iranians got a lot of influence when we got rid of saddam and that is true. the iranians are tearing their hair out about iraq. i got an e-mail from an acquaintance of mine in teheran predicting that al-maliki would be confirmed as prime minister after ramadan and that was in september and we don't have a new iraqi government. this is more ticklish because there have been reports that iran is getting some support to the taliban now, the reports of iranian involvement in iraq are much more serious and we know that american servicemen and women have died because of the ied technology and special groups and others supported by iran since 2003. the u.s. and iran have not been

able to cooperate in any way in iraq. will that change? i don't know. that's why i suggested afghanistan because there is a history of cooperation there. i mention these talks that were going on from 2001-2003, there were a iranians offering to help the united states in iraq when it became clear that the u.s. was going to be invading the country the bush administration said no thank you. one has to sink out history might have been different if we decided to cooperate in 2003 in iraq. >> wait for the microphone, please. i am from inter press service. i would like to get the comment from all three of possible. how exactly does saying that all options are on the table help

the u.s. case in iran for human rights or anything else? or even with respect to nuclear program? assuming what senator hagel was saying is correct that attacking iran would have unforeseeable consequences, which i think any rational observer would conclude might involve or very much could involve the necessity for ground troops, how, at this point, can this be a realistic threat on the part of the united states and given the other two wars? my question is -- how does repeatedly saying that all options are on the table help and the of the cause of that have been laid out that our concern to the task force? >> my personal view is that the united states has to say it but

it is an option that should not be exercised at this point. i take my cue from iranians. particularly members of the green movement to say that the one thing that could destroy the chances for democracy in that country for another generation would be a u.s. attack in iran. i think perhaps ambassador eisenstaedt and senator hagel will be able to respond better as to why you have to say that option remains on the table. >> do either of you want to comment? >> i would say that if you really don't mean it and they know you don't mean, it is not significant. from my standpoint, while hired with everything that has been said and emphasized that we need to give sanctions a chance to work and we need to give the increasing isolation that iran is facing a chance to change their policies, we need to avoid driving the opposition

into the hands of the more radical elements -- we also have to send a very clear message, in my opinion, that what is most unacceptable is iran having a nuclear bomb. if they don't understand that we think that is in deep unacceptable -- indeed on acceptable, perhaps they have no incentive to change. there is always an escalating cents. there are things short of bombing. we have seen news reports of warms in some of the machines that drive the centrifuges. there are all range of actions that can be taken to slow down and even cripple the process of sure of this imagery of having 100,000 troops invading and

waves and waves of bombers. we have a lot of options. to me, it is really critical to make it clear to iran that we are giving them this extra time and we will keep the sanctions pressure on, we have the strategic patients but that at the end of the day, it is not acceptable for iran as it is currently led to have a nuclear bomb and a nuclear capability. if we don't send that signal, i think we are in serious trouble. >> i would add this -- i am not so sure that it is necessary to continue to say all options are on the table. i believe that the leadership in iran regardless of the five power centers that you refer to whether it is the ayatollah or the president or the republican

guard or the commission have some pretty clear understanding of the reality of this issue and where we are. i think the point that it -- your question really brings out which is a very good one -- if you're going to threaten on any kind of consistent basis whether it is from leadership of the congress or the administration or anyone who generally speaks for this country in any way, then you better be prepared to follow through with that. stuart noted putting 100,000 troops in iran, just as a number to play this thing out, the fact is, i would guess that we would all -- i would be the one to start the question would ask where you would get 100,000 troops.

your point is a good one, i think. i don't think there is anybody in iran that does not question the seriousness of america, our allies, or israel on this for all the reasons we made clear. i think there does come a time when you start to minimize the legitimacy of a threat. when you threaten people or you threaten sovereign nations, you better be very careful and you better understand the consequences. you may be required to employ that threat and activate that threat in some way. always outd people we have laid out and every president and administration and anyone has -- of any consequence has talked about can say and it does say but i think it is implied that the military threat is always there.

stu made an important point about there are many ways to come at this. but once you began a military operation and you ask any sgt and it is the sergeants and the guys at the bottom, not the policy makers that have to fight the war, they are the ones that have to do the dying and the fighting and make the sacrifices and that -- not policy-makers. my point is, once you started, you better be prepared to find 100,000 troops because it may take that or eventually where you're going, you don't know. you can't just start out with the concept of doing this but it will be marginalized and limited warfare. i don't think any nation can ever go into it that way that would be what i would just add to the rest of the other conversation. >> i would again emphasize, number one that we need to give

as barbara is suggesting sanctions and a potential outrage on a positive and broader initiative a chance to work. if it is rejected, we have to consider ramping up sanctions more but we also have to make it clear, in my opinion, that it is not acceptable for iran to have a nuclear weapon. there are a lot of things short of that can be tightened against them that can be very disruptive. i hope we do not have to get to that. i do not think the option is sending 100,000 troops in. that is not the best option. we have a whole range of options and have a little bit of time, as barbara has indicated, than we thought we did six months or so ago. >> we are excusing ambassador

eizenstat had a pre disappointment. thank you very much. we really appreciate it. -- a previous appointment. >> i am from the european embassy. just a quick question. iran has been under u.s. sanctions, so why do you think it will work now? why is it easier to negotiate? why do you think it is easier to negotiate with iran under sanctions? >> they have been under one form of sanction or another from u.s. these are now multilateral sanctions. as i pointed out, in the mid 1990's and had a policy of dual containment, europeans, asians, were all blindly going on signing business deals with iran and that has changed. we have seen the reports shift in european trade is coming down.

china, for a time, seemed like they were going to fill the gap. even chinese imports of oil have gone down now. also chinese investment in the iranian oil sector is going down according to a report i have cited in the issue breeze. i think the world is getting the message that this is the government not behaving well. the u.s. has never had this kind of consensus behind policy. i think this has a much greater chance of working. unilateral sanctions almost never work. multilateral sanctions sometimes do. you have seen remarks by iranian officials, the former president, who said it that these sanctions are no joke. there are a lot of commentary even in the very control the iranian press about the impact that these sanctions are having. i think that this is a different situation now. the other aspect is the human

rights aspect, the revulsion that so many people feel over the human rights abuses that have been committed by the government. we on the before that this regime cut, on occasion, be very brutal. people were executed, assassinated, and so on, but we never saw it the way we have seen it now on youtube, facebook, and so on. we also have a new crop iranian emigrees to have a been forced to leave the country. they are very outspoken. they have a fresh information and knowledge about the society that perhaps we did not have before. >> if i may, i would like to add one thing on a point of perspective. it rarely gets brought up for obvious reasons. the assumed nuclear issue did not begin with this administration. this being the iranian administration or previous

administrations after the revolution in 1979. the nuclear program started under the shah who was our puppet is essentially. we finance 10. we like him. we set him up -- refinanced him, but it was clearly in american interest to have a strong man there. when you talk about revolution of human-rights, history is instructive here. not to defend anything or anyone, or certainly not as current government in iran, but this is why task force are important and taking the time to hear from exports, but let's open up the aperture and get the entire vision of history. it was not that long ago, 1979. the people remember that. not all of them, as barbara has

said, but they have one of the youngest demography's in the world which is hopeful and good for freedom. we also have to factor in the frame of reference and the free- market thinking of a lot of the iranians. the brutality of that came a result -- as a result of the shah that we've financed and propped up, this goes back before 1979. this does not change the dynamics are the risk -- or the risks or thread, but it is helpful to go back and understand why certain countries and people think the way they do. it was noted earlier, and i really do believe this. i was with two iranians in the group and they said one thing that would fasten that society

back together quicker than anything else would be a military attack. that would bring the iranians back together for cultural reasons, historic reasons. now, maybe a military option will eventually be the only thing that is left. i do not know that. like we have said, we better be careful and we better think through that. we should employ every other option before we have to make that decision, if we have to make it. >> thank you, senator. we have a question here. >> i just wanted to make a comment -- i am from the heritage foundation. the ambassador said it "unacceptable." i had a question what that exactly means when there are five or six countries that keep on saying that it is unacceptable and iran keeps enriching uranium. we have the example of north

korean. at that same time, they said it was unacceptable and it actually happened. what does that actually mean? the other question is with the word "democracy -- "democracy." when you see what they democratic iran, with always said they are not a fatality. regime. there are many different -- they are now paying -- not a totalitarian regine. how does that serve american interests? it serves the interest of the iranian people, but is that something we should take risks for american policy-makers? >> barbara? >> ambassador eizenstat said it was unacceptable. i did not say that. my personal view, and this is my personal view, is that the

united states could probably contain, deter, live with a nuclear iran as the head with a nuclear pakistan, and nuclear india, and a clear israel, and a nuclear north korea. there are a lot of reasons they want this capability. i am not sure they would go all the way to a weapon. and does not serve their strategic interest to have the weapon. it serves the interest to have the world think they might have a weapon. i am not sure they would go beyond that. that is something we can address as we work our way through this task force. the united states should give a better definition of what it means b"nuclear capability." they should decide whether they can put up with limited uranium enrichment. these all things need to be clarified. on the question of democracy, these are the human rights. i think what iranians want is a

more representative and less brutal government that would be focused on their national interests. frankly, if they had a different government, i do not think the world would have such a problem with them having nuclear weapons. it is the nature of the regime that makes it "unacceptable" because as we know they cannot act as a very constructive player in a number of areas in the middle east. it tweaks some people very poorly. whether you, democracy or human rights, i have spent a fair amount of time there of the last 14 years. i think i have a sense of what iranians would like ideally if they could get it. i am not sure if they want they treat -- a complete transformation, but they want a more open, a freer system where people will not be thrown in prison for demonstrating peaceably on the street and certainly will not be shot to death for demonstrating. >> and that is what you're

suggesting with your various other measures such as greater access to the internet, greater freedom of communication inside the country and out so other countries can help. we have another question? >> john limbert, university professor. i want to thank you, barbara, for a very memorable phrase which is "the iranians consider themselves the rodney dangerfield of the middle east. they just do not get any respect." and lisa many areas including nuclear, the issue of respect, being dictated, being dictated to it comes up over and over again. we hear it from the president. we hear it from many others.

we hear it in the context of the nuclear program. we hear it in the context of the tehran nuclear deal. what is behind this? how does one deal with something like this? is this a smokescreen for other things or is there some way of dealing with it and how you view this constant refrain in the iranian position? >> john, you are much more than a university professor. he was deputy assistant secretary of state recently. one of your contributions was to help change the language that the u.s. government uses toward iran so it is much more respectful. i think that is important. president obama, when he refers to iran, he always mentions

mutual interest and respect, and i think that is key to understand where they are coming from when we approach any kind of talks with them, any kind of negotiations. we have gone beyond the formulation of the knowing what you need to do. we did not watch your finger at them as much. every now and then it slips into the department briefings. respect is important but so is power. particularly is the power to inflict economic pain on iran and i think they have shown when their national interests are at stake they can make decisions whether you are respectful toward them are not. i would hope our diplomats would use appropriate language. iran was very skillful diplomats. even now, after the purge the have inflicted on the foreign ministry, there are still some savvy people. one will hope they will

approach this in a respectful manner toward the united states. they did not help their case when a man and a dad -- went on to manage a bond -- respect is a two-way street and i think they understand that. >> at the barber said it very well. -- i think barbara said it very well. i would connected benjamin's question to yours. they do present and immigration and altman outcomes. when you connect what benjamin asked regarding what does this mean when you say these things like "unacceptable," "weapons. what is acceptable uranium?

what rights do i iranians have to possess nuclear power and capability? we have stated that all nations do have that right. where is the line? it blurs, it seems to me, into which you were talking about, and you are as knowledgeable about this, john, as anyone in this room. it blurs into your point because if we have any hope of making any progress through the diplomatic channels and all the other influences that we are using and coordinating to influence the outcome that will all be framed and partially part of whatever acceptance there is to what will we accept? what will iran accepted?

i go back to this real example. the turkish-brazilian so-called "compromise," which we lay that on the table one year ago and walked away from it. it was not only our fault, but the iranians blow this up to. that is not a new assessment. my point in bringing that up, the brazili-turkish point, is because it goes back to benjamin's point because it starts to get to the issue which we will all gatt at and get to at some point. what are you willing to accept? how much and how you do that? the russians, as you remember, but the deal on the table a few years ago. we will and rigid, so on and so on. -- we will enrich it, and so on. this is all woven together in

the same fabric. this is part of the real complexity, as you know, in trying to find a resolution. i think what we need to do as much as anything else, and this goes back to what stewart was talking about, barbara, someone, is just trying to put this issue, not unlike the middle east process, on a continuation of high ground. i do not think you will solve the iranian piece in six months. maybe it will be, but there are all of these questions just like with the middle east issue. if we continue to move this on higher and higher ground and get this to a point where there is a confluence that will dictate a settlement that will be in the interestf all countries. the last point i will make is

that we should not underestimate again, and barbara has brought this up, the regional aspect of this. this is critical. this is something that i have always thought we have made huge mistakes when we went into iraq and afghanistan. we did not regionalize the strategic concept, the geopolitical dynamic of all of those movements and decisions and actions that we have taken. we are now trying to do that. we will have to do that. it seems to me this is a clear case of that. >> let me underscore what senator hagel just said. if you just take a look at the way turkey looks at missile defense the way poland does, geography makes a difference. we will have an agreement in lisbon at the nato summit in a couple of weeks that will be a

very careful agreement that takes into account turkey's sensitivities. the other thing is it just for clarity for the atlantic council, you heard one past member say it is unacceptable to have nuclear weapons. one said you could contain, deter, live with. the atlantic council does not take positions. as you can see, this task force has not decided on that point. i did not think we have to. i think the questions that we need to get that are what should we be willing to accept? what leverage do we have to after the determine that? then, how do we determine what she would -- what we would be willing to accept? it is not just, could be contained them? but what do we do about proliferation in the wider region? are they going to carry through on threats to push israel and to the sea?

what is the impact on hamas, hezbollah, and someone? i think that would have been ambassador eizenstat's answer, certainly. >> i think that is the message. we have a question from benjamin. >> thank you for convening this great group of radical centrists. i will offer my question to barbara. now that we hear reports that sanctions are beginning, how iranians view the enrichment program? how will this affect them going to the negotiation table the next couple of weeks? >> it is hard, of course, to do proper polling. there have been some. this is just really from anecdotal stories and my own

sense of traveling there. they care about the notion that iran should have advanced technologies. they should not be deprived and they think that is their right. if they could trade that for a better economy, i think they would do that in a minute. there are some slogans that are tossed around in that country. people repeat them pro-forma because they have to. they are drummed into them ad nauseam. in the books there wrote about iraq and iran, "death to america close "and "can i have your autograph"? the 29th anniversary of the revolution, everyone was enchanting, "death to america the go -- "death to america and." they think in richmond is their

natural right. there are a bunch of young kids saw that i was a foreigner in the crowd. i said i was an american. they were on the platform saying, "blah, blah, blah," and 50 young girls came and asked for my autograph. just because i was from the states. and you figure this out. this is an issue that the government uses for nationalism. it is something they tried to build up to unite the people because there is not much, frankly, to unite them anymore. if the islamic republic lost its religious fervor, they portray this as their right. it is not the first priority for most iranians, in my view. >> thank you. we have another question.

>> my question is for ms. slave and also. -- ms. slavin also. thank you for the atlantic council to having me. thank you for your report. my question is related to the last two. he cites the current political instability as a good thing because the following regime could be more open, more democratic, and more respectful of human rights. then you go on to say they are more likely to cooperate or at least not be so confrontational with israel and/or the west. my question is why? would be more like us in a lot of ways. knowledge the democratic peace theory caveat for an entry point.

maybe the most recent election ultimately it is not clear that he would not have one given the support in rural areas. you, yourself, that a lot of his internal opposition is from reactionary elements. >> that is true. right and a falling regime, if we are patient, comes in with more respect for human rights and what not, why would we assume that they would not pursue as aggressive shi'ite policy? i do not know how you would characterize the influence of love and on as anything but the stabilizing -- the influence of love and on as anything but destabalizing? >> my evidence comes from the policies from when the last president was in. they sought better relations with saudi arabia and the gulf.

hatani gave a speech to inbei -- in beirut and make claims about wiping israel off the map. it was a different tone. the europeans are eager sheeting with the united states over this. we have an example about what a more constructive iranian administration can look like. i make this statement because of the comments that have been made five the leaders of the green movement who have repeatedly spoken about the fact that they would have a different policy toward the united states, toward the west. i take this from my experience is visiting iran over the last 14 years that they would have a different approach. the economy is very importa.

if you will recall, one of the slogans in the demonstrations that took place after the elections last year wasn't, "no to lebanon, no to gaza." the reason that some much of their money is spent supporting hezbollah. i think they would take a very different view. i do not think they would vote those kinds of resources to those radical movements. hatani used to say if they reached an agreement with the israelis that they would not stand in the way. it was a different perspective. we have to hope, i think, that a future iranian government would be more nationalistic. would they give up their claims? ano. the shah was the one who started the nuclear government.

three islands were seized from the united arab emirates. i do not think you would see emerging nationalism, but the tactics would be different and certainly there were be less of a confrontation, hopefully, with the united states and the west. >> thank you, barbara. i will ask senator hagel and fred if they would like to say anhing before i wrapup this discussion. >> only to thank you, again, shuja nawaz, and all have participated over the last nine months. thank you all for joining us. note to fred for his leadership. the jobs of chairman is to stay out of the way and not screw anything out of. ladies and gentlemen, the president. >> i actually have nothing to hide. -- add. >> uncharacteristically. >> i think the audience to coming and the members of our task force, many of home will be

watching this on television or listening to this on our website or reading the transcript. thank you for your invaluable work in supporting what we are doing. i want to thank the atlantic council for giving us this grants in getting this going. we hope to continue on the regional issues that need to be discussed on a broader level because this is the south asia center. we want to look at the indian view, pakistan, afghanistan, the gulf states, what they all think about iran and the engagement between the west. i also want to thank, again, the project director for the iranian task force who had to be in china unfortunately and mr. this first meeting. we want to thank mark and all of my colleagues.

thank you all for coming. but we will see you again. >> thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] our international conference continues with dean pakistan former president pervez musharraf and relays ship -- and the relationship between pakistan.

we also talk about the president's recent trip to asia. this is one hour 45 minutes. >> thank you all and welcome to the atlantic council. president musharraf, it is an honor to see you again. my last interview with you before i left "the wall street journal" where i was editor of looking after editor -- europe and the middle east to run the atlantic council was in january 2006. i would get a couple of lines from this interview just to illustrate how much can change and how little can change during that period of time. we spoke about something that had not made the news much until that time and that was the notion of a gas pipeline that would run potentially on to

india, a trilateral track that began changing one of the things we are working on at the atlantic council in the south asia center. we are working on how does one drive this regional cooperation? how does one wage peace in the region? we talked about drones. they're just been an attack on a village where al qaeda leaders were expected to a head dinner that killed pakistani women and children and set off street protests in pakistani cities. you talked in the interview of how you had not been informed in advance and the pakistan -- and toldhe u.s., "we do not want anyone to operate in pakistan, even if that meant a slow response to intelligence." mr. president, we established a seouth asia center two years ago because we recognize the centrality of these sorts of questions and the centrality of

the bilatel relationship with pakistan in its regional context. you are an unusual man, talent that understands both the region and washington. and we have picked a leader for our center who is probably the most unique person in understanding, he is an insider in both societies and an outsider, which is a frightening bit of schizophrenia to bring to the leadership of any organization. he knows how washington and pakistan works, and it gives us a leadership that has a position where the south asia center is not an american center. it is a global ceer talking about a region and bringing us real expertise that has put us at the center of this debate after just two years, less than

two years in operation. only by understanding that the relationship with pakistan, wh this kind of sophistication, can we move forward. there may be no more important bilateral relationship in 2011 for the u.s. than this one, president obama's trip to india, notwithstanding. so, we want to talk about the geographic subcontinent in the center -- afghanistan, central asia, iran. we think this the lives- a solution to the problems we look at will only come from this link. john kerry has called our work on u.s.-pakistan relations seminal. since the center's launch, we have published an updated report. the first report we did was in 2009. we did an updated report on the

tenuous relationship, and we remain committed to our mission of waging peace. let me quote the first sentence from that report. "perhaps no bilateral relationship in the world matches that of the u.s. and pakistan when it comes to its combustible combination of strategic importance and perilous instability." so, that context is as important as is our speaker today, a man who understands the context and the challenges as well as anyone on earth. few people in the world have an understanding of the inner workings of pakistan better than president musharraf. he worked his way up through the military and political ranks to become general and army chief of staff in 1998. he took over as president after a bloodless coup in 1999 and led until his resignation in

2009. his life story tracks the history of the country and the region. he is not only a person of history in the region but as we will hear today, he is very much a person also of the present. president musharraf, the flo is yours. [applause] >> mr. kemp, president of the atlantic council, members of the council, it is indeed my unique privilege to be talking to all on a very important subject, the subject of our region, what is happening there. it is the happening place today and the stratec focus of the whole world is to our regi. therefore, i would like to say

that we must understand the region and there is doubt that the world and indeed the united states coalition forces and pakistan must cooperate fully to be merged successful and what ever they are battling -- to emerge successful in whatever they are battling. therefore, i am going to talk to you on regional development, on the current situation there in the region, and also the ups and downs of pakistan and the united states relationships. as you said, it's a strategic relationship of great importance, but may i very frankly say that yes, indeed, in words, but in actions, one would expectuch more to show or to demonstrate the strategic importance that pakistan enjoys in that region. i will no annunciate debt to

whatever i'm going to say. i would like -- i will not enunciate whatever i'm going to say. i will start -- from that, sorry. rings]l phone [laughter] shut it off. i take the historical perspective, dividing into a certain periods, and with that, i will extract the relationship of pakistan and the united states and why there have been ups and downs. the first period is 1979 to 1989. since 1948, pakistan has been a strategic partner of the united states. and we have been with you all these years for 42 years, right up to 1989, very clearly.

the united states and pakistan, we call it a jihad. reader about 25,000 -- we drew about 25,000 from all of us -- almost all of the muslim countries. we trained, banned taliban. this strategic relationship with the united states has only been since 1948. we fought a were together for 10 years in afghanistan. we fought the jihad.

in this jihad, we abandoned afghanistan. the jihad was spearheaded by militant religious groups and also the negative aspect, which i must highlight, that the glue that held afghanistan together, the ethnic groups together, was the national covenant, translated. after the king was posed by the soviets was no more. then when we talk of political resolutions, we are talking about a new national covenant, a homegrown national covenant, giving afghanistan the predominant position in government. these are the two points at want to highlight from this time of

1989 which ended in the soviet defeat. what happened after 1989? hat happened after 1989? the next. period is 12 years of disaster. firstly, pakistan and afghanistan was totally abandoned by the united ates. not only abandoned, there w a strategic shift in the united ates towards pakistan -- against pakistan towards india. there were sanctions imposed on pakistan and cozying up of relations with india, starting in 1989, despite of the fact that we were the strategic ally for four years and we fought a war together for 10 years. this led to a sense of betrayal within the people of pakistan. which exists even now.

so 1989, the abandonment of the region, was the first great blunder committed by the united states. not only these of the pakistan, but also the 25,000 mujahedin -- not only vis-as-vis pakistan but also the 25,000 a shot had been coalesced into al qaeda. -- the mujahedin coalesced into al qaeda. for six years, battling each otr -- even the pashtuns were divided into eight groups -- and they ravaged the country. the fhting was then between al

qaeda on one side and the northern allianz, minorities on the other side. this then destroyed afghanistan years.anothehr six afghanistan yeasrrs, became of ghost country. i visited afghanistan. kabul was worst than somalia. so this was kabul, a ghost city. this is what happened in these 12 years after having won a victory in the soviet union. because the strategic focus was euro-centric because of the cold war, warsaw pact, reunification of germany -- all that gains went into york.

what did afghanistan or pakistan get? nothing. for 12 years, pakistan bought 4 million refugees in the process into pakistan. we had to fend for 4 million refugees, warlordism in afghanistan. pakistan alone to protect its own interest in these 12 years. that was the -- of pakistan- united states relationships. they thought the united states had used pakistan and abandon the spirited and kim 9/11 -- then came 9/11 and the terrible terrorist attack here in the united states. pakistan again becomes important. pakistan is needed again. and therefore, we again become a strategic partner. but then we became strategic partners, the question i was

asked all the time, what makes you think the united states will t again use us and abandoned us? it is important, ladies and gentlemen, today when we are trying to take the decision whether to stay or quit, are we again to be abandoned -- question mark -- in the minds of every pakistani. so now the next blunder that i will talk of which is very significant -- after 9/11. the taliban were defeated with the help of the northern alliance, because the minorities -- taliban dispersed, ran, al qaeda ran into the mountains and cities of

pakistan. they were in total disarray -- taliban. afghanistano was available for the political instrument to be used. [unintelligible] by giving -- we were forced and the military dominant position in afghanistan. and now a political solution available to be executed in afghanistan. but, unfortunately, the political solution did not come about. what is the political solution? you cannot govern afghanistan with a minority dominating the government. they are only 8%. afghanistan has always been governed by pashtuns, 55% of

afghanistan. now, he w the situation early in 2002, where we could have changed policy, taken pashtuns on board and put a pashtun- dominated government in kabul. unfortunately, we did not do that. the environment was available. we failed to do that. and therefore, the country is governed by the minority, the biggest blunder with which we are persisting even out. now we are trying to talk to moderate taliban or taliman. what we should have done in 2002-273, from a position of strength, now we are trying to do from this position of weakness. that was the next bluer. and now we are in the pro cess of taking a decision

whether to stay or quit. ladies and devin, this decisio has to be taken very carefully. -- ladies and gentlemen, this decision has to be taken very carefully. we cannot commit a fourth blunder. in afghanistan, a lot of people ask whether we can win. i would like, my reply is, we must not lose. even if the answer to win in maybe 50-50, but we must not lose. and let me say with 100% conviction, if we should resolve, we will not lose. and we are not losing. so therefore, my food for thought here is, ladies and gentleman, that we must not lose first and then work out the winning strategy.

and i have said that pakista is supposedly a strategic partner. i don't know. the people of pakistan are not to shore whether we are the strategic partnership- the people of pakistan are not too share whether we are strategic partners. what are the sensitivities of pakistan? integrity, our world being, of course -- our well being, of course, and the world showing us concern and giving us the importance that is due to us. the other is the kashmir dispute. it is important, not only that it is a dispute in the united nations but today, it is causing a lot of terrorism and

extremism. -- within our society. in 1989, when kashmir erupted, dozens of mujahedin groups sprang up within pakistan, and thousands of people were volunteering to join to go to india, near kashmir, to fight againsthe indian army. and all these maligned names of -- mujahed, etc -- are products of the 1990's. now there is another intifada movement by people of the indian -held kashmir, and that is suppressed by the indian army and with the dozens killed. these mujahedin it groups again

start rising and people give them support. its impact to terrorism and extremism must be understood by the world. and therefore, the significance of resolution of theashmir disput not because pakistan wants i it has been necessary for the region, for the world to fight terrorism andxtremism. the other sensitivities are nuclear capability. ladies and gentlemen, pakistan as much as rogue nuclear state, islamic bomb. i don't know why india is not a -- bomb. [unintelligible] pakistan is nuclear as a defensive, existential threat

exists on it. our strategy was of defensive milita rate from 1948, and we quantified this into army-navy, air force. only conventional type. in 1974, india went nuclear. so, therefore, the strategy became untenable. therefore, pakistan had to go nuclear. and when india started firing missiles in the early 1990's, pakistan had to make missiles to restore the balance and restore the strategy of defense, which we did. so, therefore, pakistan's nuclear capability is an existential compulsion which is with ida. dia. no pakistani will understand the logic of what pakistan's nuclear

assets are disturbing the world. this is a sensitivity. our strategic assets is the pride of every man walking the streets of pakistan. so any indication of negativism coming from abroa the threat coming on the strategic capability of pakistan is viewed extremely seriously by every individual pakistani. so this is the compulsion. oto president obama's visit india. i do not want to talk much. i do not believe in caucus and indo-an being

centric. i believe in the bilateral importance of relationships. the united states president was to go to india, absolutely. he has all the rights to do everything. but if pakistan is the strategic partner, paktan has strategic significance, pakistan is suffering because of so many bomb blasts, hundreds if not thousands of people dead. the army has sufred 2500 dead. isi has suffered 300 dead. and then we had this flood, massive flood, unpredented. so many casualties. i thought president obama should have shown some concern for this small strategic partner and visited pakistan. no mention of kashmir.

i have explained the issue. it is sensitive in fighting terrorism and extremism. the concern of india is that no third party is to be involved. yes, indeed, it should not be involved, and we should resolve the kashmir dispute bilaterally, which we were doing in my time, and we were near a solution. but certainly from the sole superpowerone expects concern for pakistan being a strategic ally of importance and also sensitivity to terrorism and extremism, because kashmir does contribute negatively toward terrorism and extremism. while there is concern in the

united states or interest in the united states, because india wants to purchase $45 biion of arms purases, yes, it is of commercial and economic interest, but i remember in my time, pakistan -- there was the question of the european union and united states for a free trade agreement or preferential trade agreement on additional market access. i believe in trade not aid. it means opening of factors, job creation, poverty elimination, unemployment reduction. unfortunate, it was not given. lastly, ladies and gentlemen, i talk of the political scene and pakistan. here in united states, all

said, pakistan's strategic significance therefore, we are to be concerned what is happening in pakistan and what the future holds for pakistan. we must ensure that pakistan's integrity, its solidarity, is stability is maintained, because we have to fight terrorism and extremism and defeats it. and if we want to do that, we look at the political realities in pakistan. today, pakistan is on a downward turn. its economy, its government, political turmoil, and of course, terrorism and extremism. in this situation, let's look at the future. one has to look at the future. otherwise, -- react when it is too late. we need to see is there light in

this darkness that pakistan is facing today? and that light will come through the political alternatives. i do understand that democracy has to be maintained, but thugh democratic, to the process of elections, is light visible? we will have elections in 2013, hopefully, when the government completes its tenure. some people are saying midterm elections or whatever. what will be the result of those elections? will we have a government that will deal with -- that will take pakistan forward in this darkness to light, fight terrorism, and sure the solidarity of pakistan? i don't see that light, unfortunately. therefore, ladies and gentlemen, i personally thought that ieed to get involved.

maybe there is a chance that i will producen alternativehat may be viable for pakistan. and therefore, i joined politics. one has to analyze the future of pakistan. we must insure the stability of pakistan for the stake of contain further turmoil in the region. i know i have less time. i am open to any questions you may want to ask. [applause] >> thank you, mr. pres ident. as usual, there was a sweeping vision that you reflected in your talks. i'm going to pick up on some of the points you raiasesed,

particularly on the u.s.- pakistan relationship. i am reminded of a quote of the ambassador. he said that being friends with america is like living on the banks of the great river. every four years, it changes course and it leaves you flooded or high and dry. and one could get that flavor from your commenry on the u.s.-pakistan relationship. tepn you took the fateful se of joining the coalition of the course after 9/11, you agreed to provide access to the united states to pakistani territory, to launch the attack on afghanistan. and there is enough evidence that some of the drone attack, which led to public outcry,

were launched from pakistani airfield originally. there was no -- taliban in pakistan at that tim resulted largely of -- because of the army into the border region. looking back, do you think there was too much haste aceding to the u.s. request? >> this is the argument many people have given. i have faced this question many times. first of all, pakistan's decision to join the coalition and the united states. the first question i asked myself before joining -- what is in pakistan's interest? does pakistan want a talibanized government in pakistan?

and do we believe in and the views of islam that the taliban holds? the answer was no. 99% of pakistanis would say no. we do not want that. with all that cfidence, it was not in our interest to be supportive towards taliban. notas pakistan's interest, u.s. interest. then i went further. if we did not join, what could happen? and my answer, which i do not want to elaborate, was that it would be dangerous for pakistan. because india was ever prepared to join and certainly the united states would attack afghanistan. how did the attack afghanistan from india? pakistan's sovereignty and aerospace or land. from all points of view, bravado is good at a personal

level, but when it nations and states are involved coppe, bravado is not the solution. i took the decision. in hindsight, most of the pakistan is believe it was the right decision. ttp was not there. there was dnsm. which was more serious. he was the leader. and he is the man who's stronger in this malikahn divison. ion. then there was notheanother ader. these are products because of what has been happening. these are products because we

defeated after 9/11, taliban and al qaeda were defeated. then 2003, or in 2004, we had a two year period to execute a political solution in afghanistan acceptable to the people with pashtun. i coined the term that all taliban are pashtun, but all patun are not taliban. --'s get them o noun our side the pashtun. now that was not done, so therefore, taliban emerged in 2004. they are starting out to go towards taliban. they are few in numbers, but taliban have emerged. you cannot put that on mine,

that i did something -- and then kasir, yes, indeed, as i said, kashmir, freedom was -- this at all this dynamics some religions militancy in afghanistan, and after 9/11, yes, they turned it towards me. so, therefore, our national establishment -- the extremism went on the rise occurred because of the. so i think we need to heed the history but see the future, the realities of today, and battling in the future and winning. i think we should concentrate on that. back to the drone,

s, every single person on the streets and pakistan is opposed to them. then why allow the drone attacks to cross your sovereign boundary? >> yes. you did ask. now, drones. there's a dilemma here tha we share with you. thdilemma is that these drones are militan. t. i know that. at the same time, indiscriminate use of drones causes >> in my time, i never allowed [unintelligible] we needed drums of for giving us

information about targets. where is the target? that is the main thing. surveillance is important to spot the militants. you can send your helicopter gunships, or we have created a force called special operations skforce for the special services group. there are various methods. i was for the use of armed forces. i think that there were only a

few grown attacks inhose times. i've always objected to them. the use of drones is causing in- a negative. that is the dilemma. the pakistan armed forces. united states law comes into play, and these a unusual circumstances. >> this is the element of distrust that prevails beten the strategic partners. let me take you back across the border and say something quite important about afghanian. can we win? your response was, we must not

lose. it has been almost 10 years since there were coecticut operations in afghanistan. what, in your mind, is that missing strategy? >> first, i check the important part. do not lose. en we talk of quitting, it has terrible impact,-on both sides. -- impact, negative on both sides. every partner in the coalition including pakistan would like to evaluate the situation. certainly, i am reminded of 1989. millions of refugees in pakistan, so pakistan will have

to thi. the sphinx -- must think. negative. the enemy is very clear. if i was a taliban commander, god forbid, time is on my side. or the -- what a negative thing. ladies and gentrelemt -- gentleman, in tribal culture, chivalry i respected. this is nev expted. therefore, stay there. now we have to certainly win. what is the winning strategy. how can we do it?

we first have to be in the military dominant position. never speak from the position of weakness. how do we do that? our forces, the u.s. forces, coalition forces, they are diluted because there is too much space. think of going across the pakistan border, it is increasing space. you will be defeated. you will suffer more casualties. never ke that mistake. therefore, how you do away with the dilution of space. do we know that the national army today -- what a blunder.

50%, 55% is ethnic. how can you do this? there has toe a balance in the army. there has to be more. secondly, is then any other element? i think there is, even now. we should havdone it in 2002. if you see a tribal culture, to things that i want to highlight. their confined to their mosques. over the centuries, where are they? they are supressed. but they are tehre.

-- there. everyone here is a weapon. each side has its armory. it is a weapon culture, weapons and good weapons. let us look at tribes that have no ideological affinity with taliban. and tribal maliks that have some -- i don't want to use the four- letter words. [laughter] they are raised, armed, give them their pride. let them fight the taliban. tribal people have always fought with the pakistan army against

india. let's create those. this is to gain military dominance, and the political instrument, the military will never give you a solution. so a political instrument. we have to get them on board. term ofagree with this moderate taliban. do what you can to get them on board. they are not a monolithic. they have good command structure like the army. there are a number of groups

operating. fact, let me tell you [unintelligible] their people hvae -- have clashed with each other. 150 dead, killed by the group. they ambushed them. there is -- it's very good that there are a number of taliban. managing political affairs. but from opposition. >> thank you. one last question before i share you with the audience. this is picking up on your point regarding the 2013 elections. you said you had decided to join politics, and some said that you

joined in 1999 when he took over the government. what has changed from the time that you left pakistan that would allow you to go back? and the obstacle that you face, the legal challenges. that is a question of the presidency, but the national assembly members voting for the office of the president. it has only just been launched. the think there is any realistic chance? -- do you think there is any realistic chance? in a journey starts with the first step. -- >> any journey start with the first step. you think of it as too big. you don't have that leadership

in new -- you. i presume it's not too big. because, number one, i left not because my popularity was rock bottom. i was the most popular man in pakistan since 2007. there is no doubt in my mind, i know that. i understand the people and the masses of pakistan. it was in 2007 the political turmoil took place. for which there was a reason and i don't want to get involved in that. it is not that pakistan was going down. the socioeconomic development of pakistan was not going down. it was not that the condition of the people, the welfare and well-being of the people was going down. the poverty in pakistan according to the [unintelligible]

the 2008 figures were reduced from 32% to 17%. the people of pakistan no way. -- know it. now, this is one. my popularity did go down, but it was not rock-bottom. i was popular and a lot of segments of pakistan. the other point is, pakistan is suffering today. is that the reason for the gain? i said, in the darkness, the people of pakistan are not seeing the light what is the choice? i don't have to elaborate. everyone knows what is happening

in pakistan. the alternative, twice and failed miserably. in 1999, pakistan had $300 million in the foreign-exchange. l our indicators, it might be a little bter than the united states today. and it was -- the economy was in a terrible state. people were crying, i was a chieftain. i know how many women and men came to me and asked when i was going to take over. if i gave the names of some of them, even those at this gathering would know them.

they told me to take over before pakistan has gone in 1999. this condition now is almost the same. people looking to run away, inflation, people committing suicide? people in the streets. now they are remembering wt they missed. the important items, sur is one of the sanctioned items. in 2006, the sugar price went from 21 to 23. i called the sugar mill growers, why this to be increased? today is 115. this is what will happen in two years. is just one thing.

the pakistan people are yearning for deliverance. that is why the first step has a lot of relevance, and i think there is a chance of success. i caot be sure, but i believe it is better to try and fail and then to not try at all. >> i will open it up. i will start at thfrontier. if you could please wait for the microphone and identify yourself. >> welcome back to washington. very fond memories. also the first meeting that you had with president bush at the united nations, our official residence in new york after 9/11.

my question build on what you were just talking about, the economic situation. i remember the economy was growing. it was something like 7% per year. i stand corrected. and recall we were talking about different ways of economic cooperation including trying to create reconstruction opportunities so that we can give preferential treatment to pakistan products that would come to the united states. can you elaborate on what your -- getting pakistan back on its feet economically, given the opportunity? >> a cherished my memory with you, sir. your very frank in your

approach and i appreciate that. you also appreciated by frank s. -- my frankness. for the development of the socioeconomic development ofthe tribal aras. -- areas. nothing came about. that is the negative. what i want to say is, we have to be fast. we have to be trusting. we have to move fast, delivering and doing something for the people. today, the economy of pakistan is nosediving downward. why is it going down, sir?

immediately after 2008 when the elected government came into being, one thing that happened, [unintelligible] pakistan is running away with their money. the dollar was heldt 60 rupees for 8 years. today it is 87 rupees. fbi has gone down considerably. the reduction in fdi. exports have half the effectiveness. revenues have gone down. your balance of payment deficit increased.

i don't know the latest figure. these are the negative trends, why? because of lack of trust and confidence in the government. i personally think that if people have trust and confidence in the government, without doing anything, there will be a reverse flow of money. pakistan wants to invest in its own country. why should they te their money out? halo bring their money back. -- they will bring their money back. i believe that the policy and relations mostly, interstate relationships have to do with interpersonal relations. i am very sure that everyone will be -- could be persuaded.

the economy will start doing well. i have no doubt on that. our position today, before an exchange reserves are there. from $300 million to $18.50 billion. it is there. it is not $300 million. and also, we raise revenue collection to one trillion. it can certainly go down, but not that much. the stock index had gone to 14.5000. 14,500.

-- gone to 14,500. what is required is confidence of the people in the government. i have a simple definition. it is my own definition for any leader or any government. ensure the security, progress, and development of the state. this is the definition i have. it can be ensured. all other things are secondary. i know i am talking to a u.s. audience. democracy, ladies and gentlemen, it is a tool to deliver e progress of the state and the welfare and well- being of its people. it is not in and of itself, it

must deliver to the state and to the people. if you have a democratically elected government running people down to the ground, i don't think that kind of democracy is the democracy that any state or once -- wants. the welfare of the state, the well-being of the people. that must be ensured tt pakistan can deliver to the people. >> we have a question there. there is great demand for qutions. >> i apologize, i am giving long answers. >> thank you for coming. i agree entirely with your analysis, b where i respectfully disagree is that i don't think we can wait until 2013. i recently returned from another trip from pakistan and i

believe the situation is far more dire than the people in this country appreciate. the dialogue only procrastinated the inevitable which will be a collision between the united states and pakistan because of a profound misunderstandings. what, if anything, can the united states or pakistan do in the short term to turn around what i believe is going to be this collision? >> think you, sir. i am surprised and glad to hear what you say. we, what the unid states can do is to help pakistan. helping pakistan, i have been very bluntly indicating that what is happening is not really helping pakistan. we have to help pakistan

economically. but concerns of corruption, there is no doubt. you ask a difficult question, frankly. if i were there, i would have asked for market access so i can create jobs and open factories. i can reduce unemployment, ian reduce poverty. that is certainly a thing that the united states can certainly do. immediately. remaining -- i think pakistan on the law-and-order side, we are

being -- a the the term is extremism. the united states needs to develop a better understanding of the army instead of blaming the army for collaborating with terrorists. i don't understand why this is done. the army has suffered 2500 dead at the hands of them. they are killing the army men, and you're blaming the army? i don't understand. they are killing the personnel, about 300 dead, officers all over pakistan. we are collaborating with -- there is a mismatch. please try to understand.

i will leave micromanagement to pakistan. be concerned with their intentions, that they do not want taliban and al qaeda. be concerned with strategic delivery and don't micromanage for them. they understand who to talk to, how to talk, what enemies to take on. and we will leave this micromanagement to the people of pakistan. the this is the second, i think. we need internal stability in pakistan, political stability. i don't know if the united states can contribute and to bring in political stability. that is the ultimate requirement because the political stability would bring

about economic stability and good governance. i don't know if the united states can assist. >> thank you, mr. president for your very candid esentation. if i might draw you out on what seems to be a tension in your presentation. he spoke to the president's visit of the region and or resentment in regards to depictions of pakistan that your assessed with india. you spoke of the fact that a nuclear capacity of your region is a compulsion, it is an existential come posen. does it have to do with india or something else? how do you reconcile the comments, please?

>> if i were to tell you very briefly, and indian forces today are based on 33 infantry divisions. 25 of them are oriented towards the pakistan border. there are about six armored and mechanized divisions. all six are organized at pakistan's border. th are used for an offensive. the navy, may be oriented towards pakistan's shores. the incidents like the attack on the parliament, the whole army came on to the borders of pakistan. the situation developed.

or do you x -- what do you expect pakistan to do? there force is three or four times bigger than pakistan. and when incidents take place, the politicians in india are crying for punishment, attacking pakistan, it is a trifecta. what can the leadership do? it has an existential threat. the military strategy is of manila and defensive deterrents in the conventional and unconventional. previously, it was conventional with india going nuclear. >> thank you for your frank comments.

stepping back from the immediate issues you have been discussing thatre very important, those like myselfave lived in pakistan, where are very concerned about the educational system there. i have been the many villages where it says that there is a school there, b there is no school there. you helped initiate a good program, but international measures say that only 40% of kids that are school age are in school. how we get pakistan to head towards those goals that are so crucial. for the long-term benefit of pakistan? >> i could not agree with you more, sir. the long-term strategy. education, poverty, unemployment. this is a knowledge-based

economy. that is a long-term strategy. i understand we have to do something. what needs to be done, more allocation of funds for education, how do we talk about allocation of funds? we increased the budget from 2.9% to 4%. a 1% increase is 170 billion rupees. that is the kind of money that is a 1% increase. the total of pakistan between 88 and 99 used to be about 90 billion rupees for the public sector development project.

it was to 520 llion. out of this 1% increase, therefore, the difficulty and money requirement. i agree with you that government has not been performing. your 100 percent right about those schools. 20% of teachers in pakistan are ghost teachers. it was 1996 or 1997. there is a corps commander in my region. the total survey, 20% schools. teachers are ghosts, only on paper. we have to do something more than the government. and we create -- he was a doctor here, having a very good

practice. he gave me this idea of education and helping at the grass-ros level. he gave me the idea that we would have freer schools. the spending of money. take schools from the villages. the teachers from that village, girls and boys, and i told him to come to pakistan. he did that. since 2001, its red to many districts of pakistan. thousands of adult literacy centers. there are a lot of philanthropic activities involved in collecting money, donations, and opening schools.

they are the best because they do it with a passion. i personally think that the government should reinforce the philanthropists because they do things with passion. and make them expand. i think it a multipronged strategy to educate the people of pakistan that is so important, not only from economic development, but also fighting off terrorism. i could not agree with you more, sir. >> when you were in power, you came across as a leader that genuinely wanted a solion, and he made ma efforts to reopen the debate, think outside the box. it was reported you were very

slow to doing an agreement with india. is that true? >> get me elected and i will revise its. [laughter] the issue, i think you are right. i used to be called a man of war, which i was. i was in uniform. i call myself a man for peace. i say that with conviction because i have seen the ravages of war and all of the confrontations with india. internally against the uprisings. my own best friend has been killed. my son is named after my best friend. nobody understands the ravages of war as much as i do. i am a man for peace.

a lot of people ask me if i have a military man, and not everybody understas that. i initiated the process, and i initiated the process, i'd probably say that i initiated. it is proceeding well. there are three qualities required in a leader. i have said for some agreement. onis sincerity. sincerity to resolve the dispute from the heart. the other is flexibility. accepting someone else's point of view. the third one is called us and courage. why is required, where will we

be on an issue -- don't believe the two sides would be naive enough to give everything. so there has to be a give and take. india has to give, and pakistan will have to give also. if there is a leader who buckles under pressure, that he will be thinking that his political clout will go down and his popularity will go down and the people, that interferes in that movement. it is reasonably fast in fact. we were drafting an agreent i think it is a pity that and we can't reach conclusions,

fleeting moments come in the lives of leaders, and the key to success is to grasp the fleeting moment and don't let it fly past. >> we have about 15 minutes left, and we have a number of questions i will try to go through them quickly. the microphone is coming to you. >> you talked about the blunder's made in afghanistan. by the u.s.. i wanted to ask you why you allod the taliban leadership safe haven? were you really in control of

isi? there was an evidence thatisi -- that isi was helping hte tali -- the taliban. >> i have to be ver careful in answering to you unless you write something that disagrees with us. which you live done before. [laughter] i have forgotten your question. [laughter] >> thealiban -- >> if you think that i provided safe haven to caliban -- taliban, what can i say to you? people that attack me, i am

providing safe haven to them? --an't answer anything again people talk. there is an office. have you identified were the of this is? if is a big statement. their refugee camps. the biggest camp is 100,000, about 90,000. i have flown in a helicopter arou the camp because i thought maybe one day you would put in the military action, there are lanes inside where men cannot -- is so close and so

congested. 90,000 people live like this. it is a nightmare if there is any military operation in this area. now, all of these refugee cam, there are dozens in pakistan. all of these refugee camps are used for various purposes. and they must be people who are harboring them. but that i am allowing this to ppen is not the case. we introduced checks, and germany has thousands of vehicles coming every day. including the isf.

we introduced biometric systems there. and the system, so we can control the movement across the border. on the other side, in spite of my best efforts to introduce a similar system on the other side, nobody has done that. so we have been trying our best to control movements, but on the other side, there is no response. so therefore, i would say that while these refugee camps might be a safe haven for any kind of activity, it is not a government sponsored. there is no safe haven created -- after all, all of the leaders

of significance, tell me what has been caught in afghanistan. all have been caught in pakistan. and by whom? but pakistan law enforcement agencies and intelligence. in cooperation with theia, yes indeed. these are sensitive materials which really disturbed everyone in pakistan when we put all the blame for movement across the border. i don't understand why. why is pakistan only responsible when the coalition

forces are not responsible. can we share the blame? i don't understand. this is what really develops the mistrust and lack of confidence in each other. gosh let me join the others and welcoming you. i like to ask you about afghanistan and the role of pakistan and india. many people say that the countries are engaged in a proxy war, and since you were just talking about peace, is it possible for india and pakistan to wage a proxy peace? of countries have interests. pakistan has strong security interests. what would you do to move away from proxy war to proxy peace?

>> who is initiating a proxy war is the first question. what is happening in afghanistan, i am from pakistan. please do not think i am saying all of this just to protect pakistan. i know there are many indians who might be sitting here. unless we fight this terrorism with unity of action, we will fail. what is happening to pakistan, i would justike to enunciate. everyone knows. why is it there. why are these to there? there an indian community there? are they doing trade there? what is the interting of

india? nothing other than aiding and abetting terrorism in pakistan. i have documentary evidence. i know indian intelligence is coming, i of the construction activity that they are doing, and i have been telling the president not to give construction activity to indians on our border. you can go anywhere in the interior. we will build a road for you. but no, they must build their. they want to call terrorists into pakistan. and who is against the interbreeding of pakistan, he

said on television and in the media. they don't believe in pakistan. he is sitting in kabul, sir. he is -- i have seen photographs. let me say this to the others. the training of diplomats, military intelligence, it takes place in india. i have been offering everything to karzai. nothing in pakistan. only india. we are being stabbed in the back. what should isi do? it is supposed to protect pakist's interests.

therefore, the united states must understand what is ppening. and i say this very openly to everyone. help pakistan stop all this. there must not be a proxy war there. i totally agree with you. but please understand who is doing it. and why it is happening. >> you made some remarks earlier of regarding the conduct of military operations in afghanistan. can you make some suggestions regardg the local tribes, leaders, etc.? it seems to run the country to the least official strategy of building of the afghan army and the national police.

d.c. a possibility of your ideas or similar ones of them powering tribes and local leaders could take place? is there anybody that will listen to this? where are we doomed to fail because of this idea that we need to build national institutions? >> it is not in conflict. the conflict -- the national army and police, we can raise them to a level, that is a good course of action. but i said that there is the adde possibility. if we can't have the possibility, the police and the national army is the answer. ultimately, they are to take over.

i hope ethnic balance is being maintained. i am afraid you're pushing more to the taliban. there is the war there. total war. the revival of 89. we must have ethnic balance, and we must have people and the dominant position. not in having the water to ministers giving useless portfolios. under his nose, hows this happening? we must -- and the police and the national army is being raised in large numbers, enough

to police the border and the talents, that is very good. i think that is the right strategy. >> we are getting near the end of our time. this is in the order that i recognize. and then, at the back. >> very nice to see you again. i would like to ask about a different militancy problem, not one coming from afghanistan, but one coming from within the country, particularly punjab, paicularly, l.e.t. pakistan faces a dilemma of how to deal with groups that have been very helpful in the past with india and it will even

offer again to join the army against india if necessary. they are causing havoc. i heard from officials as recently as yesterday that l.e.t. was a fantastic success because it destroyed some many promising chances for peace. because you banned so many of these groups, but i would like to ask you about your own time in office. given everything that has happened since july of 2007, did you ma a mistake? >> [unintelligible] >> attacking. and the brothers. >> l.e.t. and i have hinted at the history that 1989, the

freedom struggle started. [unintelligible] because the suppression of the indian army iran and pakistan, it came about. and left europe in the early 90's. evenother names i don't remember, frankly. groups can about in pakistan, and it was such -- there was a lot of sympathy, no government really did anything about it. and also, they were going to fight to the indian army. it went along with the psyche of the people of pakistan and everyone.

india was refusing to even people in -- table it in any form. it did not allow pakistan any room towards resolution. it went along this activity and went along with the psyche and the thinking of the entire population. then comes 9/11. now rejoined the coalition -- we join the coalition. there is taliban, al qaeda, everything. [unintelligible] they developed a nexus with taliban and al qaeda. these are problem areas involved with terrorism in pakistan.

i have banned almost all of them. it is easier said than done. the pakistan government and the intelligence organizations, allow them -- you can rock the boat so much that the boat capsizes. there are things that need to be done. allow gradual action for the strategy that does not disturb the entire law and order situation in pakistan. thiss what i would like to say. by the way, [unintelligible]

they did the best work with the eahquake. they did an excellent job in the relief operations. you are dealing with a situatn that has popularity with the people. when they went to fight, it is very popular with the people of pakistan. they are being killed, so we must help them. it is a difficult situation for any government in pakistan. that is the root. that is my concern that president obama -- [unintelligible] you have a responsibility towards everyone. i thought maybe it least he should have mentioned that you need to resolve this.

certainly, i did not do anything wrong. it is in the hearts of -- heart of islamabad. the women, another 2,500 with explosives and suicide jackets inside theosques. we were being humiliated. the government was being insulted. the government was challenged by these. i remember the ala thatas caught in the diplomats. they sent their families out. these people were beating them up inside of that moscow -- mosque. before taking action, i did everything to bring them to an understanding.

i used all religious lobbies, the consul of islamic ide ologies. and when everything failed, we succeeded in getting tusands out. pakistan cannot be declared a banana republic when the goverment is challenged. at least not under me. >> in the back. >> if you become the next lead of pakistan, will you stop all drone attacks? and allow them to exist for intelligence?

>> we will cross that bridge when we get there. [laughter] first, get me there and we will see what we can do about it. we have to resolve this dilemma. we must target militants. we must not do something that disturbs public opinion massively. so we must get to some solutions. the dilemma has to be resolved. it has to be resolved. >> mr. president, on behalf of my colleagues at the atlantic council, i would like to thank you. [applause] >> thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> we will continue our national coverage with a look at u.s. strategy in pakistan. and how climate change might pose a threat to national security. and a news conference with kathleen sebilius. the senate returns monday for general speeches and both republicans and democrats will hold off-the-floor leadership reluctance -- collections. the first expected vote is on the use of natural gas and electric vehicles. then wage discrimination and food safety. also on monday, a house ethics subcommittee hearing on the case against representative charles

rangel, including failing to disclose and come in a series of inaccurate financial disclosure reports to congress. now look at some of the newly elected governors. robert bentley one alabama's division, defeating democrat sparks. in california's race, jerry brown won over meg whitman who spent her own money to fund her campaign. he will take the seat held by gov. schwarzenegger that this term limited.

learn about the men and women who served in the military with the c-span video library. oral history and veterans day commemorations through the years. zero free on your computer, any time. now discussion on u.s. strategy in pakistan and afghanistan. and they looked at the obama administration's counter- terrorism efforts in that region. this is about an hour. >> good morning, let me ask you to pay -- to take your seats. i am here to moderate a discussion about a new council on foreign relations task force report on u.s. strategy for pakistan and afghanistan. >> here with me to give you a sense of what is in that report, you have copies and can read it soon enough.

we have richard armitage on my far left, who was the former deputy secretary of state, now president of our litigious national, and daniel markey, who is the council's senior fellow and was the project director for this report. who is the council's senior fellow and was the project director for this report. we hope to have sandy berger with us, but he was not able to be with us this morning. my hope is that in the first half hour, we can give you an idea of the report and then ask you to pe your own questions to mr. armitage and mr. markey. let me begin with the usual injunction that you turn off your cell phones. the isi has beensked to

pay attention to this. journalists in the audience and others, feel free to take notes and report. let me begin by asking mr. arm attached a baseline question. what is that read like -- mr. armitage the baseline question. what is the big thing you would like us to start with? >> president obama got a bad lie from the bush administration regarding afghanistan. we do salute his attempt to rectify the situation. we support him conditnally. we feel that the president and administration should take the time from december through july, 2011, if necessary, to have a very deep review of the situation. if real progress has not been made, we suggest that we changed

the mission to a much different mission, one of sport counter- terrori and continued training. our report has significant dissent in it. it is something that made sandy berger and i quite proud. we had a debate that congress should have and the american public should have on a matter that is so important and involves the lives of our men and women in service. >> let me begin with the pakistan sections of the report. you talk about the need to help pakistan, a devastated by the flood, in addition to weather problems, throughreater humanitarian assistance. you talk about the need for greater economic engagement and

economic and development of pakistan. you have talked about a shift in pakistan's own strategic calculations. the question i was left with, these are things we are trying to do today. they are elements of american policy as it currently stands. what leverage do we have to achieve more? how wou you get more out of the policy machine in these ways? >> the question is, how effective are we? for instance, the excellent bill that votes $750 billion over five years igood if we follow tou on it and develop the infrastructure projects to he a lot of people. what we're suggesting is the shift in our approach. that is instead of focusing on appropated monies to the u.s. government. the most efficient and we could

do is to give them greater access in the textile industry, which is their largest single industry. it can be done with limited expense to us and no harm to our own textile producers. second, i don't believe it is possible to get pakistan on-side unless they understand what our and status. without understanding that, it will be difficult to g them to go the distance we want them to go. >> go ahead. >> i would add on that mr armitage has it right. we want to accentuate the positive of partnership with the u.s., including its opening of greater trade opportunities. the report mak it clear that we need to take a pretty hard line on the negative side. it makes comments about the use of our intelligence apparatus, and sending a clear message about pakistan's continued

relations with some groups in particular that don't get enough attention, we believe. we believe two networks are extremely coming increasingly dangerous. on less pakistan understand they are out of bound, we are unlikely to see shifts. it is not so much negative leverage in terms of sticks or carrots. the report suggest we can do better on both ends of that spectrum. >> let me ask you in this regard, what would be the evidence on these security issues that pakistan was on- side. what would it take for them to be on the right side? what would they be doing differently with the lat? >> i would hope they would see the network in the same way they see the pakistani taliban.

this is a threat to them. they have to see this as something that could be something that causes war in a single stroke between india and pakistan, sothing that would be late al qaeda to no end. we are dealing with a vy dangerous situation. >> if that effort to encourage, prod pakistan toward a different strategic approach should fail, you say in the report that we should move away from long- term, bilateral cooperation, and undertake increasingly aggressive unilateral u.s. litary strikes against precisely that list of adversaries. that sounds almost like going to war agait pakistan. i want to to explain to us what

it would bend what the risks would be >> we don't want to go to war with pakistan. it is difficult for me to see much difference between the attacks are having right now and what we are suggesting. the difference is we inclu lat in this target list. but the pakistani do not see this as a threat and an existential threat to them, we see it that way. we will prosecute. >> i will add the report does not advocate a shift in this direction. i think it recognizes the fundamental potential for instability in the u.s.-pakistan relationship, that there is a question of how sustainable such a relationship can be if the united states either seize over a period of time and effort that it is not getting progress with pakistan, or it is in one fell swoop, if we were to suffer an attack from pakistan, we would

be forced to take a different line. it is recognition of that reality, political reality, at leads us to look at what those alternatives would have to be. it is not a desire to go there. it is not an inherent threat or anything we are trying to lel against pakistan. it is a recognition of the realy. >> there is one subsidiary issue that is just outside the discussion about afghanistan and pakistan over the last three years. that is kashmir and whether, in some kind of ambitious regional diplomacy, the u.s. could more actively encourage the kind of dialogue in india and pakistan over kashmir that seems to have taken place during the musharraf years. i would ask whether you think that is realistic, whether you

think india's ambition with our support to join the united nations security council gives us any particular leverage on the question. that is a free cushion shot that gets the political military people excited. >> i am starting to sweat already. >> talk us through whether that is possible. >> i will be glad to. i think my colleagues may have some thoughts of their own. they have participated in this endeavor. there is no question that we need to be more regionally focused, to bring in the central asian states. you have influence on the situation. we have not done that as well as we should. the specific question of kashmir, during the time of president musharraf, the reason i think the u.s. was not seen publicly as pushing one way or the other, they were not

pushing either side of the equation. i know because i was doing it. that is the best way. preston musharraf showed it is responsible. i think the public pressure on kashmir would have negative repercussions. i defer to those who are much closer. >> if you would be willing to address this -- this is something you have thought about in detail. >> i would be happy to. i agree with what ms. spermatid ju said. the key thing, -- armitage just said. there is the principal ingredient that was missing during the otherwise quite successful back-channel talks,

which narrowed the gap, but did not eliminate it. let's not assume the job is essentially all done. the other issue that was alluded to deluxe -- alluded to delicately, if the u.s. will have a diplomatic role encouraging india and pakistan to talk, they both have to be prepared to play along. it effectively means that it has to be an invisible diplomatic role. otherwise, you lose india. india has to be part of it. since then, the situation has gotten more complicated with the summer of riots in kashmir. that opens up a different issue. >> ambassador, as you read indian behavior, they have had a rougher time dealing with cashmere -- cakashmir.

does that worry them enough that they would be more amenable to broader diplomatic options and perhaps u.s. assistance? >> india has had talks with kashmiri separatists and with pakistan, and they have never happened at the same time. that is what is going on now. the summer of trouble has galvanized on indian decision makers. it has been towards reopening channels to the separatists. that is not going terribly well, but ere is no inclination to bring these two processes together. >> let me turn our discussion to the afghanistan recommendations of this report, which are pretty stark. you focus operlyon the

december review of policy, and you go into some detail. i will read briefly from what the report says are the issues that the president is going to need to resolve in this review process. if you cannot finish it in december, you should keep going with it. you say "it should mark the start of a clear eyed assessment of whether there is sufficient overall progress to conclude that the strategy is working. it should address some fundamental questions including, has there been a significant improvement in the capabilities of the afghan national security forces? is momentum shifting against the insurgency in contested areas? once nato operations have taken place, is normal life starting to return? is progress being made in building local security? has the government taken serious steps to combat corruption?"

those are the issues the review will focus on. i think we would all be interested in your sense of -- based on what you know -- oof initial judgment. >> on the training, bill caldwell and his colleagues have done a magnificent job. they have encouraged greater recruitment. they have got people trained at a higher level. you have more people trained. what are they going to do with training? will they stand and do their job or will they walk away? at is a judgment relief to people in the field. the question of our e erratic rtnership with the karzai government is a real one. does the president and his colleagues feel we can get a commitment from the government to be more helpful in this endeavor? the development of human capital, this is the biggest single act that we face in afghanistan. it is fine to have an operation in my job.

our troops can hold and do all of that. can anyone government? to make an assessment that would be based on something like, we can turn profits over to the afghan security forces, is insufficient in my view. the basic question of whether after we have turned it over, the taliban can be kept out and the government can step in, or will people prefer the swift justice of the taliban? there is one thing we always seem to overlook. we mention it our report. this is what i would call sustainability. we estimate -- it was estimated by our administration, $320 million annually are contributed to the government of mr.arzai and to the training of the ansf. we estimate the annual money needed for that is about $7 billion. where will it come from? it will not come from

international pockets forever. we need to develop the internal economy, and this is something i think ought to be part of a judgment the president and his colleagues make as they look toward the ly, 2011, date. >> in the run up to this december, we have had report thing out of afghanistan -- reporting out of afghanistan "in general petraeus, saying that significant progress is being made in one area as a result of our new offensive. what is your own judgment about these positive reports, based on your contact with people and your visits to the region? >> i suspect we're going to get an nie on the question of afghanistan. i would be surprised if one was not in preparation right now.

that would be unlike our government. i suspect it will be a little more negative th se of the comments we have seen. on the question of that particular area, i am delighted we have not had greater loss of life. i hope it is the case. i fear it is the case that they're becoming re robustn another part of the country where we are not so active. i don't have the answers. i have the questions. i am sure these are the questions thawill be answered by an nie. >> the timeline is critical. the task force concluded its final version of this report about a month ago. a lot of the questions we are asking now about the state of progress -- the answers depend a lot on how well we are deploying forces and resources that have just completed their flow into

the country by the end of the mmer. for the group to judge, it seems too early. it i not enough to make incremental progress. we have to see incremental progress that turned the tide and can be set in place for the longer term. if we don't see that, if the review does not identify that, that is where we have serious questions about the very basics of the strategy. >> you also, in your afghanistan recommendations, urged that the united states sees the political initiative in afghanistan, the implication, sees it from karzai if he is not prepared to take the initiatives himself. this is one of the toughest nuts to crack in the full story. we have a very difficult partner

in presidentkarzai. could you address this question of how we go about easing the political initiatives in a country where the government appears to be so unpopular? >> yes, sir. clearly, there are several routes. one is doable. one is to work with minority politicians. we met with minority politicians when we made our trip to afghanistan. one is to continue to work at a higher level with local, tribal elders. i am not willing to totally forget the role of the central government, but less in it. finally, we ought to be more involved in the discussion of reconciliation. we found reconciliation to be a very loaded word when we went to kabul it depends what you mean by reconciliation. if the taliban will reconcile to

a fctioning central government, that is something i would give at least some confidence toomen's group and ngo's and minority politicians. on the of the hand, if the central government is going to reconcile to the taliban, that is a different issue. it is one that scares the pants off most people in the minority and ngo's, etc.. we need to be more definitive about what we mean by reconciliation and be more involved. >> on the point of reconciliation, what we have heard repeatedly is that the process of reconciliation as it stands is a karzai-centric process. he has selected those who will be involved on the afghan side. he has left many ou many of whom would be natural partners to the u.s. they're concerned about what the prospects for that process might be. you see reconciliation without a firmer u.s. and potentially veering toward something that will be more divisive in the

broader afgh context than more inclusiv the report suggests that is very disconcerting. >> finally, on this question of broad recommendations, most important, in some ways, what if we judge, the president judges for the nation that the stragy is not working effectively enough by the metrics that we have diussed? you recommend an alternative approach that could be chosen in afghanistan if that judgment is made. perhaps you could lay that out for us in a little bit of detail. >> as we offer up a strategy, an alternative strategy, which has risks, and we acknowledge that it has risks, you are concentrating on concord terror,

there are risks associated with it. there are also to benefit. for instance, we will have a somewhat smaller footprint. of the presidenjudges the strategy isorking, he can begin in july to withdraw based on the situation as suggested. if he judges it is not working, i would hope he would make a more significant change and change our presence to one of counter-terrorism. .

>> as he said, that was our estimate of the strength of the process. if i could open it up to one of our other members in the front row, i thought as a preface, he would like to just speak a bit more about the dissent process and perhaps he could voices of dissent which is quite an interestg one. >> she generally concurred with the report but made an excellent point about having the private sector much more involved. this is something that we have looked at and we need to be better on that.

he can speak to himself, i think based on his own experience, the strategy is not going to succeed and we are not succeeding right now. it will be to you in just a minute, bob. >> he thought that pakistan, if th from their own self-interest, we could not coerce them into it or carry them into it. finally, the first of descent was one on prejudging what the present should do in july. several of our members thought things were not more positive, it was a very negative indicator. that is fair up to a point, but

we are all citizens and we are all watching this. being able to show some signs of progress. >> the former senior cia officer, i gather that you have fundamental questions about the viability of what we are doing in afghanistan. >> i have very serious reservations about the sustainability of what we are doing. it really has to do with sustainability of on the u.s. and the afghan side. i believe the focus is on a top- thou approach to building a strong central government, particularly the afghan national army. i don't think that is

sustainable. the afghan government does not have the resources to maintain this effort or to sustain such progress as we make building a huge national army. the u.s. effort that i think needs to continue on cannot continue at this level of material and human resources. it is clear that the current approach is not going to be able to succeed on the timeline that we have given it. i think we have seen enough and we need to shift to plan b period. >> do you want to say more about what pla b is and if it is doable? >> many of these judgements really need to be made by people in the field. it is very difficult for us to come to the tell conclusions from this removed.

that said, we need tbe focused on continuing to train and afghan national army, but hopefully a much smaller afghan army, one which can actually be sustained by an afghan economy that we could conceivably see in the out years. i think that our effort therefore needs to be shifted much more to a bottom up approach. we needto focus on tribal leaders who have real weight in their districts and their provinces. that is primarily a special forces mission, not conventional forces. i think we can make slow, incremental progress over time with a smaller -- lower investment in u.s. human and terial resources. it will take many, many years. therore the u.s. effort needs to be resources at aevel that we can actually maintain for many years. if we are not willing to do that, it is better for us to

ld our tents and leave now. >> thanks to all four of you for that introduction to the report. it is a very thoughtful, careful, and i must say, painful report to read, because these are really tough choices. i want to turn now to the audience for your questions. please wait for the microphone, identify yourself and any affiliation, and we will look for hence. >> that gentleman there. >> in the morning. in your presentation and a quick perusal of your report, i don't see much mention of human rights and how the u.s. can be promoting this effectively as part of our strategy in both countries. another question, considering the dynamics of religion and how

it animates many of the actors we are confronting, has the task force considered ways to engage them to promoteour long-term goals? >> we certainly knowledge the role of ngo's. i think have already mentioned the fear of sacrificing the small gains already made in that reconciliation brought -- process. my point of view is,his is very much part of our report. i did not catch the second half. >> the extent to which religion plays into the broader dynamic in the region. >> that was not central element of the report. i think we all come into this with an understanding of the context in which we are playing in this environment, but i don't

think that since the report is primarily based on a question of what can the u.s. govement t, that is the fundamental question that we ask. what should our strategy be? the u.s. government is not well positioned to play on ligious issues. i think that was driving a lot of this. it might not be the right tool, and it was not something that was central to the argument that we had. but this debate will continue. >> countries to the north have expressed concern about narcotics flowing to the north. what do you think is the right balance in terms of countering narcotics strategy in afghanistan, and what ulyou like to see to the north in terms of counter narcotics cooperation facilitated by the eu and nato and others?

>> i think he fully knows the aner, having served in asia and havi some strong views. i don't know what the balance is in terms of how much effort, but we have to have an effort directed against narcotics. we did see a bit of low back when we had the russian participation because i think the new car explode -- that narcotics flow -- how much ever we should put into it are defer to general petraeus and s colleagues to see how much that distracts from other areas of endeavor. >> i would say the report may be interesting on the counter narcotics ankle to the extent that it holds that into the question of counterinsurgency. the fundamental thrust of the report is that narcotics is a flow of corruption, a flow of money, and something has to be

treated within the larger question of how to address this rang insurgency in afghanistan, not something that could be addressed apart from that. i think you have identified great opportunities for cooperation in the region to the north, but also potentially iran. this is an area of convergence in our interest, and certainly with respect to pakistan. we should not lose sight of how nartics begich counter narcotics needs to be fitted into our broader counterinsurgency effort. >> i am from the woodrow wilson center. what if pakistan does not get on side? i take it your responses we ought to unilaterally start [unintelligible]

against thelet. you did n mention the afghan taliban. should that be included also? what do we do every cross a red linend they shut down the transit route across pakistan? >> if they shut down the transit route again? just to make a point, it is not totally unnecessary that those are the only weapons you have against let. my view is we ought to use all means necessary to root them out.

in afghanistan, they are killing us. i take it personally. >> i have not had a chance to scamhis, so i don't know if it is covered in here. one of the problems i see or one of the challenge is to dramatically changing the strate is how it plays at home. we have already spent nine years there. there are thousands of lives lost. did you consider how you introduce this big introduce this to a domestic audience and how the administration would be able to get people to back this without feeling like the last time it -- the last nine years have been for naught? >> we started with a and we were dealt. if you had asked us individually whether we like a

july 2011 date, i would say no, we don't want to give that the enemy any more information than they need. we did not have that luxury to second-guess that. that was already given to us it has led to a perception of perhaps some shortness of breath on the part of the united states in the region. this is one of the things we need to discuss the we have done it in the last couple of strategic dialogue. we should not be in the business of winning domestic support. we in acknowledge the importance of it and we anowledge the and sustainability of theresent course. that is just common sense. there is a backdrop to all this. thank god we have been successful in the international community, somewhasuccessful in stopping about a dozen attempted terrorist attacks.

we have don it through law enforcement and we have done it with intelligence. we certainly have disrupted it with our military. we think there is the ability to fashion something that will meet the approval of the congress and the people. >> to draw your attention to the conclusion of the report, i think it addresses the question of the need for public support. the acknowledgment that this has been a long war and a long struggle, and instead of cutting into it as we would need to reshape public opinion, it is working in a democratic society. we need to be responsive to public opinion and recnize what the constraints are on u.s. foreign policy and defense policy and respond to those. it also calls for a certn amount of leadership. a demonstration that if we can succeed, we need to keep at

this. i think report -- we should not shortchange the fact that the report suggests that it supports an approach, if it shows signs of progress. >> in recent days, senior u.s. officials, military and civilian, have been speaking about the the but 2014 time frame for deployment of u.s. forces in afghanistan, in part, one assumes, to deal with this perception of shortness of breath in the region and the corresponding actions that people have taken. do you think that is why is an appropriate? 2014 obviously is the time frame that karzai himself has established for transition and the departure of foreign bourses. is inappropriate for us to be

endorsing that in saying we will be on the ground until 2014? >> our nato allies are involved. we had discussions with them, and this is more of a consensus. it does key of the president of afghanistan is own comments that the security situation should be in such states that afghan forces would take that over. i think it is the better part of wisdom to just embrace it. does get to that shortness of breath question. >> we understand the council on foreign relations to be recommending in its report that u.s. forces, in whatever configuration, should remain until 2014. >> we did not address that. we have discussed the need to continue training, so i guess implicitly we do. i don't remember explicitly

putting it in. >> when you are holding a tiger by the tail, one thing you might try to do rather than strengthen the tiger is give it something else to do. in the case of pakistan in particular, we have a situation where yesterday's in karachi, 18 people were killed in the latest bomb attack. 18 million people were not. there is no country in the world that is developed with aid and military assistance as a pathway to democracy. what has worked its private- sector development. i am wondering why u.s. strategy for delopment in pakistan does not reflect what has worked in the u.s. and what has worked elsewhere in the world, which is the sort of thing we are doing with opec and why that is not a

0.1, too, and free in our strategy in pakistan. >> people are trying to kill us in pakistan, but it certainly is a point well worth including. we nee you that -- developed as more and more. faugh you have a nation of 177 million people who are extraordinarily on. 20 or 21 is the average or median age whether under martial law or democracy they have not tten the governance they need, and those in karachi who have succeeded have done it in spite of the government. they are starting from way behind.

you are pushing on an open door. >> the report does make a case for emphasis on supporting and driving private sector activity as being fundamental to development there both political and economic development. i think there is a line about how u.s. assistance could be better used but it will never be enough to finally turn the tide unless they turn it to the private side. we had a robust discussion of the followg. if they enjoyed 2% growth rate, it would be a death sentence for pakistan. that is the enormity of the problem.

>> the report as a very good job of summarizing the state centric challenges we face both here in the u.s. in terms of our policy with respect to pakistan and with respect to afghanistan. the thing i have not seen in the report is a deep dive into the non state actors, specifically the taliban. i am wondering, given the emphasis on counterinsurgen and a proposed alternative, which taliban are we talking about? how can we tell the difference between them, and what criteria should the united states and its allies be using in distinguishing limited spoilers from the total spoilers? >> i think what neral petraeus's strategy is to get

the rented taliban out of the business. i think it is pretty hard -- most americans would acknowledge notwithstanding how much experience we might have had in south asia that we did not understand entirely what was going on. i was involved in the beginning of this, and we did approach the taliban and we did talk to them about just getting out the way, and we were totally rebuffed. that is when they came into our target zone. to my knowledge, no significant taliban has wanted t remove themselves from the target set. >> the report notes -- it sounds a significant alarm with respect

to the increasing coming together of various groups in ways that are more internationally threatening that they might have been five or 10 years ago. that is a shift that i think should be emphasized in the context of this report. >> it has taken a squad while to finally realize we are fighting a flat enemy, not a hierarchy. flat emmys take a different approach. general petraeus and others have got it. we get it, but it took us a lot of time to get to that point. >> it seems that general musharraf is back again. any comments? [laughter] i am having lunch with him today at 12. he is back.

he has been speaking out on larry king and other things. i look forward to seeing what he has to say. >> i was struck by a couple of things that ridgch armitage sai. i wonder what could persuade him to double little more deeply. there is a clear difference in priorities and perhaps objectives between ourselves and pakistan. their objective is to have what they refer to as a friendly state, which looks suspiciously like a client state. that have shown the will to go

after that, among other things, by picking up one of the relatively few senior taliban figures who looks like he was freelancing in discussions with president karzai. how do we mesh our concept of a happy ending in afghanistan with pakistan's? is there a version that will be acceptable to both? it seems that both face fairly severe discrepancies from what they would like to see, and this is probably the most fundamental political problem that we face. >> i coulde corrected by those who are smarter than i on these matters, but i thought we were in relatively good place with pakistan in 2000. one reason is i think we had a pretty clear dialogue with

pakistan about exactly what we were doing and why we are doing it. the 2005 timeframe, i thought maybe the coalition was not going to prevail. hey went back to more traditional approach against india. lately, the u.s. has been pressuring pakistan to try to do something about the hakani network. we will not be pressuring them until we know what they are in a state is. if it is one that is going to leave them open for civil war in the future, for five years from now, you are right. they know that others are born to involve themselves in that civil war.

i think it starts with making sure they know how far we are going to go in our pressuring of the network and what we can reasonably expect them -- if we can get by into our end state. i don't and we have got that yet. i think we talk past each other a good bit. that is my view. >>et me commend the report. it is a year ag that many of us were coming to the end of a process, an insider review of our own, looking at these things. some of that recorded in mr. woodward's book. that leads me to a follow-on that was very pregna lasyear when this was all being reviewed. i think it is still not really been resold in the report in a manner that is clear. when you talk about that

pakistan need to understand the u.s. in the state, having to go to counter terrorist less heavy footprint, a positive approach of the two countries, how does that give pakistan any comfort thate are not going to again abandon them to afghanistan's civil war? we would have less exposure in that type of internment, potentially. can you rationalize that against saying we would make it difficult for anybody associated are like footprint in afghanistan to continue in that vein if they are wrong to put us in that position of not being on their side. >> we do suggest that if we go

to a somewhat smaller footprint and we concentrate on counter- terrorism, that includes everywhere. at one time pakistan was whistling in the graveyard about the pakistan the taliban. in ou view it represents an ultimate threat to the state, and it is not beyond the ken of ourilitary and diplomats to bring this home to the pakistan thesis. the key to it all is to let them know we are not lookin at another10-year divorce. if they cannot be brought to understand, you cannot coerce them into doing something.

>> of the way in the back, please. >> and from the congressional rearch service let me congratulate the task force on a great report and the provocative discussion this morning. from my perspective, the discussion this morning has been very rich in terms of ways and means. current approaches and potential alternatives. can be difficult to think about what progress really means unless you are measuring ainst a very clear in that state. my question for the palace this morning is about the ends specifically for afghanistan. how good a job has the government done of defining a clear and state? what are the minimum conditions we would have to see on the ground in order for afghanistan

with some international support to be able to sustain stability? >> the president at least twice has been very clear about what he considers our mission, the mission of dismantling and destroying d disrupting al qaeda. unfortunately, because we feel that taliban is still more inclined to be hospitable to al qaeda, we cannot be sure that absent our endeavors, they will not again welcome al qaeda. we find the disarray there is still a threat to the united states. that leads me to something short of nation building as an end state. i cannot define it any better yet, without in