decision, but that will help police forces. we're getting rid of the forms i mentioned yesterday to reduce our spent on police time. but we all need to say to our police forces, what are you doing to procure your vehicles with other sources? whether you doing to share helicopter? what are you doing to combine your divers? there is a huge amount. you can certainly amalgamate a lot of support functions, saving money. i think there is a big agenda there. we have hardly even scratched the surface. . .

>> if we can make the difference between the 15% that some police forces think is manageable and the figures set out in the red book -- we can do that through the freeze, through paperwork reduction, and to changing allowances -- i think this is deliverable without seeing a reduction in visible front-line policing. it is going to be challenging,

but let's start from the proposition that all the should be saying to our forces, if "were you trying to do to take our costs out of the back- office?" >> the disorders of last week or the week before last -- clearly mistakes were made and there is one to be investigated by the metropolitan police commissioner. it is found a lack of resources contributed to this problem, would they be provided by the government in the future? >> i spoke to paul stephenson, the metropolitan police commissioner. i was in career up with a g-20. in our conversation, he did not mention resources at all. i am not surprised. frankly, this is the failure as he put it -- i am not criticizing him and he was very candid and honest about it -- of intelligence and a failure of planning, and it should not happen again. it was an extremely thin blue line in front of that building and we saw it pushed away, swept

away almost by that very badly behaved crowd of people. that should not happen again. i know paul stephenson will not let that happen again. there are, i think, plenty of police officers in london to stop that from happening again. i do not think it was a shortage of resources. it was up failing of planning and intelligence as he himself has said. >> the background to my question on northern ireland is the increasing terrorist threat which was recognized by the home secretary back in september when she increased the assessment level. i know that the decision on the police budget is devolved, but obviously you have responsibility overall for security. is it your understanding that the police budget in northern ireland will remain the same, or will it be increased or lowered in the coming years?

>> it is a devolved issue. it is a matter for them. i completely agree with you that the security situation is troubling. it is an issue that has been discussed by the national security council. we clearly look at all the things that we can do to help and all the contingency plans we have to make. i think we're standing by the commitments made by the former prime minister in terms of the training college for police and other services -- the capital expenditure. obviously, the decision makers in northern ireland need to make their decisions about how to spend their money, but security must be a very great concern with what we have seen. >> partial where just before policing was devolved, agreement was made by the last government which the conservative party said it would honor. i've understand that the matter is devolved, but will the northern ireland executive have sufficient money to be able to provide the police with the resources they need? there is a growing threat.

a third of the police budget, according to the chief constable, is spent entirely on security matters. they have a whole range of issues to deal with just as police forces do. >> we believe that they have what they need. we're standing by the commitments made by the former prime minister and believe we are meeting them. this is something that we have to keep under review and look very closely at the circumstances they are in. there was agreed access to the reserve as proposed by the former prime minister. we stick to that. it is important, having devolved policing and justice, that we say to our colleagues in northern ireland, "you must try to make the best decisions you can with the budget you have, allot your decisions accordingly, and then come back to was if there is a real problem." adding devolved, we should not stand on their shoulders the entire time. it is important that is the case. >> i understand it is up to them to decide how they allocate the money they're giving -- they are

given, but it is your decision how much they are given. the select committee was in ireland last week, and the assistant commissioner, in spite of the difficulties they have, gave us an absolute assurance that they would be no let up on policing, particularly of the border area with the republic. can we give that same guarantee in northern ireland? >> i believe the weekend. i do not want to mislead you in any way. i believe that we can. that is the question we asked in the national security council and that is the discussion we had. it is important for all the devolved areas. in northern ireland, public spending is 25% per head higher than in the u.k., its overall settlement is -6.9%.

departments have had a lot tougher than that. perhaps i will drop you a line about the precise terms and what guarantee i think we can give. >> the secretary of state has so that there will not be any more open-ended public inquiries into the past. given the budget constraints, will that team be able to carry out the work it needs to carry out if it is going to be responsible for the work to the satisfaction of the people in northern ireland who have been so desperately and badly affected by the troubles? >> that is a very good question. i think it will be able to. i think the following saville, we should try to avoid open- ended inquiries and the way that you say. that puts the burden on the historical inquiries team which has a huge amount of work to do with limited resources. that is something we can look at. coming to terms with the path is a very big part of the peace process. i completely understand that and i would like to try to do that while avoiding big inquiries if we can. >> the major part of our time has been devoted to the spending

review, so i want to turn to other issues. the first to the government's claim and aspiration to be the greenest government ever. >> prime minister, you so that you want this to be the greenest government ever and you have given a great fanfare to that. what struck me, listening to the exchanges so far, particularly on transport policy, i think you so that money is to be allocated properly on the basis of greatest economic return. where is sustainable development in all of this? what are you doing to embed sustainable development, so that when decisions are being made, it is not just economic decisions, but environmental, social, and right the way this in cost-cutting why? because the coalition government has abolished the sustainable development commission, i think that there is real concern about what will take its place, how sustainable development will be

embedded and how we can be monitored. are there going to be targets? how will we know that they have been the greenest government ever? >> you're quite right to pull me up on my answer on transport. all transport projects are looked at in terms of not only their economic benefit, but there are metal impact. >> howl? that is the question. >> by taking into account their impact on the eight firemen, carving, and all those issues. what we have tried to do in a difficult spending round is to put money into things that will make a difference, like the green deal, like carbon capture and storage, and like the green investment bank which will have real money to spend rather than have quite so much monitoring and evaluation. how you will know that we're getting on, because of the last government climate change bill, which we supported and in many ways proposed, we have the carbon budgets so we can see how we were making progress. obviously we made difficult decisions and the spending round. overall, when you look at what

we managed to do on the green front in terms of ccs, feed-in tariffs, renewable heat incentive and the rest of it, i think it got a warm welcome from green groups because we took on difficult decisions to safeguard some important projects. >> i want to ask you about proposals for the green investment bank and those measures you just described, but before we leave the subject about embedding sustainable development, it has to be done in a cross-cutting way. is there going to be a cabinet cross-cutting committee? it's not just about how green are your government estate policies, it is how you embed it into every piece of regional policy, transport, the fence. i have not read that mentioned at all just now. >> that is a very good point. what we have done across government is have for each department quite clear

structural reform plans. instead of setting targets, we've set out what she each department is going to do in terms of the legislation will pass, the appointments it will make, and the regulations it will introduce -- explaining what it will do to reach the outcomes we all want. what about things that cut across government? with carbon and greenery, we need to have a cross-cutting structural for plan which will put in place. you're completely right about that and perhaps i can write to you with details about how they will work. there are some issues that cut right across departments and this is obviously the most important. >> one quick question. you employed sir philip green to review government efficiency and to look at the whole issue of procurement. did his specification from you include what to look at in terms of sustainable procurement? >> his commission was really to look at cost saving. it was not really part of a

green agenda. it was, let's just get someone from the outside to come in and look at things like procurement, i.t., and some things that governments do centrally. i think he produced a report the coast of martha's question, can we have some confidence that we can actually remove some of these back-office costs without cutting the front line? >> but is a danger that it will set the whole ship of government in one direction and is not looking at embedding sustainable development and actual green procurement, which could do huge amounts to improve local economies and reduce emissions right away across the board. >> i do not think it will embed that thinking because we are providing transparent information on in our model performance, and transparency is the best thing you could do on this front. we're going to be publishing the carbon footprint of our supply chain.

those things are embedded, but the specific purpose was to look broadly across government at cost-saving and what we could achieve. but certainly i think all of those things that it will be hard wired into our approach. i will try not to roll out any more pilot schemes in the next 10 minutes. you did on the green investment bank, which i think everyone agrees is good to be so important, is it truly going to be a bank, or is it would be a fund? is there going to be a dispute between the treasury and the department and would you be taking as keen an interest that this at cabinet level as you did in the comprehensive spending review that we just heard about? >> yes, yes, and yes.

>> there is no more ardent supporter of your aim to lead the greenest government ever than myself, although another policy i am equally enthusiastic about is that for fixed term, five-year parliament. now that the next general election is in 2015, can you tell us what criteria you use to judge the success or failure of your government as the greenest government ever question margin when we produce the structural reform plan that goes across government for carbon and greenery, we will be giving you the weapons to be disciplined enough to fill all those things that we said we would do. they are not a thrilling read, after except, but they're very clear. in the one for chris huhne's department, it says set up a green investment bank, developed the carbon capture and storage pilot, establish the green deal with all sorts of benchmarks about when it needs to be done, introduce the in -- the renewable heat initiative by a certain date. i do not want to wait for five

years to see whether we have been that any of the stuff. i want to give you the tools of the when i come back here whenever it is, you can say, your structural reform plan said you report have this done by now. why have you not done it? it is the target, but what -- is not targets, because what tended to happen in the past is that we set targets for things, missed them, and then said, that is like. that is actually setting the actual act that you've got to take, and then seeing whether you take it or not. all we got a good list of things in this area, such as troducing tariffs. i mentioned the renewable heat initiatives. there is electricity market reform and that the% cuts for government department by the end of the first year. that is a good set of things i think you'll be all of justice again. >> there will be some quantifiable measurements. you may not call them targets, but we will know how many million homes have availed themselves of the green deal and how many renewable, low carbon energy projects, which have got

planning consent and have been funded are in the pipeline. we will know we have by 2020. we will know how much money the green investment bank has lent or invested. >> absolutely. cabinet ministers are already complaining that they have had to put things in their structural reform plan that they may not be able to meet, and it will make life very awkward in front of a committee like this or the house of commons. that is part of the point in a way, which is try to have a set of plans that are quite measurable and verifiable and not all in far off target land. if they're actually concrete things that you do on the ground. i hope we will be of a chart the progress as we go along. >> d six -- did you except the suggestion from the climate change committee that electricity generation should be substantially decarbonized by 2030? to put that in context, it would mean an 80% reduction in immersions per unit -- in emissions per unit generated by 2030. >> basically yes, of the reason

that people are only just waking up to world -- if we're going to move to a world of electric cars and more ground source heat pumps and electricity-backed heating in our homes, we're going to see a potentially massive increase in electricity demand. if we do not decarbonize electricity, we have no hope of meeting all the targets that we are committed to. there sensitive discussions in government right now about how we best reform the electricity market to make that happen, to what extent do we need all the different tools to make this happen, and what sort of energy mix is likely to result in terms of nuclear, gas, wind, and other renewables? yes, i accept the basic proposition. a huge amount of work is being done and i think the decc is doing a very well. >> you mentioned carbon capture and storage, and the first competition is funded at 1

billion pounds. have you decided how to fund the remaining three competitions to which the government are committed? >> we have not yet. we are committed to them. it was important to have that 1 billion pound -- it is quite difficult to hold on to 1 billion pounds in a tough spending round, for the first carbon capture and storage budget. it will put britain a long way ahead of other countries, but we could not do everything we wanted to. >> do you except that if we are going to except these goals of decarbonizing electricity, which will enable us to achieve the carbon budgets which of the climate change committee is setting out and another one is coming next month -- the except that the inevitable consequence of that, coupled with our concerns about security of energy supplies, is significantly higher electricity prices? >> i think that electricity prices were going to rise anyway, if i can put it that way, because so much of our

infrastructure is out of date and because so much of our nuclear industry is about to come to the end of its life. there was built in anyway an increase in electricity prices. the debate we were having at the moment is on what sort of model going forward should our electricity market the? do we want to go on with this market-based model and have targets for carbon reduction and allow the market to deliver that carbon reduction? or do we want to take the slightly more planned view that we want to try to shield the public effectively from excessive further rises in electricity prices by having some quite long-term guaranteed feed-in prices. there is a proper debate going on as with the other areas of government around what sort of model will deliver what i think we all want, which is decarbonized electricity, good security of supply, and some

certainty about pricing. but you're quite right, prices are on an upward trajectory. that would have been anyway, but it legal for a slightly more planned approach, we may be able to protect people from very big oscillations in prices. no one knows what is going to happen to oil and gas prices, particularly with the discovery of so much shale gas. is that a real game changer in any prices are not? we do not know that and i don't think we should take a risk on the basis. >> when you expect a conclusion of this debate? we're just entering winter. >> this debate does not affect the current year. this is more at looking ahead at how we structure the electricity market. again, with all of the celtics that the coalition has not yet completed its work on, whether immigration, control orders, or this issue of energy policy -- so far, i would argue, we have gone through difficult subjects like higher education, the

comprehensive spending review, and defense and we of come up with good, well thought through answers. it will take a little bit of time. >> prime minister, you have described defra as the fourth emergency service. it is responsible for two of the greatest risk of the country might face. as in cornwall at the moment, the risk of flooding, and the risk of animal disease outbreak. why did you impose the second largest budget cut on the green department or start >> -- green department? >> describing these cuts as imposed is a slightly pejorative way of putting it. we had a fine reductions across government, and the department's the protected had to find some quite big reductions. what we've done in defra is to preserve the important areas of spending. on flooding, we will be spending 2.1 billion pounds on flood and coastal defenses on the next quarter years, which is

broadly the amount we spent the last quarter years. we can add to the pitt review because it should be possible for local areas to top up grants that are given to them for flood defenses. in terms of animal health, we are spending 356 million pounds a year on this, and it is only fair we ask the agricultural interests to do share some of this cost. they should be able those shares of the decision making about how the money is spent. >> how be interested to know how you think the local areas are going to top up, when we are already topping up through levies to the flood of this committee. in your debate in may 2008 after the flooding in witney, you are very concerned about low-level flooding -- funding of the empire militancy. the rural communities were not benefiting quite so much and there was a severe shortage of flood engineers. we know what is in the comprehensive spending review regarding spend defenses, but what we're not aware of is how the cuts to local authorities will impact flood spending when

they take over the role for flood risk may in his schemes from the first of april. >> that is an extremely good point. the government has its responsibility to fun flood defenses properly, which i think we are doing. i have found in my constituency that there is a concern there rural areas get left out, because you can never find the same number of houses at risk as you can in large urban areas, but there is also a frustration that sometimes just because you do not make the mark for what the eea would fund, you tend to get nothing rather than everything. i think this idea at that sir michael pitt looked that which we support and will be making some announcements about is that should be possible for local areas and communities to say that if we think a little bit of

funding for the project, we can add to it. >> we know that you like trees. is the government still committed to their tree planting program for sure mark can you give an assurance today that in the sell-off of any part of the forestry commission estate, elevated projects such as the one in north yorkshire at the moment where trees are being planted and peatlands are being created, it has biodiversity and flood defense issues, it will not be jeopardized in any way? >> i think it would conclude that assurance. we do have a good tree planting program in this country, but in terms of the forestry commission, i do not think it is absolutely vital who owns a piece the forest. the question is whether there is that access to it, is a well- kept, and is supported by a person -- biodiversity. this idea that a forest is only worth while and benefiting the nation in the public if it is publicly owned, we do not apply

that area -- that idea to other areas, and i'm not sure that we need to apply it to forestry. we wanted to be properly regulated and we want to forestry commission to do its job, but people should not be worried about the innovative financing that we're looking at. >> are you aware that one of the perverse consequences of the fixed term parliaments bill that they -- and the fact there will not be a queen speech until november 2012 is that there will be a delay to the water bill which is meant to be a flagship policy? >> i am not aware of that. i don't necessarily see why that should cause a delay, because the reason for this long session is to be getting in sync with queen speeches in the spring/summer, when the election would be, which is a logical move. that doesn't stop us introducing legislation before the next queen speeches takes place. that might be just an excuse that you're being given. i will go away and see if i can find out. perhaps they have not finished drafting it. >> a very quick question from mr. clifton-brown.

>> i want to go back. in terms of decarbonizing electricity sector, do except that in the future we get a substantially -- a substantial nuclear power-generating capacity customer to do, do accept that urgent decisions are needed so that we get nuclear power stations built in time for when the existing ones are decommissioned? >> i do think that nuclear is likely to pay a good part in the new mix in electricity. it should be done on the basis of no specific nuclear subsidy. i hold to that. we should not be giving guarantees to businesses about cleanup costs that they're not prepared to take responsibility for. i am encouraged and i have met -- i have had meetings with edf, which is going ahead with building nuclear power in this country. they are confident that the decisions that need to be made are being made to give it the certainty to make the investment. i passed -- it seems to me that

we're cracking on with the decisions that necessary to give it the certainty. >> in your answers to the last four questioners, you covered issues that have massive science and engineering implications, yet earlier you seemed to except that there has not been in establishing your science policy that cross-cutting collaboration. starting tomorrow, are we going to see that in all areas of science and engineering? >> i think that you're saying that i need to spend more time with my scientific advisor is and i certainly will do that. >> on the questions of national strategy, forgive me asking a ightly cheeky question, but did you -- did you ever hear of a organization called arag? no.in n

>> it was an organization based at shrivenham defense academy. forecaster would be a banking collapse and that would be the largest risk to the security of the nation. unfortunately the then-prime minister, gordon brown, excluded it from his national security strategy very deliberately and it was abolished to save 1 million pounds. would you agree that there is a lack of that kind of strategic thinking capacity in government? >> i think probably the answer to that is yes. government inevitably in the modern world gets focused on the short term, on what has to be delivered, on the next queen speech, and on the legislation being drawn up. it is important to try to get people in government to stop, sit back, and look at the big picture, to think strategically, and to take time the thing. it is surely difficult to do that because of all the pressures of political and

government life. i hope that in our strategic defense review -- we did do that. we purposely setting rigid separated the security strategy from the subsequent work so that we could spend some time looking at the risks and opportunities of britain. did we spend long enough? people will always be able to make an argument for spending longer, but i accept the general premise that there's not enough strategic thinking in government as a whole. >> in our report, we very much welcomed the establishment of a national security council as a big step toward better strategic thinking, but we suggest that the government -- we recommend that the government should recognize that there is a community of strategic thinkers in government and they should be treated as such and trained as such. there used to be a civil said this -- civil service college course for six months on strategic thinking. there is only a one-week module.

would you take forward the recommendation that we should educate strategic thinkers across government, like we educate stations and finance managers, in order that members -- ministers are given better support of all the possibilities, analysis, and assessment of the parameters of the decisions that they have to make? >> i will certainly look at it. i have a feeling that part of the problem, and it goes to andrew's questions about how we consider science, it that it is all very well training up the strategic thinkers and having government scientists. you need to make sure that the politicians have got a bit of time to stand back and listen to what the strategists, the scientists, and others are telling them. that is the difficult thing. inevitably there are huge amounts of pressure of what has to be did -- has to be done today, tomorrow, this year, next year, rather than trying to think five or 10 years in

advance. we have to try to find a way to do that better. it is a matter of how parliament works, how the national debate works, and it probably has something to do with my learned friends from the press as well. we have to do that better as a country. i don't think there is a single answer. i suspect that having good well- trained people to help you do it is part. >> part of our report about understanding what we mean by strategy, which has become a ubiquitous term that we use in place of plan or plan of action. strategy is about reacting to the short term intelligently as well as planning for the long term, it is not just about horizon scanning. could i invite you to consider that ministers will be able to do their jobs better if they are more often confronted with alternative scenarios and different parameters?

if that staff work -- if that business of analysis and assessment is done, much like it is done the deed to intelligence committee and the joint assessment staff for intelligence and security services, in this to be across a broader range of policy? >> i agree with that. >> we did not think he would say no to it. >> i do agree with that. i was just trying to think -- you have to make sure that this is not just motherhood and apple pie and we must all spend more time thinking strategically. i think you're right that it is sometimes i read to short-term things as well as planning for the long term. i have been pleasantly surprised by the way that you create something like the national security council, the machinery in the cabinet office underneath it enjoys doing and does do quite a lot of strategic thinking about resilience, about threats, and about future developments. things like cyber warfare is going to be a massive problem today and in the future.

i've been quite impressive that there are people thinking strategically and advising us strategically about these issues. >> but the nsc has very few staff and we do recommend it be given a responsibility for national strategy, rather than threats and contingencies and the negative stuff, but the positive possibilities and opportunities facing our country as well as the risks. >> i saw that bit of your report. if you're not careful, national strategy becomes what the cabinet ought to be. if you so broaden, you might find that the national security council loses its very important focus on security and goes off and all sorts of different tracks. willis of the that is really vital, that we are thinking about our national security in the round. >> one of the welcome objections of the rigid objectives of the national security council is its effo to improve cross- department of cooperation.

but going across the grain of that, we've got single department budgets, which tend to hinder cross-department award, and we abolished public service agreements, which used to set cross-government goals. do you think you're doing enough to incentivize cross that the cardinal cooperation in this field? >> i think so. we did look at this in opposition and again in government -- should you do more to pool budgets? it gets fantastically complicated. if the national security council is discussing pakistan and it comes to a series of conclusions about what our stance and relations should become a then every department should be informed on those conclusions. so dfid will be spending more money on mending a fragile state, the fco should be upgrading its relationship, and etc. i do not think it matters that the whole budget is not pooled

as long as ministers are then incentivized and judged on whether they are delivering what the national security council has decided. >> moving on, i had the privilege of being there when you signed the bilateral treaty with france the other day. a priority are you going to give to bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements, such as the nato agreement for smart how do you see the two slotting into each other? >> i do not think that is an either/or. nato is the court reversed this -- cornerstone of our security. i'm going to the nato council this weekend. the reason for the french agreement was that we are just two countries with very similar armed forces that both want to see sovereign capability enhanced, and so it makes sense to combine in some areas, because will will get more bang for our buck, or indeed our franc.

we should do both -- sorry, not franc, europe. i know what to do to give any further to euro woes. -- i do not want to contribute any further to euro woes. [laughter] the question i as -- what is our national interest and what maximizes it? does it deal with france? yes, it does. is very simple. >> can you see as offering bilateral assistance to france in one of its military operations? >> for instance the french came to us and said we should work together because there is a problem in kosovo or an african country, we would decide separately on each occasion. there's the danger of us being corralled into some french adventure, or vice versa. we would have the capability to do things together as we have

done in the balkans, for example, and it would be all to the good. some people wrote that this was like the end of the british armed forces being independent. the was completely ridiculous. it does not affect the independence of the british armed forces at all. it enhances our sovereign capability. it means we have better equipped tanker aircraft, which can have more effective armored vehicles -- that is what we can get out of this. we can save money on nuclear research, all of which we can put back into defense for more effect. is it really does not mean we will suddenly be careering off around the world because the elysee palace said so, of course not. >> as you just said, you are off to lisbon tomorrow. what they see coming out of this at the moment we start will be a landmark summit? the strategic concept process is the other split between those who want to stick to the old territorial limits and those who want to see an out of area

expeditionary capability. which side of that debate do we sit? >> i think the strategic concept -- in this life we all lead, you read enough boring official documents that are completely impenetrable. i thought the strategic concept was beautifully clear in how was written. i told the secretary-general that myself. i think it is very clear and a good vision for nato, which is both about european defense but also being able to act collectively for our wider security, as we do in afghanistan. i hope what comes out of the council is real solidarity over afghanistan, that we're making progress, the we must do this together, that we must fill the training mission, and we must go on training up the afghan army and police. i think that should be the preeminent conclusion of it. >> will be turning to that in a moment. >> the strategic defense review places emphasis on the importance of the world service.

as you know, the responsibility for this is being transferred to the bbc. the foreign secretary will have thththe word or but the editorial content will be decided by the bbc. how did they double impact on the opening and closing of services of the world service? >> i think as you say, the foreign secretary has the determination of where, and the bbc has editorial control. i think that is the right division. i think this was a good agreement with the bbc. i think that the bbc should not be immune from the difficult spending decisions that government departments have had to make. this agreement with a fund part of the world service and gives license fee payers a six-year freeze in the license fee is the acquittal of reduction of the budget over the spending period for what is happening to the british library or the

british museum, i think 15%. it's a committed that is quite fair for all concerned, and the license fee payer benefits by having a freeze in the license fee for six years. >> a supplementary on that. in terms of the import of the bbc world service, and what was said just now about greening government, and the importance of the environmental literacy and there being an understanding around the planet of the importance of the environment and sustainable development with respect to global security, is that something which you intend to pursue it and make sure gets taken up in the new arrangements applying to the bbc world service? >> obviously it will have editorial independence, but i think it's been quite effective in putting forward good thinking on the environment. i would also argue is very good role for the british council. i was in china, and they have a fantastic program in chinese schools trying to encourage children to think about the

environment. i think it is something across our soft power institutions, the bbc and the british councils, it is a bit example of what they can do. -- it is a good example of what they can do. >> the creation of the national security council was a recommendation of the home affairs committee in the last part of it because of a concern about the coordination of counterterrorism policies. can you tell us practically how that works with regard to a country such as yemen? we accept that terrorism does one have any boundaries, and as you know, a parcel bomb was found at east midlands airport that originated in yemen. cobra would deal with the emergency situation. the nsc would meet monthly to consider strategy, would not wish or presumably you started a strategy on yemen. how was that strategy actually implemented to diminish the risks related to yemen? >> the national security council meets every week.

the way i wanted to work -- and it has made good progress -- with all the ministers who have a role in national security, so energy, business, the treasury, the foreign office, dfid, and the prime minister. in addition, and crucially, you have the experts, the chief of the defense staff, the heads of the security service, gchq, and if we are discussing resilience, you might have people from defra or the environment agency. the idea is that it meets every week. it normally has an update on the key priorities -- terrorism, afghanistan -- to make sure that the decision makers are getting the latest information from the experts. and that each week we try to have a discussion about that particular issue that needs a strategic approach. so we've had very good discussions on pakistan and yemen, and on looking at

terrorism in northern ireland and another subject. we try to pick off one each week. yemen is it that example. we have range of engagement with yemen. obviously we have a big aid budget. the bilateral relationship. i have spoken to the president and met him myself. we have a relationship in terms of security, and we are also -- we're also a leading part of the friends of yemen, which we jointly chair with saudi arabia. we try to use all those tools to make sure that what is happening in yemen is moving in the right direction. it is a country with great difficulties, as you know. there is huge poverty, declining oil resources, a very challenged economy, massive population growth, and rebels in the north in the south. it is very challenged and also a base now for al qaeda in the arabian peninsula.

will we aim to do is bring all the tools we have with regard for our relationship with yemen to try and make sure we are enhancing our national security. all long answer, but the classic example of where you ought to be trying to think across government, rather than just relying on the foreign office. >> would you see the possibility of the head of the nsc -- obviously you chair is a your the head, but your chief civil certain -- not being a civil servant, which would be like in america? >> i missed out the key person on the national securities counsel. the national security adviser, peter ricketts, the permanent secretary of the foreign office. >> is a civil servant. would you like to have an american-style national security figure -- i condoleezza rice- type figure? >> i certainly and i ruled out of. -- i certainly would not rule that out. peter ricketts is doing a brilliant job. it brought the organization together. one of the reasons he's done so well is that having come from the foreign office, he has got

the foreign office to buy into the whole process, because this is a more collective way of making foreign policy as well. but i would not rule out having a a different sort of person in future. we won a more collective discussion at the center, with the prime minister should try to chair, rather than be the chief executive. >> very quickly. >> we are very focused on terrorism, but mindful of the fact we've just had two hostages released could be taken from their yacht off the coast of somalia, are we doing enough as a country and internationally to combat the situation in somalia that leads to piracy? we're trying, but what you can see with the level piracy in the level of hostage and kidnap, the world's efforts in the horn of africa and its coastal waters are not as effective as they should be. i think the basic problem is somalia.

you can have as many ships -- and they're quite a few -- portrait -- patrolling those waters, but while somalia is a fairly broken and ungovernable country, it is extremely difficult. there are no easy answers to it. it is a combination of factors that we need to bring to bear to make progress. >> you have given us some insights into how the national security council is working. i wonder if i can probe you on one or two more points. has the composition changed course to mark on may 12, when it was announced, the department for international separate -- the international development secretary was identified as a full-time member in you confirm that is the case. the secretary of state for energy and climate change would attend from time to time, but you have implied that he is now a full member. what is the actual composition? >> i have not that the list in front of me. for the big discussions, when we were discussing harriers,

carriers, and defense, i remember specifically that chris huhne and vince cable were both there. energy is a key national security issue. i do not know the exact membership but i can let you know. andrew mitchell is certainly a member. >> who actually determines the agenda? you say it meets every week. the interest i have in this particular section is the international development agenda. to what extent is it driven by foreign policy or defense considerations? who sets the agenda? >> it is driven by national security concerns, so the agenda is set by me on the advice of the national security adviser. so far it has quite a lot of discussions that really do impinge on the excellent work that dfid does, and dfid plays a very import role in it. we have made some changes to development policy and have focused it more on the areas where there is national security concern. we are doing more in terms of broken states and more on

conflict prevention. i know that as contention with some people, but that is important and right. >> is not contentious, but there is concern about what you'd call the securitization of development. we boost the budget in afghanistan and in pakistan we're doing so as well. i suppose the question that follow -- to what extent do you think the increased development budget actually improves national security? how can you reassure people that it does that in a way that delivers poverty reduction and development rather than sustaining defense activities or other, more conventional security areas? >> i will put my cards of the table. in order to make the argument for a growing dfid budget at time of national all-star become a we need to correctly broaden the argument for the budget. there is a moral argument, which

is that even in a time of difficulty there are people desperately poor and other parts of the world that we should be supporting, and now was part of the reason for the dfid budget, and that is why a lot of the money goes to the poorest people in the poorest country. but we should expand the argument and say quite clearly that the dfid budget is about conflict prevention and trying to stop upstream things that will cost us even more money downstream, whether that is mass migration, or climate change, whether read as conflict prevention. preventing a conflict is always cheaper than taking part in it. and also we should be clear that the development budget also gives britain clout and influence in the world. six months into the job, i really feel that. when you sit around the table at the g-84 g-20 and you discuss haiti, pakistan, or yemen, often the modern equivalent of a battleship is the c17 loaded

with aid and the brilliant oxfam team that is going to go in and help deliver water or whatever. they are real tools of foreign policy and influence and heft in the world. we should be quite frank about that and not be embarrassed by that. >> you do not have to persuade me, but you may have to persuade the wider public. the other thing the relates on climate change is that you talked about mass migration and the extent to which climate change in poor countries could lead to people being displaced, and therefore people migrating even to these shores. there is a 2.9 billion pound international climate finance initiative coming from dfid, decc, and defra. will that all the classified as development assistance and will be targeted specifically at poor people in poor countries? >> i understand that there strict rules for what qualifies as oda spending.

we will make sure that we're within those rules. there's a limit put on the amount that can be spent on climate change and climate change finance, and we will be within those rules. i commissioned a bit of work to find out what other countries are spending on climate finance, bought -- because i want to see that other following the lead we've taken. perhaps i can let you into the secret when i find out the answer. >> they give for that. as a matter of interest, we have had evidence from the permanent secretary and her team to the committee which indicated that across the government budget, that would amount to about 7.5% of our overseas development assistance, which is within the range that the previous government set as a target -- they so that 10% should be the upper limit. your government has not repeated that particular guarantee, but you except that the ballpark figure? >> we broadly except what was previously laid down. we're within that and should go on doing that. we have to make sure that even as we make a slightly refreshed

argument for the development budget, as i've tried to explain, we keep people confident that this money is actually helping the poorest in the world. i personally think that conflict and conflict prevention is one of the most important drivers in the best way to prevent poverty, so we should not be embarrassed about the change. >> think of that. going to afghanistan because that is where a significant increase in the budget has taken place -- 700 million pounds over the period, off 40% increase. are you in a position to say to what extent that this would be spent? our defense engagement is in helmand, but one would presume that our development spending is not confined to helmand. are you able to say how all will be distributed both within helmand and across the rest of afghanistan in that there are any particular sectoral priorities? number ofeen doing a

things. one is the support directly into helmand, where real -- where we have built more than 80 kilometers of road and are providing clean water. we have been improving farmers livelihoodshrough the wheat seed distribution sector, which i visited my cell. we're also putting money into other parts of afghanistan and doing some direct government support to try to build the capacity of that government to raise its own revenue. in the end, we've got to try to build an afghanistan that is the so dependent on foreign aid and support, and so we're doing some direct government-to-government support where we're going in and helping them build the capacity to run an effective government. for instance, we are spending 20 million pounds supporting the afghan revenue department, and tax revenues have gone from $20 million to almost $2.8 billion since 2004. that is a good example of capacity building at the center of government. >> there are good success

stories in afghanistan. the poppy growing has reduced a lot and the commitment on health and education delivery has improved. what can you do to reassure people that what we're doing in development terms in afghanistan is actually working? before you enter that, there is obvious concern about the level of corruption that exists within the system. concerned that president karzai as crackdown on corruption is rather lacking in commitment. that undermines people's confidence. is there anything you feel you can do to reassure people that the money is actually being effective, and that there is genuine recognition that corruption is the worst way to ensure that people will have confidence in future delivery? >> is extremely difficult. i think our aid programs are seen across the world as being relatively good at making sure the money gets to the front line, and is not diverted, and is thus supporting corruption. i think we have to do what we can to reassure people about

that. i approach the argument in a slightly different way. i think we need to explain with relation to afghanistan the reason of being there is national security. we're not clear to create a perfect country. we just want an afghanistan that can take care of its own security and deny the space to terrorists. they should be our preeminent concern in afghanistan. the aid and development work we do is to help build up that country's capacity in all the ways that you suggest. the tiering of it is that national security is the first part of the answer, and the development picture is subsidiary to that. >> i small final supplementary. i think the distribution of the previous budget before was increased was 20% in helmand and 80% across afghanistan. are you in a position to say whether that proportion to significantly changed? >> all the figures i have is that about 50% of dfid's funding is channeled through the government. i do not have the helmand-rest of the country breakdown but i'm

sure that i can get that for you. >> the justification for our still being an afghanistan has been to prevent the return of al qaeda. it's quite important to distinguish between the taliban, the locals, and al qaeda, who are international terrorists. are you still getting a bias to that effect that al qaeda -- that they think that al qaeda will return to afghanistan if we pull the troops out? >> that is the advice, gas, because of " taliban" is a term that covers a huge range of different people. at one end, try to have been ignored by the government, by private security firms, or whatever else, who have taken up arms as insurgents but who are the really connected to the taliban movement -- it goes all

the way from that right up to people whose to -- who still do have a link and strong association with al qaeda, and there are many degrees in between. is it the case that if we literally left now and afghanistan was left to set basket case country with the taliban controlling part of it, with all the bad people we know are in the tribal areas of pakistan, that they could return to afghanistan and reestablish a base there? yes, i think that is the case. i think the success we're having -- i do not want to overstate it -- is that we're having more tactical success on the ground in helmand. because we have an effective strategy working with the pakistanis, of squeezing this problem from both sides, and serious attrition of al qaeda in the tribal areas of pakistan, is why we're having success. if you pull back on either side,

and you create a larger amount of space for al qaeda to exist in. part of that could be in afghanistan if we were not there. all long answer, but it is important think about it like that. >> the military tells us that we are achieving success on the ground, and that should not be surprising because we're right at the height of the surge. but you're left with the feeling that when the military start to wind down, and the taliban will come back out of the woodwork and reoccupy ground that the military holds, unless we can start talking to them and we can negotiate a peaceful settlement. that means having talks at a high-level. do you agree that we should start talking to the taliban sooner rather than later? >> this is something for the afghan government to take the lead on and determine. the lessee is that most

counterinsurgencies the world over have ended through a combination of force of arms and some sort of political settlement. president karzai and i spoke this morning. he has said that people who take a quite fundamentally strong religious view -- southern pashtuns who have become associated with the taliban -- if they put down their arms, if they sever connections with al qaeda, and they accept the broad outlines of the afghan constitution, they can become part of a feature afghanistan. some combination of military success and reintegration of low-level taliban, and some reconciliation as well, is part of the answer, but it should be led by the afghans. >> did think the afghans are strong enough to do that at the moment? >> what i have observed as i

spent four years as the leader of opposition going to afghanistan every year, that is changed and is positive, there are lots of things not so positive -- the relationship between afghanistan and pakistan, between president karzai and president is a story is much better than it was. and that is very important to make sure that any >> you poster soon after the election. was that useful? >> yes. it goes back to our strategic thinking earlier. i was very keen as the new prime minister, having taken over, while i agreed with the main tenants, to think about what we were doing and how we were doing it and how we could get to the end point, which is an afghanistan were running its own

affairs and our troops back, as it is possible. the forward task force commander, a number of people came and it was a good session to think about what we were doing and how best to do it. >> and that was the number of people inside the military and outside the military. is it that kind of strategic thinking that needs to be prominently available to the national security council and -- >> i do. you don't have a huge amount of time. we are in a situation where it is critical that this year and next year we make good, technical progress on the ground so people can say we are denying the taliban space and making progress with the other

things i talked about. it's a long time to have a strategic rethink but i wanted to stop and check and see how we should be touching the strategy. since then, it has been much more national security-focused. a bit more realistic about what is -- [inaudible] >> you are talking about whether the afghans were strong enough to do this. you know they are opposed to the reconciliation progress. can you give some information on maybe changing their minds? >> it's part of the relationship that works best if

you're talking candidly as friends rather than trying to do too much in a public forum. i think there is great disagreement between different countries and the alliance and the combination of military success and political settlement. >> it do you think pakistan has to be involved in any settlement? >> obviously the short answer is yes. we have to convince pakistan its in their interest to have a stable afghanistan as their neighbor and we have to convince pakistan that terrorism in pakistan is part of the problem, not part of the solution and has to be defeated. i think you can see what they have done and they're putting a lot of pressure. we would like to put more

pressure on the bad guys. we want the policy to seem to be working, but if it does not, do we have a plan b? >> i'm a great believer that you have to give planned a everything you've got. i think the general and his troops surge plan has worked well. the vital importance of trading at the afghan army and police and reintegration and reconciliation. >> can i come back to that planned the? thes suppose the targets afghan president has set himself and the targets we want to achieve are not achieved. do we then nevertheless withdraw combat troops from afghanistan

come hell or high water? >> i'm not contemplating as not having a successful strategy. i will be as clear as i possibly can be. i have said very clearly that i don't want us to have combat troops or troops in large numbers in afghanistan by 2015 for a very good reason. we have been in afghanistan since 2001. by 2015, britain will have played a huge role, made a massive contribution and massive sacrifices for a better, safer and stronger afghanistan. i believe the british public deserves to know there is an end point to this. ther is a point at which we will not be in a combat role or large number of troops. that is why i set the deadline. i think deadlines actually help to focus minds and focus the mind of the afghan government

that we have to make progress and focus the mind of the military planners to know this cannot go on forever. in my judgment, that's the right approach for the united kingdom. we are five years away from that point and have a huge amount of effort to give. we will put our shoulders to the wheel. we're the second biggest contributor and making extraordinary contributions to that country in all sorts of way at the british public deserves another risen and point to this. it is 2015, and that's clear. >> y de take this view in relation to afghanistan when you did not take this to you in relation to iraq? now ofin the position taking responsibility for what we are doing in afghanistan. in the end, you have to make a judgment as prime minister what strategy want to set and do you want to set a time limit.

i've taken the decision that we should. there are different situations in iraq and afghanistan and i think i have given a clear answer. we have already been in helmand for four years. not in a combat role and with much reduced troop levels, it will be more like nine years. that's a massive contribution to the security of the country and i think we should use the fact we have given so much and spent so much and lost so much life to encourage others in nato and our trust and partners to make sure they play, even if they cannot be in a combat role, make sure they are helping that country. we will not be in a combat role and will not have any they like the troops right now. but should we go on helping that country and train the military and support their treasury? yes.

i think we learned a lesson in the past of walking away from afghanistan. the british public deserve to know our young man will not go lot in the situation there forever. >> city said it would she said in canada to reassure the british public. there must be pressure coming upon the from the british public to make a statement like that. >> this is what i feel, having looked at the defense and foreign-policy and national- security argument. wanting to take the country through what is a difficult time, we suffered some great losses in afghanistan. and wanting to make sure we can take the country into the most united way we can't through this situation for -- and to take people with us. i think that is important. >> you will see the twin fold risk that' we might be

encouraging the taliban to think they can just wait as out and we mit therefore be encouraging the local residents of afghanistan to support the taliban rather than us. the second risk is that we leave afghanistan and leave the job of combat troops to allies, which is not surely in the british tradition. >> let me try to answer this the best i can. i think setting a 2015 deadline rather takes the pressure off what i think of russia governments have felt which is a must exist -- on what other governments have felt, which is actually more dangerous situation to get yourself into. this transition we want to see

has to be conditions based on the ground that we have to get right. i think it is better to set a later deadline trying to set to meet deadlines before. >> a like the notion of conditions-based. >> this is five years we are talking. it is a long time. second, leaving afghanistan public i say is this -- we have well over 10,000 troops in afghanistan. we have been in the toughest part of the country for the longest time. when you look at the price we pay and the casualties we've taken, i think we can hold our heads up high and say we have played a huge part trying to get this country to a better place. i think other nato members respect and understand that and i am extraordinarily proud of what our troops have done. what i have tried to do is first

of all major the mission we are involved in, the we have a proper spread of troops to deliver that mission. that's why was absolutely clear we had to come out where we were overstretched and there were 10,000 u.k. troops had 20 of u.s. troops. i want to make sure we are covering inappropriate about of ground to do the job properly. a incredibly brave people did extraordinarily redid -- did extraordinarily brave things in that town. it is focused 47 of troops to do the job properly and deliver the affect on the ground and that is now happening. in the second point is it will be serious about of time we will have been there. i think we can hold our heads up high and say we have played our role to the full and we can be proud right balance of what we

have done, your respective of what we do over the next few years. >> you continue to remind us week by week of the names of the men who have given their lives in the still very costly conflict, prime minister, we want to have these occasions a little more frequently than your predecessors did. is there anything you want to add before we conclude these proceedings? >> on a happier note, it is a pleasure to have been the first prime minister to appear in front of a fully elected committee. i think this is democracy in action. i'm sure everyone would want to put on record the happy news we announced yesterday in the house of commons about the royal wedding at looking forward to that. there is a debate i think we ought to have, we don't know what the date yet, but whether or not there ought to be a bank holiday.

i think it would be a good idea to have a banking holiday. even if it is at the weekend, i think there'll be a great temptation to have a bank holiday ad day of national celebration to mark what is happening. >> thank you, prime minister. order, order. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> the associated press today declared the democratic rep the wier in california's 20 congressional district. the makeup of the members in the 112 congress is now 242 republicans, 191 democrats, with two races still to be decided. thos outstdingaces are lifornia's leaven house

districthere the democratic incumbent bases the republican. and the fourth district of new york -- t first district of new york. at today'state department briefing, spokesman mark toner briefed reporters on north korea's altar -- alcatel laurie attack. he says the obama administration planted measured in unified response, working with china and other nations in the sixth party talks on north korea's nuclear program. this is about 15 minutes. >> most evident thinks that china is the only country to have some sort of leverage on rthor. my queion is do you think chinis doing enough? heavy ask them to do more? >> ambassad boz wth was in

beijing today and should be on his way back tomorrow. he had goodiscussions with the chinese and gave a readout of his meetings there. i believe he met with the special representative and the vice foreign minister. they exchanged views on recent developments in north korea, both the uranium enrichment allegations as well as the exchangef fire overnight. we believe it's important we keep a unified and measured approach going forward. >> given that china's reaction after [inaudible]

fell short of u.s. hopes, are you confident you'll get the suppt you need from china and very taking any special measures to shore up that support? >> we are consulting closely with the chinese often the next steps. what happened overnight was an unprovoked military attack on both career military personnel and civilians. our condolences go out to those who lost their lives and their families and loved ones. moving forward, we're going to take a measured and unified approach and work with china and our six party partners on our response. is going to be measured and unified response. >> the spokesman yesterday said

a number of times that north korea cannot be rewarded for bad behavior. particularly with regard to the allegedly enrichment plant, is this been viewed as something where a threat is reviewed and then pull back of an offer of increased aid from the outside. do you see this as some kind of pattern? >> it is a pattern, absolutely. we have seen this story before and your question is right on the money. we're not going to buy and to this reaction-reward cycle north korea seeks to perpetuate. >> d.c. any relation between the beds this morning and the enrichment? >> i don't know. >> [unintelligible]

2 you believe what ever north korea is doing [unintelligible] they cannot do without the blessings and support of the chinese government? >> in answer to your second question, we are believe engaged with china as a six-party partner. on your first question, something about being able to trust north korea, it is hard. it makes the six party process a difficult process. i think the ambassador said as much. the onus is on north korea. we're going to stay unified with their partners and consult and figure out next steps.

north korea, through its actions, continues to isolate itself. >> [unintelligible] >> too early to tell. we are consulting with six-party partners at there may be some consulting at the un, but i cannot tell. >> was there any consideration given before he started off in keeping him and in the region or returning in to solve? >> maya understanding is it was always considered he would come back before the holidays. i'm not aware. i don't believe so. >> [inaudible] has there been any negotiation

or military movements in south korea's defense? >> i don't know. i refer you to did the korean defense forces or u.s. forces korea. >> what the what china to do at this stage? >> we are consulting closely with them. they have a close relationship with north korea. but they're also part of the six party process. we want to make sure we are unified in our approach and that is the best way, by presenting a unified coherent front, making them aware of their isolation. >> talks aren't going anywhere and you're not engaging with the north koreans of the are not responding to pressure.

it seems like deadlock and all they are doing is continuing with provocation. what are your options? >> we don't rule out further engagement with north korea, but we want to do it in a unified way. we don't believe in engagement for the sake of the engagement. that's very true. behavior has been very bad, provocative, belligerent, and we're not going to buy into this cycle of reporting that kind of behavior. we are in a spot now where we feel by working through the six party process and working with our partners, we will take a slow, deliberate approach responding to this latest provocation. >> you said you ought to approach north korea in a

unified way. but are you not unified now? >> it we had the incident last night or early today and the revelations of the weekend. it was something we were aware of but these are new revelations. we are consulting right now. 's worth dispatched almost immediately to the region and met with our partners and is on his way back now. we are notat unified, but we're going to be delivered about our approach and it's going to be a complicated process. >> any significant difference of opinion about how to approach this? >> i have been to the meetings but he will brief the relic -- the relevant people when he gets back. >> [inaudible] south korea has set an enormous

military response. >> i'm not aware of that statement. i think everyone involved is stunned by north korea's provocative actions. i believe the president referred to it as an outrageous and we're working within that establish from work so we have a deliberative approach and we're not going to respond willy- nilly. >> does the respond to include the u.s. using any power necessary? >> our commend it to south korea as an ally is steadfast. i would refer you to the department of defense for specifics on the defense agreement. >> [inaudible] >> i saw the white house spokesman was asked the same question. parsing out the legal

definition of that, it was clearly a provocative and belligerent actions and that would stop there and say it killed korean military personnel and injured civilians. i can't say from this spot that it was an act of war, but was clearly an act of belligerence. >> is it a violation of the armistice? >> i believe we said we wanted to abide -- >> is it a violation of the armistice? >> i will leave that to the lawyers to parse out. >> if only to people by it's not as much of a violation as opposed to 46? i'm curious as to why there is a reluctance to call this what it is, which is a violation of the armistice? if not an act of war.

to stand upilling here and parse this out. i will just say what it was, which is an unprovoked military attack on south korea. >> it was a violation of the armistice. i just don't understand why that's not in the talking points. >> we want them to abide by the terms of the armistice agreement. if you want to extrapolate from that -- >> does that mean they were abiding by the armistice? you say you don't want to parse it and that might be semantics, but actually as the meeting legally. >> i agree that it does. that is why -- i'm not going to do that from the podium right now. i will say it is an unbroke attack on south korea.

>> china was the only big country who did not specifically condemn what happened last night. >> i don't mean to be glib -- >> what does it mean when they don't even condemn it? >> ambassador was worth says they were in agreement when he left the meeting with the chinese that last night's action was destabilizing to the region. as for their public statements, i will have to referee to them. i cannot speak for them. >> [inaudible] >> it has been an issue we have been aware of for some time. as evidenced by the secretary's meeting this morning, we are trying to get the details of fax has -- details and facts as we

go forward. it is a serious issue. >> [unintelligible] >> to early to tell. we're consulting with their six party partners. i do want to get ahead of the process. >> what would be the u.s. position in the event of a south korean attack? >> it would be a huge hypothetical. not even going to go there. >> last week, south korea denounced the american policy, calling it a failure. is this another example of that? >> who denounced it? >> [inaudible]

south korea is denouncing this policy of peace -- >> south korea? >> last week, a in a white paper. do you think the current policy is not working? >> it is hard. there have been setbacks. we are committed to the six party process. >> congress is out for the thanksgiving break. when they return on monday, the house will focus of the ethics inquiry of charles frankel. a committee panel recommended censure for the democrat and the full house needs to vote on that. when lawmakers in the senate return, more work is expected of a food safety bill. you can watch the house live on c-span and the senate on c-span to. this january marks the start of the 112th congress.

many new faces in the freshman class, including the newly- reelected to misery sector. another new member is the former new hampshire attorney general who defeated the democratic congressman. stanford part -- the stanford professor to return briefly from north korea was given a tour of a secret nuclear facility reportedly capable of enriching uranium. the u.s. has sent its ambassador to the region. the professor presented his findings today at the korean economic institute. this is about 90 minutes.

>> on the president of the korea economic institute. it is our pleasure to host you for this event. as you can see by the turnout, this is a very significant event. what i would like to do is tell you how we're going to run things. i'm going to give you a little bit of preparation in terms of the trip one week prior to the doctor's trip. a few interesting points we will make that will segue into the presentation. he will come up and make his presentation and that we will have a little bit of a shuffle as we bring some chairs up so bought can join him for the question and answer session. on the second of november, nickel and i went to north korea. we were there from the second to the sixth. we have asked to see the facilities, not really to look at the new construction under

way, but to figure out what was going on in the intervening time since the last inspectors were there in april of 2009. when we got there, we were briefed i the general bureau of atomic energy safeguards division director. he gave us a preview of what was going on, which was not really much. but we began a discussion about the fuel fabrication center. in that discussion, i came to learn the enrichment facilities we were looking for -- the reaction i got when i got back to the league began to talk with the ministry of foreign affairs, there were surprised it told that. the points we made with them is you are headed down a path that will put you in the same light as the iranians.

you have said you are building a light water reactor for peaceful nuclear energy. there is a uranium enrichment facility that you say is for low enrichment uranium, for creating nuclear fuel for this reactor. but given our history and the background you have displayed, know what is going to believe you. if you look at what has happened with the iranians, you are on the path for additional sanctions, and international condemnation. but if it is exactly what you say, there is no reason in the world you should not allow people to take a look at this. and by the inspectors back in to take a look or at the very least come you should show the doctor these facilities. they were very thoughtful and said we will consider what you

said. i had no idea -- but they're going to do. we went to beijing and i contacted the doctor and he and i had a conversation about what we had observed and what we believe would better prepare him to focus on the enrichment facilities and light water reactor. with that as background, i would like to introduce dr. hecker, a professor at stanford university. >> thank you. i must say the crowd is a little bit older than the usual stanford student crowd. professor bill perry, also the former secretary of defense and i teach a class on the role of national security and we touched on places like north korea, iran and others. if you don't mind, i'm going to

take a style of my class and try to put this trip and to the proper perspective. not just to give you a travelogue, but to try to put the whole thing into perspective. particularly since this trip seems to have gathered a lot of attention. as jack mentioned, i'm out at stanford. this visited not just come out of the blow. all of the sudden they would invite me. this was my seventh visit to north korea. i was taken there initially by professor john lewis who has been tracking the north koreans since 1986. the first time i went was 2004 when they showed me the plutonium. that is when they first said we

have the plutonium. the message was -- they have message in each of these trips. the message was we have the bomb at your government ought to pay some attention. we were back in 2005 and the message at that time was, just before the september 19th agreement, we are ready for an agreement, but we watched a light water reactor. indeed, the agreement was signed one month later. in 2006, and shown here with the director of the nuclear complex. the message at that time, three weeks after the nuclear test, the test worked and we are filled with pride. that managed to get the bush administration to actually engaged the north koreans in the bilateral discussions and, and the 2007, there was a february

1st step agreement signed in august of 2007, the message was could you tell those skeptics in the west that we have actually turned the reactor off. they turn it off in july of 2007. in 2008, they began the disabled process. that is meet in the clothing to protect yourself against potential contamination. i was to test the fact that the disabled and was actually serious. but disabled and meant putting it somewhere and then being able to put it back, which they did in 2009. and i visited lead to death mind, they essentially announced we are going to leave the six party talks and we are going to do a missile launch. of course, t rest is history. that is where we were.

this is the current visit. as jack indicated, he had given me the heads up because he went to the facility shown on the left. instead of erecting and other cooling tower, which is what some people suspected, they actually told us we will converted into a light water reactor and they said nobody believed us when we announced this in 2009, which they did. and it's true. this is the only reading i will do. let me read to you the essence of what the chief technical officer told us in the guest house when we visited on november 12th. he said in the '80s and '90s, we agreed to give up power reactors for light-water reactors. 2,000 megawatts of electric by 2003. that was the key to the arrangement. in the 1990's, we build a 200

megawatt reactor of the gas graphite design. now they have become ruined concrete structures and iron scrap. i can attest to that. we have not been able to contribute to the national demand for electricity, so we decided to make a new start. for us to survive, we decided to build our own light water reactor. on april 15th, 2009, the foreign ministry stated we will proceed on our of. we have completed the discharge of the 5 megawatt spent fuel at a process that and delivered it to the military for what is asian. that was deadly 2009 when they walked away from the agreement. our nuclear program has not proceeded as expected. we have not delivered electricity and thus has impacted the economic condition of our country. we will use our economic resources to sell the electricity problem. we're willing to proceed with sixth party talks and the

september 19th agreement, but we cannot wait for positive agreement. we are trying our best to solve our own problems and will convert our center into a pilot in richmond facility. it is a high priority to develop a uranium enrichment. we will have some difficulties, but we are proceeding with the light-water reactor fuel cycle. we have designated a site and is the first stage so first priority. the construction is completed, the facility is operational. you will be the first to see this facility. we showed the construction site to the korean economic institute delegation. that is what they told us. i wanted to read you that because that is different from much of the hype. that is included in the report i wrote. that is available on the web site. but i want to put that in

context. they are serious about building a light water reactor. first, let me go back and review the status of their plutonium program. that is what concerned me the most of the beginning and is still what concerns me most today. the 5 megawatt reactor which is shown on the right is a photo we took in 2008. it shut down as it -- and it is in standby. there is no plutonium being produced. the fresh fuel to lead is not ready. the reprocessing facilities in stand by and we saw no action. there is no plutonium in the pipeline for that facility. the fuel fabrication facility, they're starting to convert it to light water reactor fuel. and 50 megawatt reactor is not -- is on the iron scrap. the 200 we did not see is on a different site is not

salvageable. that gets back to the plutonium inventory. 22 to 42 kilograms is the estimate and that is enough for between four to eight bombs and they claim they have what the highest that. basing out what you to take away as they really wanted to increase their weapons program at nuclear arsenal, they would restart or rebuild these facilities. that is the quickest and surest way. they have tested twice and the dow had to build a plutonium bomb. that is where they would go. they took us to the light-water reactor construction site. the circle that you see is the concrete containment shell. it is right next to the 5 megawatt reactor. the motivation, since most people say they cannot build one, they started the reactor

building with gas graphite reactors. the best way to put that is those reactors are great for bombs, not so good for electricity. they built them for both, but they never finished the two big ones. the same director -- is indirection the u.k. and france began with, but they switched to light-water reactors as has most of the rest of the world. but by the 1980's, they realize that problems making electricity, so they tried to get light-water reactors from the soviets. that was dashed by the end of the soviet union. in 1994, they tried -- we were going to build them to 1,000 megawatt reactors. that remains unfulfilled with the dissolution of the agreed framework. my colleague can answer any of those questions. by an experience is, as i just mentioned, the vice minister

said the light water reactor, the deal, no joint statement. so the u.s. managed to get enough of a light-water reactor in there, saying that an appropriate time it would be considered. in 2007, he told john lewis and myself that we want a light water reactor. if you don't trust as, you can operate it. we will not in rich and we will not reprocess if you are concerned about proliferation. in 2009, as you just heard, they said they would do it alone. they also said we don't know how to build light-water reactor. instead of building a 1,000 megawatt reactor, they will build a 25-30 megawatt reactor at that makes very good sense. it's exactly the way they did it with the gas graphite. i said before i didn't think they could build one, i was talking about 1,000 megawatt

reactor. they cannot build one and they will not try. they're going to build a small one. the vice minister made it very clear that the reactor is important not just for practical economic reasons but symbolic reasons. they want to get something out of their nuclear program. here are the details on the light water reactor. i make technical guy so you have to forgive some of the numbers. you will hear the term 100 megawatts. that refers to the thermal output. in the end, the reactor is nothing more than a water boil -- water boiler. you make steam and have this team dragged generator that gives electricity. the conversion from the heat to electricity brings down the power from 100. they never told me it was 25 to 30, they just say it typically gets 30% efficiency. the containment shell is going up -- they need a pressure

vessel, and that is one of the toughest parts of building the reactor. there is the way they could build a pressure vessel and do the forging of such a huge structure in north korea for 1,000 megawatts. but they said they could do it for 25-30. the electrical generators, they said it would be for local communities and we have to link it to the national grid. you have to change the fuel from uranium metal to uranium oxide. that is why the chief technical person says we haven't done it and will have difficulties, but we will do it. the fuel has to be enriched. the typical and richmond is 3.5% of the fissile uranium isotope 235. the target of completion is 2012, the target of completion for every major project because it is the centenary of kim jong-

un -- the centenary of kim ill son's birthday. lost the this country capacity to do things like that the reinforced concrete for big structures like a nuclear power reactors. we have to go back and we learned that because we have not built one for such a long time. they are going to build a small one, but it's really important that containment structure can hold a potential accident. the role of the regulatory agencies is action -- is absolutely crucial. they said they have one and did not make me feel comfortable. it is a new design and they have a team working on that. e institute for a clear power

operators and the world association of nuclear operators, after the three mile island and chernobyl accident, the rest of the world's nuclear power operators got together and said we have to do something and learn how to run these things safely. the safety record has been absolutely outstanding since that time. maybe we ought to have north korea to make sure they construct the reactors safely. people will say you can make plutonium. if you feed uranium into a reactor and you get neutron's going commie make plutonium. all reactors make it. that's not how you make bomb- grade plutonium. you can do better with the existing reactors that have. if they decide to make it with this reactor, they will sufficiently and readily detected. but it requires in richmond. for a light water reactor, you

do just a tiny bit. the natural uranium is 0.7%. you have to get up to 3.5. the bomb as 80% or 90%. the facility itself as we get to uranium enrichment, they say they started construction in april of 2009. that's when the west technical team and international inspectors were expelled after the did the missile launch and had the un security council statement condemning it. they said they completed just a few days before our visit. i'm not sure what completed means. reconstruction and renovation of building #4. they took a previous building i was in and renovated it. it looks new from the outside and we could not see the roof, but i will show you that it is blue. there are several new buildings

visible of the fuel fabrication site. you need the seed material for the uranium enrichment. this is the overhead for the fuel fabrication facility. if you want to look for something new, what would you look for? the blue roof. it's like putting a bull's-eye on top of their facility. people say they built a secret facility, for heaven's sake, ollie have to do is look at the fuel fabrication facility. it has a blue roof. it is more than 100 meters long. we walked into the fuel fabrication system and by this time, they have told us they have some centrifuges. the best that thought they could do before was news reports and there were sold 20,000 centrifuges.

i thought we would see a couple dozen of these in an old workshop. we walked up to the second floor and looked through the windows and i will show you that in a minute. first, the comparison of 2010 with july 2009. you can see the blue roof which is shown under the black/, that was building for. obviously things have changed. this is what was in buildi for what i was there in 2008. they were disassembling it. this is will we saw -- they did not let us take any photos, so i had to doctor up a photo. i took a photo from the ohio centrifuge plant and wiped out some of the extraneous centrifuges. we saw three lines a look like

that. my jaw dropped. i was stunned to see what look like hundreds and hundreds of subterfuges lined up, two each in three different locations. it was just stunning. in clean, modern facility. i said they actually did what they said they were going to do. then they told us the 2000 centrifuges in the 100-meter hall, i guess there are 6 feet high and 8 inches in diameter. they claim to have steel orders. that is very important because that makes it a p-2. the stuff that is used is a very high strength steel. that stands for pakistani 2,

which was copied after being stalled from the facility to years ago. the second number is 8,000 kilograms per year. that's the capacity of what they can and rich. they can make to tons of low enriched uranium per year. that's enough for that little reactor. so its size is just right. they claim to be operating making low enriched uranium. we could not attest to that. we didn't hear any noises and there are people running around in the control room. it looked like there were things going on, but we could not tell because we were isolated from the halls by windows. a very modern control room. the latest flat panel screens and led readout. very different from what we have seen at other facilities.

the plumbing in the one of the right is closer to what we saw them the one on the left. the one on the left is not doctored up. don't say these are the north korean centrifuges. they looked something like the ones on the left. the control room, we have no pictures, but we went to the university lab and you can see the students there with the flat panels. these were hewlett-packard computers. it turns out those screens are not under export control. the computers are not on the export control list. at least the ones we saw. on the right, you see with the reactor control room looked like at the 5 megawatt reactor. this is the 2004 picture.

the control room looked more like the university. what is the problem with uranium enrichment? the dual use problem. you need to in red for light- water reactors. you are in good international standing, it's easy to get someone to do that for you. cause a stab is to make fuel for chinese reaction -- chinese reactors. it is -- was initially going to be done at the russian facility. if north korea would be in good standing, they could get their fuel enriched someplace else, but now they feel they have to do it all themselves. the same technology, the same equipment can be used to make highly enriched uranium. then you have the iran problem. iran developed the capability to

enrich and we worry about the fact they can go to highly enriched uranium. you there kick inspectors out. now we don't have any and we should. or you have another covert facility some place. the problem with that is is a small footprint, a small signature, it's not like a reactor. it would be difficult to detect. if they can make to tons of reactor fuel or make these estimates -- 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. that is enough for one or two bombs. other people will tell you more, but let's say it's close enough. how does this change the security dynamic? unlike what has been reported so far, in my opinion, not much for

what they currently show is for the current capacity. if you are going to build the bomb or more bombs, restart the plutonium facility. all modern nuclear arsenals use of plutonium. pakistan uses highly enriched uranium is in the process of making plutonium to switch over. once demonstrated, they can duplicate the capability anywhere. that is the concern. it is difficult to detect. however, they cannot just go and build these because they are limited by the materials and equipment. the high strength steel, high strength aluminum, frequency converters, vacuum valves at all of this technical stuff. generally, we feel they cannot make that themselves. and the sameful with the camera cannot do. the indigenous capability, we

just don't know. however, if the duplicate this facility has several other places and make a lot of highly enriched uranium, that changes the security dynamics, now they have now. they could become more like pakistan with 50 or 60 weapons instead of a handful. still more sophisticated bombs require nuclear testing for the radium or require plutonium and more testing. plutonium is indeed superior. the question i'm sure you alaskan i have asked myself but times, how did they get this? what we saw are you don't build overnight. you don't start in april of 2009. it requires many years of development, manufacturing and testing and likely decades of research and development training. i'm convinced they have a uranium enrichment program, but

i thought was that research and development level. i would call this high pilot scale or small industrial scale in richmond. the only reason we know they have that is the news stories about highly enriched uranium particles on items north korea gave at the united states -- a sample of aluminum alloy and the production records, copies of the production records. there was the question that somebody shipped uranium hexafluoride at which only use it you were going to enrich to libya. the general feeling is it was most likely north korea. the current system is likely built and tested. unlike the original reactors, i believe these require help. the best articles i've seen on this comes from the institute

for science and international security, just published a month or so ago. they lay out this extensive cooperation with pakistan going back to 1993, including trading of an -- trading of north korean people in the laboratory and then they supplied them a starter kit and laid out the complex web of procurement, and including the high strength of aluminum from russia and germany. my concern all along has been the possibility of connections to iran. quite frankly, what we saw, 8000 -- 2000 centrifuges, the 8,000 kilograms, about twice of what done so far. i am not sure i would go to iran if i were north korea. it might in the future be the other way around. nevertheless, i worry about

cooperation with iran. i'm getting close to the end, but another question you have is why did they show is this and why now? i do not know. but we can speculate. one thing that is for sure that is serious about building a reactor is that it would have been visible soon. all of the analysts would have said they are building a reactor. most lightly -- likely, that would have been spun into a plutonium reactor which would have increased the threat enormously. this is the same cover story that iran has.

the other message is, we are not about to come to our knees. my quick observation, you know, the seven times i have been there, each time i have gone the country looks a little bit better off. it does not look like the economy is going. if you have any suggestions, you know what to do with them. this is a wire factory we saw in 2009. it is one of the most modern wire factories i have ever seen anywhere. this is a garment, a textile factory we visited this time. it was just great, very modern, good. when they decide to do something, they can build it fast and beautifully. poland was celebrating its 92nd anniversary of independence, and they had a couple of polish

artist and north korean artists that played the piano and violin. it was just beautiful. by the way, poland has a legacy there, as do many other countries, but not the united states. this is a swimming pool at the university. by the way, i am going to introduce the guy on the right. for public effect, this is, for those of you who have been there, the concrete pyramid, 20 years and finished. in 2009, some of the class was going up. this time, it was just stunning. last year, they had telephoned groups. -- telephone booths. now they have cellphones.

350,000 sell phones in north korea. so, what do we do now? i think the most important thing is to really understand what the capabilities are. do not hide the threat, but take it seriously. -- hype the threat, but take it seriously. in 1998, bill clinton said the secretary of defense to try to reevaluate the policy and the entire dynamics of the korean peninsula. but he said was, deal with north korea the way it is not the way you would like it to be. that was a good policy review. we have not done one since 2003.

for now, the most important thing is to not let the threat grow, especially in light of the altercation that just happened over there. , to contain the nuclear threats, and no more bombs, no better bombs and no exports. no more bombs means no more plutonium. that is what they're doing, no more plutonium pi. no better bombs means no testing. you cannot make better bonds significantly better without testing. no exports. that is really the issue of pakistan, burma, iran and so forth. the rest is, we're not going to get anything unless we address

the fundamentals of north korea's and security. there was an op-ed yesterday there really underscores the need for policy review. with that, i am going to introduce my colleague. leave the lights on for just a second, because this is a great photograph. there will always tell you that there are no lights in pyongyang. but there are lights. there are even lights at night. somebody took off, my favorite slide. with a that introduction, i give you bob karlin.

[applause] [laughter] i do not see a mouse here. for some reason, the last slide was left out. >> my apologies. >> at any rate, the last slide had bob karlin in front of one of the lit up cultural houses and it was just beautiful. with that, ladies and gentlemen, he will join me.

>> alright, we are going to have a microphone that goes down the center row for those of you who would like to ask questions. please identify yourself and then ask a question. you can start coming in the beige jacket. >> did you have a chance to ask north koreans about the manpower for their operation, and the power supply? >> first of all, in terms of power supply, we saw nothing. we did not get down to the first floor, so we saw no power

supplies. in terms of manpower, we met with the chief process engineer, and then we saw a number of people in the operating room. they took us to the control room and then what they call the recovery room. there were operators in there, half a dozen or so people, but we did not get to talk to any of them. in terms of asking about their credentials, i did not ask about the enrichment people's credentials. i did ask about the reactor designers. we are told they are a new team being mentored by the people th built the old graphite reactors. >> we're going to pass the microphone down. please wait until it gets to you. >> i am with the american association for the advancement

of science. we wonder if this is a cover-up and they intend to do weapons. they prefer plutonium, but it is my understanding that it is harder to weapon is plutonium to get it to work with the precision that you won. it did not hit the field they desired during their test. is that a significant factor? >> one certainly cannot rule out that -- in fact, i would say that we certainly would be looking at uranium design, and particularly, what we know is that there is a uranium implosion design that they gave to the libyans. that released speculation that it may also have been given to iran and north korea. the implosion, by the way, from

plutonium -- think of something the size of a grapefruit, put explosives are rounded and then set it off. with highly enriched uranium, you can make something the size of a gun to. you can also make the implosion device, and that is what was given to libya. if the north koreans had this, they would have some basis for making an implosion device. i imagine that they have exercised their design capabilities that way, but we have no indication as far as the second test whether the plutonium tests or the highly enriched uranium test -- what they told me and what i was told

later ron was that it was related to the first test. we do not know what the second test was, but my speculation is that it was plutonium. >> standing up against the wall. >> thank you. sorry if you mentioned this before -- >> could you make sure you speak up. i have difficulty hearing. >> could use a gun little bit more about what the north koreans -- could you speak a little bit more about what the north koreans said it were possible deterrent to negotiation? what did they say about the obama administration and about china? >> i am just a scientist. [laughter]

i turn to my colleague who understands the policy much better. >> i am just a scapegoat. i would say that, surprisingly, they talked a lot less this time about the diplomatic route, not that they were suggesting it did not exist, but the thrust of the conversation was not really in that direction. they did say that they were going to have nuclear weapons for a long time and we better unless ando hiit,

until we satisfied their concerns about security. unless the was addressed, they would not give up their nuclear weapons. i cannot recall that they said too much about starting talks. they gave us the obligatory statements that they were prepared to go back and honor the september 2005 statement. they did say that if we wanted to get back to the situation prior to april of 2009, there were a couple of things that we could do. one of them really was to reaffirm the sorts of statements that had been made when the dialogue was really on firmer ground in october of 2000. it was pretty interesting to me that they did that, and i think

it is pretty important, not because of the substance of the statements from october of 2000, but because of the symbolism of those. those came in a period after -- it was a culmination of a series of very long negotiations, and to those statements stood at the top of that. we had an element of trust. we had thousands of hours of contact. we understood what we have accomplished and what remained to be accomplished, but most of all, we recognized the existence of north korea as a system as it was. in effect, those statements put on paper the recommendation that dr. perry had made in his review, that if we were going to make progress with north korea we could not insisted that they

change first, but we were going to have to deal with them as they were. >> the week prior, nickel and i had also talked with the first vice minister and the ambassador on this issue. we did talk about a sixth party talks. as of had indicated, they referred back to -- when you go back to six party talks, they were interested in going back to a time before april, 2009. with us, they were not going back 10 years, as bob was indicating, but they were talking about the pre-u.n. security council statement des it was before they're launched of a missile. -- that was before they're launched of a missile. -- their launch of a missile.

we agree to talk about a peace treaty. we agree to talk about normalization between countries and we agreed to talk about what north korea is going to do. what we did not talk about was the de-nuclearization of that. in a separate event, we can talk about a peace regime at some appropriate time. that is what we are focused on. they said that they understood from the chinese that we, the united states, japan and south korea were not ready to return to six party talks so we, the north koreans, will not be hasty in pushing toward six party talks. >> on the technical side, having the enrichment capacity that they showed us, even what we

saw, though clearly they got it somewhere else, it certainly complicate the technical part of getting back to the six party talks. before, i could have written a script of what to do to contain the plutonium program. now you cannot write the script the same way because they are not going to give up their centrifuge capability because they can say it is done for a light-water reactor. we have to change the dynamic in some fashion to accommodate the fact that they are enriching and building a light water reactor. unless we want to go change it back to what we did in prior years. >> thank you. i am from cnn. professor, i just want to make sure i understand what you are saying. you thought they had come very far very fast, and you were very

impressed. how do you think they did that? did they get information from one source and then build on that or is there someone out there specifically helping them? do you believe there are other sites doing the very same thing? also, possible to talk about the implications of what happened today? >> you can ask him, but we will do that later. >> ok, then let's just leave it to that. >> the real answer is, i do not know, but i can speculate. they need a lot of material that is very difficult for them to make. pakistan and iran manage to imported from other places. over the years, if you look at their procurement history, they have apparently been able to

import a number of important materials like high strung and steel and the aluminum alloys, and also some of the compounds that i mentioned. so they must have had them already and have probably been securing them for the last 10 years or so. so you need that. second, you do not just put up a center of huge facility -- centrifuge facility. the irani hands, it took them 20 years to procure all of this -- iranians, it took them 20 years to procure all of this stuff. so again, this is speculation, but they must have done it somewhere else, gotten a bit perfected, and then brought it down to the site.

even if you do that, you still need to train your people. and that is why, if you read the piece, they had them in pakistan. >> could you check your microphone and make sure it is green on both sides? it is. ok. >> i have a microphone here. >> right here. to your right. you are dead. one more. bear with us. >> i am and north korea analyst.

i think it is very significant for north koreans to mention the importance of returning to october of 2009 joint communique between the united states and sell -- north korea because it was a comprehensive resolution. bob, i have a question for you. you talked about the need for us to accept north korea as it is. what do you sense of the washington, d.c., about whether americans are ready to accept the need to take care of north korea's sense of insecurity to

south korea? >> i am not a washington analyst. it is much easier to analyze north korea than it is washington. [laughter] of i can say is that i hope people recognize now that the policies they have been following could stand some revaluation, that a development like this and suggest that at the very least we need major refinement and maybe we even need to go back to basics. are they ready? i honestly do not know. i am sorry. because ine comment, put the words up there that we should deal with that it is rather than as we would like it to be. people wonder does that mean we should accept that they have nuclear weapons?

as i put on my visual aid, you start with the fact that there will denuclearization -- will ization.ar is asi they have had the bombs since 2003. the end goal is denuclearization. >> you said in your reports that you do not see this as a weapon program right now. you were very critical of various officials and the administration saying this was an heu operation of some kind. should they stop calling it that, or does that dramatize the

very point you're trying to make? it seems like this puts the chinese on the spot. does it? do you have a sense of the chinese involvement in the proplan? >> on the first issue, what you are concerned about is what one says to the administration. some of the news coverage, i choose my words carefully and say, take the uranium enrichment program, and then if they make

that's serious. with that, you can get bombs, and if you make a lot of it, you can change the arsenal. but do not hype it. to get from what i sought to a hydrogen bomb, that is an incredible step. i do not believe that in any way, shape or form. >> the china question. i do not think we have really arid them declare themselves really -- really heard them declare themselves, and until they do, we do not know what they will do on this. since the north koreans say that the purpose of the program is

electricity, i suspect that is where the bulk of their position is for a while. can i use this? i cannot resist. this is very ironic. the north koreans have an enrichment facility and this has raised all sorts of problems and concerns about, i will say it reprocess the fuel? will they change from low enrichment to high enrichment? will they make bombs, etc.? we have been here before. we were going to build it and have complete control of the fuel. we were going to ship the fuel in. we were going to take the fuel out.

for reasons not altogether clear, we decided we did not want to do that, and so we scrapped the program. >> he has to do this because i could not get the photo of him up. >> this is a kedo cap. this is all the remains of the several billion dollars expended on this. it does not heard to remind ourselves that we had a bite of this apple at one time. the fact that the north koreans are doing this now is not our fault, but the more we wait on this problem, the more things develop, the more complicated it is for us to daddress it. >> whether it is correct or not, you may go back to october of

2002 when the united states suspected the north korea was creating a second route to a nuclear weapon by highly enriched iranian. there was a confrontation in which we -- highly enriched uranium. there was a confrontation in which we accused the north koreans of this. the bush administration decided they were doing as an were in violation of the spirit, perhaps the technical letter of law. at that point, they ceased the provision of heavy fuel oil to north korea. that led to a cascading of events that led to what we now call a second nuclear crisis that really ban in december and january of late 2002-2003. with regard to the chinese, this is anecdotal. after we left pyongyang, we went to beijing and met with some very prominent and senior chinese academics, not

government officials. we posed to them at the question of, what is china going to do if north korea continues with some very serious, provocative behavior? now, we have a couple here that you may suggest qualify, the revelation of this facility, and more importantly, what occurred last night, the artillery barrages. we got a somewhat surprising answer from the chinese. this was not a chinese government official, but the chinese said, the chinese will react even milder next time. they're very concerned about the stability and long-term survivability of the regime. this is from the chinese academic. >> on the china front, putting

technical things in perspective, as far as the chinese technical people, they have continue to underestimate the capabilities of the north koreans. for a long time they did not think they could get the reactor back up in 2003 and they did. they did not think they could process plutonium and eight dead. they did not think they could build a modern processing plant and they are building one. with in richmond, they said not at all. the chinese do under estimate -- with enrichment, they said not at all. the chinese do underestimate the north koreans. it is going to be very difficult for the chinese to say they cannot do this because the chinese have said all along they could. >> my question goes to dr.

hecker. you mentioned that there should and research and development of the light reactor in north korea far before this kedo project. you also mention that it is a completely new design. how do know it is a completely new design and what aspect of this is different from what we have seen in the world? >> the completely new that i mentioned is not the design but the designers. there is a new design team, a younger generation. i asked how young, and they said in their '40's. they were trained universities and have been in the nuclear trade, and they are now going to design this.

designs are out there in the world all over. this is a very small version, 25 megawatts instead of a thousand megawatts. this is tiny, tiny, but it is five times bigger than the former electricity they currently have. the interest before was always to get it from somebody else. as late as 2008, february, i spoke with the technical people and actually ask them, do you have your people over at the kedo project, and the answer was no. the light-water indigenous capability, somewhere they gave started to actually designer reactor. what we found in the past, they

have typically pattern that after someone else's. in terms of the reactor, it was the reactor in the uk. in terms of the reprocessing facility, it was the one in belgium. they built themselves, but they were patterned. interestingly enough, and i have this in my report so i will say he said they are modeled after the p-1's and p- 2's in the netherlands. so, they have some patterns that -- patterns out there. they modeled them.

a study them very carefully and then they build their own. >> i do not know if this was deliberate or not, but it was hitachi. i think they were delighted to show that they had some sort of japanese support for this. >> at the elevators that run in the hotel are also a bit touchy. -- are also hitachi. >> doctor, i am wondering if you could talk a little bit about how this could complicate the return to negotiations. north koreans could claim somewhat credibly that they need these subterfuges -- these centrifuges for electricity.

what verification process would we want, and what is the value of inspectors? previously if they were there they could keep a close eye on plutonium facility is, but now, because of what is in your report as you have said, and we do not know what is going on in other parts of the country. two years ago, inspectors were allowed to roam around the country. could you talk about how this complicates the entire problem of verification and inspection? >> the biggest problem on verification is that they would not be that facility. it is very simple with an on- site presence to know whether is leu or heu.

it is a matter of having the equipment installed or going around and taking swipes. that would be simple if we got access to the facility periodically and we could say. the complication is, from what we saw, as i said before, i believe they must have moved in from someplace else. they must have had a whole bunch of centrifuges spending somewhere else to be able to do it so quickly. we are not going to find those places without having an some presence in the country, and that is going to be very difficult. i think in terms of looking at the future, it makes the verification issue really difficult. before, we could assume they do not have an richmond's -- do not

have enrichments. but this changes the picture. that is my concern. theoctor, you've said that chinese underestimate north korea. i think the same is true of american officials. they are uncertain about north korean enrichment capability is. the issue is the risk of being targeted by a nuclear strike. the theory is they do not care because they have many more. what do you think? >> could you help me out. >> he said that like the chinese, american officials may have estimated -- may have

underestimated north korean capabilities. [inaudible] >> so, the chinese underestimated and i underestimated them on a uranium enrichme based onhat we have seen. it turns out that in 2002, the americans may have overestimated what they could do. what one has to do, i have always said, we know the least amount about the enrichment, and i wish we could get a handle. they give us a handle by a indicting sen. >> all the way in the back, the lady with -- they gave us a handle by inviting us in. >> the lady in the back with her hand up. be

related at all to secession announcements, in your view? >> mr. carlin. [laughter] sure.sur i am not a fan of single explanation rationale for north korean action. you have to be very careful not to choose the last deadline you have read and assume that is what is behind- last headline you have read and assume that is what is behind what the north koreans are doing. the program itself is not related to succession.

it could equally be a target of opportunity. they needed to show it to an expert. there are not a lot of experts going to pyongyang. there may be a little bit of a succession thing in there. that is not my top choice. >> now that i have had a chance to think about it, in previous visits, we have always gotten quite a bit of propaganda, state propaganda. the question before was whether they attributed this a facility to kim jong help, and they never did -- kim jong-il, and they

never did. i should point out that i had asked to see the facility. typically, when you arrange your visit, they say, what do you want to see? earlier this year i had asked. i said i wanted an update on the plutonium facility. no one has been there since april, 2009. by the way, and now you have announced that they had been successful in the experimental procedure, i did not know what that meant, so i said i wanted to visit the uranium enrichment facility. and they took us there. >> far right. hand up. stand up.

thank you. >> thank you for putting this on. thank you for the report too. i wanted to get your thoughts on china again, but this time on their export control laws. our assessment is that much of the program that exists in north korea is due in large part to chinese export control laws. how do you stop that? what do you think about that? >> i was at a white house meeting yesterday afternoon, and the officials were congratulating you for that report as well. >> the report is extremely timely. i actually had it with me in north korea. the chinese connection, from my interface with the chinese technical people, and i have

done that since 1994, but particularly since going into north korea, and i do not know if you know, but we go in through beijing. i have frequent-flier miles on air korea. so we talk to the chinese on the way in and the way out, and i am convinced that the north koreans have had no government sponsored help from the chinese in terms of the technical issues. i think the chinese have always been surprised by what i tell them. as far as i know there has only been one chinese technical person that has ever visited the complex, and that was done in september of 2007 when inspectors from the u.s., china and russia went in after they shut the reactor is down. the chinese were impressed that i was able to keep getting in there. in terms of the connection, i

think none. however, there is a complex web, and i think one has to be concerned about private sector interfaces' in china and the transit of those things going into north korea. i would actually turn people to your report, because you lay out the dangers of that. >> you asked that just to get a plug, didn't you? >> i have a question to both gentlemen. doctor, you mentioned that the plutonium program has since been moved. feel any military presence during your visit? mr. carlin, it seems to be the most of your interface has been

with the foreign policy apparatus of the north korean government. do feel there is a difference between pepsico depth. brent apparatuses and how -- the difference between the different apparatuse, and how was that involving? >> we have not learned anything significant from the military. after the test, we had some discussions, and one of the interesting lines i will tell you. this was 2006, three weeks after they tested. probably most of you know that first tested not work so well, but it was a nuclear test. it was only partially successful. a small field -- yield. they said, it worked, and we are

filled with pride. then someone pointed out it did not work that well. the general turned to me and said, of all people you doctors should know that it is more difficult to build a small bomb them a big bomb. that is up the only serious interface we have had with the military, although i do find their wording very interesting. they do use the word weapon is with plutonium. this time -- weaponize with plutonium. this time they said they gave it over to the military. certainly, that was there in terms of the statements that they made. >> when we talk to the safeguard director, we asked what his specific responsibilities were. he described them in terms of safeguarding the merials and program until it is handed over to the military.

so when the product, when the material goes to the military, it becomes their problem for safeguarding, not his. >> one more thing. in one of the discussions, i think it was less same discussion, i did point out -- i think it was at that same discussion, i did point out that going to the military had to do with the safety of the country not the ability to deliver somewhere else. >> i want to go back to the possibility that north korea might have received the new technology, i am talking about the new enrichment facility, from a foreign government. during my interview with mr. karl and he pointed out pakistan and iran -- mr. carlin, he

pointed out pakistan and iran. poo would be your candidates for that? what would be the pot -- who would be the candidates for that? what would be the possible time frame that the exchange would have occurred? what you're talking about the timeframe for the exchange with pakistan? with anybody? >> where could it have come from in terms of a foreign government? [inaudible] >> let me recommend the ices report. they did a very thorough analysis looking back at the connections with pakistan perhaps starting as early as 1993 and moving forward to a

round 2001. their interactions with pakistan, but it is much more complicated than that. the aluminum, the steel, we know for a fact that the germans tried to ship aluminum to north korea. that aluminum shments was intercepted, and that is why we know. there is aluminum that was reputed to have been shipped from russia and got through to north korea. there was some russian involvement. we do not know where they got the steel from, but we have a couple of potential avenues. then they need all of this other fancy equipment. they have a very sophisticated procurement network. i think that network has been operating for at least the last dozen or 15 years or so.

>> thank you. doctor, how much more difficult would it be to restore the 5 megawatt reactor with these new facilities in this location? in that connection, were you aware of any other conversion facilitates -- facilities to facilitate an enrichment program or egg light-water program in pyongyang? >> i am not sure i understand. how much more difficult could it be? could we start the 5 megawatt reactor? first of all, we were told in no uncertain terms by the chief engineer that runs that reactor that the reactor is installed and they are maintaining it.

when i said, you know, there are a lot of people in the west to say you cannot get it restarted, he chuckled and said, that is what they said in 2003 also and we started it. he made a convincing case that they could restarted, but the restarting will need a cooling tower, but that is reasonably simple. in six months they could build a cooling tower. the second thing, which is more difficult, they need more fuel. but it turns up that they have released one load of fuel rods. i have seen those fuel rods in storage. i asked to see them again and they said we do not have time. but he assured me that the fuel rods are still there. those fuel rods cannot be put right into the reactor because two thousand are ready but the

reactor has 8000. they have to take the fuel rods and clad them. it needs an alloy clad, which they know how to make. the building, the magnesium alloy cladding, that building is, as far as we know, still operable. i would have to assume that they can clad those fuel rods as long as they have them, and that they can restart the reactor, perhaps in six months' time. that is much shorter than they can get n l w are going, which is going to take them some number of years -- get an lwr, which is going to take some number of years.

i heard you say that north korea might be interested in but that that was rather far- fetched. could you comment on that? >> to get from what i saw and say that the danger is that they're going to make nuclear weapons is far-fetched. that is a big stretch. there is much else needed for nuclear weapons besides highly enriched uranium. we have no indication they have any of that, and it takes nuclear testing. so, there is just no indication of that. you also need highly enriched uranium, but that is a small piece of taking the big step from a fission bomb to a hydrogen bomb. that is what i meant to say.

>> gentleman in the back, a blue shirt, blue tie. >> thank you. quick question. did they say anything about their uranium fluoride production? >> i spare you all of those details. i have more visuals and all of the rest of it. it is a very interesting story, so i will put on my professor at. for the gas graphite reactor, you on in the uranium tetrafluoride. you take that comment any reduce it to metal and you are done. that is what you put in the reactor. to enrich, you have to change the tetrafluoride to hexafluoride. that just means it needs new flooring. -- it needs more florine.

there is no question in my mind that the north koreans can do that and could have done it at any time in the past. however, the hexafluoride that the libyans bought the pakastani claim they got from north korea. i think there is a good likelihood of that. i asked them, first of all, where did you make the tetrafluoride, because the building where the is to make the tetrafluoride, before 1994, had corroded so badly that the interior collapsed and they abandoned it. however, they found a work around by changing the technique to one that is less corrosive. they said that is what they did. how did you go to hexafluoride? yes, we did that here in pyongyang. i will just briefly mentioned that there are facilities you

can see from bugler -- google earth, and some of those may be associated with having that capability. so yes, hyundai claimed to have reestablished -- so yes, they claim to have reestablished uranium hexafluoride. >> last question. >> [unintelligible]

how do see the development of the infrastructure for the material supply? >> for the hall light water reactor? >> and also for enrichment. >> 4 in richmond, they have demonstrated that they can do 2000 -- for enrichment, they have demonstrated that they can do two thousand units. it is not limitless. they are limited by exports. on the light-water reactor, what they have to do first of all is change the type of fuel, as you know. it is a different manufacturing process. they said, we're going to have problems, but we are getting started. in my own view, they can do that

part of that. i am not concerned it will be allowed to do the fuel. but cladding is a different story. they need an alloy that is tricky to make, and i do not know if they have any experience. however, you can use stainless steel. it does not have as good a performance, but they have a lot of experience with stainless steel. they can do the fuel. they have done the enrichment. my biggest concern is about the reactor structure itself and the interface with the regulatory agencies. i have been involved in the nuclear business for a long, long time. when you try to build a nuclear facility today in this country, the seismic risk that you take and what you have to do to meet the size the criteria are immense.

regulatory bodies are extremely important. i do not know how true that is in north korea. >> before we close out, i have a couple of announcements. one, we will have an audio of this available probably within an hour of the event. if you do not get it, let us know quickly. there are about 60 copies of the report available outside. now, we have a little split year. for those of you who would like to follow up with questions for the doctor, it will be available in our library, which is just back. we will get you there. for those of you too would like to talk about the artillery incident occurred in north and south korea, another doctor who was here and introduced himself as a north korean specialist and i will be available here to answer a few questions or attempt to answer a few questions. questions.