are no huge scoops, which is sort of what you would expect given the secret and low classification level. but i think in a way, in a democracy. it's newsworthy that what the diplomats are saying is not at odds with what we generally understa our foreign policy to be. and while undoubtedly therare some relations that are strained, this is sort of a scatter shot thing. and you could all -- very quickly, you saw secretary of state clinton and others usi these revelations to the advant of the united states. there were a number of leaders in the arab world who were outed as being extremely fearful and outspoken against the notion of iran having nuclear weapons. that is not a huge surprise. but it's something they tend not to say publicly and certainly not to say as king abdullah of

saudi arabia said, you must cut off the head of the snake. secretary clinton while deploring the leaks and talking about the damage caused also said it's interesting to see we and israel are not alone in being fearful about this. and one other thing i should say is i think diplomats, many diplomats including some i talked to, were very distressed at this andthought it would make their jobs harder. there was so of an undercurrent of pride in what i think many people that i have oke with were impressed with the general quality of their work, the quality of their writing and their reporting. and one of my favorite cables was something i stumbled across early on i think it was a hit. npr read it. a report by the diplomat from the embassy in moscow on a

wedding in dagestan in the caucuses. an account not momentous in the annals of diplomacy or state craft but certainly doing a service in trying to tell washington here's part of russia, it's a volatile part of russia. the dictator of chechnya came to the wedding with his entourage and supposedly left a five kilogram lump of gold as his wedding present. and just a wild scene. and a wonderful piece of reporting. so i think it did show that a lot of diplomats have a lot to be proud of. >> let me ask all of you and then those of you in the audience, we certainly want to take your questions. you have some. while we're making this final rounds be, thinking of your question. what do you have make, karen -- and i'll ask all of you this -- of this so-called anonymous group that sprung up to sort of

take on the people who took on wikileaks like paypal who closed their account, and amazon and so on. should we be sort of shaking in our boots these people might be going after all of us if you say an ugly word about wikileaks or something? >> i think it's distressing. i think it's kind of sad and it's a reflection of what i think am sof the worst of the internet and social networking that is simply throws things up against the wall like spaghetti to see what will stick. and i don't -- i don't want to say that the mainstream media or lamestream media or whatever you want to call it has an inside -- should have an inside avenue into all that's good and worth talking about. but i do think that there is --

there's a responsibility to look at what's done wit information, and information in and of itself is not worth all that much unless you have a context to put it in, unless youave some understanding of why it's important. and i guess personally, it's sort of my -- to the extent i have a problem with it -- and as a journalist there are many ways in which i don't have a problem with it. but to the extent i do, it is this sort of -- going back to what i said before, we are attacking the immoral and the illegal about what the united states is doing without being able to articulate exactly what that is. and so to the extent people jump up and say, everything should be public all the time, i think that that both personally for people in this country and in terms of the government is problematic. >> we've got three issues that are frequently conflated.

we have not done that here but one is a flawed government employee who acted independently in violation of his pledge and a government that engineered very poorly a security system. that's the first. second are these cyber anarchists that do not have a rationale other than just a capacity to create chaos. and then we have the story of responsible journalists struggling with information bridging across the two. to me, it's why i'm so worried about the collapse of professional journalism. because we've had the discipline editorial observation that has given us a sense of what is and is not news. we're contrasting here what cyber anarchists are putting out for the world to see and what responsible journalists are struggling to manage. we may not like it. i frankly don't like anything about this. but i respect the fact that

you've wrestled with it and done a very resnsible job within the boundaries of how you saw your dues. i really do respect that. we're going to deeply regret losing that as being the foundation of journalism. and that's what's in front of us in the worlds of the cyber anarchis anarchists. >> one of the most interesting things to me in this whole episode and something that sometimes has gotten lost in the reporting -- you often heard on the radio or tv, wileaks, the organization that released 250,000 secret diplomatic cables. in a limited sense that's true. they released them actually initially to a number of european publications. as far as we know, they got these -- i don't have inside knowledge but appears they got them in may or june. they could have -- if they were really living up to the cyber

anarchist's creed that everything should be published all the time, they could have in an instant dumped 250,000 unredacted cables online and it would have been much more of a tidal wave of information. whether people would have been able to make their way through it, who knows. but either because they felt burned over the afghanistan documentwhere they took a lot of heat for failing to redact out some names of afghan informants who were presumably put in danger, they retreated. with the iraq document dump they actually ended up redacting with computers and stripping names out of them. and the documents they put up were more severely redacted than the ones we put up. and with this cache of docunts, they basically have been mostly in lock-step with these publications. and i have been part of kind of a bizarre process where when we

redacted documents we were sending them back to wikileaks and they were posting them in redacted form and they were actually trying -- they were saying sometimes redacted it this way and you redacted that way. and they were taking some care. these are anonymous people. i have no idea who these people are. i was just going to say they have only released -- th is a little known fact. it's kind of lost. wikileaks has about somewhere in the neighborhood of 1500 documents on its website out of the 250,000. so they're not even at 1% yet. what's going to happen from here on out who knows but the cyber an,ists have sort of realized some restrapt is necessary, it appears. >> do you know who these people are other than assange? does anybody know who they are, where they operate from? do they have an office? maybe this is public but i don't know. >> i know very little about them. it's a bunch of volunteers in a number of countri.

assange has been report to be with some of his associates outside of london in recent times. he's been in sweden at other times. i mean they are sort of a virtual group. i've heard some names and known some names. there have been people -- it's like the pta or something. people drop out, get disgruned and leave. there's a guy who left and started something called open leaks now. it's not exactly a stable organization like csis with an address. >> has se similarities. >> despite the overwhelming similarities. >> you don't know where they are. >> they're very hard to -- i have one e-mail address for a guy but it's -- they're very hard to contact. >> i think there's some in iceland. >> yeah. >> i mean, it's the girl with the dragon tattoo. has anybody got a question here? step right up, floyd.

>> with your permission, three related questions. one, did any of the publications pay wikileaks for any of the material? secondly -- >> let's just answer -- is that true? do you know? >> to my knowledge, the answer is no. i don't think any of the ones we've been dealing with have paid. "the wall street journal" i believe reported that they were once offered a deal where if they broke an embargo on the documents, they would have to y wikileaks $100,000 and they refused to enter into it. it wasn't an upfront payment but scheme where they'd pay if they publish the documents before a particular date. but that was never i don't think part of our deal. so we've never entered into any kind of monety agreement with wikileaks. >> setting aside the legal

niceties. if the gravamen of espionage and treason is a damage to the country is the country damaged any less by someone who steals a classified cument and sells it to a foreign government in contrast to someone who acquires known stolen classified documents and makes it available to all foreign governments? and the second question is what is the rationale do you think whereby someone substitute his or her judgment for an official who determines that a document should be classified? >> you want a shot at that? >> let me try to strike a balance here without being a partisan. no. i mean, any release of classified is damaging. but so too is it damaging for us

to have a debate that tears at the consensus of american society. americans wants their -- everybody that came here wanted to leave where they were. and they were nervou about the government. so every american has a genetic disposition toward wanting to be protected by the government and to be protected from the government. and it's -- this is that delicate balance where we have to strike it all the time. i personally think this was quite damaging and i deeply regret it. i also think that if wewere to try to shut down "the new york times" over something like this, it would bear more damaging in american society. this is one of those painful things we go through all the time. and we have to basically rely on the professionalism of very gd journalist sls and responsible companies to work with us at times like this. >> i would just say as a journalist, i think there are times a journalist puts his judgment ahead of someone in the

government. just because someone is in the government, wisdom doesn't automatically accrue as a title of a government official. i think there's a question when it comes to it when you have caught the government in an absolute lie and it's a significant lie and you're able to show that it's a lie, then i think a journalist is justified in publishing that. and i think that's kind of what american journalism isll about. >> classified documents? >> well, sometimes documents are classified for no other reason than they mate not be true. anybody who has been in washington knows and understands that. but i'm just saying you're asking for a justification. that would be one of the justifications that i would cite. and if people didn't make those judgments, the idea of

whistle-blower, thinks of that nature -- i think there's a lot of good from whistle-blowers from time to time. but i think there are times -- but when responsible news organizations make a decision to do it they don't say let's just do it, it will be a lot of fun. they ge it a lot of thought like "new york times" has done and cbs news has done in times past. it's responsibility. that's the part that a lot of people in mainstream journalism wonder where the responsibility was in wikileaks in making the decision that they did. karen. >> i would ask if you draw a distction between information that is not passed through a document, information that's passed in conversations that we have every day of the wooeek th could be considered classified. or does it have to be just something in a document? it's pretty well established law

that the first amendment means that if we know something, that we have the option of publishing it. you have the option as a citizen of saying this is garbage and you shouldn't be allowed to do this and then trying to take action to stop it. but i think our responsibility is, whether it's through conversations or looking at documents that we don't publish which we do all the time or somebody actually handing you the document which is actually -- this was kind of a massive handover of documents but the fact is very little of what i do and i would guess r. guess what scott does too is having someone just hands you a document. that just doesn't -- that's a very rare experience relatively. >> one other thing about classified documents, however, is everyone who has lolled around in declassified documents

or filed a freem of information act request and gotten documents previously classified delivered to them, i mean, there are sort of semi-famous examples, some you can find on the web. and most of us who have been doing this a while has seen them. where a document through oversight or asked for between two different organization agencies redakts it twice. once it's redaktded in 1990 and then 1995 and the first thinks the top half is sensitive and blocks it out and the other blocks out the second half the paper and you get both of them. it just shows what should be classified and at what level is a very subjective process. an one other small point is -- and this is a fairly extreme example obviously. but i spent a few years living in the soviet union. they used to have an agency

ich was essentially the official censorship agency. and they had a big, thick book of everything that was banned. and government had sort of the upper hand in that society so that the fisheries ministry put in there that if -- that dumping fish into the ocean waste was a state secret and pretty much everytng got to be a state secret after a while. when you ask should the bure catd have the last word on what's classified should a journalist and many people asked why areournalists appointing themselves a the arbiter of what should be secret. we are imperfect at it but so is the government. i think it's in this interplay and tension that exists in the way we run our society, that generally we sort of muddle along fairly decently. >> i would add one thing and then we'll go on to something

else. much is classified. and because something is embarrassing to the government is not a legitimate reason to classify it. the problem with all of that is once it gets classified, getting it unclassified takes literally years. i was telling dr. hamre before this canal one of my favorite stories i ever did at cbs news years ago during the pentagon papers. i was the pentagon correspondent. one day i went down to the pentagon book store, which is down in the basement of the pentagonnd discovered they were selling the pentagon papers. if you all will remember they wereelling them as books and people were lined up to buy them. i took a camera crew down there and took pictures and did the story because what made it a story is because upstairs they were still classified and locked

away in safes. i'll never forget. that evening after the news walter cronkite called me and said if you hadn't taken pictures of that i wouldn't have believed it. that's the mess with all of this classification. >> i think just briefly along those same lines there's a controversy going on now where the congressional research service, people who work there who are charged. they are told they cannot access any of these documents which are on every website in the world. to inform them as they write their reports. they cannot refer to any information that's in any of them in their reports to congress. presumably they can go home and turn on their home computer and have full access to it. but then they can't acknowledge in their reports they've had full access to it. it is a pretty confusing and sometimes ridiculous system. >> anybody else have a question?

>> aside from the embarrassment, it seems to me there are going to be two very likely consequences. the first has to do with freedom of speech and the first amendment. the second combining what john calls these anarchists cyber people with something like stux net. julian assange hired a top notch british attorney. that will be an interesting cot case. i wonder how you come out with the issues of the first amendment. what has when this is not information leaking but something along the lines of real damage? the gas tonian cyber attacks or stux net attks into iran where you have thousands of travelers able to jump on and support that. >> well, i thi aery valid irn u but i think it's a different issue. we do not as organized society

know how to deal with this powerful communication tool that's grown up to be so hugely ubiquitous and open and that we've made ourselves so dependent on. we have huge vulnerabilities associated with this. and yet we don't know how to shut it off because we depend on it every day. so we're frankly just sum bling our way through this. i personally don't think that there is an ultimate solution to this problem because clever people will always find ways to tear apart computer software. so we use -- we have kind of a physical model for cyber security which is yo kind of have a fence around your yard, gate at the driveway, motion detectors, double locks on the doors. i think that's inappropriate for cyberspace. i think we should think of

cyberspace as -- how do doctors stay healthy in hospitals working with sickeople because that's what scriber space is going to be. this is going to be a polluted dangerous environment and w have to stay as healthy as we can. it's more about exercise and sleep and the capacity to recover quickly. you're going to get sick and it's about recovering once you get sick because it's just not going to be possible to stay in on that note, thank you all for coming. happy holidays. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> and a few moments, on october interview with richard holbrooke who died yesterday. in about 40 minutes, a forum on u.s. strategy in afghanistan. after that, of briefings on drug use among teenagers. later, we will be air -- reair the wikileaks forum. on "washington journal," we will talk about u.s. strategy in afghanistan with a member of the house armed services committee. democratic representative bill pascrell will take your calls about the tax-cut bill working its way through congress. we will be joined by nor of volkow, about the latest survey

of teenage drug use. "washington journal" is live every day on c-span. >> students, parents, and teachers -- with the studentcam competition one month away, we're going to offer -- answer your question between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. eastern. to sign up for a 30-minute session, go to our web site. it is open to middle and high school students. the deadline to enter is january 20, 2011. for more affirmation go to studentcam.org. >> richard holbrooke, the u.s. special representative for afghanistan and pakistan, died yesterday. he had been hospitalized since friday. in october, he was a panelist at the annual ideas formed. he spoke with a bbc new anger

for little more than a half- hour. -- news anchor for low more than a half-hour. >> i am at abc this week, and what i am trying to do is putting more for perspective from the international world, trying seat things that richard holbrooke deals with and bring them to a wider american audience. it is great to be with you and ambassador holbrooke. we're going to be chat for the next half an hour. i like to welcome you here and appreciate that to change your schedule to be here. as we all know, this is being

strained online as well. this starts with -- richard, you've known david through several imprisonments and arrests. >> all of them. [laughter] >> first, in bosnia which i was covering and i remember being ytone during the da 10 process. how do you remember those days? you're trying to deal with humanitarian crises as well. >> david did manage to get himself captured and was in a very bad position. we had decided to stop the negotiations until he was rest. i remember milosivic saying that are you crazy enough to stop this because of one journalist who was where he should not have been? >> and i said, yes. after three days, they got him

out. my most vivid memory is the last time voskhod david before captivity. it was at the wedding of a friend of ours. he hadn't not been married. they had been engaged. he said he was going back to afghanistan. and i said jokingly, don't kid yourself captured again. he said, oh, no, no, i will never happen. [laughter] and as he recounts in his articles and books,, quite interesting story. he tried to explain to the taliban that he was to be regarded in a different way because he had tried to expose the atrocities of the bosnian serbs against muslims. he thought the one make an impact on those people. on the contrary, they google them and the first thing they showed up was his relationship to made. in the taliban gold -- >> the

taliban googled. >> have you seen mollah zero facebookullah omar's page? he went to an interesting party last night. but they are so brutal and ruthless. you can confirm this, david, if i get this wrong. they are so ruthless that instead of realizing what david was trying to do, they got a harsh because you are the best friend of richard holbrooke and he is barack obama's special representative to this region. it did not help at all. is that a fair representation of what happened? >> yes. they had watched documentary. >> it leads to a natural next

question. david was precisely where he was meant to be in order to expose the atrocities, whether in bosnia, on the other side, or in afghanistan. unfortunately he had to pay the price for a long time. but the fact that the taliban googled might be a laugh line, but that means that they are savvy. they understand what they are dealing with, how to reach the audience that they want to reach, and how to manipulate the public's face and the hearts and minds space. >> and the cliche of that which is accurate. they're not the taliban of the 1990's. they have learned from blowing up the buddhas, a worldwide wakeup call to what they were. they have become more sophisticated but they have not changed their brew roots, their

ideology, and there goes. >> has this media savvy complicate efforts or stop the those who are trying to defeat them? just to take that rome first, the media space. >> i do not think it has affected perceptions of taliban in the europe and the united states. >> in their region? >> in their region, they are trying to exploit opportunities, the traditional target of anti- americanism that we're fighting on moslems low, christian crusaders. david's point about the taliban think that 60% of american art prostitutes, this is not a small point. it shows that they're playing to a field of enormous ignorance in which communications are

primarily still by radio, but highly literate and susceptible people. >> the question is, who is winning that battle a perception right now? >> in afghanistan, public opinion poll has shown that the afghans remember the black years, especially the women. the public support of the taliban and is always in the same range. they do not want the taliban bad. >> that is important. some americans against the war and will like to see the troops come back sooner rather than letter always say, well, look, the people of afghanistan do not want us there. in my reporting, i have seen the opposite. in millions of arabs -- of afghanistan to put their trust in to us.

if you go there, you see things that are not well reported immediately. i attempted train civil servants. our attempts to rebuild acker and agriculture. it was exporting agriculture until the soviet invasion. the country is so broken by 30 years of continuous war, warlordism, and they always miss the punch line, which leads directly to where we are today. and the consequences. it is a broken society. on the core issue, it is not a popular uprising, but i want to make an important caveat. a leader in the chinese revolution says something when i was working in vietnam.

give me two good men and i can take any village in china. it was pioneered in the 1920's and becomes standard operating position for guerrillas of the world. you go into a village, you kill the main landowner, if you kill the local officials. terrorize the village, and the good people have no way of rallying and become neutralized, and the new takeover. -- and then you take cover. >> as david was saying and was being noted by the filing of misfiles are drums across the pakistan border, the taliban still exist. there are still big areas that they control or always they can disrupt. and pakistan, and tell me whether this is correct aeronaut, you assess that the pakistani government will not go out for certain of their militant groups, such as the hot tiny -- haqqani group.

they seemed to be closing down certain routes. where does that stand right now and how spread out and how effective are the taliban along that border? >> let me address those questions in turn. on the first, the overall relationship with pakistan is complicated, more complicated than any strategic relationship i have never been involved in. but at the end of the day, success in afghanistan, however you define success, is not achievable unless pakistan is part of the solution and not part of the problem. we can sit in this room and say all the things that a lot of you may be thinking about that, but in the end, we're going to work with the pakistanis, because i believe it is the right policy

in the administration does too. it does not mean that we're not without frustrations as reflected in the "washington post." the area the size of italy, from the canadian border to florida, we were the first country in. very visible, very popular with the pakistani people, i went to the flood zone and i'm proud of that. but at the same time we have these issues that you have alluded to. as far as the current situation on the border, which is now the story of the day, let me be very -- let me try that phrase it very precisely. first of all, i did a believe it is going to change the fundamental lesson ship between our two could -- i do not believe it is going to change the fundamental relationship between our two countries. it is an area of -- where you

have been and david spent involuntary amounts of time there, it is ill-defined in areas, it is complicated, and very rough to make -- terrain. it was very unfortunate. an investigation is going on on that by nato as it should, and the secretary of general has expressed his regret about that and i would echo that. but i do not think it would change the fundamental of the relationship. >> right, but has it affected of major military point, to allow the routes to be used for native goods? >> right now there was a big attack on one of the convoys. it is not clear who did that. there have been other attacks but that journalist link is attached to these events. >> i believe that the routes are now not quite close but they are moving more slowly.

did and that is germane. a. >> we will work that out. >> you think that you will? >> forster. it is inconceivable to me that the closing of the routes, the alleged of the -- the alleged closing, but not full closing, will continue for any length of time. if you go that route and look at it from a helicopter, do look that that and once these are clothes in that thing, it will have a colossal effect on the region. it is a dangerous area. >> how you determine that the pakistanis despite the if -- the efforts of the general, the better relationship on security and cracking down on their homegrown fred, have you determined that. nonetheless not going to go after the haqqani network? to it and i'll let them speak for their own military fans.

this is their business and their country. and they have limited resources and many challenges, and right now they have 67 -- 60,000 troops were 70,000 troops working in the area. we have said that more can be done in this regard. >> it is their issue but it is your issue. if they do not go after them, then you're going back go after the -- the united states. is that what u.s. policy is? >> i am not one to buy into your phraseology. it was a nice drive. >> have you determined that you're going to have to take out the haqqani network? >> i am not. answer. >> that is a direct question. >> and that as a direct answer. [laughter] >> we will get to that. it and i want to tell the story right now because you are harassing me.

i came out into a gaggle and all these journalists yelling, and suddenly there's this table in the back, and she appears on top of the table with her own camera in her hand and starts yelling a question, and everyone backs of. that was the beginning. >> you use to answer questions. >> i still do. >> you said that the taliban are more sophisticated now than when they blew up buddhas. >> in media terms. they have not change their tactics, the brutality. >> for their goals, but they have the weapons of the moment and they are extremely dangerous and very difficult to counter. for all bus, looking from a far and listening to various statements that come out of this

administration, like the chairman of the joint chiefs saying yesterday, cautiously optimistic any mention several areas. but looking from afar, it is difficult to get a real idea of what is happening on the ground. would you say that you're breaking the back of the taliban? is the military effort breaking the back of the taliban? >> i am not going to part boston .ade about -- prognosticate they are in areas where they're really being hurt. there are other areas where the taliban is holding its own. and there may be some areas where they're making limited inroads. but the influx of additional international troops has made a real difference and created more space for an effort to push them

back. >> are you optimistic? >> as a set, this is not a game. you remember that i would never answer that question. we have a job to do and we're going to do it. and i am not a light at the end of the tunnel stop. >> how would you compare where you are today from a year ago when you started? >> the taliban were under much more immense pressure than they were then. >> there has been a lot of talk about what he did not states is going to agree with or back, whether the afghan government will get into any meaningful negotiations with the taliban, because most people say that there is no full military solution to this and there will eventually be a negotiated solution. can you give us a status report of the likelihood that any and

negotiate -- meaningful resolution with any kind of element of the taliban? >> let me start by reminding you all the from the beginning of this administration, david petreaus, mike mullen, the president, hillary, everybody, we have always said that there is no purely military solution to this war. what does that mean? there will be some eventual political solution. president karzai has repeatedly reached out in public, including his inaugural speech last november, his speech in london in january, his speech at the kabul conference in july which hillary and i were at, and many other spaces. so the terrain of to be very clear to everyone. we on this stand. you're not want to stamp out the taliban by military force.

but the issue of how the war comes to an end, all wars come to an end but this one has a unique dynamic, because it has continued for over 30 years with shifting groups and the enemy is not a single enemy like the north vietnamese or the viet cong or like the bosnian serbs like most wars. it is all these different groups, the afghan taliban, al qaeda, with whom we cannot e.t., they the l.a overlap but they have different goals. it is a uniquely complicated problem. having said that, of course, their discussions on what the basis for an outcome that does not involve a military solution continues. but there is no current, clear path of a sort you're talking about that is readily apparent.

i want to stress to everyone here at this wonderful conference, because it is and ideas conference, and this is a very big idea that we're very mindful of. all of us here discuss this seriously, and we understand its importance, and we have been talking to the afghans and the pakistanis and other important participants in the region about as. >> then negotiated resolution including elements of the taliban, is that what you're specifically talking about? >> i am going to avoid the word negotiated. it carries the implications of dayton or camp david. >> why avoid it? even if it is not all the formal process like dayton, either you have some kind of deliberations by the afghan government or u.s. sen that they are going to buckle and cry uncle and

surrender. didn't dare many other variants. >> tell us some. please. >> there is the situation -- there are many different elements. >> we are confused because many of the military commanders say, yes, this is a good idea, to bring the elements of the taliban who are reconcilable into an end of the conflict. but in order to do that, you must first deliver them the knockout blow, put them on their heels, so that they understand they are coming at this from a position of weakness. >> and you just answered your run question. you laid out a scenario. >> is it possible? >> it is absolutely possible. that is why i emphasize that there is different enemies out there. each one -- there are so many

other groups, i only mention the big five. >> this is a very important idea and you have been here very many times before it. in this case, the original partner of the united states when they win nt afghanistan was the no. alliance. ullah was his deputy and he led the no. alliance. he said to me recently, do you really believe that the taliban that is committed to a worldwide islamic caliphate, to obliterating the rights of women, is going to negotiate with a government that it ?elieves is infidel the mind set, i want you ask and you say that there's no meaningful talks going on right

now, is the radio -- in their place for this idea to germinate? >> there is space for this idea to germinate. secondly, your question implies a partial solution. and i want to go back. general petreaus and i talked about this a lot. he went through something similar in iraq. there are groups out there which switched allegiances. they will fight against foreigners, the allied themselves with the foreigners. that also happened in iraq. the circumstances are very different. some of these birds are simply defending the ballet they have lived in four centuries against the latest -- some of these groups are simply defending the valley they have lived in for

centuries. al qaeda, it is not possible to talk to them. then you go on to the other groups and you say, some of those are in constant contact with a field commander lovell. some local taliban calls on the cellphone to a person who is a relative of a friend's in the local area and says, we are tired of this war. we would like to come in from the cold. this is the reintegration program that president karzai unveiled in london on january in which we and the british and the japanese and others are funding, and it is a very of foreign programs. >> how many have you brought in? >> is not yet operational. don't give me that low. >> why not? why is not operational? >> because the government of afghanistan has not yet gotten up and running to the level it should be.

>> we have an important issue. how much time you have? the president has put a fixed deadline on it. each time you talked about condition-based, and july 2011. mri? >> does not mistake july 2011 -- do not mistake july 2011. he has said very clearly that withdrawal will begin on a careful, conditions-based -- not a deadline. it is not a deadline. it is the beginning of a drawdown process. there is no and that stated. is conditions- related to the issue were talking about. back to the reintegration program, because i want to clarify this. this is a very important program. nobody can be satisfied with this current operational level

, because the afghan government does not have in place yet the people who were born to implement this program. the project is like everything in afghanistan, constrained by the circumstances of this tragic, tormented country. this country like -- this program is not going to be where it should be. i fully agree with you to its importance. general petreaus, congress -- we have a very important member of the congress here, and jane harman, who was involved with this, congress has authorized that petreaus can use some of his emergency funds to support this program. all the afghan government is still trying to organize it, and i agree with you that it is too slow, general petreaus -- you're just there and you must of talked to david about this.

general petreaus and his team are putting into place this program at the local level. and it is proceeding. >> one of the reasons -- for unknown reasons, there have been on the ground in many of these spaces, nation-building in this country, the term is a dirty word. and yet every single general, colonel, capt., right down to the ground level, in places like bosnia, iran, afghanistan, wherever, almost unanimously would say -- maybe they do not use that term -- but the only way to do this is to do long- term -- what is the right term without nation-building? not just reconstruction, but an alternative economic future,

education, all the soft power things that have to happen in order to win any of these wars. how much are your hands tied by the real distance the success of administrations in the united states have put? >> the previous administration made this a dirty word, specifically the secretary of defense. there was an institute for nation-building and runs felt shut it down. you did not mention the thousands of american civilians, government employees, ngos, try and tractors and much greater danger because they have no security and they are on the front line. i want to pay tribute to them because that is the part of a program that i am supposed to be overseeing. but to get back your core point, nation building became a dirty word because it was spun out in the wrong way.

all of what everyone, but we're not building the nation of afghanistan. we're trying to help them rebuild. agriculture is the perfect example. they were in agricultural export country. they worry breadbasket. they dominated the world markets. they exported to their neighbors week and grapes. they even supported good ones. that is not going to happen again. many of them are still there. that was all destroyed. we can help them to it. they may be the poorest non- african country in the world, but the highest literacy rate, of massive job but it is not nation-building. they know who they are. bear in mind that afghanistan has never had the separatist movements that you are so familiar with in yugoslavia,

that exist right now and sudan, and even neighboring pakistan and india. >> some of the leaders of said to me, you have this huge country strategically located, were by and large of population wants international forces there, aligning itself with progress. they want girls educated, they will security, economic development, stand up on their own 2 feet and they're not looking for charity or hands out its record handouts. that is a totally different narrative. hot -- of friendly, mostly moslem country rather than when the taliban was there. is it not five times more important to really go after the bids you are involved in, the economic development -- call us what you want, but give them an alternative to terrorism and

drug production and all of that? >> the short answer to your question is yes. the more complicated answer is, in order to make that work, you have to be integrated with other aspects of policy and it must include a similar program in pakistan. the congress signs the checks. they have legitimate concerns about accountability, transparency, the issue of corruption, and selling on -- and so on. i want to go back to july 2011 and the statement of the america long-term presence. we have all said repeatedly that there has to be a presence in afghanistan after the combat troops leave. because they will eventually leave, this is not an open-ended commitment. the president has said repeatedly and that goes to your point, we can repeat the

mistakes of 1989, when the soviets crossed the bridge back into the soviet union and the united states immediately turned its back on afghanistan and a country we had been so involved just imploded. they move this started the various issues that we stop about earlier. it will require economic development and aid, including the issues you raised and i have raised -- agriculture, women's empowerment, and so on. we cannot turn our backs on women. we cannot have the dramatic cover photo on "time" magazine become an actual reality. the nose cut off. the headline said, what will happen if we lose afghanistan. the photograph of was something happening there today.

it is a key pulled -- part of the culture and we cannot change the culture. and it is a part of the culture? that is a criminal act by the taliban. that is that criminal and political @. >> i do not want to get into that. >> and have acid thrown at them for the rest of time. >> do not represent what i said. there's a strong culture in afghanistan which you know very well, gurkhas -- burkas, and let me finish because you made a very serious misrepresentation of what i said. there is a strong culture there. >> an equally strong culture of women fighting back. jetting you cut me off. >> i am not saying you're trying

to let that happen. >> i am not condoning them. i've given my entire life to fighting them and so has helleri. i am making a point that we do not want it to happen again. but it happens even now, it is not just the taliban to do it, it is part of an ancient culture which is an extraordinary stress. it does not just happen in afghanistan, as you certainly know. >> we have one more minute. >> but i have to finish the core point. after the troops leave, we must remain with economic and social development to prevent this kind of thing from happening. and we must continue to train the afghan police and army. that is not going to be cheap. it will be an international effort and that goes to your question about nation-building. >> we do have one last question. it goes right to the culture

thing. at the beginning you said depending on how people define success. i want to ask you about that. a lot of people say you promised to bring democracy, will you promise this, you promised that, and we cannot because of their culture or they are not disposed to this. you think people in do you think that people in the west think the idea of democracy should be western-style or nothing at all? >> success i would define it success as a country that is at peace and that in which its government, and by government i do not just mean kabul. afghanistan has not been run historical a because of the ethnic groups and lack of communication by kabul. but a country which is stable

enough to work on his economic development and build its institutions and give people literacy which is critically important. literacy is the greatest gift. and rebuild its institutions. and that has an understanding with islamabad so these two neighbors with strategic interests can live together in some degree of harmony. we will never have a day where it is violence free. like many other countries we are familiar with, there will be residual movements, subplots, special tribes that will keep fighting, but to get it out of the world arena and yet continue to have the world support. it is not an easy task. i do not want anyone in the room to be misled. it will not be easy to do. but that is part of the process. but our core goal remains to

defend our national security on the ground, in the region, because there are people in that region that will attack the united states. the times square bomber went back to the border area to get trained. enemies of the united states are still out there, and we have to take action. >> holbrooke, thank you very much indeed. thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> richard holbrooke, the u.s. special representative for afghanistan and pakistan spoke about his career at an event in october. mr. holbrooke died yesterday. he was 69 years old. in a few moments, a forum on u.s. strategy in afghanistan. in more than an hour, a briefing

on drug use among teenagers. after that, a forum on the effects of the website wikileaks on public policy and journalism. a couple of live events to tell you about tomorrow on cspan-3. the house judiciary committee holds a hearing on foreclosures that will focus on the documentation practices by mortgage servicers. that is at 10:00 a.m. eastern. at 1:00 p.m. eastern, the open source intelligence roundtable closed the discussion of the relationship between technology and traditional media. panelists will talk about the future of so-called open source intelligence in national security decisions. >> this sunday on c-span, and her first televised interview, the newest supreme court justice elena kagan on the confirmation process, or adjustment to the court, and her relationship with john roberts.

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/books and be sure to use the promo code "cspan" at check out. >> now a forum on u.s. strategy in afghanistan hosted by the center for a new american security. panelists include the former coanon troops in lieutenant general david barno, and andrew exum, a former adviser to general stanley mcchrystal. this is a little more than an hour. >> it is my great pleasure to welcome you here to discuss the report, "responsible transition, securing u.s. interests in

afghanistan beyond 2011." before we begin, i would like to ask for a moment of silence to remember ambassador richard away lastwho passed night. he lived a life of service to the united states, including duty in vietnam, yugoslavia, and most recently in afghanistan and pakistan. our thoughts are with his family and with those who love and serve him in his important work around the globe. thank you. a year and two weeks ago, the president made an important speech at west point. in that speech, he committed an

additional 30,000 troops to the fight against al qaeda and its allies any promise in the year he would review the progress that had been made and the work there remains to be done. the national security council is now completing a presidential review, and the president is scheduled to address the nation this thursday in order to announce what he has found. while we wait for that announcement, we're fortunate to have with us today three people who have been intimately associated with the national security policy of the u.s. in afghanistan and pakistan over the past decade. retired lieutenant general david barnom, a former army ranger andrew exum, and investigative journalist and editor bob woodward. david barno graduated in united states military academy's class of 1976. he served in combat in grenada and panama. in 2003, he was elected to

establish a new three-star operational headquarters to take command of u.s. and coalition forces in operation in during freedom, leading admission until 2005. after retiring from the army the next year, he became the director of the national defense university's near east and south asia studies center. he did that for four years before joining the center for new american securities earlier this year is a senior adviser and senior fellow. with andrew exum, dave wrote " responsible transition, securing u.s. interests in afghanistan beyond 2011." andrew exum is a fellow and a former army ranger who served in combat in iraq and afghanistan. andrew exum later served as an adviser to the scent, assessment team -- the centcomm assessment team. he is just off a plane this

morning from afghanistan where he spent the last few weeks in battlefield circulation and discussions with commanders on the ground. welcome home. we are honored to have with us to moderate the discussion a man who truly needs no introduction. bob woodward has been one of america's most famous investigative reporters since he and carl bernstein broke the watergate story for the washington post in 1972 some years before andrew exum was born. [laughter] bob has since august 16 national best sellers, including "obama's wars." and during the writing of that book, bob visited afghanistan. bob will draw observations from dave and ex before opening the floor for 30 minutes of questions. if you have further questions,

you are invited to remain for a press availability immediately following the event. i'd like to welcome these three experts to the state. gentleman? [applause] >> are microphones on? i would like to say couple of words about holbrooke who i knew for almost four years. one of the most in case people i have ever met, not just in government but out of government. he is somebody who literally threw himself at and into with the determination, in a sense like teddy roosevelt, somebody who was always in the arena. he was a member this year --

this year at one point, he told me a classic statement. people were picking on him about the united states in decline, and his rejoinder to them was, we may be in decline but we are still number one. he is -- i like to think of him as the persistent patriot, because he was a patriot, somebody who often disagreed spoke his mind freely, but in the interests of the united states. now to turn to the report. andrew, let's start with you. you still have afghanistan on your shoes. you got back. tell us what you told the general petraeus. >> i met with the general before i left. i left just yesterday. before i left on friday, i was there for 10 days at the

invitation of the headquarters, traveling around afghanistan and making general observations. i stayed in kabul for an extra few days meeting with journalists and civilian researchers. i will go through three good things and three bad things that i noticed in afghanistan. in full transparency, this is exactly what i told the general petraeus. unless our political intelligence have gotten a lot better, some of you remember a paper written for the center for new american security unfixing intelligence in afghanistan. we have gotten a lot better. 18 months ago, when i traveled around asking folks about the area of operations, they talked about the enemy. this time around, they talked about their area of operations, the human geography, the tribes. and only then, started talking about the enemy. a lot of what is driving the conflict is not necessarily the presence -- >> it is how much of an

improvement? >> it is a tactical improvement. i will get to that. war is in political, strategic, operational, and tactical. your tactics could be right, but if your strategy is of, you will lose. two more technical improvements i noted -- we are doing counterinsurgency better than i have ever seen it. our special operations forces and general purposes forces are sync up better than i have ever seen them. the three improves would be almost entirely succeeded. general petraeus told us when we first came to afghanistan that he has to strategic achilles heels. one being sanctuaries, enemy sanctuaries in pakistan. the second being governance. everywhere i went in afghanistan, everyone i spoke with, afghan officials, afghans on the street, and company

commanders on the ground, hit back with those same two strategic achilles heels. i do not think we have a good strategy for dealing with them. secondly, with regard to governance, first off, if you plop me down in the middle of afghanistan and you ask me, what is it that the isaf forces value? based on the type of metrics been breached, overwhelmingly, we value killing the enemy. that is a good thing. we need to kill the enemy in afghanistan, but its governance is one of our achilles' heels, we have to wade our resources there as well. as we begin the transition in afghanistan, this is the subject of the paper, our interest between the united states and our allied governments and the afghan government will diverge. it is one of the planning assumptions that our interests are broadly aligned with the government and of afghanistan -- of afghanistan.

that is the case right now, but that will not be the case. we will be focused 80% on security and 20% on a developer. the afghans will want to focus on the opposite way. >> ok, general, summarize the report in two sentences. [laughter] summarize. >> i would say, it is worth reading, so i encourage you to read it. there are a lot of interesting things in there. most importantly, it argues that the u.s., despite the fact we are in an era of different strategic context where deficit and debt will have a tremendous impact on our future role in the world, the u.s. still has a vital interest in the afghan- pakistan border area. to protect those interests, we have to develop a sustainable strategy that allows us to maintain a military presence not

only beyond july , 2011. that presence takes a different form than it does today. because unconventional warfare, special operations forces, focusing on attacking and keeping relentless pressure on al qaeda, because that is one of the vital interest -- to prevent another attack on the u.s. the same forces hoping to -- helping to enable the afghan military to pick up the counterinsurgency fight. >> you say in the report that we would have a residual force of 25,000-30,000, right? where does that number come from? >> we actually crunched out what we thought those numbers should look like. i have a very detailed to the list with me. as i ran through the numbers, not knowing what they would come out to be, this is u.s.-oonly, was 28000. .

it comprised a special operations capability that was special mission units, the regular isaf -- >> you've done traditional troop to task analysis. joe biden raised this report and he will say, this is exactly where i was last year -- counter-terrorism plus. you scale back. >> i am not sure we knew exactly what the joe biden ct plus was. i think we have the details in this to make the argument that not only should this be the force uigher to, but we go to a 3.5 years from now, which provides a space to build a afghan security forces to take on the mission. we would not recommend this strategy for this summer or next

summer. we recommended going to this by 2014. >> in a blog today, someone said, when you step back and look at the war in afghanistan, the united states does not have a real interest in afghanistan. what is your answer to that in terms of this report? >> i think we are very clear about what we think our interests are. i think we have a lot of interest in central asia. we have only to vital interests, meaning those interests by which we should continue to expand blood and treasure. one has to do with al qaeda and associated movements. >> which is in pakistan. >> for the most part in pakistan. >> almost 99%. >> absolutely. >> we can set that on aside. >> afghanistan is not an island.

as part of our region. the region is what we talk about in the report. is not about the nation's state property of afghanistan. the neighboring region has a tremendous influence on what will happen in the united states. >> first off, the durand line was the great wall pakistan -- then we could talk about them being to separate interests. but we can't. along the border, it is extremely fluid. the second interest as to do with the stability of pakistan. pakistan has nuclear weapons. it is a fragile state. we do not want to see a pakistan that collapses. that will have horrible implications for regional security. >> isn't somebody going to look back at this war at some point and i daresay, wait a minute. the united states had 100,000 troops in afghanistan, and you

look at all the rhetoric and documentation, all the discussion it is to defeat, dismantle al qaeda. you say the border is porous, but al qaeda is not moving into afghanistan. they are staying in pakistan. it is key taliban -- the taliban fighters that are moving into afghanistan occurred >. >> is al qaeda not in afghanistan because we of troops there? >> you know the answer. the argument, if i may interrupt is do you really need 100,000 troops for them to come in, and vice president joe biden argued, look, if we control the intelligence, control the air space, have sufficient special operations forces, we can make sure al qaeda does not come back into afghanistan. i am trying to think like

president bush on what would joe sixpack think of this. there seems to be a disconnect, no? >> when you look at what we are trying to do and afghanistan as expressed by president obama in the march, 2009, white paper and the december 1, 2009 speech in west point. it is minimal -- to deny, disrupt and to dismantle al qaeda. it is pretty minimal. at the same time, there is the assumption that an order for you to do that in afghanistan you have to create or you have to go down some pretty maximize means. you have to build a certain key institutions in afghanistan. >> nation-building, right? >> institution building. >> that is a shift in language.

president obama was clear in his orders. this is not nation-building. if you switch the language to well, we are institution building, is that not sneaky? do you think a law professor in obama might get you. >> i learned in this book come the one thing" that obama said that did make sense was doing counterinsurgency operations to buy time it to build up afghan national security forces. that makes sense. that is what we are trying to do. to make afghanistan as resilient against those transnational terror groups before september 11, 2001. >> the taliban exists out there. al qaeda and the taliban has sympathetic missions.

the reality is that we have to look at the problems realistically. we cannot simply look at the al qaeda problems and then look at the taliban problems. they overlap each other. we have to have a strategy that takes into account all of those. >> do you worry we are buying into this idea of transition to easily? you talk to military people and a lot of them will say, and were saying last year passionately, you cannot do war on a timetable. as soon as you start using the language of transition, does that not send a message, we're out of here? is that not a problem that we had? >> one of the most important points this report makes is that the u.s. as to dispel that uncertainty. we have to commit to a long-term strategy and military commitment. as a stable one in afghanistan. today if you are in pakistan and a national security adviser or

and afghan adviser to president karzai, you are operating under the assumption that the u.s. is leaving. the clock is running out. we have to dispel that notion. >> nato said 2014. from 2010, that looks far off, but all the sudden time tends to creep up. does that not still send that message? we are exiting. >> platts acknowledge there were we were this time last year, we were talking about -- let's acknowledge where we were "the star-ledger" we were talking about 2011. it spurred a movement on the part of the afghan government. i think it was a strategic blunder to put that 2011 marker out there in the december 1 speech. >> do you agree? >> i think it has worked against our interests. >> that is less than a strategic blunder. >> 12 months later, we are

talking about 2014. we were able to get nato allies to commit to 2014. the genesis of that 2014 state came from president karzai, from his second inaugural address. one of the questions people have about this report, is this time- driven or conditions-based? the reality is that certain time limits have been established not by us but by president karzai himself. he was full sovereignty by 2014. one of the things we tried to do in this paper is think about between 2011 and 2014, how do we transition to full sovereignty? this is not iraq, where they are sitting and $60 billion worth of oil. with respect to afghanistan, president karzai wants a long- term security relationship with the united states and its nato allies. >> most of the time. >> he does. >> were reported in "the washington post" yesterday he

said, i have three enemies and one of them is the united states. >> he has been explicit about the fact that the afghan government does want, and president karzai has been explicit about desiring a long- term security arrangement with the united states along lines of the force renegotiated with the iraqi government. that gets back to that ambiguity that is feared. when you talk about the people of afghanistan, they are people who suffered through 30 years of civil war. it is difficult to plan past six months. but when you are given the type of guarantee that, we will not leave in 2011. we will not abandon you. we will be there long term. hat is amenable oto u.s. interests? . >> the question i got, you americans will not abandon us again, are you?

i heard that in pakistan and in kabul. >> know the answer is not until 2014. >> that is the point of our report. there is a military future beyond 2014. if you are in the afghan national army, you will have a smaller american force beyond 2014. that is part of a commitment to the future. >> do you think you could get president obama to sign on to the constant, maybe not the numbers of 25,000-35,000, but the concept we will have a substantial presence in this advise and assist mission beyond 2014? >> i think we can make a very good case for that. i think from a lot of standpoint and from and in fact, a psychological impact on the government of pakistan and on afghanistan and on the taliban, it could be substantial pair of

>> we were talking mostly about the attitudes of the elites. if you are a regular afghan, you are trying to survive. he will head, you'll be passive, you'll say, i'm sticking out of this conflict. we need the afghan people to send their sons into the afghan security forces. you have to convince the people to make a choice, and make a choice towards the government of afghanistan. >> how do you do that? >> you do that by a long-term commitment to afghanistan. you do not do that by reinforcing this persistent -- >> you talk to them. you speak a language. >> i speak arabic. >> but you go out and play knock on the door journalist. do they say, i will do anything you want if you stay? >> no. there is a fear that david barno communicated that we will

leave. one of the things i did after spending 10 days in isaf, is i stayed 10 days in kabul and spoke to regular afghans, from businessmen to politicians to regular afghans, and there is a palpable fear that we are going to leave it, if not in 2011, then in 2014. >> when you were there, when you left the commander in 2005, tell me what the feeling was and what your intelligence friend told you. >> the war is a different war than what was in 2005. by the spring of 2005, we completed the first ever presidential election. 10.5 million afghans registered to vote. it was a serious security day, but the taliban could not effectively intervene. >> on an average day, the violence was 023.

-- zero to 3. what's now? 120 a day. >> it is a lot more peaceful than baghdad. over 66% of the violent attacks in afghanistan that occur each day have been in three districts butelmand, ken darandahar -- that is deceptive. >> the spring of 2005, the intelligence read on looking at the taliban was the chart and half the blocks were checked on the chart. by a year later, we saw a different taliban. i have a good friend who is an intelligence analyst in town. he said the u.s. won the war in afghanistan twice. we one of the first time by december, 2001, when the

taliban was driven out. we one of the second time by the end of 2004, when we had a successful transition of power to an elected government. with version 1.0 of hamid karzai. >> are you worried that it will look like we wanted a third time in 2014? >> how you build a consolidation of success? you need to work the afghan army out to a much more capable level that it is today. how to manage the transition is crucial. >> what is the big mistake that has been made from the beginning of the war in october, 2001, to this day? what is the biggest mistake anyone made? >> apart from the iraq war? >> let's set aside. >> that is legitimate. in 2003, you shipped a vast amount of u.s. military sources and diplomatic resources, develop resources over to another computer. and afghanistan becomes forgotten.

>> my vote would be lack of continuity in our u.s. leadership in afghanistan, that we have changed the military commanders. we are the sixth military commander in five years. no business or university could survive that turnover. >> when you went out to take command, how long did you meet with donald rumsfeld? >> ones are twice. >> what was on his mind? >> that was more discussion about whether or not i should take command. he looked to my military history. >> how is that possible? you are sending a commander out to fight a very important war, and it there is a discussion about, you have had all these jobs only for your or 18 months. how could you have any impact? >> that was more a critique of the military personnel system. >> it was a valid point. >> i find it strange. these are your marching orders.

i want you to report. what you think? give me a 60 day assessment. >> those are discussions that i would have had with the centcomm commander, which i did have. >> to you think it was a mistake when we turned command in afghanistan over to nato, and i think donald rumsfeld in 2005, did he not announce 2500 troops will be withdrawn from afghanistan? >> i think we sent the wrong message in 2005 twice. it was well ove 10% we had in country at the time. that was a message that the u.s. is moving for the texas. exits. the

brand usa had recognition. brand nato had none. >> how is karzai doing now? in the white house review, one of the question specifically is to him and the relations with him, the persistent distrust. how's karzai doing? you look like he did not have a ready answer. >> i do to a deg herree. gree. it is tough to think of high- level u.s. officials are developed a good reporter wicomickarzai. after 2008, we lose the ability to have a relationship of trust with karzai. he knows we are looking for alternatives in late 2008. you do not have to have this

orientalist conception of the conspiratorial mind to understand why president karzai might be offended when he sees the american ambassador showing up to opposition political rallies through the summer of 2009. we sent our ability to have a relationship -- we have sunk our ability to have a relationship based on trust. >> i have a lot of regard for president karzai. i joked earlier, it was karzai 1.0 earlier. he was a world renowned leader. >> there were talking in iraq about, can we get a karzai for iraq? >> now we have a very different karzai. a lot of it is our fault. it is cars are reacting to that continual revolving door of commanders -- is cars are reacting to the continual revolving door of commanders. >> you keep talking like best and they will send you back. you realize that.

hard question. what are the strengths and weaknesses of president obama as commander in chief in the war in afghanistan? >> i think it's difficult because of the domestic agenda that he inherited, largely against his own well. he did not ask for the financial crisis, for example. i think that if i look at the former president, who i did not vote for, compared to the current president who i did vote for, president bush took ownership of the war. one of the things that president obama has to do is take ownership of this war in afghanistan. >> and he never uses the words in public since the review last year -- victory and win. if you are a speechwriter for him, would you throw those

words in? >> i would, because i notice that even though i know he is trying to be careful about the language he uses, one of the things i admire about the president is the precision of language he implies, but the fact that he does not talk about winning this war is noted in kabul and in the rest of afghanistan. >> and in the field. you're a soldier out in the field, essentially risking your life all the time. is there that matchup with the commander-in-chief is a soulful, i am there with you, i want you to win? >> i am not going to pass judgment on the president from the junior officers of the military, but i think it was much appreciate it the president's most recent trip to bagram. that is the type of thing i would encourage occurred . >> on the positive side, he has

built a good relationship with the military. i think he is respected. when he came into office, he brought the right now look in terms of building bridges. i think his visit to dover, arlington, visits to troops -- has done hasama resonated very well. >> is it enough? he went to afghanistan recently for four hours. why not splurge and stay for eight or 12 or 16? it's a long trip. >> it is to andrew's second point. the president used the war is something he inherited, something he wants to get rid of her >> to do that he has to prevail. yes to ensure that our policy objectives are met. -- he has to ensure that our policy objectives are met. he needs to make sure that people under him direct that packard.

tolet's stop here and go questions. all we do that? gordon levy is doing the sound system. [laughter] there are not enough old people here. >> pick somebody. >> fine. here. >> thank you. >> you might share where you are from as well. >> stand up, if you would. >> from afghanistan. i like the report. it is comprehensive. it is detailed and it's a welcome report. i'll pick on two issues. one is the issue of sanctuaries. general petraeus publicly has communicated about this. in the report, you brush over this issue. >> of sanctuaries in pakistan.

>> the issue of the teltaliban having protection. the second point, what to do about it? it is broader than fighting the fight. it is related to pakistan's perception of india. >> if we do not do that, we can. >> the other is the issue of the afghan security forces. it is a good to have a goal to build the forces, but we should not be under the illusion that eventually the forces will be able to handle security that has a specific regional character to it. so they cannot protect the borders. we should be clear about what that really means. >> let me take the first one. i think we need to use the leverage we have of pakistan more effectively. if that means public, we have to go down that road, because the

realities are, and secretary gates heard this at his recent visit in afghanistan on the border, that the enemy comes right across the border regularly from pakistan and attacks their outpost. we have to do more to help pakistan to shut that down. and we have been somewhat reluctant to do that. we have a tremendous amount of leverage on pakistan with the amount of aid we are providing them. we need to use it better cared >> with respect to de afghan security forces, i do not think anyone is under the illusion that our train and equip mission will go away anytime soon. first off, over the past 24 months, we have started to take the trading of the afghan national army and the afghan national police seriously in a way that we have not in earlier phases of the conflict for. that training and equipping mission will continue going into the future.

>> the president last year rejected the military's request for trying to get to 400,000 police and army. and said we'd do a year by year quota. is that enough? >> that is what is taking place right now. it depends on how you will do your counterinsurgency ratios. it is not an exact science. i think you'll see that kept steadily grow. >> you say in the report, the security situation for remaining u.s. forces a couple of years from now, executing their drawdown, or later, those in residual force mode -- i love the terminology -- could become untenable. they will be at risk. you say that. >> there will be part of the security question. there is no question. the amount of that residual force that is devoted to make that are effective against the taliban.

>> question. where are the microphones? this lady here. >> hi. independent journalist. i wanted to ask you about the regional context. what are your recommendation in terms of improving u.s. relations with iran, say, try to work with the central asians to give afghanistan alternatives beyond pakistan in economic and trade terms of debts to you see a sign that that is happening? thank you. >> we talked to the importance of, at the national level, of using u.s. development aid to work on infrastructure development, to open up afghanistan to the potential of north-south, east-west trade. in last two weeks, they signed an agreement for a pipeline and to afghanistan. a huge economic potential there. there is tremendous transport

potential number-south and east- west as well. that has to be part of the economic issue as well. iran continues to play very much of a double game in afghanistan. they are helpful and hurtful. we see reports in the news of our men's and weaponry they are providing the-- armaments and weaponry they are providing the taliban. they are watching their interests and watching the u.s. involvement carefully. >> i will add to that. this report we every as part of a larger project we have, called "beyond afghanistan," to look at our larger regional interests going beyond 2011 it. >> where is the microphone? give it to this gentleman here. yes? >> here we go.

>> national defense university. you stated that the problem we have is pakistan's willingness to close the border. and their capability to do so. and second, karzai government. if we look three years from now and all of our wishes come true, we will then have an army of 240,000 people with 30,000 u.s. that is 275,000 trips that have to replace those that are there right now. -- troops that have to replace those that are there right now. what i s different? troop numbers are less? to quality is down. governance is not solved. pakistan is not solved. is that worth half a trillion dollars and 1500 lives? >> you have written very eloquently on some of the assumptions we have gone wrong afghanistan.ann

that assumes that the government's flat lines and the insurgency gets worse or continues. i do not think that will happen. >> why? what is the evidence to refute those assumptions? >> it first off, there have been important -- let me caveat by saying, there been important tactical gains in the south and east. we will not know whether those will hold beyond, and whether they will be semi permanent until next year, and because of the cyclical nature of the afghan conflict. it is well and good if you do well in the fall of 2009, but if the violence is up in 2010, you have the consolidated your games. we will have to first of see what kind of improvements they play. i am generally hopeful that we

will continue to improve, that we will continue to achieve tactical gains. where a word, and that comes across with what i said it is that we will not make enough progress with respect to sanctuaries. and that we are not going to make enough progress with respect to government, and what that leads to is insurgency that will generate itself. that is one of the many spoilers' we have outlined in this report. >> one of the things the report suggests we are trying to do that we have not attempted to do before is change the strategic the oculist. change the pakistani calculus. change president karzai's catalyst to make sure, how do i make sure i am positioned when the americans leave? those dynamic change, if you believe there is going to be a long-term american security

presence in that part of the world. that allows some of the other factors to move in our favor in terms of pakistani sanctuary, in terms of the taliban willing to negotiate and how it views the americans. >> in a practical sense, when president obama addresses the nation on thursday, he should do two things -- perhaps, step back from july, 2011, and say, i will not take out any. not 2500. i think you rightly identified that is a big mistake that was made in 2004-2005. and he should say, after 2014, we are going to have some substantial commitment. at least psychologically, that would send the right message. >> correct. >> i agree with the second one for next thursday's speech. the first one, i think he should make that comment next summer. he has to look at things then. this early report is such a midterm, incomplete on our

report card. somethinghere strange about the report, this review they are doing? he said the policy through a prolonged process wch i have outlined in detail. it has been in place for one year. essentially, he has asked to give a report card on his own strategy. i think the likelihood of himself, of him and give a "c" or a "bh" is not there. he will say what general petraeus and bob gates had been saying, we are making progress toward >> maybe not. i think it is and a dynamic discussion amongst various stakeholders. i think they are -- feeding into this. >> what's going to come out of his mouth will be basically optimistic. >> he may have been built his

policy a year ago. to not hit the ground full force until the first of september, three months ago -- it did not hit the ground full force until the first of september. >> the search it does reach its completion in october, when the 10th mountain division kids into kandahar. that is when the search began. -- the surge begins. >> i am an independent analyst and also a psychological operations nco. based on your recommendations on drawing down general-purpose forces and moving towards a special operations forces, if you could expand upon what your expectations are both dr. lee into the operational and technical levels, where we are going -- both doctrinally and operationally. >> i think the way it''d outline it, is from a forward

structure, we will shift 50% to be special forces. the guts of two special forces troops in afghanistan. i did not get down to footprinting them out. they would have a role in the east and the south in afghanistan. it would have a multifaceted role, much as they do today. an internal defense role, and the ability to advise the afghan security forces. one of the things that andrew may talk about that he saw out there is gaining traction in the country is a local security forces. special forces are a much larger complement -- and they will have a key role to play in that accelerant for the afghan security force structure that has been below the noise level in the united states. >> i spent some time with the general scott miller. one of the things you hear a lot

of the special forces officers talking about is that they are kind of dusting off the old defense manuals and really digging into that in a way they have not previously in afghanistan. the special forces who have been in afghanistan and have maybe ben too focused on direct action, and now i think you see a lot of our green beret brothers getting back to their institutional histories with internal defense, which the local security forces, a village stabilization operations. >> next question. this woman here. we only have one microphone. are you on some budget? [laughter] >> of course. >> i am with with the reserve officers association. speaking of budgets, with all of the intense talks about defense cuts not only here but also with numerous allies it seems concerning -- i have not heard

any talk about budgets and the effect it could have on afghanistan. our equipment is so overused and beat up, not only over there but also stateside to train. if we do have cuts, what will that mean, if they did not have their equipment? >> one of the things the report does know is that you will bring your force totals down from 100,000 to 25,000 over 3.5 years. that 25,000 is inside an active duty force of 1.2 to 1.4 million people so the demands of the u.s. force structure, the marines and the army in particular will go down to a level they have not seen since 2002 in afghanistan and across the theater. that by itself allows the forced to reset it to be recapitalized in the united states, because only a small component of the force will be committed in this long term strategy.

the special operations at -- the demands on them will grow in the shadow war that we will find ourselves in for the next 10 years. we might want to look at how large those forces are. >> do you think you understand president obama and his priorities and all of this? for my work on this, my take is, he looks at all of this is a larger project of finding money that can be shifted from, as he looks at, george bush's wars, and to the domestic problems we have here in a substantial way. he puts the cost a year in afghanistan $113 billion. a different number. are people really understand it and getting a grip on, mr. president, where is your mind on this? i just wonder -- there is a tone here of optimism.

that we can fix this, this is doable. we will shoot to 2014. you talk to people on the ground as i know you have, and there is not that level of confidence that this would be a straight shot to 2014. >> i disagree. this may be the culture of the u.s. military. you talk to soldiers and officers and noncommissioned officers, they are on it. their spirits are high ni some of it -- in some of the worst places in afghanistan i visited. >> in terms of optimistic about the ultimate mission and accomplishing the mission? is that new now? thwwo years ago? >> it depends. there are some units that went through a pretty towards a 2010 -- a pretty torrent in 2010.

i commend "the last patrol." i spend a day with another company on the ground in the same river valley where there is a tremendous amount of optimism, because they have seen the changes. again, that is at the tactical level. there is more reason for strategic pessimism as you go up. >> i was there traveling all around and there was nothing like a sense of optimism. there has been a bit of a change since 2005. >> here in uniform. >> dave buffalo, u.s. army. andrew, you talked about some of the challenges of reconciliation. what about the issue of reintegration at the local level, in a country that does not have a strong history of a strong central government. all politics is local.

this used to be a key aspect of where we need to go. targeting the accidental guerrilla for reintegration. >> that is a great question occurred thank you for asking. there is a difference. in afghanistan, we have been able to see over the course of 2010, a number of different reintegration opportunities present themselves. unfortunately, you look at the maps, they seem to be quite limited. we have not yet seen a lot of reintegration opportunities present themselves in the south and east. they that this is a little bit -- that is a little bit worrying. we have a good structure at headquarters in isaf to take advantage of those reintegration headquarters and within the government of afghanistan. >> is there a lot of field work being done, where reintegration teams are out there and that is their primary mission? >> when you submit an

opportunity, they are are now. we have to think strategically. maybe we do not want to go for reintegration in december, because you are allowing, come, reintegrate. -- rate for the winter and go back and fight for the summer -- we reintegrate for the winter and go back and fight for the summer. maybe we want to have a price on it. by the way, we want phone number is an names of the people who have facilitated the operation. >> this gentleman with a grey hair. >> i will take that as a complement. retired cold warrior. what to make of corruption and the poppy crop, both of which seem antithetical to what we would like to accomplish? >> that's a cancerous tumor on afghanistan. f

one of the good pieces of news is that h.r. macmasters in isaf headquarters has a serious bullet to shoot against the problem. the one of the bullets we have is the money that we're providing is fueling a considerable amount of the corruption. "x" has a chart on the issues of how much money you pour in the top of this bucket. >> let's take this as a generic international intervention. right here, you've got money. at the beginning of an intervention, your money is the highest cured your capacity at the beginning of an intervention, the government's ability to observe that money is at its lowest. the capacity goes up over time for your money goes down over

time. were you see that delta, that is where corruption takes place. there are number of ways in which we are feeding the problems in afghanistan with the amount of money we are putting in. we are creating a dynamic whereby the government and insurgent groups have the same interests. they need this war because they are making a lot of money. we can fix that by doing things more intelligently. one example -- any congressional aides in the audience? start taking notes now. if we have to roll it over, they would help us out to a tremendous degree. >> it depends, right now you have the incentive to spend it. you spend all the ammunition at the end of the fiscal year that you have not used in the previous fiscal year. the same inning and afghanistan. there's too much unsupervised

money in the system. if we can stop and think about the money and make sure it is accounted for and properly overseen, we could crackdown on the corruption to a large degree. that is built into our government helping to feed this problem. >> counter narcotics issue is partially the same corruption issue. the taliban is fueled more by narcotics dollars. take aoing to have to run on them, but i think eradication is the wrong answer. i thought that in 2005 and i think that today. we think about how we build the afghan economy in ways where you can get a guaranteed price and your product, transport to market, seed, and that is how you're not growing poppies. >> delayed ambassador holbrooke was working on that very hard.

agriculture does not matter. but it does, and it is a lifeline for the people there. >>, that is one of the things that the late ambassadors said when he came in a few years ago. >> the you have the microphone? >> i am with the young professionals and foreign policy. you mentioned before about pakistan and how we need to put more pressure on them to go after the safe havens from their side of the border. your reference some things that we did do. could you go more in depth into those, what specifically to put pressure on pakistan in an effective way? >> one is that we have both development aid and military aid going into pakistan, billions of dollars. that is had the same impact on

their government making -- government decision making. we have the condition that money better than we are today. did that legislation and a way that did not require explicit conditioning. that might be appropriate when that past. we have to get in and take a look at how we might use that money. >> is it fair to say that we have not have -- we have not found the formula of leveraging to do something from our point of view that makes total sense? you have got to stop, and as -- and as president obama decided secretly last year, safe havens are no longer acceptable. that is one thing to declare, but to do it is another thing. shouldn't there be -- as president obama said, the poison is pakistan.

>> this gets back to how the pakistanis define their national interest. they want to be prepared for happens next inside afghanistan, with regard to india and instability in the region. if we change said incentive structure by committing a long- term enduring presence out there, they might start worrying more about the taliban in the nation of pakistan. jordan i think that makes complete sense from the logical perspective. if you look get the very short history of pakistan whenever they come to a strategic forces in the road, more often than not, they take and -- they have taken a long -- the wrong for. did not have effective sovereignty over more. i wish we could trust that what does structure in place, they would make that decision in their interests.

>> and the civilian government and the military, the intelligence service. >> none of which are very integrated. >> exactly, and clearly the power is with the military and the intelligence service. >> and factions within them. >> on fortunately. over on the side here. raise your hand, right there. >> your reports have asked the american people to trust the military leadership that you are knowing what you're doing, that this is doable and things will be ok. my question -- isn't this getting over stages? we're still in a very serious aspect, it phase of this conflict which it is not all

clear that the u.s. military understands the situation in afghanistan well enough to make the sorts of claims. there's a lot of inconsistency over the last year and a half between what military leaders have said publicly about what needs to be done, what can be done, and then what we find out they actually do or what their actual policies are. a couple of examples. in the case of night raids by special operations forces, general mcchrystal in his report said this is the worst thing, the most serious problem in terms of aggravating the feelings of afghans against a foreign troop presence. he said it publicly as well in the early part of this year. then of course we find out that he increase the number of night raids, doubling or tripling, and

in the present year we see another doubling or tripling. >> civilian casualties. >> i am talking about night raids. and petreaus made it very clear before kandahar that the issue is governance. we need to put a high priority on that. it turns out that is not the highest priority at all. you find out that walid karzai's people are the ones that we've used to seize cities. there was a big ship that took place between -- contradictions between public and private. he changed his mind for reasons we do not understand. there are a lot of questions here about whether the military leadership really has the understanding that would be required to ask the american people to make this kind of commitment. >> that is a very good question.

>> this is not about choice of military leadership. every american needs to take an active role in making a judgment out there and they need to look beyond the military leadership. we of the u.s. ambassador and about -- and a thousand american civilians deeply involved in the civil part of the civil-military equation. it is not about listening to one individual out there. and as we described in the report, this is a problem whose nature changes on a regular basis. we have not helped this by continuing to change the actors we have had in charge of the problem. if we rotate commanders, we have had six commanders in the last 5.5 years, and four u.s. ambassadors in kabul. we have lacked continuity and, as i pointed out. but every american has still

looked at this and make judgments. i do not think it is a matter of trusting some large handover. getting into the details and understanding the dynamics, that is true of the people on question. >> question is not what the citizen can understand, he is asking, do we know what we're doing, and the root of the question is, do we have the intelligence, the ground intelligence about this tribe, that person, that faction and as of six months ago we did not have it in a way that made the most optimistic committed people -- >> right, right. there was an undertaking -- an undertone of antagonism with the military. is the military telling us the truth? we had a civilian and milk -- a

civilian and military infrastructure here in washington. this is not our rivalry. commanders on the ground in afghanistan, diplomats on the ground, however get the moral philosopher who developed the idea of a trolly problem. you are a trolley driver. you come upon another trolly. if you switch tracks, you will kill a maintenance crew. you have to make that very difficult decision on the ground. commanders on the ground, whether platoon leaders, officers, diplomats, field commanders, but they make those hard calls. with regard to night raids, they antagonize the populist but they have been devastating on the network. airstrikes cause civilian strategies. but in some cases they are the right answer in terms of protecting troops under fire. we trust our officers and diplomats and usaid officers to make the hard decisions at the

operational level. >> i think it is about intelligence, ground intelligence. what grade would you give the ground intelligence in afghanistan? if we went to an average battalion commander and put him on sodium pennant ball and said -- sodium pentothal and and ask him, tell us. >> i thought was quite poor 18 months ago. when i did the same thing last week and the week before, i found a dramatic improvement. i found it was quite sophisticated. quite honestly you will make these decisions that the tactical an operational level in an uncertain environment and with a certain amount of known as unknowns and the unknown unknowns. but you have to make these difficult decisions.

>> we have time from one more question. in the back here. either one. >> my question is to you, mr. bop. compared to the pentagon how much influence do you think ambassador holbrooke said on the decision and afghanistan? did he work well with president obama on this issue? >> i am going to pass on the answer of that and give you a copy of my book. you'll not have to read it. [laughter] >> a quick question and perhaps a good last question. what about negotiations? a great personage of the afghan population would be in favor, even if it meant returning taliban to government positions.

>> two days ago i sat in a living room in kabul and listen to the most well-respected civilian research in afghanistan speak. one very pointedly told me that you have to negotiate with the taliban. they're people that you can negotiate with. and they vary in next researchers said, no, that is not true. i don't think did you can negotiate. but that is the topic on which a lot of reasonable people disagree. there was a letter published a few days ago, prominent academics and experts and afghanistan, telling president obama that he should not negotiate with the insurgency. send that letter to the isi to other leaders in afghanistan. it is a lot like telling president obama takes the

israeli-puzzle tinian crisis -- it is a lot like telling president obama, kicks the israeli-palestinian crisis. that.'t that >> in my view, if you're going to negotiate with an objective of trying to achieve some if not most of your objectives, then you have to have leverage in negotiations. right now the u.s. a year ago, six months ago had little to no leverage in that discussion. we should also keep in mind as americans that negotiations are not of microwaves board. negotiations take years. though negotiations i can think of have been up to five yearlong efforts. wear your leverage is on the

battlefield makes an immense difference. we have not gotten quite to the point to having the leverage that we need yet. >> he believed that he did in did if he ever got that leverage. then the ability of the genius negotiator for the bosnia chords showed that he could solve that problem. anyway, thanks for a brief report. you taught me that it was the cissies the said the wars are fought for three reasons, fear, honor, and interest. i think to address all of those in your report. thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> the white house says that a

yearlong review of the afghanistan war will show that the u.s. can begin withdrawing troops in july. predator obama is scheduled to speak on this topic on thursday. in a few moments, a forum on drug use among teenagers. the affect of weekly -- the effect of wikileaks on journalism and public policy. after that, an interview with richard holbrooke. and then a discussion of u.s.- china relations. on "washington journal," we will talk about u.s. strategy in afghanistan within member of the house armed services committee. but democratic representative and of new jersey will take your calls about the tax cut bill working its way is through congress. we will be joined by nor of

volkow, head of the national institute on drug abuse. "washington journal" is live on washington -- on c-span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> students, parents, and teachers, what this studentcam competition injury a week away, we are offering their seminars with between 8:00 p.m. -- 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. eastern. document redentcam competition is open to middle and high school students. the deadline is january 20. for more affirmation, go to studentcam.org. >> according to the national institute on drug abuse, the debate on legalizing marijuana has had considerable fate on young people's view of the drug.

marijuana use among adolescents continues to increase. this is about an hour. >> good morning. thank you for greater in the snow to come here this morning, or the ice, or water for you were faced with. i am the communique said she'd for the institute -- chief. thank you for coming. the monitoring the future survey is in its 36 the year, and once again, it was conducted by our colleagues at the university of michigan. overall, there were 46,482 students from 396 public and private schools in the eighth, 10th, and 12th grades.

the survey has measured drug, alcohol, and cigarette use, and related attitudes in 12th graders nationwide. in 1991, eighth and 10th graders were added. the survey measures drug use in several different ways, primarily lifetime, past year, past month, and in some cases, a daily use. we have speakers, then we will open it up for questions. how would like to introduce gil kerlikowske, director of the white house office of drug control policy, dr. lloyd johnson, who has led the team conducting the survey, and finally, i will like to introduce my boss, dr. nora volkow, who has overseen eight surveys, and she will tell you about this year's findings.

>> good morning. i want to welcome you all, and i want to thank particularly mr. gil kerlikowske for being here, and for the support for the fight against the use of drugs in young people and everyone. i also want to thank dr. lloyd johnston, the principal instigator. this is the eighth time that i have stand -- stood in front of you to address the significance of the findings. looking at it, and try to identify what is the most salient, it is clearly though recognition that we are seeing a significant increase in the use of marijuana. most particularly relevant are the increases observed in daily use. this increase is quite large,

more than 10%. it is particularly relevant because daily use of marijuana is likely to result in more adverse effects. also, it is likely to be associated in 25%, to 50%, with marijuana dependents. another important factor is that the use of marijuana across all of the estimators that we have -- that is daily marijuana use, monthly, or exposure during the year, is high. all of these indicators are on eighth graders. there are the youngest. and this is relevant because the increase in the indicators are over 10% tariff for each one of them. secondly, young people are particularly from rubble to the adverse effects of drugs.

-- vulnerable to the adverse effects of drugs. we know from studies that the younger age of initiation the greater likelihood of dependence. studies has the chicks studies have shown that those exposed to marijuana before -- studies have shown that those exposed before the age of 17 are likely see the relied on other drugs. we are seeing an increase on daily news, which is the at most adverse effect -- daily news, which is the most adverse effect. the group targeted the most is eighth graders, the ones that are most vulnerable. if you look at from the perspective of our country, what does it mean, and why this is happening, where one can only speculate, but we have predicted there will be increases in

marijuana consumption in surveys because of the significant attention that the potential use of marijuana as a medication has generated. we cannot stop to what extent this has led to the misconception that marijuana will not be so detrimental. we are seeing a decrease in the number of teenagers receiving -- perceiving regular marijuana use as harmful. psychotherapeutic deduced -- abuse continues to be a problem. we have seen a decrease in the exposure to bright again among 12th graders, which has been stabilized. however, the prevalence rates

for the other cycle therapeutics continue to be high. -- psychotherapeutic drugs continue to be high. with respect to the alcohol and cigarettes, with cigarettes we are seeing a stabilization in the decreases we have been seeing, which are significant and positive signs because cigarette smoking has adverse effects. in many incidents, it leads to the use of other substances. those are stabilizing. in terms of alcohol, we are seeing decreases in the prevalence rates of binge drinking and heavy alcohol consumption, and even though they're not how large, they are significant -- not large, there are significant. how does the panorama look?

i can only say that the increases we are observing in marijuana use and need to be taken seriously. they were taken by the household survey. marijuana, where one takes the notion that it has long lasting effect, we unequivocally know that it has long-term effects. alcohol use will be effecting educational achievements. we look behind and say we are relying on this generation to adapt to the future. do we want to jeopardize the achievements by exposure to illicit drugs, including marijuana? my answer, is, of course, that there would be a loss for the adolescents exposed, and a loss for all of us. thank you very much.

>> thank you. it is a pleasure to be here with all of you. it is my second monitoring the future, and it is also a great pleasure to be with lloyd. the information is disturbing, as dr. volkow said, regarding use, particularly eighth graders. we know that the earlier someone starts, the greater the difficulties that they are going to have, and the marijuana numbers are particularly troubling. there is some good news in the survey, as dr. "said, but i would rather concentrate on the bad news, the used use. we have seen particularly brought the election and during that time proposition 19 was being talked about brought the country, even though there were a number of propositions and

initiatives in other states, proposition 19 as it was called in california, about legalization, continued to dominate the news. the other part that is patently false about all of this is calling smoked marijuana madison is absolutely incorrect and sends a terrible message. i have actually heard that message when i met with a group of high-school students in oregon. they talked to me about wanting to make sure they do well in school, that their grades would be good, and that they would go on to college. in a state that was calling smoked marijuana madison, they said this was giving them the wrong message. i could not agree more. we have seen some positive outcomes in the study. that should give us a little bit

of hope that if we concentrate with parents and trusted caregivers, and those adults who really aren't meaningful in people's lives -- really are meaningful in young people's lives, and give them information on how to send a message about good choices, and i just drugs, but not using nicotine, and not engaging in underage drinking, and things like nutrition and health care, young people listen to those trust the messengers -- parents, coaches, faith-based communities, neighborhood associations, etc. they take those suggestions seriously. for the people that oftentimes think young people are tone deaf to them, that is actually incorrect. they listened to the trust the

messengers, and we can make a difference if we work at it, concentrate on this, and we could clearly make a difference. right now, we are not being responsible adults by telling people that smoke mel -- smoked marijuana is madison, when, in fact, it is not. -- madison, when, in fact, it is not. thank you. >> good morning. thank you very much for coming. i see a lot of familiar faces. some of you have followed this study for a long time. it has been going on for a long time. he is a pleasure to join director kerlikowske, and dr. volkow in releasing these founding digit findings. -- findings.

in the spring, we gave health ministers questionnaires, confidential and anonymous, to some 46,000 students around the country. they are located in roughly 400 secondary schools. because of the size, we get a high degree of accuracy both in terms of levels and changes. these are students in eighth, 10, and 12th grades, and we separately sample each of those grades. they are both in public and private schools. this very well covered our youth population. if there are several findings i think that will be important. you have already heard some of them. first, marijuana use has continued in increase, and that includes daily years. ecstasy is beginning to make a comeback after being out of

favor for about five years. cigarette smoking is no longer declining, and there is evidence that is beginning to go up again. alcohol use continues its -- term decline, which is gradual, but nevertheless has reached historically low levels. madison very good man's. -- that is some very good news. marijuana use has been going on for three years, still is not great in size, but contrast to what was happening 10 years prior, one we had a steady decline. across the three grades, there is a significant change in the proportion of teens who say their use in the past year has risen from 21.5% to about 24.5%.

that is a significant increase overall. today, about one in seven eighth graders indicate marijuana use in the past year, when more than one in four 10th graders, and more than one in three of our high school seniors. the greatest concern to me is that daily marijuana use is rising. those of you who are older might recall that back in the late 1970's we actually got to a point in our history where one in about every 11 high-school seniors was a daily marijuana user. today, it is about one in 16. we are not as bad as we were, but we are still going in the wrong direction. daily use, we find about 1% of eighth graders, 3% of 10th graders, and 6% of 12th graders

indicate that on 20 or more locations in the past 30 days they smoked marijuana. the propulsion that see marijuana use as dangers has been declining in recent years, including this year, and that is usually a predictor of what will happen to use in the coming years. this is something we saw coming, and we think will keep coming. it is what we call perceived risk -- the% that say they see danger to the user in using the drug. the disapproval has already -- also started to decline among teens, and goes synchronous lead with use. reported availability and more kids say they could get it easily if they wanted.

but return to the ecstasy story. as you might recall, ecstasy declined vary sharply in the late 1990's, a peak in 2001, and then plummeted as young people came to see it as much more dangerous than their predecessors. proceeds rest played an important role. use has remained relatively low for several years. unfortunately, you never full he put it behind you. there's also the next generation of students that come along. and are more susceptible to try and get themselves. so, what happened was that ecstasy began to increase in the last couple of years, and it increased significantly this year, so that now, about two

0.5% of a trader said used in the last eight years.

>> smoking among teenagers was dropping by large proportions in fact, the prior 30 days smoking rate has fallen from a high in the mid-1990's by about two thirds. it is a fairly enculturated behavior. these are very consequential changes that will make a big difference in the life of a

person to be aware of it, the great secondary school students, say that they prefer to date people that do not smoke. that seems to be an important message for kids to get. not only does smoking not make you more attractive to the opposite sex, as the industry has been trying to tell us for some decades, that it actually makes you less attractive to the great majority of the opposite sex. that seems to be something kids can relate to. not all of the news is bad. you will be glad to now alcohol

use is declining, as has the use of a couple of illicit drugs. nora mentioned some of those. while gradual, the proportion of teenagers using alcohol has been in decline for quite some years. past month use has declined since 1980. except for a time in the mid- 1990's, when we had when i called a relapse, alcohol use went up with it, but before then, and since then, we have had a steady decline. the decline was fairly steep in the early years from 1980 until 1980 -- 92,. nevertheless 30-day prevalence among 12th graders, for example, whom we have back to 1980 was 72%, in 1980, and

today, it is 41%. binge drinking, having five or more drinks in a row, has gone from a high of 41% in 1980, the highest we ever measured, down to 23% today. there has been an improvement in not only drinking, but in drunkenness, and drunk driving. the death and highway statistics have been improving significantly, and kids have played a role. in 2010, all three grades showed further declines in both measures, drinking and binge drinking, and these were significant for the three gained -- gray's combined. the net effect is today, we have the lowest proportion of young people drinking and the life of the study. that is good news. another drug that has been showing some decline, if that

was not significant this year, but continues the pattern is cocaine. cocaine was a major drug of problem levels in the 1980's. it made some come back in the 1990's when we had there relapse, today it is in decline. it has been very gradually for several years, three or four. only about 3% of high-school seniors say they have used cocaine in the past year. that is considerably lower than it was in the 1990's, and much lower than it was in the 1980's. like a den, pay strong -- a strong narcotic drug also declined significantly, but in -- in 12th graders. i cannot explain why it does happen, but it has happened.

it is always possible there is displaced by another drug, but we hope that is not what is going on. many drugs held steady. i will not talk about them in any detail -- boxy cotton, still used by 5% of high-school seniors, methamphetamines, a particular series and devastating drug, where we have seen a substantial increase, but to date it has leveled off. amphetamines in general, including ritalin, are fairly steady. federal is more widely used now than ritalin. crack cocaine, a serious drug in the 1980's, it is said very low levels. several of the club drugs that get a great deal of attention, those are all at quite low

levels. anabolic steroid use is down quite a bit from where it was in the peak rate of around two thousand. it remains low. it is partly because these drugs have now been scheduled. lsd is very low now, and remains low. the inhalants, i am glad to say, have not taken off. we have warned in the last several press conferences that young people are seen inhalants does not dangerous to the user, which is incorrect. there has been a long time since there was an anti-inhalants program, the mid-1990s, which was effected, by the way, but there has not been any further erosion in that belief. the risk has gone up a little

bit. cough and cold medicines are of use by young people. that is quite dangerous. i am seemed little systematic change in that. fortunately, that is not growing, but nevertheless, 7% of high-school seniors say they have used these drugs for the purpose of getting high in the last year. in summary, there are three drugs decreasing in use, marijuana, texas, and cigarettes. three that are showing some decline -- alcohol, cocaine, as reflected in, and many that are holding steady including amphetamines and inhalants and lsd. thank you.

>> thank you to our speakers. we will take questions in just a minute. a little bit of housekeeping. our nida press chief, if you have any questions after the press conference, stephanie will be happy to link you up with them. where is a rough idea of? he is here with director kerlikowske. we will open it up to questions in a minute, but i wanted to make a couple of points about what -- what nida is doing to reach out to teens. we have a very robust website right now. we have a teen blog that is becoming very popular, and we do at least two entries a week. it is a steady increase in users. we just completed our fourth

annual drug facts chat day where we sit up for the scientists to chat with teenagers from schools all over the country. if you are interested in finding out what kids are asking about drugs in an anonymous format, it is very interesting to see what they are asking, and we also post the responses. we just completed our first ever national drugs facts week, which encourages community is to link teenagers what scientists so teenagers can find out scientifically accurate information. there is so much misinformation about drugs out there that this is our effort to put science into the middle of the conversation. more than 100 community is registered events this year. we hope it will grow.

finally come away partner for the first time with a grammy foundation with a music video contest, and dozens of kids entered music video is. they have a panel of musical artists who judged. our scientists reviewed the entries for scientific accuracy. you can find the winners on our website and the grammy 365 website, and also on the above the influence website, the website director kerlikowske's folks put together. all of that information is in your press packet. we have this new booklet. this is unusual. but we went to local high schools. we showed them images. we have long discussions with diverse groups of teenagers to put this together, and the

intermission and here is the most popular questions asked. i wanted to make you aware of those initiatives. of course, i am here to answer any questions about those afterwards. so, we can open it up for questions for our speakers. yes. please identify yourself, your name, and who you work for. >> i work for a a.m. media. i see in your topics in brief, the one-page handout on prescription drug abuse issued this month, when asked about how they were obtained for non- medical use, 59% of 12th graders said they were given to them by a friend or relative. the number of attaining them over the internet was negligible. what is being done to reach the friends and relatives guilty of these crimes? >> who would like to answer

that? >> there are two things going on that i think have been helpful. one is the drug enforcement administration sponsored a take back day with 4000 sites that took back over 120 tons of prescription drugs. it was not only getting people to clean out their medicine cabinets in an environmentally safe way, but it was also agitating had people on what exists in the medicine cabinet. another group of people called drug free communities, 740 around the country, that are funded by the federal government for a very small amount of money. they are truly grassroot individuals who have partnered up to educate people, particularly young people, about the dangers of prescription drugs. frankly, when they think of the drugs as prescriptions, they do not realize the dangers that

occur. there are a number of other things in the national drug control strategy that talk specifically about prescription drugs, but those are two things i wanted to highlight. >> also, early next year, and nida will be launching a series of initiatives to reach out to kids on the prescription drug issue. please be on the lookout for that. other questions? >> richard daley. just a follow-up, there is legislation that would actually establish or allowed the existing state and local drug take back programs to operate on an ongoing basis in retrieving controlled substances, which right now, legally, they cannot accept. it has been described as a major problem, and the reason why there are tenants all of the --

cabinets all over the country. is there any push by the administration to get that legislation through? >> the legislation was passed by both houses of congress, and signed by the president. that is actually very good news. it allows the attorney general to work to rewrite the rules, so that these things can be disposed of both in an environmentally safe manner, and in a much more convenient way than what we are doing right now. >> there is another point we need to consider. but did you look at the prescription -- the number of prescription of psychotherapeutic pain medications and similar medications? there have been significant increases. it tenfold increases over the past 20 years.

for pain medications, it has been four-fold increases. we might be over-medicating, or many of these prescriptions are being diverted. the recognition that there is a significant increase in the product and the distribution of these medications brings to life the need to educate health care community is to the proper dispensing of these medications, the need to educate the public about the notion that these medications, while they have very specific benefits, when your live outside the medical indications, can be as harmful as illicit substances this is one of the recent -- substances. if this is one of the reasons why these drugs are favored by young people, the myth that there are safer. finally, having a better way of surveying prescriptions among

the physicians and dentists across the -- across states. that will provide us with structured to allow us to control the over-production of these benefit -- medications. >> in this regard, i wanted to mention a recommendation i made in a recent editorial in a journal in the field. physicians and dentists might think about actually writing the prescriptions in a way that they give a lower number of doses, especially for pain medication, than is currently the practice. then, they give you a week's worth after you have had a tooth extraction. you might not use any, or you use one or two, then there is a bottle sitting on the shelf, either to be used by that person

later for reasons it was not intended for, or to be given, or stolen by someone else. there is a over-prescription. it does not mean they need to write a prescription for a shorter time, they could every noels, but the initial model could have a smaller number of -- initial bottle could get a smaller number of doses. 30% of kids who say they are misusing narcotics say they are using their own prescriptions. most are either getting it from friends, or buying it from friends, who may have had over- prescription. there is something that the medical and dental field could do that would help. it is certainly not anyone's intention to give long-term support, but i do not think many users meet the duration they are initially prescribed. >> and molly walker.

what you are up there, do you guys know if it is from wisdom teeth procedures? that seems like a common procedure in high school. >> do you know down to that level? >> i do not know the specifics. i just know from personal experience, and the experience of other family members, that they often get longer duration prescriptions than necessary. you can keep the duration as long, but it will just require someone to go back and refill the prescription if they needed. my guess is that 80% will never go back and we fill the prescription. >> to that specific question, we are calling a group of efforts -- experts to figure out what the prescription practices were.

to start with, and there are medical specialties that account for most of the prescriptions which are dentists and emergency physicians. among the dentists, the first perception was related to your question, extracting the wisdom teeth, but then what became evident in a more thorough analysis was that many of those prescriptions could not be accounted for by the needs of wisdom tooth extraction, and many of these prescriptions were given for several days, where there was the understanding that two or three days would be more than sufficient. there was also the disclosure that for many of these procedures they could be utilized instead.

one of the action items we are pushing toward is the proper education and standardization of the management of pain. it is particularly urgent to do it for adolescents and children because they are the most vulnerable. >> you mentioned that a lot of people or some people have a perception that marijuana does not have long-term effects. could you go over the long-term effects? >> this has been a discussion back and forth between those that say it will produce -- westing changes, and others say they do not. -- long lasting changes, and others say they do not. there are studies that can go from evaluating narrow psychological tests, and then evaluating long after you've stopped taking it to bring images -- brain images.

there is data, and indeed from imaging studies, clearly that there are changes in the function of the human brain when exposed chronically and repeatedly. the extent to which those changes are not reimbursable -- reversible, at this point, is not clear. when you wage when i say to put it in the most conservative perspective, it is factual but it is interfering with memory and learning. it is factual it will interfere all with motor coordination. therefore, it will impair your ability to learn, and the effect will be longer-lasting than when you are intoxicated because it stimulates in your body parts that act like a reservoir. if you are driving under the influence of marijuana, it is likely to significantly increase your risk of accident.

while we recognize alcohol contributes to a significant number of accidents, this has been easy to track because it is easy to quantify. it is much harder on marijuana. when the studies have been done, they have shown that a significant percentage of occur under the influence of marijuana, and a combination of marijuana and alcohol is also quite frequent. >> i have a question for mr. kerlikowske. you set ambitious goals some months ago, less than one year ago, a law reducing the use of drugs among young people. how does this report impact that goal? will you have a new strategy? >> the strategy that president obama released in may must be updated every year, and the

strategy is an unbelievably good strategy, because it is very balanced and it is comprehensive. it approaches the drug problem, not just as a criminal justice problem, but also as a public- health problem. the president has made it clear that preventing young people from reducing drugs and reducing our demand would be incredibly helpful to people here and throughout the world, a particularly our neighbors in mexico. that is why in his budget request the ss for and over -- and increase in funding and treatment funding because we know treatment works. we have ambitious goals. frankly, dr. johnson's report, and the survey from the drug use household survey did not come as a s