not only should this be the force uigher to, but we go to a 3.5 years from now, which provides a space to build a afghan security forces to take on the mission. we would not recommend this strategy for this summer or next summer. we recommended going to this by 2014. >> in a blog today, someone said, when you step back and look at the war in afghanistan, the united states does not have a real interest in afghanistan. what is your answer to that in terms of this report? >> i think we are very clear about what we think our interests are. i think we have a lot of interest in central asia. we have only to vital interests, meaning those interests by which we should continue to expand blood and treasure. one has to do with al qaeda and associated movements. >> which is in pakistan. >> for the most part in

pakistan. >> almost 99%. >> absolutely. >> we can set that on aside. >> afghanistan is not an island. as part of our region. the region is what we talk about in the report. is not about the nation's state property of afghanistan. the neighboring region has a tremendous influence on what will happen in the united states. >> first off, the durand line was the great wall pakistan -- then we could talk about them being to separate interests. but we can't. along the border, it is extremely fluid. the second interest as to do with the stability of pakistan. pakistan has nuclear weapons. it is a fragile state. we do not want to see a pakistan that collapses. that will have horrible implications for regional

security. >> isn't somebody going to look back at this war at some point and i daresay, wait a minute. the united states had 100,000 troops in afghanistan, and you look at all the rhetoric and documentation, all the discussion it is to defeat, dismantle al qaeda. you say the border is porous, but al qaeda is not moving into afghanistan. they are staying in pakistan. it is key taliban -- the taliban fighters that are moving into afghanistan occurred >. >> is al qaeda not in afghanistan because we of troops there? >> you know the answer. the argument, if i may interrupt is do you really need 100,000 troops for them to come in, and vice president joe biden argued, look, if we control the

intelligence, control the air space, have sufficient special operations forces, we can make sure al qaeda does not come back into afghanistan. i am trying to think like president bush on what would joe sixpack think of this. there seems to be a disconnect, no? >> when you look at what we are trying to do and afghanistan as expressed by president obama in the march, 2009, white paper and the december 1, 2009 speech in west point. it is minimal -- to deny, disrupt and to dismantle al qaeda. it is pretty minimal. at the same time, there is the assumption that an order for you to do that in afghanistan you have to create or you have to go down some pretty maximize means. you have to build a certain key

institutions in afghanistan. >> nation-building, right? >> institution building. >> that is a shift in language. president obama was clear in his orders. this is not nation-building. if you switch the language to well, we are institution building, is that not sneaky? do you think a law professor in obama might get you. >> i learned in this book come the one thing" that obama said that did make sense was doing counterinsurgency operations to buy time it to build up afghan national security forces. that makes sense. that is what we are trying to do. to make afghanistan as resilient against those transnational terror groups before september 11, 2001. >> the taliban exists out there.

al qaeda and the taliban has sympathetic missions. the reality is that we have to look at the problems realistically. we cannot simply look at the al qaeda problems and then look at the taliban problems. they overlap each other. we have to have a strategy that takes into account all of those. >> do you worry we are buying into this idea of transition to easily? you talk to military people and a lot of them will say, and were saying last year passionately, you cannot do war on a timetable. as soon as you start using the language of transition, does that not send a message, we're out of here? is that not a problem that we had? >> one of the most important points this report makes is that

the u.s. as to dispel that uncertainty. we have to commit to a long-term strategy and military commitment. as a stable one in afghanistan. today if you are in pakistan and a national security adviser or and afghan adviser to president karzai, you are operating under the assumption that the u.s. is leaving. the clock is running out. we have to dispel that notion. >> nato said 2014. from 2010, that looks far off, but all the sudden time tends to creep up. does that not still send that message? we are exiting. >> platts acknowledge there were we were this time last year, we were talking about -- let's acknowledge where we were "the star-ledger" we were talking about 2011. it spurred a movement on the part of the afghan government. i think it was a strategic blunder to put that 2011 marker out there in the december 1

speech. >> do you agree? >> i think it has worked against our interests. >> that is less than a strategic blunder. >> 12 months later, we are talking about 2014. we were able to get nato allies to commit to 2014. the genesis of that 2014 state came from president karzai, from his second inaugural address. one of the questions people have about this report, is this time- driven or conditions-based? the reality is that certain time limits have been established not by us but by president karzai himself. he was full sovereignty by 2014. one of the things we tried to do in this paper is think about between 2011 and 2014, how do we transition to full sovereignty? this is not iraq, where they are sitting and $60 billion worth of oil. with respect to afghanistan, president karzai wants a long-

term security relationship with the united states and its nato allies. >> most of the time. >> he does. >> were reported in "the washington post" yesterday he said, i have three enemies and one of them is the united states. >> he has been explicit about the fact that the afghan government does want, and president karzai has been explicit about desiring a long- term security arrangement with the united states along lines of the force renegotiated with the iraqi government. that gets back to that ambiguity that is feared. when you talk about the people of afghanistan, they are people who suffered through 30 years of civil war. it is difficult to plan past six months. but when you are given the type of guarantee that, we will not leave in 2011. we will not abandon you. we will be there long term. hat is amenable oto u.s.

interests? . >> the question i got, you americans will not abandon us again, are you? i heard that in pakistan and in kabul. >> know the answer is not until 2014. >> that is the point of our report. there is a military future beyond 2014. if you are in the afghan national army, you will have a smaller american force beyond 2014. that is part of a commitment to the future. >> do you think you could get president obama to sign on to the constant, maybe not the numbers of 25,000-35,000, but the concept we will have a substantial presence in this advise and assist mission beyond 2014? >> i think we can make a very good case for that. i think from a lot of standpoint

and from and in fact, a psychological impact on the government of pakistan and on afghanistan and on the taliban, it could be substantial pair of >> we were talking mostly about the attitudes of the elites. if you are a regular afghan, you are trying to survive. he will head, you'll be passive, you'll say, i'm sticking out of this conflict. we need the afghan people to send their sons into the afghan security forces. you have to convince the people to make a choice, and make a choice towards the government of afghanistan. >> how do you do that? >> you do that by a long-term commitment to afghanistan. you do not do that by reinforcing this persistent -- >> you talk to them. you speak a language. >> i speak arabic. >> but you go out and play

knock on the door journalist. do they say, i will do anything you want if you stay? >> no. there is a fear that david barno communicated that we will leave. one of the things i did after spending 10 days in isaf, is i stayed 10 days in kabul and spoke to regular afghans, from businessmen to politicians to regular afghans, and there is a palpable fear that we are going to leave it, if not in 2011, then in 2014. >> when you were there, when you left the commander in 2005, tell me what the feeling was and what your intelligence friend told you. >> the war is a different war than what was in 2005. by the spring of 2005, we completed the first ever presidential election. 10.5 million afghans registered

to vote. it was a serious security day, but the taliban could not effectively intervene. >> on an average day, the violence was 023. -- zero to 3. what's now? 120 a day. >> it is a lot more peaceful than baghdad. over 66% of the violent attacks in afghanistan that occur each day have been in three districts butelmand, ken darandahar -- that is deceptive. >> the spring of 2005, the intelligence read on looking at the taliban was the chart and half the blocks were checked on the chart.

by a year later, we saw a different taliban. i have a good friend who is an intelligence analyst in town. he said the u.s. won the war in afghanistan twice. we one of the first time by december, 2001, when the taliban was driven out. we one of the second time by the end of 2004, when we had a successful transition of power to an elected government. with version 1.0 of hamid karzai. >> are you worried that it will look like we wanted a third time in 2014? >> how you build a consolidation of success? you need to work the afghan army out to a much more capable level that it is today. how to manage the transition is crucial. >> what is the big mistake that has been made from the beginning of the war in october, 2001, to this day? what is the biggest mistake anyone made? >> apart from the iraq war? >> let's set aside. >> that is legitimate.

in 2003, you shipped a vast amount of u.s. military sources and diplomatic resources, develop resources over to another computer. and afghanistan becomes forgotten. >> my vote would be lack of continuity in our u.s. leadership in afghanistan, that we have changed the military commanders. we are the sixth military commander in five years. no business or university could survive that turnover. >> when you went out to take command, how long did you meet with donald rumsfeld? >> ones are twice. >> what was on his mind? >> that was more discussion about whether or not i should take command. he looked to my military history. >> how is that possible? you are sending a commander out to fight a very important war, and it there is a discussion about, you have had all these jobs only for your or 18 months.

how could you have any impact? >> that was more a critique of the military personnel system. >> it was a valid point. >> i find it strange. these are your marching orders. i want you to report. what you think? give me a 60 day assessment. >> those are discussions that i would have had with the centcomm commander, which i did have. >> to you think it was a mistake when we turned command in afghanistan over to nato, and i think donald rumsfeld in 2005, did he not announce 2500 troops will be withdrawn from afghanistan? >> i think we sent the wrong message in 2005 twice.

it was well ove 10% we had in country at the time. that was a message that the u.s. is moving for the texas. exits. the brand usa had recognition. brand nato had none. >> how is karzai doing now? in the white house review, one of the question specifically is to him and the relations with him, the persistent distrust. how's karzai doing? you look like he did not have a ready answer. >> i do to a deg herree. gree. it is tough to think of high- level u.s. officials are developed a good reporter wicomickarzai.

after 2008, we lose the ability to have a relationship of trust with karzai. he knows we are looking for alternatives in late 2008. you do not have to have this orientalist conception of the conspiratorial mind to understand why president karzai might be offended when he sees the american ambassador showing up to opposition political rallies through the summer of 2009. we sent our ability to have a relationship -- we have sunk our ability to have a relationship based on trust. >> i have a lot of regard for president karzai. i joked earlier, it was karzai 1.0 earlier. he was a world renowned leader. >> there were talking in iraq about, can we get a karzai for iraq? >> now we have a very different karzai. a lot of it is our fault.

it is cars are reacting to that continual revolving door of commanders -- is cars are reacting to the continual revolving door of commanders. >> you keep talking like best and they will send you back. you realize that. hard question. what are the strengths and weaknesses of president obama as commander in chief in the war in afghanistan? >> i think it's difficult because of the domestic agenda that he inherited, largely against his own well. he did not ask for the financial crisis, for example. i think that if i look at the former president, who i did not vote for, compared to the current president who i did vote for, president bush took ownership of the war. one of the things that president obama has to do is take

ownership of this war in afghanistan. >> and he never uses the words in public since the review last year -- victory and win. if you are a speechwriter for him, would you throw those words in? >> i would, because i notice that even though i know he is trying to be careful about the language he uses, one of the things i admire about the president is the precision of language he implies, but the fact that he does not talk about winning this war is noted in kabul and in the rest of afghanistan. >> and in the field. you're a soldier out in the field, essentially risking your life all the time. is there that matchup with the commander-in-chief is a soulful, i am there with you, i want you to win? >> i am not going to pass judgment on the president from the junior officers of the military, but i think it was

much appreciate it the president's most recent trip to bagram. that is the type of thing i would encourage occurred . >> on the positive side, he has built a good relationship with the military. i think he is respected. when he came into office, he brought the right now look in terms of building bridges. i think his visit to dover, arlington, visits to troops -- has done hasama resonated very well. >> is it enough? he went to afghanistan recently for four hours. why not splurge and stay for eight or 12 or 16? it's a long trip. >> it is to andrew's second point. the president used the war is something he inherited, something he wants to get rid of her >> to do that he has to prevail.

yes to ensure that our policy objectives are met. -- he has to ensure that our policy objectives are met. he needs to make sure that people under him direct that packard. tolet's stop here and go questions. all we do that? gordon levy is doing the sound system. [laughter] there are not enough old people here. >> pick somebody. >> fine. here. >> thank you. >> you might share where you are from as well. >> stand up, if you would. >> from afghanistan. i like the report. it is comprehensive. it is detailed and it's a welcome report. i'll pick on two issues. one is the issue of sanctuaries.

general petraeus publicly has communicated about this. in the report, you brush over this issue. >> of sanctuaries in pakistan. >> the issue of the teltaliban having protection. the second point, what to do about it? it is broader than fighting the fight. it is related to pakistan's perception of india. >> if we do not do that, we can. >> the other is the issue of the afghan security forces. it is a good to have a goal to build the forces, but we should not be under the illusion that eventually the forces will be able to handle security that has a specific regional character to it. so they cannot protect the borders. we should be clear about what

that really means. >> let me take the first one. i think we need to use the leverage we have of pakistan more effectively. if that means public, we have to go down that road, because the realities are, and secretary gates heard this at his recent visit in afghanistan on the border, that the enemy comes right across the border regularly from pakistan and attacks their outpost. we have to do more to help pakistan to shut that down. and we have been somewhat reluctant to do that. we have a tremendous amount of leverage on pakistan with the amount of aid we are providing them. we need to use it better cared >> with respect to de afghan security forces, i do not think anyone is under the illusion that our train and equip mission will go away anytime soon. first off, over the past 24

months, we have started to take the trading of the afghan national army and the afghan national police seriously in a way that we have not in earlier phases of the conflict for. that training and equipping mission will continue going into the future. >> the president last year rejected the military's request for trying to get to 400,000 police and army. and said we'd do a year by year quota. is that enough? >> that is what is taking place right now. it depends on how you will do your counterinsurgency ratios. it is not an exact science. i think you'll see that kept steadily grow. >> you say in the report, the security situation for remaining u.s. forces a couple of years from now, executing their drawdown, or later, those in residual force mode -- i love the terminology -- could become

untenable. they will be at risk. you say that. >> there will be part of the security question. there is no question. the amount of that residual force that is devoted to make that are effective against the taliban. >> question. where are the microphones? this lady here. >> hi. independent journalist. i wanted to ask you about the regional context. what are your recommendation in terms of improving u.s. relations with iran, say, try to work with the central asians to give afghanistan alternatives beyond pakistan in economic and trade terms of debts to you see a sign that that is happening? thank you. >> we talked to the importance of, at the national level, of using u.s. development aid to work on infrastructure development, to open up afghanistan to the potential of

north-south, east-west trade. in last two weeks, they signed an agreement for a pipeline and to afghanistan. a huge economic potential there. there is tremendous transport potential number-south and east- west as well. that has to be part of the economic issue as well. iran continues to play very much of a double game in afghanistan. they are helpful and hurtful. we see reports in the news of our men's and weaponry they are providing the-- armaments and weaponry they are providing the taliban. they are watching their interests and watching the u.s. involvement carefully. >> i will add to that. this report we every as part of a larger project we have, called "beyond afghanistan," to look at our larger regional

interests going beyond 2011 it. >> where is the microphone? give it to this gentleman here. yes? >> here we go. >> national defense university. you stated that the problem we have is pakistan's willingness to close the border. and their capability to do so. and second, karzai government. if we look three years from now and all of our wishes come true, we will then have an army of 240,000 people with 30,000 u.s. that is 275,000 trips that have to replace those that are there right now. -- troops that have to replace those that are there right now. what i s different? troop numbers are less? to quality is down. governance is not solved.

pakistan is not solved. is that worth half a trillion dollars and 1500 lives? >> you have written very eloquently on some of the assumptions we have gone wrong afghanistan.ann that assumes that the government's flat lines and the insurgency gets worse or continues. i do not think that will happen. >> why? what is the evidence to refute those assumptions? >> it first off, there have been important -- let me caveat by saying, there been important tactical gains in the south and east. we will not know whether those will hold beyond, and whether they will be semi permanent until next year, and because of the cyclical nature of the afghan conflict. it is well and good if you do well in the fall of 2009, but if

the violence is up in 2010, you have the consolidated your games. we will have to first of see what kind of improvements they play. i am generally hopeful that we will continue to improve, that we will continue to achieve tactical gains. where a word, and that comes across with what i said it is that we will not make enough progress with respect to sanctuaries. and that we are not going to make enough progress with respect to government, and what that leads to is insurgency that will generate itself. that is one of the many spoilers' we have outlined in this report. >> one of the things the report suggests we are trying to do that we have not attempted to do before is change the strategic the oculist. change the pakistani calculus. change president karzai's catalyst to make sure, how do i

make sure i am positioned when the americans leave? those dynamic change, if you believe there is going to be a long-term american security presence in that part of the world. that allows some of the other factors to move in our favor in terms of pakistani sanctuary, in terms of the taliban willing to negotiate and how it views the americans. >> in a practical sense, when president obama addresses the nation on thursday, he should do two things -- perhaps, step back from july, 2011, and say, i will not take out any. not 2500. i think you rightly identified that is a big mistake that was made in 2004-2005. and he should say, after 2014, we are going to have some substantial commitment. at least psychologically, that would send the right message.

>> correct. >> i agree with the second one for next thursday's speech. the first one, i think he should make that comment next summer. he has to look at things then. this early report is such a midterm, incomplete on our report card. somethinghere strange about the report, this review they are doing? he said the policy through a prolonged process which i have outlined in detail. it has been in place for one year. essentially, he has asked to give a report card on his own strategy. i think the likelihood of himself, of him and give a "c" or a "bh" is not there. he will say what general petraeus and bob gates had been saying, we are making progress toward >> maybe not. i think it is and a dynamic discussion amongst various stakeholders. i think they are -- feeding into

this. >> what's going to come out of his mouth will be basically optimistic. >> he may have been built his policy a year ago. to not hit the ground full force until the first of september, three months ago -- it did not hit the ground full force until the first of september. >> the search it does reach its completion in october, when the 10th mountain division kids into kandahar. that is when the search began. -- the surge begins. >> i am an independent analyst and also a psychological operations nco. based on your recommendations on drawing down general-purpose forces and moving towards a special operations forces, if you could expand upon what your expectations are both dr. lee into the operational and technical levels, where we are going -- both doctrinally and

operationally. >> i think the way it''d outline it, is from a forward structure, we will shift 50% to be special forces. the guts of two special forces troops in afghanistan. i did not get down to footprinting them out. they would have a role in the east and the south in afghanistan. it would have a multifaceted role, much as they do today. an internal defense role, and the ability to advise the afghan security forces. one of the things that andrew may talk about that he saw out there is gaining traction in the country is a local security forces. special forces are a much

larger complement -- and they will have a key role to play in that accelerant for the afghan security force structure that has been below the noise level in the united states. >> i spent some time with the general scott miller. one of the things you hear a lot of the special forces officers talking about is that they are kind of dusting off the old defense manuals and really digging into that in a way they have not previously in afghanistan. the special forces who have been in afghanistan and have maybe ben too focused on direct action, and now i think you see a lot of our green beret brothers getting back to their institutional histories with internal defense, which the local security forces, a village stabilization operations. >> next question. this woman here. we only have one microphone. are you on some budget? [laughter] >> of course. >> i am with with the reserve

officers association. speaking of budgets, with all of the intense talks about defense cuts not only here but also with numerous allies it seems concerning -- i have not heard any talk about budgets and the effect it could have on afghanistan. our equipment is so overused and beat up, not only over there but also stateside to train. if we do have cuts, what will that mean, if they did not have their equipment? >> one of the things the report does know is that you will bring your force totals down from 100,000 to 25,000 over 3.5 years. that 25,000 is inside an active duty force of 1.2 to 1.4 million people so the demands of the u.s. force structure, the marines and the army in particular will go down to a level they have not seen since 2002 in afghanistan and across

the theater. that by itself allows the forced to reset it to be recapitalized in the united states, because only a small component of the force will be committed in this long term strategy. the special operations at -- the demands on them will grow in the shadow war that we will find ourselves in for the next 10 years. we might want to look at how large those forces are. >> do you think you understand president obama and his priorities and all of this? for my work on this, my take is, he looks at all of this is a larger project of finding money that can be shifted from, as he looks at, george bush's wars, and to the domestic problems we have here in a substantial way. he puts the cost a year in afghanistan $113 billion. a different number.

are people really understand it and getting a grip on, mr. president, where is your mind on this? i just wonder -- there is a tone here of optimism. that we can fix this, this is doable. we will shoot to 2014. you talk to people on the ground as i know you have, and there is not that level of confidence that this would be a straight shot to 2014. >> i disagree. this may be the culture of the u.s. military. you talk to soldiers and officers and noncommissioned officers, they are on it. their spirits are high ni some of it -- in some of the worst places in afghanistan i visited. >> in terms of optimistic about the ultimate mission and accomplishing the mission? is that new now? thwwo years ago?

>> it depends. there are some units that went through a pretty towards a 2010 -- a pretty torrent in 2010. i commend "the last patrol." i spend a day with another company on the ground in the same river valley where there is a tremendous amount of optimism, because they have seen the changes. again, that is at the tactical level. there is more reason for strategic pessimism as you go up. >> i was there traveling all around and there was nothing like a sense of optimism. there has been a bit of a change since 2005. >> here in uniform. >> dave buffalo, u.s. army. andrew, you talked about some of

the challenges of reconciliation. what about the issue of reintegration at the local level, in a country that does not have a strong history of a strong central government. all politics is local. this used to be a key aspect of where we need to go. targeting the accidental guerrilla for reintegration. >> that is a great question occurred thank you for asking. there is a difference. in afghanistan, we have been able to see over the course of 2010, a number of different reintegration opportunities present themselves. unfortunately, you look at the maps, they seem to be quite limited. we have not yet seen a lot of reintegration opportunities present themselves in the south and east. they that this is a little bit -- that is a little bit worrying. we have a good structure at headquarters in isaf to take advantage of those reintegration

headquarters and within the government of afghanistan. >> is there a lot of field work being done, where reintegration teams are out there and that is their primary mission? >> when you submit an opportunity, they are are now. we have to think strategically. maybe we do not want to go for reintegration in december, because you are allowing, come, reintegrate. -- rate for the winter and go back and fight for the summer -- we reintegrate for the winter and go back and fight for the summer. maybe we want to have a price on it. by the way, we want phone number is an names of the people who have facilitated the operation. >> this gentleman with a grey hair. >> i will take that as a complement. retired cold warrior. what to make of corruption and

the poppy crop, both of which seem antithetical to what we would like to accomplish? >> that's a cancerous tumor on afghanistan. f one of the good pieces of news is that h.r. macmasters in isaf headquarters has a serious bullet to shoot against the problem. the one of the bullets we have is the money that we're providing is fueling a considerable amount of the corruption. "x" has a chart on the issues of how much money you pour in the top of this bucket. >> let's take this as a generic international intervention. right here, you've got money. at the beginning of an

intervention, your money is the highest cured your capacity at the beginning of an intervention, the government's ability to observe that money is at its lowest. the capacity goes up over time for your money goes down over time. were you see that delta, that is where corruption takes place. there are number of ways in which we are feeding the problems in afghanistan with the amount of money we are putting in. we are creating a dynamic whereby the government and insurgent groups have the same interests. they need this war because they are making a lot of money. we can fix that by doing things more intelligently. one example -- any congressional aides in the audience? start taking notes now. if we have to roll it over, they would help us out to a tremendous degree. >> it depends, right now you

have the incentive to spend it. you spend all the ammunition at the end of the fiscal year that you have not used in the previous fiscal year. the same inning and afghanistan. there's too much unsupervised money in the system. if we can stop and think about the money and make sure it is accounted for and properly overseen, we could crackdown on the corruption to a large degree. that is built into our government helping to feed this problem. >> counter narcotics issue is partially the same corruption issue. the taliban is fueled more by narcotics dollars. take aoing to have to run on them, but i think eradication is the wrong answer. i thought that in 2005 and i think that today. we think about how we build the afghan economy in ways where you can get a guaranteed price and

your product, transport to market, seed, and that is how you're not growing poppies. >> delayed ambassador holbrooke was working on that very hard. agriculture does not matter. but it does, and it is a lifeline for the people there. >>, that is one of the things that the late ambassadors said when he came in a few years ago. >> the you have the microphone? >> i am with the young professionals and foreign policy. you mentioned before about pakistan and how we need to put more pressure on them to go after the safe havens from their side of the border. your reference some things that we did do. could you go more in depth into those, what specifically to put

pressure on pakistan in an effective way? >> one is that we have both development aid and military aid going into pakistan, billions of dollars. that is had the same impact on their government making -- government decision making. we have the condition that money better than we are today. did that legislation and a way that did not require explicit conditioning. that might be appropriate when that past. we have to get in and take a look at how we might use that money. >> is it fair to say that we have not have -- we have not found the formula of leveraging to do something from our point of view that makes total sense? you have got to stop, and as -- and as president obama decided secretly last year, safe havens

are no longer acceptable. that is one thing to declare, but to do it is another thing. shouldn't there be -- as president obama said, the poison is pakistan. >> this gets back to how the pakistanis define their national interest. they want to be prepared for happens next inside afghanistan, with regard to india and instability in the region. if we change said incentive structure by committing a long- term enduring presence out there, they might start worrying more about the taliban in the nation of pakistan. jordan i think that makes complete sense from the logical perspective. if you look get the very short history of pakistan whenever they come to a strategic forces in the road, more often than not, they take and -- they have taken a long -- the wrong for.

did not have effective sovereignty over more. i wish we could trust that what does structure in place, they would make that decision in their interests. >> and the civilian government and the military, the intelligence service. >> none of which are very integrated. >> exactly, and clearly the power is with the military and the intelligence service. >> and factions within them. >> on fortunately. over on the side here. raise your hand, right there. >> your reports have asked the american people to trust the military leadership that you are knowing what you're doing, that this is doable and things will be ok.

my question -- isn't this getting over stages? we're still in a very serious aspect, it phase of this conflict which it is not all clear that the u.s. military understands the situation in afghanistan well enough to make the sorts of claims. there's a lot of inconsistency over the last year and a half between what military leaders have said publicly about what needs to be done, what can be done, and then what we find out they actually do or what their actual policies are. a couple of examples. in the case of night raids by special operations forces, general mcchrystal in his report said this is the worst thing, the most serious problem in terms of aggravating the

feelings of afghans against a foreign troop presence. he said it publicly as well in the early part of this year. then of course we find out that he increase the number of night raids, doubling or tripling, and in the present year we see another doubling or tripling. >> civilian casualties. >> i am talking about night raids. and petreaus made it very clear before kandahar that the issue is governance. we need to put a high priority on that. it turns out that is not the highest priority at all. you find out that walid karzai's people are the ones that we've used to seize cities. there was a big ship that took place between -- contradictions between public and private. he changed his mind for reasons we do not understand.

there are a lot of questions here about whether the military leadership really has the understanding that would be required to ask the american people to make this kind of commitment. >> that is a very good question. >> this is not about choice of military leadership. every american needs to take an active role in making a judgment out there and they need to look beyond the military leadership. we of the u.s. ambassador and about -- and a thousand american civilians deeply involved in the civil part of the civil-military equation. it is not about listening to one individual out there. and as we described in the report, this is a problem whose nature changes on a regular basis. we have not helped this by continuing to change the actors we have had in charge of the problem. if we rotate commanders, we have had six commanders in the last

5.5 years, and four u.s. ambassadors in kabul. we have lacked continuity and, as i pointed out. but every american has still looked at this and make judgments. i do not think it is a matter of trusting some large handover. getting into the details and understanding the dynamics, that is true of the people on question. >> question is not what the citizen can understand, he is asking, do we know what we're doing, and the root of the question is, do we have the intelligence, the ground intelligence about this tribe, that person, that faction and as of six months ago we did not have it in a way that made the most optimistic committed people -- >> right, right. there was an undertaking -- an

undertone of antagonism with the military. is the military telling us the truth? we had a civilian and milk -- a civilian and military infrastructure here in washington. this is not our rivalry. commanders on the ground in afghanistan, diplomats on the ground, however get the moral philosopher who developed the idea of a trolly problem. you are a trolley driver. you come upon another trolly. if you switch tracks, you will kill a maintenance crew. you have to make that very difficult decision on the ground. commanders on the ground, whether platoon leaders, officers, diplomats, field commanders, but they make those hard calls. with regard to night raids, they antagonize the populist but they have been devastating on the network.

airstrikes cause civilian strategies. but in some cases they are the right answer in terms of protecting troops under fire. we trust our officers and diplomats and usaid officers to make the hard decisions at the operational level. >> i think it is about intelligence, ground intelligence. what grade would you give the ground intelligence in afghanistan? if we went to an average battalion commander and put him on sodium pennant ball and said -- sodium pentothal and and ask him, tell us. >> i thought was quite poor 18 months ago. when i did the same thing last week and the week before, i found a dramatic improvement. i found it was quite sophisticated. quite honestly you will make these decisions that the

tactical an operational level in an uncertain environment and with a certain amount of known as unknowns and the unknown unknowns. but you have to make these difficult decisions. >> we have time from one more question. in the back here. either one. >> my question is to you, mr. bop. compared to the pentagon how much influence do you think ambassador holbrooke said on the decision and afghanistan? did he work well with president obama on this issue? >> i am going to pass on the answer of that and give you a copy of my book. you'll not have to read it. [laughter] >> a quick question and perhaps

a good last question. what about negotiations? a great personage of the afghan population would be in favor, even if it meant returning taliban to government positions. >> two days ago i sat in a living room in kabul and listen to the most well-respected civilian research in afghanistan speak. one very pointedly told me that you have to negotiate with the taliban. they're people that you can negotiate with. and they vary in next researchers said, no, that is not true. i don't think did you can negotiate. but that is the topic on which a lot of reasonable people disagree. there was a letter published a few days ago, prominent academics and experts and afghanistan, telling president obama that he should not negotiate with the insurgency.

send that letter to the isi to other leaders in afghanistan. it is a lot like telling president obama takes the israeli-puzzle tinian crisis -- it is a lot like telling president obama, kicks the israeli-palestinian crisis. that.'t that >> in my view, if you're going to negotiate with an objective of trying to achieve some if not most of your objectives, then you have to have leverage in negotiations. right now the u.s. a year ago, six months ago had little to no leverage in that discussion. we should also keep in mind as americans that negotiations are not of microwaves board.

negotiations take years. though negotiations i can think of have been up to five yearlong efforts. wear your leverage is on the battlefield makes an immense difference. we have not gotten quite to the point to having the leverage that we need yet. >> he believed that he did in did if he ever got that leverage. then the ability of the genius negotiator for the bosnia chords showed that he could solve that problem. anyway, thanks for a brief report. you taught me that it was the cissies the said the wars are fought for three reasons, fear, honor, and interest. i think to address all of those in your report. thank you. [applause]

host c-span3 c-span2 [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> president obama is scheduled to speak about the accords on thursday. in a few moments, today's headlines and your calls live on "washington journal." and the house of representatives is back in session at 10:00 a.m. eastern. there may be a tax cut bill and spending for fiscal year 2011.

in about 45 minutes, we will talk about u.s. strategy in afghanistan with a member of the house armed services committee, colorado republican mike coffman. 8:30, representatives bill pascrell and new jersey will take your calls about the tax cut bill. we will be joined by nora volkow, head of the national institute on drug abuse. the latest survey was released yesterday. "washington journal" is next. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] host: it promises to be quite the active day and the nation's capital as of this congressional lame duck session continues. one headline says the tax bill is stumbling toward a final vote. vote. it