wide missile arenal in the region. the aim has then to convince america's regional allies to cozy up to them. as the w. director policy

planning said last year, as the current war has dragged on for long time without a decisive outcome, this aggravates its strategic thursday and iv maneuvers on other issues. terms for growth is no surprise, but it is something that washington has downplayed for a number of years. you get more for your you on the new get for your dollar. their ability to expand has focused on espionage a search and gaining a advanced technologies from the thousands of commercial and manufacturers that produce their wares in china. what is clear is that the capabilities that are being developed are significantly beyond what most people would reasonably assume china needs for its immediate consumption. all of this is bearing fruit.

we have seen the headlines of the past few years. china is still finder surprised washington. -- china's stealth fighter surprised washington. we do not know if they work. we do not know if they do not work. they show evidence of intent and china's trend to close the capability gap with the united states. to be clear, despite china's

soviet-found military remains inefficient. there are a number of structural flaws. breathtakings commercial rise suggests that it would be a significant mistake to assume that it would not get its military act together, perhaps sooner rather than later. china's defense minister has said that china will continue to press ahead in its advance of military capabilities. it will also respond to security challenges or threats by cutting off trade but also the supply of vital minerals. the united states is beginning to respond accordingly, but it is doing so cautiously to play it needed to hot nor too cold. the most important announcement

that secretary inmates -- the secretary gates made was penetrating bomber. i do not think the decision was a coincidence. but it is evidence of superdelegates reorienting to think that their weapons, including nuclear arms, will deny a sexist to their air, sea, land, space, and cyber domain. i think that china would have gotten away with it had it not been for the bolder and more aggressive stance chinese officials have taken in the past years. it is grounded in the view that china is the sending and the u.s. is declining. there is a misunderstanding of several u.s. initiatives from the new administration's good- faith out of reach in the beginning to please beijing to keep u.s. debt.

they did not approve fighters going to taiwan and they did not approve meeting with the dali lama. i think china's view of the united states is summed up by the reaction to the defense review which headlines described as "u.s. arrogance replaced by strategic contraction." by listening to their own rhetoric, the chinese leadership, some say because they are surrounded by superfast, dramatically over played before last year and the high progressive stance on core issues, bullying smaller powers, and sweeping territorial claims, and prompting them to strike ties with washington, something that american officials have been all too eager to take a vantage of. america has increased its diplomatic and military outreach in the region.

interestingly, regional states that have held long standing animosities are forging closer relations. obviously, north korea is the driver. they recognize that china is the fundamental element of those discussions. the challenges that china's military is being led out on a longer lease during a time of political transition during which nobody wants to appear to -- once to appeared weak. this comes as the rest of the world deals with north korea. china does not see eye with the u.s. on the spirit leaves -- on this.

its view of controlling the spread of nuclear technology is, i think, are different. it depends on whether those technologies will be used directly against them. it is significantly different from other -- from how other countries you it. as americans, we see as an assistant security guarantors'. as an open society, we do not see our selves as a threat. but china is a nation with a long memory, a historic superpower with internal strife and external meddling, including the western powers. that has bred a curious blend of areas, paranoia, territorial ambition, and concern of losing face. we have to be ready for a nation that, as it grows, will become more difficult as it becomes more assertive. we have to be attentive,

clearheaded, and smart on how to engage china. on the part of u.s. leaders, unfortunate, anything else would embolden beijing, which may show weakness rather than prudence. i think secretary gates, the surveillance missions is another issue. i think the secretary gates has it right. thank you very much. >> let's go back to 2008. let's do a review of where china was. they had a policy toward the region that was spectacularly successful. it showed that china's economic

rise presented opportunities for them economically. it became the no. 1 trading partner, even for u.s. allies such as japan, south korea, and taiwan. with a new administration coming into office, it was determined to not make the mistakes of their predecessors, not spin to the campaign, talking tough to china, and spent the first year in office repairing the damage. the obama administration was careful about what they said in the campaign and thought she teasingly about how they wanted to engage china. the focus was recognizing china's importance in solving regional and global problems. you had administration coming into office the reached out its hand, wanted china to play a

greater regional role and their role with global institutions, was willing to facilitate china's entry and expansion of chinese voting rights in some of these institutions. and wanted to make china a cooperative partner on a range of issues that is a -- -- issues. that is a good position to be in. if you look at where we are today, a lot of that has been since thrown away. the essential question is why? what explains that. the initial peace with the global financial crisis, which panicked chinese leaders -- it's all their exports plummet. they sought employment -- they saw their exports plummet. they sought employment damaged by it. as the crisis went on, they saw

they were recovering faster than the u.s. and europe and maybe this was not such a great threat as they once feared. instead, they saw a shift in the balance of power that had been occurring over time, perhaps accelerating as a result of the stresses. that is a key factor. but the key thing is that, even as the obama administration reached out a hand and offered cooperation and engagement, the proper response was some suspicion. why are they doing this? why are they offering to expand cooperation to give as a greater voice in instinet -- in international institutions? it must be to tie is down, to make is make commitments that will threaten our economic growth, to buy into supporting a u.s.-dominated system. i think there was a huge opportunity. the u.s. government -- the chinese government that that is suspicious and decided not to

pursue it. instead, we have seen the balance of power within the region and globally shift in their favor. this became the opportunity to take more verbal positions on a number of issues and take action, especially within the region that reflected this perception. about the first year, the year 2009, it was focused on this. how china defines problems, they are always responded defensively to what other countries are doing. one of the earliest manifestations of this was in the south china sea where a number of southeast asian countries with claims to these islands made a declaration under the un convention. they did it for their own particular reasons. there was a deadline in may 2009. but there was a concerted u.s.- led organized effort to challenge chinese claims in the

south china sea and the east china sea. that is how it was framed in the debate and prompted what they characterized as a defensive response and what everybody else in the region sees as a much more assertive policy to reinforce and protect those claims. part of this was the issue is the impeccable in the south china sea when they harass of the u.s. navy ship operating there. but there has been a host of these kinds of things. the key is the resistance and the balance of power had shifted. there were no longer so bound by u.s. demand. they did not have to be so attentive to what other countries thought. that has prompted a shift in policy that has cost a lot of concern in the region and caused a lot of countries in the region to reach out to the u.s. and encourage the u.s. to play a more active role to balance the chinese policy. another way of thinking of that

is that, 10 years or 15 years ago, a very skillful diplomacy, listening to what countries wanted, tried to frame their proposals in light of that has been replaced by a tone deaf, assertive diplomacy focused on narrow chinese interests, such as maritime claims in the south china sea, bullying other countries, sometimes publicly, sometimes in diplomatic regions military commentators certain ways.n a i think a lot of those games from the last decade have gone away. how does that relate to the u.s.-china secretary's trip? if the u.s. was encouraging china to do more, we must need china more. that reflected a shift in the balance of power and the balance of need and now china could be the commander if they wanted it

-- it could try to set the agenda and press the u.s. on concessions on issues, such as taiwan, try to get restrictions on where u.s. navy and u.s. air force ships operated in of hours -- in waters and airspace and that they have the power to push these issue and have the leverage to try to get concessions. but if you look at the relationship, they have not gotten very much. they have not gotten anything on taiwan. what we saw were shifts in timing so that the president did not meet with the dollar llama in one trip, but he did meet inth -- with the dali lama bu one trip, but he did meet with him and another. it has created a lot of tension in the region, a lot of concern in the u.s.. as we have seen, some of the

modernization efforts pay off, assertiveness coupled with the abilities payoff and what does that mean for the u.s.? i think that is the context in which strategic dialogue between the u.s. and china is important. you have a china that is now a big player, certainly within the region and sometimes at a global level, whose nuclear capabilities, whose space and counter-based abilities, it's expanding cable operations, whose cyber capabilities are things that affect regional military balances and directly affect the u.s.. that has prompted an effort to take china more seriously. it does give them face in some ways. but it also potentially makes them a target. this is a key question. from the u.s. side, we view military to military dialogue

and as an understanding on these issues, reducing suspicions, finding ways to operate in proximity to each other without damage or without risks of accidents or incidents. and so we see this dialogue is really important for working out a new strategic relationship where china is a stronger global player. that is partly behind the call for a strategic stability dialogue to address some of these issues. i think they have been reluctant to do this. if you look at their willingness to cut off talks over nuclear arms sales, schedules were full and those kinds of issues, it shows that there is still a reluctance to engage seriously on this issue.

will the secretary's visit change this? i do not think so if you look at the timing of it, it is kind of squeeze been. it is important to the chinese to have this as it happened before the summit between hu and obama. there is the importance of talking about the strategic issues. but the chinese side has willingly -- has been cutting the sock. it would have been a u.s. talking point and focused a lot on that coverage. as it is, they have squeezed in before the summit yet without time for any agreements reached during the visit to really be implemented or to have the

summit visit be a kind of follow-up "how are we doing on this?" i do not see a fundamental shift in the suspicion that they have or the view that the military- to-military situation is a practical lover that they can use to try to get concessions on the issues that they care about. the dialogue will continue to be difficult. our first to talk about our ships and planes operate in proximity to each other, sending military -- maritime communications' agreement -- they have not been unsuccessful. they have -- if they're viewed as not operating in our space, there's not a problem. there is an exclusive economic zone that is part of the global

commons. i think the secretary's visit is an opportunity to talk about these things. i hope that a working group will lay the groundwork for more substantive dialogue. there are some positive signs that is a consequence of china's rare power. they phyllis laurel then maybe we're willing to talk about. there are some signs of that of the last six months or so. i do not see big breakthroughs and i think this issue of how the u.s. and a china that is alonger militarily get with each other. >> thank you. james. >> all of you have been the third position of a three-person channel. there really is no point in preparing a thing. [laughter]

you have about 15 minutes to react to the first peoples comments and then your off to the races. i think they have done a great job of setting a share to a teen center. i want to look at the operational goals for the visit. if you look at the recent speech by secretary schiffer and the statement by the chinese and extrapolate out of it for the future as to whether any of the water in these will hold. with many of the pioneers and practitioners here in the room, i think i will be brief so that we can have a good dialogue about it. i would like to reemphasize -- when we talk about our six principles and are four goals and are three characteristics and are key points from mike's speech, there is a continuous

theme, which is the why it matters question. we think -- until we have gotten incredibly lucky last 10 years and we have not had a very significant accident or collision of one sort or another with the chinese military that has resulted in significant loss of life. i believe we had the hostage crisis in 2001 and then we had the recent unpleasantness, but all of those -- all of you in the room know that it could have gone a lot more sideways than it did and it could of been a lot more dangerous. the dilemma for me is -- i still don't have any confidence in the protocols, if any, whether it is crisis management or strategic communications, which seem to have fallen apart and not work as we would have liked in every single one of those crises. that would be very as look for a

situation, especially if it involves tie wanted because the new have a triangular escalation. so i do not worry about -- something that signals to the national defence global commission. i do not worry about that as much as i do another 83 or another impeccable where things go much worse than they did in the past. people buy. we float search and rescue forces to the area. and the net result of that is that we are out there trekking

each other with radar. no one is entering a hot line. years of dedicated contacts and the military region and the national staff cannot match the phone and we are in quite a mess. you only need to look of the incidents that were the mentioned earlier. the u.s. senate and taxable -- impeccable is a good example. if he had to exited in getting that grappling one on the cable that has thousands of pressure on it, he would have either been ripped in half, driving under the water and drowned, so he is very lucky that he had such a bad name in my view. when a chinese submarine ran into the thing behind the john mccain, that could have easily turn into what we read in "lineman's block." bluff."d man's

whether in fact the chinese navy had asked the philippine government for a prior military transit to the philippines, exclusive economic zone come in that incident, i believe that point, we went immediately to lunch. why it matters for me is very much -- as china's capabilities have expanded, what they define as normal patrol in behavior, perhaps without having to ask mother may add to the civilian leadership has expanded both in intensity and in tempo and in geographic scope. we are increasingly rubbing up against one another's military forces on a regular basis. even after the edt crisis -- the e p three crisis, they're still having arguments about sovereignty and our stalemated on the issue on whether the u.s. will conduct a strategic

operations in international waters off of china's coast. that is why it matters. point no. 2, when you look at the rhetoric and the guiding principles that we have articulated before secretary gates is visit, you're struck by the phrase "sustained, reliable, and continued military-to- military relations." embedded within that statement, imbedded within those words is our frustration fulfilled by the situation being held hostage by the crisis. when you look at the three -- get the preconditions but the jenny said that before for what they regard as a basis for a stable relationship, in other words, the cessation of all arms

sales to taiwan, the cessation of the strategic reconnaissance operations in international waters off of china's coast, as well as the third principle, which, remind me -- the 2001 ndaa that restrains the activities of the military-to- military relationship. i see two of them not changing, probably not the third, depending on the composition of the congress. the chinese have automatically built been an escape hatch that allows them to the right back to the pattern of cancelling and shutting down the military-to- military in times of crisis. in terms of disingenuousness or in genesis of both sides going into this visit, i think that the tone from the chinese side has been very tepid.

they argue it -- there being clearly forced to do this by the civilian masters where clearly trying to check that box to create the proper atmosphere for presidents visits later in the month. i think those were chosen with great care. they were not conditions chosen in my view that can easily be removed as obstacles. i think you do that in negotiations where you're not interested in making significant gains. the areas that we highlighted as our areas of greatest interest by name in these discussions are also the areas we that are least likely for cooperation with the chinese. i don't think we did that to create a straw man that led to the failure provide it we derive our interest in their growing nuclear capabilities, other cyber capabilities. i would also add any satellite capabilities our strategic

discussion appeared they are the issues that concern us most. once again, i am drawn to the distinctions of strategic discussions with the soviets in which we did talk about the fundamental areas because of parity and other things, the continuing chinese view of symmetry in those areas which is a major obstacle to us. what it actually highlights is the breakdown in that reciprocal dialogue and the failure to get the commander struck, to visit omaha. i am sure they had a great discussion about recreation sure they visited

a lot of chapels and everything else. but it was not the dialogue that we wanted. when the boss man why he was so reluctant to come, was it because he was not comfortable with foreigners? i said, fundamentally meant, what i have read from their strategic doctrine, they have nothing left to say. they give us the "we will never strike first" briefing. if he came, he would have to come up with something different and we have heard that before. he is not prepared to say anything further on that issue and does not want to pull himself in a position where they fail to deliver the most basic context. on the cyber side, as much as i would like to have to have -- like to have a cyber dialogue, the plausible deniability that lies at the heart of computer network operations always gives them an out.

i spent two hours this morning dealing with china origins and cyber intrusions. maybe that is just in my cyber -- in my front will bring out. but the slipperiness of cyber, it is a very difficult issue with which to have concrete discussions, even when you can have one on the nuclear one. finally, at think it was important to talk to set an artillery, at least two depositions about second artilleries potential ownership of that capability. but we will largely be in transmit mode on those issues and probably not expect much in return. unfortunate, i share my fellow panelists pessimism. fox have been taken in the rose garden. i'm not sure that behind that will be a robust and sustained

and reliable and continuous mill-mail for all the strategic regions that we have outlined. thank you. >> thank you very much. this is sobering. let me ask the first question. while i'm doing that, please raise your hands and i will take names. i think it is clear what the u.s. wants. and recognizes the need for mutual respect. we have had trouble on all three of those. can you think of a concrete example of what the two sides might do to build mutual trust and start there. what are the likelihoods of that happening in the next year or so and where do you think we might make progress on that? i would ask you to make quick responses. during the questions from guests, we will maybe pick and choose.

why do not start? >> the light comes on. i think training exercises are historical a great place to start. everybody tends to be on their best behavior. you exit the glimpses of what they're like to operate with. unfortunate, there is some experience with the kind of piracy operations of the african coast. it has been important for china. it has been important for everybody else to operate with them at sea. i think one of the things is that submarine rescue would be more interesting. it is somewhat more problematic, but it isn't in that other countries do to push boundaries with one another.

>> i would say that part of it is having a more frank discussion about military capabilities. in some other interactions i have had with the chinese, you talk to them and get answers that do not only produce confidence or mutual trust, but sort of eroded because you hear flat denials of things you know are actually going on or statements that do not match what is happening with the capabilities. i think the u.s. has tried, as the administration has produced its various policy reviews, to give china some sense of what is in those and why is there. i do not know that we have gotten parallel answers back from the chinese. but there is the fact that our

military in these different domains are more and more attractive and there is a competitive element of that. it is not just that the tactical level where we are operating in some of their waters. it is starting to be a net fl--- and four-structured level. i take in mind with our capabilities. as a secretary said the other day, it is often the case that the u.s. is looking at things that china is developing and what we need to do to protect our own interests. i think that a franker dialogue about those issues would be a big step. that is why i hope that these efforts to really get a strategic stability dialogue with content in it -- had hoped that would develop positively. >> james. >> i will go against my irish nature and talk about some good news. if you look back even five years

ago at the military-millet ferrmilitary, would it not be gt if we could get the chinese to cooperate with us on the peacekeeping operations. imagine if the connection get them involved in something witle piracy issue of of africa. they threw those out as their standard fare for the things that they are interested in talking to us about and are serious about. that is progress. i think it is throwing bloody chunks in the water behind you for the sharks. but i think those are things we can capitalize. i know the administration had talked privately with capital hill in the first to use about

actually making concrete changes to the national defense authorization act to prevent freedom of action to be able to do more things on the chinese side. but some of the things that we have talked about now are actually prohibitive. in terms of process issues, i think it would go a long way for us to alter some of the characteristics of that legislation to allow us to have greater freedom. otherwise, our own hands would be tied it in our ability to be helpful in the relationship. if i can ask everyone to please identify yourself clearly. >> i need to ask a question and that it will cut in aid for direction. given the pessimism that you all expressed about the views on the pla side and their lack of willingness or at least a reluctance to engage in mil-to-mil.

will current mechanisms -- what current mechanisms to have that are available to us and what future mechanisms which you propose? >> i think you ask the right question. as long as the dialogue is military for the sake of military, we will run into a whole series of internal bureaucratic and political issues on the chinese side. as long as they can frame it and slice of life that, it does not serve their interests and it does not serve our interests. one of the things that i have been most disappointed with has been -- both in terms of protocol and bureaucratic rank -- the chinese participation in strategic and economic dialogue, highlighted as a forum where we could bridge across the civilian

and military strategic issues. as long as we continue to send top for fighters and top leaders to this meeting and they keep sending foreign affairs officers, we will never be able to do that. that is a bureaucratic logjam. i understand it on the chinese side, but it will have to break it. we have an environment where we talk about security issues and a much more multi-disciplinary and multi-bureaucratic way. then been unwilling to figure out the key to unlocking that on the protocol side. >> i agree with that. let me come it -- let me comment -- let me come at it from a different angle. they're focused on issues of dominance, vulnerability, satellite, their strategies for dealing with the u.s.. that is a very competitive and contentious dialogue. what we really want is all of the chinese users of space,

scientific use of space, commercial uses of space, satellite space, loss capabilities -- they have a different set of interest from the military. they need access to space to carry a commercial opportunities to keep the chinese satellite tv network operating in remote areas. what we really want is some kind viewsform were the pla's us are balanced by a variety of other users based in china who have a different set of perspectives and interests and views. but that is one of the problems. i think the chinese system does not do well in cutting across bureaucracy and representing this particular interest and some of the programs that are kept pretty secure.

it is hard to integrate across that. of the can find mechanisms to do that, i think that would be really helpful. >> one of the things is that it does take two to tango. in these concentrated forms, if you have the wrong people show suddenly the wrong people yourself. i do not know that that is the best way to do it. you can fight fire with fire a little bit to try to focus the other side. it would be to say, look, i am ready to have a serious discussion. but if you keep mickey mouse in me, i will do it with you, too. they advocate building trust and confidence with things

like maritime cooperation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and whenever we can do is great. i wonder, looking added instead of from the bottom up to look at it from the top down and with the panel thinks of the prospects that secretary gates could come back and convince president obama that he should persuade president hu that he should overcome these loud voices that disrupt the military-to-military relationship and other aspects. might we expect or could we hope for a realization by president couldn't tell that we do not want to disrupt the overall -- president hu jintao that we do not want to disrupt the overall

situation. do we think that is a prospect? >> is interesting to me that we have not so far talk about the military relations issue. but i think it is significant in this case. he staked out some interesting ground with the chinese military in my view. talking about his policy of new historic missions for the first five military task and the civilian origins of that leads to some interesting conclusions. one of the unheralded reasons for new historic mission to be put out was to provide the pla with a vision of a future template to continue to receive large-scale central government financial resources for missions well beyond resolution of the taiwan situation. in other words, their modernization program, which had been so successful, primarily in my view because they finally had

a concrete planning scenario, it could now have a wider range of planning some areas that we continue to justify double-digit annual increases in the to expenditure without having it all be tied to tie one. we are already in the election season. i think it is horrible that are presidential election season is two years long. we are already in the session. i think it is a very delicate dance going on with his relationship with the military, with the implications of that for the succession, particularly the estimation of whether a fact he will hold on to the chairmanship of the central military commission after the next party congress for that transition of power. in that kind of environment, given that kind of sensitivity, given that they are in a political season, it is very unlikely that he would then expend political capital to try to force the chinese military to

do something that they are disinclined to do for a whole variety of valid, strategic, bureaucratic, and financial reasons in their own minds. >> let's keep going. >> this may not be the right place. with the republican takeover of the house, there will be very different way of focusing on all of these issues. hearings are designed to make sure none of us miss any of the provocative things from every level, a human-rights trade, etc., etc. in a sense, it is the bad news if you worry about managing the noise level. but it is potentially good news if you can shave the conversation in a positive way instead of just banging a drum. >> first, i have absolutely no idea it will go in. right now, you have a lot of neophyte's coming into the

process. you have centers of voices who are no longer there. you have folks who will try to score as many political points against the administration as it possibly can over the next two years. they have already said that. i think you'll see one more -- a lot more oversight hearings, whether the provider of really -- provide real oversight is another thing. you have certain folks who are saying, well, we will try to look at this and we will try to look at this and it does not relate -- it does not appear that there is a lot to look at other the and the fact that your to grandstand. it is a shock that politics would actually be happening up there. [laughter] what am i thinking? i think it will take a little bit of time to shake out. you have a lot stronger and louder and more polarized voice

out there right now. i think the question is whether those voices continue the way they are or they start to moderate. there have been great examples that the new members have been having. there is a retreat where everyone went out and talked to a secure line. what ship is that evolution taken the coming weeks and months and years? >> when you look at the house foreign affairs committee and you look at the membership of that committee, there are half dozen people on that committee that have long established bureaucratic legislative track record of interest in china. i would expect that that committee in particular would have a fundamental change in its town and focus in the next two years. >> let me add something. what ever global or international issue you were looking at or economic issue

you're looking at, there is a china component to this. it would be less the case that is a foreign affairs or security committee that is really when dealing with china. to keep the focus on a range of global issues, china will be a part of the. sometimes, it will be a positive contribution and sometimes it will be negative. the committee will be digging into issues that are at the port -- and of a part of their responsibility. >> i said it was hard for a reason. it is not just applying the electors to it and getting beijing to start changing direction. -- electrodes to it and getting beijing to start changing direction. we have already concluded that the united states is doing stuff

and china is doing stuff, all responded to the other. this can ship itself in a positive direction or can go really, really long. >> i want to comment on david's point, which i think is really critical about the issue of mil- mil and how instrumental that might be. there is a suggestion that there is real limits on how far on an official tourney can go in a dancing it in terms of deepening understanding in a way that changes strategic thinking because the situation is so deeply enmeshed in politics on both sides, as well as military attitudes that are increasingly hardening. to me, what needs to happen is there needs to be a real

serious think through on the u.s. side about how you can engage the chinese on significant strategic issues that are not just simply narrow- issue-based, but questions of power and purpose in the pacific over time that are not all official. you cannot do this on an official level. you cannot engage in no official dialogue on questions like that that are somewhat open-ended, that are somewhat conceptual, and that are somewhat flexible in the way people dress them. you have these responses back and forth often. we can think of how you can develop in nonofficial yet not authoritative track.

something that is not led by official predicted by official statements. that is a hard thing to do. that is one reason i haven't got it. but i think it will be increasingly important. it is hard to get around these problems on the chinese side and maybe on the u.s. side and they can feed into specific questions on the mil-mil level. that will not happen if there is not an understanding of the senior level of both governments. you have to reform this kind of -- you have stood reconfirm this kind of understanding. what comes out of it can really determine what happens in the u.s.-china relations, at least on the strategic level. there needs to be a strong suit -- a strong message sent by both

sides of a commitment of discussion engagement of these issues and others that freckly lot of people now question whether it is possible. that kind of commitment has to show that the military's are not in control. they're not dictating the direction of this relationship. the chinese, to some degree, the civilian leadership have indicated that in the last several months. i think there needs to be a broadening and deepening of that recognition of both sides. it would then allow for this kind of movement forward in these kinds of dialogue. >> when i walked into this room and looked at these photographs, i always have that feeling. maybe i am romanticizing an earlier area, but the idea of being able to have conceptual

dialogue about power and purpose that are not tied to publicly stated the levels that have to be discussed -- it would be a completely new tenor in the relationship. the problem potentially is due the strategical conditions apply now. is there a unifying common threat to? those sorts of things. or are there -- are they simply not there? >> presidents and administrations have marshalled their veteran talent all the time to open different tracks and negotiations.

you can have them do back channel even better. you can get somebody who will be somewhat more seen as neutral to go ahead and do this for you. have the vatican get involved if you want to open an avenue of discussion. [laughter] that was just to make sure that everybody is listening. ultimately, there are all sorts of mechanisms you can use to do it, any and all that can, the better it is. i am not sure that the other side is really listening. we are really quite open. generally, what we say is what we say. interpreting our interest, there is another agenda that people have in washington. people have to be pretty dense for deaf to not get it to carry that far. >> as a veteran and organizer of

track to dialogue -- first, the chinese and u.s. government need a lot. all the different departments of the government and different departments and ministries have the various dialogues with china on different issues. there is a constant stream of official visitors coming in. it is harder to talk some of these -- talk about some of the strategic issues because you get into issues of secrecy and sensitivity. but there is a lot of dialogue happening routinely between the two governments. and number of people in this administration have participated in an official dialogue, as well as official once and they do try to think systematically and strategically about how you use the two. we have tried to help a little bit with that. the unofficial dialogue can be a

means, as michael suggested, for dealing with bigger picture and conceptual things come exploring areas that are not ripe for official meetings where governments have to live up to what they say in those meetings. i think the administration is trying to think strategically about when do you want things to be official and you're willing to live by the agreements that you make in those settings and also recognize that we're talking point will be cleared and it will be a more formal setting. when he wanted to be on official, where you can be more exploratory in trying to find a common ground. and how do use the two parts together? they are thinking systematically and someone strategically in terms of what the the right mix is of those two things. when you highlight some of these issues, such as space and cyber, that is good to talk about an official level, but maybe some of this unofficial

dialogue in breaking ground in those areas. another thing it can do is it can bring different parts of the chinese system to the table. on space issues, the military's interest is different from a commercial user or a chinese broadcaster. i think you want both of those in the room. sometimes, that is something that i as an organizer and others have been able to do, invite the right chinese from different parts of the system. sometimes, you can achieve a cutting across of bureaucracies that is very hard to do in unofficial contacts. >> on the cyber side, we have had similar dialogue. we create the usual track 1.5 kind of shield where the government people are there and they are in the back chairs and they can make comments and those comments are not considered official policy. it sets up proxy channels and everything else.

unfortunate, sometimes, i think it allows the side that is reluctant to do talking -- it gives them a communication channel without responsibility and authentication on something that is as sensitive as cyber or nuclear. i would just point out that everybody in the room knows that the chinese side tends to be more systematic and harvesting the information that comes out of those meetings and developing a broader picture whereas, it tends to be more unilateral and there is not as much of an attempt to systematize the information and insight -- and messages that are coming in. >> please wait for a microphone. but it does not so much these issues.

there is plenty of dialogue on that. my concern is more on the broader sense of how power is distributed and how it is changing in asia in particular and what that means for the primary strategic interests of the two countries. we have an incompatibility between the nine states and the chinese. the u.s. believes that stability in asia is based on predominance. the chinese do not accept that notion. at least, they want to qualify it significantly. they haven't said they rejected outright, but they do not accept it entirely. they want to reduce their vulnerabilities. those vulnerabilities are based will large extent on what the u.s. sees as its predominance. that flows through a whole host of issues that we're talking about here. yet, it is never really in gages by the two sides. >> i think there's a big challenge their we have to grow

been our allies in that discussion as well. it makes it difficult to talk big picture without including the rest of our northeast asian friends. >> first, i want to compliment the panel on what i thought was a first-rate presentation on this question. i wonder if one or two or more of you could comment on the psychological factors. 35 years ago, there was a defense strategy consisting of a people's war, storing grain everywhere, targeting missiles on our own soil because that is where you would have to engage the enemy. i went to china in 1976 with the house armed services committee for the first contact we have had since the nixon visit and it was impossible to have a

dialogue. the terminology made no sense. they did not know what we were talking about. over the last 35 years, the we have made enormous progress, they have not been able to develop indigenous first-rate military equipment. they had to purchase it from former enemies like russia. we are talking about relations between that military and the united states military. when we were rising as a great power, it was recognized as being the military in the world that has the strongest capabilities and that is most advanced. yet we are talking about relationships as though the chinese can resume to deal as an equal under these circumstances with the world's best.

what you have described is what you would expect from somebody who has not proved themselves. the chinese navy has been a coastal defense force. now, they are in the gulf and they are getting miniscule experience. their senior leaders are provincial in terms of the world outlook because they have not have the exposure or the contact with advanced military groups that you expect. if we want this military to military relationship to develop, we cannot have a great leap forward. we have to make incremental steps. we have to deal with each other in ways so that they can gain conscience -- confidence that they can deal with us in the types of dialogues that we would like to have without losing face because they are constantly demonstrating that they are not

up to our standards in terms of understanding what we want to talk about. maybe i am misrepresenting this. my experience is that the psychological factors play a powerful role. have i misrepresented the issue? i would welcome some thoughts. >> i think that is a good point. if you meet with chinese military officers, sometimes you meet with colonels or lower ranking officials and they are really smart. a totally understand what is going on. you ask them why they are not teaching in beijing. they say that they are a colonel and no one would listen to them if they taught in beijing. the kind of limits that are in the system, which is covering your butt, there are a lot of places for information to stop

if it reflects negatively. i think that those are all factors that we need to consider in our own thinking. we stand -- some people have ph.d. s and the trouble around the world and study. i think that we should do more about that. our focus should be to travel and spend a year in china traveling and doing whatever and then coming back and shading your beard of and cutting your hair and going back to work. you still have to figure out some way to have a dialogue. a functioning dialogue with folks that you really don't have a lot in common with. that would be a very long wait for us. you have to figure out ways to bridge a justified. it is difficult, but it is

something that you have to push through. >> the big question is of the chinese threat perception of us. the more that we engage with them, the more we reveal that gap to ourselves that they know is still present. does that increase their level of concern? i do not know how you overcome that. at the moment, they have some very advanced platforms, but on a network with the rest of their system? do they have advanced software on top of the hardware? if we find out more about that for cooperation, does that reduce their deterrent? is that the way to overcome that? the very early stages would be joint force operations. they have seen that this is vitally important in order to conduct modern war. this is an area where they are

feeling their way. they have made remarkable progress in recent years. but i do not want to use demeaning language, i just want to capture the idea. it is like taking someone from the country and sending them to new york city. the way that they behave shows that there from the country. -- that they are from the country. >> let me speak to two aspects. i am not to talk much about psychology because he has written books on that topic. you can look at two pieces of it. one is the experience of training officers. that has changed. they would spend their career in one military region into the got to the senior level and have

very little contact with foreigners. we now see an officer corps that is becoming more educated. there is a premium on credentials. there is more opportunities to travel. over time, i think that will produce a change in attitude and a comfort in interacting with others. it has only been 10 or 12 years that the chinese military it really started doing the rudiments of military diplomacy in terms of exercises and deployments for this kind of purposes. over time, you will see a greater comfort of individuals in being able to operate at this level. it is much more sophisticated and effective. that is one piece.

education, training and experience. they have made progress on that. the other side is the capabilities peace. -- peaiece. they worked in favor of the strong at the expense of the week. they are stronger. you are starting to see a greater willingness to show off those capabilities. sometimes that is a very negative way to try and intimidate neighbors. but it also means they can be more open without fear of giving away vital military secrets. that is also an underlying condition that may permit greater dialogue. it does not ensure that that will happen. it is, perhaps, a condition that will support that over time. >> exactly. a that is the key issue.

>> they are changing. they say that you do not ever asked us what we think of anything. >> i am fascinated by the psychological aspect of it. perhaps more than i was in the past. that may just be a residue of the fact that in parenting preteen girls and trying to train a golden retriever at the same time. everything you said is right. it fits very much with dick's book. there are new ingredients in this goulash. in my view, it is a very clear triumphantism that is being led by people in the pla as a consequence of the olympics and achievements along the way that

suggests -- that was in full voice a few months ago. it is interesting to find elements in this system backpedaling. perhaps the premature unveiling of this new confidence. what concerns me most at the psychological level in our strategic dialogue -- it is difficult to talk about this without appearing to be paternalistic. a combination that i feel in my personal interaction with people in the pla, a combination of a cocky swagger combined with continuing insecurity and

caution. you can define the chinese leadership as feeling that triumphalism. not wanting to deflect it. but also understanding that they are sitting on top of huge structural problems. they have huge problems in military development. it creates a psychological divergence is that some people would seek to exploit and other people are trying to heal. we talked about the spokesman. i continue to be fascinated by the . .he growth -- by the laggar this is a system that is so imprisoned by its stated principles. it is in desperate need of

names. emerge.watching them a mo they do not have the words to communicate why they are doing things. you cannot say not interference in the internal affairs of other countries. that is the purpose of being a great power. yet they want to say that they are not interfering in their internal affairs, but they are interfering in internal affairs. it causes strategic confusion and increases the possibility of what gates called the calculation -- miscalculation. we are having a lot of difficulty matching actions with words. that is this unfortunate

pubescent kind of process they are going through. that is why i think that some of our leaders in this area have said that we cannot react to everything that they do. we have to take a more strategic manager role. we have to take more of an adult posture on this. we can get sucked into that drama as my 11-year-old daughter would say and then just spiraled downward -- spiral downward. we do have a deal with a china that was concerned about face. we do not know how to deal better with a china that is concerned about face, but also has all of these triumphal list witnesses. ist weaknesses.s >> there are looking at our economic system and laughing. that was until they started having their own food problems

and then we can laugh at them. >> i think that hermann first said that. >> two a very brief interjections. let's start here. >> the psychological discussion -- of the fundamental question that we came here to talk about, in terms of the chinese psychology. what does the pla think that it is going to gain by cooperating with the u.s.? what is the pla by not doing this? >> my favorite term from cold war political science is famed compliance. -- feigned compliance with

civilian desire for a dialogue. it is more about talking and talking and setting up meetings about talking. the shell will be there, but i am not sure that the content will be anything solid. >> it is absolutely parental thinking. i was summoned to the chinese embassy a couple of years ago. for some reason, they asked if they could do something with the dalai lama. when we talked about and, if the first words out of your mouth is the so-called dollar llama fallout, -- dalai lama.

>> mike bills vary, please -- mike bills very billspllsbury -- pillsbury, please. >> it seems to me that this is much neglected topic in the study of what they are like. that is to our detriment. i have run across a number of chinese military ridings where the attempt to assess what our american psychological views are. one article was called, "how american strategic culture drives the world."

we are compelled to try to dominate the world. the general goes on with what to do with this kind of power. it leads me to ask a question. do each of you think that our own debate in washington about the nature of china -- u.s.- china relations is as sharp as i perceive it to be? there was a preface to a book of writings by me on military issues. they used the word vicious debate. there is a vicious debate going on in washington about china. the characterized it in various ways. either you agreevo with each other, or there is not much of a sharp debate about

china. that strikes me as a pity. if there is the calculations and misperceptions between the u.s. and china, if i were drafting president obama's talking points, i would be inspired by a the point that they seem to see a shift in the balance of power. both regionally and globally. this dates back to 2008. if that is true, do we agree with that? do we agree that america is in decline. are we adjusted our policy is -- policies to the attraction? that would be a paper to hand to

the chinese side that says the reason we want to dominate the world, if we agree, then bob sutter is right. i hate to use the word, we need to reduce our role significantly. there is a clash here in the washington d.c. community. the panel seems to be the same. >> there is a laughable cartoon version of what is going on. to your point about decline, i think that secretary gates very carefully chose his words before

he left when he said, "there are many nations in the dustbin of history who have doubted u.s. resolve." >> he did not say we are not in decline. it is not the same thing. secretary gates did not use those words. >> i still like the tone of it. >> do you have something profound is a? >> i really do not have anything profound to said. i yield the balance of my time. >> we have three questions left and we have about 50 minutes if we are going to wrap up on time. >> my question is to make a comparison.

in china, there is an increasing number of younger people and even much more influential people who are extremely well educated and travel throughout the world. it has been mentioned that young pla officers are showing up. it is not clear to me at the senior level that that is very general. i guess my point is whether it is a comparison of the role of the isolation of some of the plo leaders, could it lead to misjudgment? the second part of that, whether you have seen a change in recent years where the pla has gotten higher with the development of a sort of military industrial complex within china and to what extent

that development is starting to impact on policy, whether it is or isn't? >> first, familiarity is a good thing. i think that countries that have known each other really well, it is not in their economic interest to go to war and they end up going to war. britain and germany are a good example. i think -- it is always good to make sure you have as much dialogue as possible. he have to make some of the right decisions in terms of making sure it used to that course. -- you steer the course you have to be in tune with what is going on and connect those thoughts

regarding chinese policy. it gives you an multiplicity of ways to communicate and to give you a multiplicity of ways to screw up. in terms of the military industrial capability in china, the greater the military industrial capability, the greater the broader industrial capability is a significant issue. increasingly, you have components and parts on the subcontractor level -- china has components that are dual use components. am i going to witc produce parts that -- what does that mean for us?

china is going to become a self sufficient supplier at some point. that reduces the number of points you have on china. >> i think there is a lag between the caliber of the officers and the senior people in decision making. that is one benefit that we get here. we expose some of the future chinese leaders. it is not that we are one to tell them any secrets about how we do joint operations. part of the value is that they come over with a very suspicious attitude towards the u.s.. we expose them to broader u.s. society and they see a u.s. military that is not as hostile as they imagine. that is one piece. on the military industrial complex, broadly, there has been a tension between the pla and

chinese defense industry that could not produce something. various pla services preferred to procure it advanced weapons overseas if they could get them. as for the defense industries improved, there has been more of a synergy there. i think that the navy is the issue where i talked about developing a naval lobby. some of it is a navy and some of it is academics. there is a public debate about what kind of naval capabilities china needs. should they have carriers or not? that is not something that you saw in the past. whether you call it a military industrial complex -- maybe there is an element of that. i think that is starting to emerge. >> if you read this book, it

points out that militaries and their personnel in their officer corps, because of the mission and their training, tend not to be as cosmopolitan as their civilian leadership counterparts. that is not necessarily a bad thing. i think that the same light clearly occurs in the pla. the one caveat i would make to that is that i have found, talking to senior pla members, is that their views of the u.s. is deeply colored by their children who are here studying and making money and making business. there are those connections at a familial level. in some cases, we underestimate the extent to which these vast networks of country children and the economic and personal relationships here in the united states act as a constraint upon russia's behavior. it really goes to the heart of

this issue of our mutual equities. on the defense industrial side, it tends to be conservative by nature and very insular. it is important to note that the most successful sectors in the industrial base is the most integrated. it has been the ones like commercial aviation that has had the least amount of total interaction. in many cases, it has made the least amount of progress. so, they provide another window and another set of the entitlements into the global economic system. it is critical to understand to think about why the crisis has not gone further.

>> thank you. in going to take the two last questions together. randy, do you want to go first and an answer? >> the general mood is pessimistic. a kind of makes me feel optimistic. i do not think there is a bosch anything wrong with a male to male relationship. -- nothing wrong with a mill to mill relationship. sure, we have things to gain, but every time there is an arms sale and want to cut things off, we should thank them and recovery of the relationship in a way that better service to our interest rather than do what every administration does and become the ardent suitor solve

the problem. the problem is the problem as defined by the prc. we start talking about arms sales and reconnaissance flights and legislation. the question is, what is the downside of something that is a lot more modest, incremental and slow over time as long as the rest of the relationship is more robust? i frankly do not see it. they have a lot more to gain from this than we do. i can see the military relationship with about four meetings a year. what is the downside of something less robust? >> there is nothing wrong --

from the previous question, is there anything wrong with having a modest relationship? i do not think there is. what is important -- back to something that james said, i worry about a crisis spiraling out of control. what should be really important is having a reliable channel communication. a hot line that can be used. a few years ago, i was talking to people in beijing and they thought it was really cool to have a hot line with the most powerful country. it was not about using the damn thing. i was talking with friends of mine. i said, "is the problem here?

what you guys ought pickup?" all you need to say is that the message is received. take months. if we do not have that basic channel of communication, that is what i worry. >> final thoughts. giving it to their conditions with a full and robust relationship, those costs are too high. for solid strategic meetings a year and a delegation or two is fine, particularly if the cost is giving up sro off the coast which they will never do.

to every sport, i am not sure -- to interest point, i am not sure that it provides that crisis management mechanism it may just have to be taken over by civilians as it has over the last 15 years. >> you do not want to let the program drive neat mill to mill. certainly, there is value in strategic policy dialogue that we have talked about. there may be value in limited operational things such as working on search and rescue, counter piracy deployments. even in the narrow concept, it

exposes some chinese offices to that and it levels the relationship. there are levels where we can cooperate. you do not want to go overboard with it, of course. with my experience, over the seven years that i have been there, there has been a careful effort to manage the mill to mill. some of that has paid off in terms of the discussions. with respect to the crisis management, i think that we need to have modest expectations of what we can achieve through mechanisms such as hot lines and communicate those to the chinese. we should not expect the commander to pick up the hot line and call his counterpart and resolve the crisis. those are vehicles for passing information to china and not necessarily expect a response.

we should be clear about that. if they do pick up, have the note pad handy and pass it on. we do not expect a substantive response. at the presidential level calls, that would be a report and -- that would be an important part. that could be an effective tool. >> eventually there is still an impact. if you look at what we have discussed, the unofficial channels, the direct conversation, the evolution of the officer corps with a larger global view. generally, the more people come in contact with americans, they like us. eventually, they get a sense that these guys are not monolithic. they are thoughtful and they do

not wake up every morning and want to declare war on us. they are in a completely different place, intellectually, then we are. -- than we are. that is one to have an impact on the way the next generation of chinese leaders look at it. no one is really a communist at all. the number of chinese that mock the government is surprising to me. i think every single opportunity for you to drive your message across that we your view does, we know where you are going, we are listening, here are the counter concerns that we have. on taiwan, you can look at it --

look at a lot of the capabilities. eventually, there would be a unification or whatever you want to call it. on the surveillance, we are the superpower. as the superpower, if you tell me that you do not want me near your coast, i am going to have to do it. i have to send a carrier to steam into the south china sea. the thing is, it is an obligation. you have to show everybody that you cannot take that sitting down. if someone asks about chinese servant of flights over the united states, i grew up in the united -- in new york'.

from a broader standpoint, the more that you communicate, the better it is, ultimately. even if you think the other side is not listening. here is what we are up to. these are what our specific concerns are. there are sitting there saying, "level." that is the moment you are looking for. >> that is a fantastic way to end. i would like to think the participants for coming. i would like to thank our sponsor. please join me in thanking the panelists for and lighting- enlightening us. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> president obama held a moment of silence today to honor those killed and injured in saturday's shooting in tucson that left gabrielle gifford in critical condition. after that, comments by president obama on the shootings. >> thank-you very much mr. president and vice-president. you have honored me and my family by giving me an opportunity to serve you and to serve our nation. >> with more than 80 appearances by william daley and more than 100 by gene sperling, you can use the c-span video library to learn more about the newest additions to the obama

administration. just two of the one of the 13,000 people you can search and watch any time online at our c- span video library. it is washington, your way. >> president obama led a moment of silence for the victims in the shooting in arizona. he was joined by the first lady.

>> now, remarks from gov. jim brewer on the shootings that killed six and wounded 13, including gabrielle giffords. she was originally set to give her state of the state address, but she talked about the shootings instead. this is about 10 minutes.

>> thank you. thank you all. and good afternoon. [applause] >> thank you. thank you all. and good afternoon. speaker adams, president pierce, honorable senators and

representatives of the centennial legislature, chief justice burch, and justices of the supreme court, constitutional officers, tribal leaders, honored guests, and my fellow arizonans. i had intended to deliver a state of the state address to you all today. remarks that an exciting and solid plan for job creation, education, and tax reform. and i will deliver the plan to you. but not now. not today. tragedy and terror some time come from the shadows and steel are joined and take away our peace. that happened on saturday. love, innocent people and outstanding public servants,

like the united states district judge john m. roll. he had just come from the light of a darkness -- the images come from the light of a catholic mass and enter the darkness of a madman. gabby giffords is my good friend. this past week's events have caused all this to reflect on many things, including how we respond to those terrible events. s, including how we respond to those terrible events. first, our response to this tragedy must be led by prayer and comfort for the victims and their families. so please join me in a moment of silence as we pray for all of those we have lost, for the injured and those who are suffering.

>> thank you. and with our faith in their courage tightly in place, we will step forward from this chamber dedicated to do the lord's work, continue our service to the public. one year ago, in this very place, i told you i would serve beside you, proud to serve the people of arizona. i said then that public servants -- public service is acting not in personal interest, but on behalf of others. i ask you to join me in the field. gabby giffords did join me in

the field, knowing that when our proper service ended, we would be judged less by what we achieved by by what we over -- we would be judged less by what we achieved and more by what we overcame. let me take a moment to recognize the act of extraordinary arizonans who responded with professionalism and save lives, law enforcement, emergency responders, the tucson medical community, and the staff at the university medical center. daniel hernandez, a university of arizona junior showed no fear in the face of gunfire.

his quick action in going to saved her life. i will ask him to stand here and receive a kit -- receive the thank you of a very grateful state. daniel. [applause] >> it was a sunny saturday at the supermarket in northwest

tucson. it was a picture what our country is all about, public servants doing their duty, citizens, old and young, coming to hear, coming to participate in the beauty of our government and action. -- government inaction. we lost someone else on saturday -- government in actioni. we lost someone else on saturday who was just elected to her student council. she was hoping to be a positive part of the future of america. and she has become just that. she loved baseball. she was the only girl on her little league baseball team. and she loved to where red white and blue -- red, white, and blue. i should tell you that christina was born on september 11, 2001. she thought of her birthday as a day of hope.

a time to find good news in america. as her mother said, her light shines on a less today. saturday's events were not just an attack on those individuals we loved and lost, but an assault on our constitutional republic, on our democracy, on all we treasured and all hold dear as citizens and public servants. arizonan is in pain, yes. our grief is profound. we are yet in the first hour of our sorrow. but we have not been brought down. we will never be brought down.

[applause] >> in fact, we have been lifted up we are deeply grateful for the purse. arizona arizona, like all of ame, has been through difficult times before. but those times have united us and made us stronger, more enduring. let those of us who serve our state and country do so in a way

that honors those that we have lost. our meetings on sunny days will not and. end,.ll not an -- will not end. i believe that arizona will rise on wings like eagles. we will run and not get weary. we will walk and not clear week. so why ask for your help and your continued prayers as we step from here and died this great state with courage and devotion. may god bless all the victims and their families and those suffering from saturday's tragedy. may god bless those who serve us in the cause of freedom and justice. may he bless you and your

families and the great state of arizona. and may god always bless and protect the united states of america. thank you. [applause] >> members of a joint committee se as scored the kur

hon. governor from the chambers. thank you. [applause] [applause] president obama spoke with reporters about t

president obama spoke with reporters. the two leaders discussed the economy and counter-terrorism. this is about 50 minutes. to we'll, i'm very grateful have my dear friend, nicolas sarkozy, here. and i think nicolas has agreed that at the top i want to just make a few comments about the situation in tucson, arizona. obviously all of us are still grieving and in shock from the tragedy that took place. grieving and in shock from the tragedy that took pla. gabby giffords and oers are still fighting to recover. families are still absorbing the enormity of their losses. we have a criminal iestigation that is ongoing.

and charges will no doubt be brought against the perpetrator of this famouheinous crime. i think it is important to also focus, though, on the extraordinary courage that was shown during the course of these events. a 20-year-old college student ran into t line of fire to rescue his boss. she was a wounded woman who hoped secure the ammunition that might have caused even more damage. the citizens to wrestle down the gunman. that speaks to the best of america, even in the face of such mindless vionce. in the coming days, we will have a lot of time to reflect. right now, the main thing we're

doing is to offer our thoughts and prayers to those who have been impacted, making sure that we are doing it together and pulling together as a country. as president of the united states, and also as a father, obviously, i'm spending a lot of time just thinking about families and reaching out to them. now, i want to say to nicholas that want to offer my condolences to his countrymen as well. they recently had two french niger.ns kidnapped in the shar it was a the terrorism that we share. this is one more area where corp. with bridget were cooperation with the united states is critical -- this is

one more area where cooperation with the united states is critical. we have a friend in nicolas sarkozy and the french people. we have cooperated over the last several years in dealing with a global economicrisis, dealing th the challenges of terrorism, dealing with a range of geopolitical issues from the middle east to iran to afghanistan. i have always fou him to be an outstanding partner and an outstanding friend to the american people as well as the leader on the world stage. we spent the initial part of this meeting discussing the g-8 and the g-20 agenda. both france and the united states and around the world, we are in the process of healing and recovering from the disasterous recession we went through. but we're not where we want to

be. to many people are still out of work. to many businesses still have problems getting financing. they're still too many balances in the world economy's that are inhibiting the prospects of growth. and our discussions with the french in the lead, both at the g-8 and the g-20 this year, we work together to make sure that we are as productive as possible and deliver the kinds reforms and follow-through that will result in prosperity for peoples around the world. after this brief press appearance, we will be having lunch. during that time, we will be discussing issues in whi there have been close collaboration. obviously, the french are one of our strongest allies, nato allies. their key members of isaf.

fren troops have been sacrificing alongside americans in uniform in afghanistan and we are very grateful for the sacrifices. so we will be discussing our strategy there, coming off of the discussions we had in lisbon. we will also discuss issues like iran and the impact of sanctions currently on their nuclear program. i hope that we can resolve this issue diplomatically. we will be building on our shared resolve to ensure that we are not seeing nuclear-weapons in iran. we will discuss the middle east where he and i share a deep and abiding belief in the need for two states standing side-by- side for security. we will be discussing issues like qatar where democracy is

seeing some challenges. sudan, where demonstrations have taken place this weekend. outbreaks of violence could end up devastating the lives of hundreds ofhousands of people. but there's also a prospect of a peaceful transition that could result in a better life for the people in both the north and the south of sudan. we will also be talking about lebanon where we are all deeply concerned with the special tribunal there and making sure that justice is appropriately served. i just want to say how much i appreciate not only his friendship, but also his leadership. i also want to point out that the last time he and his wife

carla were here, we sent them to ben's chili bowl. i cannot say that it will be on thmenu here. the first lady is having lunch with carla while nicolas and i are having lunch. but i hope you'll find the hospitality outstanding nonetheless. again, we want to express their friendip to the french people and wish everyone in your country a happy new year. [speaking frenc >> first of all, i want to say to the american people how deeply moved the french people have beent your loss and tragedy. >> [speaking french]

>> i also want to thank president obama for his expreson of solidarity to the french people in light of the loss that we have felt by the cowardly killing of two young frenchman who were killed in a barbaric fashion by terrorists. >> [speaking french] >> both of the u.s. and france are determined to stand firm as

allies on the issue of terrorism. both of us believe that any show of weakness would be culpable. we have no choice but to go after these terrorists wherever they may be. >> [speaking french] >> we value -- when the fundamentals of those we cherish our challenge, they must combat. >> [speaking french] >> we spoke about the future of the-20. i said to him in very clear terms that we wish to work hand-

in-hand, france and the u.s. > >> [speaking french] >> we are i the 21st century. and we need new ideas for this new century. with president obama, we are determin to come up with these new ideas for the greater benefit of the peoples of the world so that prosperity and stability of the world. >> [speaking french] >> i have always been a great

friend, a tremendous trend of the united states. i know how important a re the u.s. plays in the world, how important the u.s. dollar is as the world's number one currency, and, with barack obama, we are determined to propose new ideas to get things moving, both within the framework of the g-8 and the g- 20. >> [speaking french] >> and our teams will be working very hard together to come up with common positions on the issues that are of interest and which come within the limits of the tree-20, such as the matter of currencies,f commodity

prices, and all that needs to be done in order to reduce current imbalances. >> [speaking french] >> lastly, i want to thank barack obama, my host, for his show of leadership. and also point out that something has always struck me about him is the ability to get to the fundamentals, the route causes of things. i appreciate his openness, the

way he speaks very frankly about things with me, and i am convinced, ladies and gentleman, that, in 2011, we wille able to come up with a structural solution that will enable us to tackle the world's problems. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. thank you, everybody. >> we are in close consultations with the families will have suffered these losses,s well as governor brewer, a congressional leadership. there is no doubt that we will establish some mechanism, memorial, during the course of the next several days. when we have that, we will announce it. but i think it will be important, i think, for the

country as a whole and for the people of arizona, to feel that were speaking directly to our sense of loss, but also speaking to our hopes for the future. and how, out of this tragedy, we can come together as a stronger nation. >> thank you, guys. >> the house of representatives has changed his legislative skilled critics schedule this week calling the shooting of several giffords over the weekend. it will be in a pro forma session on tuesday. wednesday, they will honor the shooting victims. live coverage on c-span. >> the c-span networks --

providing coverage of politics, public affairs, nonfiction books, and american history. it is all available to you on television, radio, online, and on social networking sites. view our content anytime at the c-span video library. we take you on the road with our digital content bus. it is washington your way. the c-span networks -- now available in more than 100 million homes, created by cable, provided as a public service. >> new jersey faces at 10.5 billion budget dollar deficit. that is part of chris christy's state of the state address in march. that is tomorrow on c-span. residents of southern sudan began casting ballots tomorrow in a week-long vote to decide

whether there region will become an independent nation. now a discussion on the future of the region following the referendum. the seat her -- the csis host to this event. >> well, good morning, everyone. thanks for rousing yourself out of bed so early and making it down here on a monday morning. we appreciate you coming along. i'm sure there'll be a few people drifting in as we get going, but i thought we'd try and make a start now so we have plenty of time for discussion. my name's richard downie, i'm deputy directer of the africa program here at csis and really grateful this morning for our panelists and a chance, really, to tackle the sudan referendum. probably being monday morning we get first crack at discussing the referendum which began over the weekend.

so as we, as we sit here and discuss the sudan this morning, the people of southern sudan are in the middle of making historic decision as you know. voting began yesterday this referendum on their -- in the referendum on their future, whether to remain part of sudan or to secede and form their own nation. millions of people appear to have taken that opportunity so far in the first day and a half of voting. many of them lining up outside polling stations hours before they opened, patiently awaiting their chance to play their part in settling the future direction of southern sudan. a few months ago it seemed unlikely we were even going to get to this point, at least on time. but we've seen a big push in recent weeks by the international community to get the arrangements on track, and, of course, the sudanese people themselves have taken the lead channeling their energies into

making this process work. so the result in recent weeks we've also seen public statements by politicians both north and south that have helped to reduce tensions and create an environment where we can be more confident that the process will go smoothly and the outcome will accurately reflect the will of the people who take part in it. so this is a momentous time, and i'd like to acknowledge the presence of our representatives from the government of sudan and southern sudan as well who in getting to this point today have traveled a long way through decades of civil war, of course, the peace agreement in 2005 and the subsequent six-year-long process of trying to make this deal work. so we're glad they can join us, and we look forward to, perhaps, hearing them speak as well this morning. but today we're going to reflect a little bit about, upon how

sudan has arrived at this moment, but mainly we're going to look forward and think about the upcoming challenges as well. because while those who have worked on the referendum, of course, deserve a great deal of credit for the fact it's taking place on time and so far at let in a relatively orderly fashion, the referendum isn't the end of the road. as was said yesterday as his vote was cast, it's premature to say job done. in many ways the real challenges lie ahead. particularly in the six month-long period following the referendum. if the vote comes out in favor of secession, this will be the time when the tough negotiations really begin in earnest on all the issues which will help determine relations between north and south for years to come. and, of course, the state of ab yea remains undecided. people there have been denied their chance to vote in a separate referendum on whether to remain part of the north or

join the south, and we've had worrying reports of violence there during the past few days. so our speakers are going to discuss some of these big issues today and perhaps say something about the role of the international community and the role they can may going forward. the united states, sue tan's neighbors and the african union asell. we're very pleased to be joined by two experienced analysts from international crisis group, an organization whose thoughtful analysis issues reports we always find useful here on the africa program. on my immediate left we have icg's new africa program directer comfort arrow. comfort oversees four different projects in africa covering central, southern, west and the horn of africa, 20 countries in all in these regions. comfort was previously directer of the africa program at the

international center for transitional government, transitional justice, i apologize. we're delighted, also, to have with us, fouad hikmat who's special adviser and takes part in icg's work in relation to sudan, and his professional background includes management of humanitarian and post-conflict programming. he's literally just touched down this d.c. this morning from sudan as well, so he can give us really the up-to-the-minute perspective on what's going on in sudan now. no pressure there as well. i'm going to hand it over to comfort who's going to give us an overview of icg's work, and then we'll have plenty of time for questions and comments from all of you as well, hopefully. thanks very much. comfort.

>> thank you very much. and i would like to start by wishing you all a happy new year, but also thanking csis, especially richard and the staff of the center fo hosting international crisis group on the day after the start of the important referendum. i also think it's quite telling that the very first job for the new africa directers of icg is to come to washington a speak to a gathering here, and that shows you, also, the importance of washington in the question of the future of a new sudan and the future of north sudan as well. so it's a pleasure and an honor that we have been asked to come this morning, very cold morning, but this morning in washington to talk about a new dawn in the africa as well. just briefly, as richard was saying, i would start off by just introducing the international crisis group to all of you for some of you who don't know it. we are generally recognized as

an independent, nonpartisan organization that services or provides analysis to governments and international governmental bodies like the united nations, the european union and the world bank, and we work quite closely with a number of organizations like the cics here in washington. and we're founded about 15 years ago this 1995 -- in 1995 as an independent, nongovernmental organization on an initiative by a number of transatlantic figures who despaired over the international community's failure back in the 1990s on tragies such as somalia, rwanda and bosnia and even at that time sudan as well. and we are quite well known for the reports that we publish. it wavers between 80 and 90 reports that we do, and i even in the sudan program, the sudan team if they we given a lot of

leeway, they could write 80 reports in the space of three months in sudan because of the nature of the situation there. we also produce what we call the crisatch bulletin which provides a monthly snapshot of what we consider to be the conflict alert countries at that moment in the month. we have several vocacy offices, and most of you may know our washington office. we also have an office in brus ls and in new york as well, and the headquarrs for the africa program is strategically located in nairobi which is a critical hufor us. and as richard has already said, as the africa directer, we operate in 20 different countries across the continent. before i joined icg, i was also working for the united nations in liberia as well. specifically on sudan, my colleague will go into more deeper details on sudan, but i also just want to acknowledge that this is a mow men

powstous -- momentous moment in the history of the continent when you're looking for key moments, key dates on the continent we'll make reference to 1957, ghana z as the frst independent country on the continent after the end of decolonization. we'll also note the freedomof nelson mandela in 1990 and the end of apartheid in 1994. this is another historical moment on the continent, the birth of a new nation. d the key concern for us is how that is going to unfold. the voting for the referendum, as richard pointed out, started yesterday on the question of self-determination which may result in the independence of the south. two decades of war have come to an end in sudan in 2005 with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, but now we are at a stagehere the dell

delicate peace -- delicate peace is going to be tested. the long-term stability of the region lies in the ability of the north and south to forge a post-cpa relationship. and the situation, if it goes well, we'll see the smooth outcome of the referendum. and if results are respected by the khartoum government, we should see some significant progresses being made. and this would provide a perfect platform for negotiations for post-referendum arrangements to go successfully. but should it go poorly, we might also witness a reignition of conflict in between the north and the south and also an escalation of the violence in darfur which fouad will talk about and again, also, the impact on the region will also be quite grave so at this point the situation is quite fluid, and it's quite uncertain how things are going to go. the situation is quite tricky in

creating a new and can independent southern sudan which already has been dubbed as a prefelled state. the borders remain undecided, and meanwhile institutions and services which urgently need to be regenerated and rebuilt, this is still a fundamental issue at stake for the new south sudan. the future arrangements on citizenship, on nationality, on national resourc, on wealth sharing, on management of oil and ter, currency, assets and the liabilities, security and international treaties must be negotiated regardless of the referendum outcome. these are issues that we pointed out in the briefing we produced in dember towards the end of last year. and, of course, the question of the future of abyei needs to be addressed. of course, we must congratulate ifis for their work in the last three weeks in bringing out the

voter registrion process. there will be a need for cohesive statement from relevant actors, in particular in this instance we'll call upon the african union and key leading space on the continent, nigeria, south africa, egypt also to make the necessary statements, positive statements in relation to sudan. and be, of course, the secretary general's monitoring panel needs to take a more public leading role in the pronouncements made over the next three weeks. there must be a careful monitoring and communication over these next the weeks which we judge to be a tense period for sudan. the real challenge, the real issue that we need to avoid in this next three weeks is disinformation, is rumors, and these are al triggers for instability. and, of course, re in washington we can't forget the role of the united states' government. th u.s. incentives have been very helpful, however, ultimately limited given that

khartoum is politically savvy enough to understand it's the u.s. congress and shot the executive that makes many key decisions on the table. the absence of a basic blue prohibit for the post-2011 referendum between the north and south constitutes the uncertainties about the political and economic future of each and risks the referendum as a serious game that sustains affairs and smooths the conduct of the exercise and acceptance of the result. added to this is the deterioration situation this darfur and concerns about insuring a more credible and serious negotiation process ongoing in qatar. insuring stability in the south and improved relations between the north and the south in the post-referendum climate will be critical to softing t darfur problem -- solving the darfur problem. getting the situation right in sudan will be a significant and game-changing moment for the continent, but also for the

international community also. we, therefore, welcome this portunity today to enge in a debate with you all here on the future and how to guarantee stability in the north and south and a new north while we concentrate heavily on the future of south sudan, we mustn't forget the future of the north is at stake as well. so i'll turn it back to richard. >> thank you very much for that overview, comfort. yeah, i'll pass it straight over to fouad. thanks very much. >> yeah, good morning. our protocol observed, i want to say that in my directive, it's impressed me very much. she's sayingshe's new, but the speech doesn't sound like she's new. [laughter] cause i think she did half what i'm supposed to do. she already did half of my briefing which made things

easier to me. but i would like to start by saying thank you so much for the cis to invite us for this event. and and it is difficult moment for me as a sudanese. if the i remove my hat from the ipg, at the end i am sudanese, and this is about human relations. as far as i am very, very happy for suit sudanese to go and vote for this historic moment and to get their country. and if i am on that side, i will be happy and grouplating for a lot -- jukelating for a lot of reasons. and i am happy for that. but also as a sudanese to see the map that we knew from the primary schools, that we draw it now by half and the map of sudan, i don't know how we are going to draw in this six months' time. the south will be very difficult to draw. it's very, very sad moment for us.

for me it is not a surprise that sudan is going to secede because fore going to talk about the challenges, i think one of the main reasons underpinning the current context is that the two parties simply failed to implement a comprehensive peace agreement. it is the mistake of the two the fail to implement the comprehensive peace agreement. i don't hold the two parties only on the she she saying. we can go up from the governnt that took control of sudan after independen. the respondent goes from there, and i think -- responsility goes from there, and i think all the government failed. but focusing on the cpa, it has got two important principles. one is democratic transition and included in that is the reconciliation process.

and, hopefully, if democratic transition happened, reconciliation happened, that will force the principle of self-determination that makes it attractive. those two principles did not happen. for a lot of politica reasons, and as we know that a benchmark in democratic transformation was the elections that were supposed to happen in half of the interim period to leave another three years of the second half of of the interim period to foster the constitution and legal arrangements being done and then to work in these three years to make sure that unity is going to make attractive. elections didn't happen until third or fourth year. it happened sick or eight months -- six or eight months just before the end ofhe sewer rim period -- interim period, so three years being shortened to

eight months for a lot of reasons. and, of course, they wanted to augment that influence of control, their power to remain in power x that's why, i think, they didn't want the elections to happen on time. so both, i think, failed in these three principles, the democratic transformation if i could consider reconciliation has another principle. and the -- but the only success is that they reach the referendum. and so for me, then, when i look into the comprehensive peace agreement, all what i can describe is it became a grand cease fire for six years. there is a cease fire in six years and now after six years that the question here is can we maintain that cease fire? so, and the other reason is, also, and i may want here to

draw specifically on islamist when they took power in 1989 they had their own vision for sudan. and, unfortunately, that region could not accommodate the preference because they saw the preference at marginal, ours as minority groups rather than groups of their own right. and they wanted t maintain power. so the cpa which should have used their power from 100% to 52% will give the splm28% and the other political parties that are remaining, they saw that in these six years how they can continue maintain the power rather than looking int inclusive pluralism. and that is, i think, one of the problems that made thepa to fail. so its operation is a logical outcome, and i don't think unity is going to be an outcome, and i don't think there is happy magic in sudan. what there is is sadness always,

and iope that one day this turns into some of hainess. so the challenges are immense. and let me focus on few things. the positive referendum issues, of course, we come to them. but it's a procedure. it's a procedure. but it is happening in an environment where there is serious tension, there is serious nervousness and volatility. that is where this procedure is haening. and at the same time there is no full agreement on any of the referendum issues. none. and also there is military buildup along the borders, and there is an economic embargo on the south. so if we see in the last weeks the government, or let me say

president what sheer, it's not the government made ts decision. let's make a distinction here. sometimes when president but she talks, he's not talking on behalf of the -- [inaudib] he made a decision that 20% of the southerners on the civil service they are going to go home after secession. and refuse to give the sudanese people citizenship. only if there is a lit call arrangement. and to be dealt as foreigners. to give you an example, at least 24,000 southern sudanese students in khartoum, what is going to happen to these 24,000 if you send them home? and at the samtime we know e that there is a lot of people going back, now, to south sudan, over 100,000, that they are really in a very dire situation as there is no humanitarian

assistance, no shelter and is -- so on. and i question that question there the ncp. it is an ncp rather than a government unity decision. so on thely, for example -- recently, for example, there are, the transactions or transfer of vital goods to south sudan have blocked the cereal market for the vernment and so on. they got the message that not to transfer cereal to the south of sudan. the aspect of oil is becoming a very big problem. [inaudible] so over 100%, prices shot to 30 or 40% in south sudan. these are policies not favored for a mutual good relationship between the north and south.

so this sort of direction, it will reflect negatively on the communities along the borders, especially -- [inaudible] because if the splm begets such policies by blocking -- who have 11.5 million heads of cattle that spend nine months along the borders of 1956, that is their livelihoods for the last 200, 300, 500 years. if south blocks that, that will be very serious, and they are very serious constituency of sudan. and these communities along the borders are highly militarized as we know that in aei, but also the baa forward rah e highly militarized. they have been used, ased

dung the last wars. militias, popular defense forces, and they were, like, the front line of the regime the last 20 years in fighting the war against the south. highly militarized. so this kind of policies in the last weeks meant some people and analysts in sudan to describe like this kind of policy diction from the ncp rather than from the government. it's a sort of like soft touch or the freshest steps to sort of on ethnic cleansin and now it is debatable because that's a legal term. but when you deny your own citizens the right which is actually in the constitution of sudan, it says that sudan allows dual citizenship. sudanese can have citizenship of other countries and can even the

president does not have the right to remove the citizenship of a person even by internationalization. and international law also doesn't accept that. so what i think it is important now for the north and south is to secure that strategic relationship to get these consequences of the political separation. it is a political -- so they need to focus on the economic and financial union, unity and looking into the common markets. ..

>> therefore, one the main conditions in the coming six months is how to avoid the confrontations along the borders. unfortunately, as i say, that both parties and particularly are creating the position along the borders. they are actively mobilizing, tribes along the borders to rejoin th pdf, popular defense forces. and on th pretext they are going to lose their interest y the succession of south sudan. if it doesn't go well, and the results not accepted, it means the separation would not go safely. the transitional period would be full violence in my opinion, and the communities ong the borders will aggregate the

situation in abyei. and abyei configures the wall between the communities in the armed forces and into why the colict on the process and two parties to conclude the cpa. as i say in the last six months, we failed to find solution to the issues. although the framework presented by the african union high implementation which includes principals, but no solutions. and i think what is important now is to discuss the issue of the citizenship and economic lationship that it affects day-to-day lives of the people along the borders. if the issue of the citizenship is resolved, in the interest of both, i think it could open this place for political dialogue on the issues, and the kind of borders, and so on.

i think that is an entry for the positive referendum. there's no need for this huge military buildup that we see now along the borders. north of the borders and south of the borders, a very serious one. and the second challenge which i want to daw the attention to which people are not aware of it is the blue light. these twohave good forces inside south sudan, and also along the borders of 1956. these with military forces that they fought with the splm for the last years. they fought for their rights, they have the protocols. it's called south sudan on the complaints of the peace agreement on the resolution of the conflict. it is a protocol blue nile that will go through the public confrontation, and into negotiate with the centers and

once they agree then they protocol becomes a find binding peace agreement. at the moment, it's not a final binding for kurdufan and the blue nile. they have to g through negotiation. now recently the government or again the national congress party asked the splm to draw the forces and disarm and they cannot come over the 1956 borders with arms. and to redeploy up to the borders in 1956 in a way to cut strategic dephs between these forces and sothern sudan. blue nile i goin to refuse disarmament. because they know the public confrontation in the context now

of the referendum is sort of a constitutional vacuum. it is not going to break the final solution that it is acceptable to the people in southern kurdufan and the blue nile. as we know it was supposed to be happening in the context of half a year of the interim period that was the democratic elections and then people who are elected in the fair and free elections and then there is the public concern on the framework of the cpa. that's sort of the vacuum of the framework. you can imagine if the republican cofrontation is going to bring any lasting solution. that's why they want to keep their arms, they want to keep their forces. because they know there's a future challenge meeting them. so -- and i think this is a very big conference. recently south sudan agreed

president basheer. i think it is important. but the risk here is that ncp could disagree or change their mind from here until then. what happens if they try to move their forces up to their borders of 1956 with not recognizing the specifics of blue nile. that's one the serious risk. t cease fire agreement which is in southern kurdufan, if you remember, the geneva cease fire. there it is still valid. it might be debatable if it's valid or not. but there's an agreement. but the cpa did not specify anything for this information for the forces in the blue nile.

i think one the channels now is the two parties, they need to renew the cease fire agreement in southern kurdufan, and looking at how to maintain the cease fire in blue nile. i think this is one the very big challenges in the coming period. and that's the role of the international community, and it's very important and look into the public confrontation cannot happen in a constitution and vacuum. because the constitution of sudan is going to end in july 2011, after that what is the constitution? after that, the ublic is going to work on what? that's why a lot of people argue that the constitutional arrangements have to be debated before the public consultation. and therefore, until this happens, the cease fire needs to maintained in southern kurdufan and blue mile. -- blue nile.

people focus on abyei and they don't see this point. as we know that, all the time ncp wants to weaken it's part, because it's important to negotiate with a weakened splm. now with the referendum going, i think it's not subsiding. because even the southerners who are opposing the splm now at the moment, they can't go around the current. the referendum is going in new country so even the opposition parties, in south sudan, they need to be careful. at the moment, there is no leverages to use and so on. splm is becoming more stronger. but they might get weaker along the line. and as we are going to talk about it in the chalenges of south sudan. so in general, instability in south sudan is not -- but the political stability in south

sudan cannot happen unless there is a stability north sudan. and if this is a stable advisory. if the south hits one area, the north will be able to hurt it and vice versa. it's important there is stability in both, and if people want the stability in the south to progress, they have to seek the stability in the north. and ithink pluralism is the direction. for both south sudan and north, given the diversity of cultures and regional interest. it appears the splm is aware of this. they had the south of all parties on the conference, they agreed during the framework, it is still on paper. it needs to be implemented after the referendum, and the referendum of the party is over, so they move towards pluralism. but the problem in the north even if that president basheer

recently said he's calling for the national unity. it's a calling. but looking into the last 20 years and the six years, can we imagine that you had our 100% cpa to 28% or 48% of that and now there is a possibility to go to 100%. they are going to go for the national government to reduce your power to what? and that's a very big question. it's going to create the reasons for continue struggle in the north of sudan. and this, of course,, -- an approach like this for the no option for darfur. the dialogue as we see cairo agreement, old agreements, sudan is governed by so many

agreements, sudn, agreements, there are about seven or eight of them. they didn't go anywhere, incldes cpa which became the cease fire. the option is very clear. the darfurians picked it up. the darfur is not going anywhere. i think they did. if people lose the opportunity to go to the boxes to change the situation, hey will go for the boxes of ammunition rather than the books of elections to change the situation. now at moment, the south sudan is -- succession is a reality. and the government will not oppose it. and the acceptance of the north of the referendum hopefully it will reflect in the north and south, and then the south will start to deal positively with the north and the north to try to deal responsibly with the

pending issues. but, of course, that will be different dice if one or within one the two take a different approach. so if people use the secession of south sudan for regime change, some political forces think so, including people from outside, that is very dangerous for sudan. i think people need to be thinking very seriously about these. and it shouldn't be a step for a regime change. and a lot of people argue that in the recent america international community, market twist the arm of the ncp to accept the referendum and the results. and this perhaps encouraged te opposition party, darfur rebel groups to say now this is the

time since the bull has started to fall, it is time to take out the knife and kill the bull. i think that's very dangerous for sudan and stabily, not only for sudan, but the southern is highly mobilized, and it is highly mobilized and it will not be easy for them to let go. what is important here is to force a strategic cooperation and relationship between the nor and south, to look into the constitutional arrangements that i talked about it and how can the nrth and south address this issue of pluralism, but also for the north if there's no discussion about the constitutional arrangement, the public consultation will not be resolved, the conflict in darfur is not going to be resolved. you know that doha, i don't know where it is. i mean if somebody could tell me

what is a doha now? but there is an agreement. but that agreement if this is a genuine solution to darfur, then people ve to address the cardinal issue in sudan, governance. the issue of the center. and as i say, that will no be easy issue that the ncp will accommodate. that's why it is very difficult to go for vice president for the region, for the regional government and so on, because also the arabic tribes in darfur are seriously conflict, seriously conflicted, they want more districts and more states in southern darfur. now we know there is three. people are arguing for another three extra. because the idea -- the thinking of the division and so on that actually led to the conflict in darfur during the beginning of

this regime when they were trying to put the pluralism dividing darfur into the ditricts and borders between the ownership of the tribe was divided with the others. with so many districts, everybody started to want to have the control of that district which then led to the tril differences. and that was the beginning of their conflict in darfur. it started from the beginning of the '90s, because there is historical beginnings. but that was the key point. i agree with many people that darfur needs to be resolved from the bottom up. definitely darfur dialogu is extremely important. it is burg djibouti, and now darfur, they talked about it the darfur forum. now the government came out with a new strategy in darfur, let's

find the solution for doha, and bring it to darfur. in principal and theory, it is good. but if we look at it conceptually, it is very questionable. and i don' think it is a strategy that it will bring a lasting peace in darfur. because if it is to bring lasting peace in darfur, then the elections could have,hould have been a fair elections where they were presented in the counsel of the three states are two representatives. now it is a strategy put by the government to be discussed by the legislative states of the council of the three states which is actually the government, but th three governments, which is actually the government, but the tribal leaders who are corrupted by the government. so this is the government. it is the government with the governmen with the government, i don't know where the rebel groups and the rest of the darfur people. i think the african union high

implementation plan now they are advocating for let's go since doha is not going. i think the americans have the approach that we go for the darfur forum, i think it is a grave mistake and will deepen the crisis in darfur. and so i suggest let me make it short and just go over very quickly on the -- on south sudan before i go. for south sudan, theissues is the challenges are immense. as we know that now, the party will continue in couple of days until july 9. where then they became independent, and even the party will become more stronger, may finish maybe a dent of the year. there is one year of party jubilation and so on.

but they need to look into the political instability. splm is not stable, it's not professional army. so the issue of the security sector is a very big challenge for te splm. is is what political stability, inclusiveness, what they agree to is the south sudanese political parties. they need to force. they need really to implement it. first of all, the interim south sudan constitutional is ending in july, they need another interim or draft constitution for south sudan. that will be te law of the land. i think that is the first step. the ddr, isarmament of soldiers and so on, that's something that's not going very well. there's a lotof arms, a lot of militias, the disarmaments

didn't go well. if you look that it comes actually from the oil revenue from the north. half of it is going through this big, big security secr. army and so on, nothing going for social services and so on. they need to reduce that army so that some of this money money -t how they are going to do the integration and demobilization for people to do what i south sudan. even though coming from the north, we knw there's nothing for them at the moment. so imagine the challenges in front of them. of course, they have to address the issues of accountability very seriously. corruption is very high. and i think during the jubilation period, they will have to be careful thinking of how they are going to use the money. if they agree with the government of the north or the

ncp on the government of oil and so on. those issues are very, very serious. i'm not going to go into the details, as you all know, nothing has been agreed. but i think citizenship is very important. what ieally see is that the way forward here and that brings me to the regional and international players is that if we look into the region, egypt, libia, what is their interest on sudan? thewant stability. i think so. the issue of the nile waters that people talk a lot about as far as egypt is concerned, that is a bigger issue. the secession is not going to affect it any my opinion. south sudan will take it's share from north, from sudan's 15 or 18 billion cuber -- cubic meters. and still the corporation framework that's signed by five or six countries is going to be an issue. i don't see how south sudan is

going to affect this for a moment. egypt has been very good with south sudan all the way. actually working to make unify more attractive than the north. for utopia, it's a serious concern. they have borders with both countries, north and south. i think they are really looking for stability. but, of course, kenya, uganda, they invest on the cpa, now they are reaping the benefit of their hard work on the cpa. and hat business people, and they want the stability and, of course, they don't mind the secession because that will actually reaping their investment and reaping the investments of the last six years and so on. but, of course, people are generally concerned about the islamic discourse that the ncp might take. in my opinion, ncp became the middle-class business people looking into their interest of work, wealth, money, more than

becoming, you know, islamic and iranian egime. they are different in concept and principal. now the recent called to go back to sudan and beating of the all of that is addressing the internal twenty sis -- internal constituencies to keep them together. they are asking questions ab the leadership. it is not really solid. ithink that call to go back is an important call to maintain the unity of islamic. you know that division happened in 2000 when they left, and the rest left, and it is divided. i think it will be a problem. even for the rest of sudan. and but it's still -- they have a very big challenge for the ncp to have the decision. because decision now is in the hand of five or six.

the idea of sharia and the islamic course and process now it is very highly centralized. at the moment there's no shura. that will weaken the islamic behind the ncp. they ned to deal with them. i question the role of the regime change. so there's a lot of countries in the region, utopia, they think the egion change shouldn't be the way to go forward. it's hard to maintain the stility because ncp has the stability of moneys, weapons, and for the north, ncp has the monopoly. you need to deal with the ncp and the major players and how to get strategic cooperation between the north and south and final political stability, political stability in the north

cannot happen unless there is an openness for politicl dialogue for resolution of south sudan -- southern kurdufan and darfur, and resolution in darfur. i say this -- this cannot happen if there's no serious rethinking of the political system in the center and the restructuring of the state. maybe something is saying that this person is talking on behalf of the splm or the opposition party. and i don't know if anydy of the presenters of the government of sudan might say this person just read a couple of newspapers of opposition. but it is a reality. if that doesn't happen, i think sudan is going to face serious challenges. finally, north thinks that in sudan, south sudan, we can see there's a lot of challenges. it might take time. i think so. but the problems in the nort