course is exactly what the people want. completely understandable. but think about it this way. if the administration calls for elections now, if they are elections now in jipts, it would be the absolute worst thing for egyptian democracy in the long-term. it is a lesson hopefully this administration is going to learn. look at what happened with hamas in 2006 in gaza and iraq in 2004-2005. premature elections before you have political parties that are truly representative, before you have established order, before you have a way of conducting this, before you have a constitution, you will get the worst elements in society. >> this is your area. do you disagree? >> i do. i think that we always wishfully wait for elections to be held in places where everybody is tolerant. all the political parties are formed. the rules are very clear. this is never the case. elections are going to happen whether we likette or not.

in fact, they could be a galvanizing force if they are moved up. i think six months is too little time. i think you should talk about calling elections in three months. doesn't have to happen tomorrow. it is going to take a while. yes, there will be a scramble among political parties to figure out how to compete. there has to be tremendous pressure on the international count in make sure these elections are as free and fair as possible, which they have not been in many years. i think the obama administration needs to turn back the clock a little bit to look at the performance of the obama administration. there was a very, very stupid decision in the the obama administration made right off the bat to cut off steens civil society groups, assistance that had been started turned bush administration and that was a -- it was basically so that they could get the relationship back on track. there was a decision made. that ail yentsated a lot of --

alienated a lot of civil society groups. they felt that the obama administration, even though they were brought in a democratic process, was actually turning their backs on the civil society. there is a lot to make up for, i think with n the united states with the people of egypt. >> the problem i have with your prescription here is that mubarak has so effectively suppressed the political parties at the center of the secular center and allowed the muslim brotherhood to organize. they have an infrastructure. that secretary lar parties do not. you bring up the elections to three months from now then you're basically handing the election to the muslim brotherhood. is that the outcome you want? >> i don't think that is a -- first of all, i think the role of civic and youth movements in forcing political parties to get their act together should not be

underestimated. that was certainly the case in serbia and ukraine. the political parties could continue to factize and be there. i think albare day is not a charismatic figure but people might be willing to unify around him. he is not particularly frightening to the muslim world. i think they would want to be a part of a coalition government and then work towards it. >> can you comments on an aspect of this? i have talked to former diplomats and former administration figures who say some of this fear of the brotherhood taking over the islamist nature of this would not necessarily take root in egypt the way it might have in other countries and further mr., some of the concerns, martin -- furthermore, martin mentioned this, going back to iran and the shaw. we're in a different place. -- the shah.

what is your perspective? >> i don't think welcome compare with it iran today. it has committed toiths a democratic process. the brotherhood of yesterday is not the brotherhood of today. yes, there are things that we as americans won't be comfortable with ins of their positions, women's rights and minority rights but i think we have to recognize that they are not extremists in saying iran or elsewhere, in terms of what their objectives are here, they are not going to try to win an election, even if they could. some purposely lose elections even if they run in slates. jordan, egypt, bahrain, kuwait, they never run more than 50% of the total districts or the total seats. why? because they are again aware that this would either provoke the regime or provoke the international community. they do remember what happened in algeria.

they remember 2006 with hamas. so there is a certain degree of pragmatism here about what they are willing to do. i'll just say one more thing on that. the brotherhood's focus now is going to be rebilling their organization. they have been repress increasingly the last seven years. thepped to get their message out. they are not interested in power just yet. maybe down the road they will be more. i think they have a more specific focus in the short run. >> let me -- i'm going to bring back couple of realtime items. first of all, martin, israel. just describe what's happening there, the level of anxiety. we've heard very little from prime minister netanyahu. >> believe it or not, today, in israel, they are totally preoccupied with a fight between the defense minister and the chief of staff about who is going to take over as chief of staff.

so chi vow burning but they are having a little argument about who is going to be in what chair, believe it or not. -- cairo is burning right now. they are deeply concerned about what this means. for the egypt/israel peace treaty, for the monostrategic alliance that has been built up over 20 years, with common enemies, whether it is al qaeda, extremist palestinian groups, in particular hamas in gaza and of course iran. and if mubarak is leaving, they are entering into a whole new world, which can be highly problematic for them. we could be seeing -- i don't think so by the way, but from their point of view, they are very concerned that this will be the unraveling of the whole peace process, the israel peace

treaty that will give jordan and wonder what will happen there as well. so i think feel that they cannot influence events, horrified that the obama administration's has kind of given up on mubarak and how will they behave toward jordan or israel when it comes to the bottom line, will the united states be with israel when it is in trouble? >> i want to ask the question that my team and i are asking as we think about our program on sunday, which will be dedicated in large measure to the story, which is what are some of the scenarios we're looking at? we have a long-term scenario, which is do we stay at this sort of impasse until september? what would cause mubarak to leave in the next two days? what do you think about in terms of media? the white house is watching as well. >> sure, i think that obviously,

again, it is a revolution and revolutions are inherently unpredictable. we can look to all kinds of different revolutions for guidance. one responsibility a continued standoff for some period of time. history suggests that it won't be forever. other force also come in and start to pull things, probably me a very negative direction. again, the army could start to unravel. the moderate opposition could start to unravel. they could become radicalized. you could see it moving into a chaotic situation like iran. it was not clear exactly who was going to be in charge and there was a fight among the different opposition groups who was going to be in charge. i think it is one that a lot ofnologist europe and the united states and the region would like to see, mubarak being moved offcenter but the army stepping in with suleiman or some other transitional figure and effectively playing the role of the old turkish military.

an orderly troigs the democracy. that is the scenario that many people in washington would like to see happen. the situation is getting completely out of hand and they need to step in and crack down. we should not rule that out. >> the u.s. government has been concerned about some kind of shock as a result of all of this. where do we stand? >> again, if in thing, oil barrel is $90 and $100 in london and if this thing is protracted, we can expect that to go even up with consequences for this fragile recession, obviously. just for the scenarios. there is the tunisia scenario and nobody knows where it is going. the military is playing, i

think, an important role and i think we should expect that, probably that scenario to unfold in egypt as well. as for the -- for izzrailt, i don't think we should -- look, israel or the united states, i think they have to adjust to a new environment. this is a new environment. i don't think whoever is in charge would dismantle the peace treaty with israel, but there is going to be, you know, a new relationship. >> all right. i want to get to some questions here and i'll ask everybody to be pointed and brief in their questions. we're going to try and do that in our responses as well so we can keep this conversation going. as we get ready to do that both here and doha, let me get a quick comment from you, shadi, if i may, implications on oil

prices. what is your take from there? >> well, oil prices have gone up significantly, along with a whole list of economic consequences. i mean, this is going to have a devastating effect on the regional economy. it already has and we're talking about stock market crashes that we haven't seen really in decades in terms of egypt's stock market, saudi arabia's stock market, so there really is a panic here in terms of the economic situation. the real swoir that if these protests continues indefinitely, there isn't more reassurance about stability in egypt and the broader region, we're going to see a continued decline in the regional economy. that will of course have an effect on the u.s. economy. >> go ahead, please. >> $100 a barrel oil for the iranians does a lot to take down the pain of the sanctions that we're putting on them. so they must be sitting there

rubbing their hands with glee at the moment. >> talk about iran. that has not coming up >> i was hoping he was going to get to that. the iranians don't see this the way that we do. we see this as an oppressed people rising up against corrupt governments. to us it looks like iran. iran is looking at this as an eants american movement. they think this is playing to their advantage. they see mubarak as the most anti-iranian going down. i think they feel they are very much advantaged, add to that martin's point about oil prices. one of the things we have to worry about, to what extent is it to their strong stoke the flames? i'll comboom to my lenin analogy. we have seen iran and al qaeda

cooperate in the past. we have to be very attune to it right now. the potential for both of these groups to see it in their interest to make the situation in egypt even worse. >> i would say that the iranian government is not impervious to public pressure having just dealt with the green revolution. in fact, i thought it was interesting they stept up the repression of picking up people, even more people, executing some people. so they are also not -- they are worried internally too, that this might reignite an opposition movement which they had successfully for now repressed. >> let's get to our audience. we'll tart in the back. yes, young -- we'll start in the back. yes, young lady. >> hello. i'm -- are we meant to state our names? >> sure. >> haley cook with the business association.

so my question is what do events in egypt and tunisia mean for libya? >> anyone? >> well, i mean, we heard what qaddafi said. how the rhetoric has evolved from support and lecturing the tunisia people and warning. he becomes a champion, as he said, of the people. definitely, he is worried. he has been in power for decades and he is really concerned. obviously libyan society, which has different social conditions. its make-up differs from that of algeria and tunisia. that does not give solace to

qaddafi. so yes, he is as worried as everybody in that region, including obviously morocco. >> yes, sir, in the back? >> thank you. joe bosco with csis. i wanted to ask a question beyond the region, obviously there are governments around the world that are watching this situation. particularly the one in beijing, which the last time saw a region swept with revolution was in the 1980's and that resulted in china, tienemen square. censoring the news from egypt except when the violence started to emerge, they are broadcasting that. would you comment on the situation? >> just quickly. i think you have captured the answer in the question. one thing that i understand has

happened is that the chinese have told mubarak, hang in there. we have got your back. not surprise glirks the russian government has done the same. >> because autocrats stick together. >> we ve a question here from our audience. thank you very much. what does this change mean for the u.s. in terms of the future balance of power in the region? the u.s. recently lost lebanon, probably tunisia and now egypt. >> obviously the government is concerned about who would take mubarak's place. >> this is a critical situation. i would like to start with a point that jennifer made before. the obama administration came out of the gate and gave a wonderful speech in cairo and did nothing about it.

in fact, turned their back on the efforts of political and economic social reform. the way the united states needs to come out of it is to recognize that mistake and realize that is the way the united states is going to have to redefine its role in the future. the united states needs to be an engine of change to enable reform, hopefully not as explosively as it has happened in egypt. hopefully convince all the allies in this region, they too need to move down this path. >> there is a big conversation about the bush administration, the freedom agenda, president bush's second inaugural, pushing specifically on egypt's door and then stepping back. what is more important that there was a -- the likes of the administration talking about freedom was coming or the disappointment associated with not continuing to push? >> i actually think that the opening in the first -- the market that the middle east was put -- the fact that the middle east was put on the political

reform agenda. no other administration had ever thought of human rights and democracy in the middle east. it was off the table. even when there was great disappointment when the bush administration eased back after the hamas, which i think is a completely different situation and frankly, the elections in egypt where the muslim brotherhood had a relatively strong showing, i thought that was a mistake, but i think that people then were reenergized in looking to the fwurings really sort of recommit themselves to reform, and this decision, even before the cairo speech to cut off all assistance, was terrible. yes, we need to get back on the track. does it need to be with the second inaugural with that kind of language? no. but it needs to be real. words need to be followed by real actions and that is not what this administration has done so far in democracy and human rights? >> martin, do you have a single

digitly different take in defense of what the administration has done? >> this is somewhat of a personal policy for me in in the 1990's in the clinton administration baltz of power was all that i thought wu important here, stability was critically important. barack at that point -- mubarak at that point was facing a violent extremist movement. we have to get with it. the tide of history is moving in a very clear direction, and if we wring our hands and say the balance of power, we have to worry about stability, no, we have to get on the side of the people who are demanding freedom, because that is what we believe in above all. then the question is how do we get -- in that context protect our interests? that is the critical question. you know, the coing jordan, another ally of the united states, has said he wantingses

rapt rapid political reform. we have to help him move on that front. we have got to do the same thing with all of the autocratic leaders. we have to get behind them at least verbally. this is going to create an opportunity for us to lead a dramatic change towards democracy in this part of the world. >> it is amazing that we can have conversations ip, kind of fundamental conversations about the middle east and we almost take it for granted, oh, well, jordan, there is no democracy. there are certain reforms that are going to take place now. it seems almost obscene that you can ignore the elephant in the room but it is a kingdom. let's get back to questions here. sorry? i'm sorry. shadi, you wanted to make a

point? go ahead. >> sure. i just wanted to add to martin's point. i think there is a real danger here that the obama administration will be remembered as resisting change and that is a big danger. let's say hypothetically this spreads throughout the region and we do see changes and see autocrats stepping down. we the last thing we want is for these leaders of these countries to think we were not on their side. it is still not too late. if the obama administration gets ahead of this, we know that u.s. credibility is very low under obama. favorability is very low throughout middle east. this is a chance for us to regain influence and to understand how the region is changing and reorient fundamentally hour foreign policy. a lot of people are talking about a fundamental reorientation after 9/11. we didn't actually do that. now i think is a chance to take

that post 9/11 rhetoric and back to reality. >> back to our questions. here, yes. >> i'm not so sure how -- being called a bolshevik. my question is considering that mubarak has been the shepherd basically of -- what does it do to the future of this process considering that the region has been -- authority for what is going on in egypt? >> the palestinian leadership in the west bank has relied on egypt for political cover, particularly for the effort to engage in negotiations with israel to try and resolve palestinian conflict with israel in that way. and they therefore are feeling, i think, somewhat like israel, a little naked at the moment and

are not able to do anything about this circumstance. but what is interesting, the two elements that are fueling the revolt here, lack of political freedom and lack of economic opportunity, at least on the economic opportunity front, west bank palestinians are doing quite well today and so they don't have the same unhappiness about their economic circumstances and taking actionsginess a key figure and putting him under investigation and signaling that he is going to take corruption and anti-corruption measures seriously. they don't have, it seems a problem like many of the other arab autocrats have at the moment. what does it mean for the israeli-palestinian negotiations? they were already dead in the water. this is not going to revive

them. it is going to cause a distraction. nobody imagines by solving the palestinian problem, you're going to be able to deal with what's happening in egypt. most people don't believe that. having said that, while the focus is everywhere else, it would be a hovel a good time for the israelis and palestinians, the palestinian leadership, to actually resolve their differences, take advantage of that everyone is focused on them. there are things that can be done on the ground by israelis, which is withdrawing the army which will give them a sense that something is happening that is positive for them. >> bust through the gates here and put down your own plan? >> i agree completely with tom that this is the moment that the israelis should find a way to do something to diffuse the

palestinian issue before what's happening in the rest of the arab world comes around again, and it inevitably will to focus on the palestinian problem. that's the way that israel gets on the side of history. >> jennifer, i want to ask a question. we'll take a few extra minutes, by the way, if everybody is willing, for additional questions. i wrote down here, what is the spark? what sparked this? how did we get to this moment? in my coverage of washington and the iraq war, i remember, let's put aside the huge debated about w.m.d. and the rest. what happened is after 9/11, the united states grabbed the region by the scruff of the neck, decapitated one of its leaders and basically sent a message that we will change the face of this region and reorients it. shadi just made mention of that. as chaotic as it was, is there a connection between that and what

we're seeing today? >> no. >> you don't buy it? >> i don't buy it. of course everything is connected but egypt has had its own story for a long time. i mean, i first went to egypt in 1985 when there were hopes that mubarak would start opening up then. so, you know, one cannot believe that there have been more crisis in egypt. all of the ingredients have been there. so the spark was really about tunisia and the events there and it was also about wikileaks and that helped tunisia, but it was the sense that if they can do it in tunisia, and tunisia was considered to be absolutely immovable. nobody even talked about politics in tunisia, because the chance of change was so distant. they talked about french politics there because there was nothing to talk about for

tunisia. so for tunisia to go down sparked something that has been building far long time in egypt and actually got people off into the streets. i would say this one point on the internet, the fact that the egyptian government cut off the internet and facebook and cell phone technologies was the worst possible thing they could have done because people had to get out from behind their computers and out of the cafes into the streets. for those that are looking into turning these kind s of communication devices off, they had better think twice. >> what about that? before the notion of speaking to the egyptian quality of a revolution, before the concept of nationalism, we talked about arab nationalism that went beyond these artificial borders that were the creation over the europeans. in this particular case, is there anything to that? whether it is through direct link to iraq or whether there is

this freedom movement that -- >> there is no link obviously between iraq and what we are seeing and certainly not between the president bush agenda and what we are seeing. certainly not the people in the streets. that is a bit laughable. what we are seeing is this is really a revolution about frustrated expectations and we hear about the rise of prices. that's what triggered it. it is only part of the story. we have seen riots before. but for people, you wrote about it, ken, people who live in the region, people who travel to the region, people who speak to the region, in the last few years, we have seen a gap that has become -- a gap between what the people expect and what the state can deliver. the autocratic stage cannot keep

up with people's demands. remember, in 2008, riots broke out. that was a first in tunisia. that's when people started talking, well, maybe something is going on. that in tunisia, we see riots, this revolution didn't start in tunisia, by the way. it started in morocco. that's what i see happening all over the place. >> we mentioned a couple of times. >> the arab states have reached a prerevolutionary state because of economic, political stagnation of the region. what i did in that book is went back to the old litsch on

revolutions and i point out, these wonderful scholars of revolution have been writing about it, it is all in the middle east. it was either going to be a gradual process of reform or a process of revolution. the last point on that, it is also important to keep in mind that the terrorism that we face is born of the exact same problem. the terrorists, the osama bin laden, they are frustrated revolutionaries. they all started to -- tried to start revolutions in their own countries and turned to terrorism when they found they couldn't start the social revolution and they turned to us because they saw us as standing behind the power of the governments. >> there are also anihilists who are also evil. >> those people are always there. you'll find those people who'll find the frustration and anger

and frustration of the people and take it to ridiculous violence. >> let's get back to our questions. >> thanks. garrett mitchell from the mitchell report. i want to try to link two thoughts here. one is the picture of david gregory and martin indyk sitting before that twitter board on sunday and martin making the observation that what you're seeing here is the 21st century revolution mode or revolution. and then to the comment that was made in doha about how this was going to force a fundamental realignment in america on policy. my question is are we talking solely about the middle east? and arguably south asia? or if we -- if this is a serious

suggestion that this is going to force some realignment, fundamental realignment on american foreign policy, is that irrespective of geography? is what is being proposed here or suggested here that america is going to have to narrow the gap between its values and its interests in dealing with countries not only in the middle east and south asia, but elsewhere. >> jennifer? >> i hope so. [laughter] yes. as a democracy and human rights advocate, we would hope that would be the case. but -- and each administration i think has sort of taken this on and grappled with it and in certain cases they have stepped back. i think what you have seen from the obama administration is they have tried engagement with a number of large authoritarian

countries and they haven't gotten a lot done. they have tried with russia and i know there have been some gains with china. you also -- in iran, they started with engagement, north korea, they have tried a lot and are finding that engagement is not bringing results on the national security side and it is at tremendous expense to our values so they are going to have to realign themselves, whether it will be the gap between our values and our interests really does change. probably not across the board but i think it might in some cases. i hope it does. >> we're ready for another question in doha but charlie, i want you to comment -- shadi, i want you to comments on this. this is somehow the opening for an islamist political movement to take root in egypt and beyond and the more extreme cases, it

has been talked about a return to the califate. what is factor or fiction? >> none of these -- talking about that, i think some of these fears are a little bit exaggerated. there are concerns about the brotherhood's position on the peace treaty and counterterrorism, cooperation with the u.s. the u.s. does have national security interests that will be affected by this. that is why i think the way to address that is to engage with opposition groups before they come to power rather than afterwards when it is too late. you don't have leverage with them afterthey are in power. we have leverage with them now. that's why i think dialogue has to start. we should have started several years ago. we had that conversation with the brotherhood and told them this is a red line or that's a red line and there was an

exchange of views. so i think we're a little bit late in game but i think it is time to start now in reaching out. >> the other question from doha? turn on your mic. >> can you please comment on the silence of the leaders and what country do you think will be next, if any? >> goodness. i don't see what they can say. i mean, we have seen utter silence again from morocco to algeria. only libya's leader, qaddafi came out and supported that. obviously, all of a them are nervous. all arab autocrats. that explains obviously why they are silent. they don't like what they are seeing and they are terrified.

what happens if mubarak does actually leave or fall? remember, tunisia was just the spark or the trigger, but as one scholar put it, egypt is really the prize, because the way egypt goes, the way the arab world will go, as we have seen it in the 1950's with the arab nationals and the rise of political islam, so that is why -- there is nothing to say. are you going to stand with the people? the same demands? your people have the same demands as what we're seing in egypt. so they are just wait and see and praying that mubarak is here and will wait until september and take it from there. >> so many countries who play an important role diplomatically, strategicically, and i think about where you're sitting and i

think about persian gulf countries, but who are autocratic. what must they be thinking right now? >> well, i mean, if i was an official in any of these countries i would be pacing in my room right now wondering what to do. >> your big palacial room. >> one thing is if they see the u.s. putting pressure on mubarak, they might start to wonder if they will be next. they can starts to initiate reforms rather than wait for their own revolution. i think it also makes us all realize, or them realize, that supporting western interests isn't going to be enough. that they have to go beyond that and really address the demands of their people. there is a widespread perception in the arab world that these

leaders are part of the western orbit and that is the main concern and people are not provided for and democracy is not a consideration. that's what i would say on that. >> we haven't talked about syria. >> i thought about that. >> the point here is that nobody has really noticed, this is a sunni revolution. it is an egyptian revolution obviously but for sunnis in syria, they have suffered under the brutal hand of the regime and they are coming out on the streets tomorrow. we'll see exactly where that goes. it may not go very far, but the regime itself, is a fairly hollow regime. it has the ability to break heads. we sauna in this 1970's. the syrian leader was kind of

caulky about it. >> just a word about saudi arabia. it has been loosening a bit. clearly aware of what's going on. can the saudis get by with their methodical progress in expanding democracy, human rights or do they have to step it up now and risk a revolution? . . >> i am going to make changes to accommodate new, but it is not as fast as some would like it to

go, but you are seeing that people do not like to rouble. it takes a lot to drive people to revolution, and if the government says, we understand your plight and are going to change, that is typically all people need to hear. continuing. it is less about how fast you go, it is more about the constancy. what i worry about in saudi arabia, is the replacement of king abdullah by a new monarchs to not have the same attitude about reform. he took on a bureaucracy. he took on members of his own family. he had to fight hard for the limited changes he has been able to make. it will be very surprising if when he died in that another member of the royal family who is not interested in that. that could be a calamity.

the saudi arabian people now expect constant change. revolutions occur when all of a sudden expectations are dashed. >> away in the back. -- way in the back. >> thank you. so far the obama administration has reacted to the events. what do you think they want as a first priority? do they want a major regime or do they want to have a transition government that they a military regime? why do they want? >> i think they want an orderly transition where everything stays the same. i think anything they do not like pales' on the street, but they are not in favor of the

military coming in. that would be a huge -- that would not necessarily serve their interests in the long- term. i think they are trying to figure out how you strengthen and put your weight behind your moderate leadership. i would add that in a lot of arab countries right now, the leaders are transferring their money out. i would not be surprised if some of the delayed for president mubarak, his family, and his colleagues or because they are repositioning their assets. you could track their financial flows nc which leaders are most nervous. -- and see which leaders are most nervous. >> they prefer a peaceful transition. that is to say, the military

will not fire on the people and, thereby, eliminate the stability to steer the situation. the situation is with the military in terms of the influence we have on them. the bully pulpit in terms of making sure we support democracy -- beyond that, there is not much we can do except to hope and pray that it comes out ok. >> i will give you one more final word. for all the uncertainty, what are the big questions you have in mind about the days to come? >> the big question is the military. we have to keep a big eye on the military. will they tell mubarak peonies to leave sooner rather than later? will they try to confront the demonstrators and clear them out of the square and impose a new

military order? of course, what will the demonstrators do? will they come out in tens of thousands on friday as a further manifestation of their commitment to seeing at newport go, -- to seeing mubarak go? this is not going to be resolved in the next day or two. this is going to take months if not years before we know that there is a new government in place. >> we are going to leave it there. this conversation can go on and, indeed, will go on. these professionals dedicate themselves to this region in the world with their scholarship. there could not be a more dynamic an interesting time.

we were watching the news last night. my eight-year old asked why the people were fighting for their freedom. i told him it was that important for freedom and the people around the world. it is a great moment and we will keep the conversation going. thank you very much. [laughter] [applause] >> in a few moments, a discussion with journalists on political movements in the middle east and how the unrest that began in tunisian of nate affect the region. . -- may affect the region. later in our report on iran's nuclear program and ben bernanke says the economy continues to

improve. on and "washington journal" tomorrow we will have the latest on egypt. they will take your questions about energy policy and the oil markets and will focus on unemployment and jobs. that is live on c-span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> i will not make age an issue of this campaign. i will not exploit my opponent's youth and inexperience. >> look at the life and presidency of ronald reagan online at c-span video library. more about how the political

unrest that began in tunisia may affect the middle east. panelists include journalist from the bbc and "the economist. this is an hour and a half. >> i work as the associate director for the middle east, focusing on politics from the middle east. we have seen four arab governments fall in the past few weeks.

every arab country has its opposition group. they tend to be very weak, but they are feeling inspired and emboldened by what is happening. that is going to have used of facts. we have seen little pressure in the world. the ripple effects may take time, but the barrier of sealer is broken. there is an idea of the interior of fear is gone now.

>> the just struck me the it is almost five i did not have time to check my blackberry, because it could be changing by the second. it's difficult to talk about, we could talk about how we got here in terms of talking about where we're going, it's very, very tentative. my headline would be absolutely momentous. let's keep in mind the events happening in the middle east right now are momentous. certainly the biggest in my lifetime. i think the consequences will effect them for a long time. i join jane in thinking the barrier of fear is broken but urge caution where we know that revolution can go various ways. if we see the uranium example, i don't want to see the new leadership of egypt end up in london in two years with the muslim brotherhood in power. that would be dangerous. i'm sure we'll discuss further

but i think those would be my headlines. >> if you are plugged in to the wider world and got news from respected sources, please interrupt us as we're going along. >> hello, everyone, thanks for coming. my name is mustafa. i'm a research fellow at william foundation based here in london. i lived most of my life in egypt and my headline would be i'm sad and happy, actually for what's happening in egypt. sad for the scenes we've all seen and sad for the old reasons that everyone is sharing with me here, seeing people killed for actually what they are fighting for, and i'm happy again for the fear factor that is eased from people's minds. understanding actually that -- understanding what happened in relation to -- in perspective of this fear factor, egyptians rediscovered, they rediscovered

thems, they rediscovered their ability, they have a voice that needs to be heard. and my statement would be, i hope that everyone would actually hear people's voices and the pollations' voice for the first time in the middle east people would consider what people say not what their statements say. >> i'm editor of online and interactive programs at bbc arab. i started works as a yourblist in 1990, a few tais after saddam hussein invaded kuwait. since then, i've been covering news in the middle east and egypt and others in the mid 1990's. we're all struggling to understand what's going on in egypt and what's going to happen. i'll take on something that occurred a few minutes ago, we've heard from our audience as well, the word broke the

barrier of fear. it looks like from talking to, from messages and the interaction we're having with our audience is that people in the middle east, it's dawned on them that they don't have to live like this. there is another opportunity. they can change something. now, we're all weighing up all the possibilities, whether it's going to be a real move to democracy or something more sinister will come up, personally i'm optimistic. i think we are about to witness a historic change in the region and indeed in the whole world. i believe it's going to be for the better. >> thank you all very much. anyone at this early stable wants to chip in? please say who you are. you're welcome to make a constituentment -- statement or question and wait for the microphone. >> hi, my name is stephon, i'm

a student of photography at the london college of communication. we heard that in yordan as well there were crises going on but we don't get that much in the news anymore, because egypt is attracting all the attention. do you have any information about jordan and other places as well? >> yesterday, they dumped the government, which has only been in pow fer a few months and starting a new one. they allowed half a billion dollars of new subsidies. this is something we see everywhere, not economic reform but populist economic policies and some connected political reform. yemen also, they announced a bunch of economic reforms including, you'll be glad to know, strapping student tuition fees and the president has also

said that he will step down at the next elections but we have heard him say that also before the last election. >> can i just, i mean i kind of -- i want to sharpen that a little, i would call it emergency measures. we're seeing the ripple effect, immediate, bread riots in jordan on what we could call a regular basis but this is entirely different. it's a ripple effect and emergency action for the government and they hope to hang on. >> besides yemen and jordan, i hear from friends in syria and algeria, they're calling for mass protest on the fifth of february and the 12th of february in syria and algeria. whether this is a domino effect or not, we'll have to wait and see. >> when we talk about domino effect, we have to be care to feel look at each country individually. for instance, in jordan, there's -- the monarchy is very stable.

even the strongest opposition do not call for the king to go and they want to king to remain. you have to look at each country separately. >> and we'll make sure to do that this evening. you are next at the back. i heard the king is giving $3,500 a month. that's kuwait for you. to the back. >> heard about an egyptian couple, they were amazed by this, for us it was normal, come out -- when we left, it was normal, now -- >> use the microphone. >> you mentioned five years, enough has been really working the streets of cairo so your sense it's been building up for five years. where, if any, is the threat and where did it start?

>> thank you for that will you give us a sense of the shock you feel? i believe you were a student in cairo, please respond to luke, he's asking you to be human about this and then use your head. let's go down the panel this way. tell us about the shock and where it came from. >> a correspondent from bbc after events in tunisia went on the streets in egypt to poor neighborhoods and asked people if they think the same could happen in ikentucky roe? do you want change? and he was met by overwhelming apathy. people were just saying, we're ok. mubarak is ok. we have food. so 25th was really a shock. i think it's a testament to how detached from reality all the observers and even the government was and i believe that the anger and the dissatisfaction was building up over years and even decades and

it was buttonned inside just waiting for a trigger to blow and this is what's happening. >> in the last five years, in addition to what you said, we have the sixth of april movement and about 200 strikes, small scale strikes in every worn -- corner of the country, probably not widely reported in the western media. i think the frustration with smaller attempts of strike and making the loud, the voice louder and louder, all this had been accumulated, it needed a group, basically. >> can you give us a sense of what it means to you, what it feels in your heart you grew up in egypt when you tell luke how you're -- >> this is quite difficult for me, having been there until three years ago and have actually my family still there. talking to my niece the other day, she was crying, basically, she's only four or five years

old, she doesn't really understand what's happening but at the same time i talk to her mom afterwards and i told her, i think those kids will hopefully have a better life than the ones we had. unfortunately, it's quite costly. unfortunately, we have hundreds of people have been killed. but i believe it's time for change. not necessarily in a revolutionary way but mubarak himself, he did not create any political rivalry. he created political culture for people to generate other position groups. >> where did it come from and -- you said momentous but spell it out. >> on that, i'm not going to be going anywhere near the emotion stuff, it's not my emotive area but in terms of analysis, gigantic intelligence failure in my view and a gigantic policy failure we should discuss about where western policy has gone wrong because western policy is implicated in this. >> will the audience allow you

to wash your hands of it emotively. >> i didn't mean to say i watch my -- i wash my and of it. i merely mean because of the demendably -- of the way he made it. >> let's take a poll, the west has a case to answer, hand up. you can emote all you like. >> the root cause of unhappyness have been building up for years. i think it was clear there would be problems in 2011. we were already seeing it begin to deter foreign investment into egypt. people's attentions previously were focused on september when the presidential election was due. there was a question about whether the president would take that opportunity to install his son. this protest ofian 25 wasn't expected to be big. what changed recently was

tunisia. that showed people that demonstrators could change things. >> i propose we come back to some of these issues. i promised to return to them. you want us to spell out, don't say every country is the same, discuss the domino effect clearly. you want us to discuss the intelligence failure. i'll take some more questions but i promise to bring these themes out before we leave. do try to remember we won't lose the important matters but you're important to us as well. you're first, you're second, you're third. >> i'm camilla, my company tracks a lot of news on a weekly basis using a database and i can't help but notice that at the moment, the lack of stuff being written about saudi arabia. john snow was trying to sort people out about what's going on in saudi arabia and somebody said they'd been confiscating satellite phones from ex-pats, there were a high number of

policemen, mrp usual at last friday's prayers. i wonder if you'd heard anymore about that and if people are getting nervous there in saudi arabia as well. >> absolutely. i gather the public is glued to the tv, i talked yesterday to two friends who just came back. king abdullah of saudi arabia was probably the most outspoke on the arab leaders to speak out about mubarak. what is interesting is i think we do need to look particularly hard at the countries where there's a question of succession and where the ruler is aging. in saudi arabia, the king is age, he's been out of the country for most of the past six months and people, whether they're working in foreign policy, diplomacy or the oil sector are saying there's a kind of paralysis when it comes to policymaking because it's a top-down process and the top level isn't doing well. the next in line, the next three people in line to the

throne are also on the older side and there are, who knows, there's speculation but there are concerns about the health of all of them. i think that is a big flash point. i think it will be interesting to see if any of the next generation of princes that could be in line for the throne might try to make common cause with some of the reformers. generally in saudi arabia, people talk about limited reform. they're not actually saying a lot about other countries. >> a linked question here. >> it's interesting you asked that question, i want to ask a similar question about saudi arabia and also countries like libya as well. i work at a construction company and i had a month working in libya. we were working for a section of the government, their account was the yen people's committee. what was surprising the most whenever the general people's committee was brought up, it was like, oh, they can't

mention the government, but they laffed about it, they said, we have no power. they were incredibly complay sent about it. in regimes like saudi, like libya, what do you think, do you think the ripple effect is going to have that big a wave and get that far? >> i bet your friends -- you'd like our friend to stop using phrases like "like saudi arabia" and "like libya." would you like to make your pitch? >> i said we need to look at each country on its own but there are common threads between all of these countries. i'll give you a story or two to explain this. on our website, we publish the forums that put we a -- put a topic, political issues to valentine's day and football and everything. one thing we noticed is that in many of these forums, the debate turns into critsisme --

criticism to arab leaders. it's as if people in the middle east blame arab leaders for everything from failure in football to, you know, commercials, consumerist societies, to -- so there is a common thread. people are fed up. and the internet opens new opportunities for people and the media. for instance, in saudi arabia recently, we did something about women's rights in saudi arabia. we heard from women inside saudi arabia criticizing the establishment. i was astonished because for me, this was the first time i hear this voice, a woman inside saudi arabia, on air, openly talking to millions of people, crit sidesing the religious establishment. >> to the back of the room with the microphone, then to the front and you're next. >> my question is in many ways linked to saudi arabia. how long do you think the saad

family has and -- the saud family has and what are the implications for the price of oil and the financial markets on what's going on in the middle east? >> do you want to take this? >> i think this is probably jane's subject. i will say one comment about the domino effect. even if it's not a governmental level, popular level, i think we can see a real government reforms are taking place, we can see people are, again, i think they are rediscovering the power of people, not only in a sensational way but the absence of political culture and in much of the region, we have to admit that this was the problem and blaming the leaders for everything is a problem that is generated from this passive attitude and so what we can see is at least if there's no revolution, uprising,

violent clashes or anything, each individual, at least many individuals, would reconsider the abilities and capacities. >> the question is, how long does the saudi royal family have? >> i think it's going to be a transition to a constitutional monarchy, the easiest thing to do is try to weaken the powers of the monarchy, not overthrow it completely. i think while the oil is still there, they'll probably still be there too. >> the price of oil, anyone want to comment on that? it's not going down. i was a wall treat reporter for seven years, it's not going down. do you want to say anything? >> no, i would if i may very quickly like to say something on the ripple effect as well. i think of course it's completely true in terms of keeping the countries accept -- each country a separate entity

and analyzing but there's something to it. the media, every conference you go to, let's talk about the role of the media. now we really need to talk about the role of the media. >> in the fall of the communist state in 1988, would the media have been an accelerant, what took five years if you argue about it, would that have -- would it have accelerated the process in the way that a process is being accelerated here? >> let me go back to the eyippings example and the internet effect in what happened in the last few weeks. this is something completely ignored by the media observers because in -- in egypt because the media is watched by the government and the police. people have been calling for this event,ian 25, and people say, you have 200,000 have liked it or said they're going to attend this event and people obviously didn't take it seriously.

it started with a few thousand, maybe a hundred thousand, but the reporting on facebook and tweeting and all this on loon has motivated people, if you're sitting on facebook, get out in the street and do what you have to do. that's why friday they had to shut it down. >> let's go to the audcrens now. >> my name is martha walter, i'm a former journalist. my question is about israel. i wanted to ask, i know this is going to call for a highly speculative answer but it's an interesting thing to entertain, whether the -- this could be a changing moment for the impactability of the eab-israeli conflict. >> that's big enough. >> let me split it into two separate bits, the first bit, the israelis are quite often ahead of others in terms of saying that we support somebody like mubarak because it

provides the stability they feel more secure with than they would with a democratic alterptive. they appreciate you don't know what happens in the tradition. of course we're talking about the entire southern region from israel downwards in a coal manner but pacified to a small extent. there are other problems we don't have time discuss but really it's up in the air now and no doubt they're extremely worried about what's going to happen. >> the concern about -- do you want to change it? >> you have to come back at the end. >> it's related to a possible transition group to take over the muslim brotherhood, i'm sure this topic would come up later. israel's concerns are legitimate in a way because of the spoth of mubarak, they're happy with mubarak and everything was peaceful in the government. if anything would happen in the future, i think what the israelis should do in the

future is selling peace to the people not only the government and start actually to believe that stability could also be parallel with democracy and if they manage to convince the egyptians, more than their government, that they could be a friendly neighbor, i think the egyptians would be happy. obviously, a palestinian deal and other topics we don't have time for. >> i have one more question. >> we'll take the microphone from there and give you -- not a good half nns you're really in trouble. >> i think it's pretty good. what i wanted to say is could it be game- the chaplain:ling in the sense and forgive me for being sim police -- simplistic but i think there's a reason to ask this question, there's a -- a lot in the arab world may be focusing their attention on a common enemy rather than potential solutions to the con frict. that's what i wanted to ask you.

it's not just about egypt and mubarak but about a real game change that we haven't seen before. >> yes,ic there's some -- yes, i think there's some truth in that. i think they're trying to dissuade from that by trying to make people hate israel by allowing anti-semitism in the state media, i was waiting to see how low it would be before people came out to blame zionists for the riot. or i'm waiting for the to say, these rioters have been trained in america by the jews. >> the u.s. has provided funding in the name of aid to egypt to sponsor the services in egypt and the army. over the past 10 years, the arch is eight billion pounds per anumb for services and army. we heard that four days ago that mubarak actually changed the constitution slightly and created someone who is head of

the secret service and the army as me the premier. given that he's going to step down to set the process for creating a transition to a more meaningful democratic representation, to what extent really are we going to have people representation or -- and to what extent is it political change doctored by the united states of america? . .

>> they have a lot of people because of facebook. they can just throw rocks. isn't it a absolutely strategy because of mubarak. our friends say, if you leave it long enough. there will be people wearing different suits and linked to those outside the country. >> i imagine a difference in this.

i would say the last five, six years. political figures, whether we like them or dislike them, we have figures like -- many names who possibly not not selects but they have solid ground. they can express themselves. >> you can take a step back. let's talk about this web transition. a transition to something that we're hoping for, while i agree i share your vision, where are the civil society structures in place, where is the groundwork that needs to be done. how is this going to work from one day to the next without protests. i think it is a serious danger. that should have been laid through western policy for many years, has not been laid. >> there's no civil society, that will allow a regime to run

egypt. >> well organized enough sth >> i would say we have enough communists, this may be shocking to many. -- we have enough communists and liberals and social i haves that would fill in the gap with the coalition government. >> would you like to enter in this? >> i would agree this smart egyptians that do a lot. civil society is week after six decades of depression. but i think there's potential. i do think the army is a big risk. there's a military risk under a takeover of constitutional reform. even if there's a democratic sense, if we look at turkey and algeria, they have gotten back from politics. >> is there more to be discussed? >> certainly.

i'll tell you what -- the people will prevail. but my worry is people don't have either -- >> there's random people. >> let's make sure we return to that, the will of the people and the muslim brotherhood, to you now. >> using the microphone. >> my name is jesse harrington. i'm a member of the public. i wanted to ask you -- >> welcome. >> you have partially answered my question but not accurately. i want to talk -- who are the contenders of power in egypt, what is the army's involvement with -- what side will the army take and what is the -- what is the -- is the possibility of the protection of the minority rights that is -- that is after the takeover. what will happen? do we know any theory around

that? >> thank you. it is a public meeting, we hope you come back many times. who wants to tackle that briefly? >> from personal experience, because i was conscripted for 14 months in the egyptian army. the egyptian army, the people look at in a very romantic way as the defender of the country, the good soldiers. they -- the -- they would not be like crush them. no officer or soldier in the army can imagine himself. there's a long history between the army and the police. where the army sees themselves ads the more pure form and the police are sort of the pugs and the police see themselves, these are, we are the -- guardians of the security and so they don't know what they're talking about. >> i mean, the army i think will

remain neutral. there's in -- there's no tendency in the army to seize power or to do a military coup or anything like that. the army -- the higher echelons want it is to remain as a national pride, protector of the country, neutral force. i believe that the civil society in egypt has qualified people that can form a government and create something that is workable. on the contrary, i do not believe that the muslim brotherhood have the expertise and caliber to form any sort of government. >> we come here for a briefing. to meet a man who is conscripted into the egyptian army, thank you for tell us that. >> if you had been a boy in the tank, what would you have -- what would you have dope? these young men in the tanks, they're sitting by rock flowers. what is that like in this?

>> one of our audience told us, when we were deployed in the square, one of the people, the demonstrators went to soldier on a tank and told -- asked hymn, are you going to shoot me? he said no matter what i would never pull my gun on you. i would dot -- do the same. >> the second part is name names. one of you name names and we move on. >> okay. names and minority rights. >> i mentioned names already. they might be better known in the western media, but we have one twoiling run in 2007, we have a liberal fig -- figure. i know something that keeps

urging us to talk about it. i can't name a figure that would stand out as the muslim brother kaat candidate. we have other communist leaders and leftist leaders that might not be nope this the public. the minority rights quickly. again, i think this is down to the value of citizenship on how to be perceived. every institution has been changed -- into better evaluation and better value of human rights and citizenship. i think it will be better off. >> we need to discuss islam and the the islammist. we got to go. those names can be written down and he'll stay. >> with the public. >> my name is -- egyptian. i'm getting my masters. i have one comment. >> no, can i say welcome, how

are you? >> actually. very -- >> get the microphone. >> i'm honestly finding a lot of -- to engage in the discussion, because this is affecting my own family and people. i will basically say two main comments. >> not yet. tell us how it is affecting your family and your people. >> as a matter of fact thousand, we don't have police forces in the streets. the egyptian families are in themselves rescinding themselves and using their open men, using very basic -- things to defend themselves. this is a critical situatioioioo it is not sustainable. >> have you spoken to your family? >> yes. >> they're so -- so far they're okay. but there are a lot of risks. one risk has to do with the fact that banks are still closed. people are not receiving their salaries and wages.

food resources and medicine are decreasing now and they're diminishing which is creating a risk i yi situation in the country. as a matter of fact, after the president's -- the speech, a lot of people were actually in support to start -- to start getting this down and to start getting people back to work and start getting life, going on again and probably moved the whole debate into -- into, into a -- a venue for negotiation rather than keeping it in this way. for my comment. i want to say one on el baradei and with all due respect, these are -- these are groups that do not deserve to -- they are using those who have been mobilized. played no role in mobilizing those people. those people are anonymous youth who had no political

affiliation. no religion kruse affiliation ever. they were simply a group of youth. anonymous youth. they're not grown. no political ambition. all they do is seek -- anything to do now. there should be some ways to dole those political -- those my political activists in order to start -- start playing a leading role. if anyone knows the history of egypt, they're all accepted before, a lot of talk -- concession. and we have never done any acfries that is -- that is worth that these youth have done. nothing. they don't deserve anything. now the -- the head of the western -- the -- who is standing and saying to people that you're not accepting anticipate consegs, this same person was accepting -- extremely talking -- extreme

concessions at other phases of which he did not play any kind of role as a political opposition. i only want to add one thing. is that i received a piece of news on facebook for all of those that are working and -- keep connected, a piece of information is that -- there is -- there are eyewitness who is concerned on the ground that the pro mubarak protecters today confess that they are being paid. and others were caught with police i.d. >> thank you for your update. we'll all plug into the news. u are proud of your country? >> i'm extremely broud of my country. i'm extremely proud of -- i'm extremely proud of my country and my people. i'm not -- february -- and i must say something also that is -- please i would urge adjourn

lis working here to start asking for people who are missing because there are a lot of people that are iffing mr. you have about 100 -- 100 youth who are -- who do not know anything. the way we are. and now, we need to start resuming our lives. >> react and get to it. >> quick comment. >> i'm with you, and i agree with you. those names are -- who would say for a reason, he's not considered to be a real position leader. those names actually sorry about it -- i was mistaken to say that these were meant to be -- i said this in a recorded interview, and you could get back to it. none of these deserve to be a president of egypt, because this is bigger than all of them. i said also this would enrich leaders. what i'm saying in these next few months we would need someone there until the power has happened.

it needs to be someone selected by the people. >> to say quickly. i think it is safe. safe is right. i think those people, that he's describing. here the home. -- hope. those people. it wasn't movin' by the muslim brotherhood. muhammad al bare die was outside the lounge at the airport, and of course to go back and say -- save egypt. come on. there's people for the hope. we got the muslim brotherhood to discuss, the gentlemen with the blue shirt, is next. you could be second and third there with the glasses. >> thank you. you partly answered the question. >> i see quite a lot of parallels and they some familiar it me. we had a slir -- similar, and it became a war between the

students and the authorities. my question is, to what extent are the people under -- in the schools and university campuses radicalized. do they the steel to say or go back to the glass. >> keep it -- would one of you like to discuss with the gentlemen? >> a week ago, 10 days ago, nobody would imagine that we would be discussing what we're discussing today. i don't think anybody -- can predict, you know what is going to happen, whether their legs will turn into arms. >> to what extent are they cad calized. do you know? >> once we know, they're angry. what -- and -- radicalize and religious leader radicalize. what do you mean? >> a teenager that doesn't want to lb to his grandfather tell him what to do and how to live. they basically will resist. in fact my experience was they

go into a bubble and they don't resist. >> there's a division now between the people, after yesterday' speech by mubarak, people believe let him stay until september and let him see until afterward. the hard-core people that say he has to go now. it is difficult to say how much, how much% of -- percent of these. it is all very volatile and i will not make an bets on it. >> do you give mubarak credit for being so wiley as to divide people with a delaying tactic? >> is it in his -- in his position is -- he's an amazing 82-year-old or a hateful one? >> mubarak is very stubborn man. he's been quoted as saying i have a ph.d in stubbornness. would you like to respond? >> he's asking how radicalized are the students?

i can't speak directly. but iran has more weapons, they were a-- they were able to undermine the protesters by saying they were a serving a foreign agenda because iran is under the foreign pressure. i don't see a equivalent of that in egypt and the military force and the revolutionary that is are with the regime. i can't make the comparison. >> we'll park that for now. >> in 10 minutes, let's turn to the muslim brotherhood. we'll go to your question. >> i'm half egyptian, and english. >> doing masters in journalism at the city. i just wanted to come back to the earlier points actually about none of these. none of these leaders deserving to be president.

did the panel believe that -- that they -- that -- they need a leader. the muslim brotherhood put their support behind elbar day. he said he wanses to transmission them to a democracy. while they're not ideal, do the panel believe they at least serve as a alternative to mubarak and they can transition them to a true democracy? >> i think exactly what you want know is a leader that [unintelligible] >> i agree with that. i think it is -- >> in addition to these comments, the constitution should be considered in this question, i think. even myself have cited elbaradei and other games. they don't have a chance. you got the vice president or the supreme court. so actually if it would be considered, which has many times

been ignored fon of them have a chance. >> you got the microphone. how long is mubarak. you're half egyptian, what does that side say? houk is he going to stay? >> it is difficult for me to stay saigh. it is changing by -- minute by minute. i thought friday he was going to announce his application. i was so depress pd and speaking as a -- depressed, and speaking as a citizen, rather than journalist. and i thought last night, he was finished. i can't say. >> do you want a change with no one there to take over, just the argument being had had, nobody to take over, is that good or bad? >> i believe the people that have generating the uprising are middle class. they're using twitter and facebook. >> they're not running the

place. >> if they're organized as efficient as now, they're organized and efficient enough to start a motion to democracy. >> my name is max. i'm an analysts, i would like to -- to talk about two questions. >> let's see, to what extent do you think the protests are driven by economic concerns really by young people caring about their futures and -- >> use the microphone, please. >> so to what extent are they driven by normal people and fears of the prospects. how did that affect fundamental change? how deep do you think the com plitment is to a democracy, in a scenario where there's elections. palestinian elections, do you think -- >> okay, west at 8:10 and you're going foirs. >> i come this the second part,

i think it is easier. we haven't seep evidence as to the democracy and egypt before. on the economic sirksde economic grievances were more important here. the unemployment, the inflation, but it is hard to separate those from political dissatisfaction. there's a general sense of injustice and a perception that the economy was being managed by an elite that was managing it in a way that was disadvantaging most people and making a few people very rich. for instance inflation has completely bucked the global trend in egypt. world food prices are going down. food prices are going up. that has -- that has a lot to do with it. it is very much an interplay. solving the economic problems is going to be a massive challenge for any government. this is worry about investment in egypt being detered. thousands of jobs need to be

created. whoever comes next is going to have to face that. >> i think the economy commitment. the point, the point being, i would probably agree, it is a complicated issue. you look at what happened on the bush -- around 2003, with the first sort of drive in the middle east, mubarak pushed back hard. that was it. other areas where are in flames. they didn't have time to deal with somebody who was holding up steadily. i think that's the reduction. >> nothing much to add there. right? >> yes. yes. you the microphone. >> no, you should have. >> no, you can't. you give us the benefit of your name. >> i'm clair. >> i'm interested to know if

there's evidence or anybody making overtures toward protesters in any middle eastern countries where we saw demonstrations? >> let's talk to the men that spoke earlier. >> there was a statement by the foreign minister saying this -- that the -- what is happening in tunisia and egypt and the transformation to an islamic middle east. this was the position. syria, and he described what was happening as a disease. he said that sierra is immuned to the disease. so, i think this is -- this pretty much sums it up. >> yeah, not much. actually saying, i think iranian comment, the official iranian comment, basically reflects, should be sufficient evidence that he established in iran -- realizes it is not the same cation and no islammist take scrofe. there's no islammist state.

you know when they speak this language, you should completely believe the opposite. >> my name is norra. and i'm involved in start agnew political party in tunisia. i -- first of all i want to say that what is happening in egypt strikes -- we have seen everything blow by blow. it is the repeat of the identical scenario. i guess we're one step ahead, two or three weeks ahead of what is happening in egypt. my comment or question to the media is when are you going to start looking at what happens next. we're in what is happening next right now. our -- we have a very long road to democracy. we have not only change the constitution, but we have to establish a political system. we have to overhaul the media. we have all sorts of

transitional justice issues around -- so all of these things are not being followed at all by the media. i'm wondering why. >> two journalists on the panel. i will ask them. what is the main manifest. you got 15 seconds to tell us what your s-your platform for tunisia. >> we got started two weeks ago. >> don't blame us. what is the thing you want? what is your platform. >> defwivens democracy. >> under whom? >> someone who is going to have to be identified but at the moment, it is the same situation as e script. there's a few people been hustled. >> the journalists, why are you ignoring this platform? >> we are not. we publish in tune nurebia.

the huge story is egypt, and we rushed back to cover the next revolution. it is very important. things seem similar. it is -- i think it is interesting that this stability on the streets was restored quickly. progress made fast. investment is not going to be as badly deterred as in e script. there's lessons to learn. >> have you taken your eye off the bull. have you forgotten tunisia and what happened there. >> of course, we went out with the meetings. we struggled with this. at one point, you struggle between making bre mature assumptions that domino is going to happen and all hell is going to break loose everything. you have to -- there's realities on the ground that -- points that there's a fundamental change happening in the middle east. the ideal outcome is -- is to --

to build infrastructure of a working civil society that is functioning. i wouldn't wond war is the leader. for instance, five, six years ago who knew about barack obama. the leaders evolve. just for the european list -- jurep lists in the room. if we -- journalists in the room, is it the party? yes. >> you can meet the journalists in the room. you want to talk about the brotherhood. i'll take the panelists discussion and turn to the room. you want to start and go down and tell us why you want to talk about it and what we need to know. we come for your briefing. >> my impression is that the brotherhood is quite divided in recent years, the government has been successful at dividing basically the opposition parties. that goes for the brotherhoods. i met in november with a young

guy. a business strategy consultant whose grandfather has been a supreme spiritual leader. he recently resigned saying they have no strategy. he was saying we're divided between people who see three broad trends. one is participation this politics, the other is preaching and social work. the third was maybe we could be something like apac. he said not like apac, but a group that is power, and not necessarily being part of the institutions. they liked a strategy when it came to the recent parliamentary elections. they strong ties with elbaradei when his pictures -- his daughter was in a swimsuit, he said this doesn't matter.

when elbaradei called for a end of the elections. they were rigged. they said gosh they're rigged. i think when we're seeing about the sudden young people, it is embarrassing to the brotherhood. maybe they could take advantage of the chinch. you norks if -- if i was a support, i would be asking why weren't you able to choose it. >> let me talk about basics. the ideology of the muslim brotherhood which i had the opportunity to study closely. whether you're a muslim or you're a westerner, actually it is the same thing. you're a muslim and westerner and everything in between. the ideology of the brotherhood is a road to totally tall tayrnism and grave danger. there's a struggle in the middle east between force that is will allow an islam to flourish once

at the same time accommodating themselves to being integrated into the global community. i don't want to talk about lofty goals and whatever. this is a clear struggle. ivanians on one side. why do they hope mubarak will fall? because they believe they will be joined in the struggle for what comes after him, the islam brotherhood. there's a ideology division between that and totally tall tayrn and what we see in southeast asia and so on and so for the. if you're on the wrong side of the de, we have a problem. i think you need to be on the right side of that debate. >> the muslim brotherhood are considered to be conservative. i don't like the label. in my view, i would label a muslim secular society. the muslim brother hood are a minority and what you have

official numbers of how large thiser. and -- the estimate are between. i'm talking about in the street and the role in what is happening now. not more than 25% in the best case. they don't have more than 25% representation in the street today. there -- their official statement actually in the 24th of january, the day before the process with the official statement, saying we're not taking part if in the protesters. two days later, had to join. everybody else had to join. they had to join because they didn't have another choice. do they have a role. does it inspire this? are they going to talk over this sth they did not inspire this. they had a minimal role as members and as a group. the -- the role they play now is as big as any other group. they might have a larger

organization skills than others. but by no means, they're -- is ham. not only in southeast asia but the rest of egypt. egypt has -- as -- i really underline, like to underline the statement queerly -- clearly. the vast majority of of egypt chans, between mubarak and brotherhood. the most are in between this. they have been politically passive for a long time. i i think the takeover may take longer time than what i'm allowed at the moment. we'll push that in a couple of minutes. >> i agree with the estimates made by -- made by the scholars that their way, the way to society is not more than 0% of the site. it would be a minority. and -- i mean, if you look back in egypt in the 80's.

the muslim brotherhood were almost nonexistent. they were their appeal at that time was to more hardline form. there was the war in affling afghanistan and -- and thfing -- and this was being encouraged and then the 0e's and 90's poll actually the appeal of the muss him brotherhood, is i think because of the injustices and the poverty and they played a role in -- in providing cheap medical fass sits and tuition and things like that. they're benefiting from the imbalances and problems in egyptian society. >> are they dinosaurs because the new group is younger and motivated by the internet and is on the streets throwing rocks.

where is it? for them they're going to be bypassed or would it settle down the longer it drags out. my question about mubarak's strategy. the longer it goes on, they become hungry. is it -- is the fact of the muslim brotherhood now and it restreets with time? >> first of all, they cannot claim this -- this uprising because it was done by young people from all sectors. there are divisions inside the brotherhood themselves, between the young generation and the old guards. >> james, i read a book and [unintelligible] can i address the question of egyptian -- egypt is separate, it is not on the border, it is a different character. s a you -- as you say there are different characters. whether the question is muslim

brotherhood -- whether or not it is important that -- there are alternatives and get mubarak again or suleman. all of that will depend on the character of the egyptian people. is it different? is it the most important arab country in terms of the tate of is ham? >> coop the microphone -- keep the mike frone. the jeants think it is. -- egyptians think it is. the influence on -- on the -- the influence has been limited more recently. and i would say, there's a shawl minority of egyptians who have been -- who have gotten this

more conservative islam. egypt is a big nation and they have hundreds. i wouldn't say hundreds, they got a large number of divisions of islam. it is down to the egyptian character. what we see, a nationalist revivel where -- where the old -- revival, where the old pictures of resistance. the resistance to egyptian occupation. >> we know the tunisias got there first. it is not that egyptian. where were these feelings before the people of tunisia that are not egyptians sexressd fear and loathing. what were the egyptians doing then? >> they were sleeping. i would have to say, they were 14r50e7ping.

this is unden -- they were sleeping. you see this again from the generation on facebook is incredible. you hear about how they talk about the n.d.p. you think we have a man -- and the and the french. this is like an occupation and we have to free our country and sentimental songs. this is coming back again. it is all very secular. >> and i been told by an iranian colleague, people in iran, they look at the egypt and they don't see the other countries. but egypt is evolving. it is not set in stone. out of the 80 million, 70 million have access to the internet. it is changing them. >> hi. my name is [unintelligible] i'm iraqi journalist. i was in iraq before the invasion and after that.

i'm -- we don't have a soiled candidate to run egypt. i'm worried that it is going to be the same in iraq. like what happened this iraq that we didn't have's -- any person that -- who can really lead iraq. that led to the division. doubt think -- do you think the scenario will be the same? taking apart the coalition forces being in iraq? >> stunned them to silence. >> i think egypt hasn't had quite the bad luck that iraq has had in the last 30 years. the history -- the various wars. the proliferation of weapons, the extent of the corruption. i think unfortunately, your country has suffered a lot worse. i think it is hard to see those, those kinds of problems being

mirrored in egypt. >> to you in the front. >> would you give us the benefit of your name. >> anita. i'm egyptian. i'm answering that statement. i think -- has it is premature to worry about -- about replacement of -- of -- you know regime, like saying we need to put something in place is basically fear mongering. the democracy never came to any country overnight. you could even look at great democracies like the u.k. and france and america. it took years. i fully expect that with any protests or any revolution, egypt is going to go through a lot of problems and upheaval for months, for years perhaps. people saying, particularly our government, the n.d.p. saying if you don't find a replacement we're going to go the same way as iraq or something is fear

mongering. we need to go for it. >> my name is ramsey. the panelist. the question i have is that the a.k.c. party this turkey, the ruling party. they came -- they came from under the umbrella of the muslim brotherhood. they -- they done quite well by all measure -- so the question is why is everyone running scared in the brotherhood? >> i think for you -- to -- you answered the question well. look at the foreign policy, if you're sitting as a western policy maker, that's why you're worried, they're doing well and things you consider to be counter productive to the kind of things you're trying to achieve. i noticed there was a big speech. i only had time to read a little bit. very supportive of the protesters. and i'm not surprised that he came out in that way.

i think you answer your own question. >> that is the main thing. and forget foreign policy. they done well for their population. there are priorities. >> it is the best case you can make. it is the government that has been really successful economically. >> and -- yes. >> what -- what is your point for the wrest of them? >> no one has give kenn the -- brotherhood a chance -- nobody has given the brotherhood a chance. >> the government hasn't given anyone a chance. >> why is it so feared? >> how the west see this is. i want us to talk about that in five minutes. you. >> please give us your name. >> nina. i'm turkish economist. i agree with the sentiment of the last -- of the last, the last contribution. i think that the -- that the -- that the panel i haves were

slightly underestimating the -- the -- underestimating the brotherhood to come to the four. in turkey, you had deep secular reforms and in 10 years you have a very islamized society. it is a question of how strong is secularism in egypt and that kind of dynamic. j keep the microphone. would you like to pick on one of them? >> the egyptian one. >> you want to be egyptian one. >> so long as we don't use names no one will ever know. >> from the way i see it, you're looking at the muslim brotherhood, i don't see in their agenda or their literature thick that indicates to me that they have enough caliber of -- of people and enough expertise,

enough political skill to form a government on their own. i'm not counting them out completely of the equation. they could be part of you know any -- any democratic system in any country, so long as they respect the rules of the game. but from what -- my point of view, if egypt, they can't do it at the moment. >> the point about the rise of the party in turkey, they were catapulted and supported by the rise of a business class. they were supported, had a social base. and here we have egypt, which has been undergoing privatization if the past 20 years. there's a middle class there which is probably resents the coneys around mubarak and are looking for an option and political answer to cent them. i'm saying the muslim brotherhood could be the mill actor that represents these small immediate crumb sized

sectors in egypt. >> what we have is at least 25% and growing? >> compared to the turkey experience, as you said, for example, again it is completely different historical process, because turkey has gone hard-core secular process. egypt hadn't had the experience at all. so that's why -- it is my -- it might sound reasonable to have a islam party coming out, after other reaction to this secular process. while in egypt actually. back to the question. how strong secularism is in e giant. before this question. what secularism means in egypt. i think definitions are tricky. if you talk about western tunisia and turkey style of secularism, you won't find this in egypt. you have day to die, people are religious and devoted. it is a core element in the identity nationalist and

islammist identity, while at the same time, they don't think -- what is actually, i have to say -- doesn't mean anything to them. they're -- one point legal codes in egypt composed in har moan. most people are happy with it. >> you're giving the lady an analysis. she says you're underestimating the potential. are you disagreeing? >> i don't think we're underestimated. i agree. they would be part of the coalition, 20, 30%. they been successful so far as far as 30%. in the future, they might actually diminish. we'll have the other groups speaking up. >> now we got 10 minutes left. you not hearing why you came in the room, let me know. >> that's takes in the audience. you're going to be the first question. and the -- the analysis is it is not about past, it is about them. this is putting the foot on the

throat of young people for 30 years and their parents. it is so much repressed anger coming out. it is less about the west. then we see it through our prism as this gentleman in the audience is saying. they seem -- barack obama -- he doesn't seem to work out what he has to say. want to put it in your terms, about where is the west supporting this now that it is collapsing? >> i think a lot of people -- are tweeting and blogging. they're asking, why going back for years and years, there's a recurring thing that you see on american news where people pick up tear gas canisters which they say made on the u.s.a. in the bottom. and they say why is this happening? obama within the language of international diplomacy, it sounds like he's going from mubarak.

he's talk about an ordinarily -- orderly transition. if you have tear gas thrown at you, you probably not hear that message. i think there's a big resentment that got so bad that even some people have -- have nostalgia for telling the stuff that bush said. >> i wonder what he's thinking on his ranch right thousand, he's suddenly -- whether he's feeling vindicated. the reality is the west has been caught -- obama has been caught sleeping at the wheel. let's use that analogy in a way. i think i said before that the reality, there should have been paid attention to this. despite it is not a flash point. you look after those parts, a difficult region in the world that poses a great challenge. if we think back a couple of years, we were worried. you look after those points. i think the principle behind the

democracyization is a more stainible long-term government is assailible. it is disgraceful that when the obama administration came in is disgraceful. you said people realized we don't have to live like this. exactly. >> they don't have to live like this. >> anyone else record the cairo speech that obama gave two years ago. someone, shouted we love you barack obama. that was cairo university. >> that wasn't there, tf here. i remember this as well. and obviously, not regret that filling the dictatorship, the west would consider the future policies in the region. but i would like also to voice, some of the -- of the people in egypt now. and in regard to the west. they didn't really care much

about the west and what they think then me think it completely domestic issue and we get support from the west. we hope obama and others will speak of it and support the people. which they know they're not going to do. they're more caught up. it is what they're doing inside. are they going to speak with -- with the american ambassador can -- in cairo the other day, was interpreted by people on the street, here you go, here's a puppet. and where this happened in the future. >> perfectly understandable, the image of the world leaders as puppets. there's a strange scene in the square. people were there, and chanting anti-mubarak slogans. then they burned an israeli flag. for me it is strange. we have to ask ourselves. what do we want from the west? what do we want from the outside

world. if -- if a demonstration was to take place tomorrow and -- in jordan, is obama supposed to overthrow the king? is this -- i think -- this is -- this is in the hands of the people now. the people have to decide what they want. and forget about the west, forget about israel. decide what they want for the future. >> if you gave up your time. you not hearing the panel -- now is the time to speak. >> i would say many werners that watched the protesters in egypt and across the arab world, the domino effect. one of the surprising things was or positive things about it is the lack of islammist or very strongly religious movement within the protests. and to what extent linking that -- linking it to the hope and

also, to what extent is the west's bogeyman and 9/11 and effect it had on policy around the world. how does this undermight be the west role in the world, in the past decade? it was striking in ton nichia, it wasn't an islammist led up rising. there's questions to be asked to what extent is it true that most people forecasting if the west have had in their heads that any resolution would be favoring islammists consequence us. and i would say a lot of secular or left spist opposition groups also -- i -- a lot of opposition groups wouldn't fit with the u.s. if you look at the attitudes toward israel, you see a lot of egyptian gruchese they're krill of israel -- groups, they're

critical of israel. it is not just going to be about the islammist. >> your name? >> hi, jim. >> you all right? >> i think -- i think the reaction of the western leaders to these tensions is almost one of 0 noticeance it seems. as far as they were concerned, mubarak despite his ways. he was a safe pair of hands. after the war, they didn't have are to worry about much in egypt. i think all of this hype going on around the muslim brotherhood is just werners like projecting fears -- westerners, projecting fears. they're worried about the new guy. this is particularly -- par

particularly israel. >> we'll hear from the audience and wrap together what you're hearing and points you didn't cover. you next? >> then to you you in the gray. >> my name is scott bowlinger. i lived in egypt for a year. i wanted to make a coom meant about this intelligence failure from the west. it is that we have to remember that politician is always changing, it is never static. i was talking about this with iran. somebody told me about the great movement is dead. there's a hogs of legitimacy there, something will happen. some same thing with the arab states, the governments will tend toward something more stable. whether the way they get there are is stable, is different. they have to start from that point that politics will evolve and is evolving. >> gray man. >> i'm an analysts. although our previous conscript, i don't know your name. commenttators sympathize that

the -- that the army is for the people and that's why they will remain neutral. what i want to know, does anyone see, see the neutrality to be short-lived. there seems to be an important breaking point now. >> please put that in your closing remarks. >> you had one. that's it. closing comments from the panel. we'll close this to time. everyone is busy. you worked hard as an audience. we'll go this direction. just for the record, this is muhammad. -- muhammad, from bbs online. >> no. i don't think neutrality would break. there's the guard which is like mubarak's bodyguards. they would defend him if somebody stoned the palace. but generally speaking i don't think the army would break its neutrality. your closing comment? >> it is interesting, henry

kissinger said on channel four about why the u.s. is what is stopping mubarak. he reminded when sad dat did the peace treaty with israel and egypt shifted from a soviet alley to a u.s. ally and that's what assassinated, and shortly afterward and mubarak came. at the time u.s. was happy to have him. it stayed this way. and the policy was built on having him as a friend and tolerating him and seeing him as a safe pair of hands. all of this, is i think being shattered. we're about to witness a totally new reality in the middle east. >> thank you, your closing view? >> i think the region is changing. i think politics from the region and the middle east and west, should start develop new agenda and policy for the region. few quick comments about -- about islammist, the is ham in

question. governments have -- want more credibility among the people in the street, they should actually incorporate with democratic secular leaders, not dictators. then they will have credibility and stability and democracy as well, considered. the issue of the people. i think they will hopefully start develop political culture and that will take generations. as the lady said earlier, this will take years to develop. and -- those are -- those ideological or religious reasons. if you put this in violent is and like hard-core violent -- hard-core groups, they change it, they make it possible that secular revolutions and changes are do-able. you don't have to blog in the tube to do it.

people can doo it with their own voices. >> you hope not to live in interesting times. these are definitely interesting times. i would say, it is about an opening up of space. this is not about western fears in the region. this is about a space having opened up and there being a real risk that it is filled with -- with this kind of regime that would be very troublesome, overall, you can't help but be excited. the reality is that the iranian regime knows since those protests that its days are numbered. across the entire middle east,ed dictators know this is not working anymore. surely that's a good thing. >> i think we had a motive -- a lot of optimism,, which is exciting. but then we hear pome possibly 300 people are dead. we talked about the western policy. the west, and the attitude of the states in the other region. probably most of the govern

it has been convenient to point to pal tin and -- palestine, lebanon and iraq. having said that. one of the most positive things i had, is the idea people are thinking more about what they could do for themselves, not just blaming the leaders and not just blaming the west. and they do have power to change ning's. >> thank you. we came for a briefing. thank you from the board. for everything you done. the second part of your question was worth waiting for. thank you so much. all of your questions. i hope it was broadly what you you wanted to know. to hear from someone in the egyptian army. a big movement in the u.k. and your analysis on youtube and leading -- heaping around the countries, i learned something. we have been trying to contact by skype. it is not working or he's not answering?

he's not answering. maybe we can't get through and hear more from people, if you have contact there. for -- from all of us, thank you so much and thank you for coming. thank you so much. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate will proceed to morning business until 3:00 p.m. with senators permitted to speak up to ten minutes each for the purpose of giving remarks relative to the

upcoming centennial of the birth of president ronald reagan. the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: madam president, there are many of us who will come to the floor this afternoon to pay tribute to one of the great presidents in american history and many of us will recollect times and experiences and contacts we had with president reagan and the way he inspired us personally as well as a nation. when i was a prisor of war in north vietnam, the vietnamese went to great lengths to restricthe news from home to the statements and activities of prominent opponents of the war in vietnam. they wanted us to believe that america had forgotten us.

they never mentioned ronald reagan to us or played his speeches over the camp loud speakers. no matter. we knew about him. new additions to our ranks told us how the governor and mrs. reagan were committed to our liberation and our cause. when we came home, all of us we eager to meet the reagans, to thank them for their concern. but more than gratituderew us to them. we were drawn to them because they were among the few prominent americans who didn't subscribe to the then-fashionable notion that america had entered her inevitable decline. we prisoners of war came home to a country that had lost a war and the best sense of itself, a county beset by social and economic problems.

assassinations, riots, scandals, contempt for political, religious and educational institutions gave the appearance that we had become a dysfunctional society. patriotism was sneered at. the military scorned. and the world anticipated the collapse of our global influen influence. the great, robust, confident republic that had given its name to the last century seemed exhausted. ronald reagan believed differently. he possessed an unshakeable faith in america's greatness, past and future, that proved more durable than the prevailing political sentiments of the time. and his confidence was a tonic to men who had come home eager to put the war behind us and for the country to do likewise. our country has a long and honorable history.

a lost war or any other calamity should not destroy our confidence or weaken our purpo purpose. we were a good nation before vietnam and we are a good country after vietnam. in all of history, you can't find a better one. of that ronald reagan was supremely confident and he became president to prove it. his was a faith that shouted at tyrants to "tear down this wal wall." such faith, such patriotism requires a great deal of love to profess, and i will always revere him for it. when walls were all i had for a world, i learned about a man whose love of freedom gave me hope in a desolate place. his faith honored us as it honored all americans, as it has

honored all freedom-loving people. let us honor his memory especially today by holding his faith as our own and let us, too, tear down walls to freedom. that is what americans do when they believe in themselves. mr. president, i sugge the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call: a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from alabama. mr. sessions: i ask that the quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. sessions: and would note that i was honored to be able to ar senator mccain's comments on ronald reagan. this sunday is, indeed, the 100th anniversary of his birth. it was an opportunity for the whole -- it's an opportunity for the whole nation to honor the memory of a man who honored us with his leadership.

the 1980's were a -- in the 1980's, we were a weakened country. inflation and unemployment were in double digits, the hostage crisis in iran dragged on with no end in sight, our standing abroad was waning and so, too, was our military strength. challenges at home were answered with one failed washington program after another. we had lost condence in our future and, really, the principle -- and in the principles that made us exceptional. ronald reagan changed that. part of that change began with 12 simple but crucial words: government is not theolution to our problems. government is the problem. and it is a big part of our problem. he stirred the passions of our country, revitalizing not only our economy but our identity and

confidence as free people. what some have called the reagan revolution he called the great rediscovery. he instilled us with a new confidence in our future and in america's role as the last, best hope of mankind. his aievements are well-known but they bear repeating. working with paul coale -- paul volcker, chairman of theederal reserve, he entaind inflation, which was depriving americans of their life savings. it was a tough course, a tough road, but he saw it through, he stayed on the course and we were stronger as a resul and we needed to get on a tough -- we need to get on a tough road and stay the course today. he lowered taxes dramatically, including a reduction in the top rate from nearly 80%, and he reined in a runay bureaucracy that had trapped innovation and productivity in a labyrinth of

regulation and red tape. his faith in the free market was not misplaced. it rewarded u. he created 20 million new jobs, grew our gross national product by 26% and began the longest peacetime boom in our history. conditions improved for americans in every walk of life. the net worth of families earning beten $20,000 and $50,000 rose by 27%. reagan's stunning success debunked every myth of those who believed a government -- a bigger government is more compassionate and can do more for more people. the growth and potential productivity of the private sector is what has made america the most prosperous nation. and this success at home was matched by his success abroad. he defended our principles and our way of life with clarity,

confidence, and vigor. his policies brought down the soet empire. "mr. gorbachev, tear down this wall." still resonates in our minds. and it liberated untold millio millions. now today, more than 20 years after reagan left office, we find ourselves facing many of the same challenges: a sagging economy, a growing government, and a diminished standing in the world. mr. sessions: we would be vie we to remember the lessons of that era -- peace through strength,, prosperity through freedom. he understood that our future greatness lies in the same place it always has, through our pioneering, restless, enterprising spirit that is filled with ambition and excitement and a deep sense of honor and decency that defines who we are as a people and who

we will be tonal. in -- who we will be tomorrow. in president reagan's farewell address, he urged a word of caution. if we forget what committee did, we -- what we did, we won't know who we are. i am warning of an eradication of that, of the american nearm y that would result ultimately in an erosion of the american spirit, he said. so we face a daunting and defining challenges of our time, and as we do so, i hope we'll look back to the leadership he provided. mr. president, just on a personal note, i was trendously honored to have been appointed united states attorney in the southern district of alabama by president reagan in 1981. it was an office that i had served as an assistant in a number of years before. and to be able to come back and to lead that office was such a personal thrill.

d, you know, the president didn't give me any directions exactly what we were to do but i absolutely knew -- and i've often said it's a great example of true leadership -- i knew exactly what he wanted me to do. and i gathered the staff, many of whom i'd worked for from years before, and used these words. i said, president reagan sent me here to prosecute criminals and protect the united states treasury. and i believe that's what he d did. i believe that was implicit in his campaign, his consistent leadership, that he believed in law and order and efficiency and he wanted us to fight corruption and to try to help produce a more efficient government. i remember in those days that we wento a united states attorneys conference that i attended with my good friend, recently the deputy attoey general of the united states, larry thompson, and we would

share rooms on the trips to save money because we knew and believed president reagan wanted us to save money and that we were -- ourpending was out of control and we had a serious financial problem. our budgets were frozen but we worked harder and we produced more. that can be done today. this wining -- whining that we can't reduce spending, and many times they define reducing spending is a reduction of the projected rate of growth. it's not even a reduction -- a reduion of current level of spending. these kind of things happened throughout the government, increased productivity of our government. it reduced the take of the federal governmentrom the private economy. the private economy grew and the governmental sector became more efficient and more productive. that's what we need to return

to. it was such a fabulous honor to have the opportunity to serve in that position, and i hope and -- that i was faithful to the values that the president who appointed me had. i got to tell you, i think i knew what they were and i know i gave my best effort to be worthy of the trust he placed in me. and i think that was true of many, many more people throughout the federal government.

>> what sort of practical steps to you think the fbi and the army can take? had you strike the balance? >> interestingly, our committee has been doing an ongoing -- has been doing hearings and investigations on homegrown terrorism for what, four years? maybe it was seven. we had a group of leaders from the muslim-american community. i ask them about the relations with federal organizations.

the fbi does the joint terrorism task force has reached out effectively to the muslim- american community. there is a lot of anxiety in the muslim-american community about people being radicalized. they are not taking advantage of america and are becoming anti- american terrorists. there needs to be cooperation between our law enforcement community and the muslim- american community. in the department of defense, we are still not prepared to call the enemy what it is. unless you know your enemy and describe it, you will not be allowed to meet it and defeat it. the overwhelmingly -- overwhelming majority of muslim-

americans are patriotic and law- abiding. i think the department of defense has to start by being truthful about who the enemy is. >> i wanted to ask you, he was charged as a lone gunman. have you seen any evidence of a terrorist conspiracy? the ucla broader -- >> the answer is no. there is no evidence he was part of a broader conspiracy. he was opened by in these statements that were radical at walter reed. the fbi happen to intercept his communication with terrorist suspects. it shows the difficulty. hassanvestigation shows us

was a lone wolf. a lot of lone wolves can be, by their individual actions part of a larger conspiracy just by going on the internet. he asked questions and got answers for what was acceptable behavior. one of the things we have to try to do -- and we are doing some of it now -- is to intervene to try to prevent -- present the other side to people trying to become part of a larger conspiracy even there they are acting individually. >> in general what we have found true is that the individual is

frequently inspired by al qaeda or by other violent, islamic leaders, but not directed by them. that can happen on the occasion, but that is the more common pattern that we see. to me, what is so frustrating in this case is this was not a lone wolf operating overtly with no one aware of his existence or his communication with the known terrorist suspects. this is an individual who was an open about the fact that he has radicalized, who says outrageous statements inside a class of

military officers, yet he is promoted. it is just astonishing and very troubling. >> thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> i in a few moments, a forum on iran's nuclear program from the recent world economic forum. in less than an hour, federal reserve chairman dan bernanke says the economy continues to recover. -- dan bernanke says the economy continues to recover. on a washington journal, will have the latest on the unrest in egypt. center jeff bingaman will take your questions about energy policy and the oil market. we will focus on unemployment and jobs with economist, stephen

rose. washington journal is live on c- span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. a couple of live events to tell you about. a congressional oversight committee examines commercial real-estate losses and their effects on banks' ability. we will hear from representatives from the fdic and the federal reserve. that is live on c-span at 10:00 a.m. eastern. tonight on c-span, a former alaska governor, sara caplan, speaks in santa barbara california marking the 100th anniversary of president ronald reagan. that is at 11:00 p.m. eastern. >> the environment of politics had come apart and destroyed. >> documentary producer on hubert h. humphrey, the art of the possible.

>> the reason for doing the documentary was showing another side of this. people did not understand the pressures he was under, which was going from the vice presidency to the 68. >> "q&a", sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern. >> michael reagan on his father's legacy. next week marks the 100th anniversary of the reagan's birth. emily lambert on the purpose of futures markets. by the complete schedule at booktv.org. get our schedules he mailed for you. signup for our booktv alert. >> the discussion was arrested

on iran's nuclear program. the washington bureau chief joined the president of the council on foreign relations and representatives of saudi arabia, turkey, and germany. this is 50 minutes. >> welcome to our session. the question of the hour is "what if iran develops a nuclear weapon." will discuss the political ramifications of this outcome.

we had an distinguished panel from the region and beyond. we had the president of the institute for both military affairs. we had the federal minister of defense of the republic of germany. we had the deputy prime minister of the republic of turkey. from the united states, the president of the council on foreign relations. gentlemen, welcome. is a nuclear iran inevitable? is the genie out of the bottle? let me start on my left so we can get the ball rolling. >> [unintelligible]

iran has completed all of the technical factors. >> there is still a chance to avoid that situation. we are in a position where we are negotiating with iran. i think we should use every opportunity to reach a diplomatic path. >> let me pose the question in another way -- what if iran does not have nuclear weapons? i think that is an alternative that everyone should work very hard for. the or area cannot afford to have the kind of competition -- in the area cannot afford to have that kind of competition.

>> let me talk about nuclear technology. we had to make the it distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. the iran definitely has the technology. they say they will use it for peaceful purposes. but over all, in turkey, we are against nuclear weapons in our region. >> the short answer is and iran with a nuclear weapon is not inevitable. i do not believe it is clear that iran has made the decision to go one better% of the way to have nuclear weapons. it is quite possible that the iranians had decided to get a% or 90% of the way to become a

threshold nuclear state. they think they can derive the benefits without incurring the costs. i think it is inevitable that they would like to get close to it. it is not inevitable that they go all the way. there are things we discussed here that can be done to address the process. there is one other complication. when we say iran, there is a big difference between this iran with certain capabilities and a different type of iran having certain capabilities. part of the question has to be is the type of iran we say, is that inevitable? would that make us feel differently about its capabilities? >> the iranian nuclear program is old. it began with the wshah. we are talking about a --

talking about a country that is bent on having the infrastructure for a nuclear weapon. that certainly is worrisome for the neighborhood -- for the turks, for the saudis. for those of you who live in the neighborhood of iran, can you afford to live in the shadow of a nuclear iran? >> our solution is very clear. every sovereign nation should use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. we do not do what -- we do not want nuclear weapons in our region. it is very important for the countries to sign a non- proliferation treaty. in our region, we have countries who have signed it.

we want a region free of nuclear weapons. we will be against any country that would try to do it. >> iran signed the mpc in 1968. there is a history of clandestine activity. if you are forced to live in the shadow of a nuclear iran, what would be the policies of your government? >> one of the ironies is that iran presented to the united nations in 1974 a proposal to make the region free of nuclear weapons. according to official iranian policy until now, they hold to that position. they continue to take unexpected activities and that is why they have faced this worldwide

sanctions on their program. the kingdom has always stood for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. that is the only alternative in the area. the elephant in the room when we talk about that is israel. that is where the issue takes on an added complexion, which must be included in the discussion. israel with a nuclear weapon is dangerous. they have threatened in the past to use it. it is from that context that we have a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. when you level the playing field, you ask everybody to play. >> iran is technically in violation of the mpc.

there are facilities and certain activities we are not being informed of. >> they have the enrichment technology. [unintelligible] it is a matter of time to go from civilian to militarized. >> what are you doing individually or collectively as iran's neighbors to deal with this issue? are you waiting for al qaeda to deliver you from this nightmare? >> we are active with the subject. iran is our neighbor. we have good relations.

on the other hand, we believe there is a huge misunderstanding going on. diplomacy and engagement is going to be the best way to overcome this issue. marginalizing iran more and more is not going to give any kind of positive solution. we are in very close touch with other countries. we have together with brazil and iran made special arrangements which were already verified with the vienna group.

diplomacy and engagement will be the keys to dealing with this issue. >> the kingdom is proposing a zone-free weapons of mass destruction. at that is the uniform arab position. >> this has been thrown out by the arabs for forever. let's be frank about this. >> i beg to disagree. at a recent conference in new york, that ticket front position and was agreed to buy all the countries who signed the mpc. there will be a conference in 2012 on the issue. sanctions hatbands issued that the -- sections have been issued. add to it two provisions -- one,

eight reward scheme for the countries that joined, giving them a technical and -- giving them technical support on their civilian development. both will be guaranteed by the permanent five members of the security council. the sanctions regime would have diplomatic and economic sanctions, but will also include military sanction clauses. blacks -- >> [unintelligible] this has created a new dilemma for the entire region.

>> it was measured before. there is a view in the middle east that iran's neighbors are easily excluded were not fully informed about the discussion between the p5 and iran. is there any truth to that? >> we are all members of the united nations. i see a lot of talks going on in between. on the other side, i think there is a change of view. regardless of the question of combining certain efforts and not just blaming the one part that is helpful or not -- i think we need to be more

creative. the p5 plus one are pressing that. i think there is room for changes. that does not bring us to any solutions. nevertheless, the double approached that the p5 plus one developed are still valid. there are still diplomatic issues on the table we could use as well as certain sanctions. there is a broad spectrum of that. combining that with the idea of a nuclear-free world, which we share, to fulfill it within the

next years to come is a big factor and opens room for creativity. >> i think the iranians see diplomacy as tactics to buy time. i think the real challenge -- i do not think the p5 plus one will succeed because of the iranian commitment to this product. we have to enhance sanctions, possibly with types of military enforcement to increase the pressure on iran. if that does not work, i fear that it will come down to a

binary choice. we have to learn to live with they iranian nuclear weapon or we have to use military force to prevent an attack to set it back. i do not think we should kid ourselves. the problem with diplomacy is that the regional members do not know every dotted i and crossed t. it was to enrich uranium. it is not interested in this in a serial way -- serious way to create electricity. this is about a sustained iranian commitment to get 90% of the way there. that is what this is about. >> does anyone in the audience

feel there is an exaggeration about the iranian nuclear program and that iran -- >> why are the countries so threatened by a nuclear iran when israel has always been in the shadows? is it being instigated and exaggerated by the israelis who are being paranoid? >> united states? >> the elephant in the room is israel. no arab country would like to see israel have a nuclear weapons. it is not just iran, any country that has a nuclear weapons is something that is unacceptable to the people in the area. it is not just iran and israel. the whole area should be

deployed of any efforts to develop nuclear weapons. that is why the zone-free of weapons of mass destruction is workable. there are other zones for weapons of mass destruction. they can be emulated. >> we will come back. richard, you had something to say? >> the last question raised important point about white people are concerned about an iranian nuclear program. iran is not a status quo power. they are an imperial power. they seek to reshape the region in its own image. iran is not content to be a

normal nation-state. it is the largest a supporter of terrorism in the world. the iranian nuclear program would give iran a much greater freedom to promote its farm policy ends in a way it chooses to carry al a foreign policy. it will also keep this region on a knife's age. edge.fe's imagine the possibility of -- if iran gets nuclear weapons, does anyone in this room think that several other countries in the region will not want to get nuclear weapons, including several of the countries represented up here? the middle east has shown itself to be dangerous and unstable enough the way it is. adding an iranian nuclear program would take the most

dangerous, unstable part of the world and place it on steroids. this as a strategic consequences we cannot underestimate. >> it is not intellectual to point towards israel in that regard. it is not fair. the outcome of that very issue is the biggest concern. a possible nuclear race has just emerged out of the question of iran. it has not happened. we are not talking about only the country's sitting around this panel. there are other countries as well. there are european countries. it cannot be resolved by finger- pointing at israel. >> israel is an undeclared nuclear power. if iran is a nuclear power, what

will that do to the balance of power in the region? >> it would attract significantly and make iran more assertive. if they felt they could act with impunity because they have nuclear weapons providing a strategic shield, what we think iran would show any strategic restraint in anything they did? that would be a -- that would be an illusion. it would make the middle east or less stable. >> the united nations security council declared four different sanction packages for iran so far. [unintelligible] sanctions approved not working as well.

it is very important to have a distinction. one of my background is engineering. you have a centrifuge. the more you turn it, the more enriched uranium you have. you can have a fuel for nuclear plant. if you do it longer, you had fuel for a nuclear weapon. it is very difficult to make a decision based on only having this centrifuges in place. it is very important for countries to have an "opportunity to have access to nuclear technology. look at 50 to 100 years ahead.

you cannot think of a world where a handful of countries at the technology and others do not. if there is really a fear, if there is a threat, and that there is a perception of threat that is real then it must be worked on through communication. >> let me digress a little bit. when we step up this panel discussion -- this is long before the events in tunisia, egypt, what have you -- in terms of priority, where is the priority of eight nuclear armed iran compared to the immediate events in cairo?

>> from my perspective, it is hard to compare those issues. there may be links between certain topics, but it is much too easy to clearly compared them. when talking about the uranium issue, it is part of the year- long discussion. it is also a question of how to buy time and other things. it is a big concern for all of us. it is very worrisome. there is potential trouble for part of the region. the iranian nuclear issue -- we get to depart that from the issues in other states. >> the short answer is "both."

as a policy maker, you do not have the ability to determine what comes in your in-box. >> let's go to the audience. >> do you really believe that force is a viable option given the recent engagements of the united states? >> i do believe that force is a serious option. the kinds of force the united states has largely used in iraq and afghanistan is very heavy on army and marines. most of the scenarios i have seen in balding iran involve mostly air and naval forces. that is not to say it would not

be difficult or costly. the forces could be used in multiple ways. you could use force in terms of sanction strengthening. force was authorized and used to enforce sanctions in iraq. it in use of force to attack known nuclear installations. obviously you can't attack on known nuclear installations. you cannot always destroy what you cannot attack. we ought to send any military attack on iran would accomplish certain things. it would set back the nuclear program of iran. i do not think we can say with certainty how much it would achieve. we obviously do not know how iran would retaliate, but i think it is a safe bet they would retaliate in several ways. anyone who has analyzed the use of force realizes it is risky.

anyone dealing with an iranian nuclear weapon says it is a risky option. that is why we want to think about how we avoid getting to this place, even if the purpose of this conversation is to say if we cannot avoid it -- >> we will discuss the options in a minute. does anybody have a burning question? >> i would like to ask, let's think the unthinkable. if the government of egypt falls, what impact would that have one of the regimes in your countries? the you think that democracies are more stabilized than a nuclear iran? [laughter] >> current events.

what can i say. >> [unintelligible] if you would look at the records of the united nations, u.s. see the arab countries -- you would see the arab countries found it apparent that israel has nuclear weapons. the finger-pointing is happening the other way. it encourages all to go for a zone free of weapons of mass -- mass destruction. without it, we live in constant danger, not just from israel and iran, but many other countries. on the egyptian situation, i do not see anything that i can say

about it. it is a situation that is in flux. egypt is a country -- it was the first nation-state in the world. there are assets within the egyptian society, government, and leadership that should not be discounted because of what is happening today in egypt. whether democracy -- how did you describe it? >> more destabilized than a nuclear iran. >> i do not know. u.s. nuclear weapons and you have democracy. -- you have a nuclear weapons and you have democracy. [laughter] [applause] >> would anybody like to try and

top that one? >> i wanted to ask, the theory is that if iran does get a nuclear weapon than the countries in the region will feel that they also have to get nuclear weapons. if that is true, the you feel your countries would have to get nuclear weapons? do you feel that the support from the u.s. and other countries for civil nuclear programs in the region are preparations for that possibility? thank you. >> i think the answer is easy to understand. more and more countries in the region would like to have

nuclear weapons. that would be a big threat for all of the region knowing that the region has many difficulties and problems going on. on top of this, to have more and more nuclear weapons in the region would have disastrous consequences. we are very clear and very harsh on countries to already have nuclear weapons. >> other countries are investing in this. >> i think it is very important.

it is important to have very transparent processes. we have to rely on the national agencies. >> the kingdom of saudi arabia has started a program on developing nuclear energy options. this is a generalization -- a generational issue that will take some time. i withdrew back at you another theory than the one you have thrown at us. that theory is that we all have a zone free of weapons of mass destruction for the reasons i mentioned before. in my view, that is a more

applicable theory than the other options that you have presented. >> [unintelligible] iran is developing nuclear power. it will lead to use it destabilization of the region. the question to the israelis is that we have to look for

realities. [unintelligible] this is the reality we have to face. we have to take this collectively in the region. >> richard, you're shaking your head. >> i do not believe the iranian program is a narrow response to the israeli program. iran has its own regional ambitions.

the united states used military force against iraq, but not north korea. it goes way beyond israel. if there is any chance for a nuclear free zone in the middle east, at last i checked that was not in the immediate future. the time line for iran's nuclear program is moving far faster than any diplomacy. that is the danger. this hope that whether it is a regional diplomacy or more narrowed the policy is going to solve this problem for us is unlikely. the iranians are busy in their laboratories with their centrifuges. >> richard thinks it is not going to happen soon.

i think it is not going to happen soon because the western powers do not want it to happen cent, not because israel does not have the security. it could be an incentive for israel and the arab countries to reach the kind of peace that we all seek if you have the zone with the sanctions. it is from that context, i think, that the zone should be an issue that takes precedence over other alternatives when it comes to the issue of nuclear threats in the area war between iran and israel and other arab countries. >> taking the case that israel would make. what gives you the confidence that pakistan -- i would like to

believe in that confidence. >> there should be an orderly regime and a sanctions regime. the sanction regime could include military options against any country in the area that does not become a partner in the zone. that is more of an acceptable alternative than any military action taken either by israel or the united states. >> which we all want to avoid. >> absolutely. >> whether it is a run, turkey -- if the of this country seek to get nuclear weapons, they will have to face the world community as a military option against them. >> there is no world community when it comes to these options. if there were, iran would not be

where it is. iran is where it is because the sanctions are not nearly tough enough. if the united states wanted to use military force, there would not be a world community backing it. the united states would have to do it with virtually no international backing. we do not have a world community on munitions. if we talk about this as operationally, my concern is we will get distracted. we have a lot of strain and metaphors. this train is moving very quickly. >> i don't think it is completely out of the bottle. i don't think it is inevitable. i think there is time. we don't know everything about iranian decision making. we there are certain debates there and calculations. increased sanctions could have a fact.

i doubt it but diplomacy could have effected it is not inevitable that is simply to defeat this given the consequences. >> because you think it is not feasible, you think it won't happen. seconds -- sanctions were reached after laborious part diplomacy by the united states. it's such labor can be put into reaching agreement on sanctions, one that without labor and that time and effort into a step that will go beyond the is the sanctions and eliminate the issue from the beginning? one and make the attempt? >> because the time one of iran's nuclear program are far shorter and faster than the time lines of what diplomacy and sanctions or nuclear weapon-free zones can be expected to achieve. >> you are proposing that that will go for diplomacy as well that the time line is too short.

are you advocating there should be a military strike now? >> now? now. . happen forill diplomacy? one final question from the audience. this lady? >> i am with oxford university. to follow along this wonderful conversation, let's be honest with ourselves, if the current iranian regime was considered an ally of the united states and israel, would we be having this debate? would there be any trained to follow? >> speaking for myself and i think it would be fundamentally different conversation. on one level, the world talks about nonproliferation as a global absolute. realistically, we distinguish.

it may not be pleasant. it may not be uncomfortable fact but the world reacted differently to india that it would to iran. i would say for good reason given india is a democracy and given it does not support terrorism. in switzerland tomorrow, we found out it had a fairly advanced nuclear program. the world's reaction would be different. you have a legal framework which argues one-size-fits-all but in the real world of foreign policy and diplomacy, we make distinctions. there is a distinction. we are more concerned about iran that we are about some other potential countries including japan because iran is a very different kind of international effort. >> that is a well taken point but the united states has lived with a nuclear pakistan. american scholars would say that pakistan is the most dangerous country. it has more than 100 nuclear

warheads. they don't have control of the government in karachi. -- islamabad, i'm sorry. what would you say to that? >> the world and united states and i fear will pay potentially an extraordinary price for the realities of the north korean and pakistani nuclear programs because the world has made mistakes. in allow on certain things to happen does not mean that we should base our foreign policy on repeating mistakes. i don't believe they should be positive precedents. the risk of a nuclear north korea and nuclear pakistan is extraordinary. why should we want to add to it? we have to work against this problem. >> from turkey? you hadld have both of

dinner together. >> from that scenario, i would assume that there should be consideration within that framework of military action against pakistan and north korea. because it is extraordinarily dangerous situation there. i don't see any talk of that. there should not be talk of that. >> in the case of north korea there was active consideration by the united states. people like me were involved in the debate and there were moments where military force should have been used against north korea and i believe the world would be a far better place if it had been used. north korea has reached a point where the as a military force against its nuclear program, the cost is probably prohibit it. in pakistan, there were some extra complications. united states and the world were too permissive. if there is a mixture of

terrorism and nuclear materials, that dangerous mixture is more likely to come from pakistan in our lifetime than anywhere else. >> it is a nightmare scenario. >> the wikileaks documents show that the arab gulf states are not only extremely concerned about the iranian nuclear program but they are -- they would essentially support an american strike to obliterate that option from iran. what would you say to that? >> wikileaks is what it says, leaks. [laughter] as such, it is incomplete, selectively published, and chosen at random rather than expressing a continuous buildup of diplomacy and policy and so on. i would reserve judgment on what happened on there and rather put my faith in the public policy of those countries and

how they state those policies. >> i am told by the powers that be that i should go back to the audience. >> i was asked to make an intervention but after listening to richard and to the last question, let me pick up with your inbox what has been going on in our part of the world. for the friends of the united states, you are looking at a different scenario. i think that is a big insult. with 300 million people, you are forgetting about the their perspective as to what is going on. it is very important what we should learn from our mistakes. we should learn a lesson. as much as i respect you, i got worried with that answer. we should be respected of the arab world because israel is an

issue. we want peace with israel. we put something in front of israel and we should be working much harder because we're not getting an answer. >> is there a question there? >> the question is the inbox. if you forget the people in the street and what is happening today and once you hit iran or israel gets a run and how it will come out and hit people -- i love the leaks but it shows the difference between officials and non-official >> i think you make a good point. i will surprise you and agree with you. wikileaks purportedly represents what officials are thinking in certain countries. my reaction to that was it is one thing for officials to tell the united states something

privately but will necessarily be prepared to say those things publicly? would they be -- would they be able to carry the day if there was massive opposition from there on public? if the united states or israel were to use military force against iran, it would be highly unpopular in the arab street. i would not assume that governmental statements of support would necessarily hold in those sorts of circumstances. the street does matter and possibly cause of the events in recent days and now this tree matters more in the arab world that has ever mattered before. the street has often been exaggerated. many predicted the street would rise up and attack saddam hussein. it did not. the street has a very different dynamic and ability to mobilize itself. >> let's ask the inevitable question -- it is the 11th hour or the day after iran develops a nuclear oweapon and you have

two options, either diplomacy or both your action. if iran was attacked by the united states or israel. we're not talking about switzerland. how is iran likely to react? would they react in a conventional way? would they resort by conventional warfare? >> it is unpredictable. as has become more complicated and very serious issues. >> i think there's a probability that the region will be on fire. we would have a european discussion how to be involved

let's try to avoid it diplomatically. >> i believe that iran will strike back wherever it well. throughout the -- wherever it will. my country and other countries would be in the firing line. iran has assets throughout the world. i called and steel clause. ws that they could use it for whatever they wish them what is the view from on caankara? >> the best would be to do things now to avoid such a scenario. >> there is talk about military strikes. >> people can make some errors and preparations but as government, it is our duty now to resolve these issues

surrounding the subject through state and diplomatic channels as soon as possible. the secret of diplomacy here is trying to approach a country in a positive way with an element of respect and on one hand, you are trying to have this but on the other hand, there are sanctions that continue to come in. when the element of respect gets out of the picture, diplomacy gets into trouble. i think it is important to take iran as a legitimate sovereign nation to be approached with respect and talk with them openly. >> you mentioned hezbollah earlier. would a run open up a front against israel if israel attacked hezbollah in lebanon? >> the short answer is maybe. iran has a wide variety of assets at its command. it is possible they would interfere with the flow of oil, something that would have repercussions for the world economy.

i participated in these scenarios. they are not pretty. there is no way to game is that whenever one is better off. everyone is worse off. it forces the conversation on steps that can be taken to avoid it. i hope the iranians take conversations like this that they would be worse off and hopefully the iranians will rethink the costs and benefits that would accrue to them if they continue with their nuclear program beyond a certain point. they would be enormous losers as well. >> as they say, all good things must come to an end. i would like to thank our distinguished panel. i would like to thank our audience in dollars. avos. [speaking farsi] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national

cable satellite corp. 2011] >> in a few moments, federal reserve chairman ben bernanke says the economy continues to recover. "washington journal" live at 7:30. live it 10:00 eastern, a congressional oversight panel hearing on commercial real estate's affect on back stability. bank stability. on "washington journal" we will have the latest unrest in egypt and talk with republican senator roger wicker of mississippi senator jeff bingaman will take your questions about energy policy and the oil markets and we will focus on unemployment