>> i would encourage all schools looking for academy status because of the extra freedom that it gives you, the extra responsibility, and the evidence is now clear that academies will, particularly those in less-well-off areas have transformed in those places. we have managed in the last month to create as many academy schools as the last government did in 12 years. -- in the last seven years. we need to give up the pressure. -- keep up the pressure. >> 48% of the british people feel that the government has lost control of the economy. given that this government has access to the future jobs find, -- axed the future jobs fund, the question that people are asking is has this prime

minister even have a penny for our young people? >> what is clear that there is only one side in this house that has a plan at all. the party opposite has absolutely no plan, apart from to deny the deficit, to say there is not a problem, and to pretend that they handed over a golden inheritance when coming in fact, we have the biggest budget deficit in events -- advanced governments and a big debt to deal with. >> would the prime minister will come the association of pension funds at his work place, the retirement income commission, which is designed to propose proposals so that people can live with dignity and with enough money in retirement? >> we want to see strong private-sector pension provisions. i think that history, over the last 13 years, has been depressing when so much money was taken out of the pension system, not least by the

pension tax that happened a year after year, proposed probably by the two people who are running the labor party. we want to see a stronger private pension provision. so that people can have independence and dignity in their old age. .>> 200 years ago, when this country managed to steal the english, from the english why does he returned to that type of activity by taking away the forests of our people? >> this government is taking a completely different approach to the last government. the last government sold off forestry with no guarantees on access, no guarantees that it was free, no guarantees about habitat. of course, i am listening to all of the arguments that are being put in this case. but i would just say this. is it the case that there are

organizations like the will and trust, like the national trust, that can do it better job than the forestry commission? i believe that there are. is there a problem with the forestry commission -- >> order. i apologize for interrupting the prime minister. the prime minister must not be shot at. -- shouted at. and the author must be heard. >> what i would say to the hon. gentleman is with their be a problem for the forestry commission who is responsible for regulating forestry, but is also the owner of the forestry. we do not accept that what the bank of england or other organizations. it is worth looking at to see if we can produce a system that is better for access, better for habitat, battered for natural england, and better for the countryside that we love. >> each week the house of commons is in session, we air prime minister's questions on

c-span 2 on wednesday at 7:00pm -- 7:00 a.m. eastern, and then again on sunday night at 9:00pm on c-span. at c-span.org, you can find the video archive of past prime ministers questions. you can find all linked to the house of commons and prime ministers websites. >> tomorrow on washington general -- washington journal, a look at infrastructure as well as house republican plans to cut spending what derek thompson. after that, but baylor institute on recent decisions dealing with health care bill. later we will track with robert draper from national geographic about the opium wars. that is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. both chambers of congress are in

session this week. the senate returns monday at 2:00 p.m. eastern to continue work on reauthorization of the federal aviation administration. if the bill aims to modernize the air traffic control system while improving safety and availability of flights. at 5:30 p.m. eastern, the senate will hold roll call votes on a couple of judicial nominees. if watch live coverage on c- span2. the house returns tuesday at 2:00 p.m. eastern -- eastern for legislative goals. one includes reviewing sections of the page redact. i follow the house live on c- span. >> i will not make age an issue of this campaign. i am not going to exploit for political purposes by opponent's youth and inexperience. [laughter] >> on the 100th anniversary of his birth, look at the life and presidency of ronald reagan online at the c-span video library.

>> israeli president shimon peres addressed the abortions of a peace treaty between israel and palestinians. joining him was a professor who talks about the changing dynamics of the middle east and u.s. policy in the region. we began with president peres'in progress. this is about 20 minutes. >> there are still important strategic anchors and a strong desire on the part of the in people and all these areas for real change to correct the mistakes of the past. we cannot overlook the possibility that the younger generation may succeed.

let us not think that only conservatism and fundamentalism can triumph. this raises the need to freeze our agenda of the israeli- palestinian conflict as soon as possible, because the conflict is exploited by all sides, but by the arab side in bayh's. israel must maintain its strength in the face of all enemies that rise up against it, but at the same time in my stretch out its hand in peace to all of those who are willing. our efforts must be worthy and visible, our efforts for peace must be that peace is a crucial need not only for us but for our neighbors. compromise no matter how painful is preferred to the

alternative in the absence of peace. the peace process is planned been slowly because of the suspicions on both sides. but we've seen in the past that the palestinians were open, that a righteous government in israel -- we believe -- they believe that our rights as government would never agree to aid to state solution. they were wrong. -- to a two-state solution. they were wrong. we have managed to overcome this with egypt and jordan and even partially with the palestinians. we have learned that negotiations began with huge gaps and the of scene that we must overcome them, and not with hammers and drums, but

creatively, with wisdom, with patients, and without talking to match. negotiations are a process in which each side tries to gain the maximum. later on, both sides realize that they must depart from their declared positions and reach practical positions. we know that alongside the opening declared position, there is a tacit agreement on a number of central issues. eight u.s. states whose name will be israel or is israel, and an arab state named palestine. they will live securely beside one another in good neighborly relations and will fight against terror. this will enable the palestinian state to be demilitarized.

this will enable a complete and to the conflict and will open a window or perhaps an update to regional activity. the sides of the territory will enable the establishment of a palestinian state and agreed upon sensible borders will give israel security. the end of the conflict will enable our regional and global economy. the palestinians will be able to benefit from a growing global economy, and israel will benefit from relations across the borders. peace will bring the momentum of tourism, the opening of joint modern ventures in the area -- energy, water, environment, free-trade. in fact, in every area of life. the younger generation will be able to buy an iphone in stead

of stones. i am turning to our palestinian neighbors and saying to them, come, but as a compromise, let us reach a compromise that can serve as a model for everything that is occurring, for all those who are seeking a true response for the younger generation whose demands are justified. established for yourself a palestinian state, but let it be a democratic state based on science and technology. in israel we have learned that there is no contradiction between science and religion. science can contend with physical property just as faith can contend with spiritual poverty. establish a democratic, scientific palestinian state that will live alongside a democratic, scientific state of israel.

a two-state solution of this kind can be a model for other states in the entire region. i believe that it can create enthusiasm along those who seek change in the younger generation. let us go back to the negotiating table. all negotiations must be open and hidden at the same time. i too look at the opinion polls which concern -- which are concerning and infuriating. but i've learned that a survey represents a passing mood, not the future. the future must be shaped, not gas. both sides can reach a reasonable agreement that will address the aspirations of independents on the part of the palestinians and the security

needs of israel. ladies and gentlemen, based on my experience in political and security live, i can tell my life -- my friends here in the government and outside it that, knowing that the making of peace is like crossing the red sea, like parting the red sea, it is extremely difficult but the alternative in the absence of peace is far more dangerous. there is no contradiction between bringing health to the region and healing the conflict. there will be tw of nation states that have freed themselves from neutral hostilities. it held comes from an economic quartet, not a political government or quartet, it is possible that the current storm

will become the required change. it is in our hands. thank you very much. [applause] >> president, mayor, ladies and gentlemen, chairman of that conference, president of harvard university, and former secretary of finance of the united

states, professor rubenstein, the subject of my lecture at this time is on its israel. conventional wisdom had at that time was on the side of israel in it is robust arabia -- in the israel-arabia conflict. a prospering economy, the arab leaders rival each other in recognizing their inability to defeat israel on the battlefield even when they depart. but i will argue that this progress has reversed itself. time is now playing against israel. i will also discuss this factors that have led to the strategic change and recommended policies for israel to reverse this dangerous process. but as began with analogy to

the electoral map of the united states. you're familiar with that during a presidential campaign. some states appeared as clearly democratic, others are clearly republican. other states lean toward the democratic candidates, and others lean toward the republican, and others are undecided. to close a call. an analogy to the electoral map, i like to show the geostrategic map as of a few years ago and compared to the current map. let's divide this into state and non-state actors, using this, demonstrating the changes over the past years and what needs to be done. a few years ago, this is what

the middle east look like more less. israel as a stable democracy in blue. we have the good guys, the moderates, in the light blue we have the leaning to moderate states, the dark green is the radical islamic countries, and a lighter green the increasingly radical camps. on the other hand, what is happening now in the year 2011, iraq is no longer moderate. turkey is not either. but a non -- lebanon is half or more radical. egypt has a? -- has a question mark.

what are the reasons for this strategic shift, for this change that time is not working in israel's favor? the transition to the missile era, which made israel more under missile cover. there's the campaign did delegitimize is rope by imposing legal constraints and political constraints for radicalization process. the weakness of the u.s. is in the region because of the bourse. and the lack of a victory of and afghanistan, the economic crisis, and some call at the post-american era. we have internal conflicts among jews and that does not know. we have internal conflicts and fights over a crisis of governance in israel. that has implications for

israel solidarity. israel is also divided between the settlers and those who want to resolve the conflict. most importantly, the arab countries as a collective have never had the ability to defeat israel. we're approaching a time where they think that they can. one of the reasons for this is what i would call the king of alliances. they have the king of alliances, and that is the president of iran, ahmedinejad. let us not take his appearance and his bizarre behavior lightly. he is the catalyst and initiator of the radicals. he is the champion of the

radical at stores and he does it very successfully. we're lucky that there is the sunni-shiite divide that serves as a constraint. they can be represented by an equation for the equation states that the collective aggregated military ability of the radical states-the damage they will incur in a future work will be greater than israel's capabilities and future partnerships with the u.s.. subsequently, this aggregated capability will succeed with a concerted effort to defeat israel. there is even a nice equation which i will put on a website. this time on israel's side? ,ook, please, at this suppllide

this time line. what we're seeing -- i am not saying that we already accepted -- all these things have happened, but our strategic advantages ending. and the second 11 on board demonstrated to the world that israel on the home front can be attacked, [unintelligible] the israeli doctrine of moving rapidly is a doctrine that requires a major revision when there are thousands of missiles that can reach any point in israel. you cannot play any sport without a strong defense. you cannot engage in war without a solid defense.

while sophisticated technology, our defense is not as the president noted, does not provide a complete answer. we must at that the size of the state of israel, we are very vulnerable. what can be done? but as the back to the analogy of the map of the united states. when the state moves toward the opposition, the goal of any candidate is to change the state's position, moving it into their column. this is basic common sense. it is not rocket science. the web of formal and informal alliances of states and non- state actors which threatens israel from near and far, even before ran becomes nuclearized, means that the f penny must drop, in -- israel must engage in a diplomatic initiative to

move syria away from the radical alliance which the president, the chief of staff, the outgoing chiefs all support. the elites shows that there is a partner in the palestinian side and the gap between the positions can be bridged. israel must make a considerable effort to bring turkey back to the more neutral position it held until recently. this is in the best interests of visual. we have no other choice. the principle that must guide us is simple. the best defense is a diplomatic offensive. even in iran, they notice. they are successful in engaging in this policy when they create alliances. . there is a diplomatic freeze. let us look at a democratic egypt, what we called the median of butter model. it can be shown that even if he

did become democratic, radical parts will be there. this as recently pointed out this week. this can be shown in the median voter model. when the majority of voters in egypt are hostile to israel, that will be at the margins of the political map. this will push the ruling power into positions that are worse for israel and in the direction of the iranian radicals. because of their perception of that, mubarak has been abandoned by the west. this is my model. as you can see, egyptian voters are only on this side of the model. regarding the american position of president obama, many in the region are asking why did obama associate himself so quickly --

dissociate himself so quickly from president mubarak? is it true that a bomb up with bring him closer to the arab masses not hostile to them? in his cairo speech he declared that this was compatible with his policy regarding human rights. engagement and non-violence and resolution of conflict, and the need to spread democratic values. that during his term and with his help, the tyrannical middle east has become a democratic region in american eyes, the justice george bush senior contributed to the fall of the former soviet union. it does not mean -- matter that transition to democracy may take years. the key is that -- dick cheney

spoke out today in favor of mubarak, but as you can see here, in this model, the median voter is what we're going have, all levels in the center, even conservatives, see democracy here. he maintained that this week that elbaradei it will become the mubarak of the peace process. this is nonsense. reality shows that this is being navigated between constrained from the right, tying his hand, and mubarak is working in a democratic system from a working system under constraints with a revolutionary system. the process of radicalization in the arab world, the perceived

weakness of the u.s. in the region, and that tens of thousand missiles and radical arab states are working against us. israel must engage in israeli peace initiatives to build strength before it is too late. [applause] >> our international coverage continues with a look at the latest developments in egypt. this is about 30 minutes. washington journal conditions. the director nathan brown. thank you for being with us. if you could, 12 days after the up rising began, assess the response. caller: it's clearly where we want egypt to be. the situation changes from

day-to-day. we are not sure who the actors are and what their intentions are it is difficult to figure out how we affect the event. assessing the opinions of a number of different opinions this is not just the military

system. >> explain the process. could the vice president take over. does he need to leave the state? all these questions seem to move over the past two years what you've got ask a regime right now in crisis in that sense, he is no longer the issue if he continues in office or not, the point is that this regime wants to basically stay as it is. we are wanting to force the regime to make for the more plural is tick party system.

the mechanisms of how we do that is not clear. if they start going outside the constitution and coming up with the process on the fly. this is all part of the transition. transition. >> if they say we won't even talk, what happens

then is that the current then is that the current >> you would widely respected would need new amendments. it is essentially designed and not really a solution. americans realize that. what americans have done have sort of backed off in support they went much farther. went way beyond the obama administration was comfortable with.

the real issue is how do we get the transition. leif: join the conversation on our twitter page or we have a line set aside if you are an egyptian american call 202-628-0184. this comment on the twitter page. >> what is stability for some people is stagnation for the other, for many others. when came after the assassination of president

anwar sadat in -- he was sort of holding down the fort, making sure that basic con tours of the egyptian system continued as they were and keeping an fairly consistent foreign policy as well. after several decades in office that begins to look like stagnation. it also looks like a system in which mubarak's friends or his family, friends and cronies have learned how to profit from. so again, stability in the eyes of one is corruption and stagnation in the eyes of many egyptians. >> last night in california form vice-president dick chaney saying president mubarak has been a close ail eye of the united states over the last 30 years, advising the obama administration to proceed carefully. he also talked about the situation globally in pakistan. here's part of the conversation with former vice-president dick chaney last night. s part of the last night. >> something to remember about pakistan.

a large population and a large streak of fundamentalism. significant stockpile of nuclear weapons. if pakistan ever goes to the dark side we'll have a big problem on our hands those are all subject for debate. all subject for debate. >> we're looking at a collection of political systems that aren't that deeply rooted in terms of their so sites. what these were good at doing

was persuading their own populations this were inevitable, they were there to stay. the events in tunisia i think are largely unrelated to the events anywhere else. but what it did was going on in tunisia it made them think, maybe the situation can be changed. and there have been all sorts of opposition movements, demonstrators, people trying to galvanize egyptians into action. and suddenly they found that they got more traction in the society. i'm not sure this is going to replicate itself in many other arab societies, but there's no question that entire world is looking what happens in egypt with societies basically line up on one side regimes looking very careful and like up on the other side. >> nathan brown is an expert on the middle east, most notably egypt, professor of the george washington university. -- the west backing gradual

transition is the headline. >> question for doctor brown. u good morning. >> it was the stated policy to establish the demonstration what would be the motive to establish would be the motive to establish >> prime minister -- also cut hy in half. >> the question about regional demonstration is a very, very good one.

what i would say is that if anything may have inhibited action. when egyptians look to iraq, they don't see the democratic system. they have lived through a brutal civil war. basically, the situation made possible for their own societies. you really want to push this. this is where we may beheading. each country has its own internal dynamic. to the extent they look to iraq, it's not the example to them. the rule of law in the arab world and constitutions, arab basic laws.

nathan brown. >> good morning. i have three questions. i realize that there is unrest throughout the middle east. it is difficult to figure out who the actors are in the up rising. my question is what does it say to the confidence of the obama administration when they start to insist that president mum mumbarak back off. number two, why the push for the mugs limb brother hood to be part of the new government they are part of the mosque committed

to overthrow israel. we are seen as the big satan. number three is, why are the radical left there now? we have code pink in the islam yik papers saying help us cleanse our country. >> we'll get those points on the >> we'll get those points on the >> to some extend i think that's a fair criticism. what the obama administration did from the beginning and acting in the name of the american people was it back pedaled fairly quickly on its support for hosni mubarak. but it wasn't quite sure exactly where to push things from there.

to be fair, this is a rapidly-changing and rapidly-evolving situation. and it wasn't really clear until the beginning of this week or the beginning of last week, i guess, that mubarak may actually step down in september. step do in september. it is also not clear exactly how much the entire process is going to honor the exiting procedures. what they are doing is trying to what they are doing is trying to >> we have to remember that our leverage in the situation are limited. if we want a stable outcome what that probably means is an egypt that looks a little bit different than a regime that

sits on top of its population, not allowing any change or organization. once you open things up to a little bit you open up to the forces that are actually there on the ground. the united states, for instance, is in no position to say this party can run in egyptian elections and this party cannot run. we don't run egyptian elections. what i think makes sense for now is to basically communicate to the egyptian population that an egypt that is a little more pluralist, an egypt that includes political forces that we don't like, including the muslim brotherhood, is one we can deal with as long as there really is a pluralism of political forces. we don't want to see an egypt run by the muslim brotherhood, but we can work with an egypt in which they are one actor among many. to be fair to the brotherhood, that's what they're pushing for now, not to runt country. in terms of the political left, i don't have a lot of insight. i've been spending my time focusing on the political situation rather than the american. but what i would say is this.

i think there is a natural inclination across the political spectrum in the united states that when you see people demonstrating for what they're calling as democracy and pluralism and freedom is a natural sympathy. i don't think it's so much a left-right issue. there are all kinds of concerns in this country about muslim brotherhood, stability, policies in the region and so on. so those are real. but i don't see this breaking down in left-right terms in the united states. >> kathleen parker in the "washington post," cairo's courage os witnesses. "to speak for peace this morning in the "washington post" focusing on many of the journalists who have been detained and are leaving for fear of their own safety because of the situation in cairo. >> egypt is a place where you have independent voices

flourishing, independent newspapers, very strong intellectual debate. where this stopped was at the place of organization. you couldn't organization. or you had real trouble if you wanted to get people together. certainly in any kind of large scale. that's when the regime would kind of clamp down and harass you. what we've seen over the past couple of weeks in the streets of cairo have been attacks on foreign journalists. interestingly, the egyptian press have maintained its extremely active role. if you look at egyptian publications, they're covering this from the various points of view, many of which are very sympathetic to the demonstrate. >> nathan brown is a former fulbright scholar in egypt, has studied -- now director of middle east studies at george washington university. gary duncan has a question that i think goes to the basic geography of egypt. he points out "why is egypt not considered a african nation? isn't it predominantly in africa and considered the birthplace of

civilization "if you look at the region. >> egypt would see itself as an african country. but the language they speak is arabic. and they feel far, far stronger ties to the arab world. you take a look at the kind of political system egypt has, take a look at kind of its culture where they export their own movies, their own books, to it's probably oriented more towards the arab world, but does sometimes identify itself as an african country both politically and second earl i would say culturally. >> joe from north carolina. good morning. republican line. >> thank you very much, mr. brown. hello? >> yes. you're on the air. go ahead, joe. >> mr. brown, you sound like a very knowledgeable man on egypt and the middle east. aren't you proud that egyptian government didn't go chinese or iranian on their people? the military has stayed back, they've stayed out of the way, and they haven't done any shooting that we know of. secondly, shouldn't other countries where democracy was a

form, i'm speaking about china and japan. although a lot of people know about china, japan is a very repressive country. political prisoners. please let's start a new system in japan and overthrow their system of corruption. thank you very much for your time. >> to joe's first point about the military and these scenes which we've been seeing over the last 12 days, tanks moving in but for the most part remaining peaceful. there have been some outbusses of demonstration, many deaths, but not to the level that one might have anticipated going into this. >> yes. i think that military right now is playing a fairly kind of dangerous game, or a game that's a little bit less appearance than meets the eye. it's absolutely true that they haven't gone for the sort of radical tee an men solution of just trying to crush the demonstrators. they have not done that. but what they have done is tried to -- they didn't interfere when a lot of the journalists were being attacked. it took them a couple of days to

intervene and clear that that wasn't acceptable behavior. they've been trying to inhibit people from going to demonstrate. they've been trying to convince them to go home. so the military definitely is on the side of continuity of this regime without any question. has the military -- could the military have played a much bloodier role? absolutely. but they're not necessarily on the side of change here. they're on the side of stability. >> tony from scarsdale, new york, an egyptian american. how long have you been in the u.s., tony? >> 30 years. >> thanks for phoning in. >> you're welcome. good morning, professor brown. actually when the demonstrations started in the first couple of days i was very much supporting it. but then when i started seeing the influence of the muslim brotherhood, i really have some kind of a change of mind. and the reason for that is because i know really what is the muslim brotherhood stands

for. i know how they can manipulate the egyptian population. when you have a population about 30% ill lit rat, a lot of people there that are under the poverty line, the muslim brotherhood does not get to be only part of many parties they will dominate actually. because i think they are a very fascist organization. so why didn't the united states deal with it as when we deal with any far right party in europe? when we say no, we cannot be with them. we don't say about the nazi or the fascist parts of german society or parts of italian society. the muslim brotherhood is no different from them. >> thank you, tony. >> yeah. i'm not sure -- i mean, i agree with the caller that there's lots of things that muslim brotherhood approach that would be a challenge to american values. but i'm not sure we're in any

position to be able to say we deal with this party or we deal with that party. to me that's a fundamental question. the question is not whether or not we deal with the muslim brotherhood, it's what message we send to the egyptian society about what kind of opposition to deal with. in terms of where the muslim brotherhood is right now, what i would say is that they are an organized political actor. that's one of their strong suits. they also appeal to values that mean a lot to a lot of egyptians. they're culturally extremely conservative. they're religion news a society that's 90% muslim. they have muslim in their name. so they have an awful lot of attractiveness. that said, if there were elections tomorrow or a year from now, i would guess you would see them getting perhaps 20 to 30% of the vote. especially now that all these other opposition groups that are not islamic in orientation, youth groups, labor groups and that sort, have shown their ability to turn egyptians out

and to mobilize them. so the idea that muslim brotherhood would be one actor among many i think of course that's what the brotherhood says that they want. and i think there's reason to believe them there, that they are in simply no position to demand or to reach for anything more. they don't have the capability. and second, i think that would be the most likely outcome. >> one of our twitter viewers saying that mr. brown, please compare the u.s. regime's crushing of the gaza-free election with its tentative ok of egyptian democracy. >> i mean, that's very interesting. because what happened in the palestinian elections in 2006 was that you did have a hamas majority in parliament. and the united states didn't i would say crushing it would probably be going a little bit too far. what they did is make clear we're not going to deal with this government. you're welcome to elect whomever you like. but we will have absolutely nothing to do with them diplomatically. and we will cut off international funding on which

this government is dependent. and eventually that led to the palestinian split between the west bank and gaza and the deep crisis that we had today. my own feeling at the time was that united states was making a fundamental mistake, forgetting that in a democracy you have elections periodically. and if you had elections in 2006 you would have had elections in 2010. and hamas would have had to face the palestinian population having produced nothing. we forgot that. we pressed for change immediately. in egypt i think we're still making policy a little bit more day-to-day. but i think we are a little bit more comfortable with the idea that egypt could transition to something that would be recognizably democratic. >> as the protests and demonstration reached two-week mark this week we're talking with nathan brown of george washington university on what's next for that country. our relations with egypt and the larger impact in the middle east. ahmed its joining us from maryland. good morning. an egyptian american. >> good morning. several points. thank you for the very

interesting conversation. we have to keep in mind that the mubarak regime has been in place for 30 years and egyptian people have been under martial law for that period of time. there's been several callers calling about the muslim brotherhood. the muslim brotherhood has fill add void in the egyptian system. they've provided free medical care, free social services, where the government failed to do so. egypt is not like iraq. egypt is not like any of the other arab countries. egypt has the highest number of ph.d.'s, highly-educated people. and many of them are young, under 30, who have no jobs and no prospects for future for marriage or anything like that because they simply don't have the money to do that. this uprising is the first one in almost 7,000-years for the

entire egyptian population to come out and say, enough is enough. they want their basic human rights. they want democracy. and to be standing, sitting here in america and talking about allowing mubarak to continue, he's had 30 years to try. we've supported him for 30 years. there was a report yesterday in egypt that his family's wealth is between 40 and $70 billion. so basically they have stolen well above $2 billion a year for each of his 30 years of regime. >> how would you respond to his points? >> well, it's very interesting. in terms of the mubarak's wealth, my hunch is that those reports are greatly exaggerated. they just seem a little bit out of whack to me. but there's absolutely no question that there's a widespread feeling within

egyptian society that certain groups within the society, certain individuals, es or so -- especially the last 10 or 15 years or so have profited from their close connection to the regime. the other thing that i think the caller was getting at, and one thing that i would agree with is that this is not primarily a question of the muslim brotherhood. we in america naturally go to them after 9/11 we're very concerned about islamic politics and so on. but what i think seeing in egypt right now is a very diverse political scene. and the focus we should be on transition rather than on any particular political actor. >> our guest is a graduate of the university of chicago and princeton. joe is joining us from manchester, new hampshire for nathan brown. good morning. >> hi. thank you very much. nathan, i appreciate your perspective. what i'm concerned about is that after 9/11 when bin laden bin laden gave his six reasons for the attacks, one of the key ones

was the u.s. propping up in support of corrupt governments. and as i hear the response and the coverage on cnn, msnbc, certainly fox news, mike huck biin particular, that seems to be very, very true, that our interest is solely in finding a partner in supporting israel and the regime in israel. and that to me is absolutely frightening that we've held 80 million people hostage through the implementation of zionism and israel, and all they really want is democracy. and my question to you is, you have been to both countries. i've certainly been to egypt quite a few times on business. my question to you is, isn't it apparent that values of the people in egypt are far closer aligned to the values of americans in terms of the desire for a pluralistic, color blind,

free and democratic society? aren't we more align today egypt than we are to israel? >> thank you, joe. >> that's a tough question. i mean, i wouldn't put it in comparative terms. i think that israel as well is a very vibrant democratic society. and i think that we're very comfortable dealing with the democratic process there. i think what has happened really -- this is not the obama administration, it's not the bush administration. basically since the mid 70's the united states has based an awful lot of its regional policy on a very close working relationship with egypt. and that working relationship is based very much on the egyptian-israeli peace treaty and on sort of the common general view of politics and security affairs in the region. there's been some prickly points in that. but essentially it's a very, very close partnership. what we're now seeing is a situation in which the regime that we have worked closely with not only under mubarak but under

his predecessor is very much on the ropes. and i think actually the obama administration has done a decent job of sort of pivoting, if you look sort of -- if you stand back and look at the last couple of weeks as a whole and saying, we understand that this system as it was working doesn't function. we want to see a different kind of system, one that is more firmly rooted but presumably one that we can continue to work with as a close partner. we don't know exactly when that would look like but we're comfortable with all kinds of different outcomes. that's what i see as a big picture. i think that's fundamentally a sound approach. what you see as a day-to-day and hour to hour basis is very fancy foot work, sometimes going too far one direction, teams going too far another and several missteps along the line. there i think it's fair to criticize. the basic approach of the obama administration it seems to be in a very challenging situation seems fundamentally sound. >> some news this morning from the "washington post," and other outlets indicating that muslim

brotherhood announcing that they will in fact meet with government officials in egypt. the headline this morning from the west post as we get a call from kennington, virginia. good morning. >> good morning. i had a question for mr. brown. i was curious as to are the tensions in the middle east as much as the media portrays or is the media coverage simply increasing? >> that's a very interesting question. because the events in egypt are i think captivating people here an awful lot in the way that domestic politics in the arab world almost never does. what i would say is that the tensions in the middle east, the international tensions are kind of problematic. the ones between states. but those aren't getting particularly better or worse. there's a lot of problems there without solution. what we're seeing in egypt and

what we saw earlier in tunisia was something a little bit different. those were really domestic upheavals. that is a little bit new. these regimes had all kind of problems. but fundamentally you could count on the same person being president next year as was last year in most of these places. a lot of egyptians will sometimes joke and say, you know, i'd like to be able to upper the phrase form president sometime before i die. and what we're seeing is in -- we've now got a former president in tunisia, come either perhaps tomorrow or six months from now we'll have -- or a little bit more we'll have a former president of egypt. so we really are seeing some dramatic political changes within arab society. >> and from jan saying we know many americans have left but what impact does this unrest have on american corporations and workers in egypt? >> well, there's no question that the short term effect has been disasterrous for egypt economically in terms of the

tourist industry and so forth and for americans who are in egypt. when the situation is resolved i would expect things to go back actually fairly quickly. egypt is a society again with kind of strong tutions and strong security -- strong institutions and strong security system and so on. one thing that got a little bit messed when you have a -- missed when you have a breakdown of egyptian cities a week ago, you had egyptians organize themselves very, very quickly in order to protect their home and neighborhoods. that was probably in my mind egyptian owe site's finest hour when they eventually formed neighborhood block committees and put this outbreak of civil disorder basically put a stop to it. so what i would say is that right now it's got to be a very, very nervous time for americans to go back and forth to egypt, certainly for americans who have relatives or friends who are in egypt. it's very unstable time.

but fundamentally i wouldn't worry about this so much for the long term. >> and one final point, vice-president -- meeting with the muslim brotherhood and other opposition groups. what role will the vice-president play in this practice in the coming days as we try to figure out what the transition will be for president mubarak and his leadership? >> the vice-president is essentially acting president right now. he is the one who's calling all the shots, at least from what we can see from the outside. he's meeting with muslim brotherhood is a fairly significant step primarily because the opposition has been very united saying we won't negotiate until mubarak leaves. and the muslim brotherhood is breaking that common front. so rather than being the most radical actor they seem to be the ones who are interested in negotiating a deal on different and sort of breaking opposition ranks. >> nathan brown of george washington university, an expert on egypt and the middle east. thanks as always for being with us. >> thank you. >> appreciate your time. >> tomorrow on "washington journal" derek thompson, blogger

and staff editor for the atlantic.com discusses the democrats' goals for spending on education and infrastructure. and the republican house's plan to cut spending. grace marie turner president of the gaylin institute considers the affordal healthcare act. and robert draper talks about afghanistan and the links between local government, law enforcement, coffee growers and the taliban. >> tomorrow a discussion on immigration policies needed to attract highly-skilled workers. also a look at the latest research on immigration's role in business innovation. the brookings institution is hosting this event. watch live coverage at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 2. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009] >> tomorrow president obama delivers remarks on the u.s. economy and rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. watch live coverage from the u.s. chamber of commerce here on

c-span a at 11:30 a.m. eastern. >> the new class of freshmen senators have been giving their first speeches on the floor. follow their speeches online with the congressional chronicle, read transcripts of every session and find a full video archive for every member. congressional chronicle at c-span.org/congress. >> former presidenter british foreign secretary jack straw recently testified before the british iraq inquiry for the third time. he testified about including reservations about the axis of evil -- tony blare on the legality of invading iraq. this portion is about four hours.

everyone.rning, i'm sorry we started a few >> good morning, everybody. we're now ready to start the hearing. we shall be hearing this morning from the right honorable jack straw m.p. who served as foreign secretary from june 2001 until may 2006. we heard evidence from mr. straw in two half-day sessions in january and february of last year. writ up statements in advance of each of those hearings. in preparation for this morning's hearing we ask mr. straw to produce a further statement in response to a

number of particular questions from the inquiry, and we are grateful for that. and it's now being published on our web site. and we are also publishing a number of other documents including some which are relevant to mr. straw's statement for this morning's hearing. now, this morning we shall concentrate only on those areas where there are specific points we wish to explore with mr. straw. we are not addressing all the areas for which he was responsible as foreign secretary and which we may wish to address in our report. and as i say, on each occasion we recognize that witnesses give evidence based on their recollection of events. and we of course check what we hear against the papers to which we have access and which we're still receiving. and finally, i remind each witness on each occasion you will later be asked to sign the transcript of his evidence to the effect that evidence given is truthful, fair and accurate. and with those preliminaries out of the way i'll turn to sir robert lime. >> mr. straw, as the chairman

said we don't need to repeat our earlier discussions. but i'd like to see clarification on a few specific points as the strategy towards iraq evolved after the ninth of september, 2001. last year we discussed the policy of containment in some detail. and as you say in your latest statement this was a policy that was difficult to sustain. is it right that as we've heard from other witnesses containment remains the government's officially-stated policy, at least until september of 2002? >> well, it's right that in a sense -- depends what you mean exactly by "containment" but if you mean by "containment" as i set out in my latest statement, containing and removing the

problem of saddam's failure to comply with the united nations obligations, then containment remained the overall strategy of the government right up to the time when we took the decision to use military action. because in a sense 1441 was a continuation of a series of policies by the united nations security council to secure the compliance of saddam hussein and to ensure that all his w.m.d. had been removed and plea grounds of capability had been broken up, and as i said repeatedly, it was absolutely explicit at the time, saddam had done that then he would have stayed in place. regime change was never an objective of the british government. and if 1441 had been complied with, which was my hope, then in an as within 1441 would have

been a successful policy. >> ok. i think we'll come back to one aspect of that a bit later on. very soon after 9/11, there was talk in the united states and quite a lot of speculation in the british media that there would be a phase two of the war on terror and that that phase two might include as a priority target military action of some kind against saddam's regime. on the 26th of november, 2001, president bush in a press conference made some remarks about iraq which boosted that speculation. then there was quite a lot of speculation following on from that in the british press about whether military action against iraq was being contemplated. in his recent evidence to us, lord wilson who was cabinet secretary at the time as richard wilson told us that mr. blair

had played an important part after 9/11 in dissuading the americans from taking action against iraq at that time or from thinking of it. and indeed on the 27th of november, 2001, your minister ben bradshaw told -- it was not the policy of the government to extend the action to other states and it was merely the involvement of other states including afghanistan in 9/11. so is it right to think that in the autumn of 2001 and indeed into the early part of 2002 the government was seeking to dissuade the united states administration from targeting iraq in the second phase of the war against terror? >> it was certainly the case at that period. we were seeking to persuade the united states government to put

off any significant consideration of the issue. because in november 2001 we were completely immersed in afghanistan. i mean, that was the overriding preoccupation for the british government and indeed for the americans. and there was and remained a serious problem in iraq, but it was not one that we had to deal with that day, that week, or that month. and eventually that became the explain and to some extent it was brought up by richard wilson's evidence. we had afghanistan going on. and then on the 13th of december, 2001, there was the attack by islamist terrorists against -- in delhi.

and that led to a series of events which over the following monthsization of conventional forces by india and pakistan. and the possibility that they might begin to threaten each other with nuclear forces. and i got completely immersed in that. i mean, with colin powell, with his deputy, we were back and forth to afghanistan throughout that period to persuade and cajole the unions of pakistanis to pull back from a military confrontation. so that was our preoccupation, yes. iraq was there. but if you're asking me, sir lord, when iraq really started to come right to the surface i can tell you exactly as far as i was concerned. and that was the day that president bush gave his state-of-the-union speech, which

was on the 23rd, 24th -- towards the end of january 2002. i happened to be in washington that day and could sense the sort of game change that his statement led to. >> and you made clear in your evidence to us last year that you thought the administration made what you called a profound mistake in the state of the union speech by linking together three separate countries which you did not see as being linked. so in this period up to at least the state-of-the-union, the axis of evil speech, where the americans are saying the afghanistan, very serious situation in india, iraq is not implicated either in 9/11 or of course in the attack on the laksuba it's not a priority issue. so essentially insofar as there are inclinations on their side to push it up to the top of the list, we're saying that's not

the priority right now. >> that's correct. for the record. >> yes. what saying, if i could just put it a slightly different way, we're saying it is a priority but we don't have to consider it now. we have other -- >> a priority like north korea? >> well, we have to deal with this, we were saying. but i mean, there's an issue of capacity apart from everything else. from my point of view it wasn't really possible to deal with then because we were dealing with afghanistan and we were dealing hour-by-hour with the indian-pakistan issue. just to illustrate what i mean by hour-by-hour, some other straw family record now that i was supposed to be cooking the sunday lunch, the christmas lunch. and i served the first course on christmas day. and the rest of the time was spent on the telephone talking

to colin powell and others about the india-pakistan thing. so this was completely dominant. but iraq was a problem. it was a problem but we didn't have to deal with it there and then. and i thought just primarily if i could pick you up on one thing that you said that i said about the axis of evil speech. what i had my difficulty about president bush highlighting the problems of iraq and north corey yeah, i wouldn't have used the axis of evil analogy because i didn't think it was an ax -- an axis. i had profound objections to him bracketing iraq with iran and north korea. i didn't think it was justified, and because it undermined the reformist president's efforts to reach out to the west and profoundly damaged his standing within his own country. >> yes. what you said to us last year was exactly that. you said "i was concerned about

the way in which he had sought to link these three very different problems together." so these are problems. iraq is a problem, north korea is a problem, iran is a problem, but your point is these are different problems and they are not like the problems unlike the one that interrupted your christmas dinner, one you had to deal with at that particular moment. now, on the third of december in a letter from which you've quoted in your latest statement to us, which has been declassified, your office -- and you told us previously that you'd personally approved this briefing to the prime minister -- your office replied to a request from the prime minister for a note on the options for. and if i can just pick out four points from the advice that you gave to number 10 in that letter, you said "there are no -- or your letter said -- your private secretary's letter said" there are no antiterrorist grounds for stage two military

action against iraq." it said "a strategy to deal with the w.m.d. threat will require rachetting up our present policy of containment." it said, "military intervention for the purpose of regime change would be illegal." and of course you have consistently argued as you did to us last year that regime change could not be an objective of u.k. foreign policy. and finally, you concluded this last bit of advice was "we should find out what the the americans had in mind and test the viability of any plans." so you saw sir david manning's mission he was about to go on to washington with sir richard gearlove as being an exploratory mission rather than one in which we were certainly arguing for regime change, which you said was illegal. were you aware that around the same time that you were offering that advice that jonathan powell was writing the prime minister a

note about encouraging people in iraq to resist saddam, a note which he described in his evidence to us slightly difficult dentally? >> i mean, i don't think i was -- diffidently? >> i don't think i was aware of that note itself. because they are entitle today send their own private notes to their boxes as my private secretaries did to me. and i didn't want them sending around the office or parading around for number 10. but i don't think that's necessarily inconsistent with a clear policy and legal requirements that the british government could not be committed to. -- a regime change as an objective. and if there had been some magic wand by which it could have been removed an and re-- replaced bya

democracy so much the better. you can have the wish and desire to see a regime change, you may also within clear limits wish to encourage that, but it could not be and actually wasn't an objective of the british government policy. and that particular briefing that went to david manning i think on the number 10 on the third of december was designed obviously to give him background but also to set out what i saw as the parameters of any overall strategy for us. and i actually think it's rather stood the test of time. >> you were of course aware that number 10 had also commissioned some briefing in parallel at the same time from secrets and terrorism service. and you sought papers -- we saw two papers that they sent number 10 these papers of course have not been declassified.

but they have been described to us in evidence sexes which transcripts of which have been published. the first paper that s.i.s. wrote for number 10 began, "what can be done about iraq if the u.s. heads for direct action have we ideas which could divert them to an alternative course?" and that paper warned of the hazards, and as described to us it argued for caution, circumspection and awareness of what a heavy matter iraq could prove to be. then there was a second paper from the same source from the same author which pointed in the opposite direction. sent at the same time or within days of each other. sent to you at the same time. under the same covering letter. the second paper discussed, and i quote, "how we could combine an objective of regime change in

baghdad with the need to protect important regional interests." and that second paper put a much broader case for regime change from dealing with the threat of w.m.d. now, your office received these papers, and they then wrote to number 10 to say that you thought the two papers were very perceptive and that you hoped the prime minister would read them. were you concerned that number 10 was seeking advice of this kind from s.i.s.? >> i think that number 10 was fully entitled to it. >> as policy advice is that what s.i.s. normally gives? >> oh, sorry. no, but it is intelligence. but you ask was i surprised, no, i wasn't. we were in a position where we

were seeking the best advice that was available in respect of an issue which prior to 9/11 had not had the attention it should have done. so it was getting people to think about the what ifs of the situation. and i apologize for, this but i have not refreshed my memory about the content of those papers and wasn't aware i was going to be asked about them. but i have a recollection of them. but my view was that both were contributions to an important -- if by private discussion which was taking place at the time about what we did about iraq and as important what advice we gave to the americans. and i'd be having sort of parallel discussions with colin powell as well about this, as i

recall. >> but the second paper set out orders being described in an earlier evidence section assetting out a road map for regime change. now, you just commended the papers, said you heard the prime minister would receipt them and were very perceptive. why do you commend a paper setting out a route map for regime change? >> you have to forgive me. i was given no notice that you were going to raise this. i have not seen the papers. for a long time. and i've also not seen the scribbles i put on the papers. but with the respect to -- because i think you -- the private office i would have read these papers late at night. i would have scribbled on them late at night "these are very perceptive. make sure number 10 sees them." that would have been translated

into an official note from my private secretary. that does not mean that i've endorsed the policy within those papers. >> i'm very curious that you didn't react to the second paper by saying "regime change can't be an objective." for the prime minister. >> it was hardly unknown that that was not only a my view but that it couldn't be. it couldn't be. >> but you said that in your own advice. so your advice has gone to the prime minister saying can't be a regime change. and then you see a paper from s.i.s. to the prime minister exploring it. >> well, i sayers without seeing the document -- and i'd be perfectly happy to send you an explanatory note about this but i haven't seen the documents but i had no idea we would talk about these two documents what i have put on them. but you have seen how -- you've heard evidence from me on the issue of regime change.

i don't think you can point to a single occasion where idea parted from the very clear view that -- >> that was especially why the question arises. [overlapping speakers] >> you say you haven't seen these documents. >> might i make this point. the view i expressed publicly is the same as the views i expressed privately, that regime changes with not a good idea for us to pursue as an objective. in any event, it was probably illegal so it was not an option. and you will be aware from documents which have been declassified and quite a number which have not that i made that point in quite categorical terms to the prime minister on more than one occasion. >> perhaps i can ask you about some other papers of that period which i hope you will have a chance to refresh your memory of and which were discuss in the recent evidence given by

mr. blair on the 21st of january. and these are the records of his conversation with president bush on the 3 december, 2001. the paper which he sent to president bush which was dated the 4th of december and was entitled "the second phase of the war against terrorism." and then the record of the talks which sir david manning and sir richard dearlove held with the opposite numbers in the white house on the 6th of december, 2001 when they delivered the paper of the 4th of december. the talks were held on the fifth. the record is dated the 6th, i think. so there are these three records of a set of exchanges between number 10 and the white house, between the prime minister and the president and their advisors. these records are classified, but we discussed them with mr. blair on the 21st of

january. have you had a chance to refresh your memory? >> i read obviously the transcript of mr. blair's evidence. >> if you want me to recall every paragraph in those documents. >> no. we hope you would have had a chance to reread the papers before coming here today. >> i think i have. i've spent a very large part of the last six weeks rereading all sorts of papers. but i mean i'll do my best to answer your question. if i can't have an instant recall of a particular document, and my memory is not bad, i will send you a supplementary note on this. >> thank you. do you know if you saw the note that prime minister sent to president bush by hand of sir david manning before it was sent? >> i can't be certain whether i did. i think i did but i'm not certain at this stage. the prime minister's notes that

he wrote -- the personal ones he wrote to the president, occasionally i saw them in advance. as far as i know i always saw them after they had gone. and he wouldn't normally talk to me about the issue in hand. but they were very personal notes which he wrote himself and in a sense took his own advice on. >> could these exchanges be described as the prime minister seeking to dissuade the americans from setting iraq as a target for phase two action at this time? >> well, i -- the prime minister said that he felt profoundly and privately that we needed to stand shoulder to shoulder with the americans after the deep trauma of 9/11.

and they also wanted other things out of a close relationship with president bush, including moves on the middle east peace process. we were, in any event, part of the coalition of afghanistan working very closely with him. and i think the largest contributor to that after the americans. and what i perceived the prime minister as seeking to do was to get on side with president bush on the issues that something needed to be done about iraq, but that not needed to be done, had to be very carefully thought through. and just deciding that saddam hussein needed to be taken out and taken out rather quickly was not a sensible option for the united states. and also not a possible option

for the united kingdom. >> yes. not presumably to get ahead of president bush on this issue or enahead ahigh-speed -- encourage president bush to push it ahead at high-speed. >> certainly not as far as i could perceive. >> because as you said earlier, the priorities of that time were dealing with afghanistan and dealing with this very dangerous situation in the indian subcontinent. iraq was not today's problem. from your recollection of these papers, was the end point the strategic objective that mr. blair set out in his note, which was about iraq, was it the removal of w.m.d. or was it the removal of the regime? do you recall that directly?

>> i mean, mr. play gave his own evidence to you. -- mr. blair gave his own evidence to you and was always clear that the are move of the regime was highly desirable. i mean, there's no question about that. but he also accepted that this was not a legitimate, lawful objective for the british government nor i think was it a practical one either. but his evidence was given i think on the 21st of january. and you will recall it. [overlapping speakers] >> if i may say, sir, what needs to be seen is that this was part of a -- what mr. blair said to president bush through the medium of that note and many conversations was part of a