for manufacturing exports. but the government can do to encourage that is ensure that we are delivering what manufacturing businesses want -- thus regulation, lower taxes, and a real boost in apprenticeships, which this government are providing. >> does the prime minister agree that the bankers to a bad job in lending to small businesses and the real economy and that the police do a good job in helping to cut crime? >> we are doing -- what we're doing is introducing two 0.5 billion pounds levy on the banks each year and every year. we are seeing the bonus pools come down and bank lending go up. none of those things happen under the less government. >> the law courts have been basildonwe discussed this to ene justice is done? >> they have consistently raise this issue. it speaks for many people.

there is one law that applies to everyone else and another law that applies to -- i will arrange a meeting between governments so they can look at what these to be done and so we have genuine fairness in our country. >> each week the house of commons we error prime minister 's questions life. due to the questions, -- time change, we will do it at 8:00 instead of the usual 7:00. you confined video archives on our web site. >> our international coverage continues with the defense secretary. both officials testified on

defense. the purpose is to give evidence on the development and outcome of the strategic defense and security review. this hearing is about 2 1/2 hours. >> national-security review. it seems that the first thing i need to do is to reduce expectations because this is intended to be a high level examination of the defense review end of the national security strategies. we want to work out how the process these -- processes

were established. how this process fell through into the various capabilities we have now. what we do when that stuff happens as it seems to be happening now, how does the process the back into that? if the review was a deep strategic, how do you keep that strategic oversight plugged into any reforms to defense review that might come through as a result? that is the general idea. we will not go into things like why were carriers cap, why were they not kept? [laughter]

>> i have the wrong briefing. >> we will have at least -- that brings me to something else. because there are secretaries of state, mr. mitchell, if i may, we do not want to get confused. let's begin -- i do not think you need to introduce yourselves. as ministers you are well known. the national security council, it has been broadly welcome to. what is its status and what authority does it have and how was it working? i ask that question but and i

say we have a huge number of questions and witnesses. we will try to be as tight as we can in asking our questions. you do not have to answer a lot -- answer all of them individually. please would you keep your answers as tight as possible. thank you. >> i agree about that when. -- that one. it sits alongside other commissioners. it authority derives from -- but its decisions are subject to congress as in the case of any other country. >> the reasons for its existence is to bring together all of the

departments that have a part to play in forming the area of security not just to deal with things for an early -- foreign but also domestically and to enable that collection of ministers to hear a continuing conversation from the experts, the relevant ambassador or the head of the foreign office, or the office of the secretary. if you ask for my opinion, my opinion is that it continues to fulfill that role rather well.

it has a discussion now limited by the traditional boundaries of domestic and -- or one department to the other. >> how were its structures and the support mechanisms decided? >> the fundamental idea dates back to the report for the conservative party where we asked tom kean to examine the question of how to bring together a national security. she and tom did exactly that work. one of the recommendations was a national security council. when we came to form the coalition that had to be

discussed. we had discussions about -- committees just after the government came into existence. that was discussed by the tepid -- deputy prime minister and decided on within a few days. >> doctor fox, what is the role of the chief defense staff? how does he contribute and how did the other chiefs of staff contribute to the national security council? >> ministers who are not members would like to attend the discussion directly. still -- senior officials

briefed the committee every week whether there is a specific reason -- they can also be invited to attend. it takes place in my office with what ever personnel are required as well as the chief of defence staff and the agency heads also attend to make sure that everything is available to the ministers. >> and the other chiefs of staff? >> i doubt it very much. we do discuss regular pre-briefs in my office. i would be better informed. >> treasury.

the treasury estimates of the national security council. what is its relative power? >> well, the treasury is represented by the national security council and they contribute as ministers to the discussion. in addition, they have the treasury concerns. what of their purposes is to make sure that the discussions are realistic in terms of what can be the field -- be fulfilled. most of the decisions are there for everybody.

from time to time, issues arise and there have been discussions which should not go into in detail about specific issues, either those who are members come for a specific purpose to consider something that might need to be done we're spending money might be involved. >> ok. next question. overseas issues, how do you balance those in the national security council? i do not mind the two answers to this. >> we discuss them all. they are all there.

i would say the majority of discussions over the last 10 months have been on overseas the matters if we statistically added it up. as you can imagine issues surrounding afghanistan are a greater preoccupation. we discussed at get this done and a very regular basis. -- afghanistan on a very regular basis. we want to make sure that oversees issues predominate in a statistical sense. we have been able to cover home and overseas issues. the issue of the role of the treasury, the national security council more than both cabinet members works in a non

departmental way in terms of ministers and others giving their opinion. of course we have our departmental briefs but we have a vigorous discussions that cross all of those boundaries. and did not necessary -- not necessarily on strict boundaries between them. >> can you give us one example of a non overseas issue that has been discussed? >> we discussed terrorism strategy's in the capsule. that would be top on the list. the threat of international

terrorism is one of the top identified in the strategy. >> the balance between domestic or international issues is driven by external events but also intelligence we get from the heads of the agency. for example, we might look at depending on the information how assets might be moved into anti- terrorist space or training depending on what the boundaries are between the intelligence we are getting. that is one of the areas where having everybody around the table, able to give a live feed, where we think we might be best required rather than

waiting to react to events. >> i want to emphasize one thing he said. we speak frequently about counter-terrorism but it is also stretched out to intercommunal relations. the connections between those complex issues and international issues relates to countries where it matters to understand the relationship between the population and others. it is the ability to have that whole discussion that we find immensely useful for issues of national security. it would be difficult to imagine having the discussion in any other form. >> that has been on the agenda.

>> my final question is, any thought of the cabinet minister for national security? would that add to this process or detract from it or does all beyond your scope? >> that is something we have not discussed. in the past, before we came to power, we had taken the view that security in the home office is the right way to have. that is what we have been that member is a member of the national council. they beat their presence in a department and the leverage that comes from that in order to operate satisfactorily.

>> that is fine. silt you are a strategic body that discusses elsewhere. it takes executive decisions -- i am interested in the decisionmaking process. you sit there and say, yes, this is a good idea and that is then a set of actions that are put into training? does that actioning any decision you make and the money that goes with it? >> it is an executive body. it is a committee of the

cabinet and it is accountable through the cabinet. it takes many more decisions that were gone over in the cabot in detail. the cabot this -- the cabinet discusses these issues as well but not as the same -- in the same detail. we meet once a week. it is an effective decision making surrounding these issues. that is why it works. we all know that structures are one thing but how you use them is another. if you do not use them as a center of decision making, why respond to them and decisions are to be made elsewhere instead. the reason the security council

is working in this administration is that the majority of decisions are made it and the departments have to prepare their ministers to make those decisions. it is not just an advisory body, it is the center of our national security discussions and decisions. >> you mean by the treasury? >> it is part of the process. the treasury agrees to it. >> no doubt that would also change the financial plans of government. that would have to be discussed in the cabinet. but decisions debt float out from the national security council.

where those administers a relevant, they are there in the national security council. agencies are there. we could digress that the people like the head of the intelligence agencies coming in more contact with the members of the government under -- other than before and secretary. -- the foreign secretary. >> there are also members of both sides of the coalition in the cabot -- cabinet. therefore, it is not just a formally important, practically

speaking it forms a coalition discussion. >> i will incorporate them in it. >> the vice chairman has reminded me of the issue of the cabot. what has happened to that? >> the national security council is a center of decision making about the conflict in afghanistan. it takes those decisions on a regular basis. >> what if the opposition were involved? >> the opposition has been invited to the council. on at least one occasion they have attended. >> it was in the early summer. >> is that in an invitation structure or is it just does

what the prime minister thinks it appropriate? >> he made it clear on that occasion that he would continue to invite the actual leader of the opposition. there was a particular issue where he thought -- >> i am sure what there will be more opportunities for invitations. >> on the creation of the national security adviser, what effect does that have on the articulation of a national security strategy? >> i am happy to begin. there is a crucial component to the whole of the council. in the sense that he and his team draw together material from

a wide range of sources and try to ensure that they are in good order and that the council is considering the things they need to consider. that is closely linked to the deputy prime minister so that it becomes possible and not simply to have a committee by one department or another but -- that is what he is in charge of. >> we are appointed on the first day. it is about who could to it. one way this improves the

articulation of the strategy is that in other countries the-the security adviser is a point of contact. such as the u.s. system of the government that has a national security adviser to the president. the french government has a specific adviser on foreign security to the president. it provides a counterpart for those countries. >> how has the nic improved crisis management? >> it gives us the opportunity to have information from the services in real time. as we go through what has been happening in north africa, it

has enabled us to cross reference. i think it has enabled us to have l.a. --a in more than one department. it is extremely useful to have somebody we can talk to a commission if we require. for example, if there is a specific issue, that has been -- i also debate it puts education in government that can be expensive. >> last question. how has crisis management, are you looking at what prices management has done -- crisis

management has done and ways to change or improve it? >> i think that is how it was originally conceived. it's first and overriding task is strategic. it is important to have that distinction between the large a scale decisions that are made and the the important but separate issue of how to manage a particular situation. >> how would you describe the tactic in those terms?

>> i am conscious of a large number of people standing. remove the seat from mr. mitchell. he will not be needing it. still free to sit down. to sit down.el free >> they meet on a weekly basis which will often -- it is complementary to cobra officials. >> do they come in on those meetings occasionally? >> some of them. >> i would like to turn to the

committee in november and the strategy. he agreed to start constructing a mechanism to deliver a grand strategy looking at the world as it might be in 2030, 2040. i would like to get the reaction on -- how do you describe that brand strategy? what is it meant to achieve? >> i would refer you to the national security strategy. that is a good place to start if you're talking about strategy. the overwhelming point index -- in that is we made the decision

to adopt a position. we came to the view that we are not likely to be omniscient. things will happen that we have not expected. therefore, the whole structure of what was designed started from the proposition of we will do not know what will happen. there will be a whole series of possibilities. therefore, the thinking about how things might book five, 10,

30 years out is a useful exercise to engage in, but we are not doing it -- we looked unable to what -- we will maintain an adaptable position that will enable us -- that is an important it provides a narrative. >> let me mention some perspective. we do not have the energy secretary here. you may want to interview him about this. but if he were here, he would say that some of the decisions we make about our energy security, which is a considerable thank you, not in

its in secure -- not in its security impact, but it's a job to compact, some of the decisions in the security field, sort of the making a nuclear power stations. that is a decision, once you made it, it's not very adaptable. it helps to understand whether it is likely that we will face energy shortages 20 years, 40 from now. it may behoove you to make specific decisions on the sort of thing. what we're not trying to do is designing the whole of anything in such a way that it is based exclusively on the the

assumption that we know exactly what the future holds. >> and adaptable approach recognizes that it is not determined by ships and aircraft, but also by the extent to which we can train the police and afghanistan. we can build up and accountability structure and ensure that we get girls in school. that water pledged to secure a, of tackling the problem -- that approach to security, tackling the problem -- >> looking ahead stood 20 years,

30 years, 40 years, the national security has said up in broad terms the in terms -- the importance of climate change and other things, from which we decided that it is important to maintain a strong global diplomatic network with the united kingdom. and a more global world and complex network, it is a diplomatic presence in some need for places. the long-term trend has informed the decisions we have taken. we live in a genuinely globalized economy.

the risks are more widespread in more places and subject to more actors elsewhere. there is the unavoidable implication of strategic risk. but we have to look very widely held very best to mitigate the risks. what alliances and other structures we might want to use to reduce those risks. i think that is what they're talking about in terms of that wider share --. in fact, we already have the global strategic trend look out with provisional judgments and provisional some areas. for example, the future conflict by the cbs committee.

>> we had the document produced february last year. >> you have tied so much in with security. do you see a risk increasing for being seen so closely allied with defense policy. are we in fact playing a neutrality? [unintelligible]

>> we never compromise on our duty of care. this is part of a debate which confuses securitization and working in some of the most difficult and conflict-ridden parts of the world. we have announced support today to the engine a subcommittee of red cross for chief humanitarian relief. the work of development which can be very long term can be characterized from my budget. all of that budget is spent in britain's national interest. but it is also an interest of the people who we are seeking to help. the confusion, the debate, is

that working in conflict state, you are addressing people who are deadly wretched, not because they are extremely poor, but they're caught in these conflicts and this functionality. i think the debate sometimes gets a bit confused. nevertheless, working in conflict states, you're working where the maternal mortality is high, where children have not had a chance to get to school, where there is a lack of food. i do not believe there is any real confusion about the priority of business development were taking place in some of the most insecure and vulnerable places in the world. when the last, soldier has left afghanistan, but development will still continue their because that is -- because it is one of the poor centers in the

world. >> the national security structure is not a bad objective. do you agree with this analysis? >> it is an assessment largely of the risk and impact in broad terms and what we need to do about it. career lay, for the first -- clearly, for the first time in government, looking at processes

here, the assessment of the overall sense of strategy, i thought the process is -- >> what is a scenario weakness? sdsr. was central to besds it is quite clear that the national security document came out one day. the book came out the next day. what you say is that one did not

meet the other ones statement of need and that is quite clear. >> there's the fact that, for very long time, there has not been a tight coalition between the two. we have refreshed the program and make sure that we're not -- that we're matching the assets we would require to do with any of the problems. that is a constantly changing picture. >> [unintelligible] >> the starting point was the consideration of the race but the country faces.

a great deal of work has been done. it has been developed and accentuated by the present government in assessing the impact of different race and the likelihood for different verse. -- for different risks. the intent is to identify those risks that high impact or higher likelihood. it was intended to be a security

strategy. that was the ultimate purpose, to provide the prius possible security for the population of our country. obviously, once you start with that and you have identified a particular way to which it best majesty, in some cases, you can move quite rapidly -- which it matches best with you, in some cases, you can move quite rapidly. we have allocated a considerable additional sum. that is the sort of case where you can move rapidly with identification of the risk, to the need, to a decision. in other cases, i do not find a risk made as an important risk of a high likelihood or high

impact. >> i think i'm giving the impression of [unintelligible] and trying to address what the important risks are. so you can make decisions appropriately and quickly. >> [unintelligible] >> our thinking was to develop

these things in paradox so that we could understand interactions as we move forward. but the thing which we start with before we did anything else, we then began the work of trying to work through the sdsr. producing golf 3 -- producing all three was done to see what you get. obviously, they do. there was not a stage at which they were one document.

the chancellor had it in mind to have a spending review from the start. there are three discrete elements in there. there is the need to reflect the changing nature of threats and the emerging major threats. the second is to track how successful we are with mitigation measures. how effectively our resilience in planning measures have been in reducing the potential impact. >> how do you respond to the

suggestion of [unintelligible] >> certainly, it is the methodology. it summarizes the strategic need and the strategy. and how we conduct ourselves over the coming year. it will change over time and need to reevaluate them. a third of the methodology is standout particularly, but there are the shutters and the follow- up documents. >> the assessments that we made, because of the nature of a

thing, we have to have a widespread range and has given will rise to -- and has given rise to when we identify the range of risks, we need to have a range of ways of doing things. sometimes we might want to do things through nato. we have a range of tools. i think we are dealing with a very complex and interdependent world. we're trying to deal with international tools. we need to develop a wider range of potential actions. we have been spending a lot of time developing bilateral relations and to get ourselves

into more groupings. one example is the powers defense in southeast asia. there is a range of our interest in that part of the world. it is building up a picture of a range of responses to a range of potential threats. >> the highest risk would automatically be -- [unintelligible]

>> i think it means something rather different from what you gleaned from it. identifying a particular risk as having a particular place in the hierarchy of likelihoods and impacts shows you the attention we have taken. of course, some risks, which may be very important may nevertheless be cheaper to deal with the than some other risks which are either less likely or have less impact but more intrinsic and more expensive to do. the decision about where to place your resources is not

something that you can leave off the table. we analyzed cyber attackers as enormous and trucimportance to e country. but there is a limit to the amount of money that you can spend on it because it requires telling the people to do things to make an impact on it. >> the statement in the national security strategy says the

council has reached the conclusion of britain's national interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of -- i would like to address mr. hagen specifically and have him explain. >> this is directly involved with the foreign office. that means that we have to maintain or extend their influence in multi-lateral bodies, with deliberations and the g-20 or the security council of the un or whatever it may be.

and bilateral relationships as well. indeed, one of the reasons for the objectives is for bilateral relations. the importance of those are elevated by the development of new measures of alliances and friendships in the world. take for example, turkey. there was a diplomatic attention in the first 10 months of government. it opened dozens of new embassies and consulates a strong bilateral engagement with turkey is necessary. and also a multilateral table. to do that effectively, you need that global diplomatic presence.

it needs to be beefed up in some places. with the right combination of hard power and sought power in the world to be able to influence events around the world, that is the objective that i am sure it is right to start with, particularly given the shrinking economic world economy our influence would naturally shrink. we have to ensure are so similar to -- that means changing the budgetary arrangement. we have restored that protection. we have to maintain our

diplomatic network. the network of our embassies and consulates are being adapted to the world economy. but it is not just a matter of foreign office presence. it is what we do within the entire range. that is why you wanted mr. mitchell to answer as well. >> the surface fleet to 19 cirrus ships, getting away from aircraft carriers for 10 years, can you really say that our interests will not shrink as a result of these decisions? >> i think that depends on what we do in other areas. >> it is compensated for where? >> there are trends of the

fences that we will have in the future, not withstanding that we will have to make painful decisions along the way. >> i recognize the painful decisions. is denial of a shrinkage of influence -- it strikes me as being a little unrealistic. >> my colleagues can speak on that. it does not just depend on the resources your dispensing. it depends on how you are using them. if the use of resources at whatever level in an effective way.

the defense treaty with france is a good example with that, working together in many areas of our differences so that we get more value from the many that we put in. against, -- again, this is all relative. >> the contact you referred to, i think it is important to make clear that one of the reasons we have stood by our commitment on international development, increasing substantially the amount we spend on international development is not just because we think it is morally right. it is about the values that we have is a government in the country. it is also because it is very much in our national interest to do so. i was in somalia recently.

i found very clear evidence on the ground of france to britain interests and security, frets from piracy, french from migration, and threats from terrorism. smiley remains to be number one threat to the united kingdom from africa. so the budget is spent in britain's national interest. quite a lot of it is spent in certain national security interest, too, and we agreed early on that, by 2014, we would double the elements we spend in conflicted states, different parts of the world, increasing it something like 1.8 billion pounds a year. i just want to emphasize the fact that this is the projection of soft power and it

is not just a somber. it is more scherwin for britain's interest. >> -- it is more importantly for britain's interest. >> given that the foreign office is a soft power, should there be -- [laughter] >> the whole question of influence is multifaceted. we exercise our influence by letter late. we do it through nato, the un, the eu, through our various relationship. the influence we have your our

intelligence relationships with other countries. there are ways of affecting influence. but the one asset that has not been discussed sufficiently is time. it is that time that ministers are willing to spend working on those relationships themselves. when we set up in new northern group, they had a number of reasons. it was to improve our relationship with norway, a very key energy security partner for the u. k it was to provide a better vehicle for finland to deal with the security apparatus of the region, to get reassurance to the baltic states.

that did not cost us more than the press of the tickets to the meeting. but it did increase our influence in an area where we have been absent for too long. there is an undervaluing of the incredible influence you can get simply by investing the time in getting those relationships going. other countries have been doing that better than we have. we have had long absences from some asectors. in australia, george younger, prince philip, we need to better understand the frequency of

contact and influence can be brought. it is not in itself the only way to have influence. >> [unintelligible] >> that is right. soft power without hard power is music without instruments. >> the intention to double the amount of our aid which goes to areas of conflict, how will that be squared with the very tide pools we have in the duty of care for our employees? >> you are quite right.

the duty of care must be paramount. the foreign office always kept it under review. i hope it is appropriate. it is important to emphasize that in some of the most difficult parts of the world, we worked bilaterally and multilaterally. the point of these very detailed reviews about which i wrote to to members of the community, the biological aden the country's program, is that it should be appropriate to the results we wish to achieve. we are working out where we want to be, where we should be. those are decisions that are important by cross-your mess discussion. what is the best way to achieve those results? they are strongly in britain's

interest and those we are seeking to help. >> there are difficulties in protecting afghanistan. if i think about doubling our commitment without strong partnership with the armed forces, the americans have the view on that. they have a lower requirement on -- how do you see scoring that cycle with a smaller defense budget and having twice as many people deployed in war zones? >> it may not be twice as may people today. there are different ways of doing it. but i should emphasize that, in some of the most difficult and dangerous parts of the world,

brilliant civilians, brilliant ngo's do extraordinary work very effectively. >> conflict prevention is the key of the national security strategy. i think we have heard already that there are imitations to resolving conflicts with the capacity to provide in areas of conflict. how does the national security strategy contribute to conflict prevention and the revolution of other crises? >> it is something that we ought to devote more resources. it is successful and cheaper to do than engaging in conflicts.

it is also dramatically expensive in human lives. so it is identified as an important priority to this country. the range of assets is from one situation to the other. one area where we have worked successfully in recent months on conflict prevention is sudan. this is a highly active foreign office. very closelye converwork tailored. -- officials work very closely together. since we both know some of the leaders on both sides in sudan, we both seen the crucial times during the referendum, making usual calls to people on both

sides, to last and to act with restraint. and when a violent incident has occurred, not to respond to that. other countries have been doing the same. britain is part of that effort. that is not a conflict prevention that requires hard power. it is diplomatic and humanitarian. the incentives we provide in that situation to complot -- to prevent conflict is economic and diplomatic. it is provided they can behave in a peaceful manner toward each other. >> so you're saying that the reduction of the capacity of the u.k. to provide more around

the world, that capacity is reduced. sending a task for summer, where there is the risk of conflict? >> -- sending it task force somewhere, where there is the risk of conflict? >> there are so many major potential conflicts. they are dealt with most effectively by a combination of development, political and economic, resources. and there are the cases where we need that military presence as well. a great deal of our conflict prevention is in that soft power area. >> in your comments, could you also reflect on the statement you made last week on the

delivery of the national security strategy? >> the conflict prevention point that you made and the statement made last week was about much more on conflict prevention. i want to emphasize the that is a humanitarian concern as well. some of the most wretched people in the world live in conflicted places. so the work of conflict prevention, which my department carries out, it is in turn to build the capacity of revenue authority and addressing accountability in government, which is how we hold our leaders accountable for what they do. , whether it is trying to build up work opportunities for women and jobs, try to build up

accountability structures. in all these different ways, we are heavily engaged and the papers which we set up, you can see that the most conflicted areas in the world we will live and you can see the work we're doing. >> i am sure that we will be doing some very good things. >> can i get to the north africa and libya situation? >> we asked a question about changing threats and circumstances and credibility

gaps. new threats inc. and all that -- it did not answer the question about what is happening now. how do we respond? what does the nsc no. do? >> we keep going back to the assumptions, first of all. the question really should be revised. >> go ahead. >> we specifically set out in the sdsr to have an adaptable

posture. one was that we should withdraw closer to all men and closer to the appropriate assets in that direction. there were others who said to go exactly the other way. but we should have are highly committed posture should the complex of the future be like the ones we face in afghanistan now. there would not be requirements for widespread capabilities. we chose an adapted posture. it recognizes that there would be limitations on the money we have available. but what posture would give us the best capabilities? when it comes to looking at some of the angles we did not choose to prioritize, we decided we

would have to invest to get capability that was unnecessary. i think that the broad decision was correct. where we have to constantly keep the review as the risk assessment. two years, of course we will. >> let me put it another way then. does anything that you see currently and going forward about the instability in north africa, what are you doing to tickets to the nsc.

will you actually defer -- that is thought to be necessary for the next two years or three years and to make a simple revision of the policy for 2020 that you decided on earlier. it might be better idea not to put against the other document because it may be the very sort of asset we would read -- we would be required in the north of africa. >> it is entirely open to us to go to the nsc to make the changes we want. there is one element, above all, we want to put right.

tomorrow, ministers will meet in brussels. there has to be a proper balance between what we are willing to do and capable of doing unilaterally as united kingdom and what we do in terms of alliances. those are key questions. there will be emerging in coming weeks from nato. is it operating successfully, particularly, doesn't have assets for deployment? that is a crucial question. it is not possible. we do not run the world. , but in partnership with other countries, you should be able to have a lot to do. >> should we have -- one of your

colleagues is saying that we should just run extra guns to them. who is actually controlling this decision-making process? >> is this the nsc. is this the world covenant. are you in charge of the state of foreign affairs? who is in charge of it? is the authority there to do it? is it your decision or his decision? you're asking a theoretical question. "could." it allows all of the relevant ministers together to consider all the ramifications of the situation together.

it is chaired by the prime minister. the security council meeting in recent weeks, we are able to look at the deployment of the military assets and we have the intelligence reports. and there is the diplomatic response. we're looking for a more bold and ambitious european approach. we're looking at the future reved egypt and tunisia. >> on funeral chemistry and trauma fact, you said it was just music without insurance. >> may i just make a comment on what you suggested. to the extent that we are not

able to deploy british assets, can i suggest we reduce rhetoric to those assets that we personally can deploy? >> >> moving on, on north africa, do we now have a concrete allegiance when nobody could criticize you -- do we now have a concrete strategy for that region? if so, could you articulate that for the benefit? >> we do it with our international partners to be effective.

we do think that recent events in north africa and the middle east require a major change in how europe works in that region. we expect our international partners to do the same, to act as a magnet for positive change in that country, without being patronizing, by respecting the different cultures and tradition. we need to do the equivalent of what we do for eastern-central europe after the cold war. this is different, but if it is the equal of an aunt -- but it

is the equivalent of a european back situation. it helps to encourage reforms and open those economies and political systems. the union already produces vast sums to the neighborhood. by offering more formal relationships with the european union -- for the region development, that is what we are looking for, believing, as we do, that we should be optimistic about the opening up of democracy and political freedom. but there are great risks if these countries clue been to

stable model democracies, it would be better in world affairs. >> [unintelligible] 1 of the things i would like to talk about is how much you have spent time actually reviewing previous documentation. everybody talks about what you thought was going to happen in

the middle east. i was looking at the strategic trend program that came back in 2009. it said that social networking is becoming de important feature of future conflict. it created a joint operational area. we knew there was some networking and the capacity to communicate was a risk. why is it not built into the national security strategy? why is that component not passed a? >> that is a very correct assumption. the trouble is that is, as you say, a global network, knowing that you would appear in tunisia

or egypt, that was could differ -- that was difficult to predict. even in hindsight, it is difficult to see the particular pointers. i think we can look at the analysis that you mentioned and see, in the areas where we have seen this become a real from and not -- a real phenomenon. we could get the point where it might happen again. what do we know about the age of the population who have access to these networks? what do we know about their income, other levels of education? it could give us a pattern that might give us some pointers to where it might be likely to happen in the future. >> you did tell the commission last year -- we have a very poor record at predicting when

conflicts will occur and what conflict will look like. >> i think that has been repeated in every capital. it treated paris and rome and washington and the other major country fields. we are unable to predict conflict the precise dates and times and complex, africa, we would be at the lottery. >> it was not predicted in the falklands and in bosnia. the current conditions have made this time different. what gives you the confidence that the national security strategy and the the platforms put in place will make sure that

we're safe and secure. >> i think which is the correct posture. had we decided to the written policy and pretend that we knew not be affected by events elsewhere and, therefore, we could retreat into our shells, it would not be inappropriate response to what we have seen happen. we no longer required a meeting of the site that we had. we invested far more in land forces able to become increasingly involved in operations in afghanistan. that would have been a real choice. the fact that we do need to have assets that are widely deployable, given whatever financial resources we have the

time is the correct decision. it is the essential judgment and the essentialts is the sensibl judgment of the potential threat. >> to what extent do you think libya can go three more painstaking way, the channel through nato and the eu? to think they have adopted a different position, a different posture, a different leadership role with the -- if the constraints had not been in place? >> how do you think we would have behaved differently if we were not in the situation we are in now? >> we were well ahead of many of the countries.

it is fashionable in the u.k. to see how far we were behind other countries, but we have any backdating hundreds of foreign nationals. in many cases, there are more foreign nationals with ditceach movement. we have been doing all the heavy lifting for a lot of countries. >> [unintelligible] >> i understand that. but the u.k. is not capable of doing things -- not only were we capable of getting our citizens out, but other foreign nationals out as well. it is something we should be very proud of as a country. the new defense ministers are meeting tomorrow.

we want to look at the options. we want to make sure all the all the measures are looked at. >> this would not have been different if the decision had not been made? >> you are acting as if we believe been correct political constraints and to walk alongside our allies. had the prime minister not, nixon would have been this positioned. mickey for nato -- the key for nato is that, if the scooping is done and it is clear what buses need to be used, -- what resources need to be used, it brings back to an important question. having assets is not sufficient

if the political will is not there to use them. it leaves nato collectively disadvantaged. >> i want to take us back to the presses for a moment having making that strong an accurate statement that we have a long history of being unable to predict in any meaningful way what conflicts are coming up, do you think that there is a case for reviewing the firmly entrenched system of working on planning assumptions? i get to the impressions that the americans are looking back on a very different scale. >> planning assumptions are the guidelines were used in terms

of first generation of what we think we need to do, the broad shape and size of forces. but taking on the adapter posture, what we have in fact said is that we have the balance and capabilities. and decided not to go to one extreme or the other dip termedd by the shape and size of the forces. >> [unintelligible] >> how can your department's insurer