for this design. as i said, those are designed, at the earliest, would be finalized sometime in the late summer, early fall. i think we will have some information, if not all of the information of the japanese event by then to inform any decisions we need to make about those designs. i do not want to speculate that right now. so-called passive plants are the solution because we simply do not know what was the most relevant phenomenon there. what we do know is that in this country, through the analysis we have done of nuclear reactors and the safety issues, that this kind of situation, where you lose all of the electric power for an extended period of time, is a -- situation. they would insure they had plans

in place to recover the of site power and be able to cope with the situation for it. time that it would take him to recover that of such power. right now, the exact facts are not totally clear. when we get those, we will take a look at everything we have in front of us in terms of licensing or any other actions we may have and see if there are lessons we need to apply. host: one of your former nrc commissioner says this event will lead to a slowdown in licenses. are an you not willing to concede that? because of the need to divert manpower and strutted this accident and the lessons learned and incorporate this, will it have some affect on the pace to which you could make decisions? guest: and this will be a significant workload for the agency. we will take a look at how we can deal with this work load and

if we need additional resources, we'll have to ask congress for that additional support. those are preliminary at this point. want to make sure we put the right resources to this and adjust our work is necessary. i want to emphasize that our number one priority will continue to be the safety and security of the existing -- we don't intend to take resources away from that to help the effort to analyze what happened in japan the decisions on the new reactors are still some time away. right now they're getting public comment. that will take a few months to get all of those comments in. then we will begin the process of reviewing them. that is still several months away. i am not sure exactly how we will balance our resources. mother nature has thrown

a hideous tons of the japanese, bigger than their civil a nuclear engineers and licensing authority's anticipated. how can we be confident -- not that we are likely to say tsunami -- how can we be confident that we won't have a hurricane, earthquake and other natural phenomenon that is bigger than the biggest thing you have budgeted for it? guest: the way we think about it is we come up with what we think is the maximum natural phenomenon that we expect to occur and we designed these facilities around that with a little bit extra margin because we now there are some things we don't know. we recognize there may things we had not envisioned or thought about. we have established a program that we call our severe accident program. regardless of what the cause may be, it deals with the situation

in which you get a very severe impact to the nuclear reactor site. we have procedures that the utilities have to develop to deal with these kind of situations. that is how we build in that extra sense of certainty that even if we experience something we had not anticipated that we have an approach and a way to deal with it. the final effort we have is this effort after september 11 where we looked at a situation where you could have a very severe fire or explosion at a nuclear plant. possibly not natural, possibly coming from an external threat. the impact of that kind of situation may be similar to one of these unknowns natural phenomenon. we took that situation and required the utilities to come up with procedures to deal with the fundamental things you need

to do like keeping the reactor cool and keeping the spent fuel pool cool. if they need any equipment, required them to states that and have that identified. we would know immediately what to do and how to mitigate it. host: the benchmarks we have seen over the last week and a half, three mile island which remains operational and chernobyl which is closed and has become a tourist site in the ukraine -- what is your early prognosis for the long-term impact on the fukushima plant in the area around that plant in terms of the livability? guest: i want to speculate until we have the final situation ultimately resolved. there obviously will be contamination that has to be addressed and there will likely be difficult operating these reactors in the future. the focus right now for everyone

is making sure that we can continue to bring this crisis to a close and we will continue to help the japanese government do that. host: the chair of the nuclear regulatory commission, thank you for being with us. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> president obama is taking a torture latin america and he stopped in rio de janeiro to deliver a speech on u.s.-brazil relations and then he arrives in santiago, chile for a press conference with the chilean president. it will travel to ellis of the door tuesday will he will meet with the present there for a bilateral meeting and press conference. before returning wednesday, he will stay in el salvador where he tours the national cathedral and the mayan ruins. >> today on suspense "road to the white house," harmon kane on

the economy and whether he will run for the republican nomination then i put my toe in the water and now i am up to my neck. >> the feedback we have gotten from people across this country, tens of thousands who are willing to volunteer -- >> at 6:30 and 9:30 p.m. >> monday night, marking the eighth anniversary of the department of homeless to charity with former secretary tom ridge and michael chertoff and press secretary janet napolitano. they discuss the nature of threats facing the country, the structure of the agency, and what they miss most about the job. >> people have asked me if i miss being secretary and to a certain extent i say yes, working with the people i came to trust and respect and admire, particularly the early months and years. it was an intense an exciting time when you are around good people.

i miss not knowing. not that everything we read every morning was something you would run to run home and talk to the family about. but you do miss not knowing. >> secretaries tom ridge, michael chertoff, and john of a politician now discuss the department of homeless occurred monday at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. now, a senate armed services committee meeting with general david petraeus of the obama administration's july 2011 drawdown of u.s. troops from afghanistan. he is also joined by michelle flornoy, defense secretary for policy. this is one hour, 35 minutes. >> i will ask the committee to

consider two civilian nominations in a list of 252 military nominations. i would ask the committee to consider the nominations of michael vickers to be the undersecretary for intelligence and joe and rooney to be deputy undersecretary for defense of personnel and readiness. they had been before the committee the required length of time. intelligence and joey rooney. there is a motion? >> so moved. >> second? all in favorer say aye? motion carries. also have the nomination of michael dempsey. the nominations had been before the committee in the required length of time. is there a motion? is there a second? all in favor say aye, opposed, nay, the motion carried. today the committee receives

policy from michelle flornoy and general david petraeus. we thank you both for your years of service to the nation. and the sacrifice is made by you and your families. we also cannot express enough our gratitude and admiration for the men and women in uniform deployed in afghanistan and elsewhere. they are doing a phenomenal job. their morale is high, our troops are truly what inspiring. please pass along our heartfelt thanks to than. it has now been a little over one year since president obama's speech at west point announcing his strategy for afghanistan. the strategy included two key elements -- a surge of 30,000 u.s. troops to help reverse the taliban's momentum and seize the initiative and the setting of a

date, 80 months from then, or july, 2011, for when u.s. troops would begin to come home. the setting of that july date also laid down a marker for when the government of afghanistan would assume more and more responsibility for that country's security. during his visit to a dentist and last week, secretary dates determined -- during his visit to afghanistan last week, secretary gates talked about increasing security responsibility to of kasten and beginning the drawdown the u.s. forces in july of this year. president karzai is expected to announce next week the first phase of provinces and districts throughout afghanistan that will transition to an afghan lead for providing security to the afghan people. we have heard two messages in recent months relative to the july, 2011 date when u.s. troop numbers in afghanistan will

begin to be reduced. message #1 -- secretary gates before this committee recently said that the july date was needed as a way of telling the afghan leadership to take ownership of the war and as a way to grab the attention of the afghan leadership and bring a sense of urgency to them. mrs. number 12 -- secretary gates -- message number 2 - secretary gates said there is too much talk about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done right. some may dismiss those messages as inconsistent or that secretary gates is speaking to two different audiences. i disagree. secretary gates well knows that with modern global instantaneous communications the world as the audience for every utterance.

the unifying threat in the two messages is that both are needed for success of the mission. success requires afghan buy-in, at against taking the lead, and afghan ownership of the mission all of which depend upon their confidence in our continuing support. both messages and the thread that unifies them are part and parcel, i believe, of general petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy which is so instrumental in turning the tide in afghanistan. the success of the mission depends on afghan security forces holding the ground which they are helping to clear the taliban. that is what undercuts the enemies narrative when they say that we are there to occupy

afghanistan. the growth and the size and capability of afghan security forces and control of territory by those forces is robbing the taliban of their propaganda target and bring us closer to the success of the mission. that is why i have pushed so hard to grow the size of the afghan security forces and to keep metric ton how many afghan units are partnered with us and being mentored by us and how often afghan units are in the lead in joint operation. that is what a number of us are pushing so hard, including the president himself, for approval of the pending proposal up to 70,000 additional afghan troops and police. nato training command in afghanistan has done an extraordinary job building the numbers of the afghan security forces but also improving their quality as well, focusing on

marksmanship, training, leadership, and literacy. this success in recruiting and training afghan troops reflects the desire of the afghan people to provide for their own security. that success is why taliban suicide bombers attacked recruiting centers. the young man signing up represent the taliban's worst nightmare. during our visit to afghanistan in january, senator jack reed, the senator tester and i saw how the afghan people of growing confidence in the ability of afghan and coalition forces to provide security and foreign -- in former taliban strongholds. the afghan people are returning to villages and commodities and started to rebuild their lives, joint operations are increasingly afghan-led in their planning and execution. the afghan people see their

ongoing forces providing protection after the taliban are cleared out. afghan confidence in the army and police gross. ws. this enables at the coalition forces to find and clear a much greater percentage of improvised explosive devices. the increase in support of the afghan people across helmund and can dunbar has allowed special forces and that can command us to target large numbers of insurgent leaders in the last few months with the vast majority of them being captured without a shot being fired. the growing support that the afghan people have for their security forces will make the transition to an afghan security lead more achievable in the short term and sustainable over time. certainly, challenges lie ahead. general petraeus has said there will be a taliban spring

offensive and secretary gates has want this fighting season will be the acid test as the taliban tries to take back the rate it has lost and engages in a campaign of assassination and intimidation. afghan leaders need to bring a sense of urgency to improving governance and delivering services and fighting corruption and nothing -- other practices that prey upon the afghan people. if they are to earn the support of the people for the afghan government and additional steps must be taken to end the safe havens that surgeons use in pakistan which impacts on afghanistan's security. general petraeus brief to the nato defense ministers at the meeting in brussels last week. i hope he will address the outcomes from that meeting including whether any further commitments by our nato partners are forthcoming to address the continuing shortfall in trainers of afghan troops. also of interest would be the

status of any discussions on a longer-term relationship between the united states, nato, and the afghanistan beyond 2014. again, our thanks to our witnesses for their work on behalf of our nation and for their devotion to the men and women who defend us. senator mccain? >> thank you mr. chairman and not like to welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for their -- for their service to our nation. want to say special note of thanks to general petraeus. the truest test of a commander is whether he is worthy of the sacrifice made by those he leaves. whether the young men or women we call upon the day in and day out to risk their lives for us feel their commander offers the same degree of devotion. as they devotion we are fortunate that general petraeus is such a commander. it is the highest priority of congress to be just as worthy of the sacrifices made by the men and women of our armed forces

and to provide them with everything they need to succeed in their mission of defending our nation. let me take this opportunity to say again that we urgently need to pass a full year appropriations bill on defense for the remainder of this fiscal year 2011 as the secretary of defense has repeatedly called for. it is irresponsible to continue funding our fellow americans fighting two wars for piecemeal continuing resolutions that do not meet their full mates. perhaps the greatest need of all is winning the war in afghanistan which is the subject of this hearing. the cost of our commitment to this conflict remains substantial, especially the precious lives we have lost. according to one new poll reported in "the washington post, "a majority of americans no longer support the war. the next several months will therefore be decisive as winter

turns to spring, the traditional fighting season in afghanistan. nato forces will surely face a renewed taliban offensive to this spring to retake the territory and momentum they have lost and the battlefield. those losses have been considerable. u.s., nato, and death and special forces have dealt a crushing blow to the midlevel leadership that the taliban and their al qaeda allies. the forces are recapturing the momentum in key terrain arreas. they are improving in quality faster than planned. the afghan local police initiative is empowering communities across the country to provide their own security from the bottom of. up. the cumulative affected these security operations is we are turning around the war in afghanistan.

as general petraeus says and will emphasize, this progress remains fragile and reversible and the sustainability of our games will be tested during the fighting season ahead. we should all be very clear about the fact that violence will go up in the months ahead and we will surely encountered setbacks in some places. as a result, we need to be exceedingly cautious about withdrawal of u.s. forces this july as the president has called for. we should be mindful that perhaps the wisest course of action in july may be to less-securedops for mor parts of afghanistan. in short, we should not rush to failure and we should cultivate strategic patients. this patient will be all the more essential as we wrestle with two other key challenges which our military operations

are necessary but not sufficient to meet. the first is governance and corruption. american taxpayers want to know that the vast resources they are committing to this war effort are not being wasted, stolen, or misused by afghan officials. we must not allow this legitimate and critical demand to feed a sense of fatalism about our objectives. some are alarmed that the afghan government is at times a week partner. that is the norman any counter insurgency. if our local partners provided good governments, there would not be an insurgency in the first place. the goal of any counterinsurgency is to create the conditions that enable our local partners to provide better, more effective, and more just governments for their people. that does not mean that we are trying to make afghanistan like us. it is more like afghanistan used to be prior to the past three

decades of civil war. , when the country enjoyed have a century of relative peace and rising standards of living. a second key challenge stems from pakistan. the growing instability of the country, the insurgent safe havens that remain there, ties to terrorists that still exist there among the military and intelligence services and the some deterioration of our relationship amid the continued detention of u.s. embassy official raymond davis. here, too, a measure of patience is needed. we have sought every means to compel pakistan to re-orient its strategic catalyst short of cutting off u.s. assistance. we did that once before to no positive effect. to be sure, pakistan deserves praise for some steps it has taken to fight al-qaeda and

taliban groups on the pakistani side of the border. what we must increasingly recognize is perhaps the most effective way to impact the packers and support for terrorist groups is to succeed in afghanistan. ultimately, it is only when an afghan government security forces capable of neutralizing the terrorist groups backed by some in pakistan that those pakistani leaders can come to see that a strategy of hedging their bets in this conflict will only lead -- leave them less secure and more isolated. we have made a great deal of progress in afghanistan since the last hearing of this committee on the subject over half a year ago the momentum than was with the insurgency, our forces have now blunted it in many places and have reversed in key areas of the fight. it is not possible to envision a process of transition to afghan

responsibility for security based on conditions on the ground. with 2014 being a reachable target date for it for that transition to be truly reversible and for it to lead to a strategic partnership between the united states and afghanistan, our country and especially this congress, must and remain committed to this fight and those americans waging it. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. secretary flornoy. >> thank you very much. thank you for inviting us here today to update you on our efforts in afghanistan. nearly 10 years ago, al qaeda operatives carry out terrorist attacks that killed thousands of americans and citizens from other countries. as we all know, these attacks emanated from a safe haven in taliban-controlled afghanistan. in response to the september 11

attacks, the united states, supported by vital international partners, entered afghanistan by force in order to remove the taliban regime and to prevent further attacks by al qaeda and its associates. our mission was just. it was fully supported by the international community and a initially, it was quite successful. in the years that followed, however, we lost focus on afghanistan. our attention was turned away and al-qaeda and the taliban and associated as extremist groups or reconstituted their safe havens along the border lands between afghanistan and pakistan. as a result, we rest the return of a taliban-led afghanistan that would likely once again provided safe haven for terrorists who planned and executed attacks against the united states. when president obama took office, he undertook a review of our strategy. he reaffirmed our core goal, to

disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-qaeda and prevent its return to again stand. in the course of that review, we found that the situation in afghanistan was even worse than we thought and the taliban had seized the momentum on the ground. in the response of 2009 and 2010, the president attends of thousands of additional u.s. forces to reverse that momentum. last december, we conducted a -- a on review -- a fall of follow-on review. we had a civilian campaign to build afghan capacity to secure and govern the country and in increased diplomatic effort designed to create favorable and endurable outcome to the conflict. over last year, we have made significant progress.

with the troops searched on our part is that over 150,000 troops in afghanistan but relentless pressure on the insurgents and secure more and more of the afghan population. that surge has been matched by a surge in the numbers and capability of the afghan national security forces. during the past year, the asnf has increased the we have been able to improve their quality substantially by developing afghan noncommissioned officers and trainers, expanding the training curriculum, adding literacy programs, increasing retention rates, and partner in at kenyon is with forces in the field. as general petraeus will describe, u.s. and isaf forces fighting side by side with increasingly capable afghan units throughout the country have taken the initiative from

the insurgency and a stronghold of centre helmund and kandahar provinces. return of the pressure on al- qaeda and its affiliates on the border to pakistan. we have significantly degraded their ability to plan and conduct operations. one contributor to this positive momentum is the afghan local police initiative. it is a focus problem that is already significantly disrupting terrorist activity and denied terrorist activity. at the same time, we have ramped up our civilian efforts to improve afghan governments and today, thanks to the civilian search, there are more than 1100 civilian experts from nine different u.s. agencies helping to build afghan governments and economic capacity. that is work that is absolutely vital to the ultimate success of

our overall mission in afghanistan. nevertheless, the significant gains we have made in the last year are still reversible. there is difficult fighting and had a major challenges remain. most notably, we must continue our efforts in pakistan to eliminate terrorist an insurgency safe havens. we want to build an effective partnership that advances u.s. and pakistani interests including the denial of safe havens to all in addition, we must work with the afghan government to tackle "corrupt -- tackle corruption, especially predatory corruption that feels the insurgency. and we must create the

conditions necessary to enable a political settlement among the afghan people, including reconciling those and surgeons willing to renounce al qaeda, forsake violence, and it here to the afghan constitution. this july, lee will begin a responsible condition-save drawdown of our search forces in afghanistan. we will also begin the process of transitioning provinces to afghan lead for security. by the end of 2014, we expect afghans will be in the lead for security nationwide. this transition is a process, not an event. the process will unfold village by village, district by district, province by province. the determination of when the transition will occur and when it will occur will be based on bottom-up assessments of local conditions. this process is beginning now and we expect president karzai to announce the first district's

four transition on march 21st. as the transition process gets under way and as afghan national security force capabilities continue to develop, we and our partners will set out forces as conditions allow and gradually shift to more and more of a mentoring role. some of the forces moved out of a given area will be reinvested in other geographic areas or in the training effort in order to transition the process. the objective is to ensure the transition is irreversible. we have no intention to declare premature transitions only to finish the job later. we would much rather stick to a gradual approach making sure area is truly ready for transition before sending out the forces there. this is the surest path to a lasting success. but let me be clear, the

transition that will take place between now and december 2014 in no way signals our abandonment of afghanistan. president obama and president karzai have agreed the u.s. and afghanistan will have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. we are currently working with afghanistan on the details of that partnership. finally, i would like to acknowledge the very real costs of this war. many of you have expressed concerns about these costs and light of battlefield casualties and fiscal pressures here at home. but the afghan-pakistan border lands have served as a crucible for the most catastrophic terrorist activities of the past decade. the outcome we see is the defeat of al qaeda and the denial of the region as a sanctuary for terrorists. this objective is the reason why our brave men and women in service have sacrificed so very much.

we are determined to bring this war to a successful conclusion for the sake of our own security and also for the sake of our security of the people of afghanistan, pakistan and the region and of suffered so much and who have some much to gain from a secure and lasting peace. members of the committee, i would like to thank you for the opportunity today and i look forward to your continued an invaluable support for the policies and programs that are critical to our success in afghanistan and pakistan. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. general petraeus. >> it's a privilege to be here with the undersecretary to report on the situation in afghanistan. before proceed, i would like to offer my sincere condolences to the people of japan. as they work to recover from one of them worst natural disasters

in their history. for many years now, japan has been a stalwart partner in afghanistan and an important contributor to the mission there. now our thoughts and prayers are with our longtime allies and with all those in japan affected by the earthquake and tsunami. >> if i could just interrupt you, i think in expressing the sentiments you are speaking for everyone on this committee and every american. thank you for doing that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> it is our assessment that the momentum achieved by the taliban in afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. however, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. it is clear much difficult work lies ahead with our afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the

expected taliban spring offensive. nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and 2011 have enabled the joint afghan- made a transition board to recommend initiation the spring of transition to afghan leader in several provinces. the achievements of the past year are also very important as i prepared to provide options and a recommendation to president obama for commencement of the drawdown of the u.s. surged forces in july. of note as well, the project achieved has put us on the right azimuth to accomplish the objective agreed upon at last november's lisbon summit. that of afghan forces in the lead by the end of 2014. the achievements of 2010 and early 2011 have been enabled by a determined effort to get the inputs right in afghanistan.

with a strong part of -- strong support of the united states and 47 of the troop-contributing companies, we focused tremendous resources on building the organizations needed to conduct a comprehensive civil military counter insurgency campaign. on staffing, those organizations properly, in developing in close accord asian entrepreneurs the requisite plant and deploying the additional funding needed. more than 87,000 additional troopers from nato and one of additional civilians have been added to the effort since the beginning of 2009. afghanistan's security forces have grown by over 122,000 in that time as well. getting the inputs right has enabled our forces together with

afghan forces to conduct a comprehensive campaign necessary to achieve our goals in afghanistan. our core objective is insuring afghanistan does not want to again become a sanctuary for al qaeda. achieving that objective requires we helped afghanistan develop significant capabilities to secure and govern itself. that effort requires the execution of the comprehensive civil military efforts on which we are now embarked. over the past year in particular, isaf elements with our afghan and international partners have increased all the activities of our comprehensive campaign substantially. we have, for example, stepped up the tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders. a typical 90 day time frame, units -- special forces units

kill or capture some three entered 60 targeted insurgent leaders. moreover, intelligence-driven operations are coordinated with senior officers of the relevant afghan ministries and virtually all include highly trained afghan soldiers or police with some afghan elements now in the lead on these operations. we have also expanded considerably joined operations to clear the taliban from important -- held safe havens and then hold and build in them. isaf and afghan troopers have cleared the districts west of helmand -- kandahar west of, areas that expand the kabul security bubble and areas in the north were the taliban has expanded its presence. one result has been a four-fold

increase in recent months of the number of weapons and explosives cache is followed. another has been a gradual development of local governments and economic revival in the growing security bubbles. in the one time hub of the taliban and the illegal narcotics industry held an election for a community council on march 1st during which 75% of registered voters cast a ballot. as a result and the the security improvements, markets that sold weapons and explosives and narcotics feature over 1500 shops selling food, clothes and household goods. and we will do further work with our afghan partners to establish as much of a defense as possible

to disrupt infiltration of taliban network members. we are coordinating more closely than ever with the army in pakistan to combat operations that will provide the anvil on which -- on the afghan side of the line against wish pakistan taliban elements can be driven in the border areas. with your support, we have devoted substantial additional resources to the development of afghanistan's security forces. this effort is another very important component of our comprehensive approach. it is are you employed the los critical point in the effort to help afghanistan develop the capability to secure itself. we have seen significant progress in this arena over the past year, the we have had to contend with memorable challenges. our afghan partners are the first to know the quality of some elements is still uneven.

the train and equip mission is a huge undertaking and there is nothing easy about it. however, the past year alone has seen afghan forces grow by over one-third, adding some 70,000 soldiers and police. notably, the forces of grown and quality, not just quantity. investments in leader development, marksmanship, and institutions have yielded significant dividends. in a hard fighting west of kandahar, afghan forces comprise 60% of the overall force and fought with skill and courage. the local police initiative has also been an important addition to the overall campaign. it is in essence a community watch with ak-47s under the local district chief of police with members nominated by a jury at council, abetted by the afghan intelligence service and

partnered with afghan police and u.s. special forces elements. the initiative does more than allow the army of local forces in the conduct of limited defensive missions. through the way each unit is established, this program mobilizes communities in self- defense against those who would undermine security in their areas. for that reason, the growth of these elements is of concern to the taliban whose ability to intimidate the population is limited considerably by it. there are currently 70 districts with each one averaging 300 members. 27 of the district elements have been validated for full operations while the other 43 are in various stages of being established. this program has emerged as an important that i have a conventional u.s. infantry

battalion under the operational control our special operations command in afghanistan to augment our special forces and increase our ability to support the program's expansion. we have increased our efforts to enable the afghan government work and that of international community civilians to improve governance, economic development, and the provision of basic services. these are essential elements to shift delivery from a mental reconstruction teams and the international organizations to afghan elements, thereby addressing the president's been understandable concerns about parallel institutions. we have provided new initiatives for reintegration, supporting the recently established high peace council and peace and reintegration councils. we recognize that we and our afghan partners cannot just kill or capture our way out of the insurgency in afghanistan.

afghan-led reintegration of insurgents must be an important element of this strategy and it now is. in fact, some 700 former taliban every integrated with afghan authorities in recent months. some 2000 more are in various stages of the reintegration process. all of these efforts are part of our comprehensive approach. we worked hard to coordinate activities with the international organizations and diplomatic missions in afghanistan as well as with our afghan partners. we have sought to ensure we minimize loss of innocent civilian life in the course of our operations, even as we ensure protection of our forces and our afghan partners. of note, a recently released study observed civilian casualties due to operations of decreased by just over 20% in

2010. even as our total forces increased by over 100,000 and a significant offensive operations were launched. our progress in this area notwithstanding in view of several tragic incidents in recent weeks, i ordered a review of our tactical direct on the use of force by all levels of our chain of command and with the air crews are attack helicopters. i also reemphasize instructions on reducing damage to infrastructure and property to an absolute minimum. counterinsurgency cannot succeed if they harm the people they are striving to protect. as i noted at the outset, the joint native-afghan transition board has recommended to president karzai and natal leaders commencement of transition in the next few months.

karzai he will announce these locations. the shifting of responsibility from isaf to afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. with the assistance provided by the bottom up so those at operational command levels in afghanistan can plan the resulting battle field geometry adjustments with our afghan partners. according to the nato principles, transition will see our forces sending out, not just handing off with reinvestment freed up by a transition in contiguous areas or training missions were more work is needed. similar processes are taking place as we commence transition of certain trading and institutional functions from isaf traitors to their afghan counterparts. as we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind the imperative of ensuring

the transition actions we take will be irreversible. as at several ambassadors have emphasized that one recent meeting, we will get one shot at transition and we need to get it right. as a number of isaf national leaders have noted in recent months, we need to focus not just on the year ahead but increasingly on the goal agreed at lisbon of having afghan forces in the lead throughout afghanistan by the end of 2014. indeed, we need to make sure we take a sufficiently long view to ensure our actions in the months ahead enable long-term achievement in the years ahead. we never find our campaign plan to do just that. we are also now beginning to look beyond 2014 as undersecretary flournoy noted. as afghanistan and the data

discuss partner -- possible strategic partnerships. this is all enormously reassuring to our afghan partners and of considerable concern to the taliban. with respect to the taliban, appreciation there will be an enduring to abandon some form by the international community to afghanistan is important to the insurgents recognition that reconciliation rather than continued fighting should be their goal. before concluding, there are four additional issues i would like to highlight to the committee. first, i'm concerned levels of funding for our state department and usaid partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform. adequate resources and of our civilian partners could in fact jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. i offer that assessment noting we have just completed a joint

civil military campaign plan between u.s. forces afghanistan and the u.s. embassy in kabul which -- second, i want to express my deep appreciation for your support of vital capabilities for our troopers. the funding have provided has for example enable the rapid deployment of a substantial increase in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets supporting our forces. to take one example, we of increased the number of various types of persistence surveillance systems, blimps and towers with optics from 114 this august to 184 at the present. there are plans for continued increases this year. it has enabled the rapid development of the all terrain

vehicle version of the mine- resistant plant of vehicles. with 600700 field since i took command. your support as continued to supply commanders with another element of our strategy -- the emergency response program funding that has proven invaluable as a well- capitalized in rapidly on his hard-1 gains on the ground. -- hard-won gains on the ground. it has been instrumental in enabling key components of our overall effort. third, i should also highlight the critical work of the world bank and the asian development bank. these institutions are the largest donors to afghanistan after the united states and they have been critical to the success of important products

such as the ring road and the railroad. we need these critical institutions and further u.s. support for them will ensure they are able to continue to contribute as significantly as they have in the past. fourth, i also want to thank you for the funding of the afghan national security forces. the continued growth of the afghan forces in quantity, quality and capability is, needless to say, essential to transition from isaf forces to afghan forces. the resources you have provided have been the critical enabler of it. in closing, the past eight months have seen important but hard-fought process in -- hard- fought progress in afghanistan. insurgent safe havens have been taken away from the taliban. numerous insurgent leaders have been killed or captured.

hundreds of reconcilable mid- level leaders have been reintegrated into afghan society. afghan forces have grown in number and capability. local security solutions have been instituted. in key places, progress has been unable in governance and development. none of this has been easy. the progress has entailed hard fighting and considerable sacrifice. there have been tough losses along the way. there have been setbacks as well as successes. indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller-coaster ride. the trajectory has generally been up board since last summer, but there has been significant bumps and difficult reverses at various points. nonetheless, although the

insurgents are striving to regain lost momentum and safe havens as we enter this bring fighting season, we believe we will be able to build on the momentum achieved in 2010, though that will clearly entail additional tough fighting. as many of you have noted with the past, our objectives in afghanistan and in the region are a viable importance. we must do all we can to achieve those objectives. those of us of a ground believe the strategy on which we are now embarked provides the best approach for doing just that -- noting as a dialogue with president karzai has reminded us of various junctures, we must constantly refine our activities in response to changes in circumstances on the ground. needless to say, we will continue to make such adjustments in close consultations with our afghan and international counterparts as the situation evolves.

finally, i would like to thank each of you for your continued support for our country's men and women in afghanistan and their families. as i have noted to you before, nothing means more to them that knowing what they're doing is important and their sacrifices are appreciated by their leaders and fellow citizens back home. each of you has sought to convey that sense to them and we're very grateful to you for doing so. thank you very much. sense to them and we are very grateful to you for doing so. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, general, thank you both for your testimony please leave if you're going to make any comments in public like that. just please leave. general, let me start by asking you about the july, 2011 date

which you have made reference to in your statement as a date about which you recommend to president obama commencement of the draw down of some of our forces. have you decided on the level of reductions that you're going to be recommending yet? >> i have not, mr. chairman. >> do you continue to support the beginning of reductions of u.s. forces from afghanistan in july? >> i do, mr. chairman, and i will provide options to the chain of command and the president to do that. >> and why do you support the beginning of reductions this july? >> if i could come back perhaps to your opening statement, mr. chairman, i think it is logical to talk both about getting the job done as secretary gates did with his nato counterparts and beginning transition and responsible to

use president obama's term reductions in forces at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. as my good friend and ship mate, general jim mad us noted, it undercuts the narrative of the taliban that we will be there forever, that we are determined to maintain a presence forever, and it does, indeed, as i have told this committee before send that message of urgency that president obama sought to transmit on the first of december at west point in 2009 when he also transmitted a message of enormous additional commitment in the form of 30,000 additional u.s. forces, more funding for afghan forces and additional civilians. >> thank you. now, relative to the pending request to increase the size of afghan security forces by up to an additional 70,000 personnel, i believe you have made that

request, is that correct? >> i have, mr. chairman, and my understanding is that the secretary has forwarded that. this was made in consultation with ministers of interior and defense in afghanistan who also gained president karzai's support for it. keeping in mind that it reasonable degree of medical certainty a floor of 352,000, and then if there are certain reforms carried through, which are already very much entrained by ministry counterparts in afghanistan in terms of additional commitment to leader development, recruiting, retention, and attrition issues, that the growth would be to 378 total. >> is that a floor of 352, that is approximately 45,000 more than the goal for october, 2011 as i understand it. >> that's correct, mr. chairman, and the afghan forces are on track it appears to reach that goal probably even early as is the case this past year.

>> secretary flournoy, are you recommending that increase? >> the secretary has forwarded the increase over to the white house for the president's consideration. we do expect a decision on that soon. >> are you able to say that you support it or the secretary supports? >> yes, i think the secretary does support the range that general petraeus suggested between 352 and 378. >> you both -- thank you. you both made reference to pakistan and the safe havens which exist there with the pakistan government basically looking the other way in two key areas, that's north i'm sorry ear stan and down in kwet a where they know where the people are who are crossing the border, and terrorizing afghan citizens, attacking us, attacking afghan forces, coalition forces. now, pakistan may be looking the other way in that regard, but i don't think we can look the other way about what they are

not doing in those areas. so i would ask you both what, if anything, more can we do to persuade the pakistanis to be the hammer which i think you made indirect reference to, general petraeus, so when those forces cross the border, we can be the anvil? >> mr. chairman, first, if i could, i think it is always important to note what pakistan has done over the course of the last two years, and that is very impressive and very challenging counter insurgents operation toss clear swat valley and a number of agencies in the tribal areas of rugged border regions. and then to note the enormous sacrifices they have made, their military as well as their civilian populous, which has also suffered terrible losses at the hands of internal extremists. there is indeed as a result of a

number of recent visits and coordination efforts in recent months, unprecedented cooperation, coordination between pakistani, afghan and isaf forces to coordinate in operations that will complement the other's forces on the border, say for example where the pakistanis go the border and we are poised indeed to be the andville on which they are driven. the fact is that the pakistanis are the first to note more needs to be done. there is, i think, a growing recognition that you cannot allow poisonous snakes to have a nest in your backyard, even if they just bite the neighbor's kids because sooner or later they're going to turn around and cause problems in your backyard, and i think that sadly has proven to be the case. having said that, there is, of

course, considerable pressure on al qaeda and on the hakani network in north wi seer stan. the campaign there disrupted significantly the activities of those groups, and then of course on the afghan side of the border, there has as i noted in my opening statement been an enormous effort to establish a defense in depth to make it difficult for in filtration. again, we conducted a great deal of coordination with afghan partners and ultimately as senator mccain noted that the way to influence pakistan is to show that there can be a certain outcome in afghanistan that means that there should be every effort to help their afghan neighbors and indeed to ensure that they do that on their side of the border as well. >> mr. chairman, if i could just add from a strategic level, i

think what's needed is continued investment in the strategic partnership that we've been developing with pakistan, and very candid engagement with them on these issues to influence their will to go after the full range of groups that threaten both of us. it means continued efforts to build their capacity, things like the pakistani counter insurgency fund, but not only efforts to build their military capacity but also their capacity for governance and development in areas like the fatah and other parts of afghanistan to meet basic needs of their people. we can't walk away from this problem, and we believe a strategy of engagement, investing in the partnership is the best way forward. >> well, i think that's all well and good, but it is actually factually true, i am afraid that simply investing in their capacity is not what we need at the moment in north wi seer stan and in kwet a with the taliban.

those folks using those areas are attacking our people, and the pakistanis basically resisted going after them in those areas. they have done that for their own internal reasons, and on the other hand, we've got to continue to find ways to impress upon them that their backyard is a backyard where snakes are permitted to continue to exist and those snakes are crossing the border. you say simply increase their capacity, i am not willing to simply increase their capacity without some kind of an understanding that that capacity is going to be used to end these safe havens which are deadly to our people. so i'll simply say that. if you want to comment you can. i should have announced we have a seven minute round, i probably used mine already. in any event, i will end my round there, unless you want to add a comment. >> if i could just add, we are having extremely candid

conversations about our expectations of what we would like to see our pakistani partners do in areas like north wi seer stan and elsewhere. we are continuing to apply as much pressure as we can from the afghan side of the border and also in terms of pressure on al qaeda senior leadership in the border region. >> senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i thank the witnesses again. general petraeus, i have been a member of this committee for a long time, and i've sat through hundreds of hearings and one that stands out in my memory was in september of 2007 when you and ambassador crocker came and testified when the majority of americans and the majority of members of the committee and majority of the senate wanted to have an immediate pullout from

iraq, which obviously was -- and that the surge could not succeed and would fail, obviously that turned out not to be true, that the surge did succeed, and i have a bit of a feeling of déjà vu here because this morning, i am sure you may have seen "the washington post" indicates, the headline is on the front page, quote, most in u.s. say afghan war isn't worth fighting. nearly two-thirds of americans now say the war in afghanistan is no longer worth fighting. the highest proportion yet opposed to the conflict, according to a new washington post, abc news poll. could you respond to that poll and maybe have a few words for the american people about this conflict? >> well -- >> and you might mention the consequences of failure. >> thanks, senator. up front, i can understand the

frustration. we have been at this for ten years. we have spent an enormous amount of money. we have sustained very tough losses and difficult life changing wounds. i was at walter reed yesterday, seeing some of our troopers whose lives have been changed forever by their service in our country's uniform in a tough fight. but i think it is important to remember why we are there at such a time. it is important to remember that that is where 9-11 began, that's where the plan was made. that's where the initial training of the attackers took place before they went to germany and u.s. flight schools. that is where al qaeda had its most important sanctuary in the world, and it had it under the taliban. at that time, of course, the taliban controlled kabul and the vast majority of the country.

and indeed, we see al qaeda looking for sanctuaries all the time, frankly. they are as i mentioned earlier under considerable pressure in their north wi seer stan sanctuary, and there is a search for other locations. and afghanistan would be an attractive location were the taliban to control large swathes of it once again. indeed, there is a small presence of al qaeda in afghanistan, some probably less than 100. we killed the number three leader of al qaeda in afghanistan several months ago, and have detained another very important individual there as well. and we do see the exploration, if you will, of certain possible sanctuari sanctuaries. the other thing to remember is the one i made in my opening statement. that is it is only recently we

have gotten inputs right in afghanistan. as undersecretary flournoy explained, there were a number of years where our focus was elsewhere, where afghanistan an economy of force effort to use the military terminology, and it is only since late 2008, early 2009 that we have focused back on afghanistan and have deployed the military, civilian and financial resources necessary, adjusted our campaign plans and concepts, staffed the organizations properly, and so forth, so that we could indeed say that we actually had the inputs right. we judged that that was roughly last fall. that is what has enabled us to make the progress that we have made. i do believe that we can build on that progress as difficult as that will be. and i believe it is imperative we do so, because again, i think this is as president obama has

said a vital national security interest that again al qaeda not be allowed to reestablish sanctuaries in afghanistan. >> let me then ask you to respond to a los angeles times story this morning which says national intelligence director james clapper told congress last week, i think the issue the concern the intelligence community has is after that and the ability of the afghan government to pick up their responsibility for governance. tame general ronald burgess, head of defense intelligence agency offered a sobering view, one that is shared by the cia. uchlt officials say it contrasted sharply with the optimism expressed in recent days by petraeus. quote from general burgess. the taliban in the south has shown resilience, still influences much of the population, particularly outside urban areas. burgess said u.s. led coalition has been killing taliban militants by the hundreds he said, but there have been no apparent delegate rad agency in

their capacity to fight. would you respond to general clap errand general burgess's statements? >> first of all, with respect, i have tried to avoid what might be labeled optimism or pessimism and have tried to provide realism. and i think that the opening statement speaks for itself in terms of expressing what we believe is reality on the ground, with a very significant note of the challenges that lie ahead. there is no question that governmental capacity is an area of in a sense strategic risk as we identify it. in the slides we provided along with the statement, you will see the so-called cloud slides, and i think there's a double thunder bolt coming out of that particular cloud. the reason is that indeed it is very difficult to transition tasks that are currently

performed by international organizations or isaf provincial reconstruction teams to afghan institutions if that capacity is not present. i had a long conversation with minister of finance in kabul, and then president karzai the day before leaving and discussed the imperative of increased efforts to expand this governmental capacity, particularly in the arena of budget execution. now, that may sound like an odd item for a military commander to be engaged in, but with our civilian partners, we absolutely have to help afghan partners increase their ability to spend the money they're provided, to speed the very bureaucratic processes they have instituted to enable them to take money that's provided in through the top and gets down to the province and district to replace again service provision by

international organizations and provincial reconstruction teams. they are seized with that. they realize that the trend that is currently in afghanistan has to be changed and that indeed budget execution has to increase substantially again to enable president karzai's goal of doing away with parallel institutions to be achieved. >> could i finally ask very briefly, do you see increasing evidence, evidence of increasing iranian involvement in afghanistan? >> we did in ter dikt as you saw i think press reports, senator mccain, a shipment from the force through a known taliban facilitator. this was in ter dick ted, three of the individuals were killed. 48 122 millimeter rockets were intercepted with various components. this is a significant increase

in more than double in range over the 107 millimeter rockets we have typically seen, more than double in terms of bursting radius. >> do you see other evidence of iranian involvement? >> we do see certainly iranian activity to use both soft power in the way they shut off the fuel going into afghanistan a couple of months ago and also certainly to influence the political process there as well in ways similar to what we saw in iraq. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator mccain. senator lieberman. >> thanks, mr. chairman, thanks secretary flournoy and general petraeus for your service and testimony. general petraeus i don't think we can thank you enough for this service and leadership you've given our country, particularly in this case you had gone from remarkable leadership in iraq, helping with a lot of help from state department and our troops turning that situation around,

then the central command. suddenly with general mcchrystal's departure from afghanistan, you are called to the oval office. the president asks you to go to afghanistan. you could have found a lot of reasons not to. you just didn't hesitate. you said yes, sir, and you've been there with a lot of support from the administration and others, and we're turning it around now in afghanistan, without any illusions about the difficulties we face. i just think the country owes you a tremendous expression of gratitude. you set by your example the standard for everyone who serves under you in afghanistan and frankly for any of us who have the privilege of serving our country in whatever capacity, and i thank you for that. the public opinion polls are on our minds today. i think we all know from experience you can't make

decisions about war and peace based on public opinion. once you commit to a cause as we did after 9-11 to the cause of a different and new afghanistan and you commit troops to it, you can't be effected by waves of public opinion. we know from recent history, when wars are succeeding, when wars are failing, seem to be failing, public opinion is negative. when wars seem to be succeeding, public opinion turns more positive. in this case, we are succeeding in afghanistan today and therefore i think the downward turn in the public opinion here in the united states has more to do with the understandable preoccupation of the american people with the economy, with jobs, with the deficit. in that sense, i think we have to come back and remind the

american people of why we are in afghanistan, why it is worth it, and that we are now succeeding. and i think secretary flournoy and general petraeus you have done that most effectively in your testimony. secretary flournoy, i want to quote from you. you said just right to the point, the threat to our national security, and the security of our friends and allies that emanates from the border land of afghanistan and pakistan is not hypothetical. there is simply no other place in the world that contains such a concentration of al qaeda senior leaders and operational commanders. this remote region has served as a crews bell for the most catastrophic terrorist actions of the past decade as we learned at great cost after abandoning the region in 1989, staying engaged over the long term is critical to achieving lasting peace and stability in this

region and securing our national interests. end of quote. i don't think we can say it better and have to keep saying it about why we're there. second, general petraeus, i think your presentation today tells us, again, nobody is under any illusions that this is turning around. i can tell you that i've been going to afghanistan since january, february of 2002, after our initial victory there, overthrowing the taliban, going back at least once a year, usually twice a year. and for a period of years just to validate what you said about us turning our attention away, every time we went, if we looked at the map, every year the taliban was in control of more of the territory of afghanistan until the last year, until 2010. and i don't think this is an accident, because as you both said in some sense we only fully

engaged in afghanistan for the last year. president obama made the decision to commit the surge troops. in fact, since the president has been our commander in chief, we have increased our troop presence not just 30,000 but 87,000, when one considers the previous commitment made. so we're there for a reason, we're making progress. i can't thank you both enough for all of that. i want to just get to a couple of questions briefly. we've talked about the safe havens in pakistan, but what strikes me as really significant and i think underappreciated is that as of two years ago, there were large taliban safe havens inside pakistan, such as marja, and one of the things that happened in the past two years, our coalition has taken the safe havens away from the enemy, and shut them down. i wonder, general, if you would

comment on that. >> well, indeed that has been one of our most important objectives and indeed one of our troopers' most important accomplishments. these were significant safe havens in the case of kandahar city, the well spring of the taliban movement and right on the doorstep of the secondz;zu largest city in afghanistan. indeed, there was a period in early 2009, i remember the intelligence analysts came in and told me they thought kabul was being encircled once again in the same way it was during the civil war. so these are very important accomplishments and the increase of afghan security forces and the advent of the afghan local police program now also enable us to prevent other safe havens and much less populated areas from springing up as well.

and that is certainly one of our objectives. >> i appreciate that answer. let me go to another important matter that you both talked about. we're on a path now to transition control of security to the afghan security forces by the end of 2014, but both of you have testified today about the importance of the signaling and enduring commitment to the security of afghanistan and i couldn't agree more. i wonder if both of you would describe, i know there were some discussions going on now seriously between the u.s. and afghan government. what kinds of long-term commitment you might contemplate, and i wonder if you would comment on the possibility of some continuing base presence, perhaps jointly operated system of bases in

afghanistan between us and the afgha afghans? >> senator, thank you. when the president first announced the strategy at west point, he was very clear that we were making an enduring, long term commitment to afghanistan and the region. having made the mistake historically of walking away, then paid a very dear price for that. so that's been clear from the beginning. it's an important message to emphasize as we begin this transition process. we just had a team in kabul this we can starting to discuss the outlines of a strategic partnership with our afghan partners, being clear about the kinds -- our expectations of that partnership and the kinds of commitments we would be willing to make. the president has also been very clear from the beginning that we do not seek any permanent bases in afghanistan, that we don't seek to have a presence that any

other country in the region would see as a threat. that said, we are committed to the success of the afghans to continuing to build their capacity, and so we do envision if the afghans invite us to stay the use of joint facilities to continue training, advising, assisting the afghan national security forces, conducting joint counter terrorism operations and so forth. so we are in the process of discussing what kind of parameters should outline our partnership. i should also add, it goes far beyond the military domain to look at how we can support further development of governance, economic development and so forth. >> general, do you want to add anything to that? >> well, again, i think it's very important stay engaged in a region in which we have such vital interests, and i think the concept of joint basing, concept

of providing enablers for afghan operations and so forth frankly similar to what we have done in iraq since the mission changed there would also be appropriate in afghanistan, again, depending on the circumstances, noting we have nearly four years to go until that time. >> i thank you both. i think the important points you made, obviously we will only stay in afghanistan after 2014 to the extent we are invited to do so by the afghan government, and we determine we are able and want to do so, but i think, general, you point out very correctly that we have -- that we would do this not just for the afghans, but we also have security interests in the stability of afghanistan and in the region more generally. i thank you both very much. >> thank you, senator lieberman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me identify with the remarks

of senator lieberman about your service, general petraeus. i might also add that in the 17 years i've been on this committee, i don't recall a better opening statement, more comprehensive. i appreciate that very much. one thing hasn't been talked about, i thought you might have a comment to make briefly about what's happening now with the budget and about the crs, how that is affecting the military. >> well, thanks, senator. the fact is that the services will do everything in their power to make sure that those on the frontlines are provided everything that is required, and they will do that even as they start to inflict pain on themselves. we've been through this before. i remember this, i think one of the years i was commander in iraq, the services did some very serious belt tightening, but they continued to provide the support to us out there. now, there does come a point,

however, at which some of that pain has to be passed on where you just can't continue. and our assessment, again, strictly from an afghan perspective, not from the perspective of those here in the pentagon, but we sense somewhere in the june time frame, probably with that there would start to be a limiting factor. and that obviously would cause us enormous concern because the last thing that we want to have to do is to halt our progress in an area that is so important to the ultimate transition of tasks. if i could add a comment on that, while we're on this topic, though, senator, that does have to do with the growth of the afghan national security forces. again, making very clear my job, of course, is to state requirements. i'm a battlefield commander, every level above me has a broadbroad er purview and broader

considerations. of course the challenge with the growth of the afghan national security forces, the concern, is the issue of sustainability. so while it is clearly desirable from the perspective of the ministry of interior, defense, isaf and afghan leaders, there is an understandable concern about the sustainability of that over time and you all had quite a bit of dialogue with secretary gates on that. i think that's the discussion that has taken place here in washington with respect to that growth decision. >> i appreciate that very much. in general, i do want to -- i notice you made a request for additional $150 million in the sert program and that's been one of my favorite programs. you've spoken very favorably about it. i notice, though, when the special inspector general for iraq reconstruction, they had a report where they were somewhat critical of it. i would like your response to that. >> again, there was -- there

were in some areas grounds to be critical about it. we have taken quite considerable steps to improve our oversight of this and a number of other programs, frankly. we have increased significantly personnel who are in the business of tracking our contracting, overseeing the implementation of the various construction efforts and so on, and also monitoring serp. i established new procedures. we have done more training of the serp individuals. we have, indeed, structured the program so now the average of these is entirely what i think the committee's intent was all along, roughly $17 million on average, this particular year. we have already done more projects this year than we did in the last fiscal year because, of course, of the increase of our troopers now on the ground, deployed, and they have gains that they want to solidify and build on with the help of this

program. so that additional $150 million that we requested over the $400 million in regular serp is very important to us and that would be something that would cause a significant halt in some of the programs that we seek to capitalize on the very hard fought and costly gains of our troopers on the ground. >> we talked about this back during the iraqi thing, we went through the same thing. and, you know, i look at this, perhaps they're the same safe guards in there, but there is so much more that can come by the immediate decisions to carry them through and those figures still stand. let me just mention on a much larger scale, we talk about train and equip, our figures have gone up from fiscal 10 to 12, 9, 11.8, $12.8 billion. i would say i had both of you have been very complimentary about the changes in this and

the changes taking place with the iraq -- with the after gagh. i was over there, spent new year's eve with the kids over there and took a long time at the kabul training center. and i was just really in shock at the attitude -- well, first of all, being on new year's eve, the attitude of our kids over there, just the spirits are high, they are -- they know what their mission is, they're excited about it and they're dedicated. but in terms of watching the military train, it isn't all that different from the training that takes place here. we have done a great job over there. and i think that -- we should make comments about the successes we had in the training of the afghans. >> well, this is another area, senator, in which, again, it is only recently that we got the inputs right. key input in this regard was lieutenant general bill caldwell, commander out of ft.

leavenworth, before taking this command, and he has guided this effort very impressively. the fact is that we have increased very substantially in every single area of the so-called train and equip mission. the funding has, indeed, gone up because we're in the stages of building the infrastructure to allow the additional forces. buying the equipment for them. and we still do have fairly substantial numbers of contract trainers, but we're starting to bring those down as we replace them both with nato, isaf trainers and increasingly afghan trainers because we have an afghan train the trainer program among all the other efforts. one of the most significant steps forward in this regard is in the literacy arena. and we have actually already had some 50 to 60,000 afghans go through literacy training and we have even more than that number in literacy training now. now, you may say that's a

strange pursuit for a train and equip mission. but the fact is that one of the major challenges in afghanistan is human capacity because of the more than 80% illiteracy rate. and if a soldier can't read a serial number off a weapon, a policeman can't read a license plate on a car, needless to say that is mission limiting. and so we bit the bullet and decided that as part of basic training for the army and for the police that we would introduce basic literacy training along with it. without having to extend the courses, night program, interestingly the afghans have really taken to this. not surprisingly many of them were quietly ashamed of not being able to read and write, they now get themselves to a first grade level, a functional level, and then we build on that in the subsequent noncommission officer training courses for the soldiers and police as well. this is a huge investment in afghanistan at large and a major investment in the afghan

national security forces. but the same is true of a number of different areas. there are now 11 branch schools. the institutional side of this is building the leader development side is beginning to take off. and we're starting now to build the so-called enabler forces. for a long time, we were basically training and equipping infantry battalions. but, of course, a force of infantry battalion is only as good as the military intelligence, the logistic support, the transportation, the maintenance and all these other, again, enablers, and so that has been a key area of focus in the past year. >> and that's going great. my time has expired but i would only say we were able to randomly -- select some people out, afghans and get their take on this thing. and i understand that literacy issue. the training is going very well there. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator inhofe. senator reed is next and after

his round, we will then have a break of perhaps five minutes after senator reed is finished. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. madam secretary, general petraeus, thank you very much. not only for your appearance today, but your extraordinary service to the nation. thank you very much. general petraeus, we are counterplaying a serious issue in terms of the budget, the department of defense budget. many have suggested that we have to move forward regardless of other aspects. but integrated within your plan is a strong state department presence in afghanistan. and the state department request for ocho funding $2.2 billion, civilian personnel, economic activities, aid work, et cetera, how central and critical is this funding to your overall strategy and your assessment of ultimate

success in afghanistan? >> well, thanks, senator, because it is critical. it is absolutely central to what we do. this is a comprehensive civil military counterinsurgency campaign. it is not a military only campaign. and as i noted in my opening statement, we have recently revamped the u.s. civil military campaign plan and essential to that is the ability of state aid and other implementing partners to capitalize on the hard fought gains of our troopers on the ground and those of our afghan partners in joint operations. again, it is not enough just to clear and hold. you do have to build and the build includes local governance, local economic revival, if you will, improvements in basic services and so forth, so that the afghan people see that there is a better future by supporting the afghan government, a legitimate government, and it has to be seen as legitimate, rather than a return to the

repressive days of the taliban. and there are various areas in which the taliban can actually compete, conflict resolution is one of them, by the way. so, again, if the afghan government can't or doesn't provide those basic services, then there will be a reversion to the taliban. however little the people have regard for them. and they remember what it was like under the brutal rule of the taliban. so this is very, very central to what it is that we're trying to do. >> thank you very much. and i'll ask both of you to comment on, we hear various comments emanating from kabul, the civilian leadership of the afghan government, from our nato allies about the strategy, the long-term commitments, et cetera. but what struck me along with senator levin is that the local level there seems to be much more traction with respect to

local afghani leadership and also there seems to be continuous improvement in the afghan security forces that gives a different perspective than listening to the announcements of the president or some of our allies. i wonder if both of you might comment on that and i'll just -- to what extent is one overwhelmed by the other to what extent one is a better sign of the reality on the ground than the other. and general petraeus and then secretary flournoy. >> local government has been growing and developing as has the development in other areas of basic service delivery. as i noted earlier, there is no question and president karzai and his minister of finance are the first to recognize it that at the budget level, execution has to be involved and they're

determined to do that and they have plans to do that so that more money can be put on budget rather than being injected through what president karzai understandably is concerned with, this term of parallel institutions. certainly some things are said in kabul at times for domestic political reasons. i know that that never takes place in washington. >> never. >> but occasionally in kabul that does take place. and beyond that, though, i think secretary gates made a good point the other day. i think before this committee, that sometimes we don't listen well enough to president karzai. we have -- he was understandably concerned for years about private security contractors, which he sees as the ultimate parallel institution under the control and in some cases former warlords or members of what he and we, by the way, have agreed to call criminal patronage networks, which he's very concerned about. and we had a long conversation just again the day before i left

with general h.r. mcmast, speer focus the right attention on this very, very challenging element that can erode the very institutions to which we need to transition if, again, these are criminals, they're breaking the law, they have political protection in some respects, and they're not just acting as individuals. they are part of networks. and president karzai sees these and he wants to deal with them. when he heard that evidence and his surgeon general, for example, he fired him on the spot. in a subsequent previous briefing between an afghan parter and general mcmaster. he did the same with the afghan national military hospital, when he heard what they were doing and how derelict in their duty and frankly immoral in failing their moral obligation to their soldiers. so, again, i think at times we have to listen better. what he says is understandable about civilian casualties. we cannot harm the people that

we are there to help protect. and we have to protect them from all civilian casualties, not just those at our hands or those of our afghan partners, but those of the insurgents as well. so i think that's how you do have to look at this. and i do think that periodically we have got to think about walking a kilometer in his shoes and understanding the dynamics with which he has to deal. the political foundation that he has to maintain because it is not -- though the executive has enormous power in that system, there are also significant checks and balances on it that may not be as apparent to individuals who haven't lived this the way some of us have there in kabul. >> madam secretary? >> senator, i would just add secretary gates also said this is a case where the closer you are to what's happening on the ground in afghanistan, the more positive you are about the ultimate outcome. because when you go to -- at the

district level, very small changes can have huge impact. if you combine some basic security with a decent district police chief, a decent district governor, a shura that is representative of the local population, you start to see the basis of transformation at the local level. and that is what we are seeing in many, many villages and districts across particularly the south. and, you know, i think -- i would totally agree with general petraeus' comments about president karzai. but i would also expand to say, look, we work with many, many afghan partners. and many extremely competent ministers who are committed to fighting corruption, who are committed to afghanistan's success. i'll just cite for you the new minister of interior, minister amadi, he has personally gone

district by district. he's removed 66 corrupt police leaders. 2,000 officers, personally rooting out corruption where he finds it, holding leadership accountable. those -- each of those changes can have a profound effect on the population in that locality and so as we see our afghan partners stepping up to take on that accountability, the anti-corruption, the transparency, we are seeing -- starting to get real traction at the local level. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator reed. we'll take a five-minute break. >> later in the week, general petraeus reiterated his support for the obama administration's july date to begin the drawdown for u.s. troops. he made these remarks during an interview house and by "the

national journal." this is about one hour. >> in good morning, everybody. welcome to the events. i welcome all of you here to this important event. with all survives in patrick's day. that is very good. this is the first day of the incident led march madness tournament -- the first day of the n.c.a.a. march-tournament and my practice is a little battered. we went to think the museum. we think general petraeus and his team for helping us to build this event. a special thanks to the ceo of the museum and we are indebted to him and the museum for presiding -- providing the

forum. thank you tuesday that the new america foundation. this is a ritualistic thing. this is important. please silence yourself phones, iphone, and every other if electronic device so we do not interfere with the conversation. you have the ability to bring your own questions to general petraeus. "the national journal" staff will circle around taking your questions which will bee filtered. not filtered -- [laughter] >> he said filtered. [laughter] >> as you can tell, i did not surprising patrick's day. they will not be filtered. they will be put into the ipad which i will then quite elegantly years in 30 minutes and we will have those questions and mine for general petraeus after the first half are which

will be led by michael. again, not filtering. if you know are so motivated and are twitter savvy, as this conversation continues, if you are so motivated, to to read what you are observing and taking all of this in at #njpetraeus. i will now turn this over to our moderator, michael, from the brookings institute. thank you, michael. [applause] >> let me say a brief word of introduction for general petraeus. we will go to a conversation, a set of questions, and then we will take all of your ideas and thoughts to the general.

1974 graduate of west point. he had many positions and commands and the distinguished honors along the way. he won the george marshall award from the army general command staff college. he went to princeton, where i got to know him in the red school. he did his ph.d. in the 2.5 years, less than half as the rest of us. it continues to be a princeton record. he spent some time teaching at west point. many of us know the story from that point onward in the following two decades. i will remind you that depending on how you can europe, he is in his seventh deployments including haiti, bosnia, three deployments in iraq, and now command in afghanistan. let me mention a few of the awards. many of them are familiar to you. the defense of distinguished

service medal, the bronze star, and the gold award for the iraqi order. we have seen in number of accomplishments. he was the border region runner- up for time person of the year in 2007. i'm still not convinced no one had a better year than he did. i want to conclude this in a way that i think is appropriate. his wife, children, and all military families around the globe. drama in a proper welcome for general petraeus. -- join me in welcoming. >> thank you for the kind introduction. thank you for being here instead of being diluted your tv screens to see what happens in libya or any of the other areas around the world. it is a privilege to represent the great men and women that you

talked about here today with respect to the time that it took me to turn my phd at princeton, i heard michael was going to do it in less time. it is not that i am competitive, but i decided to step up the pace. i have done a handful of presentations at the museum and i want to think the museum nation in getting such a wonderful audience. i did want to be reassured that there is no serving military officer that has done more than i had at the museum -- at the newseum. we have done several of these in the past. they seem to work out pretty well. it will be interesting to see you on twitter and the ipad and everything else. i do have reinforcements ready

in the former power point slides. you know the deal. that is one of the first amendment rights of every four- star attorney-general, the times on the bill of rights. as i look at the audience coming here, it is an impressive group. i was reminded of a moment in number of years ago when i was a young major working on temporary duty for the then commander in chief those days of the u.s. southern command, jack galvin, home some of you will note came on to be supreme commander of europe and went to the fletcher school. this was in the mid-1980s's. this was going on in el salvador, colombia, peru, and it was really quite an experience for a young officer. i learned a great deal from it. in relevance to this event, i

remember watching his interaction with the press and he was quite skillful. i remember one day in the particular, when it was complete and we were walking to the vehicle, how do you think it went? "it seemed to me that you got all of your point across, but frankly you never answered a single one of their questions." he responded, "they did not answer a single one of mine." that will not be the case today and i look forward to conversations with a great princeton colleague, the man who has the record for the most of dead's and has appeared on television to a thousand times and counting and so it is great to be here. he just got back one night ago,

i guess. but we will asking for updates as well. "general, thank you. i know people are very concerned about the war in afghanistan. you inspire great confidence and york testimony and from congress has been very informative. for a nearby oakum you joined the military during the vietnam war. you wrote your dissertation about vietnam. i do not think afghanistan is vietnam, but i would like to invite you to explain why it is not why we are nine years going on 10 and in at a time when secretary gates at a speech in brussels and reminding our allies that we should accomplish a mission objectives. i just really wanted to ask you to comment on why this is not

becoming a quagmire. again, i do not think it is, but some americans have that concern and would like to give me the opportunity to respond. >> first and foremost, there is very little argument about the truly vital national security interest in reside in afghanistan and the greater afghanistan-pakistan region. there is no question about why we went to afghanistan. it is because of 9/11 and the attacks were planned at the camps that the taliban controlled. the training took place there before they moved to hamburg and u.s. flight schools. we went there because of those attacks and our core objective, again, a few narrow it to afghanistan is to ensure that they do not want to again become a sanctuary for some other would

be trans-national extremists. they certainly do have some aspirations in that regard. it is important to recall, as i explained on capitol hill, and maybe total of about 10 hours of hearings, two in senate foreign relations behind closed doors as well. one of the themes that i really sought to stress was that it is only recently that we have gotten the input right in afghanistan. secretary gates says there are three phases to afghanistan, the early phase, got that right. we liberated the country. then over time we took our eye off of the ball, focused on other issues in iraq. in that darn guy in the petraeus mounted all of those resources. we haveve come back and

started to get this to a reasonable place and we have this on the glidepath. when i took command of centcom coming out of iraq in late 2008, the end of october, and the debt afghanistan in a very, very deliberate manner, on it was clear that we did not have the organizations in place to carry out a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. they were not existing. they did not staff properly. since then, we have added some 87,000 nato i south -- nato isaf forces. we did not have the concept right. we did not have a military campaign plan, a tactical

directed to reduce civilian casualties to the variety of these other, again, underpinnings for the type of campaign we needed to conduct. the bottom line is that to achieve our core objective, again, an afghanistan that does not have an extremist trans- national sanctuary, there's only one way to do that. that is to help afghanistan develop the capability to secure and govern themselves to an adequate degree. we're not return them into switzerland in 10 dead -- in 10 years or less. the only way to do that is to carry a a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. a comprehensive approach, one that is not just kinetic activities but also include substantial support for the various organizations that are helping afghanistan build the local governments, provincial, and national governments and to get the economy at those levels

moving as well. really got that right about six months ago. the serious studies in the final months of the bush administration and the two reviews done in the first year of president obama's administration and the decisions out of them have provided the resources that we needed. we worked very hard with the various commands to build the organizations that we know are required and we did not have a reintegration to sell. if you do not kill or capture every single bad guy, you have to figure out how to reintegrate the reconcilable. we did not have that. we did not have an operation level of headquarters. all of this in a country that, although the perception was that we were winning for quite some time, and the truth was that they were beginning the momentum from at least 2005 and perhaps even a bit earlier.

the fact is that i was asked to go to afghanistan on my way home to the second tour in iraq, shifting for five months, and in the secretary of defense ask me to come to afghanistan. that was my reward. we went out there with the team and we did this. we had a variety of observations, suggestions, and so forth. we included, by way of a par 45 that was titled, "afghanistan does not equal iraq" and laid out all of the differences. then the bottom line, i said i owed it to you to give some broader observations as well. the bottom line is that, in my view, afghanistan will be the longest campaign in a long war. that did not elicit wild applause of the third floor of the pentagon. again, at that time, there was a perception well into 2007, i think, and we were sitting in iraq wondering why did not take

the job when i had the chance. that was a war that we were winning and going away, but the truth was it was already starting to spiral downward and they were already reestablishing safe havens. it was only in the last six months the we have taken away the very important safe haven in kandahar and a very important areas that were the real axis between the taliban and the illegal narcotics industry. certainly we had challenges where there was an unfortunate reference to governments in a box that turned out not to be in the box. interestingly, this year there was an election for a district community council. it followed a very spirited and raucous debate and 75% of the registered voters cast a ballot. they now have a community council.

they have a good district governor as well. that is generally true of the other districts in the central province as well. there is serious fighting to be down there, particularly as we push further toward some other areas. >> i will now try to probe in. but on a couple of big issues. when will the afghan government and security forces i will ask you about that in just a second. then i want to ask about pakistan then we will go to the audience. on the first question, we tend to personalize the afghan government and a lot of the afghan debate in the former president karzai. i was fortunate enough to see him on monday. you see him a lot. he is a person that strikes me as frustrated with the length of the war, like many americans, and emotional about the state of play. i do not want to ask about president karzai. i want to know about the other

afghan leaders that you deal with in the military, police force, the cabinet, and maybe invite you to explain to all of us a little bit more about what you see in terms of their mettle. do you see good reformers -- reformers? do you see good people? on the afghan security forces themselves to be mentioned in testimony this week that they have done a lot in operations in kandahar and others. 60% of the combined force was afghan for some of the operations in the kandahar. can you tell us a little bit more about how well they are fighting and how well their leadership is coming along? also how well their ethnic balance is working because some people are concerned about intentions as well. >> the ethnic balance is easy. almost mirrors the country in terms of percentages. it is about 42% the army and the

challenges that there are insufficient boston's rather part of the country that trouble to the east. that actually have had a very active recruiting campaign to try and fill that gap. they have done reasonably well. there have been getting hundred per month from the southern provinces which is a considerable increase. it also reflects, frankly, the fact that security has approved it to the point that in certain districts that young man can raise their hand, join the military, and not end up with their family dead, kidnapped, or intimidated. that is positive as well. with respect to the government, the senior missed -- ministers, by and large, are very impressive. the vast majority are of what would be termed technocrats. there western-educated with phed's. there are very impressive individuals. you have to operate within a political context, as does

president karzai, with significant constraints. there is a sense that he is omnipotent. he is given very considerable powers compared to other democracies by the constitution, but the fact is that he has to maintain a political foundation that must include, for example, his first vice-president, the no. alliance, and he is constantly having to shore up his political foundation which consists of considerations for both ethnic and sectarian dynamics. then you get into the tribal aspect of that as well. that does come in a sense, but right and left the limits on the road forward for what they can do in certain respects. the senior leaders, again, quite impressive. they will be first to tell you, president karzai will be the first to tell you, that the

challenge of the human capital in the institutions themselves and then there is the challenge of criminal patronage networks as well. he is very forthright about and it truly wants to deal with. with respect to human capital, you have to remember this has suffered through 30 years of war. it was one of the three or four poorest in the world. i think it was understandable. there has been an attraction back to a number of these individuals, but not enough to populate these large institutions, large ministries, to the extent that is necessary by any means. there is the challenge of governmental capacity when it comes to this. i did long conversation with president karzai about this. if we cannot get budget

execution, as you put more money on the budget and remove the parallel institutions, they're doing what governments should be doing for the people. the basic services will not be there. they're going to do all that they can in the years ahead because this is the key to building institutions. there is another issue though. that is the challenge that he and i have agreed to call criminal patronage networks. these are crux, breaking the law -- crooks breaking the law and enjoying criminal protection.

they are not acting as individuals but rather parts of that works. the surgeon general fired after hearing what they were doing. they were replacing them with counterfeit and these types of activities. as this was laid out as a result as an isaf/afghan effort, he fired them on the spot in his version of the mobile office. there are other cases out there like this that will be big tests. the resolution of the troubled bank and so forth -- kabul bank and so forth, the imf, which is hugely important, because you

need the imf going. these are all important efforts. to some degree, these are organizations that are owned and operated by important war lords. it pays their salaries. we contribute to this. he sees rightly as competing with the governmental security forces needed to dig this country forward. we now do have a breach solution as of two or three days ago to take that issue now to be resolved. there are calls for diplomats beyond that as well. they have grown not believe -- not only but in quality.

i do not want to overstate, but this is a hugely challenging endeavor. this is building the greatest play while in flight and being shot at. you are building institutions, not just battalions, but this is about building branch schools and centers, enablers, logistics', artillery, armor, aviation, and military intelligence, military police, all of these are necessary. this is why we judge them ineffective as of yet. we want them to improve as units but that is the focus for

this year and next. there are still challenges with some of the elements. there was frustration, but there is no question that integrity in a culture of service has to be inculcated in these forces. some of the units have really and truly crossed and i can assure you that president karzai and more are very serious about this. the mli have replaced dozens of senior leaders in general because they were either

incompetent or in relative terms and effective because they were corrupt and carrying a corrupt activities. there have been a lot of discussion about july 2011 and i have often noted that july to thousand 11 was a message of urgency. it was a message of enormous commitment and i thought it was inappropriate complement to that. it did in fact create a sense of urgency. the money have the lisbon agreement for 2014, you are then sustained, that complemented the july to thousand 11 and took any concerns that people may have had about july 2011 and heading to the exit rather than being the beginning of the drawdown of

surge forces determined by conditions on the ground. that gives you some sense and the challenges in building capacity, which i think will be the challenges. if we want to achieve the commitment of 50% on budget, there needs to be a much greater conversation at length. it is so important. general caldwell and his team have been truly marvelous work including biting the bullet and doing something which should have done years ago. it is not enough to train

someone to shoot a weapon if they cannot read the serial number off of the weapon or to train a policeman in the basic patrolmen duties are they cannot relieve -- read. it was 6 or so months ago. over 50,000 or 60,000 have actually completed it. they get basic literacy trading. it only gets them to a first grade level, but that as they go to nco development, it goes to third grade and carries on a bigger than get to the afghan national military academy and there were over four applicants for every single slot. a hugely competitive. by the way, they did did nation's progress by numbers and not names so that there could be no linkage of this individual being connected, part of this tribe, or that try. that does not work.

the way ahead for afghanistan has to include the development of human capital. the biggest contribution to that is basic education and this is very heartening to see that there will be 8.2 million afghan children in school compared with less than 1 million under the taliban and 37% of those will be girls compared with and miniscule percentage of the taliban. >> i will package two questions into one. on the afghan forces and then another about the forces. this is essentially alleging that the afghan security forces do not fight. i want to put that bluntly on the table and ask you to respond.

in the leadership you talk about, do they really flight? -- fight? >> they do. what is the best measure of that? it is a macabre measure, but they die. they die in considerably higher numbers than our troopers. i often get asked, ok general. when will the afghans to step up to the plate and take the lead? these are usually imposed in the bowl -- placed in kabul. it is 20% of the country's population and afghan forces are in the lead. we heard president karzai announced the transition and it will be announced on the 22nd. if you drive around, it is not baghdad. one of the early take away as

after taking command is that this place is not on the receiving end of three car bombs per day, as was the case in baghdad in my second month in command there. yes, there are periodic sensational attacks, but they're quite periodic. it has really been quite good. it is the afghan forces. afghan police are on the streets, they are the face of security. it is the afghan special mission units that are on the streets every single night conducting, on average, two or three targeted intelligence driven operations which are coming to be sure, assisted by the u.s. military or a partner or some intelligence agencies. it is the afghan forces during

the knocking on the door, going on the wall, conducting the actual operation with some assistance, as i said, and the relatively small numbers. >> in your testimony, your property of knowledge to -- your appropriately acknowledged. i was glad to hear your town of guarded hopefuless about -- tone of hopefulness. i wondered how much you worry about the counter arguement. they may not have backed away from it. they may not think we both get this done, so there is not too

india friendly a government that will come in next. they will make sure that they are power brokers. how confident are you that pakistan will step up their game against these centuries? >> let me start by saying that i think you hit a key point. very likely, among the most important ways to influence what happens over time in the pakistan is to continue to make progress in afghanistan. if there is the hedging of bets, as you say, in various debates about this and that, it is because there is an uncertainty about how afghanistan will turn out. it is understandable that pakistan will want to have reassurance and that the country

to its west, given how narrow pakistan is in particular, which is often seen as the strategic duff relative from india that it is not, again, a proxy for india or something like that. they will not be just peaceful and stable, but they would be a friend of pakistan rather than antagonistic. i think that is hugely important. it is a reasonable desire on the part of our pakistan the partners. -- pakistani partners. i was at centcom and i remember the enormous challenges. the reserves were running down. the price of oil was spiking. it was the winter 2008. commodity prices were going out -- going up.

i was so worried this had security implement -- implications. danny had been -- then we had the talibani pakistani take over. they had lost thousands of soldiers in an impressive campaign to clear the valley and other areas adn do the same in most of these agencies. this has been very, very tough. they have moved a lot of forces to focus on this effort. they have increased by at least a third of the forces that are out there and taking a number of internal reforms to refigure for

this kind of combat. they have done so very impressively and have sacrificed a great deal. having said that, there is no question. they will be the first to tell you that there are other groups that are causing problems in the region and that do over time have to be dealt with. but it is usually an important that there is a campaign that is putting enormous unprecedented pressure on the sanctuary there. that is a future significance to our partners, our allies in europe and to the homeland. there are these other areas. i think we have often talked about how, over time, pakistan does try to come to grips with this dynamic -- and remember, we funded these curves from the very beginning it is how we are rid of them in the wake of charlie wilson's war. we left. we should remember that. what happens when you disengage?

there are these groups. this is the conundrum of allowing poisonous snakes have invested in your backyard. they will bite the neighbors' kids. sooner or later, they turn around and buy your kid. that is how the punjabi taliban worked. you from some of the settled areas, as the term is, of being radicalized in the tribal areas. this is the kind of challenge in addition to the various political, social, and economic challenges that pakistan faces. this is the kind they're trying to work with. we are working more closely to work and coordinated operations on either side of the border.

we are postured that they come across the border, as we did this past winter and killed a couple dozen of them who were fleeing, as we have conducted operations on our side, we're working to coordinate them said that if they're going to be up near the border, and there was a recent operation in this province that was very important because that was in this place safe haven. that is an operation that is no longer there. >> now over to you and the crowd. >> i will ask you to do some things you are familiar with the. i'm not treat this as a lightning round, you can do a lightning round, but some of these are very good and you will

want to get to as many of them as you can. let me start with one thing you said on capitol hill. this is my question. he said combat troops "could" be included in the july 2011 with a drawl. will they? at what number? if not a significant number to invade that this is a foreseeable end point, would that not undermine what the president promised december 1st? >> would you like the specific unit designation does well, major? >> as the civic is you are prepared to be bank of -- as specific as you are prepared to be. >> we're still looking at the options and i am doing it with a very, very small group of individuals. there are only two other people participating in this. i will deliver it personally to my chain of command and then on to president obama.

we have a variety of criteria, if you will, by which you will assess the different options that we will provide in the course thereof and lead to a recommendation. i have not yet finalized but that recommendation will be. it is very likely that there'll be combat forces in each of those options, but again we are still working our way through that and we have not yet finalized it. >> "the washington post" poll said that 46% to not believe this war is not worth fighting. why are they wrong? >> i was struck by that. as a commander, i am not here to sell war. i am here to report on the situation on the ground and i think that is the responsibility of military commanders. clearly, you have to be aware of the strategic context within your operating and public opinion is a very important

pieceo f it as well as th other -- piece of it as well as the other 47 nations. i tried to remind people of this, it is important to recall, why we went there and why we are still there. it is a vital national security interest that transnational extremists, al qaeda, and others not be able to establish a hold there. >> is afghanistan a teflon country? do you fear the changes you are instituting will not remain after we depart? >> we are not about social and political change. we want to get our afghan partners develop what is right

for that. that is our goal. i have to remind our troopers that this is not about winning the hearts and minds for us. we would love to have the hearts and minds and everyone would like to be loved, but what matters is our afghan partners and we can transition tasks to them so that they are seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people. that is the true measure of success and that is what we are trying to do. we are supporting, certainly, the development of institutions in afghanistan. it literally evolves and there are countervailing forces and there are a lot of people, including speaker policy -- pelosi, speaking about ensuring there is not back sliding. there is a 10% greater number in the afghan parliament and the u.s. congress. there is a constitutional

requirement for that. it does exist. there is a much greater access for elementary schooling for afghan girls, the same school of secondary and college education, but let's remember that it is also a very conservative country particularly in the rural areas. there are dynamics that will be pulled in different directions. our job is to support our afghan partners and not try. >> you think provincial reconstruction teams are properly resources? president karzai wants to disband them. do you agree? >> he is right. parallel institutions have to go away. the half to go away when afghan institutions can be the very important work that provincial reconstruction teams are doing for the afghan people together with a variety of other international governmental organizations, u.s. aid prominent among them. >> two questions along this

line. what is the nature of iran's role and is entirely malignant or are there opportunities? >> what you see with iran in afghanistan is a degree of confection, almost bipolar. you have the security services which have been greatly strengthened in recent years as a result of the supreme leader having to turn to them in such a significant way in the wake of the hijacked elections 1.5 years ago. you have the security services and the islamic revolutionary guard corps providing training and so forth to the afghan taliban and we announced the seizure of the military rockers -- rockets after they were

seized in a special operation. it was not a coincidence that we were there or those elements were there. those rockets are double the range of the 107's we have seen, double the payload, and doubled the radius. that is a big concern. there's also an effort to use soft parts of influence various political figures. at was remarked upon that the chief of staff of president karzai was provided a gift when he left the country saying, "we will take money for anyone who will give it to us and we will put it to use for the afghan people." that happens covertly as well and it happens with various afghan political figures. then there is the use of soft power like cutting off the field to afghanistan a couple of months ago as a reminder of how important access to that is. yet, there is no desire of on behalf of iran to see the afghan

town of them returned to power. -- afghan taliban return to power. they are a shi'ite state. they do not want them going back to power in afghanistan. so you the narcotics industry that has since lived quite a substantial number of young iranians. it is similar interests and to get afghan refugees who have returned to afghanistan in very large numbers in recent years from iran, pakistan, and others, but to get more those home as well. >> i have some questions about the continuing resolution. the stopgap continuing in the stopgap continuing in anyway,