he returned briefly to iraq in january and left after 15 days after he was the object of the assassination. more recently he came back. he appeared alongside a secular shiite and threatened to remove his support from the prime minister and public services did not improve over the next six months. we also have to ask some questions about this relationship. if iran-iraq ties are so close, why is there still no peace treaties between these two countries for the iran-iraq war? why haven't iran paid recreations for the war which iraq started? why is iran still holding on to some aging iraqi fighter jets

flown into iran during the 1991 gulf war? why is iran dumping consumer goods on iraq and hurting iraqi productions? one of the complaints is if you go to a butcher particularly in the south thers butcher will ask you whether you want a sunni chicken or a shiite chicken? [laughter] and the shiite chicken comes from iran and it's blessed by an ayotollah. so this is quite a racket for the iranians. despite these irritants in the irritants, we have seen a panic spread through the sunni iran world about iran's rising profile in iraq and this panic about the shia wave have only gotten worse in back rain over the last weeks and months. we look at iran's relationships with these iran shia, i think

it's cynical and incorrect to say that iran is somehow the instigator of these -- we know very well are there's are grievances particularly on the parts of shia and back rain. and they historically have been scripted against the sunni monarchy. it's interesting also given the hysteria of some of the saudi propaganda, the persian media was devoting any tonings the back rain. this change after the saudis and ore g.c.c. members sent troops into bahrain recently. then iranian state media picked up the cause, but the way in

which they've done it is i don't know if it's terribly helpful for the people in bahrain. the head of the guardian council which is a body that supervised iranian election is the chief friday prayer in teheran. he gave a sermon the other week in which she said that bahrainy should resist the enemy until you die or win. and this is the iranian pattern. they are perfectly happy to fight till the last arab. when we look at iran's relations with the iran nations across the persian gulf -- i would never call it the iran gulf. i apologize to all my iranian friends. when we look at the relations, we see there's a fair amount of variation. while iran has long had very tense relations with saudi

arabia and more recently now with bahrain, it has quite good ties with qatar which it shares a gas field and with oman, which has needuated -- mediated. they helped get one of american hikers that's in jail in iran. iran also historically has good ties with dubai which has a lot of iranian ex-patriot population. and it is still the largest part of iranian imports. it's about $9 billion worth. turkey is taking a lot over the reexport trade but it's still substantial just this last year. is iran the winner? well, obviously iran is benefitling form the increase from oil prices.

but it's still far too soon to say that iran is somehow the great victor of this. in the brief, i compare iran to a porcupine which tries to project an image of bristling strength. in large part to hide the internal vulnerabilities, the soft inner core of the country. the protests have boomeranged. but there have been demonstrations in iran every week since february 14. and the new slogan is "say it ali's turn." the supreme leader of iran. the green movement, you know, it never died.

it was dormant perhaps for a year but it is very much there. and iranians are extremely well aware of what's happening and the west of the region and the government is so terrified of this movement that they have been executing people at a record rate. they recently hauled off the two phenomenal leaders of the movement into detention at an undisclosed location with their wives and in a further sort of candle ballization of the elite they have removed the former president, the pillar of the revolution from a very important post of experts which is a body that's supposed to choose the next supreme leader. these actions narrow the base of support for the government. and it's scholars of iran and there are several in this room know that the more one faction appears to consolidate power in

the country, the more it discipline terse and the more opposition it faces. -- it splinters and the more opposition it faces. he could have been a mediator between the reformist opposition. now i doubt that is going to happen. in terms of winners and losers, this is in the issue brief and i thought i would mention it boozer with seeing new development in the region. i think israel is a bit of a loser. clearly, it is now going to have to be more careful in terms of is behavior as mark mentioned, these new governments that are going to come into power are not going to be as accommodating to israel if it tries to mount

massive attacks on planes -- palestinians or lebanese. still, i think in the longer term, we should be optimistic and more democratic egypt is likely to be a more reliable peace partner than knew bar was. he went to israel once and that was only for a funeral. a more democratic egypt will be more self-confident jim. it can resume leadership role in the region which it has largely given up. it may be in a better position to mediate iran israeli peace or palestinian factions. and in talking about winners and loosers, i think mark mentioned syria where we're seeing -- the

only real winner i see right now from all of this is turkey, which is truly the indispensable nation. it has ties with everyone in the region and internationally as well and just recently got four new york city journalists at its captivity in libya. so it's playing a very important role in this and i would expect that it will continue. all of this uncertainty is likely make iran more risk averse. this is the pattern we've seen over the last few months and actually last few years. iran was unable to complete a confidence building nuclear deal with the united states back in 2009 i think because of the domestic opposition to him. a major reason for it. but there's still one area afghanistan, where there are some overlapping interests and where i think the united states can be more proactive than it

has been. obama has really pivoted from engagement now to containment and sanctions and i think u.s. can be a little more creative in this area. iran has four main goals in afghanistan. one is to keep the taliban from completely taking over again, even though it plays a double or triple gain and give some support to taliban, it doesn't want taliban in the country. second is the extend the flow of drugs which has made iran the most addicted country in the world. a third is to do something about the sunni area which feeds a sunni in iran's own beluche area. and finally, iran wants the united states to withdraw is troops from afghanistan although i would think they would be prepared to have some limits provided there's assurance this

would not be used as base that the united states could attack iran. some of these issues are already being explored. there was a track that explored in meetings and the iranian participants said they wanted to see a increased role for the united nations and the establishment of a core group to discuss afghanistan. similar to the bond groups that help set up the first government in afghanistan after the overthrow of the tal pan and the sixes through two meetings that were held in the 1990's among iran's neighbors plus russia and the united states. it's also worth remembering that these types of discussions provided cover for bilateral u.s. talks. the top u.n. representatives in afghanistan has convened ambassadors from united states, iran, and other regional players in what he calls the "silkwood"

initiative. he did this this year. it was a first couple of meeting. since 2005 and the first time the american representative in kabul have sat in the same room at the iranian dip accurate in kabul. earlier this week, he said he like to have a meeting in istanbul. turkey again, later this year, and then there's supposed to be a meeting to mark the 10th anniversary of the bond conference which gave us the karzai government. the u.n. is also facilitating talks by afghan by karzai's high peace council and these are good initiatives. there's a new report that's come out from the century fund on negotiations for afghanistan, the way forward and in addition to recommending the selection of an international facilitator for peace talks among afghans, it

also recommends regional diplomacy and it recommends bilateral u.s.-iran dialogue on afghanistan. if iran is going to be playing a more constructive role in afghanistan, it's going to expect something in return and this is the tricky part that the ambassador mentioned. can the united states continue to put pressure on iran over its nuclear program and still offer iran something to be -- behave in a more constructive manner in afghanistan? i think one of the answers is transit trade through iran from afghanistan and central asia. it should be encouraged, not discouraged and there's a question of energy pipelines through iran. this is a controversial topic in afghanistan. this is something that's been discouraged but if we want help to central asian countries it would seem that the more routes from central asia to the -- the

more ways in which trades can go to india thailand, the better. this is the dilemma the united states is going to have to deal with. pakistan right now is far more unstable than iran is and if you want to benefit to central agency, you should keep that in mind. we are in somewhat similar situation as to the situation we had with the old soviet union. engagement doesn't have to be a zero sum gain for every issue they're on. iran will change. if there's anything we've learned from the middle east over the last few weeks is that government can change and i think it's important to begin to lay the ground work for a better relationship with iran because iran will change. and if we can make some progress on this issue of afghanistan it may be easier to talk to iran about nuclear issues and human rights and other issues that we

care about in the region. so i will stop there and we will be happy to take your question. >> thank you barbara. that was excellent. let me kind of ask the first question based on what's happening now in libya and implications for what's happening in libya for iran. i would think that the regionally backed natea operations would give iran pause. is that a fair assessment? >> you know, this is an interesting case because iran actually has had a relationship with gaddafi. most people probably don't remember this, but when libya brought down pan am 103, there was a series that this was actually a hit against the united states in retaliation for bringing down the iranian airliner during the iran-iraq war with the losses of many iranian lives. originally, the iranians asked a palestinian faction to do it and

they were discovered by the germans. i believe it was the pslpgc and it was then sub cracked to gaddafi. so iran and -- they are not happy to see a nato-led intervention against a dictator in the middle east. this is a frightening prospector them. at the same time, i'm afraid that it may make them redouble their efforts to get nuclear weapons. there's been a lot of commentary as to what's koreans are saying the gaddafi was a fool to give up his nukes in tweet because that's made him vulnerable now.

it's part of an unsettled picture that has to make the iranians worry. i mean, if it comes out well, if gaddafi is overthrown and peace is restored, i think it actually works to the u.s. and western advantage and it may help those in iran who would like to see a negotiated resolution differences with the united states and the international community. >> ok. thank you. yes, sir? >> thank you very much, mark. thank you very much also for an update on this evolving situation. probably perfect to have a journalist doing it. you've got deadlines week by week, i would think in the region. my question relates to a conclusion to task force drew in the first paper which i think was in november, and it was that iran might have the best chance in the region to be a durable democracy and i'm wondering if you could provide a little color

on that. what led to those conclusions or that conclusion? >> actually, i just came from an event the carnegie endowment where the iranian ambassador -- sorry, the italian ambassador for iran for five years spoke and iran, yes when the day comes that the regime changes in iran, i think iran will be much better positioned frankly to become a stable democracy than a lot of the iran countries where we're seeing regime change right now. why do i say that? it's because of the educational level country, more than 80% literacy, which far exceeds that certainly in egypt. it's a history of seeking representative democracy that goes back more than 100 years. iran had a constitutional

revolution in 19 06 that brought about the first -- 19 06 that brought about the first parliament in the middle east. the revolution in 1979 had a lot of democratic elements but it was hijacked by the religious extremists and many iranians certainly would like to see a change in that. we've had these civic democratic evolution. if you look at iran, the evolution of civil society in that country began after hamani died in 1989. all of these different interesting philosopher. -- philosophers. we had the upset election in 1997. he eased the hand of the state on the iranian people. and what we've seen really since

2005 and especially since 2009 has been a reversion to a more authoritarian kind of system. and i just don't think it's sustainable in iran. so yes, democracy could work in iran perhaps better than anywhere else in the region. >> yes, sir. >> my question is that now, i just came from the press relation from the state department white house and a lot of things as you know, senator, in the white house and step. -- where is it going to stop? do you think it's going to go to china because chinese people are also waiting for the waves of this tsunami to reach on their homeland for a better life and human rights and rule of life and democracy, and religious freedom and oppressed freedom.

and also nato is now going to play a role in libya. and now they are fighting in afghanistan. can they do this without humans on the ground and or the forces on the ground and libya? thank you. >> well, i will began and hand it off very quickly. i think your question, your last question about essentially boots on the ground is an area that to some extent suffered a gauge cover two weeks ago in testimony on capitol hill. but i would go back to more basic question than that. what's the objective? or what's the point? what's the purpose? over plight? ok. then with gaddafi still in power or with him out of power? there seems to be some confusion about that.

"washington post" led with a headline today about clarity. it is a pretty critical dimension for any democracy when you commit troops and essentially as exactly gates said in his testimony, we are engaged in an active war. not just the united states but the nags who have participated from nato with us are engaged in war. now, then what is the essential objective of that? is it the regime change? is it to live with gaddafi? is it to fight libra? and that's where you have to start before you can get to the next set of questions. you mentioned china. and i'll let the professor handle that sense he has just arrived fresh from analysis and he noted a couple of observations about that and i know the ambassador probably have a comment or two and barbara. if it's ok, let me ask mark to

respond and then anyone else here. >> can i suggest that we not diverge into tchine? we've got a very clear focus. let's spend the time on this. >> but i think though that it does connect into what you were saying about china thinking thoughts that they have about what's going on. but i think your question is relevant. >> i will be very quick and brief here. china is worried about two things. first of all, any kind of contagion in the form of popular upheaval transfering from the middle east to china and you can see stories in the papers showing the steps the chinese government is taking to control any step toward popular dissent. there's a real explosion in the middle east.

they deep care over in china and korea about the democratic movement in the middle east, but it's because where they get their energy resources. iran is the third largest supplier of oil to china. and that's the concern. they want a continuity in terms of their own economy and they want stability in the global economy. >> i think i will pass on that and just stick to iran. >> one quick question. >> exactly gates is saying something different what you said what exactly clinton and president obama said today and yesterday ever since that mr. gaddafi must leave. >> well, i think as the ambassador noted, we're here to talk about iran and not gaddafi. how he fit spoose the larger scope is ok, but i think we should go on to some other questions. >> ok. yes, sir. right there. >> my name is walter injure

rassic. chuck hagel mentioned a very important one which is understanding the difference and we have a problem today friend, tomorrow, enemy because of misunderstanding of the difference. in order to turn of friends to -- i mean, to turn enemies to your friends. and i have a very interesting book which father of macroit. in the book, if anybody can read and give you the idea what is the problem in the war. it is a fascinating book to read explanation --

>> walter, we have many questions. we will need a question. >> is there a question? >> the question is what can be done so we can understand the differences between cultural lidge, and political, between iran and united states. >> [laughter] that could be an entire issue brief on its own. i think we have a lot of affinities with iran. that's one of the reasons i wrote a book about it. and anybody who's gone to the country know that americans are more popular there than south asia because of the afintis. iran is a deeply religious country, spiritual country, but it's not a very thee accuratic one. -- theocratic one. this real or base for democracy.

the women's movement has been very strong there. women have been at the forefront for a lot of demonstrations and civil society. it is prime to go in a different direction. but the two governments have been fighting each other for 32 years and unfortunately, the current government appears to see -- with the united states as a pillar of its survival. it has to have an enemy, it has to have a scapegoat and that's a big problem and it's going to be very difficult to overcome. >> thank you. right next. yeah. >> thank you very much. i came from poland just today i realize there is a meeting, so thank you very much. i'm very glad to be here and to listen to this wonderful presentation. i have two very brief questions regarding iran. first one is that you've mentioned about the possible spreading of the revolution in the middle east to iran, but

when i think about what i call or maybe somebody call before me, the faithful revolution they indeed in fact, they started in iran after their last few elections. so do you think we should find the beginning of those revolutions in this process and during the last presidential elections in iraq? and the second question is concerned with the change and balance of power in the iran league? do you think that those revolutions that take place now in the region, they will affect the balance of power in iran league and their attitude towards iran in the future? thank you very much. >> very good questions, both of them. yeah, i have written at 2009 and the demonstrations that took place in iran really if you wanted trace back, that's the beginning. the iranian government tries to say that all these are in 1979

which is ridiculous. 2009 was facebook. it was cell phone, cameras, you know, catching the demonstrators and people being beaten and killed though streets of teheran. and in fact, some of the organizers of the demonstrations in tunisia and egypt have said that they communicated through facebook with iranians and learned some techniques in terms of how to organize facebook to get some these interfadas started. you're right. i haven't thought about the realinement on the iran league and this is not a strong organization for years. it's been kind of a joke. if you have more democratic stronger governments that could mean a more vigorous iran league. i was really surprised that they all agreed on this intervention in libya. i thought that was really something because you might not have seen that in the past and

in terms of relationships with iran, this is again, you know, some people are very worried about egypt. egypt may restore -- egypt let two iranian relationships go through the suze candle. -- canal. there will be for smuggling to whens into gaza. there's no way they're going to let iran spread its influence across the persian gulf. we have the united states with all its myriad military independence speculations. the u.s. is not retreating east of the suze like the -- suez like the british did. i don't think we should be concerned that iran is suddenly going to have great friends in the region. we have the sunni-shia divide.

we have the iran-persia divide. so i think that's an exaggerated concern. >> steven. >> one comment and one question. the comment is that i believe that iran is going to be the loser in all of this turmoil primarily because of egypt. egypt has sort of not existed on the international scene for 30 years. and that's not going to be the case no matter who is involved in running the government there. if it's an old representative, it will provide an alternative place to focus discontent in the sense that they did it, they got there, we don't want to go like the iranians did to get the -- that's the comment. question is we just completed a study of the opposition in iran. and what emerges is that it's an indelible part of the society. it is in fact a social part --

part of the social structure and goes back all the way to the revolution where there are dem democrats and urbans and all of that. they're not going to be strong enough to overthrow the government and any real change that takes place has got to come from some insider who can reach out to them. and i'm interested from your comment. >> well, i certainly agree with the fact that the opposition has been a permanent feature of iran, not to say the islamic republic for a very young time. i'm not so sure how the change will come. i think there's a tremendous power in the green movement and the fact that it is in a sense leaderless because you can't decapitate it. every iranian is potentially a member of the green movement. a lot will depend on whether the members of the military, particularly the irgc remain

loyal to the regime. there will be a transition point. a lot of people have tremendous hopes invested in hatami but it was the supreme leader who prevented them from becoming a ayotollah gorbachev. you need one perhaps and that could come with the next supreme leader. i just think that given the demographics 70% of the population under the age of 30, they don't remember the shaw given the education level and so on, eventually, this is just going to have to evolve. for iranian's sakes, i hope it will be peaceful. but this regime is not going to remain in power for another 20 years. i would venture that within the next five to 10 years, we will see a change. >> yes, sir? >> actually, the man in front of you and it will go to you. yeah.

>> thank you. barbara, i particularly enjoyed your comments but i have to take issue. as someone back to washington by my boss -- then boss, bill richardson for being misquoted at chatham house by an iranian stringer who said that the united states government wanted pipelines to go through iran. i take issue with the idea that we should encourage multiple pipeline routes through iran. i really think that that attitude has not changed. i'm giving a talk next week on turkey as an energy bridge and the need to reduce dependence on russia is the key to the pipelines going through turkey for example. i would be interested from your reaction. >> yeah. well, you know, we've been through this back the 1990's and i go with charean hunter on this.

she's written an excellent book on iranian foreign policy, recent foreign policy. i believe that u.s. administrations, success of the dem croatians democratic and republic have made a big mistake by giving iran no assets to jeopardize. if the united states had been willing to allow iran to have pipelines back in the 1990's, if the united states have been willing to allow conoco to take that deal with iran back in the 1990's, wrong we would have the hostile relationship we have with iran today. should we continue this pattern because of the nuclear issue? if we want to get -- to end the russian no monopoly, if we want afghanistan to be prosperous, i think we do have to end this policy of blocking iran from having pipelines trying to

discourage transit trade, you know, the late richard holbrook was so proud of the fact that he had gotten a agreement from pakistan to india. well, there should be routes that go there. it's in everybody's interest. i would refer people to fred star at johns hopkins sites. he's written extensively about the silk road. everybody can belt. turkey can benefit. all of the countries along the old silk road. >> this is one area where trance force is not unanimous. i have a great expect for barbara and the work she's done here. i think this this would be absolutely the wrong time to send that signal. iran is doing everything it can now to try to find ways around the increasingly effective sanctions that's starting to bite. this is whereas i sit in my opening remarks there's a

tension between the need to engage with iran, find areas of cooperation like afghanistan and still keep up a very strong front. i think if we were to send a signal now that we want to encourage pipeline to iran, it would be a strong signal. >>[inaudible] >> no. i'm not talking about encouraging. i'm just talking about no longer blocking others from doing this. india, for example, pakistan. obviously, the united states, we have laws that forbid it now. very, very strick laws on the books. but we should stop, you know encouraging others. >> we can't have it both ways on a nuclear issue. we really in my opinion are facing and i think the opinion of others. we're in a real crossroads. question of whether or not the sanctions will be effect testify enough and send a strong enough signal and hurt enough to deter iran from progressing on its program.

you know we face a potential threat and of either accepting a nuclear ram and going to a deterrent mode or having a military confrontation either with ourselves or with the israelis. i think between now and whenever that time is that we have to hopefully avoid that, face it, we need to have the strongest front possible with our allies with other countries, with india and others who are finding ways in which to engage on oil and get around some of the sanctions. so again, maybe this is a good long term policy but until we have a, you know, more definitive cooperative relationship on imposing sanctions and seeing if they work, i guess i'm sorry for -- in one area disagree. >> i would just offer one additional point on this. i'm not sure that we should be stuck in an either-or kind of

situation here. i don't know really, i speak only for myself obviously here, but i don't know when we've had real strategic thinking in our united states government foreign policy. now that may sound a little harsh for some, but why aren't we broadening the framework here of options and creativity and taking advantage of the realities as they are? i think one of the possibilities it could fall out of this new dynamic in the north africa, middle east, central asia that's occurring which i think is a very clear 21st century example of manifestation of great power limb limitations. -- limitations. if it is not happening now it is not -- something's going to happen here. it's happening now.

there will be some fallout here and some stabilization. won't be perfect, won't be everywhere. we should be creative in our strategic interest in connecting different ways, different thinking that maybe we haven't thought about and i think we do a great disservice to our country, our people who we are. i think we're better than this. when we lock ourselves into down to either this or either this and i don't think the world's that simple today. i don't know if it ever has been. the world is complicated interconnected and combustible and adjustments are going to be required like never before in human history. >> yes, sir? >> barbara concerning the -- your thought about perhaps overlapping interests between u.s. and iran and afghanistan, you know, before 2007, there were a lot of analysts this in this city talked about our

perceived overlapping interest in iraq and iraqi stability. in 2007 and 2008, we found out that the iranians' goal of expelling us from iraq trumped all other interests and they were willing to risk instability in iraq in order to accomplish that and to break up shia unity. so i'm wondering now as i look at your list of four iranian interests in afghanistan, it seems to me in having just come recently from being on the ground in afghanistan that again, their interest in expelling us from afghanistan trump these other three and trump them quite traumatically. so why would we think then that we could come to some sort of meeting of the minds on these other three when they are -- it seems to me, on the track again at willing to back a militant faction for these purposes of expelling us? thanks. >> thank you for the question. the united states wants to get out of afghanistan.

in july, if president obama is to be believed we're going to start bringing back some of the combat troops that were part of the surge. there is a process. this is a year for dip crask surge as well. exactly of state clinton has said so as well. there's going to be a political settlement and a wider regional and international framework for that settlement. the united states doesn't want to keep 100,000 troops in afghanistan forever more than it wants to keep 100,000 troops in iraq forever. so i think it is possible to work with them on this. and some of these other goals are important. i would note that the u.s. hasn't been doing much on the narcotics front lately and the iranians are very re-sentful of

that because that's where a lot of drugs they're wining up. i would see that there are some quid pro quos there. if the united states is willing to be a little bit creative. we have all these demands that we always place on iran. it's always iran's fault and we never look at our own actions. i mean, we are now surrounding iran. we have toppled two governments. we have american troops on either side of them. we have american troops in the persian gulf and, you know, we act as though iran is not supposed to be alarmed or concerned or to do anything to hedge is bets. -- its bets. we need to look a little bit through its eyes as well. if we want to be able to get out of there, then we need to address iranian vest also. >> yes. in the way back. >> i also have a question about engaging the iranians in a

discussion about afghanistan for you, barbara. and that is with the green movement, you know, just now hoping to benefit from these up risings, what do you have to say about the timing of trying to engage the iranians on afghanistan. wouldn't that run the risk of undermining the movement which we're trying to encourage? >> i don't think so at all. with the old soviet union, you know, president reagan met with dissidence. he called to bring down the ber len wall and all the rest and we negotiated at the same time with the russians over arms control. absolutely not. what we have to do at the same time and what obama and clinton and others are doing is we have to stress human rights constantly in regard to iran. i think human rights is more important than the human issue because iran is not going to give up its nuclear program but you can really make some embarrass, the u.n. has now named a special repertoire on human rights which is terrific.

president obama gave a ruse to iranians he named political prisoners by name and talked about human rights. we can walk and chew gum at the same time. there's no problem in doing both. >> let me also add another dimension to this which is another dimension on reality. you have the gallup poll with the people in afghanistan. i don't think that's going to be reversed. those numbers are going to continue to go in the direction of get out for a lot of reasons budget, so on. seems to me that we're going to have to continue to play all these factors into the real the of what we want, focusing on our strengths, focusing on where we have something to use as diplomatic leverage, factoring our instrument offense power into some common purpose, allies, relationships, the political reality of budgets of

what we've done to our fore structure in the pentagon over 10 years of war, so on and so on. regardless of what your position is and did we go in or was it the right thing to go into iraq or not? that's passed. the reality is we are where we are. the only question is where do we go from here just like in libya or anywhere else. and i think within the context of all this, there's some real possibilities, some new possibility that is going to force us into some new areas of thinking. last point i would make here and this is a raging debate and always and should be debated. but i've always believed that engagement is not appeasement. engagement is not weakness. how else are you going to get to, again, what's the objective? you want to go to war with iran? that's certainly an option. i'm not so sure how much stomach the american people have for that or any of our allies have for that. it may be that's the only

resolution, i mean, i don't know. but it seems to me we got to think down the road, what happens next? what happens next? where are we going in what's the point of this? can't we be a little smarter than how we're doing some of these things? we got to go back and question every past frame of reference, every past reference point in dealing with the iranians or any of these issues. and again, i don't see that as a weakness where a lot of people do. the political reality is going to dictate a certain amount of this, a certain amount of it and anyone really believe that the republican nomination for president, those debates that are actually starting now, you saw what haley barber said the other day and mitch daniels that this is not going to be a central piece of the republican presidential prime rich. ain't going to be budgets. what candidate disagrees about the budget, let's cut spending, let's get this deficit under control. let's have a smaller government. yes, yes, yes. but where the differences are is

foreign policy. and we're going to get a very thorough airing of this and we haven't had that for a long time. we've got to get out in front of this and we have the capacity to do that. >> yes? >> gaining nuclear capable has been a central aspiration of the iranians for a long time also before the 1979 revolution. do you have an impression, barbara, about how news of japan sinks into one of the most seismically active country in the world? it's a good question. a lot of my iranian friends have been very afraid about the brashear. -- brashear reactor. i had one friend tell me it's such a hodgepodge of technology. the germans started it in the 1970's and you have chinese bits, russian bits that they're afraid if you plug it in you're

afraid the whole thing's beginning to to blow up anyway. now you have japan. it's a very cautionary tale for the iranians. you notice brashear as that -- has not opened. i would bet that it's going to be a while before that reactor starts up if it ever does and if they don't have a functioning nuclear power plant, why do they need all these lower enriched uniform for? -- uranium for? that's in favor as well as all the other problems that's going on, the assassinations of nuclear scientists and so on. it definitely could be a factor in suggesting that they might slow down. i don't think they're going to give up their determination to have a program and to say that they have a right to the program. that's a nationalistic issue. that's not going to go away. >> but that's a lesson not just for iran but for the entire middle east given the discussion

on proliferation of civilian nuclear activity. >> it could be a great counterproliferation. i mean, it's a horrible cost and one feels terrible for the japanese but it could be really good in terms of all these other countries that supposedly want nuclear power. >> yes, sir? right there. yes. >> my question's for you ms. slaven. slavin. don't you think pakistan would have more influence and iran being more sympathetic to palestinian causes wouldn't iran have more support in those areas, syria lebon and gulf iran countries? even though they're both iran? >> yes, pakistan has more of an influence certainly over the taliban as we know, they've given safe thivene the afghanistan taliban but you also

-- iran has considerable influences as well. 20% of afghanistan speak a version of farci. you have a substantial shia population. and in iran as well. a lot of cultural links and even among -- this goes all the way through pakistan and india and the poet that one thinks of as native somehow, even all the way to turkey, really, thinks somebody like rumi or afghans they will quote hafeds to you. they do have an important influence and as joe rayburn pointed out, they spoiler role. iran has historically been a spoiler. that's how it gets back at the rest of the world for isolating it since the revolution and you want to minimize their motivation to play the spoiler in afghanistan. in terms of the palestinian issue, you know, the gulf states

also, they give lip service to the palestinian cause, sometimes more than that. no, this is iran's way of exerting asymmetric power. part of it is through the co religion ties and it's a way to show that you can't ignore iran. you ignore iran, they're going to get back at you through their support for hamas hezbollah. it's the iran states now become more supportive of palestinians, egypt in particular, then perhaps iran will be less trovelt the palestinian cause. that's another way to look at it. this is a true marriage of convenience. hamas iuzzini. they don't love iran. no arabs love iran but they take is money. they use each other. do >> following up on that, could you talk a little bit more about

how what's happening in bahrain intercepts with the iranians because of course there, you have a popular movement on the shiite island of bahrain being repressed by the saudis helping the bahrainan ruling family. if you could talk a little bit more about what's happening there, that would be great. >> if the 1980's, there were iranian efforts to subvert the situation in bahrain and kuwait and eastern saudi arabia. iran was in a revolutionary mode and it was a way to get back at these countries because the iran-iraq war because the iran were supporting saddam hussein. but in more recent years, that hasn't been the case and i think that the bahrains and shias have gone out of their way to insist they are patriotic bahrainies. they don't want bahrain on their side.

they wanteded parliament that represents their views. and it is absolutely cynical for the bahrainies and the saudis anders to call this somehow an iranian plot. would iran take advantage of it? yes, of course. but i mentioned the sermon. he will fight to the last iran. he will encourage the bahrainies to die if they can't win. but you're not going to see a single iranian soldiers. you'll see iranian intelligence agents. there is a very big divide between the iran shia and the persian shia. people should understand that this is an ethnic clash that goes back centuries and if you've ever met arabs in iran and ask them about their treatment, do you know there are no sunni mosques in iran? it's not allowed. if you talk to the shia arabs in iran, if you talk to the ethnic irans, they are treated very

poorly. so if this is -- this is not a relationship that is made in heaven by any chance, even though there may be some shia who follows some ayotollah -- most bahrainy shias follow the runs from iraq. >> and we'll take one more question. if there is one from the audience. and let me close with this final question. the administration is wrestling with how to channel the popular will that's been expressed in middle east in a democratic direction and in certain ways, despite the reference to models elsewhere in the world, it's a case of first impression. what advice would you offer the administration as it wrestles with that question and to -- how should it develop policies that it's consistent with that goal and our goals in terms of changing iran?

>> wow. [laughter] um, in terms of iran, again, i mentioned human rights, emphasize human rights very, very strongly, but also continue to reach out to the iranian government over the nuclear issue, over afghanistan. put the onus on iran to reject negotiations. don't, you know, totally pivot to sanctions and containment. we've done very well on that front. but i think the u.s. should also be constantly looking for possible avenues for dialogues with iran, especially as we see all these develop developments and regis. there are going to be people who will be looking for if not a resolution of the differences with the united states, at least to lay the groundwork for the day when that regime changes and it will change. >> thank you. thank you, barbara, that was excellent and thank you, senator hagel. your

[applause] >> thank you.

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>> i am a numbers guy. >> charles blow expresses his opinions using charts and graphs. >> for me, the data comes first. i don't decide that i'm going to talk about a subject and then go out and look for data. i really do search for data first and see if it said something interesting and something that kind of agrees within an opinion that i have or confirms something or sometimes it surprises me and i think would surprise my readers. >> "q&a" on c-span. .