no-fly zone to stop the regime's attacks from the air and further authorized all necessary measures to protect the libyan people. people. 10 days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the international community offered gaddafi a final chance to stop his campaign of killing or face the consequences. rather than stand down, his forces continued their advance, bearing down on the city of benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women, and children who sought their freedom from fear. at this point, the united states and the world faced a choice. gaddafi declared he would show no mercy to his own people. he compared them to rats and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment.

in the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets and kill over 1000 people in a single day. now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. we knew that if we waited one more day, benghazi would suffer -- a city nearly the size of charlotte would suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. it was not in our national interest to let that happen. i refused to let that happen. and so nine days ago, after consulting with bipartisan leadership of congress, i authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce u.n. security council resolution 1973. we struck forces approaching

benghazi to save that city and the people within it. we hit gaddafi's troops in a neighboring city allowing forces to drive them out. we targeted tanks and military assets that had been choking off towns and cities and we cut off much of their source of supply. and tonight, i can report that we have stopped gaddafi's deadly advance. in this effort, the united states has not acted alone. instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition. this includes our closest allies, nations like the united kingdom, france, canada, denmark, norway, italy, spain, greece, and turkey, all of whom have fought by our side for decades.

and it includes arab partners like qatar and the united arab emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the libyan people. to summarize them, in just one month, the united states has worked with our international partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secured an international mandate to protect civilians, stopped an advancing army, prevented a massacre, and established a no- fly zone with our allies and partners. to lend some perspective on how rapidly this military and diplomatic response came together, when people were being brutalized in bosnia in the 1990's, it took the international community over a year to intervene with airpower to protect civilians. it took us 31 days. moreover, we have accomplished these objectives consistent

with a pledge that i made to the american people at the outset of our military operations. i said that america's role would be limited, that we would not put ground troops into libya, that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation, and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners. tonight, we are fulfilling that pledge. our most effective alliance, nato, has taken command of the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no-fly zone. last night, nato decided to take on the additional responsibility of protecting libyan civilians. this transfer from the united states to nato will take place on wednesday. going forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting civilians on the ground will transition to our allies and partners, and i am fully confident that our coalition will keep the

pressure on gaddafi's remaining forces. in that effort, the united states will play a supporting role, including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications. because of this transition to a broader, nato base coalition, the risks and costs of this operation to our military and to american taxpayers will be reduced significantly. so for those who doubted our capacity to carry out this operation, i want to be clear. the united states of america has done what we said we would do. that is not to say that our work is complete. in addition to our nato responsibilities, we will work with the international community to provide assistance to the people of libya who need

food for the hungry and medical care for the wounded. we will safeguard the more than $33 billion that was frozen from the gaddafi regime so that is available to rebuild libya. after all, the money does not belong to gaddafi or to us, it belongs to the libyan people. we will make sure they receive it. tomorrow, secretary clinton will go to london where she will meet with the libyan opposition and consult with more than 30 nations. these discussions will focus on what kind of political effort is necessary to pressure gaddafi while supporting a transition to the future that the libyan people deserve. while our military mission is narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a libya that belongs not to a dictator but to its people. now, despite the success of our efforts over the past week, i

know that some americans continue to have questions about our efforts in libya. gaddafi has not yet stepped down from power, and until he does, libya will remain dangerous. moreover, even after he does leave power, 40 years of tyranny has left libya fractured and without strong civil institutions. the transition to a legitimate government that is responsive to the libyan people will be a difficult task. while the united states will do our part to help, it will be a task for the international community, and more importantly, a task for the libyan people themselves. in fact, much of the debate in washington has put forward a false choice when it comes to libya. on the one hand, some question why america should intervene at all, even in limited ways, in this distant land. they argue that there are many

places in the world where innocent civilians face brutal violence at the hands of their government, and america should not be expected to police the world. particularly when we have so many pressing needs here at home. it is true that america cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. given the cost and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. but that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what is right. in this particular country, libya, at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. we had the unique ability to stop that violence, an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of arab countries, and a plea for help from the libyan

people themselves. we also had the ability to stop gaddafi's forces in their tracks without putting american troops on the ground. to brush aside america's responsibility as a leader and more profoundly, our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. the united states of america is different. as president, i refuse to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action. moreover, america has an important strategic interest in preventing gaddafi from overrunning those who oppose

him. a massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across libya's borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful yet fragile transitions to egypt and tunisia. the democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship. as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the way to power. the writ of the united nations security council would have been shown to be weak, crippling that institution's future credibility to uphold global peace and security. while i will never minimize the costs involved in military action, i am convinced that a failure to act in libya would have carried a far greater price for america. just as there are those who

have argued against intervention in libya, there are others who have suggested that we broaden our military mission beyond the task of protecting the libyan people and do whatever it takes to bring down gaddafi and usher in a new government. of course, there is no question that libya and the world would be better off with gaddafi out of power. i, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means. but broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake. the task that i assigned our forces, to protect the libyan people from immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone, carries with it a un mandate and international support. it is also what the libyan opposition asked us to do. if we tried to overthrow gaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter.

we would likely have to put u.s. troops on the ground to accomplish that mission, or risk killing many civilians from the air. the danger posed to our men and women in uniform would be far greater. so would the cost and our share of the responsibility for what comes next. to be blunt, we went down that road in iraq. thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our troops and the determination of our diplomats, we are hopeful about iraq and their future, but regime change there took eight years, thousands of american and iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. that is not something we can afford to repeat in libya. as the bulk of our military effort ratchets down, what we can do, and we will do, is

support the aspirations of the libyan people. we have intervened to stop the massacre, and we will work with our allies and partners to maintain the safety of civilians. we will deny the regime arms, cut off its supplies of cash, assist the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when gaddafi leaves power. it may not happen overnight. a badly weakened gaddafi is trying desperately to hang on to power. it should be clear to those around him and to every libyan that history is not on gaddafi's side. with the time and space that we have provided for the libyan people, they will be able to determine their own destiny. that is how it should be. i will close by addressing what this action says about the use

of america's military power and america's broader leadership in the world under my presidency. as commander-in-chief, i have no greater responsibility than keeping this country safe, and no decision weighs on me more than when to deploy our men and women in uniform. i have made it clear that i will never hesitate to use our military swiftly, decisively, and unilaterally when necessary to defend our people, our homeland, our allies, and our core interests. that is why we are going after al qaeda wherever they seek a foothold. that is why we continue to fight in afghanistan, even as we have ended over combat mission in iraq and removed more than

100,000 troops from that country. there will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and our values are. sometimes the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common humanity and our common security. responding to natural disasters, for example, or preventing genocide and keeping the peace. ensuring regional security and maintaining the flow of commerce. these may not be america's problems alone, but they are important to us. there are problems worth solving. in these circumstances, we know that the united states will often be called upon to help. in such cases, we should not be afraid to act, but the burden of action should not be america's alone. as we have in libya, our task is instead to mobilize the

international community for collective action, because contrary to the claims of some, american leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all of the burden ourselves. real leadership creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well, to work with allies and partners so that they pay their share of the cost and bear their share of the burden. and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by all. that is the kind of leadership we have shown in libya. of course, even when we act as part of a coalition, the risk of any military action will be high. those risks were realized when one of our planes malfunctioned over in libya. yet when one of our airmen parachuted to the ground in a

country whose leader has so often demonized the united states, in a region that has such a difficult history with our country, this american did not -- he was met by people who embraced him. one young libyan who came to his aide said we are your friends. we are so grateful to those men who are protecting the skies. his voice is just one of many in a region where a new generation is refusing to be denied their rights and opportunities any longer. yes, this change will make the world more complicated for a time. progress will be uneven, and change will come differently to different countries. there are places like egypt where this change will inspire us and raise our hopes, and then there will be places like

iraq where change is fiercely suppressed. the dark forces of civil conflict and sectarian war will have to be averted, and difficult political and economic concerns will have to be addressed. the united states will not be able to dictate the pace and scope of this change, only the people of the region can do that. but we can make a difference. i believe that this movement of change cannot be turned back, and that we must stand alongside those who believe in the same core principles that have guided us through many storms. our opposition to violence directed at one's own people. our support of a set of universal rights including the

freedom for people to express themselves and choose their leaders, our support for governments that are ultimately responsive to the aspirations of the people. born as we are out of a revolution by those who longed to be free, we welcome the fact that history is on the move in the middle east and north africa, and that young people are leading the way, because wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the united states. notably, it is that faith, those ideals, that are the true measure of american leadership. my fellow americans, i know that we are at a time of upheaval overseas. the news is filled with conflict and change. it can be tempting to turn away from the world, and as i have said before, our strength

abroad is anchored in our strength here at home. that must always be our north star, the ability of our people to reach their potential, to make wise choices with our resources, to enlarge the prosperity that serves as a wellspring for our power, and to live the values that we hold so dear. but let us also remember that for generations, we have done the hard work of protecting our own people as well as millions around the world. we have done so because we know that our own future is safer and brighter if more of mankind can live with the bright light of freedom and dignity. tonight, let us give thanks to the americans who are serving through these trying times, and the coalition that is carrying

our efforts forward. let us look to the future with confidence and hope, not only for our own country, but for all those yearning for freedom around the world. thank you, god bless you, and may god bless the united states of america. thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> tomorrow government officials talk about the situation at

japan's ailing nuclear power plant. live coverage from the senate energy committee at 10:00 eastern here on c-span. over on c-span3, a senate hearing on protecting the civil rights of muslim americans. tom perez is a witness. it also starts at 10:00 a.m. eastern. >> as protests continue in the middle east and is nato starts to take control of military operations in libya, find the latest on the administration officials and the reactions from world leaders from the c-span video library, all searchable on your computer anytime. watch what you want when you want. >> now the implications of what is happening in libya for the u.s. among the panelists, paul

wolfowitz. he says the u.s. needs to engage the libyan opposition more. this took place before president obama's speech on libya. from the american enterprise institute, this is about 90 minutes. >> we have a sense at the moment of being in the middle of a great historical world when. we are being taken somewhere, and few of us are certain about where we are going to land.

the president is going to address the nation tonight on the war in libya. and none of us are quite sure what it is that he is going to say, but many have a lot of hope that he he will express a clear sense of what the united states hopes to achieve, what our goals are, what our plans are for the future, and how we see libya hitting into the broader question of the revolution's going on, even as we sit here today, throughout the middle east continuing to spread throughout syria, yemen, bahrain, and elsewhere. an enormous amount going on. difficult for even seasoned experts to stay at top -- on top of. tomorrow the international community will meet in london to discuss many of the same

questions. presidents are cozy and prime minister cameron is a statement saying they wanted to gather the international community together to talk about how best to relate to a libya not led by muammar gaddafi. how best to help the opposition, and what the international community could do beyond the no-fly zone that is in place. i think that part of the problem that many of us see is that there is confused leadership coming from the united states, a sense that the president is not really willing to lead on this matter, has been pressed by others in detecting a four- leaning position that was not a position of his choice. and the president deeply eager to pass this responsibility on

to others, perhaps slightly, perhaps strongly. but at the root of it all, it begs the question about whether the president of the united states has a vision for what it is that is in our national interests to accomplish in libya, and elsewhere. despite that criticism, and it is fair to call the criticism, we have to give the president kudos after having explored every other option to do the wrong thing, we nonetheless did do the right thing, as indeed he did in iraq and afghanistan. american forces have stepped up. we are part of the enforcement of the no-fly zone. but where are we today? one of the things we had hoped to do was to talk about what the military situation is, on the ground and with nato, and to assess where that is leading,

but we are accomplishing, and how the operation overall is going. to discuss that we have four wonderful panelists. we always have wonderful panelist and today is no exception. going down the line, ken pollack is the director of this upon director of the brookings institution. everyone has a buy online. can reminded me he has read and extensively on the libyan military history. michael o'hanlon, let me get your title wrong -- senior fellow and foreign-policy at the brookings institution. he writes often and wonderfully on military affairs. paul wolfowitz, the visiting scholar at the american enterprise institute, and has been following these issues

extraordinarily closely and riding a great deal. and finally tom donnelly, the director of arts center for defence studies. to confuse everyone watching the panel, we're going to go in slightly different order. for those who have not been here recently, the way we always used to do evince is that we had a set piece and i would talk a lot. i have kept to that tradition. i apologize to our panelists. and in our panelists would each give a presentation and we would turn to explore questions. we have been doing differently lately. i hope that you will all enjoyed the change in format. if you do not, none of you will hesitate to tell me. we have a more interactive style. we call it meet the press style. i am going to do my best. he would go back and forth between our speakers in between

our audience and speakers, more question and answer style. that is how we are going to do it. we will open up the floor to questions toward the latter part. mike, i set you up. i told you i would hit you first and ask about the situation on the ground. how do you see this military operation unwinding? do you see the international community coming together with a clear goal? is it a problem as some have written in d.c., that we have the smallest coalition of the willing that we have ever had? are we bringing the right forces to a pair to achieve this goal is that we wish to achieve? or are we unclear on those goals in the first place? >> i am thrilled to be here. i know ken is as well on behalf of brookings.

it is a wonderful opportunity in thank you for the invitation. the questions you just as well consumers for the hour-and-a- half, so i do not want to give a comprehensive sense of where we stand on the campaign. first, we recognize that there is a fundamental tension in our goals. on the one hand, we want gaddafi gone. that is a matter of official u.s. policy. as a policy that i had the honor of calling for paul wolfowitz a few hours before the president got to it. but the military position as defined in the un security council resolution makes it clear that that is not the explicit goal, and perhaps not even a reasonable expected. so there is tension on how you have a difference between these two approaches. getting through -- how can you conspired to get rid of gaddafi

with diplomatics, when you're not willing to use your military. but me say that i still think the president has made basically the right choice, although it highlights which is set in the introduction, the four more of affirmative clear presidential rhetoric. communication is part of the actual policy. it is not the side note to it. obviously the world is trying to take the president's medal and temperature on where he stands, so i'm delighted that he will be speaking tonight. i think there has been too little communication, even though the president cannot fully reconciled this tension in his policies, and i do not expect into this evening. we will hope that he leaves the the same but we will not do that directly with our own forces. as to why i agree with this approach, neither too hot or too

cold, the goldilocks approach, no ground forces but some level of concerted intervention, i would say that america in general would recognize we could not stand by and watch the slaughter of the opposition for not only a humanitarian catastrophe, but would have made a mockery of the entire winter and spring revolution in the middle east and change the fundamental trajectory in that in ways that others will comment on. and the idea venter inning with ground forces would have been too far and the other direction. -- the idea of intervening with ground forces would have been too far in the other direction. we have the right basic strategy at least to start. we are only 10 days in. the initial change in momentum has been favorable to the rebels. we will agree with that. but this is nowhere near a conclusion. by contrast with the 1999 cause

of low air campaign, which was motivated by similar thinking, we have to do something but we do not want to do everything, we want to keep ground forces out as president clinton said. but this was begun in a much more muscular and realistic way. we attacked ground forces design for ground combat, not just their plans from the outset. there were ways to effectively strike their forces using airplanes and contrasting it kosovo case. we did not try to wind this up into three days. the president has been in a hurry to make a transition to nato. but he has never indicated, and gates and clinton did not indicate yesterday, that we are looking to disengage the united states. it is been a more muscular and effective start to this air campaign than we did in 1999. it is the most relevant analogy

and modern u.s. history. where this is going is unknowable at the moment. i teach courses on military policy and military calculation, trying to analyze combat scenarios and figure out how they're going. everyone on this panel things in these terms as well. i do not know how to do with calculation on the battlefield dynamic and the power. too much is a noble. the rebels have benefited to make inroads into the center of libya. we have established control of pan gauzy and that looks promising. maybe that -- maybe you it will be the same as rwanda and it will keep on going. i also think there is a distinct possibility of stalemate. then the question is, how much do we want to escalate with more air power, perhaps arming the rebels. and this is better to leave as a

set of questions rather than trying to answer. but there are two distinct possibilities -- actually three. the rebels keep their momentum going and overthrow gaddafi in tripoli, or his palace elite deserting him in a way that has as an epic. the second possibility is stalemate. and the third is that gaddafi somehow reverse is the momentum. i do not think that is likely. i do not have to predict which one of the first to is more likely. >> i guess that is up to the president. you start out by saying that we have a fundamental tension. you outline that and i do not think there is much disagreement anywhere that the tension exist. on the other hand, to suggest we have no idea where this is going to go -- you get that feeling,

we have got to do something so let's bomb those sites. but if you have no vision of where to go, there is no possible means of getting there. don't you guarantee a stalemate of some sort? we do not have any clarity and you did not outline the other bit of confusion. no real clarity about whether it is legal to arm the rebels, even though there have been reports suggesting that we are supporting back channel arming of the rebels. but it is not entirely clear that the un security council .esolution would allow that is there really any way to reconcile these things other than hoping it comes out for the best? >> i agree the administration has some difficult choices to make. at the moment, we can -- u.s.

administration and focus on the speech tonight, and i hope this new momentum continues. but chances are in the next two weeks, they will have to figure out if they want to escalate. that could cover a wide range of possibilities, some of which could raise legal issues, arms transfers, others that could involve american special forces on the ground or people to figure out what is going on the ground, better battle ground intelligence and help the rebels organize better. and it is analogy, the 2001 afghanistan campaign, the use of air force on the ground helped the no. a glance. the administration will have to think hard about contemplating such options. all at the conversation address that option in the coming minutes. i agree that that is a big choice and i do not sense that it has yet been made in the administration. >> part of the challenge, tom,

is the communication challenge that might talk about. secretary gates, they did not raise away from american involvement on the sunday shows, but clinton in gates made statements that were adding a new layer of a confusion here by suggesting that what we do not have a national interest in libya, we do have a national interest regionally. i guess i know how to read that in a think tank. i am not sure how to read that coming from the secretary of defense. without that, even adding in what the president said on saturday when he suggested that we step in an inverted a great humanitarian disaster, as if somehow that was our mission, if that were of mission, why are we not everywhere else? was our only interest to avert a humanitarian disaster or do we

have an interest or as the secretary of defense says, do we not? i am trying reconcile those questions through the military means that we're using in the progress on the ground. >> i will take the goldilocks analogy, but not the temperature, to get something more substantive. it is a problem -- the defacto cold is first and foremost getting rid of gaddafi. it is pretty well understood. pretty well accepted. it is very difficult to enunciate for a whole host of american domestic political reasons, foreign, domestic partners, at different conversations and

internationally. we will figure out how to get there somehow and we are making it up as we go along. we are starting out with the "i hope that this words, close code and the establishment of the no- fly zone has been done extraordinarily well, and rapidly, as michael pointed out. interesting to think what would happen if it had been done when the rebels had first been at the gates of tripoli, it might have saved this fall and the libyans a lot of bloodshed. as mike also suggested, in his three potential outcomes, the most likely one is some form of operational pause, sitzkreig, in which the rebels are not

organized enough and do not have enough firepower to bust through the gates of tripoli, they got a does not use his frequent flier miles to go to caracas are wherever he is going to end up, and someone has to go the final number of miles. it is also unlikely that even the best form of western air power, and also a more muscular response in the balkans,, it is still less than 100 sorties being flown today. and whether it will be sufficient, the st. targets, per ticket will leave when you get closer to tripoli and the business gets nasty, to make effective use of the air power, only time will tell. it is not just decisions that

have to be made but a decision that leads us to the outcome of first of all of getting rid of a gun out the -- of gaddafi. if we have an interest in going to war in the first place, we have an equal interest if not greater in ensuring that the regime that comes afterwards is one that does not lead us down and even worse road. remember in 40 years of gaddafi 's role. part of the task for the president this evening is to take that next debt. he does not have to get us to a perfect vision of what his outcome is. but he must take farther down the road that is ultimately committed to. >> you are writing the president's speech. what does he have to say? and more importantly, what does he have to say and what are the tools that he needs to lay out

the we are going to be using, they will take this to the next level? >> he does not have to be especially specific. it is -- he has not spoken to the american people of the congress. he has to express a sense that he is on top of it. in even though he has rounded up this coalition and wants to share the burden, he has to convince us that the outcome is going to be a success. here are the processes the we're going to follow, what we are going to get, and has to transmit the idea that the purpose for which we are fighting is the removal of the regime and laying the foundation for a libya that is more like a normal nation. >> in other words, going back to

what he said previously and has not said cents, and he will have to go beyond the language of the u.n. security council resolution which does not call for the use of air power or any other air power to remove the regime. that is a difficult corner of that in many ways by trying to do the right thing from a few different directions we have ended up being taken into. you are a veteran of a whole series of no-fly zones, not all of which had in that is neatly and as beautifully as tom lays out, if only we had said the right thing. i'm not sure that any did. talk to us about that and also your doorstep merkel understanding of the libyan military than -- your historical understanding of the military dynamic. >> it is wonderful to be back here.

it is great to be back on the stage with these four people. but tom and mike are getting at is the biggest problem we have, less the confusion over the coals and much more about laying out a strategy of how we're going to accomplish these disparate goals. mike mentions his teaching, i also teach a class on military analysis. one of the interesting things about teaching -- about this, one of the most successful military campaigns in history started out with confused goals. the biggest problem is whether you got a strategy that allows you to get any of the goals. what we have not yet seen is are ticketed strategy that can bring us to either the president stated goal of removing gaddafi

from power or an actual resolution of the immediate humanitarian situation. like mike, i think was right to intervene in this situation because of the pressing humanitarian concerns. it was a rapidly unfolding decision and the right one to may. we have done that. we have stayed up the humanitarian catastrophe -- now what? that is the big question. to bring in some of the history, the problem with no-fly zones is that they are not the size of military operations. they do not in and of themselves contain a way to end this conflict. it is all well and good to keep praying every night that someone is going to put a bullet in gaddafi's head, but that is not a strategy, as colin powell was so fond of reminding us. having started this, where do we move forward? we have a history with gaddafi that is not good and you cannot imagine any kind of a stable

political resolution of the current situation in which gaddafi remains in power. many of you do not remember this -- paul does because it was government at the time, but in 1984, during one of his many invasions of chad, it brought the libyan invasion to a halt. gaddafi and mr. ron struck an agreement by which both sides would pull out of -- mitterand struck an agreement by which both sides would pull out of chad. france pulled out, gaddafi camouflages forces and let them in. to think that you can somehow walk away leaving gaddafi in place does not make sense. it brings us back to the different scenario that we've already started putting on the table.

the history of air power is that you have a capable opposition, you could run something like the afghan approach. i do not think libyan opposition is the equivalent of the northern alliance. what we have going is the bolivian military is not -- the libyan military is not the equivalent to the taliban. we of seen whether -- we have seen how they have fled at some of the risks of shots. they may not take a lot. it might not take as much effort as it did in afghanistan. but that is pure speculation, to go back to the uncertainty, and is much more likely that if the u.s. or our allies want to employ that approach, we will have to go back and build up a libyan opposition which will be capable of doing that. you're right, the u.n. resolution does not allow or unable that, but it also does not necessarily forbid it.

that is what we had a cia for. that is one option, to build up the libyan opposition. but that will take years. the problem there is, can you sustain the current situation, particularly the u.s. stepping into the background -- is great that the french in the british have stepped up. how long will it happen with the market if it takes two years -- how long will it take? if it takes two years, will the british and french want to keep and flying -- enforcing the no- fly zone? at the italians learned about machinery does not do well in the desert. so it may be a no-drive zone as well.

>> i noticed that you did not bring in the example of iraq. , no, to the contrary, it is always wise to leave it out. on the other hand, it is hard to escape this, because setting aside the 1991 uprising and the mistakes made, nonetheless, we did in up in a situation where we had a divided country in which the un partially administered the north, saddam administered the south, we had a no-fly zone, we had occasional military operations sustained by a coalition that may be hard to reconstitute. i doubt there was regional powers that it is the ability to fly in and out on a regional basis.

and then the question of arms in the opposition, we were on slightly different sides of that debate at the time, but no one disagreed with the idea of building the opposition, but in any case, laying that out as a plan b is a very hopeful way of doing so. and it will allow us this mini- fiefdom in tripoli. let us not forget to hussein was. support for terrorism, the flight that killed so many, it just seems to be something that the second to pick at it, it begins to unravel constantly. >> i'm glad you're reminded me

of iraq. it was one of the things you started to get at. i am not a big fan of articulating policies and then doing nothing to actually implement them. that is my fear about what we may have done here. i hope we hear from the president is that there is a plan to take this vision of libya without gaddafi and turned into actual policy. if you want to go much beyond what i laid out, which is effectively the afghan option or something like that, then you're talking about a ground invasion of tripoli. i do not see any interest in that. i'm not sure it raises to that level of our national interest to do that. the inc, they are in their neck and neck with these guys.

it is an issue of political stability and we saw that in iraq. over the course in time, that coalition got smaller and smaller and smaller as we try to enforce the no-fly zone over iraq. i hope that we have this here that we did not have in iraq, there was not a plan to actually try to bring about saddam's demise. that's not quite true. we did have a plan but it was a rube goldberg machine that might have somehow resulted in his death by falling accidentally on a port 17 times. -- fork 17 times. the cia has a lot of experience with this now, thanks to its afghanistan were. and it could be weakening gaddafi significantly. the libyan military is not the

military.addam's if you can prevent him from resupplying, over the course of months, perhaps a few years, you will weaken him and build up the rebels. at least that is a very reasonable possibility of the outcome that we want from this. >> that challenge of what rise to the level means is an involved in wonder nothing in afghanistan ever rose to a level, either, until it did. it is enough to try to rise to that for those kinds of levels. paul, and you have talked about the libyan opposition. what we need to do, do we need help, what areas are desperate for help, who we need to get off the air -- but for many, there is an open question about the

other side, what it looks like at all. adding a sense that once gaddafi is gone, we will have a group that we can work with, even if he did fall on my fork or get shot by one of his defecting leaders, how do we deal with that question? >> we might have to have an answer to that more sooner than we realize. we might get very lucky and what might be described as catastrophic success, because the change in momentum has been striking, rather dramatic. it underscores something that we need to keep in this discussion, referencing the weakness of gaddafi's armies, but they did not show how weak

it was when you have hired africans and others and put them to the most brutal types of training so that they can brutalize libyans. this is not an army, is a game. -- it is a gang. we really do not want -- no one is talking about, but tanks seem to be the decisive factor in keeping people off the streets and snipers on the roof. it makes one think that even a relatively small number of anti- tank weapons could change the course. we may face the post-gaddafi situation sooner than we expected we may have done nothing to prepare for. one of the things that strikes me that is that so much of our discussion on both sides of this issue, from the very beginning,

it is not a no-fly zone, a good deal more than no flying. it is focused on our military options. it reminds you of is saying is that -- of the saying that if all you have as a hammer, everything looks like a nail. falling upon the statements that we made that this is a libyan problem with the libyan solution, and there libyans out there with astonishing bravery confronting tanks and machine guns unarm, and we have not yet established a significant presence in been gauzy to find out who these people are. -- benghazi to find out who these people are. there are some nasty islamists in their numbers, but there is someone else that we have been dealing with for a couple of

years and many officials who live -- who we have been dealing with for a long time. they had issued statements which we give almost no attention to. there is so much that we could do before we even get to the question of anti-tank weapons, although i would bring that up much quicker than most. the fact that gaddafi's state media continues to broadcast. why can they shut down libyan state tv said that you could not cede the garbage for that poor woman is accused of being a prostitute or something worse, and a woman who let tax, even prostitutes are patriotic and this woman is not patriotic -- why broadcast that garbage?

and why not get broadcast capability for the provisional government? if we look at the statements they have made, the statement of principles that one would be happy to see them to subscribe to, if we will engage with them, we could say, we want you to sign up to these principles in a formal way -- commit to the united nations may be, it and you might be shocked at my saying this, but it might be a good thing to have the un resolution establishing that gaddafi the parts, there will be a national referendum to determine some of the basic issues of how they're going to be governed, instead of wringing our hands, saying, we do not know who these people are, therefore we will not recognize or supply them. as far as i know, we're not even sitting medical assistance. there is a lot that could be done and that is the instrument. and it is in our interest to

avoid the still made option. i think we have warded off the possibility of a gaddafi victory. we may not know who the opposition is, but we know who gaddafi is, although not in the state that he will be in if he keeps control of libya. he will be insanely bent on revenge than anything we have encountered. we tend -- ignore the fact that as recently as last year, he was meeting with leaders of the iraqi opposition. insurgency.rver an the instrument lies in making good on what we have said about if there is a libyan solution. a stalemate would not only be a defeat but the longer it goes on, when people say libya is not

a vital interest, they act as though libya is in the south pacific and we evaluate its on its merits and we talk as though nothing is going on in the middle east. it is in our interest to get the decisive resolution can be as quickly as possible. every thing else is catching on fire and we will have a hard time handling the region. if we are still debating who is in charge of a no-fly zone and the mission. >> we did advertise this as being beyond the question of of thlibya. while libya? -- while libya? why not syria?

there are questions to these -- answers to the questions. there have been 8000 lost. the numbers in other countries are far less. arguably, we have vital interests in a few of those countries. one way or another. we're not doing something right. we are not articulating our interests or clearly wide -- why we get out there and answer those questions we do not walk away as we did in the balkans. done something meaningful for an important part of the muslim world and end up with a group angry we were not there for them. i want everyone --

>> it is an important question. answering it is enormously difficult. the way to underscore how difficult it is, people -- john kerry said yesterday what we're seeing is important in a world historical significance as the fall of the berlin wall was. it has a sweeping impact across a huge region. you need a strategy for the problem but that has to recognize each individual pieces different. i think -- this is not a place where we should go by analogies. there are different. i do think george h. w. bush gets credit at the beginning when the wall came down and our allies were bringinwringing thes about germany. we have to face the possibility. president bush said we are for a unified germany.

he swept the opposition away. one place where we failed as in the balkans is -- what is going on, they are discovering there is no reason arabs cannot have freedom. how might get applied in different situations is different. for one -- the one thing that seems to be clear is the western world has a chance to embrace the idea for freedom and of qaeda is in no position and if we fail to take advantage of that interest, we have lost a historic opportunity. >> i find the firming of these questions -- framing of these

questions, everyone knows why. we have political principles that chips away we make strategy. on the other hand, it is not an algorithm or a mechanical process. there are still leadership decisions that must be practiced -- and statecraft that must be practiced. we're taking advantage of local developments in libya. the winds of change have been blowing through that part of the muslim world. they came within an eyelash of succeeding without us doing anything about it. this is something that is in our strategic interest and it is not just a humanitarian thing. to rule out 90% of the picture.

we have been having a generation -- in several generations long question about u.s. policy toward the muslim world. we ought to have learned something over the course of those years. we've done a lot of difficult things to achieve our and and introduce governments into the region. we continue to fight and sacrifice american lives to do it. this one even if it is not in and of itself a world shattering change is part of the larger world historical event. it is almost mendacious not to see how these things are connected. it may be difficult to come up with a comprehensive answer and a step-by-step strategy. to not see this is in america's

profound strategic interest seems to be narrow minded. >> we may not see america's interest but i think it demand some explication. everyone knows -- i do not think everyone knows. you have a response? >> i will try to restrain myself if you invited me to step up on my soapbox. i will try hard to keep my comments short. as you are aware, the last 10 years, paul is right. one of the things we're lacking, the problem we have is no one has articulated a strategy. the same thing is true for the middle east.

which kept the air people in misery. this is a moment where it will require full list. plumas that we saw for a moment from the obama administration in cairo in 18 or 20 months ago. demonstration walked away from too quickly. we will have to put our long- term interests ahead of short- term interest free of we will have to embrace change but recognize change will have to mean something different in every part of the reason -- region.

change is not unpredictable and explosive resolutions -- revolutions. this gives me pause because what comes next could be awful. it will be about setting priorities and that is one of my great concerns when it comes to libya. when american troops are in combat, that is where our attention goes. libya is not unimportant for all the reasons we have been talking about. we have other priorities as well. higher priority starting in egypt which is a far greater consequences -- of far greater consequence. we are focused on libya. egypt, so goes the region. we have had this experiment going on and the administration has done a poor job of pursuing it. i hope that their recognition

this is the kind of change that needs to come to the region will include iraq which is of great importance. it will be about having a dialogue with the countries and these reforms have been in every country. it will be about concrete actions that we have had words we need more in terms of concrete action. the egyptian government is in danger of running out of money. the biggest employer by far is the egyptian government. that would be disastrous. there are profound reforms that need to go on but in much deeper areas. the legal system and educational system. if you want to understand why it is that the arab economies cannot generate a labor force,

it is because of the educational practices of the arab world. the air of education -- you want to talk about real change to the middle east? education is where it comes from. >> this comes back to criticism i think all of us often hear. you love the military power and is always the right answer. i do not think it is a fair cop in any way. you spend a lot of time with our military commanders in afghanistan and iraq. many of you have in one capacity or another. petraeus has emphasized my component, i have my component but i cannot go without the other part. we will not win the effort unless we get the civilian side

right, unless we get the economic side right. we can -- keep talking about this as if it was a fresh step. we need to bring these great efforts to the opposition. we stink. the evidence on the ground is we're not good at it. we step up to a certain point when we have to. preemptively, we have not been capable of stepping up and educating the opposition and for enforcing a better education system and putting in different structures. ism that the other half of the coin we do not talk about? it goes back to ground sources or whatever it maybe? >> it is well put. i do not disagree. i will go in a different direction. i do not think this sequence of events we have seen this winter

and spring, i do not believe was of the nature that would have allowed pre-existing conceptual frameworks to handle it or more capacity in terms of our experts to handle it. the way i would put it and it may be related, this is a step up moment in a way for secretary clinton and president obama. it is their pay grade that has to define what the doctrine will be of the kind of american role we are seeing involved in the broader middle east in this time. it sounds like i am the friendliness toward the -- what they're doing. doctrines emerge in retrospect rather than being articulate it. both in regard to libya and the region, we are at this inflection point when now is the time to do more than give a speech. he can say he is in charge and

he can comport himself well and he sounds presidential. the choices have been the least bad. it is getting to be a moment when we need clear doctrine. the reason is not only do we have to sort out what our goal is, i am tortured by the question also. we have to figure out how to deal with yemen, bahrain, and syria. there may be others that emerge. we could see a need for some kind of organizing principle. these cases are best handled individually. there is a 25% rule for grand strategy. that is missing and we are far enough into this it is time for secretary clinton and president obama to explain what broader the more strategy we have to guide our roles here. this, and this is

somewhat visionary and strategic. we're trying to quiet things down and hope it does not get worse and hope we do not have to have a big new idea. power-sharing between sunni and shia or of of world family to advocate. -- abdicate. these are judgment calls based on individual circumstance but you need some broader way to explain what you are doing. it does not seem like an endless series of individual decisions which may be ok but it does not add up to seizing the historic moment. >> you need to know who the other side is. which is how we might have prepared ourselves. you have been itching to say something. >> i would be leery of a moment

of new doctrine or reinventing doctrine. i think we have been on an evolving path for along time now. it has taken us a while to understand that stability of postcolonial governments giving you the liberty that you would prefer. and i fear that the temptation for this administration to define itself in distinction to what has gone previously will not serve us well. making the individual case call it is a contingent decision. there has been a defacto strategy to promote political change. we have been on the path without

being able to say out loud. this may be an opportunity to define a more precisely so we have it as a planning metric so it tells us in future how to respond to the cases or point us in the direction. i would be nervous if the speech that the president gives his we have made a u-turn from our path and strategy. we will do this in coalition with help from others and everything we have done previously is not connected to what we're doing now and we will do in the future. >> i completely disagree in your analysis and your prescription. the idea that we have embraced the notion of pushing change in the middle east defies the historical proof. consistently, every time when we have been asked how important

this change is, we put it at 87. the bush administration adopted it briefly during the freedom agenda until that got and convenient. the obama administration adopted it. and before that, under the clinton administration. we had the dialogue. corps would go over there and would say you need to do this and every time he would say to you want to do this or push the peace process and if you could get around to this it would be great. it was meaningless. we never tried. that is what we need to do now. we need to recognize that approach over 20 years is what has gotten this -- got us into this problem and we have to make that change. tonight's speeches about libya. it is a speech the president needs to give.

>> it seems to me we have not done it preemptively. we have had something approximating a government and we had some conversations. that is the extent of our dealings. >> let me open up the floor to questions and remind everybody of our rules. i will call on you and a nice person will bring over a microphone and you can identify yourself and give us a brief question. ahealet's go with both of you. go for it.

yield the floor right away. i would like to pose my question. i note there is no names mentioned and we hear a variety of names which means we are far beyond the opposition in knowing what the opposition to saddam was or egypt. we knew who el-baradei was. who would be a good leader? the rebels have torn down the khaddafi flag -- gaddafi flag.

is there a chance of the heir coming to power? >> you can google and find out who they named and they have named provisional cabinet spokesman. the nostalgia for the king probably does not go to much beyond the five but it does reflect the sense that libya was once a civilized country until gaddafi and his kids got hold of it. i go back to what i said. we do not have to sit here putting our figure in the air and figuring out who are the opposition leaders in libya. we should be using resources and i would say not cra. this is not a secret operation.

we should be out in the open and talking with those people. i have yet to hear a reason why we should recognize them. we could have a presence in benghazi and talking to them daily and putting out that kind of information. we would know the names of these people and they would be out there every day. >> hold that closer. ? could you give me your commentary about russia's - position? position?s negative >> this is a question on the

approach to the security commission. anyone have a comment? >> the most intersting thing is if they should be negative or neutral. i do not know what drives their policy. you can count on the russians to get in the oil business. >> the thing that struck me is who the abstainers war. -- were. even indicative of how reluctant the other great and wealthy

powers of the planet are in stepping forward in these kinds of circumstances. russia may be having nostalgia for the empire but also the chinese who obviously will be in there also. commercially and for natural resources. >> thank you. i am planning myself a little confused which is a plot it to the panel. this has been a fascinating discussion. i feel like i am walking away not knowing the answer to this. on the one hand, the point has

been made that the president needs to talk libya tonight. but he says about libya, the notion i get is this group believes they need to stick to the libya script and if that is the case, and if we know is there's trouble brewing in syria and bahrain, there is trouble in yemen and who knows where else, and that could erupt any time. can he go on television tonight and address of libya only, or does he have to make some statement about this is what

we're doing and why. we are clearly aware this is brewing and lay down some predicate, some something that says on the one hand, we make the decisions individually. we do not throw darts at a board. we have a point of view, whether it is embracing change or what it happens to be. >> many of us who watch the president do not know how he feels about this. can you take this on? >> i assume you came in a lot confused and the fact you are

leaving a little consumeconfuses testimony. the right way to handle this would be what you laid out. to start with, the people -- this is what has been going on. this is how we're thinking about it and this is what we're doing as part of it. that is not the speech we will get. we will get the libya speech. i want them to give that broader speech. i would like that to be tonight's speech. that is not what we will get. they're thinking this is american combat troops in harm's way. the president needs to explain what they are up to and why they're doing what they're doing and under what conditions.

i can understand that and i tend to look at things from the perspective of a middle east perspective. >> what the president emphasizes is here is the wide american troops are in harm's way. let me explain why we are not the lead and not responsible. we are passing off responsibility. that is the vibe i have gotten from every speech. >> a lot of the problem is how they have explain themselves and off -- how off the back foot they have been. this is a speech the president should have given days ago. perhaps before we went in or the night it started and it is late

they're doing it this way. there has been the perception of incoherent. they believe they have a consistent world view and everything works out perfectly in my response is shared with us. everyone wants to hear it. ? i would like to see, there is a special obligation to talk about why you put american troops in harm's way. that focus is appropriate. the immediate reason is humanitarian. the larger reason is what is taking place in the middle east. the second thing is how to fill the gap between our military action and our desire for the outcome. it is fine if he says the use of our force is for the humanitarian purpose.

we have an objective here and it will take more than just economic sanctions and threats of the national criminal court to accomplish it. i would like to hit see him -- to see him talking about doing a range of things. i would like to see him explain the bizarre language of the un security council resolution that refers to the country as the libyan-arab area, the regime. these are things that are not going to happen but there is a huge gap that should be filled. for the larger question, the fact is what you are saying is a reputation of the arab inc eption. freedom.desire tfor

we will not send pilots in harms' way. we are with those people and we will figure out how to make it work. people tend to equate bahrain and libya. the basic principle which should espouse is evolutionary change is much better than evolutionary change. all the tyrants and he ought to say something about iraq should wake up and smell the coffee and recognize it. they're likely to face the kind of revolution is the bringing down governments throughout the region. >> this lady over here. >> i get the sense that gaddafi

needs to go. is there any scenario in which his staying in power would not be a strategic disaster? if for >> i have had some good conversations with my coat- palace. there are circumstances under which it could be a tolerable, temporary outcome. we're not going to recognize him as the leader of libya. this is not preferred and not yet time to do this. if we wind up in a stalemate and different after a stalemate where we have various assets on the ground, trying to size of the [unintelligible]

i could contemplate a cease-fire where he was sanctioned or blockaded and told he had sex number of months to figure out is time to go. temporarily allowing him some limited control over tripoli. it is not something i want. you have to negotiate carefully. the fact cannot trust him and any kind of cease-fire would have to be monitored by the robust international forces that were big enough to fend off small-scale attacks and this is massi, not preferred, and not one i would rule out. >> i wonder if you could share with you know about the state of the military and their ability to respond to orders from his

bunker. >> let's go back to mike's point. most of this stuff was sitting around/ there was a stockpile of ammunition and spare vehicles. the best thing is to look at the proof in the pudding. you do not shoot will and if they are going up against untrained rebels who have nothing but kalashnikovs, the can do a lot of damage. the big question, how many tanks for a pcs, how many artillery pieces are operational? how many are runners. it may be a half-dozen. the problem you get is you do

not have satellite imagery. it may be that is a journalistic impression. that may be the account. six tanks can be a killer. this is what we will see. the big question is twofold. one is psychological. is there a perception that gaddafi is winning or losing? and how much can he get stuff from elsewhere. the fact that he has stockpiles and some fall into the hands of the rebels. >> that is why things like getting libyan tv off the air is so poor and and why recognizing

the opposition will be important. if this were to move quickly, it would be based on a psychological factor. on the conviction by people following his orders is it is not a good future. that will be done by non-lethal means and lethal means. >> the deaths of mine -- the depth of my lack of knowledge about the been society and the regime, [unintelligible] in the conventional sense, they are weak and subject to the kinds of military power we could bring to bear or even organizing the rebels. the question -- is there a band of loyalists the could form the core of an insurgency?

an undigestible nut because of local or tribal loyalties, whatever their motivations might be. a core depending on what comes after gaddafi. could they be integrated into the future of libya? even if you eliminate what ever formations and palace guards there may be, whether it is people who are invested in the past regime, who cannot be integrated into society, who are not well organized bar trouble for us for the follow along government. >> this is another important thing. we talked about information and specifics.

the press spends time watching state media and this is one of the things i noticed when i read about -- the most information comes out of state media. there is an enormous amount of difference. it is unconscious. the conditions of people see their options in terms of going out into the streets. gaddafi phoning the airwaves does dominate and we see this in syria. there is this wholesale ownership of the media in a way there was not in egypt. it conditions people's willingness to step out and their understanding of the scenario. that is why there's so much agitation on the part of these folks to get these media organs can and stop posting the apologists.

>> it is taken for granted that long term transformation would be a good thing. i'm thinking that saudi a reverie is with us -- saudi arabia's relationship with us is chilled. goes awry,transition share concerned that these events could get out of control in a way that makes our position hentoff in the middle east? >> i want to endorse that view. this is -- i was doing an interview and use that term. we are writing the tiger. that is why i was agitating

for this 10 years ago. we have revolutions and we know revolutions have a bad habit of getting hijacked and we're in the middle of transitions. of those things are out there. we have not mentioned our other friends out there. these guys are out there and they will try to take advantage. there will see opportunity and they do. if it succeeds, it will be there definite. it will be a bumpy and dangerous right for a while. if we get it right, the middle east will be a much better place. that is a long term prospects. there is potential for things to go badly. >> the moroccan foreign minister spoke and the whole speech was eloquent. the phrase i remembered was he said the arab spring has arrived but the summer has not yet come and it might be followed by a

dark winter. it is a metaphor that is worth keeping in mind. often when the question is asked, there is an implicit assumption. this might be going in a direction we do not like so let's turn it off. once you see it that way, you realize how silly it is. it is desolate as people who in power.the barmubarak was we did not create the tiger. we have to ride it properly. >> we are not the only one who are riding the tiger. another subtext is we are getting sucked into another

engagement or involvement. somehow it will deflect us from doing the other more sensible break power types of things. this is something we do not have much of a choice on. you are either riding a tiger or the tiger is aiding you. >> a horrible metaphor event. >> yesterday, lieberman said a president had been set. when asked about libya. maybe that is a way to win the hearts of the arab world.

>> could be. you told us that earlier. >> syria is unfolding. we need to see what happens. we can hope the people of syria also get the better future they deserve. as for what will unfold, should the u.s. -- the administration made the right decision. i am not ready to commit ground troops to taking ieee. that kind of bounce my thinking about libya. let's see what happens in syria. i would not rule out any intervention under any circumstances because the world has a bad habit of creating scenarios were no one could see. syria will be a much better place if political change comes

to damascus as well and the u.s. ought to foster that as well. >> a brief additional point. i would welcome the departure of president assaad. some change in syria would not be bad for the u.s. it would be great if it happened but the idea that we could promote it or we are in a position to take advantage of an opportunity is premature. we have not talked a lot about the arab league which was a decisive group for laying the predicate for the libyan intervention. we will continue to listen. i do not want to suggest they have a veto but their intervention was of monumental significance. i will want to hear what other arabs say about syria. >> we have not talked about the

arab league's military intervention. i am curious about that. also, the willingness to speak quickly and oic spoke quickly on libya. how much of that willingness was dictated by the fact gaddafi tried to have king abdallah their and is tha ttheit policy? do they have a strategy they see or is this a low hanging fruit that existed out there? >> what ever interest the arab league had in libya pales in comparison to the interest that jordan and iraq and turkey have

in what is going on. this is a strategic country with neighbors that have conflicting and different interests about what happens. we should be in the most intense of possible diplomacy. as to precedents, i do not want to comment on what i have not seen. i do not see that as what is coming down the pike with syria. it is a mistake to rule things out orient. we need to see how this evolves. how the situation develops is unpredictable. >> something that no one has

mentioned and there have been calls on the left and right. with president obama committing an act of war against another country without a vote by congress, it has been called unconstitutional. i heard there was a personage of making a move to push for impeachment. >> why would we leave this president out? try and address your question. we had one of you suggest congress has not been dealt with well. how much of these are legal questions? none of us are lawyers. i do not want to go too far on

the legalism. if anyone wants to address this question. >> i think we recognize the constitutional tension. there is an act that tries to do with the ambiguity. this does not preclude the administration from doing what it has done. it is a 60-day time window. you can distinguish between a limited military action of which there have been so many in history and to imagine congress could have approved everyone is unrealistic. the administration might have considered more than it did. trying to go to congress quickly to ask for consideration of approval given its significance and given what this president is doing in terms

of reshaping america's role. there might have been a virtue in seeing if we could get approval and it may be an unrealistic board to set. those are my somewhat contradictory points. >> with that, i am afraid we have reached the end of our time. i apologize to everyone who was not able to college. let me thank our audience and panelists for this terrific event. [applause]

next, a correspondent for al jazeera out talks about the challenges of reporting from the middle east. a former cia officer on the international threat of terrorism. will get an update on libya from the un. we will continue our conversation on libya tomorrow. a defense analyst at the heritage foundation joins us. we will talk with congresswoman karen bass. last week, president obama informed congress of his decision to use troops in libya. david golove will discuss the war powers resolution enacted by congress in 1973. each morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> as protests continued, and as

nato steps to take control of operations, find the latest from the u.n. security council and reaction from whirlybirds on the world leaders on the c-span video library. >> and al jazeera correspondent discusses his experiences. he is interviewed by [unintelligible] the interview took place before president obama's speech on the bill. -- libya.

we will spend time visiting with our guest and i will have a chance for you to ask questions halfway through. today is a timely moment for us to be visiting with our guest. ayman mohyeldin covers the middle east for al jazeera and has had a fascinating couple months although -- a fascinating couple months. he was in tunisia when the revolution in egypt began and had to make your way to egypt to cover that story which turned

out to be a larger story. i am fortunate that he has been a cnn colleague. he went to baghdad during some of the toughest times of that war. am glad to be with you as former colleague. he has covered the entire middle east story from gaza to the west bank to libya. he has reported on libya's decision to give up its nuclear program. what i would love to do is visit for a few minutes and talk about the last couple of months of real-life and what it has been like. it has been an interesting 2011.

the year has gone in a way few people could have predicted. 2011 has been described in some and a different -- so many different ways. it is safe to say what we're witnessing in the middle east is a change of sorts, in the relationship between the citizens and the state and it is an awakening at least of the arab street. go back to when the beginning -- the beginning of the arabs spring. what brought you to tunisia, what did you see, and what were your thoughts? >> when i think when the offense happened, it started in a small village where a young fruit and vegetable seller set himself on fire out of a discussed have

been living. the plot of his life had degraded so much he decided to do this in protest. it ignited the protests that began and spread. i was in egypt and we were struggling with what was one of the biggest stories in recent history. the sectarian tension between the coptic christians and muslims following the church bombing on new year's eve which triggered weeks of riots. i got a call from our offices on the day the protests had reached to this -- tunis and everyone was anticipating a monumental shift given what ben ali was conceding more and more, reforms, and altman lease stepping down. they asked me to go to to nation. me and a group of journalists

came at different points. we were not allowed in tunisia. we were throwing dice and seeing what happened. >> you flew without a visa or permission to come in. >> the equipment would have been confiscated. the authorities almost instinctively had changed their attitude towards journalists. even the street had changed. it became so when we worked out in the streets, they would flock to as and speak to us and it was a different dynamic than 24 hours before. >> you are in tunisia and everything is changing. you are covering the day's events and they are extraordinary. how much of your brain was also occupied with the possibility this was going to expand beyond

tunisian, thinking about egypt or jordan, thinking about elsewhere? >> when i was in the village where this man had set himself on fire, every single person i spoke to said, tunis was the beginning. i was surprised there were saying this because they had a sense of pride in they have begun this revolution in tunisia. everyone said when they find -- found out i was in egypt, they would say egypt is next and i would be somewhat suspicious. the calls for the protests to happen on january 25 had begun after i had arrived in egypt. i am making a concession. one of my friends left a message, are you going back on january 25? i said they will not be anything big.

as soon as january 25 happened, i was on the first flight out straight from tunisia to turkey into cairo. the twenty-fourth had changed the rules of the game and a hat begun calling for that the day of a year or rage. we knew that was going to be a monumental show. people on the ground. when my friends were messaging me saying what will happen, i was like, tunisia is a big revolution and i was wrong. now it is january 26 and two were in egypt. what did you see? >> i arrived that night and from the 25th until the 28, the protests were ongoing but they were madly skirmishes with the

police. very low intensity. not what we saw on friday. the calls for a day of rage for after friday prayers had gained and gathered momentum. we anticipated it would be big. the most troubling thing was the announcement by the egyptian minister of interior who came out and about never again would protesters take control of the square like they did. the second you heard him say that, the dynamic change. everyone said we have to go back to the square and that is where the showdown will be. the calls started to be on the 25th, everyone after friday prayers march on the square and what was troubling was on the evening of the 27th, the government announced it was cutting off the internet. egypt was taken off the information grid. it was in a blackout. that sent shivers up everyone's

spine. this was unprecedented but we were about to witness. we have begun preparations anticipating it would be a big day and we've deployed teams and i went to friday prayers to see what -- how he would be treated and how he would be received. elbaradei had just flown in. >> how did you operate during the egyptian revolution? you had a bureau in cairo, but i understand it was closed. what happened and how did you do your work? >> as most people know, it was shut down. we were subject to two different campaigns, the official and the unofficial campaigns. the official campaign from the

government jammed our signal, they came to the office and confiscated our equipment, the revoked licenses, and so we had nothing to prove that we were journalists. that was the official campaign that the government unleashed. the unofficial campaign which was more dangerous, in sight. that happens. they have senior officials of the egyptian government blaming what is happening in egypt on satellite channels belonging to friendly countries. it creates this incitement which spills over into violence. people come to our offices with sticks and knives, thinking that we have made them a target. throughout the course of the revolution, our offices were attacked. you have people show up outside. when we left and went to a note

-- a nearby hotel, they showed up with knives demanding that hotel security turnover al jazeera staff. >> how did people know where you work? >> when we left our office, everyone took refuge in a hotel next to the bureau. it is mostly concentrated in one corner block in cairo. it became apparent where al jazeera and a lot of other networks were. that was never hidden. the camel attacks, that date many came over to the hotel where journalists were and demanded that al jazeera staff be brought out. >> how much time did you in your people spend outside the hotel, of versus wondering in the square, knowing that others were being beaten. we'll outside trying to do -- >> i never stayed at the hotel

and never worked out of the hotel. i stayed street level. to our credit, our bosses anticipating this tension toward al jazeera, they made a conscious decision to keep as many of us in terms of our equipment in safe areas. we put some of our equipment in tahrir square, hiding in an apartment there. other times, our staff, we were always out in the field. i don't think we were hiding in the refuge of the hotel. we used it at the end of the day as a place to actually state. the crew and myself, we never operated out of the hotel. >> was it frightening knowing that they were pro-government forces out there that would like nothing more than two a rescue and perhaps worse -- the rest

you and perhaps worse? how did you feel moving around and going in and out of the square, in and out of the hotel? >> extremely frightening. i have been a lot of difficult situations, from iraq to others, but this was different. it seemed almost personal. in other situations your almost a product of the environment, which is a violent environment. here you are always looking over your shoulder knowing that you were al jazeera and you could be in one pocket at one point where the people around you are not necessarily fans of al jazeera and you could be targeted. it was frightening but at the end of the day, i looked at it like, these zero the tactics of the regime that ordinary egyptians have suffered from four decades. these attacks, the camel attacks, this is something that ordinary egyptians had been

accustomed to. we had seen an election and political rallies and during protests, and we knew that has accredited journalists, it would not be hard for any ministry official to get out our information to pro-egyptian thugs and have them knocking on your door in the middle of the night. these were part of the environment that we had grown used to. >> all is an awkward position for a journalist to be the story rather than just covering the story. egypt and other places as well, but you became a part of the story. when that government was talking about those zero -- other arabic language languages -- language satellites, it was not much of a code. how does it affect your job when you are part of the story? cnn covered the al jazeera part

of the story. give us your thoughts on it. >> the way i look at it is -- this was not buying al jazeera's design. this was by the government's design. it was the government putting al jazeera in the cross hairs. i think that is a testament to the quality of the journalism coming out. one of the things i have been saying is that these of the first revolutions that we have witnessed in the information age. information was such a catalyst behind these revolutions. whether it was satellite, internet, it really shocked the space and time by which this information went to egypt. when people talk about these revolution, the fact that they can go from yemen to syria to morocco, that is what is so powerful. governments are extremely operate in that sense. al jazeera is no different that

the government shutdown the internet. they looked at the internet as a threat just as much as al jazeera the difference is that al jazeera as a single entity was singled out. for me, it is unfortunate, but i have to stay focused and all of us to our credit stayed focused on the story and not got sucked into being part of the story, whether the egyptian government or other media reporting us. >> when the egyptian government set down everything, how did you operate during that time? how did you get information? >> as you probably know, the use of a lot of small technology, satellite equipment that we have thus -- with us in the country, in order to circumvent the limitations of relying on the local information infrastructure. there was one way we were able to get pictures and video out

and to our live shots and reporting. one of the most important components was the internet. it become such an important tool. in the u.s. where the al jazeera is now regularly view, we knew that al jazeera would be important. we knew the internet was going to be a cut off and i gave access to my twitter account to a good friend of mine. i told her to constantly update whenever she sees on al jazeera english on twitter. i went from $3,000 to something like $20,000 in the course of three days. -- 3000 followers to something like 20,000 followers in the course of three days. people were not getting their information exclusively from television. there were getting it from alternative sources, whether twitter feeds. we were relying heavily on the

internet for a lot of the viewer-generation of content. whether libya or tunisia, it was generated by you are standing in tahrir square and elsewhere with their own cell phones transmitting to al jazeera. >> let's talk about libya. i'm curious of your impression -- and it is worth noting that libya has not been easy for al jazeera. tell us what has happened. it and we'll have one of our cameramen killed. -- >> we have had one of our cameramen killed. we have had some of our staff to attain. we have had others shot out, vehicles ambushed. i think it is safe to say that al jazeera has paid a very heavy

price for its coverage in libya, along with some any other journalist. i think the "new york times" and other photographers that are there. the violence will be used to silence what is happening in libya. >> is al jazeera free report now from libya? >> we have teams in tripoli and benghazi, and some moving with the flow of the frontline, so to speak. and others with the security assessments are constantly revisited. they operate freely in that they are one part of the story. the team in tripoli was there by the invitation of the libyan government. they have the same restrictions and impediments you would expect by being brought in by the government. they are only allowed to see a certain part of the story.

>> talk about the president's speech tonight. it is obviously a significant moment. he has worked hard to point out or to suggest that the united states is not taking the lead in the libya operation, and is quickly handing over command- and-control to nato. this is a coalition, not the u.s. driving it. your thoughts about that, and if your viewers and i know that al jazeera does not take the position, but based on your sense of the region, if people in the arab world believe that, if they see this as a u.s. operation or do they see this as a truly international -- let as much as by the arab league as

for the tar? >> i do not think anyone looks at it as an american operation. they looked at it as a western operation. but i do not think a lot of people think that that is a bad thing. in the region for the first time in a long time, there is actually a convergence is of interest. surprisingly of big part of the arab street is in favor of military intervention to protect the libyan people. you'd be surprised to see that even though there is an extreme caution of a part of united states should not be perceived as certain way or military intervention been perceived in a certain way, this is one of the unique opportunities in the history of american military involvement in the middle east where the u.s. is not looking at what is happening in libya as an attempt by the united states to impose its own objectives on to the region.

that is at this stage in the process. there is always the skepticism because of america's large military could put in the region. there is always a little bit of skepticism. what gets more fuel to the fire is the fact that libya's largest natural resources of oil. the that the united states is engaged now in this military operation is not something that people are necessarily upset about. when the the biggest evidences of that is that for the first time in the years that we've spent covering the middle east, in the past 18 days i never once saw an american flag being burned in tahrir square, neither in tunisia, neither in libya. despite the common knowledge that most arabs have that the united states supported so many of these regimes, finance them, equip them, but they did not hold that as the regime's were

crumbling. that is to the credit of the people making the distinction between the policies and the united states is a country. >> contrast that with the protest you have covered in the arab world -- you cover the iraq war. you're an american citizen the works for unite -- for al jazeera english. >> to a great extent over the years, there was a huge amount of animosity toward the american government for its policies, particularly not just in iraq and elsewhere, but also the biggest problems with the palestinian-israeli conflict. that resentment over the years has created a sense were ordinary arabs do not trust the intentions of the united states government. they looked at the farm policy as an interest-driven foreign- policy, not about a use-driven farm policy.

it does not resonate with ordinary arabs because the actions do not match up with the rhetoric. in this particular case, there is a convergence of interests. ordinary arabs, particularly those in libya, want the ouster of muammar gaddafi. they believe that in the absence of any other type of interference from arab states, which we know are incapable of employing -- imposing a no-fly zone or defending the libyan people, the only option was western military intervention. this is why this unique situation has arisen. the u.s. and the west intervenes in libya and is not seen as an imperialistic operation. the question is how big the military operation is, the long term attempts by the united states to shape the rise of a new libyan government, if that

happens, and to what extent there is an engagement with the emergence of a new libyan government? those of the questions that ought to be answered. >> your expertise as an american and an observer of american politics and of global politics, who'd you think the president's audience is tonight? >> i would have to wait and see what he says. but i think is immediate audience is definitely the united states. there's a great deal of concern from watching and reading the ,ommentary in american media there is a great sense of concern. i hear a lot of questions about who are the libyan rebels? >> who are the libyan rubbles? >> the libyan rebels are libyans. you should not dismiss that. there is a tendency to over analyze the situation to where we are talking about the libyan

revolution as if it were not organic. do not forget where these revelations began. they begin with ordinary arabs all across, and libya is no different. it turned fallen -- pilot when muammar gaddafi the ordered it, which is on army refused to do. with people ideologically driven, sometimes described in western media,, that is not what we're seeing in libya. i was watching one of the sunday morning talk shows, and the question posed was, we do not know whether these are going to be good muslim extremists are bad muslim extremist. i was really surprised that no one stopped to say, how do we know they are not muslim extremists? they could be ordinary libyans.

back to your question, president obama, the first thing he should try to do is a lay the concern of ordinary americans about what is actually happening in libya. i hope he has more intelligence and information being discussed in mainstream american media. it is sometimes a low bit short- sighted. people leaving these revolutions in libya, we may not have all the answers but that is not a bad thing. we are trying to rush to find that who is the national council, who are these people? they used to be in the libyan government. we know what they stand for. they have given the timeline of the transition to a light to impose. they do not have the weapons or the ability to invade tripoli. they're trying to address those issues with diplomatic maneuverings. all common needs to address that -- obama needs to address the concerns of the american

domestic arena, and then he needs to do of message to the americas street -- to the arab street that america is not intervening in libya for any input realistic objectives, but because of humanitarian and value-based judgments. >> there taking notes at the white house right now. i want to take a few minutes and get questions from you all. wait for the microphone that will find you. there are two microphones here. we will start over there. >> thank you. if i could play on your broader experience in iraq and israel, and now tunisia and egypt, the landscape has changed significantly in the region. " we have seen -- the first time in my lifetime reduce see the

arabs in the street. these arabs had been victims of the repressions of their government for generations. the object of indifference from foreign governments for the most part. if this continues, what are the arabs in the street saying about what they expect from two key actors, one, the united states, what did they want from them, and the other is israel. how in this changed landscape. these newly empowered arabs expect from them chris marjah and i do not think they want anything from israel. -- expect from them? >> i do not think they want anything from israel. they're willing to set different level of engagement. the arab street once their government to interact with

israel differently, not necessarily want anything from israel. you're going to see in the case of egypt, they want to see the interest of egypt take priority over the interest of israel. the sale of natural gas, when egyptians can i get natural gas in their own country. they want priority and cd siege on because of be lifted, because there is sympathy with the people of gaza, and they want egypt's policy to reflect that. they want this to taper city over the national security of israel and the united states. egypt's national security concern to the back seat to washington and what they wanted egypt to do. to engage in mediation efforts, eige andd see this s

gossip, the barricade was built at the behest of america, when they wanted that lifted and a free-flowing of people between gao's and egypt. gaza and egypt. with united states, they want united states to engage in the arab street in these arab governments on a farm policy that is more value-based, not interest-based. they want to see the united states engaged in civil societies, brains and know-how that america has come a bring that to the region but not impose a former model of government on the egyptians. if the muslim brotherhood emerges as a political player in egypt, they do not want to see

the united states hanging of veto over it not dealing with an egyptian government that has the muslim brotherhood on that. the muslim brotherhood is no different from any old red- religious party in israel. they can play with in the secular roles of the game. and they do not want to see that type of western imposition sign that the muslim brotherhood wins a certain number of seats, we will not deal with them. that kind of tone is what egyptians want to see. >> do you have a sense now that as a political process moves forward in egypt, that the muslim brotherhood has a significant amount of support? during the revolution, even the

muslim brotherhood try to downplay the amount of support that they might get, but now that the political process is open -- >> i think the muslim brotherhood was completely surprised. this was not a muslim brotherhood revolution. no one can take credit and say that. never once was the moslem brotherhood flag waving over tahrir square. never once were their slogans chanted. not by accident, and more particularly, the people there were not part of the muslim brotherhood. this was not a muslim brotherhood-led initiative. it is a part of the political fabric of egypt. that should not be ignored. that is the reality. little, medium-sized, or a big part? >> let me what to the sequence. they said they would not feel the president canada and no more than 30%, but that is what they

view themselves and parliament electorate -- in popularity. as soon as they wind those, they will not have more than 30% of the egyptian parliament, if they win every one. the muslim brotherhood in egypt, they themselves anticipate that their popularity was do you because they were the only game in town behind -- beside the mubarak regime. president mubarak was the power, and the only legitimate opposition was the muslim brotherhood. no one to any other party seriously. even if you are not ideologically in support of the muslim brotherhood, you supported them because they were the ones willing to go to the street and opposed the regime and they paid dearly for that over the course of the years. i cannot quantify it, but i suspect that they will not be the type of party that is all or

nothing. they will not control everything and they certainly will not be in the fringes as some other political parties. they will be very visible, but not necessarily dominant. >> another question. right back there. state your name and affiliation. >> i'm from the atlantic council. let me say thank you as someone riveted to my computer watching you day after day, wondering how you're managing to continue to broadcast through all this. talk more about the secular parties and the young activists. or they going to be able to get their act together to participate in the parliamentary at potentially the presidential elections? we have seen some push back against mohamed elbaradei?

should we wait to see a new personality? >> no doubt there have been five or six prominent egyptians who have turned their names in, including the popular judge. there are people who are merging. analyticallymore then and as a journalist, but i don't think any one of these individuals has a great deal of attraction, particularly with the revolutionary group. one of the most unique things about these revolutions is that they are organic and leaderless. nobody can claim credit for the egyptian revolution. no one came rolling in from the countryside on a tank. no one flew in. was ordinary people that took to the streets. that is a good thing in a bad thing. it prevented an opportunity of a new generation of egyptian leaders to emerge.

this grouping of revolutionary groups which now we can safely say or in the ballpark of 12 or 13 groups, they are not traditional political parties in the egyptian regime. none of these parties are part of the core revolutionary groups. many of the kids belong to them, and many support that ideology, but they are not part of it. we are witnessing this emergence of a new egyptian generation. if the elections happen in six months, the key to whether they will be ready to practice abide is whether they -- there are two such opposite sides of the coins, but if one is banned, it will give a great opportunity for these parties to emerge, not parties, but youth organizations. then they suddenly find themselves involved in helping these groups. if the ndc stays, it is a recipe

for a problematic election. the two strongest parties will be the ndc and the freedom and justice party, the alternate to the muslim brotherhood. we're expecting the decision relative listen, perhaps the next week or so. the prosecutor general of the job, it will be his call, done in close consultation with the military whether or not they are going to ban that party. i expect in the next two weeks we will get a decision. it is one of the demands of the revolutionary kurds. they have announced parliamentary elections in september, and they expect a new law on the formation of political parties in egypt, very implement all talf -- instrumental on how these each of us -- these elections will pay out -- play out. the demands of the protesters

are if you are genuine about a new political atmosphere, you have to ban them. and you have to avoid them for participating in the upcoming election. they may defer to the new president of the new parliament, but they may are you optimistic or pessimistic about the relations in turkey? >> i think what i have seen in egypt has been very promising. egypt has gone from -- it has probably gone 170 degrees.

i do not want to say 180 degrees, because i do not think they are willing to tackle the military and the fundamental issues that are still problematic in this transitional period, which has to do with the military, the constitution, and a few other things. i think the media in egypt has had a huge advantage, in the sense that there are plenty of news outlets, whether it is television or something else. they were usurped by the regime. i think this is a huge evanish, compared to tunisia, which only has a few newspapers. they are going to start from scratch. the idea that egypt has a long history of newspapers, of print and press and broadcast, and more importantly, in this day and age, they have plenty of news channels, and plenty of entertainment channels. .i think turkey is a good model.

i think that we're probably be one criticism that i would have. i with the naval postgraduate school. this has been a fabulous

session. thank you so much for what you're doing. the public expectation about how quickly things are supposed to happen, and they keep going back to my friends and saying it was 13 years, so my question is, how do you think this is all going to be crammed into a very short period of time, to meet the expectations of everyone wanting to get into this new space? >> you know, even more recently, and i am not an expert, but the transition that chile went through, and there were problems to more democratic processes. i think you have to look at egypt's progression, one capacity billing institution, freedom, and you have to look at things like accountability, justice, reform. there are a lot of people saying it is not as important to try to

bring elements of the regime to justice. you are spending all of this time. this is more politically motivated, that the general prosecutor who was appointed by mubarak and was not -- people are saying he is only doing this to buy himself time, and people are questioning whether he is going to be fair and would do justice, and i think that is a legitimate concern. you want to make sure about the processes your building, that they are capable of bringing about genuine reform. i think there is a huge concern and trying to impose a huge timeline. this is between those who think the six month time frame is realistic and as to say no, it should be more than one year.

the constitutional amendments that were passed. it is not going to bring about the institutional reforms that they need. he did not abide by what was supposed to happen, so he is telling you in essence that the constitution has failed. everything else is complete and functional. i think there is a great concern that you rush things. it does not function like a democracy. >> yes, ma'am, in the middle ear.

-- in the middle here. how has this actually changed aljazeera? i think this idea is false. it has grown by 2500%. at one point, surpassing that of the new york times at its peak. the vast majority is from north america, from the united states. i think it is a testament that when people want news, they know where they can get it. how that this changed aljazeera? i think it has only be committed

us to the values that when you report, sometimes the most simple reporting is the most powerful reporting, and i think that you see the aljazeera commitment in employing a lot of the resources. i think sometimes, the problem with the criticism, if i can, in this current climate, there are a lot of budget cuts. there are a lot of international corp. to have consolidated their coverage in london and new york engage in that type of journalism, and aljazeera has 16 bureaus around the world, and i think this reaffirms this. to keep people on the ground, but to keep people on the ground, you will always have the story, and that shows from the bottom all of the way to the top, and i think this is a historic moment for the network in terms of exposure. i think we're beyond the

negative exposure that we suffered in the united states. the discussion is about our coverage, about what we have to offer. it is no longer about who the aljazeera is. it is about what aljazeera is doing. fighting this perception, i think we are beyond that. it is just getting people to respond a little bit more positively. >> yes, sir? in the second row. hello, jonathan, georgetown university. i am looking at the various people on the political scene, the newly opened political scene. what is their stance on the libyan conflict and the western intervention? how is that affecting their strategies? >> i think the egyptian people, particularly the revolutionary groups, have a huge amount and the key for the people of libya

and for the pro-democracy fighters who are engaged in this fight. i think there is actually a great deal of criticism against the egyptian transitional government for not being more supportive of the libyan rebels. i mean, it had gone so far as some saying that the egyptian government should help now in this new environment, and a quick way for the egyptian government to reemerge in a credible way is by helping the rebels, by giving them material, whatever support we can offer them, and something that they should be engaged more diplomatically. the egyptian but it should take a lead in supporting the diplomatic initiative. i think what is problematic is that the egyptian government is, in itself, in a crisis and in transition and not getting a sense of clarity in terms of what it is doing. it is just beginning to korea prioritize its own national security interests, its own priorities. the prime minister just to

visited sudan. it is expected but egypt is going to recognize some of sudan. this is a area that used to be considered a superpower. they very mudslide with, you know, the opposition, if you will, in libya and the people fighting against the gaddafi regime. >> yes, right here? >> hello, candy, with a website. the way that certain people emerge as sort of icons of resistance and become a galvanizing force for their actions, there was one for libya and maybe in the last 24 hours another, and i wonder if you think it is going to take that kind of spark in, say, algeria and morocco to give more impetus to the protest there or what you think it will not happen in those two countries?

are they different somehow? >> i think the genie is out of the bottle. i do not think any arab country is a unit to what is happening. every army chief of staff is asking, "what am i going to do when this happened in my country?" but i think every country is different, because the forces at play are very different from country to country. libby is -- libya is a country where for four years or so, the duffy has -- for 40 years or so, the duffy has been enroll. there have been no parties. the forces that are at play and the tensions, this is very different. and i am not a big fan of this, but this is something we hear a lot. we hear about the tribal society, but the forces in

libya, this is not a tribal war. these people are not going along tribal lines. it is a misnomer to say this is a tribal war. i think of your korea is going to be an experience, because it had these tribal fault lines but also has institutions, so it is going to be very interesting to see, but i do not think there is an arab country that is immune to the winds of change that are blowing across the region. >> we have spent a lot of time talking abut yemen, syria, to a lesser extent jordin, but in each of these countries, the regimes are trying to quickly make reforms, and the emergency law is going to be lifted in syria, so, clearly, the regimes are trying to do what they can to relieve the pressure, stay in power.

and each country may be a little bit different, but what is your response to what those regimes are doing? too little, too late? >> i think it is too little, too late. these regimes have had decades to implement reforms without it being instigated by popular uprisings, and they chose not to. so any attempt for them to offer these reforms are widely going to be seen as attempts to hold onto their power if -- power, so the question will be, what can i do to hold on by offering these piecemeal haute concessions, these reforms? but i do not think they are resonating or have any traction with the arabs. this is not to say that it will not delay it coming to your country. it may buy new wartime, but nonetheless, the demands for change now, and when we talk about the demands of change, one of the most important parts of

that is that the fear factor has been broken. ordinary arabs, particularly in some of these countries where we see violence being used, they of overcome their fear of these regimes, so they no longer fear that the security. i do not have to tell many people hear the kind of security services that existed in egypt, but those were completely squashed in a matter of 72 hours, and i think that has become contagious. people are seeing the fact that they did it in egypt. they can do with in syria. they can do it in yemen, in morocco, algeria, and, perhaps, these countries we are talking about, let's not forget the fact that there african countries, so it could even go beyond the arab and african countries and even into african countries, themselves. >> a couple of more questions. >> hello, i am dan with cbs news, and first, our bosses want

to thank you for your work, because the aljazeera said we could use audio, so we were able to do that, and i never thought that i would say something nice about my cable company, but cox cable had outages europe. did you go to school in washington? >> i am all of the above. i was born in egypt. my parents emigrated to the u.s. after i was about five years old. i went to school right down the street at american university and got my master's and started working for nbc news right across the street from american university, and i started off with a very entry-level position. i was handing out newspapers in the morning and during phone calls. it was a great situation korea most of all, i was in all of the correspondence, but i was watching to see a people

operated in that kind of high- pressure environment. believe it or not, i was actually going to leave journalism. "i am not cut out for this." it was the summer of the shark attacks and chandra levy. my parents said that i had a master's degree, this is not what i would be doing. and then there was 9/11, and the world's changed. there was all this talk about the war in iraq the following year, so a lot of the american networks started to beef up their networks with people we spoke the language and knew the region, and that is what led me to cnn and the rest is history, as they say. >> you skipped one of his questions, which was six >> -- which was 6'8". >> 6.4".

>> there have been some preliminary signs, but anything more serious? >> the word under arrest is probably not the best way to describe. the way i looked at it is demands for change. whether that actually happened peacefully. i do think that the demands for change will happen in saudi arabia. i think even the king himself has recognized this. he has offered a huge incentive deal, $80 billion, which kind of makes you wonder where all of that money was for the last several years, but nonetheless, nonetheless, you are going to see those demands. the reason i was saying earlier that every country is different, that is because the forces that lead to these acts of civil disobedience are different. what we are seeing in bahrain, i personally do not subscribe to

it. it is not a fit. demand. their demands are for equal rights, and it is different. i think what we're seeing in yemen is different and what we are seeing in saudi arabia is different, but i am convinced that any arab country, including saudi arabia, iraq, jordan, others, they are going to demand a new equation for the citizens and the state. >> i want to thank you for your time. you have seen a career's worth of news in 6 months' time. thank you for joining us. >> thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

>> i generally think it is going to have a huge impact. >> thank you. >> egypt is a huge role. very tragic in the square. >> tomorrow, but officials and watchdog groups talk about the situation at japan's ailing nuclear power plant. live coverage from the senate energy committee begins at 10:00 eastern here on c-span, and over on c-span3, a hearing on the

civil rights of muslim americans. witnesses include thomas pressed from the justice department's civil rights division and a cardinal, the former archbishop of washington, d.c. the senate judiciary subcommittee hearing also starts a 10:00 eastern. up next, a look get libya, the middle east, and the cia, from "washington journal." this is 45 minutes. host: mike baker joins us to talk about libya and state sponsored terrorism. welcome to the program. guest: thanks very much. host: in light of the no-fly zone in libya, how much concern that gaddafi may try to exact some sort of revenge, especially on the u.s.?

guest: given his history and his past involvement in terrorism, such as the lockerbie bombing, it is a scenario that you have to be made aware of. it is of concern, particularly to the intel community in terms of monitoring what his services may be doing. there is probably a calculus going on with gaddafi. he is a very calculating survivor. he has been in place for some 42 years. you have to look at this and say, he is making the analysis that if he were to engage in some terrorist act as a result of what is happening now, it

would pretty much spell the end for him. i think he is looking at the likelihood of still being in power, with control over the western side of the country. it is a scenario that you have to be concerned about. host: how much do know about what he is thinking about what is happening in his country right now, and who is advising him o what his next move should be? guest: he has in part survived over the years by pging those who moved up through the military ranks and witn his government, once they appear to be kidding too much of a profile or their own following. at the end of the day, it is not unlike a lot of other dictators.

he relies on a very small circle, which is often his immediate family. the potential of what that means, whether we are talking about gaddafi or any other dictator is, a decreasing ability to obtain human sources that can provide insight into the plans of someone like gaddafi -- his plans, motivations, what he is actually thinking. intelligence operations want to know that about him. you have to look at the variable potential targets and people who may have information. profiled the individuals into determine who is a likely target. we have had a hard time developing quality sources in libya for a long time.

it plays out to some this -- degree to understand where this may be going on the ground. we know where it is going in the air. the air attack allows for the rebel advances. in terms of what is going on in his compound and what people are thinking? very limited. host: why is it difficult to develop thisntelligence on the ground in libya and in certain places of the middle east? guest: we do not blend. in order to develop quality sources, you would like to think you have that one-on-one

contact, an initial development, rather tn working through access to someone that has access to them. getting that person can be limited in place like libya. you can argue throughout other parts of the middle east. we have traditionally relied heavily on our foreign partners in tha part of the world to provide us with additional insight to what is going on in the inner circles. without goi too far into sources and methods and other sensitive issues, that is a look at the problem. host: we are speaking with a former cia officer. our discussiofor about the next 40 minutes will center

around the be and state sponsored terrorism. if you want to get involved, the numbers are on the screen. u can also send us messages via e-mail can't twitter. -- and twitter. tell us more about diligence llc is. guest: it is an intelligence firm. when you have my type of background, you wonder what he will do in the public sector. we provide support to multinational financial institutions, law firms, whoever may need it. it is something to do due diligence on individual

companies that another firmay be considering doing business with. a u.s. company could be worried about what their foreign competitors are doing overseas. -- they can create an unlevel playing field. it all falls into the same pocket of information that will make business dealings more transparent and more profitable and minimize the risk. host: our first call comes from louisiana on average democrat line. -- on our democratic line. caller: i am concerned with the visit of republicans meddling with a price of survival. it is written indelibly on

stone that we have had a price of survival. and we have had a government pport us. we know who the big threat was with a cold war and what not. we have to have friends of our enemies and enemies of our enemies. when we cannot exist, we would not remain. we need oil and trade and we have to sell and buy stuff. host: he made an interesting ma -- a remark. one day,he friend of your

friend is your friend, and then they are your enemy. tell us how intelligence gathering survives in a world like that where the line keeps shifting back and forth. guest: a terrific point. at the end of the day, nothing is black and white. you learn that very quickly in the intelligence world, where oftentimes your choices and who you deal with overseas is not between good and evil. it often times is between that ana less bad. egypt is a good example. b -- ad and less bad. bad.d abnd less bad.d abnd less