. that does the "washington journal for today's" we will lead back tomorrow to take more of your questions and comments. we want to bring you the senate energy and natural resources committee. they're having a hearing this morning on the nuclear reactor disaster in japan. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> ok, why don't we get started? thank you all for being here. this is a briefing, not a hearing as such. i think the reason we tried to do it as a briefing is so people would not have to file written testimony 72 hours ahead of time and all that. things are changing very quickly with regard to the evolving situation at the fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant.

while this committee does not have oversight on the safety of u.s. nuclear plants, we do have to consider how events such as those at fukushima affected the ability of our nation's nuclear freedom, 104 reactors, to supply electricity. of course, these 104 reactors currently account for about 20% of the electricity that we use and what the future of nuclear energy will be as part of our nation's energy banks. events at fukushima are changing by the our. they are serious, and we are watching those events unfold on the other side of the world. our knowledge at best is incomplete. as we look forward to these experts and forming a committee on what they see at the plant, how would impact our nation must

existing fleet of reactors, and answer questions the committee members might have. before i introduce our two -- our first panel, we have four witnesses, two on this first panel and two on the second trip before i introduced the panel, let me call on senator murkowski for comment. >> let me welcome those who are presenting today. i appreciate the time is of the hearing this morning, or this oversight this morning, as we try to better understand what is unfolding at the fukushima daiichi plant. as you pointed out, mr. chairman, it is probably too early for us to say that the situation is under control. i think that it is important to recognize that the workers there on a daily basis, the progress that is being made, all clad in a positive step, being

achieved their -- hopefully, a positive steps being achieved there, it is important to recognize and praise the courageous efforts of the workers on the ground trying to stabilize the situation. they have been going around the clock for over two weeks now, probably no doubt exhausted. at the same time, they are dealing with personal stress issues brought about by lots of love ones -- by loss of loved ones, loss of their homes. it is perhaps easy for us in this country to be sitting back and looking at the situation, picking at the issue, but we do need to keep in mind the very selfless acts that these individuals are embarking on every day as they were to prevent further damage and protect their fellow countrymen. mr. chairman, i do hope that this is an opportunity for us at the committee as well as other committees here in the congress to really take away some lessons

learned here. i will be listening with great interest this morning, and as we continue piny weeks ahead, to understand more -- continue in weeks ahead, to understand more of what is happening in this disaster. with that, i look forward to the testimony. >> thank you very much to our first panel is dr. peter lyons, who works as the acting assistant secretary, we hope to be the assistant secretary at the office of nuclear energy, and mr. bill borchardt, executive director of nuclear operations at the nuclear to the tora commission. -- nuclear regulatory commission. dr. lyons, why don't you go ahead and keep your perspective, and then mr. borchardt, and then we will have some questions. >> thank you, chairman bingaman, senator murkowski, members of the committee, for

the opportunity to be before you today to discuss the situation in japan, the department of energy's response to the situation, and research and development employment programs within my office of nuclear energy. let me briefly recap our current understanding of the still- evolving events at the push in the daiichi nuclear power plant, with its six -- the fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant, with its six nuclear reactors at. when the earthquake on march 11 to stock, operating reactors shut down in accordance with procedures did backup diesel generators started, but were damaged by the tsunami. the operating units were battery powered and continue to run the cooling ponds until the batteries were drained and a punt failed. as the reactor cores heated from radioactive decay, steam was produced. the pressure build up on that team required inventing, which released some radioactive materials. it also lowered the water level in 3 reactor pressure vessels,

reducing the cooling of the core. it appears that all three reactor cores are damaged to on an extensive. additionally, as the fuel temperature increased, a reaction took place between the zirconium fuel plaiting and his team in the water pressure vessel, producing hydrogen. it may have ignited all three reactors. products have been released through this process is. once pumper units were brought in, see water cooling was used for many days until fresh water supplies were available. some reports are that i least one of them was empty for some hybrid see what was used to cool those pools until fresh water supplies were obtained. current information suggests that the plants are in a slow recovery from the accident.

however, long-term cooling of the reactors is essential during this period, and has not been adequately beached -- reached to the best of my knowledge. a massive clean-up operation obviously remains for the future. to assist in our country's response, nuclear incident team operations center at the department of energy was properly activated, and has been continuously staffed by office of nuclear energy personnel since the accident. the focus of all activities led by the operation center has been to understand accident progression and offer advice and assistance to the japanese officials who have a direct responsibility to manage the accident and recovery. department of energy has deployed about 40 people and more than a 17,000 lbs. of equipment, including every management system and so-called consequent management response teams. the national atmospheric advisory committee has been

modeling and transport, potential transport, a radioactive materials. office of nuclear energy has established eight nuclear energy response team that is utilizing our capabilities to analyze the situation and suggest to purchase. and industry team is providing important support both in japan and here it. secretary chu and john older averaged out to laboratory directors and other scientists for technical advice. beyond our response to the accident, the research and development and deployment programs of the office of nuclear energy are highly relevant to future decisions about the potential options for nuclear power in the united states. as examples, our proposed small modular reactor program will explore designs that offer a city advantages -- save the edges, and we are conducting research and development at high temperature gas reactor designs.

our light water reactor sustainably program is exploring whether the lifetime of our operating reactors can be extended with no compromise and 60. research in fuel cycles is also within the office of nuclear energy. while we await guidance to the commission and america's nuclear future, we are conducting research and development into a broader range of options for the nation's fuel cycle, with careful attention to safety and environmental protection and non-proliferation. safety of the future systems is key to all of the program's. selected research areas, like you plaiting cannot generate hydrogen in an accident, or feel that is virtually impossible to melt, as various -- have various opobvious relevance. a hot at the laboratory will be providing in court -- important abilities to the industry that can be used to assess and improve the safety of existing

and future reactors. i fully concur with the recent statement made by deputy secretary that we view nuclear energy as an important component of the overall portfolio we are trying to build for the clean energy future. the programs at the office of nuclear energy are focused on ensuring that the option for safe nuclear power remains open to the nation brought by way of concluding these brief comments, the earthquake and the resulting tsunami brought tremendous devastation on japan. at the department of energy and throughout the administration, we will make every effort -- we are making every effort to assist the japanese people in the time of need. thank you, and i will try to answer your questions. >> thank you very much. mr. borchardt, go right ahead . >> good morning. the staff of the nrc is deeply

saddened by the events in japan. i and my colleagues have had close professional interaction with our regulatory tunnel parts in japan and we would like to extend our condolences to them. we are mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public of the city of the american people. we have been very closely monitoring the activities in japan and we are reviewing all available information. review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, allow us to say with confidence that the u.s. plants continue to operate safely. there has been no reduction in the licensing oversight function of the nrc as it relates to any of the u.s. licensees, notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided as a result of the events in japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities. on friday, march 11, an earthquake hit japan, resulting

in the shutdown of more than attend reactors. from what we know now, it appears that the reactors' response to the earthquake went according to design. the ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating current power to six units at the fukushima daiichi site. it is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. it is our assessment at this time that units one, two, and a three have experience some degree of cord damage, and that they are currently stable and being cooled with fresh water. units two and three appeared to have some primary containment damage. there have been releases of radioactivity that are of significant concern, including a significant contamination in the lower levels of unit two and unit three turbines. the spent fuel pulls on units

one and through four have expressed varying water levels but have also been alsoseawater from helicopters -- but have also been receiving seawater from helicopters and space systems. they're trying to change all the units from fire trucks to normal pumping in the next few days. tokyo electric power co. is restoring the electric power to the site, and to the six reactor control rooms. the situation in general continues to further stabilize, although there are many hurdles that remained. shortly after 4:00 in the morning on friday, march 11, the nrc emergency operations center made the first call to inform management of the earthquake brought we went into the monitoring of mode at the center as the first concern was for a possible tsunami impact on u.s. plants and radioactive materials on the west coast in

hawaii, alaska, and the u.s. territories in the pacific. on that same day, we began actions with our japanese resort counterparts and dispatched two experts to japan to help at the u.s. embassy. by monday, march 14, we dispatched a total of 11 staff to japan. we subsequently rotated in additional staff to continue our on-the-ground activities. the areas of a focus for nrc in japan or to assist the japanese government with technical support as part of the u.s. aid response, to support the u.s. ambassador. while our focus now is on helping japan in any way we can, the experience will also help us to assess the implications for u.s. citizens in as timely a manner as possible. let me also noted that in

concluding and this section of my remarks that the u.s. government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across the country of nuclear power plants and the environmental protection agency's system that there is no reason for concern in the u.s. regarding radioactive releases from japan. i will now turn to the factors that assure us of on going domestic safety. we have since the beginning of the regulatory program in the united states accused the philosophy of the defense and debt, which it rrecognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, an operation, and safety does not rely on any single level in order to protect the public health and safety. there are multiple physical barriers that efficient products release every reactor design, the on that, there are diverse and redundant systems that are required to be

maintained in an operable condition, and they are frequently protested to be enjoyed at the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario. beyond this, we've taken advantages of lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement. we have learned from the experiences across a wide range of situations, including the three mile island accident in 1979. as a result of those lessons learned, we have significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures. we have addressed many human factors regarding how control room employees operate the plant, and we have added new requirements for hydrogen control to prevent explosions inside the container. we also created requirements for enhanced control room displays showing the status of palms and valves -- pumps and valves. we have a system that manages

the monitoring of radiation released. one of the most significant changes since two mile island was a program that has at least two full time nsc employees at every site with unfettered access to all activities 24 hours a day, seven days a week. as a result of the operating experience and ongoing research programs, we have developed requirements for severe accident management guidelines. our program of continuous improvement based on it is operating experience will now include evaluation of the significant events in japan. we have begun enhancing inspection activities to temporary instructions through our inspection staff to look at the licensees' readiness to look at design-basis accident and beyond design-basis accidents. we have issued an inflammation notice to licensees to make them aware of events in japan and

requiring them to verify capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents. over the past 20 years, there have been a number of the new rule makings that enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness against some of the problems we are seeing and japan. the stations' blackout rule requires every plant in the country to evaluate what the response would be worded to lose alternating current so that it can respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site. the hydrant rule requires modification to reduce the impact of hydrogen generated beyond the design basis event. regarding the type of containment design used for the most heavily damaged plant in japan, we've had a boiling water reactor marquand containment improvement program since the late 1980's. this does require the installation of hardened vent

systems for continued pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability for the automatic depressurization system. the chairman of the nrc, with full support of the commission, has directed the staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct immethodical and systematic review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and make recommendations to the commission for its policy direction. this activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives. for the near term, we will begin a 90-day review. this review will evaluate all of the currently available information from the japanese event to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting any of the 104 operating reactors, including their spent fuel pools.

up in this edition include ability to protect against natural disasters, response to blackouts, the spent fuel accident progression, radiological consequence analysis, and severe accident management. over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations as appropriate for changes to the inspection program, licensing guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory requirements are needed. the task force's longer term review will begin as soon as the nrc as sufficient information from events in japan to the task force will evaluate all the technical and policy issues related to the fed to identify additional potential research -- related to the fed to identify additional the dental research, changes to the oversight program, or rulemaking, or adjustment to. the. the appropriate recommendations

will be provided to the commission within six months of the start of this evaluation. both of the 90-day report and the final report will be made publicly available in accordance with the normal commission procedures. in conclusion, i want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the u.s. fleet our top priority, and that u.s. plants continue to operate safely. at the same time, we are undertaking a thorough look at the events in japan and the lessons for us. based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the u.s. nuclear power plant. thank you. >> well, thanks to both of you for that testimony. let me start with questions, and we will have five-minute round of questions. fukushima daiichi plant, let me ask -- there have

been reports of high levels of radioactive water, radioactivity in the water that is found in that turban building -- turbine buildings' basements. do we know what the source of at random act of water is, and extent of the problem -- source of the radioactive water is, and extent of the problem going forward, either of you? >> yes, while we have a very limited information on this, as with many other aspects, we believe that the water is the result of the bleed and feed process they have been using to keep water in the reactor cores and in containment of the unit's. is leaking out, the exact flow path of that the ditch has not been determined -- the exact flow path of the leakage has not been determined. but the result of the water they had been injecting since shortly after the onset of the event.

>> i would add to that, senator -- as i noted, it is essential that they distort dependable long-term cooling to those system -- that they restore the by the long term glee to those systems. -- restore dependable long term cooling to those systems. >> let me ask about the thrust to use passive safety features and designs and get to a point where, if power fails, you don't have this kind of potential for crisis that we have seen occur in japan. to what extent are we trying to ensure that those passive-type designs and systems and safety features d put in place in our

nuclear power plants? >> well, in the united states, there are two principal reactor designs called passive designs, and the reason they are called passive is they don't rely on alternating current in order to respond to an end of this magnitude. there is no pumps that need to start and run off of alternating current. any of valves that need to change position change because of the stored air, a pneumatic system, or off a battery power supply. once they are running, they rely on natural processes like a gravity in order to create a water flow to keep the court will. these are designs that have undergone extensive nrc review. they are receiving approval. in fact, there are designs that

are being planned for construction in the united states that utilize this design concept. >> and i'm right in thinking that none of the 104 currently operating plants have these design features in them at the current time? is that right? >> that is correct. >> yes, dr. lyons? >> just a comment that the small modular reactors are of great interest looking into the future, and in our program, each of the small water systems proposed is a highly passive system. that is certainly one of the aspects that we look towards items of the potential for the future of the small modular systems as well. >> ok. mr. borchardt, let me ask you on re-licensing. there are quite a few nuclear power plants in this country that are scheduled for re-

licensing, or ride least are applying for re-licensing in the next few years. to what extent do you think that this development in japan will impact upon the actions of the nuclear regulatory commission on thosere-licensing applications? is there any way to judge that at this point? >> well, senator, as you mentioned, over half of the 104 operating reactors in the united states have already received a license renewal for an additional 20 years of operation. we expect that the other half will continue with either ian in-process review or the will apply for renewal in the future. it is our intent through the lessons programs and our continuous operational oversight

of the operating fleet that if there was a design change necessary in order to adapt to the plants to what we are learning from japan, we would take that action, absent or outside of the license renewal review process. we would take that without hesitation. there is no technical reason that i am aware of that is what impact the license renewal process for the remaining plants in the u.s. >> thank you. senator murkowski. >> mr. borchardt, you mentioned the task force and the 90-day review that you will be undertaking here. so much of what we needed to learn, of course, we are not able to know at this point in time because we cannot safely go into the facility. do we have any idea how long we

are looking at to get these units cool down so that we can enter the area, examined the reactors, look at the spent fuel? what do you anticipate? >> i cannot even hazard a guess on how long that will be. the reason we are approaching the nanny-gate lessons learned immediately is that we do not one -- to wait 90-state lessons learned is that we do not want to wait to evaluate. there are things we need to evaluate immediately and that is why we are beginning that review. >> just as a possible addition to that, the department has provided information to the government of japan on radiation capabilities available in the country. asia and is being readied -- a shipment is being readied -- i do not know if that has left yet, but there will be a hydrogen robotics available soon

as i could provide some of the information you are asking about. certainly not all we need, but some. >> do i understand correctly that japan did not have any of the robotics that we are making available to them at this time? >> i cannot speak to whether such it capabilities are available in japan. i can only speak that the government of japan has been very interested in understanding the capabilities that can be brought to bear from this country, and we have provided that information and day out identified needs and we are moving expeditiously to ship not only the robots but also operators who perhaps will be used to train a japanese operators not how we don't know yet how close -- to train japanese operators. we don't know yet how close they will be to the site. >> let me ask about the decision making process at the nrc to evacuate u.s. residents.

the decision was made for evacuation with the 50-mile radius within the reactor itself. of course, that initially, the determination from the japanese was that it was 12.5 miles, then they wanted to -- they bumped it to 19 miles. can you tell me how the decision was reached? how did you conclude that 50 miles was the appropriate evacuation range? >> the fact is taken into consideration include all the indications that we have a strong belief that there was likely fuel damage in three reactors, there is degraded water level conditions in at least two of the spent fuel pool at the time, and that there were elevated radiation releases from those plants. given the uncertainty -- given

those realities, and then given the uncertainty of the progression at the time, we ran some models to see what kind of releases would be possible under those scenarios, and made a conservative decision that although the conditions and did not exist at that instant to require an evacuation, we thought that it was the conservative and occurred in a recommendation to make -- conservative and prudent recommendation to make. >> you mentioned at the monitoring we have in place. alaska -- we understand -- i hope all three are up right now. but there is a lot of concern about what may end up in our oceans, impact to the fisheries.

do we have radiation monitors off of honshu that are measuring anything in the ocean? or is it just monitors that are evaluating the air? >> the department of energy systems, as far as i mentioned, the airborne system that is monitoring ground contamination, but not over the ocean. the epa has made the monitors that you mentioned in alaska and hawaii has added several additional monitors. i am not aware of monitoring capability within the notion that we have -- with in a deep ocean that we have. that could be added if it was deemed necessary. i should add that the department of energy, through the calculational capabilities, using the source terms developed by the regulatory commission as being the worst cases, we do not

anticipate a significant health act in any of the united states areas. >> thank you. mr. chairman. >> senator udall. >> thank you for being here. we of learned that just because an event is improbable does not mean it is impossible. in that spirit, let me turn to the design of the spent fuel pools. it seems like, based on what you've told us this morning, that was a key part of the ongoing crisis at daiichi. i understand that the same design is employed at almost 1/4 power plants in the u.s. it seems like this is a design flaw. i'm surprised we have not addressed it previously, but what are we doing now and what can we do to address it in the months and years ahead? >> well, even after the events

of 9/11, th e nrc took a concerted review effort to the address to risks at the plant -- review effort to look at this at the plant regardless of cause. keeping water injected into the muscle to keep the core cool -- there are a number of procedures and pieces of equipment that can be put into place in order to keep the spent fuel pool full. that has been greatly enhance, as well as having backup systems and power supplies to do the same thing. >> dr. lyons, you have bought both on the point of view of the department of energy, -- you have thoughts both on the point of view of the department of energy, but i would be interested in your view of how to make fuel rod systems safer

moving forward. >> senator udall, i was on the nrc as he conducted many of those evaluations extremely carefully with the existing spent fuel pools. using the best information available at the time, both storch systems were deemed to be safe -- both storage systems were deemed to be safe. i look to the review conducted by that nrc -- as bill said, the pools will be part of that review non to whether there will be any suggestions for changes, i will await their work here. i do not have concerns based on the nrc studies to date. >> i know you have an official plan of you, personally, do you have any thoughts on how we might make spent fuel storage rods safer in the future? thinking creatively, thinking as

the engineer that i know you are? >> senator udall, i think my comments would say that we should await a review of hte nrc -- of the nrc. we include within our programs research on the longevity of storage, and that may prove to be relevant in these discussions. but that would be the main area that i can think of offhand that would be applicable to your question. >> i believe there is a design where the spent fuel rods are stored in the basement or at a lower level -- >> yes, that will be the case -- i'm sorry. >> talk about the engineering challenges to do so. i happen to believe that it is easiest to bring the fuel rods out of the reactor at the top and move them at the same level into the spent fuel rods, but there are five or six stories in the air and gravity works

against us in that situation. >> bill will help me on this, but i believe all the pressurized reactors in this country utilize it ground level or near-ground level storage, and knowing your interest in the small modular reactors with their underground the siding -- a grounds -- underground siting, the intent there is that it would be stored well underground at the. as sites >> i appreciate you mentioning that engineering approach. mr. borchardt? >> it is the difference to the boiling water reactors that are of great, and the ones that are near ground level, really just one of the original design philosophy during the early development of those designs, probably in the 1950's and 1960's. there isn't really a technical barrier that would prevent a change in that configuration for

a new design. >> my time is about to expire, but this is obviously a very timely topic and i look forward to working with you moving forward as we look at what happened. we are all frustrated with the various kinds of information that is often covcontradictory, out of japan, and i want you to comment on how we can do a better job on the situation in our own country not doubt that has added to the sense that this is out of control -- situation in our own country. it has added to the sense that this is out of control and that the improbable as the possible. >> senator corker. >> thank you for having his grieving, and the two -- for the -- thank you for having this briefing, and two of you for being here. senator udall went down a line of questioning that is similar to mine. on the quarter of reactors we

have that are boiling water reactors in the country, is it your sense that over the course of time, we have done things to alleviate the same type of risk in our own country? >> yes, sir. as i mentioned, we have done a number of improvements to the design. some were not specific to boiling water reactors, but included both pressurized and boiling water reactors, like the station blackout rule, which looks at the loss of alternating current, complete loss. there are things that are specific to boiling water reactors, the way to relieve pressure from inside the containment, that is a design improvement. we required inside the containment to prevent the possibility of explosion by having the containment inerted with nitrogen. generically, with all reactor

designs, we look at severe accident mitigation guidelines. these are programs and procedures, pieces of equipment, that exist in the plants that say that even with all the careful design and design requirements we have imposed, what if the unthinkable still happens? we should have the systems in place to adopt that, and so we have done those at all of the plants in the country. >> so, knock on wood as i ask this question -- my sense is that you might see nothing that has occurred in japan and thus far that you have not already tried to engineer or a change in our own existing facilities of that nature. >> i would say that is true, but that is why we're doing this extensive both short-term and long-term review, to do a thorough analysis to make sure we're not missing something. >> you asked about the storage situation, and we had a debate in this country that is sort of stalled out at present, all

we've looked at a national repository. one of the reasons we have this spent fuel rods on-site as we've done in this country is we never came to an agreement about what we might do with them over the long haul. are there any editorial comments you might make about regional or national repository's? >> senator corker, the main comment i would make is that the secretary create it the blue ribbon commission to look at the back end of the fuel cycle to approve a possible repository processing issues. that commission, which includes a number of utechnical and other leaders from around the country, is fairly close to the interim report and has abated in july -- interim report, anticipated in july. i'm hopeful that that report will provide input and suggestions and guidelines as the nation moves forward with this challenge.

>> but you don't want to state what you help those guidelines will say, i guess. it will be interesting to see, and certainly at some point, to hear comments about a catastrophe of this nature happening and how that might have affected things if they had a different type of storage mechanism. back to the small modular reactors, they utilize more of a natural cooling process. i, too, am very interested in that technology and i hope we're getting ready to move ahead. these are reactors where u.s. engineering can be more redeployed and certainly with lesser capital up front. -- more readily deployed and certainly with lesser capital up front. that natural cooling process that occurs -- is there anything about this recent disaster that makes you feel that might be more sick or less safe? have you learned anything from

the japanese incident regarding them? >> i don't know specific from the japanese incident, but in general, as we discussed earlier, those small modular reactors that we are interested in what have highly passive systems. they would rely, as mr. borchardt already noted, on gravity and conventio -- and convection. one obvious concern in japan has been at the loss of the pumping capability. that would not be an issue for a highly passive system such as we are exploring. >> so what you are saying is that some of the failures that have occurred recently in japan likely would not occur with these smu's? >> at least small modular reactors would not depend on the use of pumps in an accident situation. that is one very, very major difference. designs and japan are very much

dependent -- the designs in japan are very much dependent on those pumping capabilities. >> the japanese ministry of economy and try to sort of does -- they sort of do both sides of the equation, but they promote japanese nuclear product. they also regulate them. have you seen any issue their beverly its to lack of oversight because of that will mandate -- any issue there that relates to lack of oversight because of that dual mandate? >> we are not aware. there is a strong focus nationally about the independence of the regulator. there was recently a iaea review done and they did not identify any of that interference concern that you are referring to. >> thank you. >> senator frank and. >> -- senator franken. >> thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

in a report by the national academies, they recommended that the spent fuel rods stored in pools on site should be arranged to place old, cool fuel rods next to a newer, hotter rods to prevent hot spots and fires in the event that people's lost water to cover -- the pools lost water to cover the rods. in an editorial in "the washington post," they wrote that despite these regulations, no such action has been taken in the united states and japan. there are plans to review these regulations and possibly implement them. >> a senator, i believe, and perhaps you can ask the next panel, but i believe it is common practice to do such a thing at the plants in the united states, that there is a

movement of the fuel in order to optimize storage conditions in the spent fuel pool. >> that is at odds with what was written in "the post," and i will ask the next panel. we have a nuclear plant in minnesota that basically is the same design as the fukushima reactors. you know, we are not going to probably have an earthquake in minnesota, probably, if we have a tsunami there, we would have bigger problems -- [laughter] but we do have floods. is there any chance that the back of a generation in places like prairie island in minnesota

could be overwhelmed by an forseen levels of flooding? >> monticello and every other plant in the country has an extensive review done before original licensing that looks at that specific site and looks at the historical records for things like flooding, tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and as a review using that historical record to make sure that the plants can respond to all kinds of natural events that happen. >> do they do those kinds of produce in japan? > -- reviews in japan? >> i cannot speak to that id some of the design bases they consider factors, but licensing site reviews,. i don't know >> what i -- wouldn't that be a good thing to know? >> certainly. yes, sir.

>> ok, i would suggest hopping right on that. in terms of the cost of nuclear power, how the events -- have the events in the fukushima changed any sense of what the costs of nuclear power is vis-a- vis other sources of electricity? either of you? >> that remains for the results of the nrc evaluation. to the extent that they identify needed changes, that might change the cost equation. i cannot speculate now. >> ok, fine. we have if you reactors -- a few reactors -- we have a very large earthquake and tsunami. are there any reactors in the

united states, say, a california, that are built near faults and oceans? or just one ocean? [laughter] >> well, of course there are, and as i mentioned in my previous answer, we do is look at the earthquake history for the plants in california, for example, and do an evaluation of the distance and conditions that would be felt on the site. you have to consider what kind of the soil and permissions exist between the fall line and the plant and get down to how much emotion you will see at the plant. the systems have to be -- how much motion you will see at the plant. the systems have to be designed to withstand that motion and more. that is part of the design

basis, and every plant, therefore, has its own design phases and its own requirements based upon its specific geographic location. >> again, your testimony is you are not aware of whether or not they did the same kind of analysis in japan. >> that's right. i can't speak to the japanese design criteria. >> ok, because my feeling is that they didn't expect this. thank you. >> senator barrasso. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for being here today. there will be on the lessons learned from this tragedy. the situation on the ground still is evolving. focus clearly is on helping the japanese people get through this disaster, and it is good to see secretary chu publicly assuring americans that people of the united states are in no danger from this tragedy.

senator corker talked about needs to finalize a long-term solution for storage of nuclear waste, and the administration has stopped the long-term nuclear storage facility and has created the blue ribbon commission to look at the problem. as you discussed, he said we would have a report possibly in july. fundamentally, is it safer to store nuclear waste in temporary storage facilities around the country, or in the permanent disposal site? dr. lyons? >> the way i would respond is that the nrc would even i would both can be made safe, -- would evaluate both can be made safe, and their requirements would he ensure that safety. >> when you talk about the report -- that the use said, hopefully soon, july, what do you think the commission would have the opportunity to learn

the lessons of what we see happening in japan and to apply those, or would we have a report they have been working on and would be ready to put out from preparation prior to the current disaster we are studying? >> senator barrasso, i don't have detailed information on what they will have in the report. that should be left up to them. but the report in july, the so- called interim report, due july 29. the plan after the interim is to allow six months for public comment, and the final report in january of next year. in response, then, to your question, there is a very adequate time for the brc to take whatever lessons may be necessary for japan and incorporated in the final, if not the interim. >> the more recent news -- reuters reported this morning that the tone and has been found in soil near the nuclear complex

-- plutonium has been found in soil near the nuclear complex. it may indicate a bridge in the containment mechanism. can you speak to that? >> the reports i saw reported trees level of plutonium -- trace levels of plutonium. the report i saw, it is debatable what those derived from. all operating reactors, whether they start with any plutonium in the fuel or not, build up plutonium in the course of operation. finding plutonium that was derived from either the operating reactors were the spent fuel pools would not be regarded as a major surprise. certainly, it would be a concern if it were in significant levels. at least anything i've seen, it was not significant at this point. >> in "the new york times"

today, it reported that highly contaminated water -- senator bingaman commented on this -- could leak into the ocean. what are the implications of that? >> well, certainly that has to be monitored from the standpoint of fisheries and food products. there are other agencies in our government would be tracking whether there were any concerns a u.s. perspective on that, and the japanese have adequate resources to be verifying that from their own standpoint. i think it is fair, certainly from the department of energy cost standpoint and i would guess that nrc's standpoint, that our focus is on controlling and stabilizing the accident and trying to move towards a situation where we can see a long-term path towards eventual resolution, whenever that may be. our focus has not to be on that

particular issue, but it may be for other agencies and the japanese government. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator coats. >> thank you for the testimony. pulled me out a little bit here, because i am somewhat -- new to all h -- help me out a little bit here, because i'm somewhat new to all this and i don't pretend to be an expert in any sense of the word. we keep seeing the news reports that come out, and the public reacts in a way that potentially, i think, could undermine any kind of consensus- building for the place of nuclear energy in addressing energy needs in the future, whether it is here in the united states or elsewhere in the world. obviously, the carbon footprint of the nuclear plant is extraordinarily less, or virtually nothing, compared to other sources of energy. a wrong perception or conclusion in terms of how we should go forward with nuclear energy

possibilities for our country and others could lead to some very significant consequences in a whole number of wise. -- ways. i am trying to get my head around a little bit what we see in the paper every or what we see on tv every day, every time a plum of steam escapes, it is immediately on the networks. the headlines talk about things that had just been mentioned here. plutonium potentially leaking into the sea water, so forth and so on. then we read about news that has come out about babies should not be drinking milk in tokyo, vegetables may be contaminated. give me some perspective in terms of levels of radiation, where we need to be concerned as opposed to those where it is

something that is not of such a serious nature. for instance, in your testimony, dr. lyons, i believe it was, basically stated that some of the level of detection in the united states emanating from the japanese coast line -- we get 100,000 more radiation, units of radiation or however measures you do, just simply from natural causes -- rocks, sun, buildings, etc. i am trying to put this in perspective, because when you look at the paper, 100,000 times more -- that is what was recorded in tokyo relative to vegetables. is this something that should cause us the kind of concern that we are having? i'm just trying to put it in better perspective. >> there have been several press releases from the department of energy trying to assist with the

general point that you are making, senator. you are indeed right to be essentially live in -- that we essentially live in a sea of radiation and we have exposures of 300 miller and to natural causes and a year, and the mg is a natural unit and a flight of around the country, you pick up 300 simply from that flight. it is important, and we have certainly tried and we will continue to put into perspective the radiation levels that are measured. i do not mean to suggest that there are not harmful levels. dta and others have to find a so-called protection action guidelines -- the epa and others have defined a so-called protection action guidelines. levels in the united states are

many, many orders of attitude below anything close to a protective action guidelines. in japan, and they want to be much more careful -- they will have to be much more careful to of is their version of protective action guidelines. >> there continuing to take samples, readings, and we have not seen any readings that would be any concern at all to public safety. >> to quantify that slightly more commonly of the aerial monitoring system which takes camass measurements. just to give you one figure, within to board 5 miles of the side, -- within a 2.5 miles of this side, they're not been higher than 20 per hour. they have gone down.

levels ofasuring radiation and that is available on the d.o.t. web site, available to the japanese and we're trying to share that as much as possible. >> i do not think that has been that shared. so within what circumference? >> there are certainly higher levels closer than that, but our crews are not going in a closer. 30 per hour. >> in perspective to the danger level? >> in one year, it is 100.

30 would be the maximum you would spend at that, three hours. that is the highest dose observed. >> within 2.5 miles? >> yes, but on the side is much higher. >> the perspective and that these types levels are flowing the nation of japan, reaching the west coast, and i think it is important to put it in that perspective. >> thank you, germany. men and thinking to the panel -- thank you chairman bingaman. i will reaffirm that i think there is broad concern about irradiation, dosages, and i am sure you are far more familiar than i am. general confusion about orders of magnitude and possible impact. i happen to represent a state

that has no nuclear facilities but is within 50 miles of four others. one of which is of the design of the reactor in question. as i understand reading and listening today, one of the areas of action has to do with the battery power and backup power. the unique circumstances may not occur in the united states, but there are other circumstances that may give rise to the need for a more than 48 hours back of scenario. what are you doing to look up battery -- to look at backup battery capacity for the spent fuel rods especially given deep lack of a clear path forward for spent fuel rods in the united states?

>> these are exactly why we're putting together these lessons learned. we will be looking at the blackout rule which require a review of the coping capability along the u.s. reactors to look at the operating current and then what capabilities exist at all the 104 reactors to see if we need to strengthen the regulatory requirement. one of the obvious questions is it do we need an enhanced battery supply? one that can last longer? we already have seized -- tested and there is a day tank that provides fuel oil that is provided. there is a robust capability already, but given what we have a learned, the obvious question

is do we need to make it even more robust and strong? that will be part of the review we are doing. >> i am glad to hear that as part of the review and i'm glad to hear there was a prompt move to the top to bottom review nationally. my causing concern which is be to urge you to magna whatever the outcome of understand this is an industry that of all the defendant to stringent regulatory review -- an industry that is subject to stringent regulatory review. we need to address legitimate concerns and focus on the specific value mechanisms here and make sure that we deal with spent fuel and how it is happening so that it could not lead to another. >> we have done a thorough evaluation that storage in the wet fuel for a dry storage,

which many are using, both provide adequate safety. >> are spent fuel have a global -- have a lower back standard? >> they require a circulating pump, but there will be many days, as long as there is no damage, but it would take many days to heat up to a point to where you would lose water level. some of the regulatory things to put in place after 9/11 where other back of waste water into the pool using fire hoses and other things that are not hard applied to the defense fuel.

you just need to keep water and the poll -- pool full to protect the integrity of. >> senator lee? >> i thank you both for your testimony. >> i suspect you would agree that the people in japan are doing the best job they can to deal with this situation. as you look at it, is there anything different you would have done than what was done in japan to deal with this disaster? >> as part of the standard procedures the nrc would go through to say nothing of the special review committee would

be a very careful lessons learned whether it is three mile island, 9/11, there are always lessons learned. that needs to be done in this case as well. we did not have enough detail now to really do that. as the tail becomes available to understand in detail and understand whether an alternative sequence in steps could have been more effective. that is a little premature and we're very much focused on trying to help them with restoring the cooling which is almost independent of the accident sequence that got us here. they need to restore back drilling. >> are you fairly confident

that once rare reviewed all of that and have had a chance to review the post-mortem that you will be in a position to evaluate whether it's the same thing or the exact same set of environmental conditions happened there, if we would be able to withstand them without a meltdown or the release of radiation that occurred there? >> badri slightly different. as we indicated, for each plant there is an assessment. depending on this, one will of god with different natural phenomenon. there has to been another track -- and other check of what those will be. >> i the question about dealing with spent fuel, following up on

what my colleagues have asked. can either you tell me what the biggest single impediment is to our using spent fuel reprocessing in the united states as wasn't approach to take -- as one approach to take it? >> reprocessing is one of the issues we will be studying. and will be part of the recommendations. it is not obvious to me whether reprocessing or not will have dramatically changed at least what we have seen to date. from the u.s. perspective and with in my office we have a range of research programs looking in different potential options resolutions.

that research, guided by the rnc, will allow us to consider things for the future. >> in the meant time, -- meantime, onsite storage will be sustainable? guest: i was -- >> i was at the nrc when they did the tests. i admit i had never seen a spent fuel cask. they are impressive structures. i have great confidence in the safety of the dry cask storage. we have research programs trying to understand how long a duration one should

consider. we do not know what the upper bound is. >> thank you. >> 7 dermot caskey, did you have other questions or should we go to the second panel -- senator murkowski? >> no further questions. >> we will allow the second panel to come forward. >> and david lochbaum, director of nuclear power project with the union of concerned scientists. also mr. anthony pietrangelo, i think i have the pronunciation correct from a senior vice president and a nuclear officer with the nuclear energy institute. mr. pietrangelo, did i pronounce your name correctly? thank you.

mr. lochbaum, if you would like to proceed with your testimony, then we will have a few questions. >> of the fukushima die ag plans to experienced a station -- the fukushima nuclear plant experienced a blackout. the normal power supply energizes of the equipment needed to operate the plant on a daily basis as well as the emergency culminated in an accident. when i normal power supply is lost, the back of comes on with emergency diesel generators that provide electricity needed to cool the reactor cores. at fukushima, this caused the normal power supply to the cause and the tsunami caused the

backup power to be lost. batteries provided it is sufficient power to cool the reactor cores on units one, two, and three. there were no cooling system for the spent fuel cores. some have been damaged by overheating. had they been restored before the batteries were depleted, we would not have been here today. there are lessons that can and should be applied and i cannot emphasize enough that these apply to all reactors and not as the boiling water reactors that those affected that fukushima. none are yet to black out problems and all must be bit less vulnerable. they're designed to cope for blastoff lasting eight hours, as

were those in japan. 93 are designed to cope for only four hours. one lesson from fukushima's the need to provide workers for options with dealing with a prolonged gestation blackout. anyone who enters in the station blackcap condition, response efforts should respond on parallel paths. first, restoration as soon as possible. recovery of the generators as soon as possible, and then acquisition of batteries or temporary generators as soon as possible. the theater of the first two paths lead to success, then they conclude the reactor core. it's the first two paths lead to failure, success on the third leads enough time for the first two to be achieving related success. the time line associated with the third path should determine whether additional batteries are required at existing facilities. for example, existing battery

life may be sufficient when a reactor is located where temporary generators are available such as one in the california which is right next to for pendleton. it may be needed to increase to the thought that the third path leads to success. one reminder in walls vulnerability of spent fuel pools. all of them have more than what exists in the reactor core. all reactors have less reliable systems that are provided. at zero u.s. reactors, it is housed with less containment. this to be an undue hazard. there are two simple measures that can be taken to better manage this risk.

move them into dry storage or upgrade the guidelines for how to address an emergency and provide operator training for spent fuel pool problems. currently the spent strategy is to build the pool to capacity and then transfer them to dry storage. this keeps the fuel called at capacity. -- pool at capacity. less of irradiated fuel generates a lower heat load. it gives more time to the workers to restore cooling or the water inventory in the spent fuel pool. if the irradiated fuel the become damaged, having less any means the radioactive cloud would be much smaller. following the accident at three

mile, they significantly upgraded emergency procedures and training. prior to that accident, the procedures relied on the reactors diagnosing when happened and taking steps. if they misdiagnosed the accident from the guidelines could lead them to taking the wrong steps for the actual accident they face. today's procedures guide the response to a normal high pressure without undue regard for what happened. these revamp emergency procedures have improved procedures before three mile. no comparable procedures would help them respond to a spent fuel accident. it is imperative that the considerable emergency procedures be provided as they help protect us against the reactor core accidents. thinking. -- thank you. >> mr. pietrangelo, go ahead.

>> our thoughts are with the japanese, our friends and colleagues in the area and the seven struggling with trying to bring this to save condition. senator murkowski, i akko your thoughts. i cannot imagine what it is like to be hit by a massive earthquake, a tsunami, and then the nuclear fallout. there are doing all that they can. there have been questions about could this happen here and what are the events that could bring us to this similar condition in japan. what i would like to say is that the positions that go on to the licensing of our plants, but for the people at the station, and almost does not matter whether it is an earthquake, tsunami, flood, hurricane, a tornado, equipment failure, operator error, a manufacturing defect.

all of those areas are reviewed before the nrc before you can get a license. if you got there were combination of those that put you in a station blackout or concerns were you can i get cooling to the core, that is why we prepare the way we do. we are ready for those kinds of measures. i want to start with the practice steps we have taken to basically look at severe accidents and what goes into what we've prepare for in terms of these events. originally, the demonstration had to be that you could place the plant in a safe condition given the extreme device basis. since that time, we have gone beyond the design basis and we have used risk assessment to look at combinations of initiating event coming human failure, other action, that could damage the core and what

we can do to responded to those. we have identified vulnerabilities and i agree with the suggestion that looking at severe management accident -- management. we have some measures in place, but not to the extent for the reactors. the president got it right on march 17th. these designs have been exhaustively reviewed, but it is incumbent upon the national atomic agency and operators all over the world to fully understand your lessons learned that have come data fukushima and apply them. i do want to talk about the improvements we have put in place. i mentioned the pra improvements. after 9/11, we did a lot of impacts and seeing what measures

could be put in place. this goes into some of the station blackout measures in the ability to get water into the primary containment. this included getting sprays to the pool and a connection to pipes for existing equipment. it is a great radiation shield and you can go to any pool without any protective clothing on whatsoever. depending on the age and how

long it's been in there, it would take weeks to boil off the inventory. there is typically 30 feet. that's a long time to deal with the event. one thing i can so going forward, is that our hallmark is learning. boutearned a lot from tmi a design enhancements.w we have started to get the lessons learned already. we will enhance safety across the industry. thank you. >> thank you both for your testimony. mr. lochbaum, what are your

thoughts about the testimony in the first panel about the station blackout rule that the nrc has put in place that presumably would could delay some safety precautions about the loss of power or the consequences from loss of power of the obscene in the case of the japanese plan stocks could you give us your views as to the adequacy of that blackout rule and whether it does what it should do? >> the station blackout rule was to the nrc's credit. with japan showed us is that when the van last longer than our thoughts commission not give

the operators with no choices. when the blackout lasted longer than eight hours, they were left with no options. the reactor cores in the spent fuel pools were overheated and damaged. we need to do a better job of increasing reliability. we need to provide the operators with something else if those options fail so they're not left with any options other than a miracle. they're great, but you can rely on them. we need to increase the odds that things should be prepared about the restoration of power. i think we can do that. i do not think it is difficult. japan should the price of not doing that. it is cheap and insurance to go

ahead and do that. >> mr. pietrangelo, a thought on any of those comments? >> that is an obvious place we will have to look at. the dean at the event in japan with the earthquake and the tsunami destroying all of the infrastructure around the plant, that was a massive failure of all of the backup emergency diesel generators. it is hard to postulate that here. and is very, very unlikely to occur and also destroy the entire infrastructure around the plant such that you cannot get help soon. we are already looking and trying to stage equipment regionally. we have done locally in response to 9/11 said the vote we can go beyond the station blackout and provide cooling. -- so that we can go beyond the station blackout. we will take a hard look at that this is what resources would be necessary. it is pretty remote that you would get that kind of failure

across all the systems. this was predicated on getting sufficient time to restore a sea park on the grid or when the emergency diesel generators back. >> mr. pietrangelo, and let me ask about when statement. "a better strategy would be to reduce the inventory of the irradiated fuel in the polls to the minimum amount which would be the fuel discharged from the reactor core within the past five years and reducing the spent fuel would lower the risk in a couple of ways." he goes into that. have you looked at that recommendation? >> it is not a new recommendation. as a result of the the schimel, we need to take a hot good look at how we managed spent fuel -- as a result of the fukushima, we need to look at how we manage

and fuel. the issue is with spent fuel. we do not know exactly what happened in those spent fuel pools yet. this will be specifically focused on the risk for uncovering of fuel and what happens. nevertheless, wide -- while there would be some risk reduction in the unloading the spent fuel rods after five-six years from the precious old fuel is where the heat load and the radio toxicity is. you would still have some risk of going forward so the problem does not go away and it is a marginal reduction in risk when you do so. >> senator murkowski? >> just to follow up on this.

the decay radiation in the spent fuel that we are moving and saying after five years we're going to move this, we are still going have a level of radiation there. do we know what kind of decay radiation we have? understanding that, do we have to design some kind of a new cap to contain the radiation? how do we deal with it? either one of the. >> there are hundreds of the tasks around the country -- of casks around the country. we can use the ones certified by the nrc. we want to facilitate that use. >> so we do not have to do that

much in terms of new technologies? we just move it quicker? >> that is correct. >> let me ask you a question about the use of seawater as excellent. --re now in the process seawater as coolant. there was been questions about the corosive nature of the salt. maybe this was best asked of the two before you, but can either of you speak to this issue about whether or not the salt is having an impact on the ability to get these undercontrol? >> when you boil the sea water

you are left with salt and. that was the concern. as soon as they have fresh water available, they started that injection. those barges from the u.s. navy i believe have arrived now. >> given that we had used substantial amounts, do we know if that has proven to cause further complications? >> i do not know. >> they were facing dire situations, so it helped to stop. they dealt with the problem as they should. now they are diluting it. they took the right steps for tehe right reasons.

>> there are provisions to use river or sea water in existing systems. it's there if you need it. >> does the salt haeve impact on the spent fuel pools? >> it is the same concern it would be in the reactor? >> any concern about a corrosive effect? >> there are steel liners that help retarded than other forms of the steel. the implementation of the ever controls from the reactor, we have heard that they restored supplies to the pool so that they will be depleting so whatever damage has been done is getting better as long as they are able to sustain that progress. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

>> senator franken? >> i have a couple of areas i want to get into. in getting some idea about assessing the safety factors of a nuclear plant, mr. pietrangelo termeer spoke in some great detail about that. when i asked mr. bork chart -- mr. borchardt how their system compared to ours he said he did not know. if americans are going to get some kind of comfort that our system, when everything you described works, it would be nice to know how we compare.

it didn't work in japan. mr. lochbaum, i find it concerning the this far into the crisis that the nuclear regulatory commission does not know how to compare the japanese system of sighting vs. ours. any thoughts? >> i am under an unusual role of defending the nrc. they have 4000 people and in international programs unit there probably knows that answer, but to his defense he does not lead the combined knowledge of the 4000 people. i would be willing to bet this week's paycheck that the nrc has that answer and could get it

fairly quickly. by the way, it was not my paycheck, but someone else's i would bet. >> going forward, you are right. we have to understand and align the differences in the regulatory system but from an industry perspective -- we have to understand not only the differences in the regulatory system than there emergency planning. we need to compare it to what we have in place and assess the gaps, if you will commit to see if we would be a birble to dealr if we need to do additional things. >> it's hard to take comfort it what we do if we cannot compare because obviously what they did was not sufficient. i quoted a "the washington post"

editorial. did you read that? >> i did. >> i did. >> hero that despite the recommendations by the national academies that spent fuel rods be stored in pools on site but they should be arranged with cooler next to new rods in the event that they lost enough water that despite the recommendation in 2006 no such action had been taken in the u.s. or japan. mr. borchardt said they had. so, now i have two questions. he is an expert at harvard.

is he wrong? is mr. borchardt wrong? >> the writer is wrong. there was a correction about two or three days later in the editorial section from him saying that there have been measures taken to address some of the concerns he raised in his op-ed. it is a checkerboard pattern which is precisely buwhat he was talking about. after 9/11, it was also used to prevent to lose an inventory in the pools. >> that answers that. i have 20 seconds left. evacuation. we are seeing a lot of

controversy about how much area around the reactor in fukushima is a safe area. if you take a 50 mile radius from some of our reactors, you have tens and tens of millions of people around them. do we have adequate evacuation plans in case something like this would happen in the united states? >> there based on studies done in the 1970 proxy by both the nrc and other agencies. the 10 mile emergency planning zone or epz was determined to be sufficient to protect public health and safety. there is also a 50 mile zone that looks at the injection task

of any contamination of food or dairy products and so forth that can be sampled. there are provisions to increase the evacuation or protective action recommendations, the evacuation are sheltering, beyond the 10 mile epz. they conduct exercises that are overseen by fema and the nrc. we practiced those drills quarterly on side. we think we of the gold standard of emergency planning. it is a difficult situation for the nrc two weeks ago when we were in in the middle of this event and they were looking at 3 cores and four spent fuel pools with limited and conflicting information. when there is a lot of uncertainty in the ground, they make a very conservative decision. we have seen that over the years with how the regulate. that is what happened here. >> mr. lochbaum, and the

opinion -- any opinion? >> they are as good as the ones in the japan on march 10th. >> i do not know what that means. >> we would equally be in dire straits if we've were faced with that kind of disaster. they're the same on paper. in practice, we would come up short. >> i would add that the japanese responded as we would with our emergency plan. they evacuated within the 12.5 mile or the 20 kilometer radius. they put sheltering in the place. they did precisely the type of actions and recommendation we would take to protect public- health and saved. that is the state and local officials are acting on recommendations from the plant operator and overseen by the nrc has made that decision. >> fukushima is not as dense and area of as many of ours.

indian point was brought up as an example. let's say -- there are millions and millions of people living within 50 miles of that plant. let's say you are a parent or a kid at school going the opposite way of exiting. do you think we need to improve on what we are doing? >> local and state officials say that the federal government over world with the state and local governments do. it would happen anyway. i tend to trust the local and state officials who deal with this on a day-to-day basis. >> senator murkowski?

>> did you think it was confusing, the fact that the evacuation order where these on the top 5 miles initially and the u.s. comes in and says 50 miles -- evacuation order, where they said 12.5 miles. was it a confusing directive? >> we support the president's decision. it is a different decision to evacuate u.s. citizens. there will not be as many living within the radius as it is for japanese people and i can understand where the confusion comes from. the potential to degrade it, i think it, they made a conservative decision and i

understand where the confusion can come from. >> in the united states, one of the things we learned from three mile is to have one voice and avoid confusion. what this suggests is we need to look at the international concept of one voice so that there's a discrepancy that one side or the other can either say it was too much or too less. after we went to one voice after three mile, it would be a good idea to look at it on an international level to see it the same factors apply. >> i appreciate it. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you both for your testimony. it has been a useful briefing for us. we appreciated. if additional issues come to your attention, please let us know and we will try to and from the full committee on those as well. thank you. >> thank you, senator. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> related story to the fukushima reactor. this morning, "the washington post" reports that the head of the tokyo electric power co., who has not been seen since the beginning of the problems of the nuclear plant. in washington, news that president obama will deliver an

energy speech this wednesday. political reporting that the president will "outline his plan for america's energy security" the white house said this morning. he would deliver that at georgetown university. both the u.s. house and senate are in for business today. the senate -- in at 10:00 a.m. eastern and they are working on a small business bill. they will take a break at 12:30 eastern for their weekly caucus meetings. they will be back at 2:15 p.m. the house comes in at 2:00 p.m. eastern. one bill would end federal mortgage assistance. you can watch the house live on c-span and the senate on c- span2. in london, prime minister david cameron, secretary of state hillary clinton, and other foreign ministers having a 1 day meeting dealing with the ongoing military situation in libya and

developing a plan of action. during the opening session this morning, secretary of state clinton said military and political pressure would continue until muammar gaddafi and complies with the u.n. resolution. we will also hear from the british prime minister reaffirming the delivery of humanitarian aid. this runs about 25 minutes. this is from this morning. >> good afternoon. welcome to everyone. a warm welcome to london. we have foreign ministers here for more than 40 countries, america to asia, europe to africa, the united nations to the arab world. we are all here united in one purpose which is to help the libyan people in their hour of

need. today, i believe, should be about a new beginning for libya, a future in which the people of libya can determine their own destiny free from violence and free from oppression. the reason for being here today is that the libyan people cannot reach that future on their round. they require, i believe, three things from us. first, we must reaffirm our commitment to the u.n. security council resolution from 1970 and 1973. we should reaffirm the broad alliance that has been put in place to implement them. second, we must insure the fast delivery of humanitarian aid where needed including to the newly liberated towns in libya. third, we must help the libyan people plan for the future after the conflict is over. these are the three goals, i believe, of this conference.

i beg to say little about each in turn. the u.n. security council resolution in the 1973. it was just 12 days ago, following an appeal by the arab league, that the u.n. passed the historic resolution to protect the people of libya from the murderous brutality of colonel gaddafi. at the meeting, sarkozy hosted in the paris and we made the right choice to draw a line in the desert sand to halt the murderous advance of gaddafi's forces. i believe we should be in no doubt that that action saved the city of benghazi, diverted a disaster, and has given freedom a chance. we should be in no doubt about something else as well. as we sit here today and as i speak, people in misrata continue to suffer murderous attacks. there have been reports that the

city is under attack from both land and sea. he is using at snipers to shoot people down in the streets. he has cut off food, water, and electricity to starve people into submission. he is harassing humanitarian ships trying to get in the port to do with they can. he continues to be in flagrant breach of the u.n. security council resolution. that is why there has been such widespread support among the libyan people and the wider arab world for the action we are taking. it has saved lives and it is saving lives. these give us hope. we must be unequivocal that we will not take that hope away. we must continue to reject the libyan people from danger. second come humanitarian aid. just as it is essential that we

work together to stop, it is vital that we give aid to save lives. it has to happen now. even in misrata, humanitarian agencies have managed to get some aid in. in benghazi, they are working hard. the hospital is functioning urgently need more supplies and nursing. we need to redouble our efforts. the whole international community needs to work together and the u.n. has a critical role in ensuring that aid gets through. when the fighting is over, we need to repair the hospital then have been ruined by shells, rebuild the homes demolished by his tanks, and restore the mosques that have been smashed by his very. it is never too early to start

planning coordinating action to support peace over the long term. the u.n., working with a regional organization did the rest of the international community, we should leave this work. repairing the infrastructure and insurance services and give them a restoring government at every level. we must help the people of libya plan now for the political future than they want to build. military action can protect people from attack and humanitarian action can help people recover, but neither are sufficient to provide a greater path to freedom. altman the, the solution must be a political one for the libyan people themselves to determine their destiny. that means reenforcing the u.n. sanctions to exert the greatest possible pressure on gaddafi and his regime. it requires bringing together the rightist coalition of political leaders including local leaders and most

importantly the interim transitional national council said that the libyan people can speak with one voice. i propose that today's conference should agree to set up a contact group which will put political lever on a sustained basis in supporting the libyan people. we should be clear about the challenge. this will mean a development program, cultural exchanges, to our trading arrangements, all of these things must be redoubled and support the building blocks of a democratic society. freedom of expression, the right to free and fair elections, the right to peaceful protests, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. these belong to everyone. they are universal and are embedded in the division of the democratic libya. we should warmly welcome this commitment. as this broad range of countries gather here today in london,

there are people suffering greatly under gaddafi's world. our message is this -- there are better days ahead for libya. just as we continue to protect the libyan people from the brutality of this regime, so we will support and stand by them as they take control of their own destiny. their courage and determination should be rewarded. a new beginning for libya is within their grasp. we must help them to seize it. thank you. i now would like to ask the secretary general ban ki moon to speech then qatar and then secretary of state clinton. >> thank you, mr. prime minister, and i think the communities for this important meeting. i have the command and appreciate your leadership. the security council resolution

1970 and 1973 statements about our determination to force the government of libya to stop the campaign of violence against their own citizens. the fact that the international community acted decisively and swiftly saved thousands of lives. i am very much in thinking that in the 10 days we are gathering in a much broader participation and i am very moved by this movement of the international community. when air strikes began, the broad that appeared to be inevitable. for now, we have prevented a humanitarian catastrophe. air operations did not resolve the crisis. we need to bring about a

political solution to meet the aspirations of the libyan people. i welcome the welcome -- i welcome the international partners under the leadership of the african union. united nations have undertaken strong diplomatic efforts to end the crisis in libya. ever remained in close contact with all parties including the libyan authorities and opposition. i have called repeatedly for an immediate cease-fire and ending humanitarian access. my special envoy will talk to libya short leave to meet with the leaders of the government and opposition. he will also engage closely

with international stakeholders including the league of arab states, the african union and the european union. the aim is to keep direct channels of communication with all sides on the conflict to help resolve this and bring about the settlement. this is of course with the will of the libyan people. along with my special envoy's activities, the coordinator will carry out the mission in tripoli. the efforts are ongoing and preparations are underway for a humanitarian assessment of libya. it is important to recall the security council resolution 1973 which demands that the libyan authorities comply fully with

international humanitarian and human rights laws. as you know, we continue to receive deeply disturbing reports about the protection of civilians including migrant workers as well as the abuses of human rights by the parties in the country. in view of the current military operations, humanitarian aid should be delivered by humanitarian organizations in order to ensure that a delivery is carried out. according to the latest from international migration and the u.n. high catcher for refugees, 380,000 people have left the libya since the start of the unrest and some 13,000 people remain stranded at the borders with egypt and tunisia. we are organizing all possible

efforts using international organizations. i spoke with egypt and tunisia last week. $160 million so far for the regional crisis is 67% funded. i hope the countries participating in this meeting will generously contribute to this. the assessment by programs in eastern libya report that food supplies have gradually been consumed are not replenished. this will affect the number of those needing assistance. excellencies, our party remains within has been since the operation began -- our priority remains to end the hostilities.

any cease-fire must requiring coordinated monitoring. in turn, this requires an international aid a presence and the critical definition of the community remains. movement on the ground requires more help. the libyan people will have to be engaged with each other. our long-term interest is to help them do so focusing on the establishment of a transitional arrangement leading toward the democratic aspirations of the libyan people. i would like to support what

prime minister dave cameron suggested to contact and i'd like to see that the coordination among the united nations, league of arab states, african union, and european union should have a very causal coordination. any fragmented approach -- i know everybody's very much anxious and passionate to help the libyan people and address this crisis, but we need to have very close coordination. and i'm going to leave this coordination, if you agree. we know that any stable democracy must be grounded in economic, social experiment. this will require strategic -- strategy based on integrated framework and commitments from us all.

we'll have issues as economic reforms, job creation, civil rights, institution building, political dialogue, electoral assistance. these are the issues, the people in the region desperately need. i'm sure that the libyan people will -- need much, much more because they are not organized. the government, they have not encouraged the civil society. must been one man rule therefore we need to be very much strategic in helping them to have a very small transition toward the rule of law. there is no repression of political parties, civil society, organizations, and media also pose substantial challenges.

the transition to a democratic government and society will take time and the support of us all. the united nations is ready and willing to assist the people of libya in this transition and we are eager to help and to work very closely with you. thank you very much, mr. president. >> thank you very much, secretary-general. i would like to ask the prime minister and foreign minister of the state of qatar to speak to us. >> thank you. use the headphone because i'll speak in arabic if you don't mind. >> in the name of allah, mr. dave cameron, the prime minister, excellences, ladies and gentlemen, i just would like to thank you, thank the government of the u.k. for arranging for that meeting in order to discuss the new issues which happened after the paris meeting and after the meeting which took place in the united

nations. the arab league has requested wanted to enforce a no-fly zone on libya to protect civilians and african union has also asked to stop violence and the security council -- took control of that after the resolution 1970 and 1973 which permitted the arab league and members to take all action required to protect civilians. and there is -- and has asked for a cease-fire and stop all assault on civilians and allow humanitarian aid to reach needy people. that delegation from the united nations is a commitment for all member countries and that delegation was very important to stop the massacre for libyan

civilians gaddafi was about to commit. gaddafi was going to commit atrocities against civilians and we took that to the league according to the u.n. charter and security council to have that delegation. that's a legitimate action to stop killing the people. there's no doubt that actions and military actions are being taken according to that delegation has stopped to a great extent the power of gaddafi and protected the civilian from the violence which gaddafi regime was about to commit. that was actually important to make the libyan people feel like they are about to get rid of that murderous regime and they'll be able to achieve a better future and they will have freedom with the help of the

international community. the aim is very important and in spite of the power delegated by the international community we as a country are providing humanitarian aid to the libyan people and took part in enforcing the no-fly zone and at the same time we moved many people who were not able to go back to their country because of the violence and lately we have acknowledged the down sill, because we are convinced that the only representative of the libyan people, legitimate representatives, and the people inside that council from different libyan regions, we would like, we hope he give up power to stop the killing and the murders of people. he would like -- we would like gaddafi to listen to the

international community and we hope our cooperation will succeed. >> thank you very much for those words. i'd like to ask secretary of state clinton to speak to you us. >> thank you vitch, prime minister. thanks to you and your government for the critical leadership effort you have demonstrated in our common effort. thanks, too, to france which has been at the forefront of this mission, including by hosting many of us last week in paris and really thanks to everyone around this table. we have prevented a potential massacre, established a no-fly zone, stopped an advancing army, added more partners in this coalition, and transferred command of the military effort to nato. that's not bad for a week of work at a time of great intense international concern. the united states has been proud to stand with our nato, arab, and european partners. we have been responding to the appeals of the libyan people and to the arab league's call for

urgent action. and we have joined with countries around the world, including all three countries representing africa on the united nations security council to pass two strong resolutions. so this has been truly an international effort and a refleckshub of our shared -- reflk shun 6 -- reflection of our shared concern for safety of civilians and support of the legitimate aspirations of the libyan people. we meet now in lob to be at a turning point. nato has taken command of enforcing the arms embargo and no-fly zone. on sunday it agreed to take on additional responsibility of protecting civilians. last night president obama expressed his full confidence that this coalition will keep the pressure on gaddafi's remaining forces. i second that confidence. this coalition military action will continue until gaddafi fully fly complies with the terms of 1973. ceases his attacks on civilians, pulls his troops back from

places they have forcibly entered, and allow key services and humanitarian assistance to reach all libyans. but beyond our military efforts, all of us are called to continue to work together along three tracks. first, delivering desperately needed humanitarian assistance. second, pressuring and isolating the gaddafi regime through sanctions and other measures. third, supporting efforts by libyans to achieve their aspirations through political change. on the humanitarian front under the leadership of the united nations, we will work with nato, the e.u., other international organizations and regional partners to deliver assistance. the coalition military campaign has made it possible for more help to get through. for example, a convoy organized by the world food program was able to reach benghazi this weekend with 18 tons of supplies including food and blankets. but a great deal more aid is needed. and we have to work quickly and

cooperatively to assess and respond. beyond the humanitarian crisis, we know long-term progress in libya will not be accomplished through military means. all of us have to continue to pressure on and deepen the isolation of the gaddafi regime. this includes a unified front of political and diplomatic pressure that makes clear to gaddafi he must go. that sends a strong message of accountability and that sharpens the choice for those around him. it also includes financial pressure through the vigorous enforcement of sanctions authorized under security council resolution 1970 and 1973. as president obama said last night while our military mission is focused on saving lives, we must continue to pursue the broader goal of a libya that belongs not to a dictator but to the libyan people. now, we cannot and must not attempt to impose our will on

the people of libya, but we can and must stand with them as they determine their own destiny. and we have to speak with one voice in support of a transition that leads to that time. we agree with the arab league that gaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead. we agree with the african union on the need for a democratic transition process, and we support u.n. special envoy's planned travel to libya following this conference to assess conditions and report to the international community. we believe that libya's transition should come through a broadly inclusive process that reflects the will and protects the rights of the libyan people. the transitional national council and broad cross section of libya's civil society and other stakeholders have critical contributions to make. earlier today i had the opportunity to meet with senior representatives of the council and talk about the path forward. the u.n., the african union, arab league, o.i.c., and the

e.u. all have important roles to play. and through this the united states will join the international community in our commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of libya. this at a time of great change. for libya, for its neighbors, across the region, and around the world. under different governments, under different circumstances people are expressing the same basic aspirations. a voice in their government, an end to corruption, freedom from violence and fear, the chance to live in dignity, and to make the most of their god-given talents. now, we know these goals are not easily achieved, but they are without question worth working for together. and i'm very proud that this coalition has come to this place at this time to try to pursue those goals. thank you very much. >> secretary clinton from earlier today at the london conference on libya. this is a live look outside lancaster house in london where

the meeting is taking place. as far as we know it's still going on. we do expect a news conference sometime after the meeting wraps up that will include british foreign secretary william hague among others. we plan to have that life for you if at all -- live for you if at all possible. from the associated press today, that syria's cabinet has resigned to help quell a wave of popular fury there that erupted more than a week ago and now is threatening the president's 11-year rule in one of the most authoritarian and closed off nation in the middle east. this is syria, the assad family has controlled syria for four decades. it's expected the president will address the nation there in the next 24 hours. according to the associated press to lift the emergency law in place since 1963. as far as the london conference goes we are looking for a news conference sometime this afternoofpblet hope to have it live for you. we will be live with the u.s.

house coming up at 2:00 p.m. eastern. they'll gavel in for a couple of items on their agenda today, including a bill that would end a federal home mortgage assistance program. live coverage of the house here on c-span at :00 p.m. the senate meanwhile, they came in today at 10:00 and they have been working on a small business bill will take a break shortly at 12:30, but back to the small business bill today at 2:15 eastern. you can follow that on our companion network, c-span2. more about libya now and reaction to the speech last night that the president gave. this is from this morning's washington journal. defense anae heritage foundation. let's begin with what president obama said. he said the united states has a responsibility tact in libya. what is your reaction? guest: the constitution says the president is the commander in chief. certainly, the united states can and has participated in

humanitarian operations. every single operation has to be judged on its own merits. the good that you can do and the damage that may be done. there's no rule book in the sense that we must act. it's always a judgment. that's why we elect presidents. that's why we have a commander- in-chi. that's why there is latitude to make those decisions. saying was forced to do this or required to do this is not accurate. host: what did you make of his arguments that gaddafi would have made deadly advance is had they waited one more day. guest: that is unknowable. this is often called the rwanda scenario. these things are impossible to prove. there's something calledhe culminating point. as you advance, you obviously

have the advantage. at some point, your lines of communication and your logistics' get very long. the defender, who has fallen back to his own ground, has the advantage. th's called the culminating point. we saw that twice in libya already. when the rebels advanced on gaddafi, as they got closer to tripoli, they became weaker. gaddafi was able to counter attack and push them back. they were falling back in benghazi. gaddafi was getting overstretched. whether the opposition could have held else without the mbing or through some other types of assistance, that's an open question. the reality is that there is no dew over. these questions are interesting, but they are irrelevant. what the president did in his eech that the administration has not done before it's too

late out a path forward and the u.s.'s part in that. he described three things that have to be done. one, isolate and contain gaddafi, so he can eventually be brght to justice. the second task is he has to prevent gaddafi's military from going back on the offensive. that's the second task. that was accomplished with military intervention. the third task is you have to identify and build a credible opposition. by credible, i mean, one that will not be anti-democratic and one that will not be infiltrated by terrorists. those are the three essential tasks. it was good to hear the president laid that out. there are still unanswered question. nobody doubted the capacity of military operations to stop gaddafi's advance. the question is, where we go

from here? the president said we will turn it over to the intnational community, which i do not think is sufficiently a full answer. host: why not? guest: the international community is ill-defined. we know we have nato. as the president admitted in his speech, in both the nato commitment and the un resolution, those are ambiguous and open-ended documents. the president said he could not go for regime change because a lot of people would see that as a violation of the un resolution. the nato commitment was clearly structured on the fact that they would not. host: you laid out what you heard from him on principle. on goals, you heard what they are, you're not sure we can

achieve them. is that correct? guest: ironically, we do not know much more than when we started. no one ever questioned that if you had a military intervention with airpower that you could stop gaddafi's advance. no one questioned that. the question is, as always, where did you go from here? i think the president articulated the three tasks last night. those were obvious last week before we started the operation. that raises the question, why didn't someone lay that out last week? going forward, the question is -- who is going to do this? the president did not answer the question. host: secretary of state hillary clinton is in london right now. we just showed her a ride in there. she's meeting with over 40 foreign ministers. what do expect to hear from those meetings? do you expect to hear a strategy on what to do with colonel gaddafi and the ansrs to your

questions that you raised? guest: there may be something in terms of political support. there's a libyan transition of authority that's recognized by some countries. there may be a decision for broader recognition. as the traition of authority has some issues -- most of t leaders are former libyan governme officials who are, in a sense, part of the problem. in closed societies, there are two types of people. there are the double figures -- double thinkers and the true believers. i'm not sure we have sorted out who these people are. are these people who will really become democratic and look after the people and ensure human rights? are they just people who swched sides because it is convenient and they want to do what gaddafi did

the international community and the u.s. is going to have to sort through that. this is a sensible course of action. the idea of throwing in more forces and rushed to tripoli -- there are two problems with that. the opposition is not an organized military force. they do not have logistics'. they do not have fire support and artillery. they do not know how to coordinate with the allied air power. even if the allied air power would help them do that and some would argue that would be a violation of the resolution, do they have the capaci to go to tripoli, and urban center -- as leasing, urban warfare is very different. that would be a battle that would be very difficult to win. you might have the humanitarian catastrophe that ty are supposed to prevent. the second problem is, what if they did not win?

then you would have a countr that isn chaos. no government and no ruler how do you ensure the capacity that someone will step in and provide the services for the people and look after them? host: what's your analysis of the endgame? guest: and has to be building a legitimate, credible opposition in libya that can look after its own people. and not have infiltration by terrorist groups. eventually, gaddafi can be brought to justice, whether political or military operation. i'd think that is months and years away. i do not think there's a simple d the game. the question -- who is going to do this? host: when comes to nato, what sortf experience and assets does nato have versus

what the united states does have? guest: how do you keep gaddafi on the offensive for the months or years that it might take to build up a force that can protect the people and bring back the government? that can be very expensive. thno-fly zone that we did in iraq cost several billion dollars. you have to find a che way to deter gaddafi. only the united states has long legs. for example, if you want to fly aircraft without bases, you have to have their roots -- you have to have air refueling tanks. the united states has that. there will always have to be ships at sea to do the embargo part of that. you need command-and-control.

there are many things the united states is uniquely suited to provide. i think that's open question. the president says ourilitary commitments are already going down. quite frankly, they ran out of targets. it's disingenuous to say that we are turning things over. their job is done and there's nothing left to do. it creates this impression that there's a real transition. i doubt that. even with the operations turned over to nato, i think most military analysts believe he will have to have a significant level of u.s. committee. over the long term, it might transition to something where there are capacities built in the region to do these things cheaper, but i think that's some time off. host: we have a link to abc

news. the pentagon is saying right now that in the first week, we spent about $600 million. guest: i'm sure that is true. it could be slightly higher than that. that cost will probably go down over time. as gaddafi's forces lose the ability to do offensive capabilities. if all you're doing is keeping him from going on the offensive, that cost will go down. if you're going to do that for weeks and months and years, that cost will add up. you have wear and tear on the equipment. if the unid states does not do that, someone else will have to do it. who willay for that? people have to remember that, in many ways -- i'm not being negative. we all want to see gaddafi gone and the people of libya to have freedom.

in many ways, this looks very much like the beginning of the first iraq war. we went in with limited force. we had arab support. we had a coalition. we established a no-fly zone. years later, we wound up invading. peopley concerned about who are at the outset of a conflict declaringictory. we have to remember the enemy always gets a vote. host: it was wrong to go into iraq in 1991 and it was wrong to go into libya? guest: no. complex hardly ever unfold the way people plant. -- conflicts hardly ever and told the way that people plan ned. host: pete, good morning. caller: i like your last point that these things never really worked out the way they are

intended. it is definitely disingenuous to say we're in there for humanitarian reasons all the time and then talk about the cost. it seems to me, if you if you care about the human issue, it should not be mentioned. we have to think about the cost when we go into the middle east, anywhere, northern africa, what are we doing -- the money we spend is wasted mon. the humanitarian issue is laughable. let's be honest, we start throwing bombs and missiles around, there are people on the ground that are not involved that we are trying to protect, generally, they get killed also. it seems to me that we need to stop in this country messing around with islam, the muslim

world, the middle east, and let it shake out on their work -- on their own. if europe wants to get involved, that is fine. we are wasting our time. host: after the united states, what role do the other countries play? guest: that is not clear. somebody will need to provide a military presence. somebody will need to keep gaddafi's isolated. somebody is going to have to sort throu the opposition to make sure we do not have another pipeline of freedom fighters -- the second largest group of foreign fhters were funneled from libya. we need to be concerned about a pipeline coming the other way to

fight gaddafi and whoever else. somebody will need to be on the lookout for that. somebody will need to sort through the transitional government to find people that are interested in promoting freedom and acting responsibly. somebody will need to build the capacity not just to develop the capability to defend themselves, and to look after the people of libya, but eventually to maybe take a government back. that is a long list. >> we talked about what the allies need to do. the enemy has a vote. what does colonel gaddafi have at his fingertips? guest: i think the biggest advantages are a big bank account. even with frozen assets, people think he has a lot of money. host: more than the 33 billion? guest: that is what people

believe. it is often like this with close societies. show me somebody that is absolutely sure, and i will show you some one that does not know what they're talking about. most of tse guys are smart enough to have a rainy day fund. subleasing did. -- saddam did. with money, that buys commitment. people are committed to his regime. they might leave -- he might leave, but they would be stuck there. he has capital. it might be the largest human shield. remember, the idea was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. if you're going to have a battle of tripoli, people will die. let's be honest, he has friends. there are people around the world that wants to help him, that have stood up for him.

as this drags on, people will find ways to help him. as he gets access to some of the oil, there will be people that want to buy the oil, and that will be revenue to keep him afloat. the idea in the first gulf war was that we isolated saddam, he could not go on forever, and he virtually did. host: cnn reported that libya rebels blew on his home town. they reported that colonel gaddafi has invested large sums of money in his hometown area and has a lot of loyal supporters. so, it is a story line we will be watching for as people continue to cover the military action. we will go to carlton, ga., christopher is a democrat.

we are talking to jas carafano of the heritage foundation. caller: i totally disagree with the previous caller. basically, he was saying that the united states should keep their noses in just our business, and let the united world deal with their own issues. we are the leader of the free world. without us, there would not be a free world. all other countries would not have role models or people to buckle up for as far as independence and freedom. i totally agree with what the president is doing with allowing the international community to come together and figure out a resolution to this problem. we have come -- for we have become bankrupt to do too many wars, and many things we are doing for other countries. we are giving humanitarian aid. we are giving all of these different incentives to different countries, but now we

are on the brink of economic downfall. we need other countries to come together, and we all work together to deal with universal issues. guest: the first thing i want to make clear is that regardless of the cost of this war, defense is not bankrupting america. defense is one-fifth of the federal budget, less than that 30 years ago, it was 50% of the federal budget. with all the welfare programs, we spend more than the defense. we spend much more on medicare, medicaid, and social security. host: you're putting them in the same category -- entitlements against discretionary? guest: defense is not bankrupting the country. foreign d is a small percentage of the budget. we have financial issues, but they are primarily driven by domestic economic policies, not

foreign policy. we need to be clear on that. defending america, and even fighting, these are not the things that are ibankruptcy in the country. the point on humanitarian aid is worth focusing on. if the presidentaid we have stopped the humanitarian disaster that is not necessarily true. if the humanitarian disaster happens next week, next month, or next year, it is just as big of a problem. no military analyst ivor question that we could make a time out in a civil war. if that does not mean you have stopped a humanitarian disaster. you only do that when you take away the potential. as long as gaddafi is still in power, there is the potential for civil war, the possibility of of of radical insurgent, the crisis is still there.

the president should acknowledge that in his speech. in a sense, not to be pejorative, but people reflect back when president bush got on the deck of the uss abraham lincoln, with the banner at "mission accomplished." if the president said our job is basically done here. we do not know if we stopped a humanitarian crisis, and we do not know what international community we will turn it over to. there was much good in the speech, that he did, after a week of conflict outlined what the plan was, the tasks ahead -- that was good, but he glossed over the vital questions. i think the administration still has a lot of work to do, and the notion that the hard part of american leadership is over -- i do not think that is true. the hardest part is yet to come.

it is easy to get people to participate when we are providing military power, but now we want a coalition to stand up and do things that are not in many countries national interest, put a lot of resources into this -- if you can pull that coalition together, get them to stand, and create a libya that is free and at peace, that is an achievement, but it is work yet to be done. host: the associated press is reporting that police in yo gonna have stopped supporters of gaddafi from attacking it u.s. and other embassies in that country. also, u.s. air forces have fired at a libyan vessels. an independentk, in ohio. caller: the gentleman before you

started out with a sentence about "this is not within the bounds of the constitution." i find it ironichat every republican seems to pull out the constitution and used piecemeal wording to say we are not within the constitution. the guy did it by the book, unlike george w., who told the whole world lies, and got away with treason. we are spending ourselves into oblivion with our military. that is claimed history. if you do not believe that, i know somebody th is on this guy's side, and it is the chinese >> to the fer washington journal online. we are going next live to london for follow-up news conference. this after the one-day conference on libya has wrapped up live here on c-span. >> we have seen two key

developments today. first, foreign ministers and leaders from over 40 countries and organizations, including the united nations, the arab league, the organization of islamic conference, the european union, and nato met here at the london conference on libya. i will list our key conclusions in a moment, but we certainly widened and deepened the coalition. where a new pledge of support for operation from sweden. a growing number of countries committed to implementing the u.n. resolutions on libya, and agreement to a new contact group, an international contact group on libya. second, libya's interim traditional council have launched again here in london their vision for a future libya that is free, democratic, and unified. and we said throughout that we want the libyan people to be in the lead in determining their future and today was a significant milestone in that process. it comes at a time when the forces of the gaddafi regime continue to shell libyan

civilians in misrata, and other areas in a brutal manner underlining why our efforts to protect libyan citizens must and will continue. i have here a copy of a letter we received today from a member of the local council in misrata thanking britain and our allies for our actions to relieve the people of misrata through targeted strikes and enforcement of the no-fly zone and for coming to the aid of the libyan people as he puts it, in their most needy of hours. he says in his own words, the local council can testify for the effectiveness and accuracy of those strikes and confirms there has not been a single case of civilian injury let alone deaths in and around misrata as a result of coalition activity. he goes on to salute the men and women in uniform who have put their lives object the line to save the lives of libyans, saying that we are forever grateful. my colleague, prime minister and

foreign minister of qatar, is one of our key allies in implementing u.n. security council resolution 1973. his country is showing great leadership and commitment both in the skies above libya and political gatherings like these, and indeed we welcome the fact that qatar has agreed to host the first meeting on the new contact group on libya which we agreed to form today. before i turn it over to him and chairman of today's conference, i just want to draw your attention to some of the key conclusion of today's meetings which are set out in great length in documents that will be supplied for you. participants today have reaffirmed the importance of full and swift implementation of the u.n. security council resolutions, and our strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of libya. we have agreed to consider pursuing in the u.n. and regional organizations additional sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the regime.

participants here today are implementing these measures as a clear message to gaddafi he cannot attack civilians with impunity. we have a broad based coalition to implement the military actions mandated by security council resolution 1973. so far the action we have taken has been successful in protecting countless civilians from gaddafi's forces and effectively wiping out gaddafi's air capability. participants pay tribute to the bravery and professionalism of military personnel from all contributors in the coalition. the current and potential contributors to military operations had a separate meeting as part of the conference. we met to underlie our commitment to the military action to implement the provisions of the resolutions. we reaffirmed our unified support for this course of action. we welcome nato contribution in agreeing to take on command and control of all military operations to enforce the arms

embargo, the no-fly zone, and other actions needed to protect civilians. participants here today have reaffirmed that very clear conditions must be met under the security council resolution, including the establishment of an immediate cease-fire, a halt to all attacks on civilians, and full humanitarian access to those in need. we agreed to continue our efforts until all those conditions are fulfilled. and the libyan regime will be judged by its actions and not by its word. we agree it's not for any of the participants here today to choose the government of libya, only the libyan people can do that, but we agree that gaddafi and his regime have completely lost legitimacy and will be held accountable for their actions. we recognize the need for all libyans, including the interim transitional national council, tribal leaders, and others to come together to gun an inclusive political process. and we -- to begin an inclusive political process. we call on the international

community to help with that process. participants today exmolested our concern for the well-being -- expressed our concern for the well-being of the displaced people. we have agreed for priorities for humanitarian response. we noted the offer of qatar to facilitate the sale of libyan oil were consistent with international law, particularly with provisions of the security council resolutions and other relevant resolutions and to support the people of libya in using the proceeds to help meet their humanitarian needs. to take this work forward, participants of the conference agreed to establish the libya contact group. this contact group will meet to provide leadership and overall political direction to the international efforts in close coordination with the u.n., the african union, arab league, organization of islamic conference, and the european union to support libya, to provide a forum for coordinating the international response on libya, and provide a focal point

in the international community for contact to the libyan parties. qatar has agreed to convene the first meeting of the group as i mentioned. thereafter the chairmanship will protate between the countries of the region and beyond it. the north atlantic council meeting along five coalition partners will provide the executive political direction to nato operations. the participants welcome the u.n. skect general's office to lead the coordination of humanitarian assistance and planning for longer term stabilization support. turkey and other key regional players and international agencies offer to support this work and take it forward with the contact group. this conference has shown that we are united in our aims, we are united in seeking a libya that does not pose a threat to its own citizens or to the region or more widely. and in working with the people of libya as they choose their own way forward to a peaceful and stable future. thank you very much. i now invite the prime minister and foreign minister of qatar to

speak. >> thank you very much, william. first of all i would like to say that we thank britain for this conference which has become a very important conference after the first conference in paris, because that shows the solidarity of the ally and more countries join this coalition. it's a sad and -- sad moment but with hope in the future, sad moment of what we are seeing in libya, sad moment that we see that we need to try to intervene in a country which belong to the arab, but we as arab in the arab league, ask the community to participate, to try not to let the libyan people by their own facing gaddafi and his group

which they are, as we saw last few weeks, they are using all the heavy machines to kill their protesters and their own people. hope that we hope that this will finish as soon as possible. hope that the libyan people will decide how they would like to run their country. we in qatar participate in the humanitarian side and also the no-fly zone by sending some of our planes to their side. and they are doing their mission at the moment when we are talking now. i think the libyan national council for us, we'll organize it now but later the people of libya will decide what it is. i think this conference was good to evaluate what's been done last few days from the military

action and what we can do. urge gaddafi and his people to leave and not to cause anymore bloodshed. i think this is the only solution to solve this problem as soon as possible. right now we don't see any indication of that, but this whole -- hope which we offer it now might be not object the -- on the table after a few days. i'm not warning anybody here but i'm trying to stop the bloodshed as soon as possible. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. now i have time for a few questions. my press secretary will point them out. >> thank you very much. bbc news, do you both fear that it may not be possible to protect libyan civilians from the air? did today's conference discuss the possibility of arming the opposition as they have

requested? or did you fear that if you did so you might be arming some at least who have al qaeda sympathies? >> we didn't discuss at the conference today arming the opposition. that was not one of the subject for discussion. discussed all the things that i just set out. all of which are designed to protect civilian life in libya. but that was not raised at the conference and it was not on the agenda for discussion. you're right that this subject has been raised of course by the interim transitional national council. but it's not part of any agreement today. the united kingdom takes into account the u.n. security council resolutions on this. those resolutions apply to the whole of libya, all those it's consistent with u.n. security council resolution 1973 to give

people aid in order to defend themselves in particular circumstances. but we haven't discussed that so there's no new decisions to communicate to you about that. prime minister? >> i would like to add to what mr. william said that we did not discuss that definitely. but our opinion that we have to evaluate the air strike after a while to see if it's effective. to protect the people of libya or not. and at that time we have at the international community have to see what sort of measure. we are not talking here about invading libya or we are not inviting any military ground to be. but we have to evaluate the situation because we cannot let the people suffer for so long. we have to find a way to stop this bloodshed, but we still in the first days of what's happening and we need to

evaluate it maybe at some time later. >> microphone's on its way. >> the daily telegraph, are you at all concerned that they may take advantage of this resolution that's taking place in libya? whether they would be muslim brotherhood or whether they be more extreme in terms of al qaeda? >> i think the initial answer to that is the document that was published by the interim transitional council this afternoon, as you are aware the vision of a democratic libya, that is a document i was very pleased to see and indeed encouraged them to release. because it includes so many of the things that we would like to see. so many of the commitments that we would like to see about the future of libya, including the

summation of political parties, genuine political parties, freedom of expression, and the media, and peaceful protests, it is the right document and the right set of commitments for the future of libya. also talking about using science and technology for the betterment of society, free private sector, and an effective civil society. these are strong commitments. and absolutely the right commitments from the opposition forces in libya. and i think they are sincere in putting those forward as their plan having discussed them with some of our representatives this morning and having talked to other of their representatives by telephone over the last few weeks, i'm sure that is sincere. but we can never be and must never be complacent about the way events like this could turn out. one of the reasons it's necessary for the european union

and the view of the prime minister david cameron and i to make a bold and ambition and -- ambitious and historic offer to the region is try to act as a magnet for this kind of positive change given, of course, there is a dange they're if things go wrong in the region on a sustained basis, there could be new opportunity for terrorism or extremism. so we must not be complacent about that. but i'm sure that what we are doing to protect civilians to encourage a political process in libya in which -- through which libyans can choose their own future government is the right way to combat those dangers of terrorism and extremism. prime minister? >> i would like to add a little bit about extremism. this has been part of it because of how we are dealing with the

people in the middle east. and this part of it being put by the leaders in the middle east because they want to stay in power. i think we should not look, if there is a left or right people or muslim brotherhood, we should look to them how they behave. if they behave according to international rule, if they can do something better, if we are looking for democracy, let the democracy decide who comes and takes power. but this has been used many times, if we want to go further, why al qaeda happened it's because of our mistakes. so we have also not to fear but to try to treat our mistakes and by letting everybody decide what they want in their country. >> thank you. cnn, minister hague, the foreign

minister just said that you need to increase your political pressure on gaddafi to step down and that you are looking for countries to take -- for him to take refuge. could you talk about what efforts you're doing to increase the political pressure on him to step down? and for the prime minister, the united states in particular and other nations of nato have asked for arab leadership and support for this effort, which really was the pretext for going to the u.n. security council resolution, why do you think more arab nations have not publicly joined qatar and the united arab emirates in joining this coalition? do you expect more nations to join in the coming days? thank you. >> would you like to take that first? >> yes. when we went to the arab league,

by enormous majority except one country, we decided to go to the security council to ask for a no-fly zone. it was a big argument but we told them what was the alternate -- alternative? people killed, slaughtered, or we have to go to the united nations. i agree with you the arab involvement is not so big, or not so concrete, but at least there is some arab countries participating physically and some arab countries participating in the conference here in london. i hope it will increase. i hope the arab league have in the future mechanism to do these things to avoid these things happen and ask for international help. because this is an -- unfortunately we could not do it by ourself but to show our solidarity in qatar, at least, and our belief we joined the

international community. >> the question of gaddafi stepping down. i think this meeting and the unity from such a wide variety of nations and the arab world and the prime minister just been talking about the role and unity of the arab league, but also represented here today, the organization of the islamic conference, the united nations, as well as the arab league, the european union, these strong unanimity, the strong emphasis on what i was saying earlier that we all agree that will gaddafi and his regime have completely lost legitimacy and will be held accountable for their actions, that is extremely strong, intense lith strong international pressure -- intensely strong international pressure for him. there is no libya for gaddafi. or trying to hang on to power there. that is clear to all these nations and organizations and we have made that emphatically

we of course support the reference to the international criminal court. we are not engaged in the unite the kingdom in looking for somewhere for him to go. that doesn't exkwlude others doing so. -- exclude others doing so. al jazeera. >> my first question, the first country to contribute in this operation and first country to consider a national league n counter and legitimate representative of the libyan people, and we sauted on the list a tendees more than country from morocco is qatar going to

get more contributions from arab countries in operation? second question for mr. hague, you said there was a separate meeting between the current and potential contributors to military operations. can we have an idea about who is potential contributors in this operation? thank you. >> well, about the participation of the arabs, as i mentioned there is sop arab participate in the meeting in london here. i believe -- we are not trying to push the others to be part of it, but we have some beliefs. andure beliefs -- and our beliefs let us participate from day one and let us go to the g.c.c. conference and ask for no-fly zone. and we ask for the meeting in the arab league and the arab league supported the idea of no-fly zone. so it's a process. to be legal we went to the

security council. all this gathering here in london or paris before, it was about that. the people will not allow the international community will not allow gaddafi kill his people. will not allow what happened in libya. and for us when we saw what we saw the first few days, we thought that this is a shame to stay aside and say, well, it's not our business. it is our business. unfortunately i think the participation of the arabs should be more serious, but i'm glad there is arab countries in the unity. i'm glad that the international take this serious. and i think this is the example how we can cooperate between us and the nato, between us and the united nations. i think this is the first coalition which is demanded by the arabs and by the libyans, it's not