the universally described here in washington the revolution in egypt as democratic. i am not sure what that means in egypt. i am not sure what the credit means for all of us. we are all enthralled with the way the young people in i workee foreign relations committee for a long time. senator bind made an observation. the most important characteristic a politician can have is the ability to count. in and my problem is too many of us who wield this as a democratic revolution have been blinded by the i.n.s. operation

and have forgotten our ability to count and that's what worries me. i am concerned about where we go. what i mean by that is -- for the referendum on march 19, the christians, all of the youthful opposition, democratic group it is on the square, every business person i spoke to has voted no. they all voted no and together, they could not get 23% of the population. so i'm asking who are the other 77% of the population? first of all, the biggest movement everybody talks about is the muslim brothers. but nobody i've seen believes that the muslim brotherhood can generate more than 25% of the vote. so all of a sudden, we now have

the 23% that will fall in the reformist movement plus the 25% that falls into the muslim brothers. i'm saying who is the 52%? where did those people come from and where did they go? none of us know. we all have to speculate what their thinking is and that's what makes it so difficult as an analyst sitting near washington. you'll get some idea of where these people come from if you go back and look at the 2005 parliamentary elections. in those elections, they tried to reform the n.d.p. into being a more democratic, more youthful, more western, more worldly party. and what he did is in the party convention, he engineered the replacement of the traditional candidates from rural areas with young, urban, aggressive people with some parts of the community but mainly they were his people.

people who were worldly. they had gone to school and knew the world and replaced the traditional leaders in those areas with those candidates. tradi against the candidate. they beat the candidates across the board. they replaced the ndp. all these people said, we will have our traditional leaders, the people we care about. they know us and we will vote for them. i would expect -- when they got to parliament, the all rejoined the ndp. all the independents who were not muslim brothers joined the parliament. they really did not want to be out of the party.

data base of support -- that the base of support still exists. therefore, that is a very strong stable factor within egyptian society. the muslim brothers are almost all centered in urban areas of. cairo, alexandria and some of the other towns. why? those areas where people have lost their traditional village in family identities. the traditional leaders in the village do not have the influence in the cities where they come from? that is a problem that we face because we do not know where these people are going to go and. those people on the outside were looking for ways to help the democratic people become more popular. 23% of the population of. within that 23%, you have many

of the people supported the old regime. these ministers who are being prosecuted today -- they would all fall within that 23% of the population who are reformist. they were reformists'. what we see at this point is not the removal of -- is a removal of the regime, but is also in those people who would be called reformists. at the government reformist became too corrupt. when people talk about wanting to change the democratic structure, they're trying to figure a way to get that 23% to be a majority. that is what we want. if you listen to reforms, we want to break down the system.

break down the system and create lists. who do you open it up to? if it will replace it? will it be democratic reformers? will it be muslim brothers? it is a problem that we face. and then you see the other pillar that is coming under attack, the army. the army in egypt is different than anything we know. it makes you uncomfortable as americans to see how they function in. but they have functioned in egypt their own way. they are an institution and they had been separate from society. they are not an institution that wants to interfere in the internal affairs of egypt. they want to be on this side and they believe that they are responsible for providing stability. when they came into the square, at those who knew the army knew they would never fire on the

egyptian people. kit -- their job is to protect the egyptian people, not to harm them. when you had the pro-mubarak people attack the square, they were not going to fire on those people either because they were also egyptian people. their job is to bring stability. they did not want this job, they do not want to be in power, they want to see a civilian government come back. 10 years ago, i think the structure of the army would have preferred a military officer to take over. there's been an evolution in their own thinking. they do not want to control the country. they know they need the civilian people. the real problem they face today is the revolution for most egyptians was not a democratic revolution. that is not what they're in the

streets. it was an economic revolution. that revolution continues. the social economic problems of egypt are tremendous. if you see the news reports about factories, strikes, things are not working, the economy is going downhill. the fear is that those people who have not participated in economic growth over the last decade, they did not participate that much in the revelation. this is the 77%. but expect their lives to get better. if this government cannot deliver on improving the lives of the masses of people, this revolution is likely to take a second revolution. we have the -- we may have something happen that we do not know. we do not know where this is going to go. the crucial thing for the government is to get goods and services to as many people as possible so it looks like the government is doing something on their behalf. boring about the democratic revolution is fine, but you need

-- worrying about the democratic revolution is fine, but you need to address the economic problems. the world is going to makes its sorry if they did not help the government of egypt address the economic issues. >> thank you very much. very enlightening perspective on the egyptian evolution -- revelation. we will take some questions at the end of the session. we can move on now to the next speaker. >> let me start by a st. thank you for the jamestown foundation for inviting me. is a pleasure to be year. -- it is a pleasure to be here.

thank you for coming. before i start, i would like to say something. it has not been easy preparing this paper. it all depended on whether gaddafi folded. in the beginning, the only a few people believed that colonel gaddafi could stay for long. the two countries bordering egypt, the regime fell quickly and. -- fell quickly. in egypt, the regime of president mubarak felony few weeks. -- fell in a few weeks. he was not only facing an internal rebellion, he was facing the whole world, including the mighty army of the u.s., britain, and france.

we are in the third month of the libyan crisis and gaddafi has managed to stay in power. he may fall indeed as the american government hope he will do. gaddafi has managed to weather the storm and has lasted almost 43 years in power. can he manage but he did in the 1980's and 1990's? we will see. in this paper, i will try to point out some strengths and weaknesses and the gaddafi regime. i will also talk a little bit about the opposition party, the rebellion, and i will also mentioned the implications of what is going on in libya and

algeria, a country that i believe is a very important country that should not be ignored. before i start, let me say something very briefly. libya presents a golden opportunity for reconciliation between america and some of the the odds -- jihadists. the end result could lead to a more weakens -- there is also the possibility that the policy could backfire by and you will end up with a stronger al qaeda in the whole of north africa. we will talk about this a little bit later. let me start by saying something about the gaddafi regime. the regime is very weak from the

outside. , gaddafi is the man who makes the decisions and libya. no order can be issued without his approval. he claims to be needed to be a president nor a prime minister. he is the leader of the revolution, king of the african kings, of course. [laughter] a 1 and regime is not the thing to do -- a one-man regime is not the thing to do. in practice, it is a very difficult, as gaddafi has proved for the last 43 years. the 1969 military coup was not a one-man show. the three officers came from all over the country.

they were mainly influenced by the popular movement at that time. gradually, colonel gaddafi started to change. he wanted power all to himself. this led -- in the 1980's and 1990's, gaddafi regime defeated three major plots carried out by one opposition group. the residents of colonel gaddafi in tripoli. at the end of the 1990's, -- at the end of the 1980's, the national front moved its fighters to algeria from which it was hoping that it would

fight algeria and it failed in doing so. some officers from a very powerful tribe tried against . we will talk about a little bit later. gaddafi defeated an insurgency led by the jihadists. it is formed by a -- he defeated all of these attempts in the 1980's and 1990's. his base was shrinking.

d.s.o. many enemies within the country's. -- he has so many enemies within the country's. all these attempts led gaddafi to change the way he organizes his armed forces. he started to see the army as a prep. the army could one day produced an officer who may try his luck with a coup attempt. gaddafi created what can be described today as a parallel army. it is known today in libya as the gaddafi brigade. peace brigades are -- these brigades were fighting the rebels in. when the doctor created these brigades, his aim was that these units are able to defeat any coup attempt that could start inside libya.

the main task was not fighting an outside army. the main mission was to topple the and the coup attempt against the regime from within the country. one of the most famous brigades was the one headed by a friend of colonel gaddafi. in addition to these, the regime depends on its survival on a complex map of tribal allegiances, especially in the west of the country. the survival of the regime or its demise depends a great extent -- i know that some people dispute the influence or the importance within libya today. the pointes the fact that the

insurgencies or the rebellion has supporters from across the country, from all the major tribes within libya. at the same time, -- they also say, even the tribes that are still balking gaddafi in the west of libya are doing so because of fear of reprisal of his regime. i also accept this argument. however, i still believe the survival of the regime or its demise depends a great extent on what these major tribes do in the next few weeks or months. the first tried on which gaddafi depends -- this tried -- this tribe is in central libya. it is very powerful. its members hold sensitive positions within the state and the armed forces at.

they are currently fighting the insurgency. any spiting units -- the most important tried for the regime is in the south of libya. a great number of the fighters who were fighting on the front of, gaddafi come from that region. and their loyalty to the regime should not be questioned. they have a pact with gaddafi, there is a family relation between them. it is cemented by family ties.

the brother and lot of, gaddafi, from that tribe. -- the brother-in-law comes from that tried. -- tribe. to highlight the influence of the importance of that tribe in libya. colonel gaddafi exerted so much pressure on britain to free the bomber, enormous pressure from within the tribe. before making a lot of threats against british interest. some critics would say that it was his own interest was to bring him back to libya in case he were to tell the secrets of

the bombing. this tribe is considered the largest tribe in the libya. its members lived all over the country, all over libya. even in the capital of the rebellion. the people also control a vast chunk of the military and security institutions within libya. in 1993, there was a problem between this tried and gaddafi. its relationship with gaddafi it was set back after the 1993 failed coup, which some of the

officers were implicated. gaddafi had trusted this tribe and allowed them to control the military institutions. in 1997, members of the tribe, loyal to gaddafi, executed the implicated officers. some would argue that they were forced to do this by gaddafi. whether this is true or not true, at the end of the day, he managed to keep the blood of these dead officers on the tribe itself. it became an internal issue. in some arab cultures, we still have this problem of taking revenge. if someone from a tribe is killed by someone from another tribe, the tribe family has the right to go and take -- and kill

someone from the tribe which kill that person. this tit-for-tat things cannot be the case. by making the tribe executed some officers, gaddafi managed to keep it an internal triable issue. he has nothing to do with it. it was the tribe. it was the leaders of the tribe who killed their own officers which betrayed their regime. also, a very quick point here, at the beginning of the rebellion, the revolution, the uprising in libya, it was said that the tribes joined the rebellion. many people said so. if they indeed joined the rebellion, the regime would have fallen by now.

they only live a short distance from misrata. they could march to misrata and take the siege of the third biggest city in libya and gaddafi's regime would fall very quickly. there is debate on whether they're still with gaddafi or at least not joining the rebellion. i will say a few words why. the fourth tribe is also seen as loyal to gaddafi. they occupy an important position. their role became more important after 1993, because gaddafi said that he was putting his trust in them. when the officers tried to go against him, he wanted to diversify, make more alliances and pacts with other tribes.

others were indicted and became very powerful within the regime. -- were invited and became very powerful within the regime. the backbone of tripoli to be defended comes from that region. the population within tripoli itself originally comes from there. if the opposition wants to do anything within the libyan capital, maybe that tribe could play a role in that. i only named a few of these tribes still seen as loyal to the regime, but at least not fighting with the rebels. the reason for them staying loyal to the regime may be related to their wish of honoring their historic pact. also, they could be fearful of losing the power they have held

all the time if gaddafi falls. members of these tribes have occupied important positions in the government. now, a new regime is emerging, based in the east of the country. the rebels attacking gaddafi's forces are mainly from the east. it may be normal that some tribes in the west of libya may feel threatened by the emergence of a new rival power in the east that may try to take away the power they have held for so long. this would lead me to talk about the formation of the rebel forces, the opposition. it seems that american colonists -- columnists are debating who the rebels are. it is not easy to answer this. began as a popular movement

before it quickly became an armed rebellion. this quick transformation of a peaceful movement into an armed struggle has not allowed time to identify properly who the leaders of this new rebellion are. i will try here to identify some of the main players in the rebellion, but before i do that, i would like to say a word about the absence of political parties and culture inside libya. for the 42 years of colonel khadafy is rule, the political parties were -- colonel gaddafi pose a role, the political parties were banned. -- colonel gaddafi's rule, political parties were banned. people were rolling themselves. even under the rule of the king -- people were ruling themselves.

even under the king, political parties were banned in libya. the libyans are not accustomed to having political parties. so, when colonel gaddafi's regime fell quickly after the revolution in february in the eastern regions of libya, there was a vacuum. who would fill it? no party existed to fill or take advantage of the fall of the regime. the people who went to the streets against the regime were mainly ordinary people belonging to different backgrounds of the libyan society. there were no known names among those people to take charge of the uprising. so, the responsibility fell on former officials who were part of the regime and only defected after the start of the uprising. the most noun -- the most noun

among those was the former justice minister -- known among those is a former justice minister. he is well respected. he is a decent man. but there is a problem here. he does not seek power. he is very willing to relinquish any post he has. he has the national council. he says his job would finish the minute gaddafi's regime falls. he does not seek power. in addition, many of the council members were part of the gaddafi regime before joining the revolution. the interior minister, as the ambassador, all of the known names within the opposition have now been part of gaddafi's

regime. so, the absence of proper elections, it seems impossible today to say if these members of the council have any true representation of the masses who led the uprising. all the opposition groups have come back to libya now in order to reconnect with their supporters and also to reconnect with the people who led this uprising. the libyan national salvation sent some of this members to reconnect with their members. the muslim brotherhood also sent some people. but i think the quickest to act with it than this -- were the jihadists.

they are part of the libyan people and felt that it was their part to participate in the military struggle. some of them have returned from outside libya. they were these people who came from outside, a fraction of the jihadists operating within libya itself. as you know, libya freed around 100 jihadists when they were conducting peace negotiations. some of these people were young people who did not know anything about the struggle against the regime in the 1990's. they were mostly young, influenced by i iraq and allied a -- in iraq and al queda.

these people were freed by the regime and, i believe, many of them have joined the revolution. others have made statements in support of the revolution, but i believe that their role is very minimal in the things that happened within libya. a final point here before i move on, colonel gaddafi has been saying from the start that the armed rebels fighting his government are al queda. he seems genuinely hurt that he once helped the west fight against that group and now the west is fighting to topple him with what he sees as an insurgency led by jihadists. by this degree, i believe that

will play a role in any government that comes after the gaddafi regime. i believe they will not try to hijack the uprising. they will work within any system that comes after gaddafi. he will be glad that i will finish. a few things should be mentioned about algeria. i think it can play an important role. algeria actually feels that these actions have led to al queda in the north taking advantage of this situation. you have seen the recent briefings of military intelligence of al qaeda possessing weapons from libya. i do not know if this is true or not, but it seems the president

also believes that al queda has also managed to gain weapons from libya now. syria also does not feel comfortable when it sees its arch enemy, france, meddling in the affairs of the country. you also have to take into account the the algerians are very sensitive to seeing the french bombing and killing libyans, even if the dead people were gaddafi supporters. the algerians still remember french planes bombing them during their push for independence. also, algeria is sensitive to the moral policies. when morocco fights with the western alliance against the libyan regime, it seems normal that algeria wants to take a totally different if not opposing policy. the final point, algeria may not be comfortable seeing the end of the conflict in libya with the

victory of one side against the other, not now at least. a victory for the rebels in libya will encourage its people, the algerian people, who want to seek change, to act now. if libya descends into a civil war, algeria could point to some people and say, if you want to start a revolution, you have the example of libya. do you want a civil war? three points. algeria's point of view should be listened to in any serious effort to resolve the libyan crisis. the algerians are very well -- they know how to negotiate. they have done it for some many years including the american hostages in iran in the 1980's. if algeria can play a role, i think it should be encouraged to do so. maybe it can offer gaddafi and

his family some kind of exile. second point, assurances of some kind should be given to the tribes in western libya still fighting with the regime. if you want these tribes to switch sides, you have to offer them an incentive to doing so. this incentive should not be seen as the trail to gaddafi's own tribe. it should -- be trail -- betrayal to gaddafi's on drive. -- own tribe. finally, actions in libya may turn out to be a genius masterpiece of brilliant foreign policy. it could resolve your long- running struggle that you have had in the middle east or at least most of them. it was you saved them from

gaddafi's tanks when they were approaching their base in benghazi. your interventions won the battle to their favor. someone about -- some will no doubt be grateful. others will surely disagree. they are mostly al queda people. they're not very strong now, but they may be in the long run, especially if libya descends into a civil war. they will have plenty of time and a proper place, and most importantly, access to weapons, plenty of them. thank you very much. [applause]

>> thank you. that was very interesting to me, especially the role of the different tribes. next, our next speaker will tell us about his personal experience in libya. >> thank you very much. showing a visual multimedia presentation. these are some of my photographs from the couple of weeks that i spent in libya from the last day of february to mid-march. these are from my own experiences, and i am going to be giving a talk the sort of the company's the photos. these will help to explain some -- accompanies the photos. these will help to explain some of the points i am making. the title of my talk is, "the mitsubishi war."

i chose that title sort of tongue-in-cheek as an all monished to the toyota war -- an homage to the toyota war of 1987. pickup trucks were fitted with guns and anti-aircraft weapons used against america in the early 1990's. a little bit of background. before i arrived to libya, i arrived to broke on february 28th. the libyan conflict began as a small cluster of lawyers demonstrating on february 15th in downtown benghazi. people who had been inspired by the revelations -- revolutions to the east and west in egypt and tunisia. by february 28th, a full-scale

armed revolts had broken out. as libyan security forces gun down an unknown number of protest is, told to me by a libyan civilian, to be in the 100, in what was called -- to be in the hundreds, in what was called the day of rage. the libyan revolution began. what personally drew me into the libyan revolution was that libya was a deeply closed society, say for the bangladeshi migrant workers and the odd italian tour group that would come to visit roman ruins from time to time. libya's on a need to throw out over four decades of gaddafi rule to open the area to mass

tourism. libya has been a largely closed society akin to north korea, relative to the beaches of tunisia and the pyramids of egypt and so forth. the people of eastern libya, cut off from most of the west of the world, clamored to make their voices heard. journalists were bombarded with every type of political and emotional sentiment. some older libyans for wanting to tell 30-40 years of anecdotes and stories of how they have suffered under the gaddafi regime since the revolution of 1969. the peripheral effects of the libyan war. the implosion of libya threatens most of the mediterranean littoral states. gaddafi has often threatened to turn the southern tier of the

european union black eye unleashing migrants and reference -- black, by unleashing migrants and refugees with italy being the most vulnerable. what happened with the collapse of the libyan security state was much different. hundreds of thousands of migrant workers were flooding not necessarily italy or the canary islands in spain, but the egyptian and tunisian borders, very vulnerable, destabilized, still in revolutionary states. virtually every other african state-the republic of south africa had an unknown number of migrant workers. the egyptian border, the organization of migration had

charts of order for all of the people living there, people from every single african state from guinea, gambia, equity oriole guinea -- the equatorial guinea. the scale of which i will personally admit i had no idea how fast this crisis was in that regard. -- vast this crisis was in that regard. when i cross the border in february, there were thousands upon thousands of bangladeshi man between the ages of 18-35 who were just camped out at the border. the bangladeshi government could not or would not come to their rescue. on the flip side of that, when i returned to egypt several weeks later, there was not a single bangladeshi man left and there were thousands upon thousands of people from chad and the sudan, most of whom were without

papers, passports, many of whom had been outside of their native countries. some of them were born in libya and had no identity documents of any kind. let's see. gaddafi pose a resistance to the eastern-led revolt -- gaddafi's resistance to the eastern-led revolt has ripple effects that will be felt as far afield as bangladesh, a vietnam and the philippines. this is actually a global crisis. many of the migrant workers who had been working in libya for many years actually do not have a place to go back to. i spoke with people from chad and some of the south and north sudanese, and many of them told me that they do not have homes in the countries they were from because they had been in libya for an incredibly long time.

the rebels themselves, who are they? this is a question that has constantly been asked in the media here in the united states and in the european union, which i was able to read some of online when i got out of a very internet-restricted libya. lydia's rebels are, as you might discern from media accounts, or anything but monolithic. every fighter i spoke with claims to be fighting for what they called a free libya. most say they're looking to transform the gaddafi state into a representative government that includes a rotating presidency. many said they wished it would be four years, consistent with the united states, coupled with some form of open, cyclical democracy. there are implements -- there are islamists involved in the fighting. some are the dedicated front- line fighters.

however, these fighters do not in any way make up the demographic majority of the rebel movement. if anything, they are in allied air. some of them came into the conflict as -- they are and out liar -- a outlier. some of them came into the conflict as opportunists. some came to the front line wearing flip-flops, a cliche you have heard about the taliban in afghanistan. the rebels are incredibly disorganize despite their spirited corps and a wasteful display of bravado that was carried on for foreign after day.s davy they have lots of finite ammunition. they looted weapons stores to have massive displays of much she's no -- machismo.

thatte gaddafi's claims the rebels have allocated ties i saw noda timees, evidence of this in over two weeks. i appear today with my head still attached to my body. libya in 2011 is not iraq in 2004, despite claims to the contrary. the biggest threat to journalists is gaddafi forces, not jihad forces or nihilists. a colleague of mine is currently in captivity from the libyan regime, along with three other journalists, one who has not been reported missing, and the other three have been reported

in a detention camp. various media outlets are trying to work for their release. they do not have the diplomatic clout of the new york times, unfortunately for them. i asked specific front-line fighters about their views of the islamic fundamentalist groups. one said to me that is irrelevant. most libyans consider the lifg a spent movement that has nothing to add to the current revolution. they consider it something that was more important in the 1990's. they wanted this to be portrayed desperately as a civil society revolution with an armed wing that was trying to overthrow the gaddafi regime. the rebels were often insisting that their cosmopolitan, pan- libyan movement, their very

thinly drawn out initial platform in the courthouse in benghazi says the tripoli is the capital of the united libya. it was essential to the rebels that they did not want to portray libya as a place that was about to fracture down the center, dividing tripoli in the north and the stronghold in this apparent desert with benghazi in the east -- the saharan desert with benghazi in the east. they were insisting that the country not be cleaved in two. on to the rebel equipment and their inherent conflicts along with and alongside nato. the people of eastern libya and the people of the central coast that i spoke with have a very bitter memory, a very bitter collective memory, of 30 years of italian fascist colonialism

that existed from 1911-1941. older libyans, some of whom are actually involved in the rebel movement -- there are very senior men fighting in this movement, told me that they fondly recall allies, or their parents had told them about allies getting out fascist powers. you ever heard about the australian forces fighting against german and italian fascism in 1941. the older generation of people and libya have instilled in the young people and the fighters at deeply anti-occupation sentiment that exists within the current rebel movement. not only does this stem from the first pillar of this almost xenophobia, stems from the legacy of italian colonialism,

which is very bitter. my colleague wrote about this. he was a resistance fighter to italian colonialism who was hung and is a pen ultimate symbol of the rebel movement. he is depicted on the bottom of a flag which is the red green and black flag from before gaddafi's green, monotone flag. the other main factor with libyan hostility to any potential western ground intervention is the libyans observation through mass media of eight years of heavily destructive war in iraq. as one rebel said to me at the conclusion of a battle, forget about baghdad. if all the troops enter libya,

we will make mogadishu look like a walk in the park. they are operating from a position of the inherent weakness in terms of arms, manpower and training. but they also still believe they hold the cards in that, they came to demand heavy western air power but said that if one western beirut, french, british, italian or american -- one , french, british, italian or american was walking around benghazi, they would shoot them. they're very fearful of occupation. both sides have their red lines. the rebels have the town which was once a secure place but now many of you have likely heard of.

it has a desert road that bypasses benghazi to the south and connects to the egyptian border. the rebels insisted that if it was genuinely breached, it is possible that the war would be lost without western air intervention. i left libya just before western air strikes began. on the other side, we learned -- and a colleague of mine was shot in the calf -- that they have a red line. the rebels were telling journalists a bit of their own propaganda mixed in with their bravado that they were going to storm that line any day. foreign journalists like myself learned about this geographical buffer, and a breaching it was

absolutely unacceptable. they ended up putting of a very strong fight. some colleagues of mine were pinned down in a firefight with machine guns and snipers along with mercenaries for several hours. that was the initial battle, and then many western journalists retreated to points further east. once the rebel movement realized that this was an insurmountable task, the toppling of this area, the calls for a no-fly zone increased among both war fighters and civil society actors in benghazi and other areas. that was until the air strikes actually came to fruition. the libyan revolution has reduced itself to a contest over the heavy oil producing basin,

the most valuable of the oil producing areas. there seems to be a pendulum swinging to and fro between the oil areas in the rest -- in the west and another area in the east, which is where we are today in the back and forth fighting. i would like to make a point about some of the rebels equipment and how they're actually fighting the war. the rebel equipment consists of an army of chinese and cheaply produced chinese and better produce japanese technicals outfitted with a 50 caliber anti-aircraft guns. soviet era double and triple quod mounted guns with ammunition which are used when the gaddafi regime was launching airstrikes. they would fire wildly into the air trying to shoot down whoever

was overhead. the rebels are fighting amongst extremely difficult physical conditions, sandstorms combined with poorly trained fighters were often little more than can fodder. the supply lines along the central libyan coast were constantly being struck as the front lines started moving further and further west toward the aforementioned town. one weakness the rebels had was an inherently diminishing amount of limited military material. without a resupply from the outside which gaddafi had reportedly had access to himself, the rebels did not have a way -- it was really unclear

at the time. i'm talking about mid march. i was made privy to information that the french government had actually sent a shipment of weapons and munitions to the rebels in the port of benghazi march 11th and 12th when it was clear that a leader wanted to be declared in this pan- mediterranean conflict. i would like to talk a little bit of the civil society aspect of the war, the home front. i am primarily referring to benghazi. outside of the courthouse in benghazi, there would often be people chanting no, no, no al queda. a lot of these people were women, interesting for a north

african and arab conflict. those on the home front insist that there is basically no political space for anti- democratic islamists within libyan civil society. that is despite the fact it there are islamist fighting on the kinetic war front. insistence that there be no western footprint on the ground, not even the lightest intelligence 1, was evidence to me of a politically immature mind stead -- mindset among the revolutionaries. if air power was going to be used, as it now is, if there were westerners from these intelligence services correlating armed forces, i'm not sure how the libyans thought that nadir destruction of rebel tanks was going to be unavoidable -- nato destruction of rebel tanks was going to be unavoidable. nato spokesperson said he did

not know the rebels had tanks, which i find someone astounding. one of the things i found by talking to a wide swath of libyan society is that the libyan people are essentially exhausted from not being active participants in an increasingly unevenly globalized world. the reasons for the beginning of the revolution, besides nearing their neighbors in egypt and libya, were economic, social, and a massive grudge that many people had against the regime regarding the 1200 men killed in a prison massacre, which was a lot of the legacy from something happening 15 years ago and a place like libya with the

history of the italian occupation. even young people have a long memory. in conclusion, where do we, or rather, the libyan people go from here? the military pendulum continues to swing back and forth with no end in sight. reports of oil terminal towns being captured, lost, recaptured, seem to continue ad nauseum. nato on board and across the mediterranean coast may have indeed averted -- nato on board meant -- bombardment along the mediterranean coast may have indeed averted civilian deaths. their limited air and sea engagement will unlikely topple

the gaddafi family in the immediate or near term. in my view, from the hundreds of people i spoke to over several weeks, something has to give to alter the current course of the conflict as the status quo is unsustainable. the rebels must be better trained and equipped and willing to sustain mass casualties if there to try to take misrata entirely in rebel hands, and eventually mount a very difficult assault in tripoli which would be immensely violent and lead to many debts. nato and the united states may have to ultimately be willing to decapitate the regime, depending on how much the western public is willing to take in the political will of the united states and the european union and its counsel partners in the conflict. ultimately, the somewhat

xenophobic rebel movement may be forced to except when stern -- accept western boots on the ground. they may ultimately have to have a self recognition of their very limited military capabilities and the fact that gaddafi believes he is in this conflict for the long haul. thank you very much. [applause]

>> thank you for those interesting firsthand observations about libya. i am going to try to gather of some of the more specific things we have heard this morning and talk about revolutions in general. i think that nostra thomas himself could not have foretold nostradamus himself could not have foretold what is a happening in the middle east, all sparked by a tunisian food vendor. revolutions are dangerous creatures that can unleash all kinds of social forces that can take a revolution a long way from where it started. the french revolution of 1789, which both inspired and terrified europe, began with days of mass action much like

the days of anger that we have been seen today in the arab world. though the king and queen were led to their death, it was not long before leading revolutionaries had their own meetings with the guillotine. liberty, fraternity and equality became mere slogans as napoleon bonaparte restored authoritarianism to france and began directing the slaughter of a generation of young man in pursuit of imperial conquest. what are the areas of revelation that have -- one of the areas of revelation that has many parallels was the european revelation -- arab revolution. in most closely resembles what

should the continent at that time. there was a rapid spread from country to country despite eats nations revolution having -- each nation's revolution having a different character. it often attracted a reluctant middle-class. governments appeared to cave in at first. too many university graduates were pursuing too few jobs, a condition we have in north africa right now, many of these folks making up the core of revolutionary forces, both in 1848 and in today's north africa. most importantly, no charismatic leader emerged along the lines of fidel castro or even a george washington. what was the result of this kind of revolution? at that time, small concessions

from the government's lead to a dwindling interest in revelation. when the casual revolutionaries gave up, the revolutions became doomed. by the summer of 1848, the forces of counter-revolution had time to reorganize and began clearing the barricades with the loss of thousands of lives. in two places the revolts became larger wars of national mobilizaliberation, hungary and italy. with a one year -- within one year, both had been solidly defeated. the revolts failed, but they laid the foundation and provided inspiration for later revolts such as the russian revolution of 1917. they signaled that the end of

absolute monarchies was in sight. in this sense, even failed revolutions can have an enormous impact decades later. it has been suggested in some quarters that the military weakness of libyas rebels can be overcome with modern supplies of weapons. it must be noted that every influx of arms into that region in the last century has been followed by years of violence. for example, it was an influx of arms that contributed to the breakdown of order in darfur that eventually resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people. darfur used to use a centuries old inter-tribal resolution system, usually involving compensation in cash or animals to deal with incidents of violence such as murder. however, this system broke down when the introduction of automatic weapons allowed the slaughter of dozens of people at a time by a single individual. traditional methods of conflict

revolution were simply overwhelmed by advances in killing technology. arms may be the solution to gaddafi, but they will not bring stability to north africa. those advocating a shipment of modern arms to libya as rebels speak about controls over whose hands they might end up in. this is wishful thinking. once arms are sold, abandon, lost, stolen or even given away. some have already found their way into the hands of al queda. that should give pause to those backing the supply of arms to the libyan insurrection. the half-hearted endorsement of a no-fly zone by the arab league was taken by nato as a green light for attacks on gaddafi's forces. in reality, with the exception of wealthy but distance cutter,

most of the arab league has kept qatar, most of the arab league has kept a distance. there are rumors that algeria is providing arms and aid to gaddafi. algeria has no desire to see the arab revolution washup on the shores of tripoli, and giving the libyan rebels a bloody nose way togo along discouraging like-minded incidents in algeria. in sudan, political survivors will not be hasty in counting out gaddafi. both nations have deep if turbulent ties with libya, which has fluctuated between assisting their development and interfering in their internal affairs. in the meantime, both are

keeping their distance. but if gaddafi falls, it is likely that both will attempt to exert their own influence on the formation of a new regime. the fall of tripoli would not necessarily mean the end of gaddafi or his regime. the libyan leader would have the option of retiring on military bases in the desert where he enjoys solid support. with access to fighters from neighboring countries, gaddafi or his successors could continue low scale the debilitating attacks on the libyan oil infrastructure that would prevent any new government from getting off the ground without substantial foreign aid. it would not be difficult to raise a tribal forces opposed to what many libyans might see as a benghazi-based government intent on giving western and southern tribes power, influence and funds. such a conflict could go on for years with an effect on oil

prices and the global economy. the rebels do not have means, and possibly not even the inclination, to distribute oil revenues throughout the larger libyan society. should gaddafi feel he is losing his grip on libya, it is possible he could once again sponsor international terrorism, especially with strikes against the western nations leading the attacks on his regime. we of no reason to suppose a new government would be a force for stability in the region. the question here is not whether al queda will take advantage of instability in north africa, but whether it can operate there in any meaningful way. egypt is the historical

crossroads of the world, and as such, it is an appealing theater of operations for al queda, which has ideological roots there. al queda could certainly attempt to penetrate egypt and resume operations there. of course, that would definitely appeal to them. however, al queda does not appear to have any active cells in egypt or even many sympathizers there. there is little appetite for a return to the dirty, back street war between islamic re extremists and the regime that dominated the 1990's. more importantly, egyptians realize that extremism = poverty and deprives them of important sources of foreign currency.

al queda still does not present a political alternative beyond slogans and the implementation of sharia law. with insufficient agricultural production, a rapidly increasing population, massive unemployment and under- employment, as well as threats to a water supply that poses dangers to cultivation, and power supplies, egypt is in need of a more thoughtful strategy than that supplied by extremists. there are many sincere muslims in the region who desire sharia, but they would also be questioning of the wisdom of leaving this in the hands of al qaeda of north africa. opportunities will nevertheless be presented for al queda from the complex that will inevitably follow revolution.

foreign attention and resources will be diverted for their -- from their activities. let me turn to sudan for a moment. cobbled together from scores of ethnic and tribal groups speaking hundreds of different languages, sudan, unsurprisingly, has been a center of dissent, rebellion, an outright civil war from their first day of independence. while popular revolts maybe the mediterranean coast, the sudanese people have already overthrown -- may be new along the mediterranean coast, the sudan and people of ari overthrown two dictators. sudan is now -- have already overthrown two dictators.

sudan is now faced with the possibility of an influx of neighbors from libya. a small protest movement has been firmly repressed so far, but there is enormous dissatisfaction in the north with a president who has failed to keep the country together and has lost most of its oil revenues to the new southern state. in the current situation, there is a possibility of both north and south sudan turning into failed states with enormous consequences for a large part of africa. the crux -- the collapse of the gaddafi regime would have an enormous impact on chad, maui and the share. let -- niger. libya is an integral part of the economy of the states, including

the employment of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers. gaddafi regards this region as a libyan interplant and has played an important role in the area, particularly through his recruitment and sponsorship of people whose ancient homeland has been divided amongst half a dozen nations in the post- colonial era. having long acted as a sponsor of regimes that consider the presence inconvenient and irresponsible, gaddafi is now trying to get them to rally to his cause. whether he wins or loses, there is immense concern in these nations that the fighters will return to their home states to initiate a new round of rebellions in oil and uranium rich regions. egyptian revolution is not yet

history. we may have only witnessed the first phase of a process that could continue for years, decades, or even generations. it is unlikely that the egyptian officer corps, unquestionably part of the egyptian elite, is willing to oversee the transfer of power to the masses. indeed, it would be unreasonable to think that this would be their first instinct. in egypt, political revolution is also social revolution, and these types of things do not usually happen overnight. egypt's internal security service has collapsed in the wake of the egyptian revolution, and they are in the difficult process of being rebuilt and restructured with the new mandate that promises to secure a genuine security threats rather than repress political opposition. while there are many cases of government violence against demonstrators, there are

remarkably few incidences of retaliatory violence against the security services during the revolution. such matters of all is traditionally been handled -- such matters have always traditionally been handled by the elite. the question is how competent they will be in controlling extremists. they are employing an interior ministry forces three times the size of the military, securing egypt from islamic extremism has come at considerable cost to the liberty of the egyptian people, because no longer considered acceptable. the question remains, however, whether lighter and less intrusive security presence will still be as effective in

eliminating islamist extremism. gaddafi's libya has always been one of the major financial backers of the african union. this has stopped now, with significant consequence for union that already suffers from underfunding. there is no guarantee that any libyan regime would guarantee such support, nor is it likely that another african state would be able to step in and fill the shortfall. sub-saharan countries have been effectively excluded from partaking in the libyan conflict even though they have close ties with libya and will inevitably affected -- inevitably be affected by what happens there. there are negotiations -- i do not know if anyone heard that they are going on. they were treated as an unimportant sideshow by the same

nations that were busy taking out libyan armor and air defenses. at some point, the west will have to shrug off the white man's burden that has become outrageously expensive and destabilizing. african peacekeeping missions have an uneven record, but they are not going to get any better at this kind of thing by sitting in their barracks. more cooperative efforts between the west and africa that a knowledge the interests of those actually living in the continent and the limitations of external parties in dealing with political crises there would do more to stabilize north africa than a hail of bombs and rockets. in short, revolution is not an easy thing. most failed. it would be presumptuous to assume the revolts in egypt and libya or elsewhere in the middle east will lead to inevitable success regardless of how that success might be interpreted.

however, whether successful or not, the repercussions of revolution can rarely be tamed, making the recipes for insecurity. at best they can be managed with a bit of luck. at worst, efforts to contain or refer social and political transformation are only capping the volcano. if it does not erupt there, it will erupt somewhere else at a time of its own choosing. thank you. [applause] >> now back to my role as moderator. we will take 10 minutes for questions. if anybody has one, yes please, you sir. there is a microphone coming.

>> there was the possibility that gadaffi could survive by regrouping in the south. i am wondering how he would then pay. i am looking at your own paper which tells me all of the energy goes out through the north coast. however the you raise the money? >> he has been planning for this a long time. we call him a mad man, but he is not as crazy as that. what he has been doing -- when oil was so, it brings in revenue. he has been buying gold for years. libya has enormous gold reserves. unlike a lot of nations that choose to store their gold reserves in secure places like

switzerland and fort knox, he has kept it all in tripoli. he has as well secured there. -- it will secure there. this is a mobile source of funds. you cannot spend a gold as easily as cash. it might be necessary to sell a bit. he has enough to keep a were going for years. he is not short of funds. he could endure the loss of oil production. >> any other questions? >> thank you very much. he speculated on a little bit about algeria. a couple months back as it was always about what country was

next. i was wondering if he could elaborate a little bit on what is next for algeria. is there a potential for an uprising? >> algeria would not wish a quick and to the war in libya. it the regime of pol quickly, i think there'd be a bigger demand for change. the president has started a process of changing inside his government. the whole regime needs changing. people in the middle east are not content with superficial changes.

they want deep-rooted reform. it comes from a dictatorship into a democracy. i think there would be a bigger demand for change inside algeria. it continues. it belongs to libya. i think the government may manage to say that change could have been -- happen, resulting in violence. >> i just want to make a comment about algeria. in speaking with the rebel leadership, it they say that gadaffi is having two core al arab allies.

a lot of the people that i spoke to view it as cause i belligerent. they believe that the government did not want to see gadaffi fall because it to threaten their own regime. now we have seen that syria appears to be tottering. i am not sure that is isolated to algeria. >> thank you. thank you. i wonder about the chemical weapons that libya has. unaided picture three weeks ago.

in 1994, that they signed an agreement that it will reduce the weapons. they have asked for extensions until may 2011. i think 23,000 tons is in libya. where are they? it is really hard for them to lose it. what are the prospects? >> thank you. he mentioned the bombs. they are not the same as chemical weapons. the only chemical weapons research that we still have is a certain amount of mustard gas that was in the process of being destroyed. there is only a small quantity

of this leg. the forces to not have the means of doing this. that is why you are not seeing a lot of attention being paid to chemical weapons. the lot were eliminated in 2003 and the following years in order for it libya to restore this. >> would you like to take this t? >> they know that it needs to change. they are feeling the heat. the need to change. otherwise they will have revolutions.

however, if he manages to extend the current uprising, i think it'll give encouragement to the rest of the dictatorship. they can also do the same and prevent change. morocco is the other dictatorship. they started the process of reform. they are able to plead. they are trying to reduce this. i think the monarchy needs major reform. many sectors with in the moroccan society have the process of change.

i believe the king of morocco has understood the message. we will see it in the next few months what kind of change he is willing to offer. >> he is sharing his knowledge. kumbaya own experience, something i observed was the deep penetration of the patronage system write their egyptian society. the importance of keeping this in keeping people loyal. it seemed to be disrupted at the moment. i wonder how the reformers might be able to replace it with more equitable means of distribution of the funds of egypt in a way

that would not be designed to simply further the existence of a single regime. >> actually, that is to questions. the purse is over the equitable distribution of wealth. you had reformists in egypt who and supported by the world bank. there were getting high marks by changing away from the socialist state to being free and more open. this was done three series of prospects. it took all of these industries that have been nationalized and they made them economical and then sold them all. the problem with the system was that they then fired them.

thousands of people were without work. the problem was they were sold to cronies of the regime. those people to benefit of the program. at the same time in order to meet the needs of having an over subsidize society, they've reduced extensively the subsidy system to the port. he created a dual problem in society where you are making a certain group of people very wealthy and the mass of society have a declining standard of living. this was the reason why you never saw much support with the economic reform. you saw the social deprivation of the lower classes as fundamentally destabilizing.

the notice to got removed from the regime, it was all the economic reformers. there is seen as having a destabilizing society. patriot system goes their egyptian society. they take care of problems they solve. he provided funds to the people. this system is still very much in place in the countryside. this is why you see the democratic reformist and the muslim brotherhood filling the gap. if you break down the system, you will have lost a major source of stability. he will have more people who no longer have their identities. that is the problem with where we are now.

it suggested that anybody who was in parliament the ban for five years. you end of disenfranchising all this local leaders to have local support. >> thank you very much. we will take one more question. no takers? there is a mentioning of african union. i wonder if you can comment on the potential role. there has been more important in games. what was the last part? >> i wonder whether the and the

game -- the end game is for gadaffi? >> we are talking. we feel the african union should be encouraged to play a greater role in the amending recurring conflicts that we see in africa. this is not the solution to every problem in africa. there is a tenancy about states to be more interested in the opinion of their neighbor. sometimes this is better taken. is not to say there is no rule. there certainly better training for peacekeeping forces and

intervention forces. it can go a long way to improving the ability of africans to take care of their own concerns. regarding the state of gadaffi, i think there are a number of possibilities if he was going to exile. he already offered it a week ago. i did an article about this. he is already offered refuge. he even said it as bit of a model.

this is something that is not well understood. how many have leaders that have admiration orris -- or respect? that is the perspective we do not have here. they look at him very differently. even south africa is another place he might take refuge. who is the person that broke the sanctions and embargoes against libya? mandela was the first person to express his gratitude to muammar gadaffi for his struggle against apartheid. these of perspectives that we do not have.

>> i actually visited the african union headquarters in ethiopia last week. i did not know too much about the inner workings until i sort of showed up at the office. it is a fairly thinly stretched organization that is in a transition. i'm working on an article. i stumbled on to another that is the chinese government. they are solely constructing the new headquarters. be a you is definitely not. the chinese are hoping to change into a much stronger body. i visited the offices in somalia. we are doing some research.

the communications with discordant. it is not a completely together organization that is very powerful or strong. ok. we will take a one hour break for lunch. 30 minutes? ok.

i wondered what you thought about it. the bahraini people have been silenced in this conflict. only the leadership of iran, bahrain, and saudi arabia seem to be speaking. the bar raineys have essentially been silenced. -- the people of bahrain had been insufficiently -- essentially silenced. >> i have seen people are the u.s. government reflect this sentiment.

it is a mistake for the government to come out so quickly as they have done and label their citizens s she is and then as arabs. they are repeating the same state they did in iraq when they picked effectively pushed the shia elite into the arms of the iranians. if there is a back and, the iranians will fill it. this is a mistake. call them arabs first and then refer to their religious identity. more rain is a unique case in many ways. one-third of the population is

of iranian descent, those who left iran in the 20th centuries. s and as i know where i am from, they will play me some persian music. there is a strong cultural affinity in many ways. about 30% of bahrain's citizens are of iranian descent. i remember seeing pictures of the ayatollah everywhere. i agree with you. iranian cultural influence is far greater than the political message of the islamic republic. you have to go into isolated pockets like a mosque and all of the chair of the worst they do. they also bring money to the table. >> in 2005 when i went to visit

southern iraq, i saw the ayatollah ought to picture all over the place. i asked the iraqis out what the deal was. they said they did not want an islamic republic. but they thought he was a cool guy. he looks like sean connery. he is followed as the supreme bridges -- supreme leader or religious spiritual leader. you're from u.s. reporters that we lead into that. they are trying to establish an islamic republic in iraq, which, of course, was not the case. the notion was never advocated. his father disagreed so strongly with the ayatollah. we are talking about diversity. that is a very much the case for

shiah factions about the middle east. >> could i add one thing? i agree with all of that. if you talk to the people, but to use the same thing. discrimination is all. we aren't prohibited from this or that. we are proud to be saudi arabs. all of the arab regimes are compromised on the subject of israel and the iranians are not. to the extent there is a deep- seated opposition to root l israel, the iranians are doing more about that than any of the steny arab regions. -- sunni arab regions.

>> why has the iranian leadership crackdown so hard? we all know the paranoia behind the shiites in bahrain. there were divisions within the sunni family in bahrain. some wanted to have a dialogue and come to a more reasonable approach. the others participated in the crackdown. for the saudis, it was a red line. we have five more minutes, i think. >> one of the big strategic questions that was brought up this morning i would like to address. you have a piece coming out with

james town on iran. that seems to be the big question about what would be the strategic impact on iran. should the regime fall -- strategic conventions address what it would mean. if you could just address how the saudis might react. it seems like it might be the equivalent of the berlin wall. >> i just read this first piece 80 days ago. what i argue, of course, is that if syria does, iran will have a major problem. of course, syria is the bridge for iran to have contact.

that will go, especially if the islamic government is their placement. that will be a major problem for iran. the sunnis are not sympathetic to the iranians. they are very suspicious. having said that, i think iran would not lose. i think they would help syria. another thing is that iran is confident that they will take care of the dissent. they are not worry about it. they noted the government will stay in power. if syria does, i would agree with what gary brought up this morning -- iran would have a major problem in the eastern mediterranean.

it would be a major loss. >> my only comment is to follow up and say yes, syria is a great practical channel 2 has will look -- great practical channel to hezbollah. the iranians have always had a healthy of view of where they stand vis-a-vis syria. there's never been any ideological issue despite the syrian government not having much in common. it is a marriage of convenience. whenever the syrians and israelis started talking, they were actually making headways. that is the price. we can kiss this relationship goodbye. i agree.

it will put them at a strategic disadvantage. again, particularly at saudi money is what brings the new syrian regime into power. that will be a big political loss for iran. >> the saudis have had it up to here with bouchaeshar. the king did quite a lot. first, the to the investigation all of the table. they did not say one word about that anymore. then he invited beshar to the opening of the university. then he went to syria on a publicized state visit. he took all the cell the media with him. what was the response? to invite ahmadinejad to come to

syria and attend a news conference. they have had it with beshar. to say that he would replace them with a sunni regime is not unpalatable to the saudis. >> are there questions? last question. the microphone is coming your way. >> it was mentioned that the lubricant that keeps saudi arabia moving smoothly -- could be society and government adjust back to $50 a barrel oil price if that happened over a suspended. the time? >> palestine are you talking about? -- how much time are you talking

about? you used to hear the saudi people postulating that if there is no oil, we will go back to the old way of life. we will herd goats are wrong -- along the iraqi border. note. to date but the saudis have grown up with air-conditioned bewick's an air-conditioned apartments. they would not know how to live in that society. remember what happened in the 1980's when the price of oil went bulletin dollars a barrel for a while. one thing that happened was that vice president george h. w. bush went to saudi arabia and urged the saudis to drive the price back up because of west texas was going down the drain. that was then. [laughter] they had enough money in the bank debt they could absorb budgetary deficits much better than other countries for quite

some time. and they have the ability to control to a certain extent of the way that would work. the saudis pledged to maintain solidarity within opec, but it would take quite a sustained price depression to cause them any real pain. >> with that, we would like to thank our excellent panel an audience for listening and participating. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> now, a united nations briefing on humanitarian aid to libya. this is 20 minutes. >> valerie and less will have to be out of here by quarter past one. >> i'll just make a very short statement. i am short you have a number of questions. i had just returned from a mission to libya and it visited tripoli and benghazi. my purpose was to secure agreements for establishing a

humanitarian presence in tripoli and push for an end to hostilities so we could facilitate the delivery of much- needed humanitarian aid. i also wanted the opportunity to look at coordination efforts on the ground in benghazi. in benghazi, i met representatives of humanitarian agencies, member states, and the relief committee of the national council. while in tripoli, i met with libyan government officials and heads of humanitarian communities. in tripoli we signed an agreement with the government of libya to ensure the protection of humanitarian aid organizers and access to those in need, especially in areas where fighting is taking place. specifically, the government agrees to facilitate the

establishment of the humanitarian presence in tripoli. to provide the security guarantees necessary for a humanitarian presence in areas under the control of the libyan government and to facilitate the entry and exit up humanitarian staff and the import of equipment necessary to support the un humanitarian presence in libya. we need humanitarian aid on the ground so we can get a sense of what is actually happening to enable us to plan and respond. we plan to send a team into tripoli as early as this weekend. in addition to humanitarian staff already on the ground in benghazi, egypt, and tunisia. the humanitarian picture in parts of libya remains of utmost

concern for the humanitarian community. fighting continues in several locations inside libya. we have been unable to verify the number of reports of civilian deaths, injuries, and displacement. the situation grows more serious every day. although we have been unable to verify numbers, clearly hundreds of people have been killed or wounded during the almost continuous biking. in addition, the situation in is extremely violent. people are in need of basic supplies. thousands are still unable to leave. that includes a third country national refugees and libyans. our humanitarian efforts are focused on reaching those who

urgently need our help. i am happy to take questions. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much for this press conference. there is this feeling expressed by an organization based in london that introduction of european union troops to support the united nation efforts will be taken as a last resort. do you think the united nations need it troops to protect it in order to get help to the needy people? >> we are able to use civilian means. for example, the international

organization for migration evacuated a number of people out under misrata yesterday. a unicef ship will dock today to deliver much-needed supplies. at the moment we have an agreement with the european force and with nato that should we reach the point where the utilization of civilian assets becomes impossible because of the security situation, we, the un, would have the opportunity to call on them for support for military assets. we are not there yet. we are still able, utilizing civilian efforts, to evacuate

people. it is difficult, but we are able to do it. >> based on what you are talking about now, one of the concerns is if you have troops protecting humanitarian aid it blurs the land -- burst the line between military and humanitarian. is that your concern also? military advisers are and benghazi to apparently believed the rebels on humanitarian issues. does that blur the line as well? can you explain how your agreement in tripoli -- does that means you can go in and do what you need to do? >> on the blurring of the lines between humanitarian and military, you will know that every time we try to operate in

a conflict context, we bought up against this reality where you have states that are party to the conflict in some way to, at the same time, what to be involved in the humanitarian effort. our responsibility, just to make it clear, be a bit that we supply is -- the aid that we supply is on a mutual basis. the blurring of those lines means that you very operant but the security of humanitarian workers at risk, but you also put the delivery of that aid at risk. in the case of libya, you may have seen that there are reports that the libyan government has stated clearly that it will stop

any attempt to use the humanitarian assistance or aid to support military efforts. we have to be extremely careful about that. we have to try as much as possible to ensure that those lines do not get blurred. on the issue of uk military advisers, i am not aware and i have not been party to what the terms of reference of these advisers are. of course, the u.k. government will have its own priorities. my priority is getting humanitarian aid in it and making sure -- humanitarian aid in and making sure the lines are not blurred. on misrata, the written

agreement that we have is in relation to establishing a humanitarian presence in tripoli. separately, i raised the need for us to have access to misrata because part of this is controlled by the opposition in part by the government of libya. i have received assurances by the government of libya about ensuring the security of humanitarian workers and enable them to get to misrata by road as well as trying to get in by sea. >> ms. amos, unicef had a ship docking today. beyond that, what can you say

about plans in terms of getting more supplies in? what is in the pipeline? where are they coming from? >> the timing depends on the security situation. secondly, it depends on our ability to lead successfully. i am not just concerned about misrata. over the last few days a lot of libyans are crossing the border because of the intense fighting there. we had 6000-crossed in a few days period. we have to try to get into misrata and other cities as well. we have stocks on the border of tunisia and egypt. as soon as the security situation allows and as soon as

we are able to do effective assessments, we will be able to move to where we need to. >> where did you visit in libya? what do you attribute this change of heart that allows the unicef ship -- >> i only went into tripoli and benghazi. i went to tripoli one day and went to benghazi on the following day. i was basically involved in meeting the leaders where i went. a lot of the aid is going into misrata is going in obviously

might seek to area that is controlled by the opposition. with respect to the humanitarian corridor, we were able to negotiate. we are now able to negotiate that kind of access with the government of libya. i am not able to second-guess their reasons for doing that. my concern is to get as much access as we can so we can see what is going on, but also have an opportunity to help those in the greatest need. we are getting lots of support, but we need to verify that. >> a question about getting aid in. this is a logistic cluster report from april 19.

hell are issues of getting insurance after getting things in affecting yet? what is being done to ensure that refugees or people who want to leave the country -- in foreign workers are able to be processed? >> insurance is a concern. it is extremely costly. it is to get the cost of evacuation as you can imagine. in terms of those particularly leaving misrata, the majority of them are third-country nationals. we have been raising money ourselves. we have pressed our donors said that we can get enough money so that we can have these rotations to get people out.

>> 1 follow up -- is there some attempts -- what can be done? can you still get in? >> of course. if there was not insurance, the ships we are currently using would not agree to go in. >> [unintelligible] >> it depends on where it comes in from, whether it comes from the egyptian border where the tunisian border or whether it thes in bity sea into port. it is taking on average about a day for a ship to go from benghazi to misrata.

by road, there are roadblocks. security is a major issue, not the state of the roads themselves. it is nearly impossible to say. it is over 100 kilometers from the tunisian border to tripoli, for example. from the egyptian border to benghazi, again, it is not that far. >> if i understand what is happening here, what was the

libyan government is failing to protect its citizens. are you referring to the libyan government -- are they still the recognized government? >> there is a government of libya that still controls the central part of libya. you have an opposition in libya that controls part of libya. that is the situation. >> is it called the gaddafi regime? >> you can call it the gaddafi regime if you like.

>> last question. >> my understanding from your comments is that you're not able to get the cessation of hostilities that you wanted. the government has promised you security. how does that work? there's fighting going on. will you be traveling with government soldiers who will protect you? will government soldiers protect w.f.p.? >> we obviously have our own security people, but the government of libya has given us assurances that they will also provide security to enable us, for example, to get through the checkpoints and get this far as

we can. i am very well aware that there may come a time where, for example, the fighting is so fierce that we can get no further. we absolutely recognize that. we have to do this on the basis of the security situation that is operating at that particular moment in time. we have to take advice from our own security people about the extent to which they feel we are able to make that trip at that time. we also have to depend, if we are going to bite road, on the assurances from the government of libya that they will in short security for humanitarian teams on that road. there are many checkpoints. >> i am sorry to cut off any further questions, but ms amos

has another engagement. thank you for coming. >> every weekend, experience american history on c-span3. it is 48 hours of people and events telling the american story. hear accounts from people who have shaped modern america on an oral history. history but shalt features the best known history writers of the past decade. every weekend, visit college classrooms across the nation as professors delve into america's past. join curators, collectors, and historians behind-the-scenes at museum exhibits and historic sites on american artifacts.

american history tv on c-span3, all weekend, every weekend. get our complete schedule online and sign up to had an e-mail to you with our c-span alert. >> in a few moments, president obama's facebook town hall wednesday from palo alto, california. then, washington journal is live at 7:00 eastern with segments on the debt ceiling and federal spending. on washington journal this morning, we will be joined by robert nichols, president of the financial services forum to talk about the debt ceiling, financial regulation, trade, and jobs. democratic representative gerald connolly from va will take your calls about the budget, deficit reduction, and unrest in the arab world. our series on the

recommendations for the national -- with commission member alice rivlin. washington journal is live on c- span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. a couple of light is best to tell you about this morning. the haitian president elect will hold a news conference at 9:00 a.m. eastern. that is on c-span2. here on c-span, the center for american congress will talk about the occupational safety and health administration. they look at the agency and a panel of workers. that is it 10:00 a.m. eastern. pod mini is noi applau more. pod maxi.u the isop

>> mike daisey comments on the world sec said. >> all of my monologues and come out of my obsession. >> find out more about his obsessions sunday night on c- span's "q&a". it also download podcasts online at c-span.org/podcasts. >> but that obama held a town hall meeting at facebook headquarters in palo alto california yesterday afternoon. he took questions on the deficit, health care, and immigration. this is a little more than one hour.

thank you. we like to welcome you to our first ever faced but alcohol with president barack obama. halol with pal patown president barack obama. today we have the president for the first time and visiting us. it this is what the most popular

people on facebook. we feel like he is coming home. welcome home, mr. president. [applause] we are honored to have many special guest joining us today along with all of you. house minority leader nancy pelosi. [applause] there you are. our old lieutenant governor, gavin new sowsome. [applause] california state comptroller, john chang. [applause] united states representatives. [applause] our own a mayor in palo alto. [applause]

president of the board of supervisors, they did cortez. -- david cortez. [applause] thank you for being here. [applause] today we are going to talk about the fiscal challenges facing our country and the difficult decisions we all need to make together. president obama will take questions from the live audience and from people on line. if you are watching online, please submit your questions. with that, i get to call on mark zuckerburg. he will moderate the discussion. thank you for coming. [applause]

>> a lot of people all over the world use facebook to share a lot of things. things about their day, things about their family, their kids, and their views on things like politics. more and more, a lot of government officials, candidates, and folks are using facebook to share their views with the people that are following them. i am kind of nervous. we had the president of the united states here. [laughter] [applause] so, it has never been as easy in the history of the world for people to have their voice heard and exercise their freedom of speech. it is good to complement that on-line dialogue with this time

as well. what better way to do that than by having a facebook live "q&a" with the president. it is our honor to welcome to facebook the president of the united states, barack obama. [applause] >> thank you, based but, for

hosting this, first of all. -- facebook, for hosting this, first of all. my name is barack obama and i am the guy who got mark to wear a jacket and tie. [applause] thank you. >> second time. >> i know. i will say, and i hate to tell stories about mark, but the first time we had dinner together when he wore his jacket and tie, halfway through dinner he was starting to sweat a little bit. it was really uncomfortable for him. i helped him out of his jacket. if you would like, mark, we can take your jacket off. [applause] >> that is better, is it not? >> you are better at the stop and me.

>> first of all, i want to say thank you for all of you for taking the time, not only those of you in the audience, but those of you all over the country and around the world who are watching this town hall. the main reason we wanted to do this is, first of all, because more and more people, especially young people, are getting their information through different media. obviously what all of you have built together is helping to revolutionize how people get information, how the process information, how they are connecting with each other. historically, part of what makes for a healthy democracy is a good -- is when you have citizens who are informed, who are engaged.

what facebook allows us to do is make sure this is not just a one-way conversation. make sure that not only am i speaking to you, but that you are also speaking back. we are in conversation. i love doing tell hall meetings. this format and this company is an ideal means for us to be able to carry on this conversation. as mark mentioned, obviously we are having a very serious debate right now about the future direction of our country. we are living through a tumultuous time. admittedly, my lifetime is a lot longer than most of yours so far. this is a pretty young crowd. but we are seeing domestically a whole series of challenges, starting with the worst

recession we have had since the great depression. we're just now coming out of it. we have all sorts of distractions -- technological disruptions that are taking place, most of which hold promise of making our lives a lot better, but there are a lot of adjustments people are having to make throughout the economy. we still have a very high unemployment rate. it is starting to come down. there are people being challenged altair day in and day out. wondering whether they can keep their home. internationally we are seeing the sort of changes we have not seen in a generation. we have certain challenges like energy and climate change that no one nation can solve, but we are going to have to solve together. we do not yet have all the institutions in place in order to do that.

what makes me incredibly optimistic, and that is like being here at facebook is so exciting for me, is that every juncture in our history, whenever we have faced challenges like this, whether it be the shift from the agricultural agent to the industrial age or whether it was facing the challenges of the cold war or try to figure out how we make this country more fair and more inclusive -- at every juncture we have always been able to do that. we have been able to change it and get ahead of the curve. that is true today as well. you guys are at the cutting edge of what is happening. i am going to be interested in talking to you about why this debate we are having a around debt and the deficit is so important. it will help determine whether we can invest in our future in

basic research and infrastructure that will allow us to compete in the 21st century. i am also am going to want to share ideas with you about how we can make our democracy work better and our politics work better because i do not think there is a problem out there that we cannot solve if we decide we are going to solve it together. for that, i am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you instead of just giving a lot of long speeches. mark, i understand you read the first question. >> let's start off with the debt. yesterday morning you had a tell halt in virginia where you talk about your framework for the longer-term debt. he spent some time talking about tax reform and cost-cutting. he also talked about things you did not then we could cut like

education, ever structure, and clean energy. my question to start off is, what specifically do you think we should do and what do you think we can cut? let me first of all the share with you the nature of the problem. a i think a lot of folks understand that it is a problem, but are not in it -- but are not sure how it came about. in 2000 at the end of the clinton administration, we actually had a surplus. that was in part because of some tough decisions that had been made by president clinton, a republican congresses, democratic congresses, and president george h. w. bush. they said let's make sure we are spending wisely on the things that matter. let's spend less on things that do not matter. and let's make sure that we are living within our means -- that

we are taking in enough revenue to pay for these basic obligations. we went through 10 years where we forgot what had created the surplus in the first place. we had a massive tax cut that was not offset by cuts in spending. we had two wars that were not paid for. this is the first time in history where we had gone to war and not ask for additional sacrifice from american citizens. we had a huge prescription drug plan that was not paid for. by the time i started all this, we had about 81 tree in dollar -- 8 $1 trillion deficit. we had massive accumulated debt with interest payments. then we had this huge recession. what happens is less revenue is coming in because the company's sales are lower and individuals are making less money.

at the same time, we are having to help state and local governments. a lot of what the recovery was about was making sure the economy did not get into recession all of it was expensive. it added up to about another $1 trillion in debt. now what we have is a situation where we had this accumulated debt, and the baby boomers are starting to retire. what is scary is not only that the baby boomers are retiring at a greater rate, which means they are making greater demands on social security, primarily medicare and medicaid -- but health care costs go up a lot faster than inflation. overpopulation is used more health care costs. put that together and we have an unsustainable situation. right now we face a critical

time where we are going to have to make some decisions on how to bring down the deficit in the short term and bring down the debt in the long term. in the short term, democrats and republicans agree that we need to release -- we need to decrease the debt by $4 trillion over the next decade. it sounds like a lot of money, but it is doable if we do it in a balanced way. what i proposed is that about $2 trillion over 10 to 12 years is reduction in spending. government waste. it is like any other institution. there are things we do that we can afford not to do. there are some things i would like to do that are fun to do that we cannot afford right now. we have made cuts in every area. a good example is pentagon

spending or congress, often times, but its weapons systems in the pentagon budget that the pentagon itself says we do not need. special interests and constituencies helped to blunt the pentagon budget. we have already reduced the pentagon budget by about $400 billion. we think we can do it by another $400 million. we need to look at spending on not security issues as well as defense spending. ? we said is less take another $1 trillion of that that we raced through a reform in the tax system that allows people like me and, frankly, you marked from paying a little more in taxes. >> i am ok with that. >> i know you are ok with that. we are talking about going back to the race that existed when

bill clinton was president. a lot of you were -- [laughter] i am trying to say this delicately -- still in diapers at that time. for those of you who recall, the economy was booming. wealthy people were getting wealthier. there was not a problem at that time. if we go back to those rates alone, that by itself would do a lot in terms of thus reducing our overall spending. if we can get $1 traded on the revenue side, at $2 trillion in cutting spending, which can still make investments on basic research. we can still invest in energy so we can figure out where the next breakthrough technologies that can help us reduce our allies -- relax on fossil fuels.

we can still make investments in education. we have already expanded the pell grant program so that more young people can go to college. we are investing more in math and science and technology education. we can still make those investments. we can still rebuilt our roads and our bridges, and best in high-speed rail, and invest in the next generation of broadband and wireless and make sure that everybody has access to the internet. we can do all those things while still bring down the deficit medium-term. there is one last component to this. i know this is a long answer, but i want to make sure everybody has the basic foundations for it. even if we get this $4 trillion, we still have a problem with medicaid and medicare. inflation goes up so much faster than wages and salaries. this is where there is another

big philosophical debate with the republicans. what i said is the best way for us to change it is to build on the health reform that we had last year and start getting a better name for our health care dollars. we waste so much on health care. we spend about 20% more than any country on earth. we end up having multiple test where we can just do one task and have been shared among physicians on facebook, for example. we could focus on the chronically ill. 20% of the patients account for 80% of the costs. doing something simple like reimbursing hospitals and doctors for reducing their admission rates and managing somebody with chronic illness like diabetes said that they can take their medications on a regular basis -- this saves huge

amounts of money. that is what health care reform was about last year. we want to build on that and continue to improve the system. what the republicans right now are saying is, number one, they cannot agree to any increases in taxes. that means we would have to cut out that $4 trillion -- all that would come from education, transportation -- areas i think are critical for our long-term future. they propose 7% cuts in clean energy. i do not know how we free ourselves on dependence on foreign oil. we have to invest in the basic research and technology that allows solar, wind, and others to try and develop. at the same time, but they said

is let's make medicare into a voucher program said that retirees instead of knowing that they are always good to have a health care, they are going to get a voucher that covers part of the cost and whatever health care replacement comes up will be on them. it the health insurance companies do not sell you a policy that covers your illnesses, you are out of luck. i think it is very important for us to have a basic social safety net for families with kids with disabilities, for seniors, four boats in nursing homes, and i think it is important for us to invest in basic research. we will only be able to do it by taking a balanced approach. that is what the big debate is all about right now. >> sorry. did not make to cut all your applause. [applause] that was a very thorough answer. >> if they were stunned by the

length of that answer. [laughter] it is complicated stuff. >> the next question is from facebook life. williamsburg, va. asks -- the housing crisis will not go away. mortgage financing for new home buyers is becoming difficult. as president, what can you do to relax the policies? how can you ensure the low to moderate homebuyers that they will have the opportunity to own their first home? >> this is probably the biggest drag on the economy that we have that right now. i know the frustrations people have about gas prices. what we are really seeing is the housing market, which was a bubble, greatly over and played it in all regions of the country.

i note we do not get a lot of sympathy about that here. i can only imagine what rats and mortgages you guys are paying. it is a real drag i get all sorts of ways. people still poor even if they have a home or have already purchased a home. for a lot of folks, their mortgages or what we call "underwater." the mortgage is more than what the home is worth. if you select your most important asset is now worth less than your debt, that is going to constrain how you spend. people who want to move have a great deal of trouble selling. people who want to buy, as you pointed out, or same terms a lot more restricted. we put in place a bunch of programs to try to see if we can speed it along the process of speed it along the process of