since the roads were not crowded -- plowed at 4:00 a.m. with 8 feet of snow, i would march out across the gulf coast -- across the golf course. one of these mornings, i had this brief case, the -40 degrees at 3:00 a.m. on a dark golf course as i am headed at to see my boss. as i am about to clear the last set of trees at the edge of this golf course, about 20 yards from his back door, icily realize that the terror -- i suddenly realize that the terror warning we have been receiving -- we all had badges telling secret service not to shoot us. but it was dark.

i had three layers of clothing over my badge. and i had no light. it was perfectly pitch black. i had no flashlight with me. as they say, you go to work with the back that you have. -- staff that you have. [laughter] >> good point. >> so there i am with my 15- pound briefcase, which probably looks like a satchel charged in the dark to the secret service. i am completely good. -- hooded. white parka happens to be black. there are no lights, and i am close to the vice-president. first, the secret service guys are really good shots. second, the shop will light the wick and neighbors. so i will be dead -- the shot will likely wake the neighbors. so i will be dead. and a failure. i do not mind being dead. but i did not once said that i

have not done the staff work. so i decide that the only thing to do waiting in the snow with my parka and satchel was to sing loud enough so i do not settle -- startle the secret service, but not so loud that i wait the neighbors. but what do you sing? the only thing that comes to mind is a song by the rapper eminem. i finally come up to the secret service agent. it happens my bad luck to be a friend of mine who i had taken two minutes before drinking too many shots of tequila. a cowboy bar that you may know. i tried to pull my dignity together and i said, " why do not shoot me?" it was part of his job. and he said, "you know, do you think a terrorist is stupid enough to be out here on a night like this?"

[laughter] so i finally make it into the best president's house. i am covered in snow. i am horse from trying to sing. i am dressed in sweats. my brief case is settled. there is an icicle hanging from my face. my hands are shaking because i almost got shot. and the vice president takes a look at me and he can say -- he can see that my job satisfaction is sub-optimal. and he said, "you do not know what it was like working for rumsfeld." [laughter] >> i do not believe it. [laughter] >> there is not a terse story in that book. -- there's not a truer story in that book. [laughter]

there are several interesting subjects in the known and unknown. i was prepared to raise several of them. but i do not think there is time enough for more than one and a third. one of the sub-teams is the importance of strategic thinking. the book describes ronald reagan as "strong, long range, with strategic sense, so successful to -- so essential to successful leadership." the book describes nixon. 8 strategic thinker looks to three steps ahead. by contrast, the book describes as a dangerous this judgment the "post-cold war holiday from strategic thought that characterized much of the 1990's." the book contrasted the strategic thinking of one of our main competitors, china.

the book says, "and unlike many western policy makers, the chinese make the practice of thinking several moves ahead while they look to take advantage of current trends." the book notes that the chinese, to this day, led by the writings of a fifth century bc writer, sun zhu, a long-range thinker. "even to the point of sound business." -- when it comes to being extremely mysterious, do you think the chinese have a lot to teach vice-president cheney? [laughter] as part of the kind of strategic thinking that we need, the book points to the importance of avoiding mirror imaging.

we need to think through how our enemies the problem, not how we see it. and for that intelligence -- and for that come intelligence plays a very important role. a related problem or theme in the book is the problem with intelligence. as another strategic -- another element of strategic thinking, the book says the surprise is inevitable. there is the famous quote. "we need to consider our older but is with imagination." -- but vulnerabilities with the ke."on to kee it quotes frederick the great who asked his generals, "what

designs will i be forming if i were the enemy?" >> of course, i should point out that that is mirror imaging, mr. secretary. frankly, i was also disappointed in you letting frederick the great saying that. but then again, that was when he worked for you. [laughter] the question he should have last was who has studied how this enemy things and ask that man with the enemy might plan. next, as the book notes, we tend to treat the and familiar as the improbable. the results can ruin your day. there is a passage to like very much. "the period covered by this book is one of great obscurity for those who lived through it. that was the future clouded, but the president was equally -- present was equally clouded. we broke after interpretations of events, sometimes reversed lines of action based on earlier reviews, and hesitated

wrong before grasping what now seems obvious. we had more than the usual difficulties discerning the shape of events. that is not don rumsfeld in two dozen 11. -- 2011. it is dean acheson writing about the 1940's,in the 1940's, a time the people today think was much less complex and a time when we had a theory of containment, a strategy of containment which leading figures of the time had wildly different interpretation of. i should also quote this passage to be judged by your readers. "terrorism is a form of warfare and must be treated as such. simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. terrorism must be deterred." that is not donald rumsfeld into the as 11.

-- in 2011. that is donald rumsfeld in 1984. or will's fictional book "94" also had a veiled threat. -- "1984" also had a veiled threat. -- a real world a threat. in 1979, a time entitled "islam, the militant revival." you note the precision. your position remains controversial and i hope you have a chance to discuss it. one theme is the importance for clear, strategic thinking and the difficulty that that has posed for america. a second related theme touches

on the all too common in perfections of our interagency process -- all-too-common imperfections of our interagency process. both interagency and inter- departmental problems. your observations in this realm are, sadly, as you know, not new. you could well have cited sources even before your era. preeminent cold war historian yale john steward guess said that kennedy's strategy broke down because it did nothing to prevent the subordination of strategic interest to those of the organization implementing the strategy. large bureaucracies all too

often develop their own institutional momentum, making them impervious, either to instructions from above or to feedback from below. samuel huntington wrote of the eisenhower years. we ought not to be surprised that organizations resist innovation. they are supposed to resist it. that same area, dean acheson wrote about the truman period. accustomed to dealing with the future only when it becomes the present, we find it hard to regard future trends as serious reality. yet failure to achieve this state of mind is certain to approve fatal. henry kissinger wrote, "most farm policies that history has marked highly in whatever country have been originated by

leaders who were opposed by the experts." i hope you have a chance to comment, mr. secretary, in the context of a food world. -- fluid world. their lives by 1.33 themes that i said i would manage. i have too little time to go on. i want to congratulate you, mr. secretary, on your memoir and on writing a history of the bush administration that i think, in years to come, many will see as the second-best book on the topic. [laughter] >> well, now, my goodness gracious. i look out there and i see people who were in the administration, many of whom could give the answers to the questions that these folks have posed every well as bad as i. ken, thank you for your

hospitality. -- every well as good as i. ken, thank you for your hospitality. i am pleased to be here with this group of panelists. i now go to work with the panel i have. [laughter] such as it is. i am told that have 10 minutes for 12 minutes to comment. >> only if you want them. >> i was told not to interrupt, but you all are allowed to. is that the way it works? the process of the book, i debated whether i should take a year and write a book basically from memory. i had such a rich archive, having lived a third of our country's history that i decided to take four years, digitize a lot of my papers, and create a web site that now has over 3500 documents on its. -- on it. there must be 10,000 or 20,000

pages of paper put there. so when people see the book, they can see a primary source i quoted, see the end of, and go to the web site for more information on it. rather than rewriting history, we want to write history and try to correct what jamie calls the first draft of history in a way that will be helpful to serious people who were interested in learning and reading the original documents from the website and the approach of people who are actually there as opposed to people who were talking to people who were there, probably mostly two weeks for three weeks down. so i took four years and have been enjoying completing it and

having a chance to answer questions about it. the questions that doug had, it seems to me, are interesting ones. one involved the deferring to generals or not to deferring to generals, as the case may be. i think pete case would be better to answer that than i. but there is a picture of me shining the generals shoes. [laughter] so i hope someone looks at that. there has been a lot of talk about rumsfeld coming into the pentagon and having some. the technology or modernization or transformation or something. it was just not the case. i was -- and having some idea about the technology modernization or transformation or something. it was just not the case. i was minding my own business. i have no idea about coming back into government. gov. bush gave a speech at the

citadel. he was talking about bringing the department of defense and to the 21st century and into the information age. that was the blueprint for what he wanted. when he asked me to consider coming into the government again, after being out for 20 years to 25 years, that was what was on his mind. he was interested in having the department of defense to engage in the process of transforming itself to fit the challenges of the 21st century, which he saw as being notably different from the prior period. that was the challenge. that is what we set about to do. once you do that, you begin by saying that you have to engage people and things will have to change in one way or another. you sit down and work with these people. and change is hard. people in the military are proud. they developed a doctrine that they were talked and believe in and are implementing in many

years of their lives. when a president comes in and wants to make adjustments to what is comfortable, what is known, which is reasonably certain, what has been practice, that which has been exercised and the train vendor, that is uncomfortable. -- and they trained under, that is uncomfortable. the entry of george w. bush as president, there were not comfortable with a new president they did not know and they kind of changes that he was urging. general chase talked about the -- general pace talked about the situation in afghanistan and the people. i should say one other thing about the generals.

pete, you should answer this. but i was in meetings, very comfortable with people asking questions. i like to ask questions and i like to learn. i must say, i do confess that, if the answers were not good, i had trouble hiding it. is that fair? >> that is fair. >> is it an understatement? >> no. it is absolutely true. if you arrived at a meeting with the secretary of defense and had not done your homework, you're not going to have a good day. shame on the generals who did not do their homework. i will not take much of the secretaries microphone time, but i will tell you that those folks who are out there, the bulk of the generals, etc., each and every one of those was either working on rumor because

there were not in the room or they had their buds shoot for good reason because they had not done their homework. >> the afghan army has described accurately that there was concern that there would not be able to afford it, but he is correct when he points out that we could, with a relatively modest amount of money, help them support it at a cost per person. we left for what it costs the united states to do that. one thing that has not been brought up in the connection of both iraq and afghanistan is -- first of all, i did write a paper in march 2001 and is on the website, talking about guidelines for using military force for the united states. and i sent it to the national security participants and to the president. this is a will before september 11. i said -- i thought it was important to have an understanding about that and i hope people will look at it.

somewhere buried in there is a comment that i think we, in the united states, have to have a healthy respect for the things we cannot do and hope for the things we can do. i think we do have a degree of modesty about our ability to nation build. they have different histories, different tribal arrangements, different neighbors. and time is varied. it is not possible for the united states, i do not think, to "build nations." i think people build nations and they have to do it themselves. we can help them create an environment that is possible for them to do that. but it is only realistic to face up to that fact, that ultimately they will have to do it. there is some middle ground obviously between hands-off and hands-off.

but the reality is that americans have a tendency -- i mean, if a ditch is to be done and enough people are around, our inclination is to dig and we will dig a duke aide -- and we will dig a good one. but that the goal is to dig 5 million ditches, we ought not to be digging ditches. we ought to be teaching people to dig ditches. we ought to have some tolerance for ditches to not be as good as we might do it or as fast as we might do it. we have to understand that, it seems to me. the afghanistan situation -- i have had the impression that the discussion about it was, in the current administration, that the government took their eye off afghanistan. i do not think that is the case. the reality is that we went in with limited forces. general franks plan was -- mass -- general mass -- general frank's plan was essential.

they went in and did a superb job. they killed and captured a lot of the al qaeda. they managed to move the taliban out of kabul. and the level of violence was fairly modest. it was low. to be sure, the taliban are determined. they want it back and they will get it back. they went into pakistan and they ran silent and deep and prepare themselves and came back over time. during 2003 and 2004, 01 people were worried about taking the offer afghanistan, afghanistan was in good shape. they drafted a constitution. the elected people and set about their business. refugees came back, son million people give back to that country and drove down the street and you could see a lot

of economic activity. that is a misrepresentation of history as i thought. in 2005, i asked minister miki to look at it and he did. we began to see a level of violence increase. and we then set about increasing the afghan army and taking a series of steps. in the last analysis, i personally believe that afghanistan will evolve in a way that fits afghanistan and fits its particular stage of development. it will not be -- the idea that we have a template that works elsewhere is a misunderstanding. we did not even have this template ourselves. think about the bumpy road our

country went through. my goodness, we had slaves and to the 1600's. we had a ghastly civil war. women did not vote until the 1900's. we did not arrive in 2011 like this. and those countries will not arrive where they will end up. they will have to work their way through just like we did, like other countries do. it is not a smooth path from authoritarian systems or different systems or drought or so war and 10 years to 12 years of occupation by the soviet union. it is not an easy path from there to where i think they're going. admittedly, it will be bumpy. weapons of mass destruction, that has been handled. i agree with karl rove. he wrote a book or he said that the biggest mistake they made was the button "bush live, -- not rebutting that bush lied,

people die." there's no question that the united states men and women who put on chemical protective suits as they were moving north in iraq, they did not do it for the fun of it, because they liked to wear them. they did it because they were concerned. every leader in the area said to get closer. you will face chemical weapons. to not rebut it and to allow it to happen undermined the bush administration. but you can be absolutely certain that every word that the president said he believed, that every word vice-president cheney -- everything that colonel colin powell said -- he spent a lot of time preparing his words for the united nations. he believed every word that he said.

the idea that was the lie is irresponsible. -- that it was a lie is irresponsible. i made a few comments about the press. one of the stories i discuss in the book is a story from my first executive position as the director of office of economic opportunity where an article was written that was just totally inaccurate. so i invited this person and

let them see you what was going on and that it was totally inaccurate. he said he was sorry and left and never uttered another word about it to correct it. and the paper did not. it was a wonderful experience for me because i learned early. there was another myth about general some shacky that has been printed and shown on television thousands of times. god bless jamie. he went out and found the facts and wrote a story that said that it is almost chipped in stone that this happened and it did not. it is totally inaccurate -- general shinseki. what he said, what he meant, how he served out his term, and so forth. jamie set out an article correcting the facts. scooter brought up something that i think -- and i will wind up with this. if you think about it, world war i and world war ii had finite endings. the cold war came along and lasted decades. i worried about language, the idea of calling the war on terror a war.

it left the impression that it could be won by bullets and it cannot. it left the impression that it was the department of defense's responsibility and not the rest of the government and not the private sector. that is not the case. it is much more like the cold war where there was a competition of ideas between communism and its expansion activities and people who believed in free political institutions and free economic institutions. this, too, is a competition of ideas, this competition that we have with radical islamists. to prevail in overtime -- think of the cold war. it took administrations of both political parties in our country and it took administrations in our allied country with a persistence over a long, long time. it was an impressive time that

-- impressive thing that that was accomplished. i think that the difficulties we face today with radical islamists is of a kind and it will take a long time and that it will not be won with bullets. i have no idea -- in fact, i have another member of on a -- another memo on the website. i think it was october 16. it leaked within the press within a week and i only sent it to three people. but i basically said, look, here is our policy. we have to pursue it. it is important that we protect the american people. but i do not know that i have any metrics that i can tell how we are doing. i do not know if we are capturing or killing terrorists as fast as they're able to recruit them and train them and finance them and organize them and send them out to kill innocent women and men and children.

i still do not know if we have at this day any metric for that. there is a lot -- there is one metrics. people have done a lot of fussing about george w. bush and the structures he put in place, including indefinite detention and military commissions, which has been a long part of our history, guantanamo bay, a prison that has been maligned and the people down there have been criticized. i would submit that it is undoubtedly one of the finest prisons on the face of the year. -- on the face of the earth. it is exceedingly well run. i asked a journalist the other day. she was interviewing me. i said, give me a sense of how many people would probably waterboarded down at guantanamo. and she said, oh, tens. >> of course, the answer is zero. no one was ever waterboarded at guantanamo. not one. in any event, here we are,

almost april 2011. we could have a terrorist attack tomorrow. they can attack anytime, anyplace, using any technique and it is not possible to defend against terrorist attacks in every location, day or night, against every possible technique. but the short answer -- but we have not had a successful america for close to two years. -- 10 years. that, in my view, is due to president bush and the structure put in place and it is not simply a defense structure. the success, i think, is rooted in the fact that the decision was made that you cannot define -- defend everyone all the time. therefore, you must go out and put pressure on them. ke everything they do harder

and that has been done very well. it is harder for them to raise money. it is harder for them to travel. it is harder for them to talk on the telephone. it is harder for them to do everything that they do. i give us a good grade their. i would give us a low-grade on competing in the competition of ideas. we have not done well on that. the bush administration was reluctant to talk about islamists because we did not want anyone to believe that we were against the religion or against hundreds of millions of people that are all across the globe who are not radical and are not islamists and are not terrorists. but there is a nervousness about it. people did not want to be accused of being against a religion. so i would give us a relatively high grade in terms of helping to protect the american people. i give us a relatively low grade in terms of communicating and competing in that set of ideas. unless we do it very well, we

will not know how well we're doing and we may not be doing well enough. there was talk about the intra- agency process. i listened to the people talk about its in jamie's business. i suppose, if i were in his business, i would do it, too. but the personalize it. that guy is against that guy or this person is against that person. there is a battle of titans going on. if you go back in recent memory, henry kissinger had a problem with the press. he had trouble with gems licenser in the press. -- jim schlesinger in the press. rodzinski -- george shelf had

problems with jeff sheinberg. people have different views. there ought to be different views. that is healthy. that is for the president and then to listen to those views and make a judgment. it seems to me -- i just got off the phone with george shultz. he is a longtime friend. he said he wrote an op ed on this subject that he hopes will be printed soon. the thing i would say is that, at the end of world war ii, we or at an inflection. the end of the war and the beginning of the cold war. an enormous number of institutions were fashioned during that critical time. the great credit of the truman administration. you ended up with the un and nato and the imf and the world bank. here at home, we ended up with the national security council, the cia, the department of defense, the u.s. i day -- the usia. all of them began at the

beginning of world war ii and gone until the end of the century. -- the end of world war ii and up until the beginning of the century. we are at different inflexion point. we are at the end of the cold war and we have not done much to modify. they do not work as well in the information age going forward. one of the recommendations i made on the website at rumsfeld.com -- a group of us in the pentagon talked about this and said, look, back then, a to still be called a hoover commission. they had people on both political parties and thought about these things in a serious way. then they came out with a set of proposals. we need that today. we need to think through these

things, -- we need to think through these things, for its influence in a significant way by subcommittees that are very turf conscious -- the defense department and the cia, they all pop up. they need to bend if they will come for the president so you can begin to pull those threads through a needle head and he can make rational decisions and not have a clash as they come up. there hast of the ways that we -- there has to be ways that we can do that. i would like to know what they are. but i do know that the information age is a terribly difficult thing for our government to manage, to handle. we are not organized that way, for the information age. half the people in your do not -- in here do not know what a

treat is -- what a tweet is. maybe a third. it is a much faster moving world today. i think that those thoughts are something that we will have to come to grips with. i know that doug has thought about. i will stop with that. [applause] >> thank you very much. the point that general paste -- pace made about how many of the assumptions on which the war plans and post-war plans for iraq were based that proved to be faulty is an important point. the particular point that be highlighted, the thought that we would have iraq yesterday forces -- iraqi security forces

available to us to help maintain order after the ouster some, i recall that scooter, ink particular, when we were briefed by the cia on the iraqi police remaining intact and the cia made the argument that iraqi police be viewed by a professional force. if you view leadership, you did not have to change the people around the country. they were well-regarded around the country. i remember scooter making the point that it does not make sense that, in a police state, the police would be viewed as professional and not an instrument of repression. that was an important factor in cent, planning. -- centcom planning. the military commands up to get there -- in centcom planning.

that is where you get your key assumptions, from the intelligence community. people raise questions about the way our intelligence community is organized. they have said that there was a major reorganization in the bush administration of the intelligence community after the 9/11 report. with the creation of the national directorate for intelligence. several people would like to know what the panel's evaluation is of our intelligence community now versus what it was before 9/11. are we better organized a? we are dealing with some other kinds of questions that the secretary raised at the end, our -- are we prepared to handle this? where we stand on intelligence organization, i would ask this of anybody that wants to jump in.

>> i would just begin by saying that i think they have a very, very tough job. i was secretary in the 1970's during the cold war. we were looking at the soviet union and we made our intelligence community made judgments that were not accurate in a number of instances. in that case, you were able to look at it year after year after year after year, the same plane, the same people, get the language confidence. and yet we made -- for example, you may remember the misjudgment as to the percentage of gdp that the soviet union was paying/span -- spending. there were convinced that it was a relatively small number. rand concluded that it was a relatively high percentage, much closer to what they of hitler in germany was spending prior to the beginning of world war ii. it turned out they were both

right as to what was being produced. we could see it and look at it and counted. what was different was the size of the economy. the soviet economy was much smaller, so the percentage was much higher. of course, the importance of it was that it showed a sense of purpose and determination. if you're willing to deny your consumers, that is a big deal. of course, in the reagan era, when the cold war was won, if you will, that critical question as to how could the economy of the soviet union survive was not trivial. it turned out that the agency was wrong. i give them a lot of credit. i think we have a lot of wonderful intelligence people work in their heads off trying to do it right. and i -- and it is very, very hard.

we're dealing with closed societies, and governed areas, not just nation states, but with networks. it is an area that we have not -- we had a big dip in intelligence investment during the 1990's. let there be no doubt. there was a bathtub. and it takes a long time to develop the kind of internal comments in an organization like -- internal confidence in in an organization like that that you can get the language skills and develop the knowledge. i think it is very easy to criticize. i think it is important to recognize the difficulty of it. but i do think we have to expect to be surprised and we ought not to be surprised when we will be surprised. giving the weapons today, vastly different from the 1970's, just enormous, our margin for error is not what it used to be. let there be no doubt.

>> i would just like to bring -- frame the same question slightly different. one thing i enjoyed about your book was the extent that it challenges and reduce the -- and effectively refutes the conventional wisdom about things in the past. one item of conventional wisdom was that the press failed in his job to ask the really difficult questions and come to some extent, the same criticism applies to policy makers who were not adequately questioning the intelligence at the time. i wonder what your opinion is of the press, specifically, and the administration. was it a matter of -- if you ask the right questions, then your bids typically would get a different answer? or was it simply the case that these things were not know what the time until after the events of the war unfolded? >> before you went to that, can i jump in on the previous

question. i think there is a part that needs to be answered. thank you. i have been really hesitant to lay a lot of blame at the feet of some very, very dedicated intelligence analysts who have been trying to do their best job. i told you that i had recommendations based on things that turned out not to be true. but i do not fault the intelligence agency for that. first of all, how are intelligence agents were getting input from folks on the ground, iraqi, and from other countries intelligence services. there were doing their best job, synthesizing that for us. just like those of us in the military who learn from our lessons, so do -- so does the intelligence community. if you are a receiver of intelligence, you need to

listen to what you are being told. it is like listening to legal recommendations. whether you listen to a lawyer or an intel officer -- a do nothing to put them both in the same pile -- but if you listen to them, you have the responsibility to apply your own judgment. and we should not excrete our intelligence committee for giving their best judgment. if you want their best judgment, then we have to understand that they will be wrong sometimes. and if we beat them up, they will start going further into their shell because they do not want to be wrong or beat up, number one. no. 2, the carpet was not answered was what about the internal structure? -- number two, the other question that was not answered was what about the intel structure? we have set up a director of national intelligence who sits

on top of the international committee -- the intelligence community. he or she has 032 direct anybody -- in the intel community and has -- he or she has zero direct a authority over anyone in the intel community and has no budget authority. if we believed -- and it is open to debate -- if you want to have somebody with a choker on to the whole process, then give them the authority and give them the budget. if you believe do not want that, fine. right now, i think what we have is an organizational chart that looks like there's somebody in charge of everybody when they are not. thank you. >> i would like to comment on the intel structure. i used to be in the pharmaceutical business. in research and development, you do not want one single control over r&d. you want people thinking and doing different things and coming up with ideas and the

competition of lights -- competition of ideas. the idea is that it would be helpful for the united states of america to have a structure where a single intel person was over every single thing, budget, personnel, in the united states of america, that would be the perfectly terrible idea. the militarily -- the military would and decreed in their own -- would end up recreating their own intel capabilities because they cannot function if they do not have access to military intelligence. there are multiple types of intelligence, to be sure. there's strategic intelligence, economic intelligence -- but the department of defense absolutely needs and intelligence mechanism and so does the department of state. i must say -- i know my relationship with george tenet and john negroponte and our department's relationship at the senior level, even down a layer -- maybe not down way

below. but it was superb. i would not have thought of appointing one person to an intel position if the pentagon without having a long conversation with george tenet. what kind of person that we need, that challenges for those kinds of jobs. he participated in all those decisions. the same thing with budgets, we sat down and work every budget issue. the idea that the director of national intelligence -- the congress behave like there was a serious problem. we must fix it. then comes the deal and i -- then comes a the dni. in the middle of the war. there were people who wanted to not break the system.

even though there were people who wanted to break the system. people were anxious to have it changed. let's having usable by approach, -- let's have a new simplified approach, one person in charge. i think that would be a very bad idea. i think that the dni's that have handled it have been wise and prudent. i congratulate them for it. >> my question was not about the imperfections of intelligence, but and a proper degree of skepticism by the administration and also by the press at the time. >> go to the website and read the parade of horribles that i wrote and sat down with people and staff and talk about all the things that can go bad. one of them was that we may not find weapons of mass destruction. it was right there, written, sent to the members, to the president. we thought about those things. i was with o'reilly not too long ago when he said, why did not tell us? why did you not tell us what

might go wrong? i said, oh, wonderful idea. but still the enemy every -- let's tell the enemy every conceivable thing we might think we might have a problem with. so that they can get about doing it. no. that is not the type of thing you tell the press or talk about publicly. but there is page after page of things that doug and other people in the government thought about and talked about and was circulated and people were worried about. >> do you think the press fell down on its job? >> we do not have time for that. [laughter] no, jamie. no. >> i do not mean me personally. i did a terrific job. [laughter] i mean the media in general. >> we have naturally focused in this discussion on the time of the bush administration for obvious reasons. but one of the things in his

books that is particularly interesting is the discussion of his career going back to when he was in the navy and his first run before the age of 34 congress and all of his various jobs before he became secretary of defense for the first time in the mid-1970's. one of the job city had was u.s. >> one of the jobs and that he had was u.s. ambassador to nato. we have had a question, which i think helps tie together your early history and the bush administration and current affairs and libya and what is going on right now. what is your evaluation of nato and what has become of nato? how has it made the transformation of its original

purpose from the cold war alliance to what it became when you were secretary of defense in the bush administration? how you see it now functioning as president obama is calling on it to act in libya? what is your general evaluation of nato? if any of you want to chime in, i know you'll have thoughts on the subject. >> nato is struggling, just like the other institutions i mentioned. they have not quite evolves or have been adapted readjusted to fit the 21st century. if you look down from outer space on earth, there it are a finite -- there is a finite number of countries that have our values and most of them are in nato. there are many others, obviously, australia, japan, singapore, south korea, and the like.

but these countries are important. most problems we face our problems we cannot handle by ourselves. we cannot deal with nuclear proliferation, the drug problem, piracy, the slave trade -- any number of things that require coalitions. i am a believer that the coalition of not to determine the mission. -- the mission and determines the coalition, and that the coalition of not to determine the mission. but these countries together in a new is potentially very useful. when the united states provide strong leadership and give those countries time to adjust and think about it and determine the extent to which the mayor may -- to which they may or may not want to participate in the coalition to do something, then nato has functioned quite well. to the extent that we have been in a hurry and have not provided leadership, there have been problems. i have been struck by all this talk about solutions in regards

-- about coalitions in respect to libya. to libya. if you go back to president bush and general colin powell who put a coalition together over afghanistan, the proliferation coalition had 90 countries. in iraq, there were 45 countries. i think that president bush was called the unilateralist. they identified that we needed help and we needed people. but we needed people to agree on the mission. the problem we have seen as recently as the confusion over the mission. imagine if you are sitting in libya and you are an ambassador or a government employee or you are in the army, a colonel or private or in the neighborhood and your looking for cooperation and they want intelligence and assistance and food and housing and you do not know, even to this day, whether gaddafi will go.

imagine. people are like magnetic particles. the point at whatever will happen. what will happen? is it likely to change? where are they planning? they are all over the lot because they do not know what is going to happen. when they get up in the morning, they do not know if you will still be around. it will alter your behavior. the thing that is going on in africa is that the critical element is iran and syria and the damage they are doing in afghanistan, the damage they're doing in iraq, the potential -- the damage they're doing in lebanon and supporting hezbollah, and the risk of iran with nuclear weapons. the other major factor is egypt

and its size and its importance and saudi arabia in the gulf. what we do anywhere is seen elsewhere in the world and people make judgments over it. how we behave will alter their behavior. will we do in libya, given the visibility, will be taken into account in two areas that are critically important. the cult and egypt, in that part of the world, -- the gulf and egypt, and then that iran and syria. i worry that we're not taking things into account and i would say they are the main feature out in that part of the world. >> can i asked general pays -- if president obama asked you, based on your experience or thoughts, as he is looking to

nato to pay a central role in libya, what the thought you would offer him? >> i will not answer that question and i will tell you why. to be an adviser to the president of united states and to the secretary of defense, you must have absolute confidence and trust in that individual. and you cannot worry, if you are the president, when you pick your chairman, if that chairman is a closet republican or democrat, is he going to write a book, are there things that i say to him in private that will be published? so for me to speak for or against something that president obama is doing is wrong. i will give my counsel in private. i have to the secretary of

defense. to answer that question, i think officers who serve have the privilege of serving at the senior ranks of the military do damage to the relationship between the elected officials of our government and those who served in u.s. military, when they stepped outside of their private advisory roles because it is inappropriate. i did mean that -- i did not need my predecessors assisting me, mike mullen does not meet me helping him, and whoever comes tax will not need us either. it is ill-advised for senior military folk to do damage to the current serving force by speaking out of turn. having said that, i would like to take 2 seconds to talk about

the nato question that the task before that one -- that doug asked of me. and from a purely military function, the non-nato coalition put together going into afghanistan, the non-nato coalition that was putting -- was put together to go into iraq, required the leadership in the unique command control and capabilities of the u.s. military. along standing nato coalition which is native -- the longstanding coalition which is net of also requires the unique capabilities of the u.s. military. nato as an institution at some as it does -- acts as it does. but the functioning of any

coalition will be depended on the day-to-day leadership capacity of the u.s. military. >> and i would say, not just the military leadership, but the political leadership in nato requires u.s. involvement and direction. it is just the reality of that institution. -- a you are saying that we're turning the leadership over from august to us? >> yes. [laughter] but not an insignificant way.

.

>> we provided expert advice on issues which the leaders are currently addressing such as a division of oil revenues, debt, as well as constitutional reform, consultation, and customary law. and workshops on how to prevent electoral violence. because of our long and deep into asia with sudan, it is a pleasure to be here today and to introduce our speakers. i want to welcome and introduce tara sonenshine. >> thank you, david. i want to add my welcome to all of you in the first few weeks of

programming here. bear with us for anything that does not work. if it is great, we will take all the credit. as david mentioned, sudan is vital to our work. i want to thank the many staff people who travel between washington and sudan constantly. i know that because i find the travel vouchers. they go and come and they are really doing remarkable work on the ground. it is intimidating to introduce one former president. but the job of introducing three is almost overwhelming. i will not tell you too much about each because they are so familiar to all of you in this room. thabo mbeki i have known for many years. one of the outstanding leaders.

he served as the president for nearly a decade as the successor to nelson mandela. he is the chair of the african union high level implementation panel. i will hope you join me in a warm welcome for president thabo mbeki. [applause] president pierre buyoya. he president of burbuni di for 13 years. the longest-running president. i am excited to tell you he was once a former grantee. would you join me in welcoming president pierre buyoya. [applause] last but of course not least we

are honored to have with us the man who served as president of the nigeria from june 1998 to may 1999. in addition to all the wonderful things that president abubakar has done, he was also the convoy from the u.n. to the condo. -- congo. i am delighted that he could be with us. join me in welcoming president abdulsalami abubakar. [applause]

>> and mr. president, ladies and i have been asked by my colleague to introduce the conversation this afternoon. as you know, we are the african union high implementation panel. we started to work in march 2009 on dark for -- darfur. our mandate was extended to the world. we have been working with the

sudanese to follow up the implementation of cpa. we have been asked by the sudanese to facilitate the talks on what is called the post-cpa arrangement. maybe the best ways to tell you where we are on these matters. then it may trigger a discussion, a question and answer. maybe that is the best way. first, as you know, about the implementation, we have come a long way. i recognize those people who

played a very important role in the organization. the professor and his deputy. [applause] we work with them on the issue and referendum. the contribution of everybody on the incredible referendum and the outcome of which has been accepted by the sudanese and the national community. i think this has been a very big achievement.

there are three matters left. issue of -- this issue seems to be the most complicated one. we are working on that. we have agreed with the president and the vice president that at the end of may our panel is going to make a proposal. after consultation with the sudanese -- we hope we will come to an agreement. the second remaining issue is

the issue of orders. there is a committee on the border. there are two issues remaining. one is to agree on what is called the disputed areas. there are five disputed areas on the borders. there is a committee, a political communi -- committee. we hope that before the night of july we will reach an agreement of those five disputed areas. the second remaining issue is the demarcation of the border. between the north and south

there are towns within a few kilometers of borders. we think this may be the demarcation. it appears that it is important to complete the demarcation in the time perdio before 9 of july. the third issue is what is called popular consultation. in the blue nile, consultation has been completed. what is remaining is to come to a conclusion. that means a talk between the

state authorities and the government of khartoum. popular consultation has not done yet because they have yet to have an election. it is scheduled on the second of may. we hope that soon after that, popular consultation is going to take place and that you will see exercise of popular consultation, it will go beyond the nine of july. those are the three issues remaining in the implementation of the plan. then there is the second state of issues, those which we call post-referendum arrangements.

they have been negotiating on the issue of citizenship, security arrangement, economic arrangements, especially three important matters. oil, currency, and [unintelligible] the discussion have also gone a long way. we are about to conclude negotiation on the economic issues. we have had many similar last week and we think maybe we need one more session before coming

to a conclusion. there are a few issues where the party do not agree. on the issue of currency, there is only the matter of production of the currency. what to do with the balance which are circulating in the south once the south has their money. on the issue of debt, the parties have been agreed on what they call 80 auction. it means that khartoum takes the responsibility to deal with the whole debt. the two parties agree to make a

joint advocacy. in washington it has been one of our main discussions. with the imf, with the creditors of sudan. things are moving in the right direction. the of the remaining issue is what the sudanese parties call the financial transition arrangement. in other words, how to share the oil revenue after the independence of the south. related to this, what will be the ownership of the oil

infrastructure? those matters are not agreed yet. we have issued a special committee to try to have an agreement on those issues. the other post-referendum is about security. we have to negotiate security arrangements. one issue is the future of the soldiers coming from the two areas. what is in their future?

there is no agreement yet. the parties continue to negotiate. there is also discussion about the border up until the nine of july. we think the most complicated issue will be the future of the soldiers coming from the south. then the issue of citizenship. there is one aspect which is not agreed on yet. it is the transition. sudanese willthe accuse -- will choose and apply

for citizenship in the north or in the south. at the beginning, the parties had had discussions on the possibility of a dual citizenship. but they could not agree. to avoid the state of state business -- statelessness, they agreed to have a period where people could choose to join the south or the north. i think we are in the post- referendum arrangement.

we are moving on all the issues at the same time and we hope that before july 9, we will have an agreement on all those issues. now we are discussing some of the issues which can be continued to be discussed even after july 9. for example, -- where we are, we have been discussing these issues in washington. we also been discussing the future of the two countries, especially the south after the independence. there's a lot of concern about

the nation building. the south faces a lot of challenges about security, documents, government -- governance. there is a lot of ways. the international community is talking about being able to help southern sudan. we have been discussing the future of northern sudan. northern sudan also will have to adapt after the independence of the south. in khartoum they have begun to

talk about the constitutional review. had to go about the constitution for the post independence of the south. and the issue of darfur. the other matter we have been dealing with is to try to implement the report on darfur in 2009. the situation has not made a lot of progress. the negotiation has been going on until now. we have tried to start the political process. it is a lot of discussion how to coordinate.

we of had discussions with the u.s. government especially. we hope we are finding the way. we hope that those two tracks will lead to peace in pardarfur. we see that darfur, it is having a negative impact on the whole of sudan. for example, on the issue of debt, one of the obstacles to solving this issue is the

sanction, the u.s. sanction of sudan, because of the war in darfur. when we are talking about the fundamental principle in our negotiations between the south and north, it is the principle of two viable states. making the number bible, -- north viable, darfur is an obstacle. it is also an obstacle in the constitution review in the north. it is part of the north. we think that the peace in the dark for --darfur has to come

from being organized. it is having a negative impact on security. there has been accusation, i am sure you have heard, that the south is helping the rebels in darfur and that the north is helping the rebels in the south. this situation can be stabilized if fighting is going on for a long time. here we are trying to help the

sudanese to move on all those issues. i have to say that we have had a very good collaboration with the sudanese, the northerners and southerners. we are optimistic that the sudanese have the ability to solve their problems. we are aware there is a pressure of time. we're less than three months until july 9. i think after the referendum, we can see that there is a strong political wave from the northerners and southerners to

work to have a viable state. that is important for sudan, the sudanese. it is important for the whole region. sudan is the biggest country in africa. if there is stability in sudan, it will be a big continuation of the stem relation -- stability for africa. that is why the african union is good to help sudan. sudan is very important to africa. the african union for the first time appointed a former head of

state to help the sudanese. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. we can now move to questions. all three of our former presidents will participate in responding to your questions. we have microphones that we can pass around to those who ask questions. just raise your hand. what we start here with steve?

-- why don't we start here with steve? >> thank you for your presentation. welcome. i was at lunch last week where a prime minister gave a presentation. he said that the kenyan government had approved and set aside the funding for development for building the pipeline up into a soviet sudan. can you comment on how that will impact the flow of oil and the administration of the revenues from the oil funds? i know it will be several years

from that -- before that will be a reality. i appreciate it. >> what we take three or four questions and accumulate them? anyone else? >> you tell us what to do. >> go ahead. >> our you, sir? i would like to know, because this involves the african union, are you satisfied with 'ivoire turned out?

you had a peace agreement with colonel gaddafi. i wonder where that is now. can you answer both of those questions? thank you for coming here today. >> he is asking about libya. >> if you please identify yourself and your affiliation. >> thank you very much. i work with refugees international. my question is regarding the situation of the northerners in the south and what we hear about the negotiation. what has been done by the panel or other institutions to reassure the people from the south and the north that after july 9, there will be no retribution or violent acts

against them? i was part of the team visiting the north and south. every people we interviewed expressed a fear that there would be retribution for their belongings and properties and physical safety would be jeopardized. thank you very much. >> did you get all 3 decks >> i think so. >> this one is on citizenship. >> we are trying to decide where i should speak from. here or there. it is better?

on the matter of the pipeline, the issue of the ownership of the oil infrastructure, pipelines and whatever else, this is one of the matters that is still under discussion. in terms of the negotiation that buyoya was talking about, that there are many issues, including the issue of oils. with the specific issue of the oil infrastructure, that should be taken to a higher level political committee. it should be taken out of the negotiating group because it has proved to be a bit of a

challenge. it would do better at a higher level. as the president was indicating, like all of the other issues in the economy cluster, this one would be resolved by the end of may. but it is one of the issues that is central to this discussion. we have not discussed at all the matter of the possibility of other pipelines. this is the first time all three of us over heard what you had at lunch. i am sure we did not know about that. the negotiators must take on the possibility of another pipeline.

the parties will proceed to decide this matter on the ownership and so on. it relates to the matter of access and what kind of access should people have to that infrastructure. the issue of citizenship, the matter has been under discussion for some time. as the president was saying, one of the principles that has been agreed by both parties is that we should avoid any arrangement that is -- secondly, it has been agreed that whatever the

arrangements, they have to include the possibility to state where they are now -- stay where they are now. they can keep the property they have. they can keep the jobs they have and all of that. it is a group of arrangements which reflect full freedom. as to northerners in the south, they become citizens of the other state. avoid statelessness ensure that

people enjoy full freedoms. what remains now is to discuss whatever outstanding questions with regard to sufficient -- citizenship. we want to avoid the form -- conflict. we are sure the agreement will be done which will then create the possibility for the states to draft the citizenship legislation which would define who is a citizen and allow people to decide as to where they want to belong. one of the issues that is outstanding, which is under discussion, is with the two

states having approved the legislation, how much time should be given to enable people to say, i may southern national, or am i -- i am not a southern national. this requires that sufficient time should be allowed so that nobody should be without a state. matters are being discussed in a manner that i am indicating in order to avoid what we're talking about, of people being victimized. or that when they go home i take the car and house or whatever else. with regard to the second question about libya, the panel

has not addressed these issues. it is complicated and difficult. other people have had to deal with these decisions. we have not discuss these things as a panel. i understand that the chairperson of the african union is in washington. he will be in this building tomorrow. that would be the person to ask this question. [laughter] let him answer. ok. it is the same. we are a panel on sudan. in december, the second round of elections was on the 30th of

november. more or less after that the african union, the chair of the commission, he will be here tomorrow. you can ask about that also. coteked me to go tocote d d'ivoire and make a recommendation. i came back, wrote a report, and i said, i think this is what you need to do to resolve this problem. askin to mar what happened. -- asked him tomorrow what happened. >> other questions? we will get a microphone for

you. use the microphone, please. >> buyoya president -- president buyoya, i would like to know be thinking or discussion in respect to that political will holding in the north in case the leadership is not sustained there. >> in case it? >> the leadership is not sustained. political will has to be sustained over the long term over successive governments. >> other questions?

>> i am a graduate student at duke university studying environmental security. my question is about the nile basin. it will be in control of the white nile. i was wondering of water has come up in any of your discussions. if so, how do you think, or how you plan and dealing with the issue? >> we will take one more. >> there is a bit of a bet echo in this hall. it is difficult for us to understand what you are saying. could we please give her back the microphone. we will hear you better. >> my question was on water and

the nile basin. given that the south will be in control of the white nile, i was wondering if the issue has come up in your discussions and how you plan on dealing with that. >> we will take one more in the back. it is on. >> lawrence freeman, from the african desk. in terms of two viable states for sudan, i have been working on sudan for almost 20 years. it seems to me there has to be a positive vision for sudan to move forward. i have not seen it that anywhere in washington to articulate the vision, which would be no. and sat -- north and south uniting for the benefit of all people. this seems to me do center of

the production of food and to help our brothers in southern sudan. poverty exists. rail transportation, this idea of the two countries working together for the benefit of each other for a positive program that goes beyond simple debt relief. this is not discussed in washington. i want to know if you have thought about these ideas for the future of sudan.

>> with regard to the first question, part of what we need to appreciate is the fact that, for 40 years, african independence -- sudan has been at war between the north and the south. that resulted in the creation of the cpa. our own experience is that the sudanese, both north and south, have understood very well the cost of war. therefore, i am of the view that

war is not going to solve their problems. any matter that is outstanding between the two of them needs to be sorted out by peaceful means. there was direct experience of what the opposite of that has meant. that is our stance. of course there are still contentions. there might be some people who think that a return to war might produce a result. but generally, in the majority, in the leadership of the north and the south, it seems to was there is a clear understanding that day -- there should be no return to war. 40 years of fighting have talked to everybody that lesson. i do not believe that if there were to be a change in the

personalities in terms of the political leadership in the north, that this would change the fundamental understanding among the population in the north. the will to proceed, the way that they are proceeding now, the political will to sustain that, will remain even if the leaders of change. you are unlikely to get anybody to say, for instance, the cpa process. to reintegrate by force or

anything like this or to take a position contrary to the notion of two viable states. i think that the matter of the political will, i think that would be sustained regardless of what ever changes might happen in the north with regard to some of the political players. on the matter of the viable state development, all of that, one of the principal reasons we came to washington was at the invitation of the imf and world bank to deal with this issue of that debt.

this debt relief -- the country cannot pay. it has to be forgiven. if it is not forgiven, it would impact directly on this matter of liability -- viability given that the north would inherit the debt. we want to discuss an element of the issue that has been raised. the second meeting we were to have was organized by the world bank. it was a round table on sudan to discuss more broadly the challenges of development for the south than the north.

the point that is being raised is correct. as i understood it, the point that was made that in addition to look at the political arrangement, independence of the south and formation of the government, what happens to the north is fine, the point was that there is an important issue which is a development question. questions of agriculture, infrastructure, all of that. the rest of the internet -- international community should look at development issues. this was part of the discussion in the round table which was held by the world bank.

hopefully, the people i hear, his senses that washington is insufficiently sensitive to this development challenge. and perhaps too exclusively focused on the politics. so maybe it might be our common duty to help the washington government and congress. because they are very important. there is a group on the issue of water.

with all of these groups, as has been mentioned, on the economy questions, on security matters, our panel convenes all of these groups. we work with them on the agenda and timetables. by mentioning that because an interesting thing about the water working group, they say to us, "we do not be due -- need you. we are making good progress. the understanding is good. i think they will be able to sort out a proper agreement. they both recognize that

historical precedent-wise, it takes time to sort out water agreements. they're perfectly confident that they are proceeding well and did not actually need our facilitation. it is being attended to. >> i had something on the issue of political will and the sustainability of leadership. i think this issue is not particular to sudan. now we are in the world of constant change of leadership.

through the democratic process. it is the reality in sudan, in this country, and elsewhere. the sudanese have to agree on some principal in the core issue. that means it will be implemented by the current leadership. the other question about the positive vision of cooperation between dtw well -- two, one principle is that of two viable states. the second is of cooperation for

mutual benefit's, not on short term, but on the longer term. the parties have decided to come to a trade treaty. when they are negotiating, they want to come to a treaty in the oil area, how are they going to cooperate in the long term in the oil area. when they are negotiating both issues, they have introduced the notion of [unintelligible] it would allow a freedom of

movement for the people between the two states. i want to say that behind the negotiation, there is a long division of corporation to mutual benefit. >> we have two questions right here. >> can you hear me? i am with the united nations in washington. i wanted to hear your views on how you see post-july 9, the roles of the african union and united nations in sudan. what will happen to the hybrid operation in darfur? will the u.n. play a role? will there be one or two missions? your thoughts on that.

>> more less the same question. does the panel have a mandate post july? if so, until when and for what? will the assessment commission carry-on in any form? >> there is a question back here. >> i am from the wilson center. we have the impression that there may be some disconnect on darfur between your approach and that of the mediators. with your team favoring some piece from within policy adopted by the government in k

hartoum, and those -- than giving priority to the mediation talks. can you explain how you are coordinating with the mediators? what sequencing of the process you envisage, and how you are tackling the difficult question of persuading of all the movements to participate? >> shall i speak? >> yes. >> with regard to the matter of oneness, the discussion has not

quite started. it is obvious that in terms of its mandate, which was to overseas thecpa, obviously that must terminate july 9. but the matter has been raised of the need for some international participation with regard to the security arrangement between the north and south. the matter has been raised. the parties have addressed this

issue. to come back to them with some suggestions as to how this matter might be dealt with, of the international participation, in terms of the security arrangements. that is a matter that we are working on. it is obvious that in that context, the issue will arise of the role both the u.n. and the african union. to that extent, the role of onus. the south, i am talking about it -- an arrangement under

consideration, at the end of the, the sudanese will probably want to approach of the u.n. a or the -- or the a.u. the south has approached the u.n. with regard to a role in the south. that is a matter that is being discussed at united nations and the government of south sudan. the matter is not quite to finalize. -- quite finalized. with regard to the deployment in the south as well between the north and south, it is a work in

progress. unament will continue its work in darfur. the aec, some discussion has risen about them as to what happens to it. in principle, the mandate ought to end it when the cpa ends. i am sure that the members will want to discuss that also. to the extent there might be to the extent there might be something -- some things