there are disadvantages to my proposal. the main one i have heard is that nations sometimes think it is their sovereign right to own, to completely own that the hardware that is being used for their purposes. if this is the problem, that we should consider what the -- it is to have a uav program. eavesdropping planes intercepting commands from a libyan commanders and troops and relayed that information, which zooms in on the location of

global forces. it sends the location to analysts at a ground station which passes the information to command centers. the command center beams the court next to a command and control plane which directs warplanes to their targets. the new "" did not even mention -- "the new york times" did not even mention the satellite communications that brings this together. this infrastructure, is this to be sold alongside the uav's? i doubt it. even if a sovereign nation once the right to sell its uav's, it will demand an infrastructure. it will depend on the u.s. or a large multinational organization. there is nothing really radical about providing uav services as

an alternative to providing the hardware itself. let me close by reading a statement eight years ago by the president and ceo of general atomics, which developed in the predator. the last thing a forward commander needs is to maintain and operate airplanes. what he needs is intelligence support. somebody looking and then piping video directly to him on a little tv set that we have already made for the special forces people. to operate uav's and that is the way to prevent missile proliferation. >> we use the same rules of engagement as this morning. please identify yourself and your affiliation.

as the chair, i would use the product of a of asking the first question. this is to all three panelists. we talked a lot about the future use of uav's. i would be interested in your thoughts about two issues. are we more concerned with the technologies that our adversaries would use to counter morese of uav's or are we concerned with an adversary thoseing uav's and using capabilities against us. >> we are an information base military.

we are dependent on precision. we are dependent on this god's eye knowledge. we have traded mass in for these other attributes. i would be more worried about somebody interfering with our ability to great precision than developing theirs. they would be a less adept at optimizing them. >> i would agree with the remarks of general hayden. we need to be concern for both. at some point in the future, because of the rapid distribution of technology is -- technologies as a result of globalization, there will be a

point when our adversaries to acquire the capability, not as fast as we have come up in terms of being able to achieve the same level of precision. you have to be concerned about the technology and grabbing hold of the uav's. this is one of the issues that we are wrestling with in terms of the services and the allies is airspace control. very simple, but the way we have used it in iraq and afghanistan in terms of de-inflection of aircraft may have to do with an adversary that may bring the 100 aircraft into friendly airspace. this goes back to something that general hayden brought up where we are already operating in

permissive airspace. adversaries do not even have to 2ave really smart iav's significantly complicate our air defense situation. >> if the uav's are adapted as cruise missiles, imagine the defense problem of dealing with a swarm of uav's. it is difficult enough for us to intercept threats coming in at high estimates and low estimates. a department of high altitudes at low altitudes. our defense tends to look one way or another. we are trying to develop better cruise missile defenses. as you get large numbers of even primitive uav's adapted as offensive weapons by the

adversary, you have a much more complicated problem. >> thank you. we have been talking about relatively large objects. there is work going on too many tries at these platforms down to the realm of birds or even in sex. where does that work stand and the panel see as the future of devices like that? >> there is a lot of work on nano uav's. there is a lot of potential here. huge potential. imagine 20 years in the future, we are sitting in a room like this. let's say this is a secure facility. that fly over there is not

transmitting everything that is going on to an external source. from an offensive perspective, to be able to have an insect- sized vehicle hanging around adversary leadership passing on that kind of information. there are enormous potentials associated with this. >> i reinforce what david said. in my second life, i do consulting for companies that are involved in those activities. there is an awful lot of energy. as miniaturization becomes more available, it is almost a natural path down what you suggested.

>> for next generation uav one of the big problems is communications. the colonel suggested earlier that perhaps they could act as a wing man or something along those lines. would you agree with that concept? what would you see in a next generation platform? >> my personal belief is that next generation mqx cannot just be an extension of where we are with the current fleet of aircraft. what we mean by that is that we cannot afford to build a variety of different systems, each one specialized for a particular rule. technology allows us to bring many more capabilities together on a single platform.

the characteristics that i believe to be important in a next generation aircraft are modularity, too rapidly allow changes in configuration that can allow that vehicle to change machine type. to go from surveillance mission, to a strike mission, to a communications mission. you get the idea. for a variety of reasons, and greater autonomy helps us in the survivability challenges when we are operating in contested for the night air space. we are going to have to focus on this first generation of survivability. not necessarily in the context of low observe ability. also, in terms of operating

concept. there are systems where you produce sufficient numbers in a network or a honeycomb structure such that if part of them go away, the entire network still covers it. those are the kind of characteristics we need to zero in on as we move to the next generation of remotely piloted aircraft. with respect to women and men, that is a cop -- when men -- wingmen, that is a concept in aircraft. we would have to enhance the concept of manned aircraft without a lot of cost. >> he was in a position to train, organize, equip, and provide. my main experience is operating

what is currently in available. four decades in this line of work, there will be counter measures. we will have these kinds of challenges. the air force in particular is trying to deal with the battle after next. >> thank you. >> i formerly served under the secretary of state, when this original mtcr was negotiated. i supported the core teams at the time because it focused on what i believe is the decisive problem, preventing adversaries from being able to develop means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, whether it is a

declared or clandestine program. i found that the invisible hand of technology has produced perverse consequences. the manner in which the mtcr is now being executed is counterproductive to its original aspirations. the focus has been taken off dealing with wmd programs. there is no real correlation between denial of exports of uav's or other on man systems and our other countries with clandestine programs. this mainly prevents friendly and allied countries from so -- obtaining these capabilities. there is a lot of support for that. it is serving to create a parallel industrial structure in countries that do not subscribe to the mtcr.

they will have their vehicles that will be widely used. we sought a rocket under saddam hussein convert their manned aircraft into on manned platforms. it is quite a simple thing. the whole approach needs to be re-evaluated so that our friends and allies can get the a advantages of this equipment while we work diligently to deny access to this technology to countries with clandestine or declared wmd programs. >> it sounds like i should take a crack at commenting on the comments. i remember well your valuable work in putting together the mtcr. the question is, what with the world be like if instead of this

problem played implementation of the mtcr, which you believe is the situation now. what could freely export the best unmanned air vehicles to customers anywhere? the world, i believe, would be a lot less safe in that situation. you would have a spread of the most advanced potential cruise missile technology and if you did not have careful restrictions on large, unman their vehicles. -- unmanned air vehicles. the technology developed in countries like iraq was very primitive. it would be much easier to deal

with than the technology we are dealing with. consider the alternative future of excising large, on manned air vehicles -- unmanned air vehicles. >> missile pleura federation is something i have focused on for years. i would argue that the ubiquity of scud missiles and technologies have probably retarded ballistic missile technology is more than anything else. countries are moving away from scud technology and moving into solid propellant. we will see real advances. we are seeing that now in iran. we will probably see that in syria in the future. by providing the technology is,

you really dissuade countries to developing be tacit knowledge needed to develop new and better systems. we could argue about this over beers. i just wanted to at that point. >> i am intrigued by richard's point. you do not have to try to renegotiate the missile control technology. you do not have to skirt it and erode its legitimate desired impact. in addition to all of the arguments that richard brought up, and forcing this -- a lot of our allies looked at the platform as someone that they want to have. this platform is an essential part of this process, but far from a sufficient parts. when the allied buys the

platform, the exotic back and that is difficult to create is still a burden that they have to meet. we have allies with whom we would like to share this technology for interests we have in common. they also have other interests that are not in common with us. let's use pakistan as an example. we would like to enable them to do all sorts of surveillance on the western border. it would not be in our interest if that was used on the eastern border. a sale of that creates very serious geopolitical tensions. the use can be somewhat shaikh. it might be very deserved. >> anything that you want to add? >> i will pass. >> i promised to get out of the front row.

>> i would like to ask the panel, what do we know and what lessons might have we learned about the uav technology and experiences of china, israel, and others who may have abused these technologies already. iraq was mentioned earlier. i wondered bank other panelists might comment on the experiences of other countries. >> i have a good idea. what i have been able to observe publicly, israel is somewhat on the same path. we have the same power lines. >> there is enormous interest in some regards. in others, the previously manned

aircraft, the last generation aircraft, we know that the chinese have taken that to heart. instead of sending all of their last generation aircraft to the boneyard, like we tend to do, they have remoded them as part of their air defense technology to create real challenges to somebody that would like to complicate an air defense and varmint if such a scenario was to evolve. they are capitalizing on the technologies and promoting using older systems, which is smart.

>> i have been able to point to other nations that have been able to use uav services rather than hardware. israel is one example. they not only provide services to countries like the netherlands, germany, afghan operations, the israeli military contracts with an israeli firm that provides uav fee for service arrangements. other examples, turkey. here is something from "the washington post." washington has created a command center with turkey for surveillance drones flying over iraq. turkish officers look over the shoulder of their american

counterparts. the united states does not pull the triggers. it just shows the pictures. the other examples of this are in southeast asia, where the u.s. navy is working with a number of regional countries to establish a fusion center in singapore. they don't wear global hawks are part of a new program where they direct the operation of global hawks. the participating countries all get unlimited access to this. from the uav service perspective, this is what some of the other countries are doing. >> thank you. the mtcr guidelines make clear that the objective is to restrict wmd proliferation by

respecting the vehicles for wmd delivery. the united states is not in the business of transferring nuclear weapons or chemical or biological weapons to anybody else. the clinton administration and bush administration have overcome the strong presumption of the nile to a transfer uav's to friends and allies. the obama administration may be doing this as well. will beansfers of uav's consistent with u.s. nonproliferation policy. particularly in the case of isir which have so many benefits and do not pose any credible threat of wmd delivery.

if some of our own from the states were to acquire these isr type capabilities, we would not welcome it. nevertheless, the net benefit would probably be to our vantage. if the russians or the chinese were to have increased isr capabilities, that is not perhaps the end of the world for the united states. we are not going to be able to afford as many isr types as we want. there are other countries that want to share this burden. to the extent that the mtcr presents an obstacle to our allies getting these kinds of systems, it seems to undercut u.s. national security objectives. there may be cases where a rent- a-predator might make sense.

that is when the united states and the other country might share objectives. counter piracy, counter narcotics. a country might be willing to rent uav services. israel, even though they may be happy to rent them out, it would be hard for me to imagine israel saying, we will let the united states control our regional isr in the middle east. >> does anyone want to tackle that comment? >> i will try. let me give you an analogy, space launch vehicles. what is wrong with selling space

launch vehicles to the rest of the world? they are not for weapons of mass destruction. the problem is that space launch vehicles have interchangeable technology with the technology of ballistic missiles. that is also the problem with large uav's. what about the question of lack of interest in what mr. chen called rent-a -predator in which countries may accept uav services for anti piracy or anti-narcotics, but would rather have full control over the system for defense purposes. that leaves open the question

of this huge infrastructure that is necessary to make the uav part of a system for connecting sensors to shooters. i describe the the infrastructure, everything from to r35's, to e3's, personnel on the ground, communicating to each other through secure channels, are we going to sell that as well? >> i would like to see a provocative comment followed up by a provocative answer. >> thanks for referring to one of our great british tabloids,

"the guardian." i feel like i have no other option to stand up, and not the fan, but perhaps the fence some of the points from the document. "the guardian" is a paper that i would not wrap my own fish and chips in, but that is my own point of view. the documents that they referred to does write some very pertinent and good points. the paragraph you referred to starts out with a quote from general robert e. lee. this is -- it is good that work is so terrible, or else we would grow too fond of it. that ease for which you could fight that distance. it does state at the end, the

discussion of this paragraph must be tempered by the fact that the moral responsibility under every commander to reduce loss of life on both sides is clear. the use of on manned aircraft -- unmanned aircraft present -- prevents loss of life and is therefore justified. the section of those against which the unmanned systems are used, as we are looking for the future strategy development, by using these technologically advanced at a distance systems which you possibly extent to which the problem, especially in a counter insurgency environment at the moment. >> only one -- if 1 allows the adversary to manipulate the manner in which they are used or

distorted. for all of the reasons we have been talking about here. first, my point was that these perception to exist regarding the degree of autonomy or control that has been handed over to machines. the point that i was trying to make without taking sides regarding the legitimacy of the publication to which you referred to, it articulates a point of view that is out there. that is why i brought it up. it is not correct that today the united states or any of our allies are handing over control

to a machine. that is my point. that is why i also stated as we move into an air with greater and greater autonomy, we will run into significant and severe policy implications. i do not think that anybody today is willing to hit a button and say, come back in 24 hours and tell me where you put those 12 2000-pound weapons. the statement is that we have more people in the loop, i was not trying to be humorous, regarding these remotely piloted systems, then we do in manned systems. they are very human. they happen to be assets that

contribute to our vantage. it is frustrating for our adversaries. there is no way that they can affect the application of force or oversight from these systems. of course, how are they going to respond? they will respond through an information mechanism to attempt to instill in the minds of the collective body politic that there is something wrong about using these systems. information is a key element of conflict. my point is that there is the potential that we need to be very sensitive to this. i would suggest that your military and government and ours is very sensitive to it. the people that are operating these things are very much in

the fight. i could make the case that to a degree, those that are present may not be. the folks that are operating these systems have more awareness of what is going on than somebody that is restricted by only using the senses that he or she was born with. >> this is going to get harder. there is an ocean of data. it becomes greater and how do you of absorberit? the other part of david's, it is very true. you have this fix was of level of intelligence. it allows the decision maker in relative comfort with some are round him to challenge his thinking. how long have you had to capture the target? how long have you been looking at this?

how long has the target than in this compound. what is the history on this compound? what is the pattern of life here? what does the incoming weather look like? how much longer do i have to make a decision before i lose the opportunity. i have two weapons. give me the bug splat on the hellfire. turn it around and bring it in from the north. show me the gbu 12. those things are only possible because we are doing it this way. any commander who is fighting this kind of war must go through what it just is that i described. he is making sure that it is absolutely consistent with the

laws of armed conflict. i do admit that is going to be harder as this goes forward. you have to depend on a bit more automation because of the volume of data. >> we talked this morning about the separation of the operators from the actual theatre. they are observing that closely. i have not heard too many people talk about the use of cruise missiles or ballistic missiles where you have somebody in a silo pushing a button and does not see the results. i do not see why there is such a growing concern. there should be a concern. asis labeling of uav's something that is very abstract, that is different.

>> our adversaries have interjected this as a question in the minds as an attempt to limit the use of what is very, very effective. that is why it is a question. >> i will stay with our british colleagues here. >> wing commander from the royal air force. i would like to ask the panel for their view on whether the usaf has achieved the correct balance between these platforms -- to that end, is the use of a number of caps useful as a metric? >> let me take that on. the answer is a complex one. i will try to summarize it. the answer is yes.

i will be quite forward about this. yours truly is the one that four years ago went to the chief of staff of the air force, when he was standing up and suggested with the logic that we make this not just the deputy chief of staff for intelligence about for reconnaissance. for the reason that if you focus or use the traditional approach to aircraft, the focus tends to be on the aircraft, when in fact, if you put all of the parts and pieces, it requires separate training and resources. they have to be treated as a cohesive whole, as an integrated entity. otherwise, one loses that the

understanding that the vehicle flying is just a small part of the output or the effect of why you are flying it in the first place. we put together the organization to highlight the back end. it is really the desired output of this entire enterprise. that is information or knowledge. i would tell you that the united states air force has done a very good job in highlighting the performance of the distributing ground system. try to distribute that to your brother, sister, wife. it is in fact the information fusion system that takes the raw data at that comes from these platforms and then analyzes it then turns it into usable

information in a rapid weight and gets about to the soldier, sailor, there force, marines who needs it. we have the right focus in the context that it is a little bit different. it is difficult dealing with the military. the military tends to be conservative and sat in their perspectives. we have to move beyond platform focus into enterprise focused. that is what you are getting at. let me stop there because i will go on forever. the second part of your question is regarding caps or orbits as a matter of merit. your answer is an unqualified, whole hearted no. they are not the best measure of an effective test to determine isr sufficiency. just like we have shown on one

of the charts. the soldier, sailor, their man who is interested in the output do not care how many orbits are being flown. their situation is being improved by what is going on in this enterprise. we worked very hard to try to get people to get off the notion of accounting orbits. i will give you a very good case in point. the air force is using a airborne surveillance pod set. mq9's have shadows. ravens have a single day the motion for surveillance video. when put on an aircraft, they can automatically look over a

very wide area about the size of a small village and then transmit directly to users tend their friend and videos. the next variant will send out over 100 different images. you can carry this on one mq9. an orbit with an mq9 system on it is very different than a mq9 or aircraft that does not. we need to get focused on output as opposed to accounting input measures or systems. this has a very tangible results. right now, the department of defense is investing in buying mq9's.ts of

if you bought the systems that would increase the capacity of what we own, you could significantly reduce the bill and the number of people required to use them, not to mention reducing the foot print. does that answer your question? >> [inaudible] >> i know where you are going. it does not contradict it. i am telling you what our perspective is. what the secretary of defense decided to do is different. >> to reinforce what david said, i do not know what the right answer is in terms of what you have to do to make that for a platform as successful as it can be. what ari going to do with this number? we are going to double them,

too. my answer is, why? we do not know why -- whether and arithmetic increase in the number of orbitz should lead to a in arithmetic increase in the number of people in information for a geometric increase. perhaps this information is of organizing and collapses on itself. this might actually lead to a lighter analytic work load. i think that it is unlikely. i am creative and enough to think it might be available in some circumstances. we have never operated these scales before. >> we have about five more minutes. let me see how many more questions are out there. i will ask you and you to ask your questions consecutively. then we will have the panel response. we will go one, two, three with

your questions and then we will have the panelists respond. >> as a comeback for the best organizational approach towards this, perhaps what we're seeing is a tightening of the decision cycle. all of the tools that are enabling us to tighten the decision cycle. that allows us to bring this information technology. the question gets into, it is the secret sauce associated with what we're doing with these air vehicles, have someone to do with the ability to tighten the defensive cycle. how far does this reached? >> we had another question over here. >> i am from the international committee of the red cross. speaking in my personal

capacity, the discussion onuav's brings to light two broader trends in warfare and what governs it. the most obvious is the trend towards remote war fighting. what is the status of the pilot oring these uav's in nevada somewhere else that as far away from the hostilities. we have this discussion earlier. for me, it is difficult to see how a uniformed member of the armed forces that is piloting a uav and directly launching attacks or providing tactical information to assist in a strike would not be directly participating in hostilities and would be in any way protected

against attack. in my mind, he would be a lawful target. in addition to that, just like a soldier asleep in the barracks, the lawfulness of that target. it is not limited to the time when they are directly participating. that is a danger to surrounding civilians that could be collateral damage in a strike to that individual. the only way we could limit that is to say that nevada or wherever else this pilot is, it is not the battlefield. there are no active hostilities and the battlefield is afghanistan, iraq, where ever the hostilities are taking place. that brings us to the second trend, which is the notion of a limitless battlefield for a global battle field. these trends in force each

other that could have some potentially serious consequences. with respect to civilian populations that are found simply by chance next two or in proximity to a lawful individual target in whatever state or territory that attack takes place. then there is more political consideration to the relationship between states and the notion of the global battle field and notions for sovereignty. to what extent do you think there is sufficient attention being paid to the potential president that is being set with these two trends and the push towards a more global and opened battlefield. >> we had one last question in the back. >> a two-parter in the back.

he talked about moving from the platform to enterprise. i was curious about what metric you could use for volume photos or video feeds. what might serve as another metric for that capability? general hayden, to talk about the data avalanche and the requisite increase in personnel to handle some of the analysis, do we have any sense about how many personnel are involved for the ground system and the analytics and what that is projected to be going forward given the budget tightening that we had? >> we have about a minute left. i do want the speakers to have an opportunity to respond to the three questions posed. the three sets of questions posed. we will start with general

hayden and move down the line. >> maybe dave can handle the metric. you raise great questions, ones that we are aware of. throughout the current war, we have not added the spice to the stew that you created of an enemy who rejects the principle of geneva, distinguishing between combat and non-combat and can be incredibly complex. the decisions that we make in government are difficult. we are in unprecedented areas. i do not have an answer. these are legitimate questions that nations should discuss. he would come to our headquarters routinely to talk about matters. we had a very adult dialogue. it is not useful to -- for other

nations tocluck at us. we cannot afford to simply admire these issues. we have to make decisions. rather than merely criticizing us for not adhering to some abstract standard, to recognize that some things have changed and it requires us to readdress what constitutes appropriate behavior between states. >> i found your articulation of the questions fascinating. i would just throw out there that a limitless battle space and global conflict is nothing new. it has not been brought on by remotely piloted aircraft. it has gone on in terms of information that has had a direct effect. that goes on with respect to operations in cyberspace. it goes on with respect to cyber act -- cyber actions.

it is another manifestation of globalization. with respect to the answers of, what are we looking at? we went through some extensive approaches to, how do we characterize the output measures. quite frankly, the answer is that that is how you do it. what is the interest that you are flying this aircraft ford? is it for video? is it for weapons aircraft delivery? is it for signals? the output measures are what you want to tie to your measure of effectiveness or whenever it might be. we got one. i would be happy to talk to you about it off line. it is very complex when you look at the different types of information that can be collected. how do you do that in a nice

tight, concise way? we have got to move beyond that. >> i hope we are put of this wonderful capability is not the delivery of chemical or biological weapons. uav's are the most efficient way of delivering such weapons. by perhaps a factor of 10. as with space launch vehicles, the united states should provide services and share the benefits with other countries, but not provide the hardware. >> i apologize for running over a little bit. i would like to thank our three panelists for some very thought- provoking and insightful ideas and proposals and some

innovative proposals provided by richard. i would like to thank all three of them. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> tomorrow on "washington journal" obama's plans to reduce the deficit are examined by mark zandi. later, stanton joins our c-span student cam winners on a discussion on neutrality. monday on c-span2, the commission on wartime contract and is holding a hearing on how u.s. tax dollars are spent on contract and in iraq and afghanistan. witnesses will include the

inspector general for reconstruction in afghanistan, the inspector general, and the former chairman of the commission on army reform. that is live at 9:30 a.m. on c- span2. >> you are watching c-span, renew politics and public affairs. every morning, it is "washington journal" connecting you what the elected officials and policy makers. weeknights, congressional hearings and policy forms. also, supreme court oral arguments. on saturdays, the communicators "" and on sunday, prime minister's questions from the house of commons. you can watch our programming any time on c-span.org. it is all searchable on our video library. a public service created by

america's cable companies. >> microsoft founder bill gates talked about his foundation's development aid efforts in strasbourg, france. after his remarks, he answered questions for members of parliament. this is a little bit more than an hour. >> and thank you very much, can i ask people to take their seats? good afternoon. i am pleased to welcome among others bill gates. with his wife melinda gates, he

has set up the bill and melinda gates foundation. that foundation is trying to ensure a healthy and productive life in the united states in -- and developing countries. there are extremely high levels in paris, berlin, and in the european parliament -- parliament in strasbourg. since it was set up in 1994, the foundation has provided more than $70 million for developing countries, most of which have gone to the field of health. that exchange of views does offer a genuine opportunity for us to examine the developing role of private and public providers of funds and the relationship between the two. this meeting is taking place at a point in time when they are debating the future policy

making at the european union and the ways that we develop financial aid. the focus on the agenda today, we have invited members of the budget committee and the special committee on political challenges for the european union 2013. we would like to welcome members of those committees to this meeting. mr. gates would love to talk to us about an end-to tiv that is aimed at decision makers and the major public as well how the public can and has transform millions of human lives. i would immediately pass the floor to mr. gates. mr. gates, you have the floor. >> thank you very much. fantastic. thank you very much. good afternoon. it is great to be here. i thought i would just make some opening remarks. we will have most of our time

together for what ever questions people have. i am on a tour called living proof. that is to spread the good news about how they particular part of aid budgets have made a dramatic difference. it is about a success story. to thank the voters in the places i am in for their generosity and to encourage them to grow that generosity. the majority of all aid that goes to poor countries comes from europe. the european union has encouraged that at the national level and that sell the book -- devoted a substantial part of its budget to these activities. my wife and i have committed all of the resources we have to our foundation to work from the same

area. we want to live to these countries up. we want to put them in a position where they will be self sustaining and in a situation where people are healthy, where people have jobs, where the environment is respected, and where the investment in the future, particularly in education, it is very strong.

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>> an article was written that was just totally inaccurate, so i invited the person in, let them see what was going on, and he saw it was totally inaccurate, and he said he was sorry and left and never uttered another word about it to correct it. and the paper didn't. and it was -- it was kind of a wonderful experience for me, because i learned early. there was another myth about general shinseki that i describe in the book that has probably been printed in the press and on television, i don't know, thousands of times, literally thousands of times, and god bless jamie, he went out, found the facts out, and he wrote a story and said that it's almost chipped in stone that this happened, and it

didn't. it's totally inaccurate, the myth oling about general shinseki, what he said, what he meant, what happened, how he served out his term and so forth. and jamie wrote a musing , an interesting, but not widely repeated article correcting the facts. scooter brought up something that i think and i'll kind of wind up with this. you know, if you think about it, world war i and world war ii had a finite beginning and a finite ending. the cold war didn't. the cold war kind of came along and lasted decades. and i worried about language, the idea of calling the war on terror a war, because it left the impression that it could be won by both, and it can't. it left the impression that it was the department of defense's responsibility and not the rest of the government, and not the private sector. and that's not the case.

it is much more like the cold war, where there was a competition of ideas between communism and its expansionist activities and people who believed in free political institutions and free economic institutions. and this, too, is a competition of ideas, this competition we have with radical islamists, and to prevail in it over time -- and think of the cold war. it took administrations of both political parties in our country, and it took administrations in our allied countries persistence over a long, long period, and it was an impressive thing that that was accomplished. i submit that the difficulties we face today with radical islamists is of a kind, and that it's going to take a long time, and that it isn't going to be won with boats. i have no idea -- in fact, i

had another memo on the website, i can't remember the date, the year, but i think it was october 16 for some reason, because it leaked in the press within a week, and i only sent it to three people, i think. but i basically said, look, here's our policy, we've got to pursue it, and it's important that we protect the american people. but i don't know that i've got any metrics to tell how we're doing. i don't know if we're capturing or killing terrorists as fast as they're able to recruit them and train them and finance them and organize them and send them out to kill innocent men, women, and children. and i still don't know to this day if we've got any metrics like that. there is one. people have done a lot of fussing about president george w. bush and the structure he put in place, including indefinite detention and military commissions, which have been long part of our

history, and guantanamo bay, a prison that's been maligned and the people who served down there have been criticized. i would submit that it's undoubtedly one of the finest prisons on the face of the earth. it has been exceedingly well run. i asked a journalist the other day, and i said give me a sense of how many people we probably waterboarded down at guantanamo, and she said, oh, tens. of course, the answer is zero. there was never anyone waterboarded at guantanamo, not one. but in any event, here we are, it's almost april 2011, we could have a terrorist attack tomorrow, they can attack any time, any place, using any technique, and it's not possible to defend against terrorist attacks in every location at every moment of the day or night against every

conceivable technique. but the short answer is that we haven't had a successful attack in the united states of america for close to 10 years. and that is, in my view, a credit to president bush and the structure that was put in place, and it is not simply a defensive structure. the success, i think, is rooted in the fact that the decision was made that you can't defend everywhere all the time. therefore, you must go out and put pressure on them and make everything they do harder, and that has been done very well. it's harder for them to raise money, it's harder for her them to travel, it's harder for them to talk on the telephone, it's harder for them to do everything they do. now, i give a good grade there on the president. i would give us a low grade on competing in the competition of ideas. we have not done well on that.

the bush administration was reluctant to talk about islamists because we didn't want anyone to believe that we were against a religion or against hundreds of millions of people that are all across the globe who are not radical and are not islamists and are not terrorists. but there's a nervousness about it. people didn't want to be accused of being against a religion. i give us a relatively high grade in terms of helping to protect the american people, and i'd give us a relatively low grade in terms of communicating and competing in that competition of ideas. but unless we do it, unless we do it very, very well, it seems to me, we won't know how well we're doing and we may not be doing well enough. last, there was talk about the interagency process.

i lisped to the people talk about it in jamie's business, and i suppose if i were in his business, i'd do it do, but they personalize it, they want to make this guy is against that guy or this person is against that person or it's the battle of titans going on. if you think back, well, just in recent memory, i mean, henry kissinger had trouble with bill rogers in the press. he had trouble with jim schlesinger. you read that. george shultz had difficulties with cap weinberger in the press. people have different views and there ought to be different views, and that's healthy, and that's for the president to then listen to those views and make a judgment. and it seems to me that i just got off the phone before i came over here with george shultz, a long-time friend, and he said

he'd written an op-ed on this subject that he hopes will be printed soon, but the thing i would say is that, at the end of world war ii, we read an inflexion point between the end of the war and the beginning of the cold war. and an enormous number of institutions were fashioned during that critical period, to the great credit of the people who served in the truman administration. but you he happened with u.n., nato, i.f.m. and world bank. here at home we ended up with the c.i.a., department of defense, usia, all these institutions were created that started working during the period from the end of world war ii up until the beginning of this century. but we're at another inflexion point. we're at the end of the cold war, and we haven't done much to modify this, and they don't work as well in the information

age and the period going forward. and one of the recommendations i made that's on the website, if i haven't mentioned it, is rumsfeld.com. i don't see a lot of pencils out. i acceptability a memo, i think, to -- i sent a memo, i think, to the president on the subject where a group of us talked about this and said, look -- back then it was called a hoover commission at the end of world war ii, and they got people from both political parties, government, nongovernment, and they thought about these things in a serious way, and then came out with a set of proposals. and we need that today. we need to think through these things as to how these institutions, departments, often run by -- not run, but influenced in a significant way by congressional committees and subcommittees that are very terse conferences.

and then the state department, department of defense, c.i.a., they all pop up, and as peter rodman once wrote, i think, they need to bend if they're going to come in toward the president so you can begin to pull those through a needle head and he can make rational decisions and not have a clash as they come up. now, there has to be ways we can do that. i'm not smart enough to know what they are, but i do know that the information age is a terribly difficult thing for our government to manage, to handle. we're not organized that way for the information age. i mean, people in here don't even know what a tweet is, i'll bet. well, maybe, maybe a third. all of us have to adjust and adapt, and it's a much faster moving world today. i think that those thoughts are something that we're going to have to come to a grip with, and i know doug's thought about it and others here at the table have, so i'll stop with that.

[applause] >> thank you very much. the point that general pace made about how many of the assumptions on which the war plans and post-war plans for iraq were based that proved to be faulty is an important point . the particular point that he highlighted about the thought that we would have iraqi security forces that would be available to us to help maintain order after saddam's ouster, i recall that scooter in particular, when we were briefed by the c.i.a. on the iraqi police remaining intact and the c.i.a. made the

argument that the iraqi police were viewed as a professional force, and that while you might change leadership, you wouldn't have to change the people throughout the country, they were actually well regarded throughout the country and they would remain in position, and i remember scooter making the point that it doesn't make sense that in the police state, the police would be viewed as professional and not an instrument of repression. there was a little bit of back and forth on the subject, but that was the c.i.a.'s position and that was apparently an important factor in centcom planning, because after all, the military commands have to get their key assumptions from the official source of key assumptions, which is the intelligence community. we've had several people raise questions about the way our intelligence community is organized, and they've said -- several of the questions have made the point that there was a major reorganization in the

beneficiary administration of the intelligence community after the 9/11 commission report, with the creation of the national director for intelligence, and several people would like to know what the panel's evaluation is of our intelligence community now versus what it was before 9/11. are we better organized? these are some of the kinds of questions that, secretary, you raised at the end, you know, are we set up to deal with the current era? what's your general sense of where we stand on intelligence organization? i would ask this to anybody who wants to jump in. >> i would just begin by saying i think they've got a very, very tough job. i was secretary in the 1970's during the cold war, and we were looking at the soviet union, and we made -- our intelligence community made judgments that weren't accurate

in a number of instances. in that case, you were able to look at it year after year after year after year, the same people developed the skills, get the language confidence, and yet we made a -- for example, go back and some of you may remember the misjudgment as to the percentage of g.d.p. that the soviet union was spending. the agency was convinced that it was a relatively small number, and harry rowen and charles wolf, i think, from rand concluded it was much closer to what adolf hitler in germany was spending in the period prior to the beginning of world war ii. it turned out they both were right as to what was being produced, because we could see it and look at it and count it. what was different was the size of the economy. the soviet economy was much smaller. therefore, the percentage was much higher. of course, the importance of it

was, it showed a certain sense of purpose in the determination. if you're willing to deny your consumers, that's a big deal. of course, in the reagan era, when the cold war was won, if you will, that critical question as to how could the economy of the soviet union survive what they were spending was a non -- it was not trivial, that question that was being debated, and it turned out the agency was wrong. i give them a lot of credit. i think we've got a lot of wonderful intelligence people working their heads off trying to do it right. it's very, very hard. we're dealing with closed societies, road regimes, ungoverned areas. we're dealing with complicated -- not just nation states, but we're dealing with networks, and it's an area that we have not -- and we had a big dip in intelligence investment during

the 1990e's, let there be no doubt, there was a bathtub, and it takes a long time to develop the kind of internal confidence in an organization like that, if you can get the language skills, develop the knowledge. so i think it's very easy to criticize. i think it's important to recognize the difficulty of it. but i do think we have to expect to be surprised, and we ought not to be surprised when we're going to be surprised. and given the lethality of weapons today, vastly different from the 1970's -- i mean, the difference is just enormous -- our margin for error is not what it was, let there be no doubt. go ahead. >> mr. secretary, i'd like to just frame the same question in a slightly different way. one of the things i really enjoyed about your book is the extent that it challenges and sometimes really effectively reputz conventional wisdom about things in the past. one item of conventional wisdom

applied to the prewar intelligence in the runup to the war in iraq, in that the press failed in its job to ask the really difficult questions, and to some extent, the same criticism applies to policy makers who are criticized for not accurately questioning the intelligence at the time. i wonder what your opinion is about the press specifically and also the administration. you know, was it a matter of if you ask the right questions and you were more skeptical, you would have gotten a different answer, or was it essentially the case that these things were not noble at the time until after the events of the war unfolded? >> mr. secretary, before you answer that, could i jump in on the previous question? i think there's a part that needs to be asked. thank you. i'd be real hesitant to lay a lot of blame at the feet of some very, very dedicated intelligence analysts who are trying to do their best job. i told you that i had

recommendations based on things that turned out not to be true, but i don't fault the intelligence agency for that. first of all, if you take one example, our intelligence agency is getting input from folks on the ground, iraqis, and from other countries' intelligence services, and they were doing their best job to sin these that for us. -- to sintize that for us. so just like those of us in the military that learn from our lessons, so do the intelligence community. and if you are a receiver of intelligence, you need to listen to what's being told. i mean, it's like listening to legal recommendations. whether you listen to a lawyer or to an intelligent officer,

you have responsibility to apply your own judgment. we should not ex-corps ate our intel community forgiving their best judgment. if you want their best judgment, you have to understand they're going to be wrong sometimes. and if we beat them up, they're going to start going further into their shell because they don't want to be wrong and they don't want to get beat up. number two, the part that wasn't answered is what bout the intel structure is. we've set up a director of national intelligence who sits on top of the national intel community except he or she has zero authority to direct anybody in the intel community and has no budget authority.

so if you believe you want to have somebody over the process, then give them the authority and give them the budget. if you believe you don't want that, fine. but right now, i think what we have is an organizational charlotte with somebody in charge of everybody when they're not. thank you. >> i'd like to comment on the intel structure. i used to be in the pharmaceutical business in research and development. you don't want one single control over r&d. you want people thinking and doing different things and trying out and coming up with ideas, a competition of ideas, multiple sources of information. the idea that it would be helpful for the united states of america to have a structure where there was a single intel person over every single thing, budget, personnel in the united states of america i think just

a perfectly terrible idea. i know exactly what would happen if you did it. the military would re-create their own intel capabilities because they can't function unless they have access to military intelligence. now, there's multiple types of intelligence, sure. there's strategic intelligence and there's economic intelligence. but the department of defense absolutely needs an intelligence mechanism, and so does the department of state. i know my relation hipp with george tenet and john negroponte and our departments' relationship at the senior levels, even at the layer down below, maybe not down below, but it was superb. i wouldn't have thought of pointing someone to a personnel position in the pentagon that related to intelligence without having a long discussion with

george tenet of what kind of person we need, what do we see the challenges for that job. he participated in all those decisions. same thing with budget. we'd sit down and work out every budget issue. the idea that the director of national -- the congress behaved like like there was a serious problem because of 9/11, we must fix out, and then out comes the d.n.i. in the middle of a war. you know, it seems to me that the people who served in that have done a very good job of not breaking the system, even though there were people there who wanted to break the system. people in the congress who were anxious to have it change. let's have a new person in charge, and i think that would be a very bad idea, and i think the way the d.n.i. we've had to handle it have been wise and prudent, and i con great late

they will for it -- and i congratulate them for it. >> just to be clear, airport an appropriate degree of skepticism by the administration and by also the press at the time. >> well, go to the website and read the parade of horribles that i wrote and we talked about what are all the things that can go bad. and one of them was we may not find weapons of mass destruction. i mean, it was right there, written, sent around to the members, sent to the president. we thought about those things. i was on a program with o'reilly not too long ago, and he kept saying, but why did not you tell us? why did not you tell us the things that might go wrong? oh, wonderful idea. let's tell the enemy every conceivable thing we think we might have a problem with so that they can get about doing it. no. that's not the kind of thing that you tell the press or talk about public it will.

but there's a list of, i don't know, page after page of things that doug and other people in the government thought about, and we talked about, and pete pace and dick myers and that was circulated and that people were worried about. >> do you think the press fell down on its job? >> oh, goodness. we haven't got time for that. no, jamie. >> i don't mean me personally. obviously i did a terrific job. i mean, the media in general. >> we naturally focus in this discussion on the period of the bush administration. for obvious reasons. but one of the things in secretary rumsfeld's book that's particularly interesting is the discussion of his career going back to when he was in the navy and then his first run before the age of 30 for

congress and then all of his various jobs before he became secretary of defense for the first time in the mid 1970e's. one of the jobs was u.s. ambassador to nato. we've had a question, which i think helps tie together your early history, your time as secretary of defense and the bush administration and current affairs with libya and all that's going on right now. what's your evaluation of nato, and what's become of nato, how has it made the transformation from its original purpose as a cold war alliance to what it became when you were secretary of defense in the bush administration and now how do you see it functioning as president obama is calling on it to act in libya?

what's your general evaluation of nato? by the way, i'd be interested, pete, if you would want to chime in, and scooter also. i know you all have thoughts on the subject. >> i think nato is struggling, just like the other institutions i mentioned are struggling. they haven't quite evolved or adapted or adjusted to fit the 21st century. now, i think if you look down from outer space on earth, you know, there's a finite number of countries that have our values and that have free political and free economic systems, and most of them are in nato. now, there are many others, australia, singapore, south korea, and the like, india, but these countries are important. most of the problems we face are problems that we can't do by ourselves. we can't deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a single nation or piracy. or the drug problem.

there are any number of things that require coalitions. now, i don't believe that the mission determines the coalition and the coalition ought not to determine the mission. but having these countries together in nato, i think, is potentially very useful. and when the united states has provided strong leadership and given those countries the time to adjust and think about it and determine the extent to which they may or may not want to participate in a coalition to do something, then nato has functioned quite well, and to the extent we've been in a hurry or haven't provided leadership, there have been problems. i've been struck by all this talk about the coalitions with respect to libya. i mean, if you go back to the global war on terror, president bush and colin powell put together a coalition of something like 90 countries. in afghanistan, there was 69 countries. in iraq, there were 45 countries. the proliferation security initiative, i think, had 98 countries.

and yet president bush was labeled a unilateralist. the difference, it seems to me, was that they set about the task of recognizing that we needed help and we needed people, but we needed people to agree on the mission, and i think the problem we've seen most recently is the confusion over the mission. i mean, imagine if you're sitting in libya and you're an ambassador or you're a government employee or you're in the army, you're a colonel or you're a private or you're in the neighborhood and you're looking for -- the rebels are looking for cooperation. they want intelligence, so they want food or housing, and you don't even know even to this day where gaddafi is going to go. imagine. now, we're there, it seems to me. people are a lot like magnetic particles. they point where things are going to happen. what's going to happen?

and is it likely to change or isn't it? and where are they pointing? well, they're all over, because they don't know what's going to happen. they're going to get up in the morning and he's still going to be around. it's all going to be your behavior, just as sure as anything. the thing that worries me about what's going on in africa is that, you know, the critical element is iran and syria and the damage they're doing to us in afghanistan, the damage they're doing in iraq, the potential -- the damage they're doing in lebanon in supporting hezbollah, and the risk of iran with nuclear weapons. the other major factor is egypt , in its size and importance, and saudi arabia and the gulf countries. and what we do in libya is -- what we do anywhere is seen elsewhere in the world. and people make judgments over it. how we behave is going alter their behavior. and what we do in libya, given

the visibility of it, is going to be taken into account in the areas that are critically important, the two anchors, the gulf and egypt, in the case of that part of the world, and in iran and syria. and i think in a -- i worry that we're not taking those things into account, and i would say that they're the main feature out in that part of the world. >> can i ask general pace, if president obama asked you, based on your experience for thoughts as he's looking to nato to play a substantial role in libya, what are the thoughts you would offer? >> i will not answer that question, and i'll tell you why. to be an advisor to the president of the united states, an advisor to the secretary of

defense, you must have absolute confidence and trust in that individual, and you cannot worry, if you're the president when you pick your chairman, is that chairman a closet republican? is he a closet democrat? is he going to write a book? are the things i say to him in private going to someday be published? so for me to speak for or against something that president obama is doing is wrong. i would give my counsel in private. i have to the secretary of defense. the person to answer that question is admiral mullen. but i think officers who serve at the privilege of serving as a senior rank to the u.s. military do damage to the relationship between elected

officials of our government and those who serve in the u.s. military when they step outside of their private advisory role because it is inappropriate. i didn't need my predecessors helping me advice the secretary of defense and president. mike mullen does not need me helping him, and they won't need our help either. but i think it's ill-advised. it would do damage to the current serving force by speaking out of turn. having said that, i would like to take two seconds to talk about the nato question that doug asked before that one of me, and i'd like to take it from a purely military function . the non-nato coalition that was put together going into afghanistan, the non-nato coalition that was put together

going into iraq required the leadership and unique control and capabilities by the u.s. military. the longstanding nato coalition which is nato also requires the unique leadership, command control and capabilities of the u.s. military. so nato as an institution acts as it does, but the military function, whether it's a coalition of non-nato or a nato coalition, is going to be very dependent on the day-to-day leadership and capacity of the u.s. military. >> and i would say not just the military leadership, but the political leadership in nato requires u.s. involvement.

it's just the reality that have institution. >> so you're saying we're turning the mission over from us to us? >> yes. but not in an insignificant way. not in an insignificant way. from a pure military military execution standpoint, i meant exactly what i said. the authorities, though, are very different. in the coalition of nonnato countries is one thing, which may include countries, but the coalition which is nato has stood the world in good stead for many decades. it's a unique institution, so we shouldn't pooh pooh that fact. as a military person on the ground executing my day-to-day

tasks are going to be very similar in just talking to different people. >> i think one of the things about nato, doug, the partnership for peace program has been a terrific thing, where non-nato countries have been engaged and brought in and begin to develop relationships with nato nations t nation's military. and military relationships are just critically important. they really are. and they get engaged and interested. they begin to understand our values and civilian principles of civilian control and how the military functions and become much more professional. there are other parts of the world -- i mentioned some of those countries, where i would like to see us develop a relationship, for example, with singapore, japan, south korea, australia, new zealand, india, not a formal one, not coming into nato, but a closer knitted relationship, because those are countries that, as i say, if

you're going to deal with a problem like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around, you're going to have to have lots of countries engaged. and to have some linkage with nato of some sort, it seems to me it makes sense. clearly the united nations has demonstrated that it can do certain things, but major things like i'm talking about really don't fit in their satchel. >> you just highlighted a topic that was a major concern of yours when you were secretary, didn't get as much attention in our panel today. i'm glad you raised it. the focus on the united states as a pacific power was something that you talked about a lot. and one of the major projects that you launched and that you highlight in your book and that we received two or three

questions about is the realignment of the american defense posture all around the world. this was, i believe, the first time in history somebody said we're actually going to look at the way u.s. forces are deployed, postured, ready to operate around the entire world all at once, in a single exercise. how much of that, in your sense -- i mean, what's your evaluation looking back on that project? i mean, is that -- is that -- going forward, do you think that you actually succeeded in reshaping the defense posture? some of the key elements of what you worked on were extremely controversial at the time, and people were waiting for your departure to try to roll them back.

where do you think it stands? >> yeah, that's the understatement of the afternoon, i think. >> well, we had forces left over from the cold war. they were in some countries where the countries didn't want them. and it was not hospitable for our troops. and by golly, you've got a volunteer force, you better have them in places that are hospital annal to the extent you can do it. second, they were in places where the countries had developed an ownership interest over them and decided that those forces worked for them. our forces worked for them, period, and that we could not use them elsewhere. so, in some instances, they said, look, you can't use them unless our parliament approves it. you can't move them in our country. another country said to us, look, if you're going to do anything with any of these forces in afghanistan or iraq, move them now before our parliament gets involved or before our government gets involved. some of the political parties

or the coalition will get pulled out. we had -- we were spending $236 million a year, as i recall -- i could be wrong, but it's close enough for government work -- in iceland to have our airplanes be sure that soviet bombers weren't harassing people in that part of the world. there was no soviet union. there had not been a soviet union for years and years. we didn't need to spend $236 million to have those aircraft. what were they doing? they were going out doing search and rescue for fishermen from iceland. now, i've got nothing against fishermen from iceland. we still had people from the middle east war that stood there and looked across the water to see what was happening. and i started moving it, and the opposition was just horrendous. it took me four years to get them out of iceland.

at $236 million a year. think of it. everyone was against it. don't rock the boat. we don't want that. and there were, frankly, a couple of countries that said, look, you can't use these forces in iraq. they're to protect us. simultaneously, some of them were reducing their military while we were holding ours and increasing ours. so it needed -- andy is sitting back there. you were involved in it, andy, as i recall, extensively, and it was tough. and there was a lot of resistance from the state department, because it caused ruffles with our allies and friends around the world who worried about it. do we make progress? you bet we made progress. was it pain-free? no. there was some pain along the way. >> one of the questions is, it

relates to the comments that, secretary rumsfeld, you made earlier about dealing with the war on terrorism not just as a matter of capture and kill operations, but also as part of a battle of ideas. and the question is, how can we think of winning a war of ideas when there are no warriors of ideas in the u.s. government? i mean, it raises the question, is there an agency of the u.s. government that has the responsibility to deal with the ideological challenges relating to terrorism? how do you work on that? >> yes, not only know, but the extent that anyone in the government tries to do it, they're immediately landed on by both feet. i can remember when i was a congressman in the 1960's and john f. kennedy was president, and there was a film made by

usia about the kennedys in india as a way of promoting america and so forth overseas. and the movie was played overseas in india, and it was a darn good movie, film. and then, of course, the congress found out what was going on, and they look at it, here's taxpayer money being used to develop a film that's highly complimentary to the kennedys, and it is played in india and other places, but it's also played in the united states. the world is the world. you can't have something to one audience and not expect it to be to every audience. so people in congress got very nervous about using taxpayers' money for that purpose. general casey, as i recall, found that, in iraq, he needed cooperation of the people. he needed iraqis to get intelligence. general abizaid said we need people to deal with the problem

of insurgency. so we decided that the press and iraq was publishing every bad thing, not any good things we were doing, but all the bad things that happened. some civilian gets killed or someone's wounded or there's a bomb that hits a civilian location that shouldn't. that's highly publicized, and the fact that the military was out there putting generators in schools, generators in hospitals, helping people, bringing them to the hospitals, none was that was being getting reported. casey decided to hire some people to see that the stories could be written and given to the iraqi newspapers so that they'd end up in the iraqi press. oh, my goodness. oh, what a terrible thing to do, printing the truth and paying somebody to print the truth and put it in the newspaper, it had to stop immediately. congress got highly excited about it. and it stopped and it was over and we were right back to square one. it is a very complicated thing using taxpayers' money to do something that deals with information, even though it's

honest, even though it's act right, and we all know the reality. the reality is that the al qaeda folks have media committees. someone said you're kidding. no, they have committees on media. they manage the media. they do a very good job of it, and they're serious about it, and they're disciplined about it. and a lie goes around the world three, four times before the truth hits. i guess mark twain or samuel clemens or whoever it was even put his boots on the truth, and it doesn't even get started. i write about it in the book. i talk about the mythology of a core an being flushed down the toilet at guantanamo, and you ended one riots in three cities, people getting killed, dead, and weeks and weeks and weeks later, "newsweek" magazine said, gee, to the extent we had part of our story wrong, we're sorry. the people that they were saying sorry to were dead. it never happened. there wasn't a koran flushed

down the toilet. and that's the problem. we don't do it well. i was asked once what kind of grade i'd give the united states of america on dealing with issues like this, and i gave us a d minus, including me. >> to wrap up, i hope you won't consider this a parochial question, but one of the people that you had dealings with over your long career was the founder of the hudson institute, herman kahne. i'd be interested if there are any reflections on herman kahne that you want to -- that you would like to share with us as a way of closing. before we close, before i turn it over to you to answer that, i'd just like to thank our panelists, general pace, jamie mcintyre, scooter libby. it's great that hudson has an

opportunity to host an event like this, and i thank ken weinstein for his leadership here. but any words to close? >> i think i put a picture of herman talking to gerald ford in the book. i'm sure i did, yeah. he was a friend of mine from the 1960's when i was in congress. and for whatever reason, we'd end up on panels up at the american assembly in new york or we were involved with the u.s.-japan relations together, and everywhere he would go was sparkly involved mind and intellect would stir the pot. he'd go to new york and say, look, the value on this side of the river is this, the value of the real estate on the other side is that. what you need is a great big pot to connect them. and you're going to end up increasing the value on the side that's so low and everyone's going to be happy. he goes to japan with me, and he starts musing about the

possibility that the japanese will have nuclear weapons at some point because it's a bit of an anomaly for a major country in the world not to have the ability to defend itself. of course, that caused quite a stir. i just thoroughly -- of course, he was with hudson when it was on the hudson back in the cold war. i adored the man. working with him was a delight. he was as stimulating -- i think back now, i remember one of his books, if i'm not mistaken, was called "the year 2000." and it's already 2011. and when did he write that? what year? in 1967 he wrote the year "2000" and speculated and looked out about the world, and it was -- it was just fun to be with a person with that wonderful brain and thought. i can remember one of my daughters once said, what should i do, and i said, well,

go work for someone brilliant like herman kahn, and she said, what would i do? well, it doesn't matter. just be around him, because he likes the trap, and you're going to find people sparkling around herman kahn, and it will be a wonderful thing. the last time i saw him, we were doing a panel and it was at a hotel here in town, and i hadn't seen him for some time, and he waved a lot. -- and he weighed a lot. he had gotten very, very heavy. i remember looking at him and saying to him in friendship that he was doing -- performing a disservice to the country, that anyone with the intellect that he had and the contributions he made to carry around that much weight wasn't right, and he couldn't do it. his heart wouldn't do it. and it wasn't long thereafter that he left us. quite a man and a good friend. and i want to thank him and

thank you, doug, for your hospitality. i hope that the questions you were asking in the latter portion came from the audience, because i didn't see any hands go up, but i guess they were all on paper. >> yes. >> thank you, doug. >> thank you, and that happens, everybody, on the panel. thank you all. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> one of the things at the pentagon, they would always tell us, the essence of donald rumsfeld was so complex, it didn't lend itself to a bumper sticker. at one point they made a bumper sticker that said it's un-bumper stickerable. after today, i think it should say, don rumsfeld, he got us out of iceland. thank you.

>> today the commission on wartime contracting is holding a hearing on how u.s. tax dollars were spent on contracting in iraq and afghanistan. witnesses will include the special inspectors general for reconstruction in iraq and afghanistan, the department of defense inspector general, and the former chairman of the federal commission on army acquisition reform. we'll have that live at 9:30 a.m. eastern on c-span2. today on c-span -- a discussion on the state of same-sex marriage in america. you'll hear from chad griffin,

the political consultant who helped lead the federal lawsuit to overturn proposition 8 in california. also, republican consultant matt klink at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> this week on "q&a" performer mike daisey. his one-man show has featured the economy, steve jobs, and the american theater. >> mike daisey, can you explain what you do for a living? >> i think i can. i am a story teller. i tell stories for a living on stage in front of people. i tell them extemporaneously. you probably have prepared a little.

i know who i am, so i am able to answer. we are making it up as we go along. that's what i do. i tell stories in rooms of people live. >> how long have you been doing it? >> in one sense, all of my life. i have been doing it as a career for 15 years. >> i saw you at the woolly mammoth theater. i want to know more. you are talking about apple, steve jobs, and china. what is the show? >> it is "the agony and the ecstasy of steve jobs." they are two stories intertwined. it is the rise and fall of apple and steve jobs and his rise and fall and rise. and what these devices mean in our lives. the other strand about where these devices come from.

i went to southern china and i investigated the conditions under which they are made. >> where did you get the idea at? >> i talk about this in the show. it is true. all of my monologues come out of my obsessions. they spring out of my obsessions. one day i was searching the web. i read this article on a macintosh news site because i am a big geek. this guy got an iphone, but it was not blank when he got it. it had these pictures from inside the factory. i became obsessed with these pictures. you do not think about how they are made. i know how to take them apart and put them together, but i

did not know how they were actually made. >> let's see a clip. it is a one-man show. is it always one man? >> it is. >> you have been sitting on stage is for 15 years by yourself talking. >> i never feel lonely. it is told in the space with the audience. it is very much live composed. it is very much communal. i am the only one on the stage. >> is there any difference performing in washington than any other city? >> not in the fundamentals. they are a very political audience. some things resonate differently at different cities. i performed in india, australia, and all over the u.s.

if you can connect humans, it is the same everywhere. >> this is from your current program "the agony and the ecstasy of steve jobs." >> steve jobs has always been the enemy of nostalgia. he always understands the future demands sacrifice. apple's best-selling product a few years ago was the ipod mini. it was awesome. steve jobs was doing the keynotes. today, the ipod mini is no more. do not take it away. i give you the ipod nano.

yea! it is everything i wanted. and i am going to lose its even faster now. >> what did you get in that clip and what do you think of steve jobs? >> i am talking very specifically about the fact that he does something that almost no other ceos would actually do. he has an incredible ability to cancel something, to throw out the past and move forward with the future. people have a hard time doing that. part of his ruthlessness is being able to detach that way. even before the market is ready for it, he is ready to move on to the next thing. that captures a lot of what i think about steve jobs.

i admire him a lot. he has been responsible for three fundamental shifts in the metaphor we used to see the world in technology. nobody else is responsible for one. i think he is a very difficult person to work for. and to be associated with. i think he is really challenging. i think he is in a tremendous position of power at apple. he has built this corporate armature around him. it is my wish that he would open his eyes and recognize the conditions that are in the factories in china and acknowledge them and work towards change. of all of the people in technology, he is the one that is most likely to do something

like that. he has always been a maverick. >> you had steve wozniak in one of your crowds. >> he was the co-founder of apple. he still has a tremendous amount of stock. he told "the new york times" that he was changed and he would never be the same again. he wept after seeing the show. we met for dinner. he and i are determined to keep raising awareness under the conditions that devices are made. workers literally work themselves to death making these devices. it is not a giant robotic factory. thousands of humans, people, in many cases children make many