protect, and reward the most is exactly that teacher who take the kids from the most vulnerable homes, the ones where education has not been a focus and catches them up. hiring promotions, everything will now be based on performance and not seniority and not paper credentials. no parent must accept the assignment of their child to an ineffective teacher a second year in row without the option of moving them. we you are asking yourself, why would anybody send a child to school for a year, take the summer off, come back, and take a test. i was baffled by that as well.

someone informed me that it is because they are in that system. you teach a child in third grade. they are assigned to my fourth grade class. if the score is bad, we cannot figure out who taught them the previous year. we have moved that back. we now will be able to associate student outcomes with teacher assignment. we will now be grading all of our schools on a basis a through f. i hope this will become much more common. it is education speak and is impossible to tell what meant what. we took down a bookshelf full of

regulations. teacher certification, we had a change to this by administrative action. young people or aspiring teachers in indiana will no longer get a license with an education major. they will have to take a minor in education and will have to study the subject they hope to teach. if you want to teach my -- math, we got the idea that you may want to know some math. many ways stemming from the

contracts that the school board has signed with local teachers union. i will show you this in a minute. we need to create a method to intervene in chronically failing schools. most of what i have talked about so far is strongly supported by the obama administration. i salute to the president and secretary duncan. they are right about these things. this is a great example. 23 schools in indiana are feeling now for decades. it is impairing the lives of the young people assigned to them. we have a system for stepping in and bringing the leadership to bear. the elections from the spring to the fall, what is up with that? you want to know.

to dominate the outcome and elect a school board in a sparsely attended primary election -- we will have more on hand to take part in the elections and we will see if it makes a difference. school boards are often handicapped. here are some examples. i do not know if everyone can read them. i've asked that they would be available outside -- anybody that is interested. i have examples of real world provision. it ranges from what the humidity of the school should be or what color the teachers' lounge should be painted. it goes to more troublesome things like the principle can

only hold staff meetings once a month on mondays. the teacher will be required to attend more than a certain number of hours with students. perhaps the most concerning at the bottom of the slide in -- no teacher can be observed in the classroom by a principal without a conference in five days' notice. that is all over. this is a summary of that. this is a provision that has been in indiana law for quite a while. when a new contract cannot be agreed to, nothing can change without the permission of the union. that means nothing can change.

the contract can only get better or sweeter, never moved in the other direction. that has now been repealed. no contract beyond a two-year term -- a school board cannot commit itself to spending out in two years where it has no idea how much money they have. you may think these changes would have been welcomed by school boards where the table is so adversely tilted for a long time. not in all cases but most cases. we found a school boards were rushing to finalize contracts before the law was effective. we cut a lot of them off at the pass. here is an example, including a 10 year contract in the city of in a sense it has one of the los

feeling records that we have. it is very unfortunate. the third and fourth bills deal with options for families. we had already achieved something in indiana that we thought was an essential component of a system in which every family of what ever station in life or income level had a full range of choice that wealthy people had. that is what we had already become in the last few years. it means that any student in indiana or family can seek to enroll their child in a neighboring four different public school district without being charged tuition. it is happening. many students from the district this fall was found in

neighboring small towns. and a suburban schools. we have had a delightful citing of billboards and direct mail pieces from one public school district to in an adjacent one, bragging about test scores and touting better graduation rates. and welcoming additional students in the dollars that come with them. we have had a strong measure of choice available to every family. we had a regime that attempted to choke the charter schools, imprint in its cradle. we discriminated against charterers in many ways. they get fewer dollars per student at the front end. they had to wait six months for

money that the traditional public schools got a ride away. they had to scratch around for space. some districts had more than 20 vacant buildings having shrunk substantially. they had no conceivable use. they refuse to sell them to charter schools. it will not be made available. we will have more charter schools, because we have more of a risers' then we had before. it is including private universities. this would be a noble project for some of our many great private universities to give birth to a new education opportunity, somewhere in their vicinity. the fourth of these bills -- the

first state is universal private school choice. it is available in all places to all citizens. the lowest income by 60% of hoosier families will be eligible. 90% of the amount they spend at the top end of the range, 50%. this is enough money to enroll a child in any elementary or middle school that we are aware of. it is a significant part of a high school. -- the cost of a high school. as of this bill was finally

crafted, public schools will get a first shot everytime. the family will only be eligible if the child has spent two semesters in a public school. you may agree or disagree. i think it is a worthy inclusion into this piece of legislation. the public-school, if it delivers and succeeds, no one will see. neither will we incarcerate any families kids in a school that they do not believe is working, having tried it one full year. we see these bills as a mutually reinforcing whole. if one or more had failed, we would have been happy about the

ones that made it. it is extremely important that each element of this pass. we believe the collective bargaining reforms protect the teacher quality reforms from being undermined in a contract. the accountability provisions are applicable to the charter school and any non-government schools that except a voucher students as well. parents and potential parents will know whether the school is the littering or not. they will be held to the same standard, which we think is entirely appropriate. no non-governmental school has to enroll in this program or take part if they are bothered by any of this. i think almost all will and enthusiastically so.

this last element is going to attract the largest share of attention. in my own view, it is not likely to be a larger phenomenon in indiana. i think it would be exercised by meaningful but not an enormous number of our students. i could be wrong, but that is my guess. given what i believe will be a much improved credible and accountable public school system. in the lives of those families and children, whether it is 1 or 5% of all of our kids, it may mean everything. from a social justice aspect, it may be the right thing to do. to give the same range of possibilities to every family,

regardless. in terms of the benefits of competition, which has been sorely lacking in the monopoly of public education -- much of life is at the margins. even if it is 80% -- a few percent, it should spur the rest of the system to do a better job in delivering for our young people. a couple of other things before we go to questions. this is something that may be interesting. a new choice is many choose to accelerate their studies and to

complete their graduation requirements in 11 years instead of 12. we will give them the money that we were going to spend on a fun filled cruise through senior year. [laughter] we will give them that money as long as they invest it in post secondary education of some kind. it could be community college or vocational training. something that will assist them into a future and help them with a very expensive business of post secondary education. i got this idea from our high schools and discovering how common this is. going from there and thinking about the money we are spending. we put this on a survey given every year to every high school

senior and every eighth grader. we asked them if they had the choice, would they take it. 77% said they would. i hope it will make a material difference. we will be in structural balance for the next few years. over all we will be replenishing our reserves. not a lot of ad spending. we are making full day kindergarten available to every five year old. we believe in investment in education and have done as much

as we could. we believe reform has to go right with it. we know this problem would have been solved a long time ago. indiana is number one in america with a budget committed to kindergarten education. we did not let medicaid historically or recently explode and eat the budget. along with public safety, public education has been our top priority with the resources we did have. there are days you do not feel like getting up and going to school. i thought i would close this on a sharing on what it is like to do those things. maybe you agree with the changes we have been working on it in indiana.

maybe not. a person i said in presenting these ideas, advocates of change in education is accompanied with being misrepresented. our commitment to public schools, our our reverence for teachers, our determination to do better by them overtime, all is important. this is star wars, right? i am told that darth vader is not a bad guy compared it to me. [laughter] i have the top billing here. this has a little bit more whip to it.

two can play. i brought two little ads. we thought it was important, because it is misrepresented. we thought it is important to communicate with the general public and legislators and journalists. thank you maestro. >> it may be misleading. >> thousands of the most gifted teachers are held back because they lack seniority. our children suffer most.

" tell legislators to pass reforms to pay teachers for their excellent results not seniority. >> and gamble on school lotteries. every parent hopes to give their child a better future. the educational reforms gives the appearance that opportunity. tell legislations to pass a bill that gives every child a chance. >> i am happy to take your questions. we have had a phenomenon of

students getting homework assignments and a lot of notes sent home. some teachers week to the written questions from our state assessment test. i wish i had brought it so i could read it to you verbatim. if you could live anywhere in the country, where would you go? where would you go and why? i think it was meant to be more of a geography question. it was written by contractors who prepare our standardized tests. it was alleged to the we had jimmied up this question to infiltrate in the minds of our students that they ought to have private school choice. we had to pull out of that portion of the test and evaluate it.

success was ultimately hours. now a real test for us is the head, which is to implement these tools in the interest of our kids in our state's future. it is a great school, but not my first choice. we hope all of our schools will be a great one. thanks very much. [applause] >> if you are talking to other education and governors who wants to make -- who want to make a breakthrough policy was,

what is your advice in strategy? >> you are asking someone who tried and failed. any advice i have a for others is largely in learning from mistakes. everything should be from the stand point of the child. the debate i found is approached by too many people about the adults in the system. each reform is tested against the obvious and sometimes the overlooked criteria. it is always framed in that way.

you cannot affirm your commitment to public schools enough. 90% are in public schools today of indian kids. -- 90% of indiana kids are in public schools today. we are trying to make public schools better all the time. we talk about school improvement. reform means different things to different people. i do not have a magic answer. if i did, i would give this talk years ago. -- i would have given the stock years ago. >> i have a question about your senior year scholarship program. i wonder if a vocational training -- germany seems to have made a success of its engineering industry.

many are graduates from a vocational schools. can we learn from germany in that context? >> the answer is yes. i expect and hope that a lot of it would be used for vocational training other than four years schools. our community college in indiana is more than doubling over the last few years. it is probably the place where the scholarships are replied. >> i have a question for you. i appreciate your work. what is the parent trigger in indiana?

>> we got it. i do not think it was last minute. the question asked about is the opportunity for parents to petition. 51%, if the parents' petition, it can be converted to a traditional charter form. that was part of our package. and that one has not reached me yet. if it is picked up, it is made a less direct than we wanted. we argued for it. >> congratulations on your achievements.

some states are considering eliminating [unintelligible] what are your thoughts on that? >> tenure in the new system will be a function of a ratings that are highly effective. back-to-back ratings for a brand new teacher will give that teacher protection in the event of layoffs or shrinkage. the bill provides incumbent teachers a starting position. they can only keep it by turning, starting right away, highly effective ratings and maintaining them.

>> i want to change the subject. without telling us what you are going to do, can you explain why it is not too late for someone to get in that is not a celebrity or a billionaire? [laughter] >> the man says when i consider the opportunity, i marvel at my strength. [laughter] i do not know the answer to that. some people are very surprised.

it is not far too late. for whatever reason, it is not. unless you are a political professional or running a bed and breakfast in new hampshire, it is a darn good thing that will have a campaign measured in months and not years. i am not sure what gave rise to it. i said before and quite honestly, the idea of my becoming one of the aspirants is something of was not prepared to think about while we were working on this. i thought the the by april 29, the statutory end of a

recession, which could have been extended -- there was a walkout. it may have been necessary to extend the session. i would have done it to make sure these bills were voted for. i thought it may become too late somewhere down the line. for whatever reason, it appears not to be. i think it is a happy surprise. >> president obama and secretary duncan have been effective advocates to get states to lift the cap on charter schools and improve teacher quality aspects. they have also increased the amount of money spent at the federal level.

last august they bailed out the state. they had a highly effective about your bill here. can you speak about what the president in 2013 might to do with it comes to education reform on the federal level? >> i want to salute and commend the president, secretary duncan, for leadership in this area. secretary duncan came in indiana. we sat on a stage of a promising charter school. we took questions from the students and others. it was a great afternoon. we do not agree on everything. i understand that. we have an honest disagreement.

we -- there is probably more of a federal role. i believe in national standards. i believe we can choose our best way to get their. sometimes a high school track team, the coach may have a philosophy. we should be jumping at the same a bar. you know how hard it was to get there. republicans do not like national and democrats do not like standards. [laughter] the department led a process. they organize the process where the states are coming together. that is a positive thing. in terms of setting high aspirations and measurements,

sharing what works, there is an incredible explosion of spending. we do not need all of that. i do not object -- a onetime attempt, raced to the top program, which we were not successful competitors. one time you try to jar the system into motion. take enormous care out there. get them to move to some of these reforms. i thought it was not that bad of an idea. it blowing up some much over the last few years like the federal budget, a lot can be taken down. i think it is without injury at all to education change. >> can you expand on your

comments from monday on fox and friends in regards to osama bin laden capturing? and also what about the war in afghanistan and our terror related qualities. you said the struggle is not over. >> [unintelligible] [laughter] i do not know how much deeper i can go for you. as best i recall, it is a subject on everybody's mind. i affirm that this was a very significant achievement. it was very powerful from a symbolic stand point.

i think we all accept it is an important moment in what will be a continuing conflict in the responsibility of the government. it was well handled. >> the voucher for the senior in high school is very exciting. everyone has known it is a pretty productive year. [unintelligible] [laughter] we have had these courses where students could go off to college, but it has never worked. a voucher. what was the political dynamic?

>> i do not remember them being extremely active. as i heard about this idea, i think they were. i did not realize how many young people might get themselves in this position. i did not realize how much -- it is a very good idea to move people through quickly. there is nothing magic about 20 getting through. many people that i have read and listened to make a very strong case that for many young people, the best they can do is to move through quickly and get on to a

productive life. this idea is consistent with that mode of thought. >> thanks for the event. i did not get to ask my question. >> i am sorry, but the, you blow it. [laughter] go ahead. >> i heard you lowered the tax rate to 6%. would you go any further? illinois will not go bankrupt, because they just jacked up their taxes. would you consider lowering it to around 4%?

>> our central objective has been not to balance budgets, not even to improve education as an end point. that is to make our state the most promising place in the world and relocate businesses. we are working relentlessly. i can bore you to death to make sure indiana comes right at the top of everyone's list and to hire people to get a chance to get money back. we are trying to lower the corporate rate that is consistent with this.

it stuck out a little bit. we have the lowest property-tax as in america. we are interested in doing this. this is something that has national parallel. this was a revenue neutral but we found. -- endeavor. it is amazing what you discover talking to people. someone came up to me a year ago and said i'd do this for a living. why does indiana forgive exempt from taxation on other bonds? we are the only state that does this.

why do you want to subsidize californians and old people? that freed up enough money to drop the corporate rate for every business. we think that is pretty good trade. it is a state of enterprise, who, and opportunity. if you call on the person furthest from the microphone, you wind up answering fewer questions. it is an old trick. [laughter] >> i am a fellow graduate of your high school.

>> did it take you 12 years? [laughter] >> north central has one of the best vocational training programs in the career center. the post secondary education is probably not a possibility or a real perspective for a lot of people. are there any policies or education platforms that have successfully been passed? has any provision for increased vocational training for high school students that when they graduate they can enter as a productive member of the workforce? >> the answer is yes. we have rationalized a strange arrangements. it can be better integrated with

standard academic offerings. it is a very important points. as hard as we are working to raise the low percentage of adults with a post secondary degree, we recognize that for years of college is not right for everybody. more lives may be available with people with an important and scarce skills as opposed to simply pursuing a liberal arts education as we have known it. one more. how about the gentleman right there. >> what is the role of state and federal government for education? many speakers have spoken about how low the percentage of dollars invested in our and the education over the past.

you are hoping 90% of indiana residents will go to indiana schools. will the federal government play a larger role? >> that is a good question. i thought there was a meaningful role. we spoke about sharing what works. i can see that being important. we will never stop learning about learning. i would say death our shortcomings in education, indiana, and other places i have looked at -- as they do not traced to a shortage of dollars, i do not think they traced to a shortage of knowledge about what works.

we have known for a long time that teacher quality is as important as it is. we have known of that charter schools work. we know that more competition is helpful. at the time -- i continue to research those things at every level. i will speak for our 2% of america. we think we know enough to make a big improvements that our kids have deserved. we will build the best school system in america. our focus will be on making it happen. thanks very much. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

1] >> thanks for coming today. [unintelligible] >> next a senate hearing on afghanistan then a house hearing on security issues in europe and eurasia. after that, "q&a", with a former navy seal. tomorrow on "washington journal." a new report about the research center which finds many americans across the political spectrum have become more divided in their political views. juan zarate discusses al qaeda,

preventing future attacks on the u.s. and eight new york times business reporter looks at the 2008 financial crisis as a lack of prosecution of high-profile events. that is some o'clock a.m. eastern live on c-span. -- 7:00 a.m. eastern live on c- span. some say that president obama has not justified the spending and his goals in afghanistan and pakistan. witnesses at this hearing include council on foreign ablations president, a princeton professor, and a former u.s. ambassador to in a stand. this is two hours in 15 minutes.

anne-marie slaughter and ronald neumann. >> the hearing will come to order. thank you for joining us today. by events that we obviously have no way of predicting, the issues that are in front of this committee at this point in time, or even more compelling and more relevant than they would have been anyway. and they were relevant and compelling under any circumstance. we have been planning these hearing for some period of time. mostly because july represents that critical moment when the president will be making important decisions about our policy in afghanistan. but for all of the obvious reasons, this is a seminal moment as we deliberate about

our foreign policy and or national security interests. the death of osama bin laden is obviously an event of enormous consequence. his wealth, his iconic stature, gained by multiple murders and terrorists acts, going back to 1993 or so, his ability to plot, organize, direct, motivate, and recruit terrorists, all of those things made him a unique threat to our country and our allies. bin laden's death dealing an enormous blow to al qaeda's ability to operate. it doesn't end the threat, however, but still it is a major victory in the long campaign against terrorism waged by our intelligence agencies and our military. this event enhances america's

security and brings us closer to our objective of mismantling and destroying al qaeda. tragically, nothing can erase the bitter memories of september 11th, 2001. the haunting images has been forever sered in our minds. the twin towers burning, people jumping hand in hand to escape. the building collapsing, floor upon floor successively, on themselves in a cloud of dust and destruction. but we remember to the heroism of america's finist, the police, the firefighters, the emergency workers who gave their lives. these images and the realities that they meant and mean still today for nearly 3,000 families and for millions of people around the world will never be forgetten. for anyone who has challenged america's right to go after osama bin laden and there have

been some, let them remember and consider the shameless, cowardly attack out of nowhere that bin laden unleased on the innocence of all of those that suffered. and that he then laughed and bragged about. in the wake of world war ii, it's hard to believe that one man's evil aspirations could again so convulse the world. so occupy our resources and transform our lives. but he did. now thank god he is dead. that death needs to be a lesson to all that embrace violence and anarchy and the guys of religious rectitude. the united states means to do whatever they take to protect ourselves and meet out justice to those that wantedly murder and maim. bin laden is dead. but the fight against the

violence and hatred that he fermented is not over. in fact, there are many questions. many more than we might have thought raised as a consequence of the events of the last 48 hours. it is important for us and this committee to think through and find answers to these questions. one the reasons we're hear this morning is to examine how osama bin laden's death affects the conflict in afghanistan. and it's implications for our upcoming troop withdraw, our transition strategy, and our partnerships in the region. this hearing is the first of six in the next three weeks. it builds on the 14 hearings that we held in the last congress on afghanistan and pakistan. and we are fortunate to start with a well qualified panel of witnesses. dr. richard haass, president of

the council and foreign relations and friend of the committee. he held many senior government positions, including working, director, u.s. coordinator towards the policy and the future of afghanistan. he's join by one the professors that recently returned to princeton of woodrow wilson schools policy planning. rounding out the group is three time ambassador ronald neumann who currently serves with the president of the american academy of diplomacy. like his father in the 1960s, embassy neumann served as the envoy to afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and recently returned from trip there. we thank you all for coming. we look to a vigorous discussion. i would just say quickly before we begin, turn to my colleagues, senator lugar. as we know in two months, president obama will unvail his strategy for drawing down our forces so that afghans can

assume a greater responsibility for their country and their future. our military is making significant end roads. clearing the south, particularly, of insurgents. we are trying to regain some of the areas this spring. we also know insurgents are spreading into other areas in afghanistan, as we drive them from their bases in the south. clearly the challenge is not only on the battle field. despite the grill of our troops, the military and civilian leaders have repeated the mantra, there is no military victory to be had in afghanistan. that is true then we accept that it is, we need to fashion the political resolution. out of these hearings i hope that we can achieve a discussion

with our partners about how this war ends, what an acceptable end state looks like, and what steps we need to take to get there. with the death of bin laden, some people are sure to ask why don't we just pack up and leave afghanistan. so it's even more compelling that we examine carefully what is at stake, what goals are legitimate, and realistic, and what is our real security challenge and how do we achieve the interest of our country? what type of afghanistan do we plan to leave so that we may actually achieve those objectives? and how will that peace be achieved? our reentry graduation of thes, frankly, have had limited impact so far. reconciliation maybe more promising in the long run, but it will not be fast, and it is not a silver bullet. and there maybe no grand bargain

to be had with mollar omar. but one the questions that looming in front of us is how if at all the death of osama bin laden and the recent events affected the answers to those questions. some taliban appear to be willing to negotiate. there are different tiers of taliban. so the united states needs to send a strong and consistent message that we support a political solution led by afghans. it will be difficult as it was in iraq. but afghans themselves have to make the hard choices to bring stability to their own country. so as we debate the end state, it is inevitable that we need to factor in also what can we afford to do in light of our budget constraints and reality in the country.

we will spend $120 billion in afghanistan this fiscal year. and our decisions on resource allocations there affect our global posture elsewhere as we see today in the middle east with the crying challenge of egypt, tunisia, and other countries. we have to ask at every turn if our strategy in afghanistan is stainable. our military strategying need to support afghanistan as we draw down our forces. we have to consider the regional concepts. and what the presence there says about the vie license -- alliance and perspectives for peace. pang -- sanctuaries continue to

threaten the perspective for peace. we must address pakistani concerns about the what end state will look like. all of this will take patient, careful thinking, it will take strategic decision making, and it will take a lot of patience and determination. i am confident that we have the ability to achieve our goals and to get where we need to get to. i thank each of you for joining us this important moment. senator lugar, my pleasure to turn the floor to you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank you in welcoming the distinguished witnesses. i thank you for holding the series of hearings on afghanistan and pakistan the days ahead. these hearing are especially timely, as you pointed out, giving the killing of osama bin laden, americans are gratified by the skill and encourage demonstrated by our intelligence professionals and our troops. this is an important achievement

that yields both symbolic and practical value as we continue to fight terrorism globally. as a prelude to our series, i would offer four observations about the ongoing united states effort in afghanistan. first we are spending enormous resources on a single country. the president's budget request for fiscal year 2012 included more than $100 billion for afghanistan. we have approximately $100,000 american troops in afghanistan. and another 31,000 in the region that are supporting afghanistan operations. we spent $9.2 billion in 2010. we are spending more than $10 billion this year just to train afghan security forces. president obama has requested nearly $13 billion for training

in 2012. simultaneously we're spending roughly $5 billion per year on civilian assistance mechanisms in afghanistan, at a time when most foreign assistance projects worldwide are being substantially cut. second, the threat to the united states national security do emanate from within afghanistan's borders. they may be the most serious lets and afghanistan may not be the most likely source of an attack. last year, janet napolitano, and director of national terrorism center mike leiter said in testimony that yemen is a most likely source of an attack against the american interests in the short term. american sources devoted to

yemen had a tiny fraction. further we know that al qaeda has a for more significant presence in pakistan than afghanistan. the third and broad scope of the activities in afghanistan appearing to be devoted to remaking the economic, political, and security culture of that country. but we should know by now that such grand nation building ambitions in afghanistan are beyond our powers. this is not to say that we cannot make afghanistan more security than it is now, but the idea of a self-sufficient democratic nation that has no terrorists within it's borders and who's government is security from tribal competition on the threats is highly unlikely. the most recent report on progress towards stability in

fortune quote indicates that improvements in afghan governance and development had been inconclusive. all of the developments today to a counterinsurgency strategy led by general petraeus have yielded some gains in select areas. the prominent caveat within the defense department report and sprinkled across all of the statements by the obama administration as these gains are quote, fragile and reversible, end of quote. fourth, although alliance help in afghanistan is significant and appropriated, the heaviest burden will continue to fall on the united states. we have contributed $26.2 billion to the afghanistan national security forces from 2002 to 2011. while the rest of the world donating through the afghanistan national security correspondence has provided $2.6 billion.

some reason the united states has helped $2.8 billion, while the partners have provided $4.2 billion. we are carrying the share of economic and military burden in afghanistan. this is unlikely to change. alliance military activities with connection in the civil war further reduce the prospects in afghanistan. one accepting these as difficult to conclude that the vast expenditures represent the military and reasonable aspects. they are threatened in numerous locations. not just by terrorism, but by debt, economic competition,

energy and food prices, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and numerous other forces. some may argue that almost any expenditure or military sacrifice in afghanistan is justified. by the symbolism of that country's connection to the september 11 attacks. but nearly a decade later, al qaeda largely displaced from the country, but franchise and other locations, afghanistan does not carry it's strategic value that justifying 100,000 american troops and $100 billion per year, especially given cost restraints in the united states. president obama must be force coming on the definition of success in afghanistan. based on the united states vital interest and a sober analysis of what is possible to achieve clearly would not be in our national security interest to

have the taliban take over the government. or have afghanistan reestablish as a terrorist safe haven. the president has not offered a vision of what success in afghanistan could entail, or how progress towards success could be measured. the outcome in afghanistan when u.s. forces leave will be imperfect. but the president has not defined which imperfections will be tolerable. there has been much discussion of our counterinsurgency strategy and methods, but very little explanation of what metrics must be achieved before the country is considered secured. i noted in our last hearing on afghanistan in july 2010 that we must avoid defining success there according to relative progress. such definitions facilitate mission. arguably, we could make progress for decades on security, employment, good governments,

womens rights, other goals, expending billions of dollars each year without ever reaching a satisfying conclusion. a definition of success must be accompanied by a plan for focusing resources on specific goals. we need to eliminate activities that are not intensic to the corps, and need to know which missions are indispensable to success. i am hoping the hearings will bring greater focus to the strategy in afghanistan and the context of the vital interest. i look forward to the discussion. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator lugar. >> we're going to go in the

order of haass, slaughter, ambassador neumann. as customary, we're happy to put your entire testimony in the record. if read in full, we'd appreciate to have a chance to have a good dialogue. i failed to mention i will be going to afghanistan not this week, be the other after. and hope to be able to get a good take on president karzai and others on how that will affect their calculations as we go forward. mr. haass, welcome. dr. haass, i should say. honorable. >> thank you, senator.

thank you. thanks for having me back here to discuss afghanistan and as has been the case whenever i testify here over the years, my statement and testimony reflect my personal views and not those of the council on foreign relations. as you all know, much of the debate about afghanistan has focused on whether u.s. policy is likely to succeed with success losely defined as bringing about an afghan government that in several years time can hold off of the taliban with only a modest amount of ongoing american help. in theory least, several more years of intense u.s. military effort will provide the time and space required to train the afghan army and police and weaken the taliban so that the taliban will no longer constitute an overwhelming threat or decide to negotiate to end the conflict. let me say as directly as i can, i am deeply and profoundly skeptical the policy will work,

given the nature of afghanistan and in particular, the weakness of the central institutions and the reality that pakistan will continue to provide a sanctuary for the taliban. yes, u.s. forces are succeed at clearing and holding. but successful building by the end of 2014 is at best taliban. some will give up. most will not. afghanistan and military police forces will increase a number and improve in performance, but not as much as is needed. the bigger question that i'd like to talk about though is whether it is worth -- what we are doing is worth it even if we were to succeed. i would argue not. afghanistan over the years has evolved from a war of necessity into a war of choice. our interests there have become less than vital with the near elimination of al qaeda in afghanistan. afghanistan no longer represents the significant global terrorists threat, and certainly

no more than several other countries, most notably pakistan in the region. secondly, there were and are other policy options available to us, in particular, more narrow and limited terrorist strategy, coupled with a limited agree of nation or capacity building. the situation in afghanistan did not and does not warrant our becoming a protagonist in the civil war, the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy, or the tripling of u.s. force levels to 100,000. afghanistan is not a major terrorists haven, as i said, and it should not be assumed it will become one, even if the taliban make end roads. it was and is an error to equate taliban return with al qaeda's return. if there is some renewed terrorist presence in afghanistan, we can and should respond to much as we do in

yemen and somalia. the afghan pakistan is at the heart of the policy. there's no way i would argue the united states will be able to persuade pakistan to become a full partner and stop providing the sanctuary, given islamabad's obsession with india and it's view of afghanistan as a critical source of strategic depth in it's having -- in it's struggle with india. even the solution to the kashmir solution would not change. there's no solution for kashmir in the time frame that would prove relevant. it's taking more resources of every sort than it warrants. $120 billion annual price tag, one out of every six or seven dollars the country now spends on defense is unjustifiable given the budget crisis that we face and the need for air and naval modernization.

the history of the 21st century is far more likely to be determined in the land areas of borders of asia and pacific than it is on the planes and mountains of afghanistan. we need to be better prepared for a number of future counterterrorist interventions elsewhere in the greater middle east and africa. we could also make sure we have adequate resources on the korean peninsula and iran. it's a strategic distraction. sure and simple. all of this is not an argument. but it is an argument for doing considerably less than we are doing by transitioning rapidly over the next year or year and a half to a relatively small, sustainable, strategically warranted deployment, one i would estimate to been the scale of 10,000 to 25,000 troops. the future troops should allow for continued terrorists, along

the lines just carried out by u.s. special forces in afghanistan, and some training of afghan forces in both the national and local level. reductions of the scale and the phasing out have a number of advantages, beginning with the fact that would save up to $75 billion a year, and hundreds of american lives and casualties. continuing what we are doing on the scale that we are doing will not necessarily achieve more than what is being suggested by what i am advocating, given afghanistan's history, leadership, demography, culture, geography, and neighborhood. even if substantial progress could be achieved, there's nothing to suggest the gains would be endure, strategy is about balancing means and ends, and the time has become to restore strategic perspective to what the united states does in afghanistan. let me if i can turn to a few

minutes briefly to discussing pakistan. pakistan is more important than afghanistan, given it's population, it's arsenal of nuclear weapons, the presence of large numbers of terrorists on it's territory, and the reality that what happens in pakistan will directly affect india. there is the view in the administration and beyond that the united states has to do a lot to stabilize afghanistan. less it become a staging ground for groups that would undermine pakistan. but it is pakistan that is providing the sanctuary and support to the afghan taliban who are the greatest threat to afghanistan's stability. so why the united states should be more concerned than pakistanis that afghanistan could one day endanger pakistan is not clear. it also exaggerating afghanistan's actual and potential influence over developments in pakistan. to be sure, pakistan is a weak

state. but this weakness results far more from internal divisions and poor governance than anything else. if pakistan ever fails, it less be because of insurgents coming across the border than from decay within. it is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship than one between washington and islamabad. it's about to become more complicated yet. pakistan is at most a limited partner. it is not an ally, and at times it is not even a partner. the united states should be generous in providing aide to pakistan only -- only so long as the aid is made conditional. we must accept no matter what the level of aid, there will always be differents to how the americans and afghanis see the world. let me suggest a guide to the u.s. policy. we should cooperate where and

when we can, and act independently where and when we must. in the recent successful operation that killed osama bin laden is a case in point. let me turn to the last set of questions. diplomacy. the growing interest and three particular ideas gaining currency. one is negotiations involving the government of afghanistan and taliban. second, negotiations involving india and pakistan, and directing the regional form. in the interest of time for now, let me just say i am quite skeptical about the possibility for diplomacy resolving the internal questions in afghanistan. i am even more kept call of the potential of diplomacy to resolve the differences between india and pakistan. but i do think there is reason to proceed with some sort of a regional form along the lines of the old six plus two forum that

actually did contribute somewhat. in this context, i would also endorse talks in the united states and those willing to engage. direct communication between the united states and taliban would be preferable to allowing even pakistan or the afghans government to act as our go between. i therefore support the decision of the secretary of state to develop the decisions in talking to the taliban. but the taliban need to understand that we will attack them if they associate with terrorists. and they will favor participation if they end with violence. whatever it is they do or don't do in pakistan or afghanistan, there is unlikely to be a rosy future for afghanistan any time soon. the most likely future of the

next two years is some form of a messy stalemate. the afghanistan characterized by a mix of the government, strong local officials, and a taliban presence supported out of pakistan that will be extensive in must of the pashtun south and east of afghanistan. resolution by either military or diplomatic means is unlikely and continue constitute as a basis. walking away from afghanistan is not the answer. the country should scale back what we are doing and what we seek to accomplish. and aim for an afghanistan that is simply good enough in light of local realities, limited interest, and the broad range of domestic and global challenges now facing the united states. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, dr. haass. very comprehensive and i think appropriately provocative and

thoughtful as always. we look forward to following up. dr. slaughter. by the way, welcome back. i don't know if you know it, dr. slaughter was an intern here in 1979. by persistence, but we welcome you back. you've come a long way. [inaudible remarks] >> thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. i want to start with three different and dramatic images that frame the story of afghanistan today. first think about our troops posted on remote and often barren outposts in the valleys and mountains working under fiercely difficult conditions to defeat and drive out the taliban. in the after math of osama bin laden's death yesterday, a

former paratrooper wrote of his deployment, our job was to build a sustainable nation in a mad wasteland. we did our duty. the second image is of the extraordinary operation carried out by the highly skilled and trained team of navy seals against osama bin laden's compound. they succeeded in a accomplishing a key part of the mission that our troops are in afghanistan to do, to destroy, integrate al qaeda. but that success did not follow from state building operations in afghanistan. indeed, it didn't even take place in afghanistan. but in pakistan. the third image is of young arabs in tunisia, e -- egypt, libya, and taking bullets to speak freely, and participate in

deciding how they will be governed and hold their government accountable for the provisions of basic services and the possibility of a better life. the determination of those protesters in their millions to demand far more, even in desperately poor and hidden countries is exactly the attitude of responsibility and self-reliance that we hope to see among the people of afghanistan, but too often do not. indeed, many reports from the field describe a culture of dependence, corruption, and inflated expectations. as we rephrase, it's worth bearing those three images in mind, the things that connect them and the disjunctures between them. we seek a secure, stable, and self-reliant afghanistan that does not provide sanctuary for al qaeda, and that is a crossroads for increasingly

prosperous and secure region. i disagree that afghanistan is a strategic distraction. it's a strategic distraction only under the next attack. moreover, we can't think about afghanistan separate from india and pakistan and the broader region which is an extremely important region going forward. a secure afghanistan means a country with low levels of violence that is defended and policed by it's own local, regional, and national forces. that means not only an end to open conflict between government and insurgents, but also the basic kind of everyday safety that allows citizens to go to work and send their children to school. establishing that kind of security in afghanistan requires not only building up afghan police and military forces, but also and crucially, creating the kinds of incentives for them to risk their lives for the sake of protecting their own people. it also means removing u.s.

troops as focal points and targets for taliban attacks. attacks that end up alienating the very villagers that our soldiers seek to protect and win over. it assumes that if we protect and serve the population of a village, they have incentives to give the information that we need to protect ourselves and drive out the enemy. in some cases for some periods of time, it's proved true. but it's a strategy that assumes the troops providing protection are there to stay for as long as it takes to erase the possibility of retaliation by the enemy that's been informed against. as long as villagers know we are going to leave some day as they will, and as long as they lack faith in our own government to protect themselves, the instincts will tell them to keep quiet. their incentives are to go with the winner, not to make us the winner.

moreover, the only real long term security flows from competent and honest government. whether in a village in afghanistan or city neighborhoods in the united states. real security in afghanistan can come only if the central government has the incentive to choose and keep capable and honest local, regional officials or a new constitution that allows for the election of those officials and mechanisms for cities to hold them directly accountable. so the key question going forward is how to align the afghan governments incentives with serving the interest of its people at every level. many different strategies has been tried, but if we are embarking on a public transition from this period forward, we can make clear from now on, we will be investing in winners. our development dollars, civilian assistance, and military advicing and support will flow to those villages, towns, cities, and providences that desperate the ability.

when the competent is faced, we will shift resources elsewhere. the message at every turn must be that we have a strong interest in seeing afghans succeed in securing and rebuilding their country, but not so strong it means we will do it in their stead. security is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. we also need stability. stability meaning previctimmability. real stability as chairman kerry started cannot be won by military force. it requires a settlement accepted by all sides to create a long term political equilibrium. the sooner we begin, the better. david milliband in a speech argued that political settlement is not part of the counter insurgency. it's the overarching framework in which it fits and operates.

he recommends that western countries in afghanistan set out a unified and strong vision addressing the security situation, possible amendments to or interpretations of the afghan constitution, basic human rights, and best model of governance for afghanistan. such a vision would provide a diplomatic benchmark against which all negotiating parties can begin to adjust their positions. i can see value in such a course, but my purpose today is not to outline a specific diplomatic strategy. however we get negotiations on a political settlement under way, however, there's a great advantage to actually beginning the political end game, rather than continually complimenting it. and that it will force multiple players to reveal their true preferences about what they will and will not accept. only with a sense of real red lines on all sides can a lasting deal be constructed. the death of osama bin laden

creating a new opportunity to begin those associations. the united states is already made clear that his death is not the end of the war in afghanistan. but we should now mark this moment as the beginning of the end. as a moment that allows us to pivot toward a comprehensive political settlement that will bring security and stability to afghanistan and greater security to pakistan while still allowing the u.s. to take whatever measures are necessary to protect ourselves against al qaeda. that settlement has to be durable and consistent enough with the basic rights and interest of all afghan citizens, sufficient to allow all countries, regional and international institutions, corporations, citizens to invest in afghanistan's economic and social capitol. the architects must pay equal protection -- equal attention to provisions that will provide a foundation for afghanistan's economic future for trade and investment, rather than foreign assistance. let me turn to that economic

vision. the last thing that we seek is a self-reliant afghanistan. u.n. officials, ngo officials, people with long experience in afghanistan often point out that it is impossible to build a capacity of a foreign government when the inflated salaries offer by our government, other governments, ngos, international institutions, drain local talent from local institutions. when afghan engineers make more as advisors to translators, it is small wonder that local and national government bureaucracies fall short. moreover, large sums of aid without accountability and being distributed too fast contribute to growing eruption. moving forward in afghanistan, we must be aware of the own inflationary footprint and the expectations of the afghan people. it is worth exploring how governments and other

organizations would confirm to local conditions and pay scales as many of the soldiers often do. at the same time, we need to focus on experts markets on farmers and entrepreneurs, and socially as well as economically profitable ways to exploit the minimal sector. the recent agreement by pakistan and india's commerce secretaries to improve trade ties across a wide range of sectors and newfound confidence in businessman that they can compete are signs after willingness to make aspirations of regional markets a reality. afghanistan's rich mineral resources are already attracting large scale investment. with china the winning bidder for a $3 billion to exploit the largest copper mine. the agreement commits china to build a power plant that could provide electric to most of kabul and build afghanistan's first railroad which will run to

the chinese providence. afghanistan also has a new outlet to the see. thanks to 135 road conducted by india, connecting the iranian port. afghanistan is increasingly pose to resume his historic and very lucrative position as trader cross roads of central and south asia. again, where as afghanistan itself may seem strategically less significant, afghanistan, pakistan, india, and the rest of central asia are absolutely essential for the u.s. and i would argue for the world going forward. the question for the united states is how a regional diplomatic agreement that would help address pakistan's chronic security concerns as the same time as it would engage key regional players in underwriting long term peace and stability in afghanistan can help build the faux foundations of regional economic and integration.

before i conclude, it's worth pausing for a moment to think about what this debate is not about. it's not about finger pointing for past mistakes. it's not about the performance of our troops which has often, superb. it's not about where the fight has been worth it. we have an overwhelming reason to ensure that afghanistan cannot again offer sanctuary to al qaeda and the fighting has brought us to the point where al qaeda is degraded. it's not about whether c.o.i.n. is right or wrong as a theory of how to fight, or if afghanistan can be governed. it's about getting where we are now and where we want to be. secure, self-reliant afghanistan. it means seizing the opportunity afforded by the death of osama bin laden to orchestration

negotiations within afghanistan and broader regional economic and security agreement. in the meantime as the end game beginning, we must move as rapidly as possible to supporting only the afghan sources and officials who take responsibility for their own security and development. that was after all the central premise of how we distributed funds under the marshal perhaps. in the end, it's a matter of aligning incentives. our military must work side by side with the development and diplomatic that focusing on building incentives for all of the relevant players, afghans, urban populations, afghan troops, pakistani government, the afghan and possible the pakistani taliban, india, china, russia, turkey, and others to act in ways that would advance the interest in ultimate goals. it's the job for the diplomat more than the military and development experts. it may seem like an impossible

job. the sooner we begin it, the higher the chances of success. thank you. >> thank you very much, dr. slaughter. ambassador neumann. >> thank you very much for inviting me to appear here. about a month after my last trip to afghanistan. i found that security has improved in some areas, as everyone is noting, heavy fighting is ahead of us. it took a long time to get in place the military and civilian forces decided on in 2009. longer than many had hoped, although many of those hopes were not very realistic. i think that lag between decision and action is now distorting the discussion of where we are. i believe that the thing to watch is what happens next year. if u.s. forces can transfer some of the difficult areas to afghans and the afghans can hold them, then transition will begin

to have credibility. if not, the strategy will lose all credibility. i believe the forthcoming operations are much more important than the speculative kind of conclusions that people are dashing to at the moment. the killing of osama bin laden is significant but the war is not over. we've all agreed on that and i won't talk about that. you asked in your letter how policy choices have affected the current dynamic. i would say that security is improving and politics are a mess. afghanistan does suffer from a weak government with much corruption. these problems are large, they are not unique to the area. however, our actions have made many of these problems worse. stride in public criticism was taken by many afghanistans as evidence that the u.s. was turning against karzai, since through ignorance, the u.s. has employed many corrupt warlords

has contractors it has created the suspicious question why should i fire your crooks if you won't fire yours? our goal of destroying al qaeda remaining important. but it is not clear to afghans what it means for our longer term policy toward afghanistan. when i was there, i heard the same point from karzai, from his opponents, afghans not even in politics saying what does the u.s. want? what does it intend? the result of this has both immediate and longer term consequences. for president karzai, i believe he has developed a strong suspicious that we are either against him, or we will leave before afghanistan has the strength to survive. he has intensified a survival strategy seeking to build a network of military and political supporters that will

sustain him if we build out. he will tolerate poor performance. clearly many of the problems of poor governance in afghanistan are afghans problems. however, i am emphasizing our own responsibility. because that is the piece of the issue in which we can work on and fix. i think we have not paid enough attention to it. four, afghans generally result in the pursuit of hedging strategies. i am on here. because my time is not -- you are going to tell me i'm out of time and my clock is not ticking. afghans are pursuing hedging strategies because of this confusion. many fear the return of the taliban either because of the withdraw or through a political deal. some nonpashtuns would fight. some are thinking about how to position themselves if the taliban returns and are even considering a civil war. i heard more talk about thinking about a civil war than i'd ever

heard before. this hedging as much as corruption is getting in the way of resisting the insurgency. you asked what we need to achieve. we need to clarify our long-term intentions to prevent the return of terrorism, we need to build afghan security forces capable of carrying on the level of fighting required as we pull out. the substantial that i am referring to is not impossible. but it does entire dynamic leaders, as well as support capacities that are only now being developed because we didn't choose to begin that until recently. this is a process of several years. difficult areas must be turned over to afghan lead and i think that process need to start. needs to start while u.s. forces are thinned out, the afghans need to be given some opportunity to lead even to fail before we simply are out the door. there is a big difference between some of us, obviously,

although some of the difference between, for instance, myself and my very respected colleague dr. haass is about the speed at which one tries to turnover. i think the question is an incredibly serious one. i think that we are behind what many people hoped would be the time schedule, but that we are right on the cusp of beginning to turnovers areas in the south within the next six to 12 months. if we cannot do that, then i think strategy is a failure. but rushing away just as we are getting to that point would also, i think, be a great mistake. the afghan central government must control it's more recapacious local leaders. this is very difficult to do after warfare. i think we are spending too much and some of our economic programs fueling a culture of dependency and corruption that does not them good since we

cannot sustain it. having said that, i understand that afghans, not we, have to work out acceptable political constitutions. you asked about broader policy considerations. two that i support are regional solution, and negotiation. but on the understanding that neither provides a fast way out. there exists a long and instructive history of negotiations to end such conflicts and every one of them took years while fighting continued to expect less in afghanistan is unrealistic. nor is it clear the taliban leadership seeks compromise. i believe that president karzai needs to know that he has solid u.s. backing to achieve a good agreement, not a fast one. i do not believe that separate parallel u.s. negotiations will do more than create confusion and counterbidding between different parties. i believe our role in negotiations can reassure other afghans their essential freedoms

will be protected. something is destabilizing now. afghanistan had a long period of peace when it's neighbors essentially left it alone. we need to focus on recreating this. understanding that such a situation requires that the neighbors realize that they cannot achieve their maximum desires. it is not clear to me that pakistan recognizing that. a regional solution that many speak about requires an afghan government capable of preserving internal order. if many afghan parties contend for power, they will draw in foreign support, leading to the rapid destruction of any neutrality agreement. let me just very briefly as i close note three point that is i've expanded on in my written testimony. i think that the effort in afghanistan is essential to our goals in pakistan. i do not think they can be treated as alternatives because of the way that pakistan looks upon afghanistan.

if we are leaving pakistan security issues strategic analysis of pakistan -- of afghanistan is extraordinarily different from whether we have commitment. so that i think it is increasingly important to approach pakistan with the linkage in mind. i think there is a grave dependence and danger of obsessive dependence on local security forces. i have lived with a number of those situations. there are some things that can work. most of them are abysmal failures. i don't think that alternative strategy, it depends on the resources if our approach to afghanistan is counterterrorism what we say to the afghan is all we bring you is endless years of slaughter. there's nothing in that approach which will produce afghan

support for us in their policy. if we are not there at least in part to build the country, there's nothing that attracting afghans. i understand the gravity of our deficit. however, i understand also as i believe you do that the united states does not have the luxury of pursuing only one interest at a time. i believe that in the effort to turn over to afghan forces, we can bring down our financial burden to an acceptable level. i also believe that the alternative is to grab at some patch work strategy that will cost us far more in the long run and i'm pleased to answer your questions. thank you very much for including me. >> well, thank you very much. all of you, you've really helped frame this debate appropriately, and it's an important one and there are just a huge number of questions that leap out of this. as i listen to you, i mean each of you make assertions that on

their face if you just take the free standing sentence sounds reasonable. they need to work out this relationship with that, or they need to be able to have some stability or prosperity or this or that. in the end, getting to each one is con as a rule luted or expensive. let my try to figure this out. ambassador neumann, you can't counterterrorism is not an alternative to a broader strategy. and you say that we can afford to do this over a long period of time. let me try to measure that against dr. haass' sort of proposal here and see if i can get the two of you maybe engaged in this.

why is -- what is our basic goal? what's the strategic interest to the united states? what are we trying to protect here? what is in our national security interest with respect to afghanistan per se? ambassador neumann? >> thank you, sir. i have very modest goals myself. having struggled with this problem. i think we need an afghan army that can carry on the level of fighting that is likely to go on for a long time in afghanistan. something we agree, we're not going to get peace quickly. i believe we need a government that has a modest amount of support so that it can hold us together. >> how much american support do you envision being there having to sustain the afghan army? >> i see us with a declining slope. i don't want to put myselfs in the shoes of general petraeus or military commander, i think that

would be obsessive. i think over the next year, what one would hope to see in the south would be the transfer out whether to other places or out of the president's decision of most of the combat brigades while those which are partners with the afghan army probably have to state, it's basically the model that we had in iraq. >> what sort of -- can you give me a ballpark figure. i'm not asking general petraeus, who won't be general petraeus in a little while over at the cia. talk about that, we are 150,000 now. >> i hate to put figures on it. i hate to think i know enough. over a three year slope the number probably should come down by more than half, perhaps considerably more than happen. i do not know how much additional trainers -- training

forces one is going to have to retain. : >> i think my answer begins by disputing the premise on which

he began the question, sir. i think you see a considerable linkage of al qaeda there you see more foreign fighters in the east that the linkages are much more fundamentalist as others coming in to the battlefield. if -- >> let me stop you there so it can get a response from the authors. basically all i am saying to you is i think first of all that separation is not correct. second, if you have a civil war going on in afghanistan, you will see the linkage intensified because talks katella dinallo -- tel dan will lead the reinforcement. you think the united states needs to be there to engage in a preventative civil war ie or engage in the civil war status? is that were that takes us? >> [inaudible] >> i disagree profoundly with what i just heard so let me make

clear what i believe our u.s. policy needs to be and why. the goal should be to make sure that afghanistan is not a major platform of terrorist attacks against the united states and the world. that is a role. our goal is not to let the afghan government or have a certain level of u.s. troops. it is the potential means of realizing that goal. i do not think we should do it with what i would call counterterrorism only but i do think that should be a more central part of our policy. it should be a degree of local capacity building. there should be a degree of local diplomacy. >> how is that distinguish from building police >> the question is one of balance and one of scale and emphasis. i think that we should have a counterterrorism policy that is the dominant one. we should try to build up local capacity but we should be realistic about what it is we are trying to build up.

we are never going to accomplish some of the goals i have heard here and we should save money. if we can save $75 billion in year, which i believe is the scale of savings we would get from the kind of policy and talking about, that is one-fourth of the fiscal savings everybody suggests we need on a slow but $300 billion a year. we would get 25% of what we need through this policy alone. it is an extraordinary bit of progress and i believe we can get it without affecting the prospects for what our goal is in afghanistan, which is to make sure that it's not a major platform for terrorist attacks against the united states. >> let me stop you there because i want to get dhaka in now as well. there is a clear difference and we need to explore it very carefully. dr. haas thinks it does say that

again, preventing -- afghanistan being a platform for terrorism. you have said that our goal is a stable and prosperous afghanistan. now a stable and prosperous afghanistan is somewhat nebulous, but does it really take that to protect the interest of the united states? >> i actually agree with richard the the ultimate goal, the reason we are there is absolutely to present a afghanistan from being a platform from tourists who can attack the united states. our difference is how you can accomplish that goal. i don't you can accomplish it without a political settlement that longer-term produces a measure of security, a measure of stability and self-reliance. the problem with the strategy richard articulated is that is the strategy we've tried. we did that for three to four years koppel, after we in the day to the to afghanistan, and the result was the taliban came

surging back. we didn't want to be in afghanistan fighting the kind counterinsurgency strategy we are now what we proceed that that strategy had failed. the issue now is precisely how we can prevent the taliban from taking over in such a way we are not going to people to negotiate with the taliban and have them not fight al qaeda unless we have a political settlement. >> we need to dig into this a little bit more and we will fly colleagues. my time is expired on this round. so senator lugar, and we will see where we wind up. >> the committee will be in recess until we can restore order. folks, this committee has a good tradition of exploring these issues in a very open and faeroe and unbiased way, and i respect,

i think it through the nose this, everybody's right to the point of view and to make that known and you can choose your form, but it would really be helpful if we could ask people to respect this process and to allow these proceedings to continue without manifestation, interruption from a demonstration or otherwise. i think every member, and i think people trying to explore these issues would respect and appreciate that. senator lugar? >> dr. haass, following through on senator kerry's questions, if i remember correctly, you recommended troop presence, u.s. troop presence kirker gradually diminished and 12 to 18 months, and you indicated this group

which supports an anti-terrorism and afghanistan. to wash out in my imagination currently our strategy apparently and our operations are very comprehensive and afghanistan is now a huge country but is a large one, very diverse situation. where would we place the ten or 25,000 or how would you concede the operations day-by-day? >> i would say three things. one is what i would do a lot less of just to be clear. it is combat operations against the taliban. i would dramatically reduce and phase out the plan mentioned. second in terms of anti-terrorism mission, that

seems to me a tactical decision quite honestly, senator. you probably want to have some sort of to pool forces and then a distributor where you thought you are most likely to face. when the intelligence suggested you were going to meet terrorists which again are quite a few in the numbers. the training mission and is a question of where it could be logistically best carried out with afghans either at bases or in the field some of the best training as you know doesn't take place on the bases but takes place actually outside on the field box, of koza this implementation decision and the big question is one of division of labor phasing out, operations limiting us to buy the we not just national forces. i will also believe the united states should be training selective forces. we shouldn't put all their eggs if you will in kabul to run the

police and the army. >> it's conceivable that if we had people skilled in anti-terrorism on the ground so the original thought of why we are in afghanistan may be because the attack came from afghanistan we would be helpful with good intelligence to bury all those who might be contemplating other attacks on us, i suppose. now second, it would be helpful obviously if the government and the military of afghanistan were fairly stable, but this is a limited training situation at that point of the few people, rather than a comprehensive 100, 200, 300,000 people which is mentioned presently. and when that is mentioned, of course, in our questions to the witnesses, they're rarely is the mention of who pays for all this and for how many years. those talking indefinitely in

the future contemplates a huge budget which isn't part of the picture all because there is in the local income situation but let me take to the taliban. if in fact taliban continue to be around come and as dr. slaughter said in a free or for your period of time going back and there were problems, this is certainly not satisfying to us who would like to see people in a space society without all of this the same time the history of the country has been one with others in which it hasn't been very peaceful and space. is it conceivable that the taliban are always going to be around? and as a result, our strategy is based upon a eradicating the country of the taliban that is far fetched in terms of

imagination. if not the taliban, some other group that says we will provide order, justice, so forth, as opposed to what is the wing on presently. and in the absence of the central government to get out and administer the situation isn't it likely there's going to be a great deal of local government around afghanistan for a long time? saw one of the interesting things about your strategy is given the fact that there's going to be very unsatisfying the governor situation we at least have boots on the ground to ferret out potential terrorists who might attack us or others in the world as a rationale for being there at all? absent that, it isn't clear altogether while we, are there all. in other words, we are not in of the other countries that have terrorists, al qaeda, al-shabaab , all the rest.

somehow they get a free pass. we visit afghanistan in the total defense budget. initially your ideas are appealing panamax am i understanding of this clearly running counter to where we have been heading in and in the budget debate that we are having presently. and even in your strategy of 28 knorr 12 for 18 months of getting their this is still going to be an expensive process, something moving people are getting some of the organization going. i would just add finally that our confidence in president karzai has its close unless we are really prepared to present an alternative you would be the president of the country, they will be a lot, they're physically has always been how we eradicate that is hardly clear at all and i think we really need to sharpen our

objectives. this isn't an incentive system it is an exercise in the reality of afghanistan. the history of the place and what is possible in terms of our own security. what do you say to all that, dr. slaughter? >> thank you, senator lugar. i would say the first thing is that richard and on and i think maybe ambassador neumann, at least richard and i agree that fighting the taliban is not why we, are there. the reason we are there is exactly to prevent terrorist attacks on the united states. the question is with the successful means for that. when we try the counterterrorism strategy we couldn't get the intelligence that we needed to be able to actually actively effectively attack al qaeda. we got osama bin laden because we got intelligence. we couldn't get the intelligence because taliban were terrifying the villagers said they can't

give us that intelligence so we move from the kind of strategy that richard advocates to the full counterinsurgency strategy where we will get the intelligence by clearing, holding and building and getting the confidence of the villagers. i do not think that can work over the long term. so the difference is i am advocating a political settlement that actually gets enough stability. this is not going to be some rosy vision of afghanistan, but enough civility so that in fact afghan forces have the incentive to fight the taliban themselves and we have, and this is credible, the ability to stay in the country and get the intelligence we need. so it is a strategy of how you remain in the country sufficient to get the intelligence you need to do what we both agree which is long term to ensure that al qaeda cannot come back and use afghanistan as a platform. >> in terms of its intelligence there is no evidence of intelligence that osama bin

laden has any relationship to whether the taliban are fighting anybody and so forth and some intelligence methods. my point is that if you have some people on the ground, maybe we already knew that there was an encampment of al qaeda that was about to attack us. but most of the writing about the period of time indicates we were not particularly diligent or on that track. books written about the subject indicate many administrations still believe that iraq was the problem and we hardly spend any time at all thinking about afghanistan at that time. i suppose my hope is that if we are talking about any troops being there the would be of a limited number and able to say there is a big camp going out there, don't need a great deal of intelligence to find it. it's got people in there that are bad actors and maybe we do something about that can't as

opposed to every village in afghanistan. >> i was involved in the policy as you know after 9/11 and the united states could get some more training and so forth. i'm not advocating a counterterrorism only strategy. there is a place for the limited degree of training but there's a fundamental difference if we expect to build up in afghanistan be it for training efforts, aid efforts, diplomatic efforts the of what is going to be robust and the major partner. it's not going to happen. and all intellectual honesty of the we have to assume if we adopt something like i am suggesting but even if we don't we're going to face a future in afghanistan with a conservative pashtuns in the south and the east are going to dominate and whether you technically called intimate and more conservative pasterns, that's what it's going to be like. and to me, the challenge for the american foreign policy is not to prevent that from happening.

that is impossible to prevent. i would suggest given the nature of afghanistan. we ought to try to break the historical link between the television and groups like al qaeda. and i believe that that is a link that can be broken. indeed, there's enough statements on the record from people in the telegram suggesting one should not equate the two. our military leadership has made such comments and that's the reason that i fever have been diplomacy. i do not think our long-term goal here as much as perhaps we would like it would be to create the sort of attractive afghanistan by all sorts of human rights and economics and other measures we but like to see. i simply think that is beyond our capacity. what we have to do is accept the fact that there's going to be the conservative pashtu in order monroe of the country and preventing that cannot be the basis of the american foreign policy in the country. even modest goals and

afghanistan are ambitious, but ambitious goals in afghanistan i think are out of the question. >> that's the strong man, no one is arguing for some kind of perfect afghanistan that respects human rights. we are seeing the same thing. use a diplomacy for the political settlement that would indeed negotiate with the taliban to pull them away from al qaeda to create a government that could actually governed with the taliban, with others, the pasterns, tajiks that we could decrease over footprint but still stay at least to the extent we need to to protect of interest. >> can i join as well? to things. first, dr. haass's notion which has always he expresses brilliantly is attractive, that there are elements of a maros. the notion of going down in 18 months to the levels of forces, it's taken us the better part of two years to get in place the

adequacy of trainers we have now. from this notion that he can put it on a diamond with our large forces is not true. if the numbers are grossly underpaid any kind of serious that is real effort. so this is a recipe for failure. you build a afghan forces, throw them out after two months without it pfizer's, without backup as green troops and watch them fall apart and then get to the problem of the policy as a failure. it makes no sense to me. second, there's a relationship between the negotiations and fighting. if the image that we convey with the afghans is that we are about to bailout, the army is going to fall apart because we are not backing it, the advisers are few, there's not a lot of incentive for anybody on the other side to negotiate seriously. so if you -- there's a difference between saying you will accept a pashtuns role --

what is the incentive for them to negotiate now? are the negotiating now? no. is there any indication about him to negotiate? >> i would have to say that the top leader should level, i'm skeptical. you've heard that from all of us. but if part of what we are seeing is you want negotiations, then to say also that you will essentially move quickly away from the military i think polls against the notion you can have a successful negotiation. i'm dubious you can have it but that's part of your policy that recognizes as the former israeli prime minister said had to fight as there were no negotiations and negotiate is there a were no fighting. if you lose that i think you lose the ability. >> i think i need to recognize the largest pot on the table the question we have gotten to yet and there's a lot more to explore here and sort of focus

on the mission. what if you had a sufficient force in terms of counterterrorism that also made it clear the taliban will not take over the country? now if that is a stated capacity with much less engagement and involvement there's an incentive to negotiate and you haven't pulled the rug out from anybody. so we need to come back and think about other pieces how you might fit this. >> mr. chairman, thank you. i appreciate you arranging this hearing. this seems important hearing among many we have and i am grateful. it is repetition to get our points across i want to focus on the nature of this hearing in the sense we talk about an end game would be to focus on the description of an end game, and i use as a predicate to my question a visit that i had to

iraq in the summer of 2007 at the time was about iraq obviously and was a dinner meeting, a small group of people including general petraeus and ambassador crocker and now that they're both still engaged, maybe the question would be relevant again. but what i was complaining to both of them about as representatives of the bush administration is the way that then president bush described the in the game or the goal and sometimes his a administration. and i was complaining about it. i said win and lose as the wrong way to talk about it in large richmond, victory and defeat, the usual language that we use i thought was inappropriate and frankly misleading. that was my complete. the ambassador crocker of the time said that his -- the language he tended to use if not all the time most of the time as it relates to iraq was sustainable stability, to words. i think the american people need

to hear from a lot more of us a basic description of what our goal is in afghanistan, not in a page or volume, but literally in a sentence or two so we can focus on the goal. if we were sitting in the same meeting today in kabul or anywhere, you were sitting there and i asked you the same question, what's the best way to describe it, and what is the best outcome than you could articulate in a sentence or even the phrase, just ask to all free of our panelists? >> dr. haass? >> the sentence to use in my testimony was that in a stalemate, afghanistan turd caused by a weak central government, strong local officials and a television presence the extensive and much of the south and east.

i would include in that a small u.s. presence, and that, to me, it doesn't sound that difference by the way we have now been a fall delete a small u.s. footprint and my view is that is probably about as good as things will get and that is also good enough. >> you say that is achievable and acceptable? >> yes, sir. >> dr. slaughter? >> i said a secure, stable self-reliance, meaning much lower levels of the violence, stable meaning predictable and stable enough so you can actually invest some economic activity can regenerate and self-reliant where the afghans are taking the lion's share of responsibility for their safety. i think in terms of getting there we are not that far apart. it does mean over time, and i agree with ambassador neumann in terms of moving from training, from actively fighting to end fighting so we want to actually give these forces a chance, but a means a small where u.s. footprint, in my view it will

also require an overarching political settlement in afghanistan and the larger regional agreement at the same time to actually get us there. but the one sentence is secure, stable and self-reliance. as the mcginn bus neumann? >> i enjoy your comment because one of the problems we have right now is the united states to send a clear expression whether it is an expression any of us come up with we desperately need it not only for the american people clearly but your responsibility but we are not projecting to anyone in afghanistan the clarity of purpose right now. and that is enormously important and debilitating. i don't have perfect words in my head but i think that chairman kerry has put his hand durand kuran one key part that the taliban can't win, that isn't

the same as stability, but knowing that we will persevere to that extent, whether it is counterterrorism, other things, whether it's u.s. forest, there's a lot of issues in their but knowing the taliban cannot win is a central piece of pakistani thinking, afghan thinking about what they can or can't dig deep could count on and one of the things we need to get that. afghanistan has a chance to rebuild i'm dubious about using stability because it's hard to achieve for all the issues we disagree on akaka it's hard to get their. we have support to stability in that sense raising their hands. they can still messed this up with everything we are capable of doing.

i would say taliban cannot win although tax when they can re-enter the causing of sustainability that afghans can make their own decisions that isn't yet at the bumper sticker kind of level that one needs for the americans the afghans but those are the two key pieces. as you get into islamabad twice and plan to go back this year and obviously the world has changed so dramatically. and like a lot of members of congress and like americans a series of questions to ask as it relates to who knew what, when and the details of that. >> if you could sit down with pakistani leader's right now in light of what has happened over the last 40 hours of so, and

media i will leave this is a question for the record as a time that if you could help us formulate some of those questions the would be helpful for those of a struggling but i have to say when i was there in 08 and even more so in 2009 there was a sense of the end of the relationship and especially on intelligence sharing is getting better soil for from our people that is encouraging that at best maybe this is compounded what too optimistic that a very mixed record in light of what just happened a very poor record. so, if you could help us formulate those questions and the better articulate them, there would be great and i will put that in the record for questioning but think you. >> think all of you for your testimony. i think as it relates to what's happening today on the ground in afghanistan i think general petraeus and others have asked

they be allowed to see through this fighting seat and then i think most people in this body are willing to let them go through the fighting season in present and so i think we are not really talking about something eminent today but i ask this question, we had libya and other things on our mind to all three of you briefly. would you all agree that what we are doing in afghanistan is not a model for the future? i mean, i think it's a simple yes or no. islamic first, yes i agree it's not a model. second, if i had to do a fifth war, and i have been and four, i would like the dynamic effective leadership on our side. >> so this is not something we can do country after country after country.

everybody agrees this is not a sustainable model, is that agreed? >> [inaudible] i do agree we cannot be engaged in country after country with this degree of responsibility for both security and building the basic institutions. i do not think that is a model that works going forward. hot >> senator corker i would expect you think is yes as well at biggs the question why is the model for afghanistan? and i would simply suggest it should not be and cannot be for any longer. >> one of the things i'm not as much as an expert as you all are on relations i've learned it's easy to enter but difficult to leave the reasons for being in a place continue to ebal. but let me just ask so, we keep talking about safe havens and i'm confused even as to what a safe haven is. we saw recently where by the

pakistan neighborhoods can be a safe haven. so what is it about afghanistan, especially to dr. slaughter and mr. neumann that makes it more of a safe haven than the other places that we might consider having 100,000 troops. >> i think we have to go back to where we were before if the taliban either control and enormous part of afghanistan on the challenge or eventually to take over the government again, and effectively, you have the ability of al qaeda and other terrorist groups to move freely back-and-forth from pakistan if the pakistanis the more serious they get the move over to afghanistan. so, you know, we have to remember where we came from. and indeed, i don't think we would have been able to actually get osama bin laden had we not driven him out of where he was in the taliban, put in afghanistan, put him on the run.

we finally drew intelligence from all over the place but we can't think of that leaving the that area alone and leaving afghanistan possibly still open to a government that would be completely willing to host al qaeda and other terrorist networks isn't a threat to us that's where people are getting trained and attacks are getting mounted. we have to have a government in afghanistan that doesn't host al qaeda. >> i'm confused because i know you said i think we shouldn't fight the taliban. we aren't fighting the taliban. we basically are fighting criminality in afghanistan on the daily basis people are locking up in presence and most cases, not extremists, we visit one presence there are 13 or 1400 presidents or mabey eda the would-be capital to the taliban. most of what we're fighting as criminality and i hear you and

dr. neumann saying to the very different things. i'm confused. you say we shouldn't fight the taliban, and he says we should be fighting the taliban. it's very confusing to me with two of you are saying. >> so we fought the taliban initially because the taliban and afghanistan and they were -- the hosted al qaeda. >> the taliban today. >> that's right, taliban today have a major resurgence is once again and we are degrading and now but it was once again in the position to either rule a large part of afghanistan or take back over the government. we pushed them back to the extent they should not ruled afghanistan and in that sense i agree with ambassador neumann they shouldn't rule afghanistan. how we are going to get there we can continue to fight them loom. i don't think that is a strategy to be successful, or we can get there by negotiating with them

in such a way to allow a political settlement there part of the government and as richard said there are many different types of television. if they will no longer host al qaeda. to senator kerry's question, i think the death of osama bin laden gives us an open to try again to see how much they are willing to negotiate. there are many different impacts of the death and we should take that as an opportunity so i suggest we stop fighting them and cut a deal that allows a more stable government in afghanistan the will not openly host al qaeda. >> probably easier said than done. i would agree with that. i just want to read a quote from segregates of the recent and, being able to turn security over to the afghan forces against a degraded taliban is our ticket out of afghanistan.

it is numbers of other questions i would have liked to have asked but i think the one thing the west on the american people on the ground in afghanistan is how much we are investing in this country and what we are investing in. and i think we have to start a huge lead their expectations, much about the culture with the vast amount of money that is coming in. let me just ask the two of you if you agree the secretary gates, and should we very abruptly changed the dynamic of the civilian investment that we have ongoing in afghanistan and really focus more on the degraded taliban come and a quick exit out of their once we feel we have accomplished that after the fighting season. >> i agree with secretary gates. i think a lot of what we are disagreeing on the panel is an issue of how fast can do that without boiling it by trying to go too fast.

second i do think we are overspending on the economic side. i think we are fuelling too many bad tendencies and paying people to do things they ought to do themselves. there's a fair amount of tension between the military spending and you need to look i think at recommending both served and aid. there is rapid spending for the short term results that are not sustainable, and i don't think they are as essential. in careful about the cuts but i think we are overspending them. i do think security -- amine put it this way. the afghan army doesn't actually have to win the war. it has to be capable of not losing it. that changes the negotiating

dynamic that changes the security situation. i do think it is our way out. what i'm saying no is i think this process needs to be looked at very hard so that we do not destroy whatever chances we have created for success by suddenly moving out much too quickly. there's a long record of how we get to this. we've had a lot of experience in afghanistan and iraq recently so we should be very careful not to jump to totally politically inspired time tables of numbers and speed of recognizing that he will never have as much time as any general or investor would like. >> thank you for your testimony

i hope we do look at civilian spending and i agree that it's happening on both through the military and through our state department. and hopefully that's something since all three of you have very different views but all three of you agree on the fact we are spending too much money on the civilian side. >> we are spending it in ways that are problematic but overall we want to pull done a military spending and very carefully monitored spending on the civilian side i think can work but we are putting too much and at one time. islamic thank you very much, senator corker. cementer menendez. >> thank you mr. chairman. i look at $10 billion a month as a cost of our counterinsurgency effort. i look at long military

contributions to afghan reconstruction and development from 2002 to 2010 almost $23 billion expected to increase obviously as we see a transition to the civilian mission and i say to myself even if we are willing to meet the enormous economic commitment to build a democracy and to find the necessary security elements of the cost of tens of billions of dollars per year what's the likelihood of our success? it seems to me the government is corrupt, our working relationship is strained to say the least, our focus on building security forces is challenged because it's largely excludes the pashtu the base of the taliban is there an amount of money or plan that can work. >> i would say no, i would say

explicit, our policy won't work, and it's not worth that even if it did work. i would say given the skill of the challenges we face a crimber of our fiscal situation i cannot find a strategic rationale for what we're taking on the civilian side of afghanistan even if it were to work and again i think it is a negligible chance, senator which only increases the questions that i believe need to be raised without the direction in the scale of u.s. foreign policy. >> i don't think we are trying to build a democracy in afghanistan as the end. once again, the goal is to insure that there's not a government in afghanistan that hosts al qaeda and other terrorist networks that they can freely planned and executed

attack against the united states, that's why we went in, that's where we succeeded africa clearly on the took over on of the ball, but the taliban started coming back. of the color and were to take over tomorrow, they would once again host al qaeda. they wouldn't be able to actually be in the country to be able to get the intelligence to be able to do what we need to do. our focus still has to be a government in afghanistan that doesn't host al qaeda and is in the tv to buy the town of him. with that we can in fact get through with a secure, stable and increasingly self-reliant afghanistan rather than doing it to try to build the country from the ground up we need to do it politically, diplomatically, keeping our forces there and a larger regional summit, every other country in that region has an absolute stake in the civil government.

>> i think we can do this in a couple of years. we consider the political negotiations immediately and the peaceful transition does depend on how well the afton forces perform the increasingly there's evidence some are performing well and we complete and an advisory. we shouldn't be fighting the battle for them. >> there's a fundamental disagreement. this administration several years ago decided in the words of the president to take the war to fight the taliban and the south and east of the country to the scope of the was an incorrect decision and then and i continue to believe it is an incorrect decision now. i do not believe we should simply assume that the taliban can takeover. i don't think they can. i think there's way too much pushback particularly in the north and west of afghanistan to really do think however they are likely no matter what we do to make inroads in the south and east but i wouldn't assume for a second that the taliban and

those equate into al qaeda return. it is a testable proposition. there's lots of evidence to suggest the taliban board in do it but that's the reason that we should talk to them and if they were ever to do it that is the reason that we should attack but i'd do believe we shouldn't be as the u.s. policy on that to me truly the unproven assumption. i would say one other thing begole as articulating of a quote on quote self-reliance afghanistan is a reasonable goal it will take several years that is an open-ended commitment for the united states military and economically and i do not believe again that that is a strategically defended given the cost and given the opportunity costs, given all else we need to worry about in the world and given all else we need to worry about here at home >> with the fall with this as the chairman will give you more time. i'm happy to have but i want to

get one more question before my time expires. original the vice presidential biden was supposedly reports said he favored it more limited mission for afghanistan designed solely to interrupt al qaeda in afghanistan and pakistan in that approach obviously envisions a smaller presence and advocates of this approach a serve the government of afghanistan is not a fully legitimate partner panel because of widespread government corruption, counterterrorism strategy relying heavily on the special operations forces to track and kill selected middle level insurgent commanders which had previously been shown to be effective and could be used to attack al qaeda and taliban sanctuaries in pakistan would be a better approach. what are your views on the approach as an alternate, and what's the argument this respect

to the question if you don't believe that approach, what is the argument for the broad counter insurgency strategy than a targeted more limited counterterrorism strategy to revive always thought we should have the counterterrorism strategy and i've been supportive of the attrition so give me why one over the other -- >> nobody is -- no one said you don't want that piece in the strategy. >> with at least the press which was completely fair to the vice president portrayed as a counterterrorism strategy is i believe that is a strategy which first of all requires a lot of on the ground presence to make

it work. >> more than we have now? >> not more than we have but what i believe you get if you have a strategy reduced to that of focused on doing anything with and for afghanistan is a strategy that invariably turns afghans increasingly against us to the point that strategy fails as a sole strategy and if that purpose has nothing to do with the purpose of afghans who have to live in their country the middle of an oral and anything that gets us out becomes an improvement. so, if you really want to create the xenophobia reaction to the farmers fighting our enemies and doing nothing for a chemist and i don't think we have to be in the total build a democracy. but it is a quick -- if you deal only in extremes and with the kind of extreme the press at

least portrayed the vice president as having a very small u.s. forces i think it becomes a complete failure. i do have a serious difference for how much strategic interest we have here. my feeling is we will get if we have something that can be defined as a loss. first we have a huge propaganda victory for people who consider they are more with us and intend to continue that war. i don't know how you measure the consequences but i've never heard of one side with in the middle of war successfully. second, i think in the context of the civil war in afghanistan, something much larger than the fighting in the south huge role in pakistan and iran and to end with and instability that royals all of central asia. i suppose we should turn our back on it.

in that kind of situation, fear of india might lead to the pakistanis to a much stronger support for the radicals that they would be unlikely to be with their own radicalism and that also leads to greater instability in pakistan. i find this a really frightening prospect and won the scarcely enough that i would stick with things albeit looking for ways to spend less which i think we can do over a year or to cutting the trip members but i think we have to try to turn over to afghans at a reasonable pace. that hasn't been tried. we are only now arriving at the point we start trying it. we ought to see how it works. >> thank you mr. chairman. there are several things in which motivate my thinking on this. first is a sense of history. afghanistan has been a graveyard

of empires, nations that have come to the country in an effort to suppress and reform it in a long history of failure. second, this is the longest war in american history and there's no end in sight. when investor neumann says we would be guilty of quitting in the middle of a war can anybody say with honesty we are in the middle of this war? i'm not sure they can. third is the fact the road to kabul was paved with good intentions. when you look of a corrupt regime running this country, when you look at ten to $12 billion monthly payment by american taxpayers much of which is being wasted and sadly portions of which are being diverted to fund our enemy you have to ask yourselves how long can we sustain this? mr. haass, i read your testimony by this kind of cheering you on until lagat to the last paragraph and i have to ask about it because here's what he

said. resolution of the ongoing conflict by either military or diplomatic means is highly unlikely and that realistic basis for the policy, walking away from afghanistan it's not the answer i want to ask about that. if this is money and clearly spending and wasting it is very hard to justify but it's about a lot more. if you believe resolution of the conflict by military means is highly unlikely and not a realistic basis for the u.s. policy, how can we send more and more american soldiers to fight and die in afghanistan? >> is a good and a fair question. i do not believe that u.s. interests to the extent of the ackley in afghanistan require a resolution of the conflict. that's good news because we aren't going to get a resolution of the conflict. but we can maintain, protect ourselves and protect record interests, the core interested in is afghanistan ought not to

be a launching pad for terrorist attacks against us or the world. we can do that i believe with a degree of counterterrorism presence and activities and a degree of limited focused treating the afghan national troops. i believe we can protect our core interest with a modest investment. so i am trying and to come up with not the proverbial little course, but it's actually closer to one in the end of the other point to believe the answer is withdraw. >> so those of us that face this boat, face to votes on iraq and afghanistan, 23 of us voted against the invasion of iraq and i continue to believe that was the right vote. i voted for the invasion of afghanistan and i've been voted for it to go after al qaeda for what they did to us on the 9/11 and to find it necessary to kill osama bin laden. now here we are, almost ten years later. and i have to tell you, if he would have asked me whether i

was signing up for the longest war in american history, which has no end in sight even after the killing of osama bin laden, i would have to seriously say that wasn't the bargain. that isn't what i thought i was voting for. now the question that i have is this. if our goal and afghanistan as dr. slaughter said and i think you just said is to prevent terrorist attacks on the united states, why are we limiting this to afghanistan? aren't there other countries in the middle east but also harboring terrorists, which until on the united states? are in their countries in africa? so, why have we drawn the line here and say we will stay as long as necessary to reach a good enough solution in afghanistan? >> it is actually the same approach that i will suggest to the other countries. what i'm trying to do, it must be a drafting problem and i wasn't clear. i am trying to scale down dramatically the u.s. involvement and investment in

afghanistan, much more akin to what we have been doing in other countries like yemen and somalia. i want the emphasis to be on counterterrorism, a degree of training but i agree with you i don't believe coming up with something senator corker said before you are right, this is not a template that sustainable i don't believe it is a template of to be sustained in afghanistan. the war you signed for and i think you the right to vote for signing it in afghanistan after 9/11 was a limited war. this has now more often to something more. we have basically about ourselves to be protagonists missile war. we need to dalia licht back again to the more limited mission which is the one that you i believe correctly signed up for and that limited mission is both affordable and in the interest of the united states. i do not believe the expanded mission that the united states has allowed was off to be drawn into as either affordable or justifiable or defends the core

vital national security. >> and is calling on us to send our fighting men and women to fight and die? >> absolutely. i agree. >> so we are now in a very sterile conversation about diplomacy and foreign policy. the reality is the question is how long will we keep sending them? >> senator, i think the answer is that there is a -- the united states has a vital national interest to make sure that afghanistan doesn't become again and doesn't continue, similar to other countries a place where terrorists can act with impunity. that's something i believe because it is a vital national interest our armed forces would gladly be involved in. again, the problem in afghanistan as we have allowed the mission to grow. we have a classic objectives and that is something that i believe is not the international interest of the united states.

>> dr. slaughter? >> we are not disagreeing about the endgame. i.t. we all agree that we need to draw down the troops substantially. the president agrees. where i would differ with richard is we tried a limited counterterrorism strategy that when you voted originally we drove the taliban out very fast and moved to the limit and counterterrorism strategy. after three or four years we turned around and the taliban were deeply resurgent. we didn't choose to be part of a civil war. we realize we were at risk of losing all the gains we made. we had to go back in with a counter insurgency strategy. >> is it not true? and they tell us we could gather all of the known al qaeda at al qaeda and afghanistan in this room yet we are spending ten or $12 billion a month in a war with the taliban which i've asked this basic question can we achieve what we want to achieve in afghanistan without defeating

the allin? >> we can achieve that if we have a stable government in afghanistan that includes part of the taliban and that doesn't post al qaeda. if we can get an agreement where the taliban can meet certain basic conditions the can be part of the government and they do not host al qaeda than our interests are served. >> we are in the position we've pushback our troops and the have succeeded in pushing back enough but we are now in a strong enough position to enter the negotiations will not be the karzai government. it will be a coalition government with a set of conditions allow us to dramatically pulled down our forces. but we have had to push back for counter insurgency because of what we lost through the pure counterterrorism strategy and we need to move to the political face. >> i couldn't agree more.

>> i recognize, let me follow quickly. dr. slaughter, use of the goal would be the government has the taliban why couldn't we have a government fighting for its own definition and sort of have an ongoing still meet? it's the struggle, and while we are aligned with a that a government that's fighting it we have an arrangement where we have a platform doing counterterrorism making sure they are not harboring any terrorists, and we also can guarantee they are not going to be able to take over. why do we have to go to the next year? >> we have a stalemate of the kind that you're describing, richard speed is describing when

we have 130,000 u.s. and allied troops. right now if we were to pull them out we would have a karzai government sort of defending its interest i think you would see the major tel dan advances. >> nobody has said pull out. they sit reduce. islamic if you can hand over to the afghan forces and we maintain an advisory role that will continue all the wood isn't as strong as the government that actually has at least some taliban as part of it so that there is in fact some kind of settlement. >> i think the model that you're suggesting is much more realistic. but we are going to be able to negotiate the afghans themselves will be a will to negotiate broadbased government with the discrete power sharing arrangement seems to be highly optimistic and it's perfectly acceptable but particularly the

local list tradition of afghanistan, the central government that isn't necessarily representative. and call them what you will have considerable influence again in the south and east of the country and if they are able to abide by certain redlines we live with i do not believe it is essential we have a national contract or government is unified or self-reliant or anything else. indeed, to try to jam the taliban participation on the thai sheikhs and uzbeks and others. i would say within only failed but would probably be counterproductive. >> you are recognized, senator shaheen. we will come back. -- before, mr. chairman. i think it is fitting as i'm sure people have said already that we are having this discussion today, two days after osama bin laden has been killed. after all, as you all point out it was his masterminding the attack on the world trade center

and the united states that got us into this war so as we think about what the endgame here is is what impact would the death of osama bin laden have, in game obviously is a huge national security and military and intelligence triumph but what will the real impact be if any on the taliban we are operating in afghanistan and does it have any impact on our allies as we look ahead. >> i believe the only way it has a significant impact would be if it leads to pakistan is to seriously reconsider their continual provision of a century to the taliban. if this leads to any conversation between the united states and washington and islamabad to a material change

in pakistani policy than i think it will have major repercussions but as long as pakistan is able to play the role that it's played for all these years and provide sanctuary for the afghan taliban, not only does it mean that osama bin laden's death will not have a material impact on the future of afghanistan, but will the essentially have the sort of self literally did -- salutary effect you and i would like to see more broadly. ..

>> it is at least worth exploring. it also creates political space for us with president hamid karzai in the sense that he often says, well, we are going to stay because we are there for our interests more than we are for his. this is now a moment where we can say, as we are hearing all over the place, although obviously it is a symbolic death, it is a very important symbol, and it gives us a chance to pitch. so that may give us more leverage as president car's side. we should seize that moment and explore. we will not be worse off. we may be substantially better off. >> do you have anything to add to that? >> basically agree. i am much more dubious that it is a moment for negotiations. i have nothing against exploring them, but i'd think the

description of a possible kind of instinct was more realistic. for one thing, there have been a great many negotiations over 30 years in afghanistan. almost all of them have fallen apart. most of them, which are power-sharing agreements have not worked. i think we need to get out of the american mind set that agreement in this things. look at negotiations historic fleet, at least in afghanistan much more like the agreements of middle ages and renaissance europe. they last until one side is strong enough to break them and go with them. so while negotiations are relevant, pinning a lot of hope on them were thinking that because you into page you have something, i am pretty dubious. i do agree on your question specifically. this is a place to push pakistan, but recognize that we have interests in common and probably have interests that oppose. one of the, perhaps, think that

we need to clarify most is what the interests are that we have that we will sustain. the confusion and the doubt of pakistan, afghanistan, regional players about us is enormously debilitating in this struggle because we are such a huge player. enemies, friends, and those that are neither take position in part based on where they think we are. when they don't know, they invent the answer and go from that reasoning. >> well, we will have a hearing on thursday to talk about pakistan, so that will be an opportunity to explore that a little further. i want to go back to the discussion that senator durbin was having earlier, and i am having trouble, i guess, trying to distinguish between that in the game that you are describing which sounds to me very much

like what we have been doing in afghanistan from the time we went in and removed the taliban until we increased our forces. so i wonder if you could just describe in further detail how that is different so i can understand the distinctions that you are making. >> what i'm suggesting is different in two ways. it's different and where we are trying to get to and how we get there. my goal is not a democratic afghanistan. although i would like to see it, it is not an afghanistan that is in total peace. it is not a unified, strong, national government. what i am looking for is simply in afghanistan that has a minimal level of functionality where above all it is not a place where al qaeda or groups like it act with impunity. and the way i believe we achieve that, of very modest goal.

the way i would try to achieve that is through a heavy infinite -- emphasis, not the sole emphasis, but an emphasis on u.s. counter-terrorism capabilities with a degree of training up afghan police and army forces both nationally and locally. a degree of diplomacy, particularly 1-on-1 with the taliban to try to draw red lines with them and also to try to have some sort of a regional forum. i would dramatically decrease u.s. troop levels. right now roughly 100,000i would reduce by three-quarters or more. quite quickly. >> can you just talk about what you are describing as different than what we are doing? >> sure. >> it does not sound that different to me. >> it sounds quite different to me, and maybe i'm not articulating well. what the big difference is, the current u.s. policy is --

>> i'm not talking about current u.s. policy. i am trying to see if i can understand the distinction you are making between what we should be doing now and what we are doing and how that is different from what we did when we initially went into afghanistan and continue to do until the buildup after president obama was elected and began to increase troop size and trainers. because i don't -- i'm not understanding the distinction you are making. >> okay. i apologize. i did not understand your question. in the original policy after al qaeda was the government was ousted was a fairly narrow counter-terrorism policy. it did not involve significant turning up of afghan police or army forces at either the national or local level. now the afghan national army and police is probably more than 300,000. essentially we have done all that, particularly in the last couple years, plus there was not

a real diplomatic dimension to be allowed the six plus two form to go into disuse. the united states did not try to test the taliban as to whether they had changed their ways when it came to association with al qaeda. so essentially those are the differences. but we did, also, the big difference, but we started doing and i would into doing is bringing to an end combat operations against the taliban. starting to a half years ago the united states made the policy decision that it would henceforth target that tall banned militarily. that was the principal rationale for the military increases taken in 2009 as well as the subsequent surge. i believe that was ill-advised, and i want to go back to the face before that where the united states no longer targets the taliban militarily. on the assumption that television presence is one and the same as al qaeda return.

i think that is incorrect, and i do not believe the united states can or should conduct policy in afghanistan based on that. i would remove that component. >> can i jump in? the desire of our policy was not to fight the taliban. at -- the desire was to push them back from the gains that they had made when we were following the narrow counterterrorism strategy. also to convince the afghans that we were there not just tough fight terrorism, but because we had their interests at heart as well. we -- if we had negotiated with the taliban two years ago or tried to negotiate, we would be in a very different position. i think the way we understand this is that we push back enough so we are now in a position to negotiate with the television with the red line. maybe we can do that without the

afghan government. to senator kerrey's point, it is still a sovereign country. difficult to be negotiating with the enemy of the government independently of the government, but i would say we try a comprehensive settlement. if we can't get that we negotiate in other ways. we had to push back on the taliban so that we would then be in a position to negotiate the kind of solution you are talking about. we are not there to fight the taliban for the sake of fighting the taliban. >> we obviously have a disagreement. i do not believe we have had to because i am not trying to get the taliban to become great citizens participating in the political life. i have one simple, that they do not reestablished the sort of relationship they had with out -- al qaeda. i don't believe we had to of militarily go to war. i believe we had the option of attacking the taliban directly, plus i believe the taliban based upon statements they have made and that have been reported back, they themselves have come to question their deep

association with foreigners which is what al qaeda is to them, but i think we have to accept the matter what happens in afghanistan at some point the south and the east of afghanistan is going to be dominated by postern political leaders which will be extraordinary conservative in behavior. what you call them technically taliban are not, there will be unattractive to each ticket -- features in terms of society. i think that is inevitable whether we have 100,000 american troops for five more years and six or seven more years. that will happen in any event. that is the future. at some point we have to be willing to carry out a foreign policy that accepts a degree of local realities and limits. one of the problems with our policy in afghanistan is when we get too ambitious and to build respect, i believe, and of local culture and traditions and realities we are committing ourselves to an expensive policy that will not have an enduring benefit in any way that is

commensurate with the military for human or economic investment we are making. >> could i say one thing? >> i will yield back to you. i am perfectly happy to let you pursue and close out the hearing. i have a 1259 need to go to, but i just want to weigh in before i go. this is very -- let me say first of all, the complexity of this and the difficulties of reaching an adequate definition and understanding what you are underlying premise is is obvious , it's complicated, not easy. we have a bad habit. i want to pick up on what was just said. we have a habit of throwing out this idea of negotiating. we throw out this idea of achieving sufficient stability and this and that. but in the end could diplomacy

and its failure, which is conflict and war, is usually based on people's perception about their interests. and it is one thing for us to sit here and talk about, you know, we are going to try and do this or that. here is our perception, but i find it very often not adequately based on and in the realities of the culture that we are in the midst of for their interests and the way that they see themselves playing out here. you know, most afghans don't want to see that taliban return. that is a reality. i don't think enough of our discussion is taking that reality into account here. you know, poll after poll shows that that taliban to not have widespread support. they are not seeing to represent afghans or even postion interest in national basis.

yet the current approach to negotiations, which we are putting on the table here, appears to be almost counterproductive in terms of some of our interest because it alienate some of the ethnic groups that don't feel represented. so you have postions who feel excluded by the negotiations. you have minority tajiks, uzbeks, and others vehemently against any kind of deal, and they still remember the atrocities of the 90's. you have afghan women who fear they are going to pay a very heavy price for peace as the prospect of any of these negotiations. a civil society members are strongly opposed to a taliban return. it seems to me we ought to be able to factor those realities into where things may flow with less troops and with the afghans having -- sort of being forced to resolve these things for

themselves with us there with a continuing capacity in terms of this question of incentive, what is happening in the incentive it signals we are sending. i don't see us saying we are abandoning or we are not going to be there to represent our interests also and work with them to go through that process. also even to prevent the taliban from making any kind of enormous significant gain. i might add that regionally there is a lot of anxiety about the taliban and coming back to power in any way. you have russia, central asian republic, saudi arabia, india with varied degrees of and to -- antipathy in this seems to me that we could work more of a rel effort to try to deal with some of that reality than we have. a number of people have suggested there may be options with the stands and russia and other parties, including, i might add, iran that we have not

adequately explored or put on the table. iran does not like the taliban. iran also does not like drug-trafficking. it seems to me there are legitimate interests here that ought to be explored in other ways as we go forward. so the pakistan piece of this is obviously critical. there are a lot of questions about that phrase in the wake of the events of the last hours, but i do think that we are going to have a hearing on that. i'd just summarize by saying that i think we really have to do more work. that is the purpose of these hearings, to hone in on what the realities are that we are dealing with and what the possibilities are. we could spend a lot of money for a long time, and i tend to agree. i don't see a lot of indicators

that is going to significantly change the dynamic on the ground. i think what is ultimately going to change it is afghans themselves feeling they have a state with a sense of what the long-term power broker structure is going to be. at think it could be significantly less prominently american and significantly less expensive. that is what we have to really examine here very carefully as we go forward. so i know this is worth a lot more discussion, which is why we will have five more hearings, including having the secretary of defense and secretary of state come in toward the end and share their views with the administration. we will leave the record open for one week for colleagues to be able to submit questions in writing and even to follow up on some of those questions that have been placed the date. i am extremely grateful. i think that three of you have

very effectively helped to frame the complexity and the realities of this debate. it is a good shaking, if you will, for our discussions as we go forward. i think you very much, and it has been profitable and helpful. if you would close out the hearing, i'd appreciate it. i apologize. do you want to ask a couple questions? now? we will then have the record available for any submission of additional questions. with that we stand adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> up next, a house hearing on europe in eurasia. dan "q&a." and it will be followed by "washington journal". [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] 1] there will be live coverage today of the tea party activists on the debt ceiling on c-span2. >> weekdays watch a live coverage of the house.

supreme court oral arguments. on the weekends, see ever signature interview program. on saturday, the "communicator's." on sunday, "newsmakers", "q&a", "prime minister's questions." you can find this on never be a library on c-span.org. >> the state department's counter-terrorism unit said the death of osama bin laden does not in the u.s. efforts to stop al qaeda. the threat to america and its allies are not over. this portion is just under one hour.

bergen is the chair. >> i want to apologize. i think some of our democrat colleagues found out we were getting early today and i t >> the purpose of today's hearing is that there are security issues in asia. europe and eurasia. terrorism remains the biggest threat to the transatlantic community. as a result, the goal of this hearing is to assess the cooperation between the united states and within others in jurisdiction with this subcommittee in regards to terrorism. last sunday night, america learned an elite american unit has killed osama bin laden.

i'd like to personally congratulate the bush situations, as well as our intelligence kmooet, law enforcement, most importantly i'd like to thank all of our fighting men and women in uniform, especially those in the unit six that did such a great job under great stress. great risk and relentless resolve on their part produced this great victory. the events of last sunday inevitably remind us of the tragedy of september 11th 2001. those we lost that day remain in our hearts and our minds. however, we must also recognize that due to the vigilance of the american troops, law enforcement officers and ordinary citizens, the mass murderer behind the attacks on 9/11 was unable to strike the united states before we got him. we may never know ul the details about the operation which led to the death of bin laden.

we do know that civilian and military elements of the united states government worked with international partners for years to track him down. we're here to learn more about and to encourage such counterterrorism cooperation. specifically, we seeking to strengthen ongoing efforts with our european and you're asian allies, including the sharing of information, resources and successful practices. counterterrorism is working in afghanistan. our european allies have made and continue to make significant contributions to the international security and assistance force. our eurasian and our asian partners also assist. i was pleased to reed this week that kazakhstan ratified an agreement that formalizes the arrangements under which thousands of flights have

crossed kazakhstan air space since 2001. such contributions are essential and must continue. our mission in afghanistan is not yet complete. counterterrorism cooperation with our european and air asi e allies must be global in scope. i'm interested in listening to the allies working together to address the threat being made. excuse me. i think the president is calling me. i'm sorry. i'm in a committee hearing. i'm going to turn my phone off, and i'll call you later. okay? i bet that's never happened to you before, has it? i apologize for not shutting that off earlier. now, when you're in with the president and you do that, he

glares at you. the united states can learn from the approaches taken by our european allies. i am particularly interested in how our allies approach counterterrorism and share successful practices. for instance, the united kingdom and the netherlands have implement eed programs that wor with communities that counter radicalization. it would be helpful to understand how officials from the department of homeland security posted in our embassy throughout capitals in europe and eurasia can bring such innovative practices here to washingtonment i hope you'll address that when we hear your testimony. terrorism threatens not only our lives but our way of life. i hope that our witnesses will describe the administration's efforts and the efrlts of our european and eurasian partners to balance security concerns with the need of robust transatlantic trade and tourism. trade with europe and eurasia is vital to american economy,

supports hundreds of thousands of american jobs across all 50 states. this trade must continue. this i look forward to hering about initiatives such as the visa waiver program that seek to provide access and american markets and for common sense precautions. i'm in favor of expanding this program to include additional qualifying european partners as well as historical lies such as taiwan. i was just in taipei recently, and they made the case that we ought to recognize them for this program. to foster trade, the united states assigned our hopes to -- we have signed our hopes to sign several different elements with our european and air asian partners. for example, negotiations continue with the european union on a renewed passenger name record agreement. it's my hope the agreement will deepen mutual trust and bolster confidence in the atlantic. our common security and prosperity depend on us working together. finally, we must look at

terrorism in the context of the events taking place in the middle east, north africa, which some have called the arab spring. al qaeda's role in these uprisings has been nominal so far. instead, the american ideals of freedom, democracy and opportunity have inspired many. however, i am concerned that these uprisings could create an opening and i hope you'll address this, for radical groups such as hamas and the muslim brotherhood to increase influence or even acquire a base in the region, a country from which they could threaten united states and israel and our european allies. it's important to understand that these radical groups do not have to convert people to their twisted version of islam in order to gain support. instead, hamass and the muslim brotherhood have a history of provide goods and services, food aid and medical care to those who would otherwise not have access to such necessities. the united states and our

european allies must take action against such a tragedy. we have a tendency to think of this arab spring as one event. however, the event is are interesting. i'm interested in the wojts' assessment of what we're doing to support democratic forces in each country. i'm also interested in how these uprisings each individually impact the united states counterterrorism strategy and cooperation with european and eurasian allies. the death of osama bin laden marked a major victory, but let us be clear. the fight is far from over. the united states and her allies must stay committed to the counterterrorism mission in afghanistan and around the world. this subexcrete can do what it request to help. we'll continue to focus on terrorism and examine it from you'll angles. we'll be traveling extensively throughout europe to find out

what our allies feel about all of these issues. i want to thank our witnesses and members for participating in this hearing and i look forward to a productive discussion. my minority member is not here so i'll recognize mr. poe of texas for his remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. like many americans, i'm worried that pakistan is not as good a friend as we think they are are. at least as much as they claim that they are a friend of the united states. capturing osama bin laden was a great moment in not only our history but world history, but it revealed also how unstable our relationship is with pakistan. i, too, want to commend those who were involved in this operation, the president for making the decision to go and take out osama bin laden and his compound, all of the intelligence agencies and especially the navy s.e.a.l.s, osama bin laden has met his maker and i appreciate the navy s.e.a.l.s in arranging the

meeting. but let's look at the facts. bin laden was hiding in a city just 35 miles from the capital city of pakistan. his house was a massesive million-dollar compound, eight times the size of surrounding houses, had 15-foot-high walls, had barbed wire. once in, with he can see the compound had been built especially for osama bin laden and his hideaway or hideout, and perhaps the worst thing of all, the compound was just a stone's throw away from the west point of pakistan. it would be like john dillon jer living across the street from the fbi building down the street and the fbi not knowing about it. it's very perplexing that pakistan claims they were unaware. even administration officials share those suspicions. the cia director leon panetta asertded that pakistan had not done enough to bring osama bin laden to justice.

now saying that, quote, there's total mistrust between the united states and pakistan. those are strong words from the person who is the cia director. john brennan, the deputy national security adviser for homeland security and counterterrorism says it's inconceivable osama bin laden had no support system to help him inside pakistan. a year ago, hillary clinton following a trip to pakistan, said in an interview with fox news that elements within the pakistani state know the whereabouts of the al qaeda chee chief. so it seems to me that pakistan was totally incompetent in their security issues or they knew of the location of osama bin laden and hid him out. if pakistan was helping bin laden hide from us, i sefrnl don't think we should be giving them $3 billion of american aid. it doesn't seem to make us any

safer to give american money to a country that may be playing both sides of the field. i've introduced the pakistan foreign aid accountability account, which freezes ny foreign aid to pakistan until it's proven pakistan didn't know about osama bin laden's wheres abouts. they have opportunity to make their case before we give them any more money. america just wants some answers. where do we stand? where does pakistan stand with the united states? president bush stated in his joint session to congress after 9/11, to our allies, that you are either with us or you're with the terrorists. and i would like to know where pakistan is in that group. there is no middle found. i'd like to also find out what's going on with the mekdgo designation. a federal district court ruled that the state did not give the

mek due process when it decided to keep the mek on the fto list. the law states that reviews are to take place within 180 days should the group appeal its designation. it's been past 120 days. it's now 230 days. during this time, the mek has been attacked by the iraqi military. yunami has confirmed that the soldiers killed 34 residents at camp asha raul, 34 residents that have yesterday to be buried because the iraqis refuse to allow them to be buried. high ranking public officials in the iraqi regime repeatedly cite the u.s. terrorist designation as their justification for treating the residents of camp asha rof so harshly. two battalions are still there. iraqi troops won't let residents bury the dead. they also won't let anyone come in for regular visits.

u.s. representatives have not instigated an investigation. the u.n. has not instigated an investigation. and of course iraq has not. of course we wouldn't expect those responsible for the action to instigate investigations. and all of this, to me, seems to compounded and made more difficult because the state department just won't take a positionen the m he ek. it's like we say in texas, time to fish or cut bait. either keep them on the list or take them off, but naik a decision. i think the evidence points to the fact that they should be taken off the list, but this delay, delay, delay, not being able to make a decision for whatever reasons is i think a problem that the state department can resolve and is within the state department's power to resolve that matter. so those are some questions and concerns that i have, and i would hope these can be

answered. i have introduced hres-60 which urges the secretary of state to take the mek off the fto list. we have 65 bipartisan colleagues who believe and signed the bill. thank you, mr. chairman. by the way, i do like your cell phone tone. it's very patriotic. i'll yield back the rest of my time. >> well, that was beethoven. >> it's patriotic. >> it does sound patriotic, doesn't it? first of all, let me say to my witnesses before i yield to my colleague from oosarkansas. i know you're hear to talk about europe and eurasia and pakistan and the issues just raised by my colleague are under the middle east subcommittee's purview. but i hope you will address those issues bau i shier hbecau

agree with everything he said. so as much as humanly possible, i hope that you'll include those in your thoughts and remarks when we get to the questions. with that, i'll yield to mr. griffin, my old buddy, from arkansas. >> your old staffer. thank you. >> and he was a good one, too. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, i want to say thank you for holding this hearing and thank you to the witnesses for coming. i think that this topic is as relevant or more relevant than ever in the wake of the killing of osama bin laden. what i am particularly interested it in and maybe i can get to follow up with some questions, but i just want to throw this out there so that the witnesses will maybe be able to address it in the context of the other questions. is the impact that a leaderless al qaeda has on the disparate terrorism yets spread throughout the european continent and what, if any, changes we might see in

terms of an increased or decreased threat. i could make the case in the absence of one leader that there could be an increased threat and increased independence of the disparate groups on the continent. i ask you to keep did in mind and if you could address it, i'd appreciate it. thank you. >> thank you, mr. griffin. now we'll hear from my colleague from ohio, ms. smith. she yields back her time. with that, let me introduce our witnesses today. i want to thank you both for being here and thank you for your patience. daniel benjamin was sworn in as coordinator for counterterrorism at the department of state with the rank of ambassador at large may 28, 2009. from 1994 to 1999 mr. benjamin

served on the national security council staff. and in 1994 to 1997 he served as foreign policy speech writer and special assistant to president clinton. before entering the government, mr. benjamin was a foreign correspondent for "time" magazine and the "wall street journal." that must have been an interesting switch when you went from "time" magazine to the "wall street journal." some day i'd like to talk to you about that. mark cumins is deputy assistant secretary for international affairs at the u.s. department of homeland security. mr. assumcumins is responsiblpr as director for european and multilateral affairs in the department of homeland security 0 office of international affairs from june 2007 to august 2008.

prior to joining dhs in june 2007, mr. koumans served in the u.s. foreign service. welcome to you both. we'll recognize you, ambassador benjamin, if your statement is going to be excessively long, we'll just accept that for the record. but we'll give you as much time as we think is reasonable. >> thank you very much, chairman burton and distinguished members of the committee. i have submitted testimony for the record that provides additional detail about u.s. counter-terrorism cooperation with europe and eurasia. i want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and i must say it's a great deal to testify today as the united states celebrates al-qaeda. you mentioned my service on the national security council for

t -- for the last two years of that time, i was director of threats when president obama declar declared for peace everywhere. i should say this is by no means our end to al-qaeda. much of its activity evolves to its affiliates and much work remains to be done. but as we approach the tenth anniversary of the 99/11 attacks, we should recognize that one of the unsung periods since that dark day has been an operation of global lines against terror, one that agents effectively to protect our innocents around the world. in the critical areas of intelligence and law enforcement, governors have been taught together time and again, including ones in plains across the atlantic and public transportation systems worldwide. our european allies have

responded extremely positively to our development and a european union underlined against the u.s. and counter-terrorism efforts. but statements also noted that al-qaeda remains a serious threat. europe very much remains a focus of terrorist plots. over the past year, we saw several attempted attacks, a suicide bombing in scandinavia and separate bombings in the metro and several caucuses. our work expands the globe. we work with our nato partners in isap in stability with afghanistan. we've been working with our european allies in the yemen process, and we are increasing our coordination with france and other european partners to con strain the environment in which al-qaeda operates, by

strengthening governments and other regional partners. such work helps to deny safe haven to terrorists, which is absolutely vital. to deal with the terrorist threat and identify individuals who are preparing to commit violence, information sharing is absolutely essential. the united states and new york are committed to posturing and sharing information in the prosecution of terrorist-related offenses. we worked on these issues through the united states treasury's tracking program, homeland security presidential directive 6. there have been some concerns raised in europe about these programs, but we know that our approaches to protecting privacy have more similarities than differences, and we share a strong commitment to protecting civil liberties. i am confident that with goodwill on both sides and the common sense of resolve, we can achieve the common goals we

seek. another crucial aspect of our ct cooperation is our bilateral work with key partners to build other relations with nations around the world. from italy in the south to the netherlands and denmark in the north share our views on implementing strategic counter-terrorism actions that deal with the capacity of partners and to stem terrorist recruitment. while al-qaeda and its affiliates are our highest priority in our ct diplomatic engagement, hamas also remains a major focus. we have been and will continue to work through bilateral channels to impress our european allies to take more aggressive action, fundraising at both the eu and state levels, and i've made this a personal priority. in conclusion, the magnitude and

bre breadth makes sure we work with our partners around the world to identify areas where further work remains to be done and how we can further collaborate ever more effectively. only through such cooperation can we succeed. thank you, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, mr. benjamin, and now we'll hear from mr. -- secretary komens. >> good afternoon. thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the homeland security corporation with europe. like you, i would like to acknowledge the achievement of last week. like secretary napolitano said, the death of bin laden is important not only for the united states, but for the entire world. i would like to commend baroso and kerkov. we all agree that bin laden's death is not the end of our

security efforts. al-qaeda and other organizations will continue to plan attacks here and abroad, and so we must remain vigilant. security is more of a shared responsibility than ever before. preventing terrorism is dhs's core mission and one that forms part of its other key mission subsidizing borders, immigration laws and shielding disasters. in order to succeed, our partners must work with the international partners. the attempted terrorist attacks on christmas day in 2009 and the bomb in 2010 underscore our international security with national security. criminals look for vulnerabilities in international networks to carry out their attacks. i would like to highlight three points. first, if a dhs works with our allies to prevent terrorist attacks. second, they cooperate in particular to prevent terrorist travel. third, the visa waiver program provides incentives to maintain

high security standards in deep cooperation with the united states. my first point explains how dhs works. to that end, dhs is nearly 400 employees in europe working daily with government, the travel public, the aviation industry, cargo shippers and others. it is dhs's goal to expedite legitimate travel and trade, both of which are critical to the u.s. economy, while preventing the flow of illicit goods and people and lessening illegal activity. much of this activity takes place at the operations level, combatting human and drug trafficking, screening u.s. bound maritime cargo containers, assessing airports and air carriers, conducting passenger screening and forcing u.s. customs and immigration regulations and investigating cybercrimes. on my second point, terrorist travel represents one of the greatest threats to european and

u.s. security, and therefore, attention and disruption are key goals. every week there are 2500 flights between europe and the u.s. they share passenger data and share information with our european partners in order to identify both known and unknown potential terrorists. dhs has a number of programs to address this threat. under the immigration advisory program, dhs posts officers at foreign airports to work with the airlines and foreign officials to identify high-risk and properly documented travellers before they board aircraft for the u.s. another example is dhs's collection and analysis of passenger name records, or pnr data. in recent years, pnr data has been pivotal in cracking the cases of david hedley, new york subway bomber and times square bomber. i just note in passing that we just passed the one-year anniversary may 1st

coincidentally the same day as osama bin laden's demise. they were denied entrance to the united states and were initially identified through the analysis of pnr. presently we're renegotiating a new agreement with the dau to avoid a potential conflict with the european privacy law. i should emphasize the dhs is not negotiating for the collection of dnr, which is required by u.s. law, but to ensure a stable and legal environment under which it is transferred. our goal is to improve security while reassuring our allies to privacy. we have held six negotiating sessions and hope to continue these talks in the months to come. since 1986, a visa waiver program has allowed people to travel without first obtaining a visa. 30 visa waiver countries are in europe.

by statute, these countries developed a security partnership with the u.s. and dhs conducts regular, detailed reviews of each country. these reviews focus on u.s. law enforcement, national security and immigration interests and they continue to share information vital to our national security. chairman burton and distinguished members of the subcommittee, i look forward to working with you as we advance cooperation with european partners. i will submit longer testimony formally for the record. i look guaforward to answering r questions. >> thank you very much. before i get to my questions, i would like to once again stress i just got back from taipei, and they have been a great ally, taiwan, for a long time, and they should be a top candidate, i would hope, for the visa waiver program, and i hope you in the department will look seriously at that. the first question i have is, after bin laden's death, there

may be some changes in attitudes around the world. with our continued commitment to freedom in the middle east, afghanistan and elsewhere and stopping al-qaeda and the taliban, do you think that the attitudes of our allies that have been working with us in those areas and those endeavors will change? will they remain as committed as they have been, or do we expect any change or have we seen any change? >> thank you for that question, mr. chairman. i think that our expectation is our allies will maintain the same sense of urgency, the same sense of mission that has characterized the cooperation we've had for many years now. if you look at the statements from any number of different european leaders, they were quite clear that this is a mi milestone achievement but is by no means the end of the threat. they all experienced the heightened threat environment in the fall. germany arrested three

terrorists in the midst of the conspiracy just a few days ago. i think there is a widely shared understanding among the governments of europe that this threat is by no means over. >> so you anticipate the commitment to afghanistan will remain just as strong as ever? >> well, as you know, there have been a number of different statements about troop levels and things like that in afghanistan in particular, but overall, we note that our european allies have supplied a large number of troops, a large number of teams for training police and other parts of the afghan government, and we certainly hope that they will continue to do so. i don't think that this event is going to, in itself, trigger any kind of sea change. >> thank you. one of the concerns i have involves the middle east. i was a senior republic in the middle east the previous two years. as my colleague from texas was

alluding to a few minutes ago, we're concerned about what's going on in the middle east. what i'd like to ask both of you is, our allies in europe, europe and eurasia, what is their attitude and what are they going to be doing, from your perspective, to help us make sure that the entire northern tier of africa, as well as the persian gulf, doesn't go up in smoke? in particular, i'm very concerned, and i'd like to know the attitude of our european and american asian allies. i'm very concerned about who is going to take over in egypt? who is going to take over in libya? what's going to happen in syria? all these areas that will affect the entire world are in the middle east and they are supplying energy in large part for many of the countries in europe and eurasia. so i know this is a pretty broad

question, but i'd like to know what your assessment is, both of your assessment, is about what's going to happen in those countries and what you project in the future. i mean, if egypt goes to the radical elements like the muslim brotherhood, if syria goes from asad to a radical element governing that country. if muammar gadhafi leaves and there are radical elements tied to al-qaeda, and we know they're there, would we be able to take over that country. >> as you said, mr. chairman, it's a very broad question but let me take a stab at it. >> they're just as concerned as we are about the fate of the region. we've also seen change come to the region.

there is a broadly shared desire to see egypt, tunisia and other countries that hang in the balance involved in a democratic way that meets the aspirations of their people. as you know, we have very close cooperation with the europeans on what is going on in libya. we've coordinated closely in terms of our assistance and our messaging to tunisia and egypt, and we've also coordinated equally, for example, in our outrage on the intolerable crackdown that has occurred in syria. this is just a sampling of our coordination. it is by no means meant to be exhaustive. i would say we are working together to ensure that we do see the kind of middle east emerge that we would like to see. we are, of course, all concerned that terrorists will try to exploit this moment. because although the arab spring, as you mentioned, has been, nits oin its own way, a

strategic blow to al-qaeda, because they were not part of the movement, they were not part of the story there, and, in fact, the events themselves demonstrated the falseness of one of their core beliefs, which is that only violence would change these countries. we view these as very positive elements, but terrorists will go whenever they see an opportunity as there is distracted security areas in the region and border security is not what it should be, they may see this as an opportunity. we're working closely with diplomatic intelligence, law enforcement and military channels to do what we can to ensure the region maintains its security and to ensure that terrorists do not have an opportunity to exploit this moment.

it's still very early days, but i think we're still very optimistic about the trajectory in the region. >> i'm about to yield to my colleague because i've used a lot of time already, but i would just like to urge homeland security and the state department to do everything, along with our allies, as humanly possible to make sure we don't have radical elements take over in egypt, syria or some of those other countries. i understand, and i think we all acknowledge, that we've had some repressive administrations over there. it was very difficult in egypt and syria, there's been a lot of oppression there, throughout africa and even in the persian gulf we've had those problems. but one thing i don't think the world can tolerate or live with is several more irans popping up in the northern tier of africa and the persian gulf, because we might not be able to get enough energy since we're not drilling here in america. we might not be able to get

enough energy to turn the lights on. so this is a very important issue, and i would just like to urge you to make this a top priority. and with that i yield to my colleague from texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i follow up on my opening comments. now that osama bin laden is dead, who is the most -- who would you rank as the number one terrorist group in the world as opposed to the united states? >> well, sir, undoubtedly al-qaeda remains the foremost terrorist threat we face. operating from the al-qaeda core base in the pakistan/afghanistan region or through its affiliates in yemen, in northeastern africa and northwestern africa. so as the president has said, as many others have said, this is a historic achievement but this is by no means the end of the

story, and if anything, i think it demonstrated our determination to continue to remove al-qaeda threats that we face. >> i agree that the death of osama bin laden shows other terrorists that the united states is resilient and will do whatever we can for as long as it takes to make sure we're safe. cia director pinetta makes the comment there is an unusual distrust between pakistan and the united states now that we have found him harbored in the country for so long. do you share that opinion, mr. ambassador? >> ambassador richard holbrook, the president of the united states, they have always said there is a trust deficit between our countries that we are working hard to overcome.

as john brennan said, we're also going over the question of what systems there were to support osama bin laden in abbottabad and to make it possible for him to live there unmolested for such along -- a long time. i do think it's important to emphasize, as our secretary said this morning, our relationship with pakistan, while it occasionally has its challenges, is a productive one. that more terrorists have been apprehended or killed in pakistan than anywhere else, and that this collaboration between our countries has been absolutely vital to degrading the al-qaeda threat over quite a number of years. so it is a complicated picture but it is a vital relationship and we need to keep working at it. >> i understand it's complicated, and my question is, do you believe that the pakistani government knew that osama bin laden was in their

country? that's just a simple yes or no. >> i believe that they thought there was a good chance that he was somewhere in pakistan. i can't imagine, given all of the focus on fighting extremism, particularly in the federal tribal areas that they were certain he was not in their country. whether or not they knew he was in abbottabad, i think that that is -- that probably came as much greater surprise to them. >> of course, the united states didn't notify pakistan that we were coming in to take him out, and they have now objected and said that strained our relationship. my opinion is they knew or they're totally incompetent in their intelligence field. let me switch gears a minute and ask you a couple questions about

the m.e. k. every time we're together i ask about the mek, and i hope we get an answer soon. is the state department going to take them off the list? and if so, when? when are you going to make a decision? >> i'm afraid the answer is the same as when we saw each other a couple weeks ago. we are working as expeditiously as possible to complete the review that the u.s. court of appeals ordered . as recently as april 6, we received new material from mek council, and we are reviewing it, and just as fast as we can, we are going to get a recommendation package to the secretary and have a decision made. >> six months, a year? do you have any idea? >> i can't give you a certain date, but i can tell you it will be less than six months. >> as a follow-up, i have attended, as many members have, all of the classified briefings that i'm aware of on this issue. has any new information come to

surface in the last two months that would help members of congress on this issue, classified or not? >> as i mentioned, sir, we have received new information as recently as last month from the mek themselves, so we're reviewing that information and seeing if it helps in our deliberations. >> all right. i'll yield back the remainder of my time. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i apologize, i missed part of your question. did you ask about what our state department is doing to urge those people who have not been buried would be dealt with? are you aware of what he asked earlier on? i mean, if those people were killed some time ago, and for whatever reason they're not being taken care of properly, it seems since we're a strong

supporter of iraq and the iraqi government, we ought to be doing everything we can to make sure that's taken care of immediately. >> i fully agree, and as soon as i get back to the department, i'll check with my colleagues. >> would you let me and mr. poe and others on the subcommittee know about that? >> certainly. >> i yield to my colleague. >> i want to shift gears a little bit and talk about russia some. on the judiciary committee, we have looked into the issue of piracy, and a lot of that, it seems, stems from activities, illegal activities, in russia. some of it by organized crime, and when i look at some of the official cooperation with european countries on terrorism and law enforcement and the many different areas that we cooperate with our european allies, i often see russia

included in some of those agreements and relationships that sends a signal that russia is helpful and a partner on a lot of these issues. i have -- i would just like to get your take, both of you, on issues of russia, how they are on issues of piracy, and if they've cooperated with us. and i'd like you to also address the role of organized crime in russia, and we're not hearing as much about it as we did maybe five years ago. i think it's fair to say, just in terms of press coverage -- i don't know if that's because it's become so routine or maybe it's decreased -- if you could comment on the role of organized crime in russian society today

and how that impacts, if at all, the official russian government's cooperation with us on counter-terrorism and things like piracy. so i would welcome your comments on that. >> thank you very much, sir. i confess in the counter-terrorism environment, we have put aside the issue of piracy. i would welcome a debriefing on that. i will say we have not detected any impact in our cooperation on counter-terrorism from those issues, and in the course of what is a very close relationship with the russians on counter-terrorism, i think that we would certainly be able to discern. i will say that the

counter-terrorism cooperation was a bright spot in the u.s.-russian relationship before the administration came into office, and it has continued to be, and i think we've actually deepened our cooperation with the russians on counter-terrorism as deputy assistant secretary komens can contest as well. we've done a lot of work with them on asian security, and we're developing some agreements in that area and will come into fruition soon and we've cooperated closely on issues such as designating al-qaeda members and al-qaeda terrorists and we've also had an exchange of information on subjects of interest. so i think it's a very good relationship and one where we are continually looking for ways

to deepen it to the benefit of all of our citizens. >> have you seen any identifiable limits on their willingness -- russia's willingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism? is there any threat that is a threat to the united states where they have been unwilling to show the cooperation that they've shown, for example, in al-qaeda, or have they been a partner in the sense that we have gotten to know other european allies as partners? >> is there an asterisk by russia? >> no, i certainly wouldn't say there is an asterisk, and i have an excellent relationship with my counterpart in russia, who is a first-class leader in this area and widely recognized as such. i wouldn't say there is an asterisk, but i would just, you

know, reiterate that some of our relationships in western europe go back many, many decades, and obviously in a historical perspective, we're still building the relationship with the russian republic day by day. but i'm quite pleased with the progress, and i have every hope for a continued success in this. let me put it this way, i haven't come up against any hard walls. >> do we have any time for the secretary? >> sure. >> secretary, if you could address the russian relationship. >> thank you, congressman griffith. i will echo everything that admiral benjamin said with respect to not having encountered any brick walls and the great depth of our partnerships in western europe, albeit the most recent partnership in asia.

we have put some additional ideas in front of the russians. i can think of one additional setting. this one concerns transportation, and others concern transportation as well, having to do with securing aviation, securing airports, but also bridges, tunnels, that's a multi-mode am removal. we gave them weekend to post -- >> i'm getting ready to yield to mr. bill rachus and. >> there is russian troops, as you know, on georgian voil. you might consider giving us an update on that and what the long-term prognosis is.

because the people in georgia are very concerned about that in the future. with that i'll yield to mr. borakis. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i appreciate it. secretary kumens, thank you, of course, for your service. you noted that every week there are 2500 flights between the united states and europe, and they said. they used that as our point of departure in the united states. i apologize if you covered this >> wear -- where we have the pushback is in the releasing of international data. why does the eeu believe that

sharing of data regarding only must beloads? seems like a long time to me. if you can answer that question, i'd appreciate it. zds as. >> i can share some of the she not mea-- sentiment. it's important to realize we are dealing with two different governmental structures, the parliamentary structure, our three parts of government. they have privacy laws that differ from ours in some respects, despite the fact that the underlying foundation, as you said, is quite similar and

there is much more that unites us than divides us. but there are distinctions that are important to them, so they would like us to go through and consider every aspect of the agreement carefully. did they get this retained? what sort of date at that time did you tell him? >>. >> one we look forward to concluding to getting close to an agreement, and as i said, in later months, we will determine it. >> i think that covers it, i really do. note we have a new subset of players, in a sense. we're no longer dealing with the european parliament, but in some

ways congress has to explore all these different issues and satisfy itself in a way, and the eeu did not. it's an education, if you will, and share some of the. i really do think a lot of it is learning how -- we do the same things in different ways, so i don't think there is a dash working their way through challenges. thank you. >> my next question is for secretary cumens. i am wondering about the radi l radicalizati radicalization, particularly as it relates to the balkans,

mainly ini albania. tehran is closest to the most corrupt capital in the world. what -- less of a haven that fair owe's on the united states? >> thank you, congressman. with respect to albania -- i should preface my remarks by saying everywhere where the department of homeland security declares internationally. we work with the department of state and choose omission authority. that being the case in about 99% of our postings. countries such as