2020. it breaks down to two critical questions. does the state department have the capability to succeed and if not, should the u.s. military remain in iraq at some meaningful capacity to help consolidate gains? many in the u.s. and iraqi government doubt that the iraqi security forces will be prepared to defend the iraqi state from external and internal threats by the end of 2011. it is an undeniable fact paramilitary forces continue to play a vital role on the ground in iraq. by continuing to serve as the guarantor of iraq's ability, we allow its nation, and democratic institutions to grow and mature. while there are many complex that from our attention, america and this congress must remain dedicated to achieving success in iraq. it is in error interest and it

is -- it is in iraq's interest to see them prosper and floors. it is that as our strategic objective and we should do everything in our part to make sure it happens even by extending our military presence on the ground. iraqi political and military figures have come out in support of extending the deadline to withdraw all but as the check comes, no one wants to be left paying the bill. the domestic political cost in iraq of asking the u.s. to stay has left the iraqi leadership pointing fingers and passing the buck. i saw it firsthand when i was in iraq last week. this hearing is meant to be an opportunity for members to ask the ministration what it seeks to achieve in iraq and how it plans to achieve it.

our goal today should not be to just judge the plans before it. it should be to find that policy that will get us to where we need to go. the united states has spent nearly a decade securing and helping to build a foundation of a prosperous and democratic iraq. a premature withdrawal would risk squandering those gains. it would be a failure of colossal proportions tusis defeat from the jaws of victory but that is precisely what i fear what may come to pass. i'll now yield to the gentleman from new york. >> i thank the chairman. the hearing today is an important one. at a hearing on this same subject last november, i suggested that most americans and most members of congress think we are basically done in iraq. our combat troops left iraq last year and the rest of our 50,000 troops are coming home at the end of this year.

as a political matter, iraq is yesterday's problem and yesterday's news. the only problem with this is that it is completely at odds with reality in iraq and the administration's plans for it. as this committee heard last year from assistant secretary of state jeffrey feldman, american assistance is intended to help iraq meet its needs, stand up its economy, and cement his democratic system over the next five-seven years. five-seven years -- to do all of this assisting, the u.s. mission in iraq will be spending billions of dollars operating five major diplomatic facilities and employing as many as 13,000 people who will be operating a fleet of military

vehicles and helicopters and maybe engage in such diplomatic operations as counter-rockets, artillery, and order notification and neutralization response. at that same hearing, deputy assistant secretary warned that we're now at a point where the strategic dividends are within reach as long as we take the proper steps to consolidate them. what does that mean? he said long-term strategic partnership with iraq faced and our mutual interest and mutual respect. secretary feldman emphasize the same point. he noted that the strategic importance of this moment cannot be overemphasized. i thought we had a major problem then. i am now convinced that we have

a total disconnect. the administration is planning for an iraq that is going to be continuing its recovery and reconstruction with the aid of a multibillion-dollar american presence, the public and congress are not just moving swiftly to the exits on this, they have actually left the building. if there is one lesson to learn, it has to be that nothing explains itself and nothing sells itself if the administration fought lesser it was vital to our national security interests to spend billions of dollars over the next five-seven years to establish a strategic partnership with iraq, then a vastly more robust effort to sell this policy to the congress and the american people was necessary. with all due respect to our distinguished witnesses, and they are indeed distinguish, this panel at this time will simply not be enough.

personally, i would prefer that we do not repeat our dismal performance in afghanistan or after driving out the soviets and then driving out the taliban, we as a nation abandoned our prayer allies to their fates. it was short-sighted and produce exactly the bad results that were anticipated at that time. it looks like we will make the very same mistake in iraq. all the blood, all the treasure, and all the national trauma and where are we? we are under way at this very moment when a smaller and smarter investment would finally give us some hope of salvaging some foreign policy benefits from the horribly amiss begun war in iraq. the administration will have to sell a lot of members on the outgoing effort that those members to not want and they don't believe we need and that they have been counting the days until it is finished. the collision of our expectations and the

administration's policy is not going to be pretty. with that, i yield back my time. >> i think the two votes have started on the floor. i did not hear the bells go off. we could probably get through the introduction. s. two bells, ok. we will begin with the ambassador. rhymes with aname popular insurance co. but i will not to my imitation. he currently serves as the state department coordinator for iraq. she is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the u.s. transition from military to civilian operations in iraq, work closely with our ambassador

to iraq. the u.s. military and other departments and agencies. the investor has previously served as deputy port and airport diplomacy for the u.s. global hunger and security initiative. also, director of the office of the afghanistan and ambassador to the asia-pacific economic cooperation forum and u.s. ambassador to the democratic people's republic. she received her m.a. in national affairs from columbia and weity and her mba froba appreciate you being here. secondly, -- are we on the second bell? i have been informed we actually have five minutes to go on the vote. in which case, we will save the

introduction of the next two witnesses until we come back. we are in recess briefly and we will be back as soon as the votes are over. we are in recess. dr. coll is our next witness.

part to join the defense department, he was a senior fellow at the center for a new american security and served as coordinator for the obama campaign direct policy expert crew. in 2005-two dozen 6 he was a council of foreign relations fellow. he received his ph.d. in political science from columbia university and his ba from university of michigan. last but not least is christopher crowley who serves as the deputy administrative assistant for the middle east. prior to this assignment, he was usaid mission director in iraq. he joined usaid in 1971 as an assistant. development adviser in vietnam and has served as a regional

mission for central asia and director of the program office in india, deputy mission director in egypt. in 1994, he became the first mission director for the west bank in gaza. he holds a bachelor of science degree in physical sciences from the ohio state university, a master's degree in international relations from the university of pennsylvania, and a master's degree in public administration from the john f. kennedy school of government at harvard university. we welcome all three of you here this afternoon. we operate on a five-minute rule so if you can keep your remarks to that time, there is a lighting device on the table that will indicate your time has concluded. we will then ask questions for the same period of time. without further ado, we will welcome you know. >> thank you.

thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the issues facing iraq and the challenges associated with the united states transition from a military-led to a civilian-led presence. of like to submit our joint written testimony for the record we have significant national interest in iraq that required a continuation of strong u.s. support to insure that we do not lose the fragile progress that has been achieved through tremendous sacrifice for it we face a critical moment that will determine whether we achieve our goal of a stable iraq. we must recognize that the ripples of this success extend beyond iraq in the united states. iraq is poised to become a political and economic leader in the middle east region. as the middle east faces challenges and an unknown future, iraq will take center stage as a beacon of democracy. countries in the region and around the world look for our

efforts in iraq to assess the sincerity with which we approached the arab world. the people in north africa look to iraq to see what is possible in the region. the transition we are executing in iraq is vital for our national interest to pursue and strengthen the sanctions. we must strengthen our long-term partnership with iraq and the iraqi people. the strategic framework agreement serves as the friend or an road map in building these bilateral ties. we have found determine partners who are committed to a shared vision. the prime minister and others consider the agreement to be the foundation of u.s.-iraqi relations. we look forward to building a long-term partnership that will strengthen iraq, secure the natural interest of both countries, and to buy -- and provide stability to the region. the security situation is still a concern but continues to

improve providing an opening for which the people of iraq and focus. they can rebuild a strong economy and forming a government that is more efficient, less corrupt, and committed to improving the nation. the people of iraq are eager to build a strong iraq and we must support them. what we are trying to accomplish is that the forefront of diplomacy. its success will not only determine the fed -- fate of a friend and ally but it will shape u.s. engagement in the middle east. this transition is one of the most important international endeavors the united states is undertaking and its success will have global implications. we cannot fail. we will do this model of the cost it requires the american people to bear. the united states has sacrificed much to reach this critical moment. now is not the time to hesitate or change course. we must maintain our

determination to secure our footing. the transition we are implementing is critical that we follow through. the strategy will continue to pursue is the best balance between what is necessary to achieve our interest and what we can honestly call upon the american people to support. because of the tremendous sacrifice that americans have made that we must continue our critical mission there. we find our two countries who used to clashes adversaries now share a common goal, a sovereign and prosperous iraq that is a strong ally of the united states and is committed to security and providing services and addressing the will of the iraqi people. now's the time to work together to achieve that goal. i would like to thank my colleagues.

and many of causes and cures throughout the department of state and other agencies involved in this transition. planning and implementing this transition has required the tireless efforts of our top men and women, many of them risking our lives to ensure that everything we have been fighting and working for over the last decade is not lost. peggy for this opportunity to appear before you today. i would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have. >> thank you. dr. coll? >> thank you. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. the ambassador has discussed the overall policies so i will focus on the security situation in iraq. i will say a few words about the support we get from the defense

department to set them up for success. members have concerns about the readiness of the iraqi government. terrorists and malicious attacks continue to pose a threat. in mid-may, an attack targeted iraqi policemen and killed over two dozen people. on may 22, al-qaeda in iraq conducted coordinated attacks in baghdad that left 14 dead and dozens wounded. iraq still faces dangers and determined enemies but it is important to emphasize that these elements -- enemies do not have the support of the iraqi people and these attacks have not sparked a return to widespread insurgency. the underlying security situation remains strong. the attack levels are the lowest in two years. this is remarkable considering the iraqi security forces have

assumed primary responsibility for the entire country and our u.s. force numbers have declined from 144,000 in january, 2009 to roughly 40,000 today. since january 1, 2009, the iraqi security forces have been in the lead. on september 1 of last year, we made the transition from operation iraqi freedom to new dawn and drew down the u.s. troops. united states continue to provide vital support to the iraqi security forces including training and mentoring and providing certain critical enablers, we need to be clear that the iraqis are very much in charge and a note -- and they don't need large numbers of u.s. forces. the iraqi security forces also remain professional despite a

prolonged period of uncertainty. it remains unclear when the iraqis will name a minister of defense or minister of interior. we continue to engage the prime minister of the importance of maintaining finality on this issue. the continuing efforts to bolster the security forces. we have taken on an unprecedented levels of. of cooperation. as one would expect, challenges exist but rest assured restdod is doing everything it can to help the state department achieve success. in november of last year, dod embedded a staff officer to serve as a liaison and deal with day-to-day issues. they have also established an ad hoc steering group for

synchronization. this group meets biweekly to review status. to expeditiously respond to requests for equipment, and equipping board was established in early 2011. the process consists of working level representatives from all services, a joint staff which defeats the sources of equipment. currently, a state and dod team has been established to deal with issues resulting from the downsizing. the transition of these sites is not a turnkey operation each presents unique challenges. each team needs to establish new parameters a move container

housing units were needed to understudy -- undertake preparation. dod will provide certain functions to provide base of operations and tech support. our continued engagement with iraq remains vital. we are now at the point where hours tremendous sacrifices are within reach as long as we take the proper steps to consolidate them. the long-term partnership with iraq continues to present many advantages to the united states. the recent turmoil in the broader middle east highlights this partnership. dod believes we must remain focused on iraq. thank you. >> thank you very much. mr. crowley, you are recognized for five minutes. >> thank you.

thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today. usaid has played a major role in the civilian response to the iraq social needs since 2003 and will continue to do so. the situation in iraq has dramatically improved over the last few years. iraq is still very much post- conflict developing country facing considerable development challenges. the reduction and violence has created breathing room for the iraqis to begin building their democracy, restoring public institutions, and creating conditions for growth. continued support is required to further nurture the iraq a fledgling democracy and prove its ability to manage its own. usaid as supporting -- has supported efforts since 2003. the primary objective then was to restore essential

infrastructure. in 2007, we shifted much of our resources to a stabilization program to complement the military and civilian search which began at that time. this program focused on community stabilization and in the district of response funds. usaid support is aligned with the agreement which outlines the political, economic, and security cooperation between the united states and iraq. the agreement focuses on sustainable development programs in several sectors and is characterized by increasing levels of host country ownership of the costs of these programs. the key challenge ahead for the iraqi government will be in security, essential services, economic growth, and strengthening of institutions of democratic stubbornness. now's the time for iraq to transition from the legacy of war and insurgency to one of economic opportunities and good

governance. the programs will continue to strengthen the capability of iraqi government's at the national, provincial, and local levels. this gradual transition toward a decentralized model of ascension 19 and control of resources. we will help expand economic growth in non-oil sectors like agriculture, financial sector, and smaller medium enterprise. usaid will support the health sector in iraq and focus on strengthening primary health care. will continue to assist the ethnic and religious minorities and displaced persons. we will also support the education sector in iraq. usaid is a strong and growing network throughout iraq. community action groups, provincial councils, farmer cooperatives all of whom have been partners or who have been trained in our programs continue

to work to improve the lives of their families and communities. usaid has been able to adapt to changing conditions in iraq and fully expects to adapt to circumstances as the military withdraws. we will continue our programs through or implementing partners. this has been a major strength of our programs in terms of our ability to engage more directly with our beneficiaries and as a way to protect our presence more widely into the country. in this way, we are better able to monitor and evaluate the impact of our programs. along with the government of iraq to and air partners and the broader u.s. mission, usaid will continue the commitment necessary to build on gains that have already been achieved. we will be assisting iraqis and further developing their own ability and resources to ensure sovereign, stable, and self reliant iraq. i would like to thank the

ambassadors and their staffs and general austin and his troops and the many bureaus and other departments and agencies involved in this transition. all have provided tremendous support to usaid in its mission. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and i would be happy to answer any questions. >> thank you. we want to thank all three of the with this is for the testimony here this afternoon. the members will have five minutes and i will recognize myself for that purpose. the administration has developed the so-called minimum essential capability -- benchmarks that refer to an end state in which iraqi security ministries, institutions, and forces can provide internal security and possess maximum foundational capabilities to defend against an external duress.

in june, 2010, the department of defense assessed that only the iraqi navy is presently on course to fully achieve its goals prior to december, 2011. iraq will not be able to independently secure its airspace before that date. overall, the department of defense has reported the potential for the iraqi security forces to meet and maintain performance at minimum benchmark levels. they continue to be reliant on u.s. support. in march, 2011, commander general james madison in senate testimony said there will be loose ends unless the iraqis ask to stay -- ask us to stay and work on these issues. those loose ends would be difficult for them to overcome on their own. dr. kahl, you mention one

example of a recent occurrence and it happened to be the one we were in baghdad. >> i was there in iraq after the fall of saddam hussein but before we caught him. that was about 2003. i was there in 2007 toward the end of the surge and more recently about one or two weeks ago. today we were in baghdad was the day that the occurrence happened at kirkuk and we met with the general whose staff were some of the victims. that is evidence of the ongoing threats to this country. with that being the case and everything we know at this point, how realistic is it for us to be able to come under the existing plan, to pull that many troops out and basically

transition from department of defense to state tax is the state department up to that test? is there any precedent for anything on this scale? what you think the committee should know about that? >> to is our assessment that the iraqi security forces have pretty good capabilities in terms of internal defense. we have spent billions of dollars and many years building up a very capable counter insurgency force as well as a capable counter-terrorism force. we say a few gaps that are likely to exist beyond 2011. there will have challenges in intelligence and logistics. the bigger gap is the gap on an external defense. maritime will be in good shape. there will have significant challenges as it relates to air sovereign to. ty.

they will also have challenges uncombined arms, the ability to use their forces corp. -- for conventional combat on their borders. it is important to note that even in the absence of a continued troop presence, there will be ways for us to continue to get after these challenges. we will be able to continue. anything beyond office of security cooperation would require the iraqis to ask. they have not yet asked. the and as fresh and has been clear that were they to ask, we would start that conversation with them. >> let me get to a second question. this is to you, madame ambassador, and if you want to follow up, you can. i understand that the special inspector general for iraq

reconstruction has initiated an audit of the police development program and has requested an entrance conference to begin the audit. they have told that the department has taken the position that they don't have authority to audit this program even though it is funded by the international narcotics and law enforcement fund. my view is sigur has done important work and police training. we think they will need to continue to look of this program going forward. i further think is inappropriate for the department to block access to information on how preparation is proceeding. let me know you plan to do to facilitate sigur's ability to continue to do its work. >> we have sought to be

consistently forthcoming with our responses to the various requests for documents and information during the planning effort. i worked very closely with the sigur employees when i was in iraq. we appreciate the efforts undertaken by them to perform audits and investigations of reconstruction activities in iraq and have provided them with requests to materials we feel fall under its mandate. as the department gauges in the significant transition, our assistance is also transitioning from a largely reconstruction- based to technical assistance and capacity building. we do not read the responsibilities assigned to them in their founding statured as extending to the state department operation in support of our diplomatic platform in iraq. the audit responsibilities, we feel, fall within the purview of our also -- other oversight like the government accounting

office or the house appropriations committee, the department of state office of inspector, and the commission on wartime contract in. >> thank you. let me conclude with a quick statement that we have spent billions of dollars over there and auditing those dollars and making sure that they are being spent appropriately and not being wasted or ripped off. we would ask your cooperation in continuing. thank you very much. >> thank you all for your testimony. is there somebody in the administration that is in charge of selling this to the american people? >> in my building, it is the secretary of state. >> i mean somebody specifically

who explains to the american people why we are doing this -- that the american people think we have already done. >> of our secretaries are heavily involved. it is a top priority for secretary gates and secretary clinton and vice president biden leaves our government efforts. in terms of a government spokesperson -- >> you are indicating that there is none. i am suggesting there is a key problem because the american people thought we were finished with this. it seems to be not the case. these kind of things will be very difficult to do in the ensuing months if not years given both realities and the

political issues we have to come to and deal with. that is not necessarily a good thing. this seems to be -- iraq seems to have been a marriage of convenience and everybody seems to agree there should be some kind of divorce. everybody thought we were waiting for the final papers to come to. now we seem to be sticking around for the sake of the children and they all say we should leave. we're not staying unless they ask us and it seems like a mess. i don't know how you explain that to the civilian population that will be asked to pay for child support.

i guess i will mold on to something else -- move on to something else. is there any war in the entire region that we can afford to ever finally leave? >> my portfolio stretches from egypt up through iraq and iran. >> can we afford to leave egypt or libya or anywhere? >> we have profound national interests in this part of the world. i'd think we are heavily invested in this part of the world and have a sizable presence. we are likely to remain postured at a pretty high level even as we draw down from iraq. i don't know if the question is ever -- >> drawdown means five-seven years and billions of dollars.

this will cost more billions of dollars. i am not advocating leaving this place yet but i just want to know because of the lack of an answer to my first question. if no one is in charge of selling it, no one will buy it. >> we have made a consistent case to the administration. the president gave a big middle east speech last week and emphasized the importance of long-term strategic partnership with iraq. it is especially important in light of the events of the arab spring. iraq has been so important to our national interest for 20 years that we have either been at war against the war in iraq for 20 years. >> what about a financial partnership? you're talking about billions of dollars in supporting a partner that is richer than we are in many ways.

not really, but they seem to have some box. bucks. they're going into other financial partnerships with other people so that means they are cheating on us. >> we have no intention of leaving iraq. it was pretty clear in our opening statements. we have asked for assistance -- >> the american people think we have left. you have no intention of leaving and everybody else in the country except those who are finely attuned which is a limited audience thinks we have already done that her it i would suggest that is a disaster. it will not just be iraq on the plate in the situation. somebody in the administration really has to start thinking about that long term even if

long term only means five-seven years. how you sell a billion dollar program to people who think they are done with the payments? >> deputy secretary nyes will be chairing a roundtable discussion on friday with approximately ce 30o's of major companies to talk about the opportunities of investing in iraq. he will also be meeting and having a number of press interviews along with ambassador geoffrey to make the case that iraq is worth all the effort and worth the long-term commitment we have made. thank you. >> those people might have a financial incentive to invest in iraq because it might be good for their 30 companies but the american people do not necessarily on that portfolio and will not see it that way.

i will say it again -- if ain't got no one to sell yo it,u ain't got no one to buy it. i taught english better than that them of the gentleman from virginia is recognized for five minutes. >> i wonder if you could comment -- i should ask -- what is your understanding of how much funding there is in this fiscal year? >> for iraq and afghanistan? i can't speak to afghanistan. that is not in my portfolio. i believe we have requested $25 million. >> mr. crowley, are you familiar

with this tax is in excess of $1 billion? >> not in iraq at the present time. i'm just talking about surp. >> i don't know with the number is. >> if it were the order of magnitude, what are the conditions on the programming of that money? you work for aid which has all kinds of constraints and regulations and legal requirements. what are the car -- comparable constraints on the use of that reporting and auditing a ofsurp fonts? >> i know how they're used in iraq while i was there. the funds were used by the military units and provincial reconstruction teams to deal with rapid response capabilities to various economic and other issues on the ground.

these are more short-term programs to respond to local situations. usaid works and i longer term -- >> i am familiar with u howsaid works. i agree that that was the original intent. when you have a kind of intent, that is a relatively modest amount of money. when you get to very significant sums of money, would it not concern you that we now have a different management challenge? the magnitude is more than $1 billion. would that be of concern to you as a professional withusaid. >> yes it would and i would build an all kind of safeguards and overlapping mechanisms in order to make sure that money is

spent appropriately >> i would, too. mr. kahl, is it of any concern to you? have you picked up anything by the water fountain? >> i will not speak to afghanistan. >> i'm asking you to speak about whether you have a concern on behalf -- behalf of the taxpayers that we have a program in respect of where is that has not boland in terms of value. it is not a $25 million program and there are only two countries we're talking about does it concern you at all from a management point of view even in the theoretical realm? are you concerned that it has so little supervision in a way that would be comparable to how we constrain the program with

usaid money? >> i would disagree with your characterization. there's a great deal of coordination. there's a great deal of reporting to congress on all the projects that are builts withurp. sigur has done regular assessment. i cannot speak to the magnitude or the specific projects in afghanistan because we don't work and afghanistan. i would encourage you to direct that to our colleagues that do. there was $100 million is thatsirp requested. we requested $20 million in 200012. 2012. >> i thank you for the revised but i already took it and i already talked to the head ofsigur and he would not share

your confidence and sirp program. a number of people and that can have alreadystan been fingered. it is a cash program and we have some people who unfortunately have yielded to temptation. it has to do with a lack of accounting and accountability. since you have offered, i will take you up on an please get back to me and this committee in terms of what constraints are in place and accountability methods are in place in this growing program. thank you, mr. chairman. >> will go to a second round. -- we will go to a second round. the couple of quick questions -- i assume all the power members would agree that it is not only in iraq's best interest

also in america's best interest that we see a democratic, for the most part, iraq prosper and flourish. i see nods assent by everyone there. how is it in america's best interest? it is an obvious question but why is it our best interest at this point and beyond not taking into consideration the fact that we have lost thousands of our men and women there and a lot of treasure has been spent their or money. how is it in our long-term best interest that iraq is essentially a successful country in that important and channel 2 is part of the world? -- and a tumultuous part of the world? >> we have a recent example of

when iraq was the opposite of that. it is in our interest that we have a democratic government in iraq, especially in that region surrounded by less stable and less democratic governments. >> that is obvious but why is it? >> it is for our own security but it is also good for the security of the region. it is also good for the world economic benefit and the potential that iraq has to become what it once was before, a middle-income country, a prosperous country, a stable country, a partner of ours, a partner of other democracies in the world. with only to gain from iraq being a democracy. we have a lot to lose if they were to revert back. >> i would agree with all that. i would add that iraq historically has been a source of instability in this part of the world. it is our hope that a democratic

iraq will be a more moderate actor that we can work with in the middle east. i would also point out that given the kind of mosaics of sectarian and ethnic manatees in iraq, only a democratic system can hold that country together. it will keep iraq stable or long term. saddam hussein kept a lid on of but it is not a stable dictatorship. iraq has come out of that and is on the right trajectory. we have an interest in continuing that trajectory. in the context of the arabs spring, it magnifies those arguments. we are trying to consolidate democracy is in egypt and

tunisia and it is more important to get iraq ready. >> united states has spent nearly a decade securing and helping to build the foundation of a prosperous and democratic iraq. a premature withdrawal could risk squandering those gains. that would be a failure of colossal proportions. i assume all the members of the panel agree with that? >> this goes back to your first question. we're not abandoning iraq and we have vast for -- we have asked for assistance to train their police forces. we have asked for assistance to continue to train and equip the iraqi security forces. in f y 12, under the foreign military financing program, we have that for a substantial amount of money which we feel is

essential to help iraq defended itself against external threats you're asking about before. our plan is actually to stay there and to help the. with this we have also requested support funds in the capacity building site. years of instability and repression are issues. we are not done but we feel we are well on the way to a much better situation there. >> i would assume the panel would agree that iran in the last 30 years or so has been an unhelpful actor in that region or if iraq falls and other implements or cannot stand up to them, that would be unstable and hurt the u.s. security interests

around the world. is that correct? i think i see affirmative. >> i would only say that a strong iraq is likely to not be a puppet dangling at the and i the of theranian string. they will want to maintain their sovereignty. i don't think the iraqis want to be dominated by iran. >> without objection, i will grant myself one additional minute for one final observation. one of the things that was a bit disturbing although not something you would not expect would be the fact that the parliamentarians we met with about whether or not there needed to be u.s. involvement beyond the end of this year were

unwilling to make the commitment all but to a person, or one of them indicated yes but we cannot say that publicly because we run for office as well. al- said the ad is foralp maliki to said. that is not cool on like we see in washington -- that is not unlike what we see in washington. this is an important key issue. the politicians in iraq will have to step up to the plate. for the united states to pull out by the end of this year and turn over complete future of that country before they are ready could literally have to feed out of the jaws of victory

and we will want to see that. i want to thank the panel and at this point, a woodfield to the gentleman from virginia if he has any additional questions than i do, thank you. >> i do, thank you. you indicated that your understanding of sirp program in iraq was that it was $25 million? >> for f y 12. it was $100 million for f-111. >> perhaps your staff can confirm this. in 2003, the total amount of funding in iraq was $3.89 billion t? >> i will have to get back to on the exact number. we spent a considerable amount

of money in iraq. >> more than $25 million? >> yes. >> and try to get at the magnitude is it your testimony, if i understood you correctly, that you are satisfied or you believe that we can be satisfied that all of the correct accounting and transparency is in place as it is usaid programs? s >>irp was an innovation to allow our counterinsurgency operations. we learned a long way and we're better now than at the beginning. it would not surprise me if going back and looking how the program was at the beginning, we found more problems. i would say the program is more accountable and there's better coordination and the money is better use now and was the case

in 2004, for example. are there no challenges? every program will have challenges. >> no one suggested there would be no challenges. the question was whether you felt there were adequate mechanisms of accountability and reporting and transparency as there are with usaid programs such that the pentagon satisfied? >> i think we are in a good place to institute sirp programs in iraq. >> sent the taxpayer pays for this, it is not an unreasonable expectation that we might expect that what you learned in your portfolio has applicability elsewhere. would that be fair? >> is absolutely true that the way the program is being applied in afghanistan learn from the lessons in iraq. in terms of on the ground afghanistan, i cannot speak to that. >> alright, i look forward to

having more dialogue about this. rthink sirp - a si thinki has grown so big that we need more accountability. we have improved and evolved, as you said, but i want to know how and what the applicability is to other places. i have afghanistan in mind but i will not burden you with afghanistan. damascus separate question real quickly. -- let me ask a separate question real quickly. we sort of reinvent the wheel every time something comes up. if we had an office center

located with expertise knowing the ropes and the vendors and providers and everything else, maybe that would make us more efficient and save taxpayer dollars. any comments on that suggestion? >> there is an office in the state department that has the purpose of doing exactly that. the ambassador would be better positioned to comment on that. usaid worked closely with that office. in situations where these kind of responses are required. we also have our own office of transition initiatives which is in itself built around providing responses to these kind of situations but it works hand-in- which is a scrs

state department office. >> would you indulge to let the ambassador's speech? >> mr. crowley is right, there is an office at the state department tasked with what you're talking about. under the quadrennial development and diplomacy review, there are a number of suggestions on how the office can be strengthened to pursue the role you are recommending them ok, again, if you can get back for the record, that would be great. >> thank you so much. >> the gentleman yield back. would the gentleman from pennsylvania -- do you have some questions that we're ready to wrap this up. thank you very much. if there is no further business before the committee, we want to thank the panel for their testimony in answering our questions this afternoon.

without objection, all members will have five days to submit questions or statements to the record. if there is no further business, we are adjourned, thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> here is a look at what we are covering this morning. on c-span 2 at 9:30 eastern, the house oversight committee holds a hearing on the recovery from last year's gulf oil spill. the mississippi governor and local officials will testify. on c-span 3, the house energy subcommittee looks into data privacy and security of information stored on line. live coverage begins at 10:00 eastern. here on c-" is next live with ye calls. followed