a recipient of security assistance and moving toward one of the nation in other places in the world. until then, an enduring commitment by the international community is critical to help us continue to develop this force. critical to enable security transitions, and critical to make it last. today nato plays a key role in this international effort to build security in afghanistan. in fact, nato is the only alliance and the world that has the leadership, the organization, and the capacity to accomplish this vital mission. the fact is, no single nation could do this mission alone. our progress and that of our afghan security partners has been enabled by a multi-national approach consisting of a partnership of nations committed to the training and development of the ansf. though we in the international

community have invested truly in this mission,it will require stc importance. we are reminded that we must achieve a transition that last. and for many of you, you realize that on this day, 67 years ago, we had a coalition formed together to achieve something that was extraordinary as the invasion occurred in europe. i sacrifice that many of us remember today. in afghanistan, and new coalition is showing similar courage and sacrifice. and its purpose is to build this that is dedicating to protecting and serving the people of afghanistan. it is capable of taking before securities up against cancer in

afghanistan. it is self sustaining with institutions that will last. i will be glad to take whatever questions you may have. [applause]

>> that was fascinating. you'll reach your numerical goals sometime in 2012. maybe there is another year of intense of partnering. 24 team does not come out of the blow. does not come out of the blue. >> that is right. our focus becomes in turning the systems back in place doing what they need to do to make this an enduring boston effort. >> -- lasting effort.

>> can you explain to us the trends you have seen into the steps you have taken that are effective. what are some of the other steps we need to consider to be where we need to be? >> it was the biggest challenge we had. we were spending just as much time training human to make up for the attrition as we were trying to build the units.

the attrition is probably 1.4% monthly. 18% over the year. one of the greatest stories that you could talk about would be the afghan civil border police. when we stood up this command, the attrition that month was just over 10%. over the year, about 120% for the year. more people were leaving them we were able to bring in the force. that was consistent throughout last summer. enabled us to put in place different mechanisms working with our afghan partners to with this past month, it was down 1.2%.

very acceptable. within a year, by understanding what the challenge was, we were able to bring it into a very acceptable level. i think it will be pretty stable down there. in the army, we are challenged by attrition. it is a high enough level where we can continue to watch it very closely. we see attrition and in those courses that are engaged in active combat. we are working closely with those that are there to see what systems we need to put in place. >> how do you prevent the taliban from sneaking in?

as you go through the recent list of incidences', there is no particular pattern. your job has to be pretty hard. if you go back to april where. several americans were killed and then problems in may where as some people were killed during a training program. we have had other random cases like that where people still uniforms. it is not something you can prevent with any kind of a venting. -- vetting? can we live with this, given that we do not have a high caliber of people? are you seeing ways we can make

better process? >> we continue to look at it and a guy with it. we have looked at every single case and have broken it into every kind of category you can imagine. . it is more of the impersonation that concerns us more -- most as we study these incidents. one ambassador told me from afghanistan that we are a country that has been traumatized by 30 years of war. there are many young men who have been through terrible experiences. sometimes the way they will settle disputes among themselves is to turn more violent than what you would see from a country that has not been in

civil war for 30 years. we actively look at each and every individual case. we look at what could have been done to preclude it. we take the appropriate steps to look at our training programs and the vibrations as we go forward. it is something that concerns us. we are worried about it. we also recognize at the same time that the taliban in some cases has used this technique and recognizes a softer target rather than engaging directly with the afghan security forces. everybody will remain more vigilant as before. britney a counterintelligence force, teaming up with the national director of security to

be a part of this process is having very positive effect. they are making very deliberate steps moving forward. they will not be able to stop this completely from occurring. >> of the 25 cases you mentioned, is occurring at a faster place, or does it seem that way? >> there has been an increase over last year, no question. here is an uptick of where it has been used more often or more frequently.

>> it is about fundamental quality of afghan forces. from your role in this process, how the answer the basic between the afghan army? can you give us statistics? an important book was written this year. he is convinced that the afghans do not fight. what is your impression on the question? >> the afghan security force are

fighting into taking substantial losses in terms of killed and wounded. they are very much engaged in their party efforts. they spoke about an hour about the development of the security force. once a month, we do a deliberate process. these forces today are far more superior and better than what we produced several years ago. if you want to make a soldier confident in what they are doing, you have to give them the skills where they feel they are very capable and confident with what they are doing. for a variety of reasons, it was not a requirement to qualify your weapon for graduate

training. now it is a requirement. same with police training. they have to shoot accurately with their individual weapon. there are police professions -- professionals who have worked with me over the last year in afghanistan. interacting with the police and army has instilled in them a greater sense of confidence of what they can do and accomplished. the units coming out today are better prepared and equipped and able to engage in combat.

they do it in a tactical manner that is effective. there is an improvement occurring. they are getting better. every time there is an international partner, we put them with their afghan counterparts to help them develop. >> please identify yourself and ask a short question. >> the microphone is coming. >> im debose -- david wood from the "cup putin post." -- huffington post." what about the deliberations on how fast and how many troops to pull out of a camera stand?

-- of afghanistan? >> the combat readiness today is the best it has ever been. after retrain, we bring in the operational force and a special team that does a test assessment of every unit before we turn it over to them. it is a joint assessment of those units. the programs in the system is that the nato training mission has been put into place and the support we have with advisers is having a real difference. as far as the attrition rate,

annualized about 3% right now. for the month of april, 1.8%. it is important to talk about it over 12 months. it has come down slightly. they want to bring it down more, which is good. much more sustainable today than it was last summer when it was 2.8% annualized. there has been a downward trend. it is moving in the right direction. the trends are positive.

>> 2.3% means about one-third of the force is leaving. in addition to that, one-third is leaving when they are not yet supposed to? >> right. even if you go awol and decide to come back, there is no penalty to rejoin the force. every month about 1000 young men come back and rejoined the force wol. had been a wal we do not add to those back in. that is why we continue to steady but the attrition rates

are and why they occur. and we continue to track when they do come back. most when the comeback stay and continue serving for a long time. we see a positive thing there. >> how many might president obama bring home? >> a combat formation this august. 800 men or sell treat it will be filled this august. we will build the support forces. this is key.

the reason the coalition forces have been there are to set the conditions set it enables the afghans to take the lead for securing their country, head of the insurgency, and be a safe haven -- reduce being a safe haven for some threat force inside afghanistan. it will be around the end of 2012 where we will have the force out into the structure. we are only at 296,000. we are still building does force today. there has been a request to go with 250,000. so another 50,000 to go beyond

that, which we will do over next year. from october 2012, the force will be fully recruited but not finished training it until the end of 2012 into early 2013. >> i want to follow up on a question that mike post about westbrook and others. we see and hear reports fairly consistently about the problems with the afghans themselves, their willingness to fight. then we hear from a general and

ambassador. if you are not involved, but you are watching the evening news, you bounce back and forth between seemingly reliable reports from people that see things quite differently. can you help us with that and a drill down and tell us what has gotten the desertion rate down to 1.2% a month? if what you say is true, and i have no reason to doubt that, and if people see it

differently, there has to be some explanation other than the people looking at the same set of facts and drawing the same conclusions. if you could fill in some of the details, it might be helpful. >> things evolve rapidly in afghanistan. had i not been there in the fall of 2009 and seen what i saw -- i always ask people when they were last there. if it is before 2010, i concur with everything they are saying. it was poorly paid, poorly led, poorly trade -- trained, poorly

equipped. if you have this, he will have problems with the police. there were pockets around the country other incredible great training going on. no holistic overall plan. i did not have a single police advisor. i ask where my civilian police is that works on the staff. i asked who is my civilian policemen. there is none in this organization? there has to be someone in this

organization. that is how we started. i have a 50 on my staff that our civil policemen integrated in everything i am doing on police efforts. they are the best there is. they come from around the world, romania. france. even germany. there is a real difference being made today in the police effort. we finally are paying them the right weight is. -- wages.

it was at least minimal level. they did not have one singled armored vehicle in 2009. we are not doing what is necessary to make the police force effective and to gain the trust and confidence of the people of afghanistan. today they have 1000 armored humvees and are going up to 5000. the methodology used for the training was you went out and recruited some mention the police force and you find them with the intent to train them at a later date. we did our first inventory of

police last year and found 60% had never been formally trained. we had a major undertaking there to train them to be policemen. you recruit them, train them, assign them. we have to triple the amount of training capacity for the police. when people say those things, i ask, what force were you with, and when was it trained and equipped? it makes a difference. overtime, we will have to go back and systematically look at those forces filled very early

on and take mobile training teams to work with them to do some of this retraining to some of these yet. those coming out today are very professional. not every single one is going to be perfect. they are far more superior than anything i saw in the fall of 2009. we have not program and ordered enough equipment to be issued to them when they came out of the training base. now they are equal -- equipped and properly trained on the equipment. i spoke about which units he was

with and i would do for rent on it. there are some factors. if you give them some predictability in their life, giving them some vacation time to go home and see their family. fix the leadership, that is huge. changed out the senior leadership, that is what the afghans have done. they have a great commander in there now. we ensure that they have a very predictable cycle system. they have six weeks off. six weeks in collective training. then they go back into combat.

once we implemented a system, and it has proven to be very effective, when someone says something, i asked, when were you last there? what unit did you see? >> a quick acknowledgement to my good friend who spoke on this issue. you have been the beneficiary of some of the attention and have taken it to the next level. a huge story of progress. second broke. -- row, . >> women's empowerment has been

a huge issue for afghanistan policy. as you are training and another 50,000 or so, could that be an initiative that you could get more women involved? once the women are empowered, i am sure you have less attrition rates. >> when i arrived in the fall of 2009, i was not trying to take on gender integration. i just wanted to produce some numbers. we had to get this thing growing o. i have brought in personnel from the institute of peace that have done gender integration for us. civilian and military have helped us with policies working

on the afghan side. we are building this afghan national security university. in this next class that comes into the military academy, a minimum of 10% must be women. at least 60 have to be women. we built a special dormitory female officers will live there during the time they are going to school so they have the right kind of mentor ship. we planned our first school for women. 23 graduate out of that. forwent to the afghan air force.

we had a specialized english language training program. some became pilots in the afghan air force. of the 32 in the program, quattro are women -- for our women and are in the top seven -- four are women that are in the top seven. they are doing exceptionally well. we are slowly increasing each size -- side, recruiting women who are able to come in and served. the minister of interior has agreed that he will add 1000 additional women into the police force each year. they have just over 1000 in the

police force now. the goal is to add 1000 more every year. the army side is still a little bit more challenged. i am very encouraged that he set that minimum standard. there are positive steps being made. the key is to sustain it and grow it. >> i am jordan snyder and an intern here at brookings. can you address the ethnic makeup of the army?

what about the national pride that will serve them in the future? >> can you tell us if you ever talk about when you will know that they can stand and fight on their own? they took a baby steps, but there was a point where he said they can take the lead in the fight. what from a military perspective can convince you that they are on a sustainable path? >> we monitor it every month. we look at the soldier ranks.

it is broken up by ethnicity and we measure it. it can be above or below a certain percentage. once we form a unit, it is that the formation that has an ethnic breakup that is representative of the nation also. we spend a lot of time working very diligently of doing that. we are slightly over. it is more than 5% right now. it is more than what we want to see right now. over time, we will not take anybody else, but make sure we do not bring as many in during the future.

it is key that it is representative of the country, so it can be a national force. we did the same in the police force. the only exception we make is with women. we made a conscious decision not to worry about the ethnicity of women, because we have a hard time getting them to come in the force. we were able to get a larger numbers. we do track it, but we are more interested in getting them into the force and we are concerned about their ethnicity. we do not want to preclude anybody from coming in. there was a process used in the building commanders identified for the first time, one of the italians able to operate

independent of the delay -- independently without coalition partners working with that unit. he has a fairly large group, about five different levels that they use to evaluate these. there is a large group coming in behind him. you can see the progressive improvement in the infantry battalions out there. we have looked real hard at the once each month, said it would be a key indicator to us. they are moving forward. when they asked me if they will be ready by december 2014, if the afghans maintain the commitment they have today, then my answer is absolutely. they will be ready to take the lead for security by 2014.

we look at indicators of different challenges we have or progress being made. >> i am at the national journal. you said afghan forces will be challenged internally by all propensities on how to act and what to do. talk about that more. why is it taking so long? >> talk about how enduring enduring will be when you talk

about what is necessary for maintaining the solutions? what are you really looking at after 2014 in terms of foreign commitments from missions, money, responsibility? what should the public be prepared about in terms of that commitment? >> as far as the training mission goes, we will not complete what we need to do until about 2017. our mission clearly indoors. endures.r when only make up about 3% of all of the military forces. it is not an overwhelming size. we do want to see this continued. partnerships are worked out between different nations, such

as nato. it is something that needs to be sustained for some time. it does not mean they have a fully developed all of their systems and institutions. we have built places for international professors to come, military and civilian, the four offices and building spaces for them. a long-term partnership will be good for them to have that continuing interface and a dialogue. from the training perspective, we do not finish until 2016. some of these things take time and patience to do from a training perspective, from

building an institution. the ability for this to last, we have spent a tremendous amount of time building and in ditches capacity. as we have gone back to look at these efforts, a lot of the training was done outside of the country. we are building of the capacity to do it inside afghanistan itself, training afghans and having them be the traders themselves. and then to run the systems. building facility engineers, personnel but can maintain and sustain military police infrastructure. before this year, we never attempted to take that mission on. for it to last, they will need

engineers. for me to help develop this engineer takes almost one year. i have to put them through three months of education, before i can teach them basic technical skills. a want them to read, write, the basic mathematics. with nine out of 10 totally illiterate, not that we cannot do it, but it is a commitment that we have to make. why were we doing it before 2010 when we started it? there were many guys like made it were there before me and did not like them saying, take on literacy. i was saying, that is not my job.

i do not do literacy. i trained them to be soldiers and policemen. we all have come to recognize how critical it is, it is the s a chiller -- the essential enablers for us to do work in afghanistan. it cost $30 for each soldier retrain to be literate to get those basic literacy score -- skills. we just got nato to stand up before literacy. they recently put $10 million into the fund. those are the kinds of contributions we are looking for. there is a last generation of afghans that were denied the opportunity to be educated. we are probably becoming one of

the largest employers that features this, because we recognize how quickly the house -- how important it is. we now have little recourse this. it is very important that we are trying to encourage teachers to go out into the unit. one thing is to empower them to do things. everything is very centralized. they have been brought up by training regiment before nato got there. teaching them to let go and allow other supporters to make decisions so they are not centralized at the very top -- it has been a very challenging task. we are making more headway now.

we are always cautious that we do not want to go back to it. they take initiative as they go through these programs. they're willing to explore. they take a lot of care for their men. when we arrive, the police were there to be served by the people. i think we are seeing a change where they recognize their job is to protect and serve the people. making sure we do not slip into any previous away they were operating 10 years ago. >> time for one last question.

>> a big problem that iraq faced -- where are you in handling that over by 2014? >> i just had 18 in iraq one month ago cleaning more lessons learned about where they are right now. they are trying to figure out what we need to do today. that is a huge piece. the support units we are bringing on line are critical. they have to be partnered with to be fully developed. we are starting far enough in advance. we have been resources to do what we need to do now.

they had not been well resources in terms of the people required. the commander preforming used to say we live in a culture of poverty in the organization. they have had to do without. we have been very fortunate that we have gotten the traders we needed in the united states and the national committee. we are ready to take more. we are being given what we need to accomplish this mission. even this fall, i think we will get a decision to give as another measure of support element that will look for us so we can work with support forces of afghanistan coming into this unit. we have been really fortunate.

the secretary of defense has given us the people resources. >> thanks for your time today general. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] -- 2011] [unintelligible]

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>>: tomorrows "washington journal" a report on the global war on illegal drugs. we will speak with the group's founder. last week, a foundation started by a hedge fund manager gave $100,000 a piece to 24 people under the age of 20, who agreed to drop out of school and to

start a high-tech companies. we will speak with the founder of the program. and looking at a walter reed medical center that is scheduled to be closed this september. "washington journal" each morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. and there will be a discussion between the relations of the u.s. and germany. we will have live coverage at 8:00 p.m. eastern. >> a complete guide to the first session of the 112th congress. inside contact information

including put your information, district maps, and information on the white house, supreme court justices and governors. order online at c-span.org/ shop. >> now a political discussion with the french foreign minister on the arab nation. this is from the brookings institution and is about one hour. >> good afternoon. on behalf of the center for the united states and europe, we are very honored today to host a

state and form with the minister of foreign in the european affairs the -- and european affairs. he has a. -- distinguished record of public service. he has been part of a minister on three occasions. he was minister of foreign affairs, and originally from 1993-1995. in that year, he became prime minister of france after serving until 1997.

the state department is one contingency rolling out every day. every day the world changes and requires us to act differently.

i cannot be responsive to every act in the world. we can respond urgently to any crisis we have in the world now. is iraq and afghanistan differently -- different? absolutely. i can do better. but we are not frozen in the past. these massive contracts is what we need to do. >> an extra minute there.

>> i am not talking about the world what contracts. it is about requirements, how responsive the centralized bureaucracy. my information is not responsive enough. there will be a difference of opinion there. there are not aware of the urgency and the contingencies around the world. maybe we can get the department of defense to look at it. the dot has asked for 22 minutes the contract.

we can provide six. rock island is going to sustain that. the state department is not focused on a lot of the details, because it has the world what look and all the time approached to help contractor gets done. >> i have to respectfully disagree. let me take the first and last one of the samples to mention. we are writing their contracts.

i think that shows excellent contingency operations. the american taxpayer does not want to spend a lot of money -- >> how do you oversee contracts? how'd you get the support for it? >> that is the responsibility of the diplomatic security officials that on the scene. we have been loaned 60 by the defense. we will oversee their operations. we are white said in a contract on rock island. there are specifications.

there are things you have to do to keep the equipment operating in available for use. when you are talking about contract and, there is the administration of the contract. we have meetings every week. >> i am talking about the requirements. >> part of the context is we're looking at road security. moving individuals is a part of the purpose.

and thef the driver's individuals, we called them a squad, when you are dealing with security, you come under fire. you have to suppress it. that is all united states army. you talk about operations and maintenance. i'm not sure you are spot on the operations. >> i would like to address that part. and we have built in the contract a training unit that is

a simulator. we have a model there. it is being upgraded. every security person that is going to be involved in the operation will be run through the simulator to ensure that they know how to operate it. the u.s. military is the greatest military in the world. i do not have that option available to me after december 31. >> you are going to use contractors? you cannot run a few are under fire. >> that is exactly what we iroquoian to do. i was going to make that point.

the mission of the u.s. military is to engage the enemy. >> he is taking my time and that is my question. i will stop you right there. i want to go back to the business as usual idea again. you talk about pulling together the resources you need. they point to an organization and the way it was organized at an ad hoc office. >> that was a model set up by

the then existing director. it is not a model that has ever been used. it was implemented along military lines. it was used once on the baghdad project. >> i worry a little bit when you talk about keep what you have, and we will put something together. i worry about that happening again without institutionalizing a starter workforce -- work force. >> what you are missing is the experience and value of tracking authority that has worldwide expertise in the corporate staff to get the job done. >> you agree with my statistics.

it is different from what the state department has account elsewhere. >> i disagreed on the contract. i agreed on the operational requirements. i disagree on the cuts affecting structure. >> i think we have major disagreements. let's move forward. >> thanks. you have been doing a terrific job since we worked together a few years ago. of want to ask you about some state department responses and the some of our recommendations. they involve some contractors.

your answer -- i do not know if you want to expand on it or go on my loan of questioning. >> i can submit additional material. it is your choice. >> your testimony says you are on an interim basis. they will give time to get your act together. i want to get a sense as to what you're going to do to avoid the things written up in the new yorker, things i have heard

about for some time that are pretty shocking. the article says a vast majority are hired hands. they are workers primarily from south asia. they are employed by fly by night subcontractors that operate outside of the law. many talk about having been robbed of wages and subjected to sexual assault. there have been food riots over this. your response to something that drove our organization.

we cannot uphold our own values if we allow this to go on. we want the oversight and commitment by foreign contractors and subcontractors. the state's cancer is that it will at cost without having benefit. >> it is a huge benefit if the world sees that we have cleaned up our act. this is a major scandal for the united states. >> we are using this only for life-support. [unintelligible]

>> free food. >> that is taking a vantage of the incredible buying power that the defense department has available. i can buy frozen chicken at the d price. and i believe those are appropriate. those are correct points on how contractors operate in the trading of its staff. our contracts for life support would only be awarded to an american company.

we right into that contra the adherence to a delay upon and requires it as well that we ladies possibility for the performance and treatment of employees on the american contract. that gives us the best chokehold to ensure that any employee working in support of u.s. government activities is treated at -- treated properly. the regional security officer has looked into them. i would be glad to send you a copy of my testimony.

we believe that we can force through those methods in situation that uphold the dignity and standards of the united states holds dear. by holding that of the primary american contractor company and looking over and across the operations aren't seen with the state department, assisted by our medical staff, our logistics staff and a security staff. >> if we know the defense department has put the onus on the primes, and they contract the subs and these things are happening, then by definition, the system is failing. that is why we made the

recommendation that we made. fiat would urge you to look at this again. it clearly has not worked. these things would not be happening. >> i cannot address how any other government agency may be enforcing their contracts. under the system that will take place in january 2012, these personnel will be living on our compound using the same food service, medical services, same security services that we ourselves use. that guarantees the dignity of life that everyone agrees we must uphold.

carper maintenance -- they employ third-party nationals living on the compound. there are none of the problems that you have outlined. we are administering the contract and seen the same as holding the master contract. >> i hope so. these things have gone on. inve made a recommendation order to foster and look at the contingency process. this is nothing for us to respond to it. i am a little troubled, because

we are looking at how the interagency process works. does the no comment mean you do not care for the system works fine? what does it mean? >> the national security staff does not consider itself an operational agency. it will not engage in this kind of oversight activity. there have been other discussions of activities related to the details. they do not feel it is within their statutory mandate.

neither of the agency's field but it is within their mandate to charter an executive office agency to engage in these matters. we have to defer to others on that. >> thanks. >> thanks for being here. it seems there were a few issues left hanging by various exchanges you had with my colleague. on this last exchange about this disturbing article, you said the

medical staff is looking at some of these allegations that the inspector general has done. the next question is what is happening as a result of those? >> we were unable to identify actions of these horrifying nature is taking place on unions in direct support of the state department. i do not challenge that it may have happened elsewhere. we have not identified activities of this nature taking place against a third country nationals. >> this is a very important issue. i intend to follow up on this in

the time that remains to us. it is tremendously important. >> i fully agree. it has the requirement of the united states government for most human dignity is one of secretary clinton's highest predicates. we would not counter on such activities. if we did find it, we would demand a change as more than just individual personnel engaged in that kind of content. >> the cause for revoking a contract? >> if it was with an american company, and we knew they were

suffering in permitting that, i would go to my lawyers and ask for that. that would be poor management on the american contractor. a good first demand that the american contractor would remove from inactivity related to us their entire american management team. >> with regard to this first issue that came up, you said the u.s. office of inspector general will look into allegations and you cannot send a letter demanding payment. i am surprised that the office of inspector general has not responded. you made the request and they refuse to process it? >> they have not completed whatever work they were doing.

i would say this is a question i received from the commissioners. it is a fair question for us to ask. if your question for us to know that there is information that backs up the 32 million, or it does not. it is operating very well. no major issues. the construction, taking direct hits on those buildings and none of our personnel has been injured. >> regarding jurisdiction, would you be willing to submit a request for an impartial third party?

>> i am not an attorney. i was assured that the position we have taken with regard to the respect of the platform -- military training, rehabilitation, our advisers position is those are not within the jurisdiction of the figure. i will stand on what my legal adviser has told me. >> i think the commission would feel better about the state permits position that no new

officer is needed if we had a better sense of the existing officer. could you supply us with the state request -- budget request for the past three years or so? and the state department's response? their attempt to have adequate resources? can you comment on that generally? >> we fully supported the inspector general. we believe they form a critical function to highlighting issues that must be dealt with.

warnings in advance for dealing with items that must be dealt with -- . the request for the inspector general's office is about $65 billion. waspresident's request $65.2 million. their budget in f y 11 is 56 million. we supported a request that is almost a 9% increase. we will get the information for prior fiscal years.

for 2008 it was 52 million. they are growing up. they have a regional office in the middle east whose main focus is the iraq and afghanistan issues. we are allocating scarce sleeping accommodations so they can be close to the scene and do their jobs. >> of want to talk about the state department's response on this. one can argue that reasonable minds can differ about a number of recommendations, including the one we just discussed. one is the notion that there

should be written justification on the stations, when a contractor officer recommends suspension and debarment -- disbarment the required written justifications with an administrative burden on both agencies that party have limited resources to carry out their existing missions. it is too time-consuming to all contractors accountable to the american taxpayer. i was shocked about that response. >> who makes the final decision on disbarment. it is not the state management.

it is the executive of the department, which is separate from the head of contract in. if the chairman executive decides that to the individual contract officer has not made his or her case in law and equity, and then it is the executive, not me. >> are you saying it would be and unduly burden on the chief executive officer to make that determination? >> it is the determination of the clause i independent procurement executive. -- quasi-independent procurement

executive. i feel that is exactly what it should be. we must ensure that the american taxpayer spends an dollars worth of about a year and get it. >> >> i want to pursue this. i find it beyond silly. it is outrageous that the department or state can say when the contract in officer recommends a bar suspension, someone is recommending it,

there should not be a justification as to why it is ignored. it seems so basic. so there is a huge disagreement that we will continue to pursue. how many disbarment recommendations have been made last year? that is unacceptable. what is not acceptable is that you do not know it. yet you say it is burdensome.

if this is to say that we do not want to do it, and you are part of it, that would be a mistake. you do not know how many recommendations are under disbarment, yet your department is recommending that our recommendation not be done because its burdensome. i would think that if we have so many, that is a huge indication. if it a permit is claiming it is burdensome, then there is an outrageous response. i appreciate your looking at that. >> when you testify before the committee, he made the point that all of the activities or

inherently governmental. explain why you made the transition that everything you are doing in the transfer are not inherently governmental. you can use contractors. in your statement, you say, the activities are not inherently governmental. what are you making that claim? >> certain of our activities are governmental. , political and economic reporting. those are inherently governmental.

there are others that are not inherently governmental. if you look at security, it is not considered inherently governmental. the united states government contracts for security personnel -- >> it is a pretty broad term. if you have an itt, and you need to get a medic to deal with the injuries that are outside the embassy, and you are under fire end you have to shoot your way out to get back to safety, you have to attend to the wounded

and aggressively use force, why do you think that is not an inherently governmental function? >> even in those circumstances, security -- there is law enforcement that is inherently governmental and then security. >> security covers such a range. we have to fight our way in to get people that have been injured. we have to fight our way out to get away from it. we have to use an aggressive effort with weapons to do that. why is that not inherently government?

>> it does not meet the definition. it is something that only a governmental entity -- i know it is a circular definition >> -- >> there are a lot of combat medics paying attention to this may be some are rolling around in their grain -- grade saying, what is going on here? they made the decision that combat medics are done by military personnel. when they fly a chopper in, and they talk about being under fire, call it what you want.

no one leaves the injured. the united states army does not use civilians. >> the primary mission is to project force. >> we are talking about a rescue mission. >> that is the distinction. it is inherently governmental. >> i am comfortable with this definition. there are 1800 state department diplomatic security professionals in the entire world.

when all is said and done, -- i will agree with you. the bottom line is necessity requires you to use contractors, because you have such a huge need. you are a very candid with this. a more helpful response would be, we have the choice. we have to use contractors. if you have to use contractors, did you are breaking the law. one of the recommendations may need to be that there needs to

be a recognition of the part of government that sometimes we have to use contractors in inherently governmental situations. as your report talks about, sometimes they have a default mechanism. maybe you need that. >> i know i have a mission that has been given to me. lawyers have told me that security as opposed to law- enforcement is not inherently governmental. eighth it says the process of that analysis should be changed, i am not going to object to that. i know there is a sine curve

that tomorrow i am not going to need seven to 500 government employees to provide security from the u.s.. >> we are hearing two things. one is it may not be possible for you to have government people fulfil these functions. the second thing we are hearing for the record is you will have to build up and then, would you be able to use these folks later on? a commission feels that it may be unfair to people like you to be put in a situation where you may have no choice to use contractors and then have to claim what they are doing is inherently governmental.

four minutes. >> we jealously guard our time. i will make a couple of observations. some of the information we are seeing here is wrong. those situations that have historically been united states military and are the best in the world, and i am not looking for a comment but a fact -- the use of contact for this is the only option, you do not have an

option. my observation is in the year 2013, we tossed numbers around. d dcaa backlog is going to be over $800 billion. it will take me longer than i have to state what the return to the taxpayer is like. contractors have pulled it back. i give an example where a contractor has struggled to get

a good submission action. my whole point is to propose we become more visible champion for dod, ensuring that you do on a reimbursable basis is fully staffed. we want them to make a dent by 2014. if i am in charge of the function of that company, i would be worried about what is the impact. i believe you can be a champion for that. you are going to make a transition and to use dot support initially. -- dod support initially.

>> for life support. not for maintenance. >> it is supposed to be awarded july 31. >> you have got to compete consistent with the manner we support. we fully support rock island army action. >> yes. >> that is really important. as you evaluate that, had a company that puts all of its claims out -- why did you pull all of those out? that is a fair question. it says i certify they believe

that all of the costs are in accordance and, lo and behold, they do not. i have other questions. my time is up. i want to thank you. i may summarize those questions. the last thing i want to say on this side is that you probably use -- i have seen the best transition before the grand slam people of adair -- i have seen that so often in disarray. it is nice to see people who know how to give notes to any witness. >> i am a great witness, because i have a great team. >> thanks. occasionally, these are combative questions.

i in short on time. you can answer these questions. i was pleased to hear that you will take another look at the new embassy compound. i think commissioner ervin for tightening up on that. he is a former state department secretary general. i hope that you will not only asked again whether it has more information, but more importantly, the report or the design and construction was extremely detailed in 2009. i would hope we could go through

it and find the part of the 32 million. they may say, we put what we have in the report. that should not be the end of the matter. we went through -- out of the police training money, you have selected 40 million. you will seek 37 million back. i hoped to confirm that once again, because that is what the public will be hearing. i was one of the people that thought it was incredible figure. the report in january 2010 on this subject said, as a result, it has no confidence in the

accuracy of over $1 billion in charges. suppose they want to know where the rest about $1 billion is? would it be ok if they looked and followed up their previous audit and find out why inl took millions out? you said you got a legal opinion in the den said you must stand on what your legal adviser has told you.

your legal adviser is a professor at another law school. >> get to the question. >> we would like a written legal opinion. >> i will raise this again with the inspector general. they are perfectly free to -- they audited once and want to audit began. all of the points i have made is that they are free to audit reconstruction activity in iraq. there are not free to audit from the state department.

i will talk to a certain former law professor and ask him what his opinion is on this matter. >> thanks. >> we wanted them to do a risk- based assessment. your response was to identify the need to determine the organic resources. i am looking at this approved oversight and accountability. law-enforcement is an inherently governmental function. >> correct. >> there is a statement that

when you read it with your mind open, it is start dropping. jaw-dropping.i >> inl works for political. here is the consensus that floors year. i applaud you for being candid, but we cannot let this pass. the current workforce comprises only%