report back to the american people. i only have another minute or so but i wanted to ask another question. it is not as focused, but just in terms of the question of governance in afghanistan, which has been one of the areas of real focus that we have to make continual assessments about, in particular the karzai government, i know this is been critical over a long period of time. there is not just a perception, but an irrefutable reality that there is corruption. i wanted to get your sense of that challenge we have right now. how would you rate them? how would you assess the karzai government's efforts to root out corruption, which has been a problem throughout? >> i would give them a great of "incomplete." i think we have seen some progress, but nothing like what

we would either expect to see or want to see from them. we have continued to keep the pressure on. we, of course, have learned a lot of the last decade about how better to deliver the assistance we do because it is fair to say that a lot of the corruption is tied to contracts that come from the united states, nato partners, and others. we have been trying to get to what is a good enough standard. we are dealing with a society that has a very old history of how to deal with people and how to get tribal loyalties and family and clan loyalties. i think we have to recognize that we are in a very tough environment when it comes to corruption as it is in many other parts of the world that we deal with. we have been watching closely because of our own interest, but

we get military and civilian aid -- we give the military and civilian aid to many countries that do not measure up. corruption is one of the biggest problems we face in the world right now because it is a cancer and it undermines good governance and the role all. it is an incomplete. we see some things we think are in the right direction and we see a lot that we are very unhappy with. >> thank you very much. >> welcome, secretary clinton. i only have six minutes. i will try to talk fast to make sure our colleagues get their chance to also make some comments. let me begin by saying i would not want the record to show that i was in total agreement with your analogy comparing our situation in korea with what might take place in afghanistan. our situation in korea is in one

of the most vital areas commercially and in terms of large powers in the world, it is the only peninsula in northeast asia where -- with direct interest of the united states, china, japan, and russia intersect. korea is the bull's-eye in the middle of that. for all the questions i have had about the engagement in this other part of the world, i think you and i both know how strongly i believe that this is a critical moment in east asia in terms of potential volatility of our relations there. in that regard, i want to say again the comments you made last july relating to the sovereignty issues in the south china sea. as you know, this is a big issue today. i would also like to point out

-- i keep hearing this analogy and i take the point to a certain extent with the situation in 1989 where we could have done more in afghanistan and in that region, but we did not. we should also be mindful that the geopolitical circumstances today are quite different than they were in 1989. if the fact that we could have done more in 1989 does not justify the methods that are being used today. i have to express my agreement with senator lugar's comment. we should not be speak -- we should not be spending $120 billion a year in afghanistan. it is almost like "groundhog day."

if we keep coming back to this. if you really look at who defeated the taliban in 2001 -- the afghanis defeated the taliban with a handful of very confident -- competent american operators and border controllers. the afghanis beat them. if we look at the small we are going to be moving forward with in places like somalia and yemen, the model is much different. i think the questions people are asking about nation-building and where this is going to go are valid questions. with respect to pakistan, the word we have not heard very much today is china.

the day that chairman kerry left pakistan, the prime minister of pakistan went to china and said they work their number-one friend. there is an article in the washington post where pakistan is clearly supporting china. i would, again, express my hopes that this is one area or china could do more to legitimize -- one area where china to do more to legitimize the status it has with the economic and military power in a way that would be positive. there will be a great beneficiary if this region does regain its stability. they clearly need to be more overt. i would hope they would be more or part in trying to bring about a solution. -- i would hope they would be more overt in trying to bring about a solution.

i in your statement you mentioned this new strategic partnership declaration. i met with the afghan ambassador yesterday. he mentioned this. he said they are seeing this as an executive agreement and that the afghanis believe there will be some sort of document within the next couple of months. you and i have had many conversations with respect to the framework agreement the previous administration worked out with iraq were congress did not have a chance to fully vet it. i hope we would get a chance to examine this and give our input. clearly, the question is in terms of what our long-term relationship in afghanistan should look like is something we should be talking about before this agreement goes into place. the final thing i would say is

about your comment on page 4 of your testimony regarding this core group that is being put into place in hopes of building political support. you have india, russia, iran -- i hope you can get china. with that, i had nine seconds left and i yield back the balance of my time. >> we are working very hard to get china to play a more productive role with pakistan. we agree with that. sunday of like to talk to you about whether or not we agree with the analogies, but just try to go through them. i appreciate what you said. >> secretary clinton, thank you for being here. i join my colleagues in appreciating the job your doing

as secretary of state. a little earlier in responding to senator rubio and the decision about what happens after 2014, you talked about the continuing presence of nato. shortly after the president's speech last night, france announced two plans for drawling down troops. obviously several weeks ago secretary gates talked about challenges with our nato allies. given that situation, do you believe that our allies in nato will continue to step up and to help us in afghanistan through 2014 and what assurances do we have that that will happen? >> senator, that was the agreement at lisbon. i think a number of our nato

allies will be doing drawdowns proportionate to the troops may have. there is a planning process within nato for how to manage that. some are in areas where we have no u.s. presence. but there certainly has been an agreement that falling 2014 there will be some kind of continuing presence. i think the president mentioned last night the united states will host the nato heads of state next year in chicago and it will be the time where we will take stock of where we are in the way forward. -- and the way forward. >> there has been pressure on our capability. is there concern that will in the interim have an effect that will change our calculations for

what is happening on the ground in afghanistan? >> i do not think so, senator. certainly from made a's perspective, they joined with us -- certainly from nato's perspective, they joined with us in the mission. they were very anxious to have them -- to have thus joined them in the libyan mission. there is not necessarily a connection, a direct line between the two, but the larger questions that secretary gates has been raising, which are not afghan or libya related specifically, about the commitments of nato or the ones that will have to be addressed. >> looking at the potential for a negotiated solution in afghanistan, and i certainly understand and agree with you. we have heard from everybody that has testified before the

committee that this is not a military solution. it has to be apolitical -- a political and negotiated solution. ambassador newman testified that he was skeptical of a power- sharing agreement. he said the only 10 to last as long as it takes for one -- the only tend to last as long as it takes for one side to break it. i am verifying -- i am paraphrasing his comments there. do you think there is a possibility for any kind of agreement with the taliban parent -- taliban? >> i think there is, but i think we are a long way from knowing what the realistic elements of such an agreement would be. i think that ambassador neiman expert -- ambassador newman expresses a view that power-

sharing agreements often a way station between fighting and it perception of fighting if parties cannot maneuver off of their opposition. it is too soon to say how this could play out in afghanistan, but i can only stressed that we are committed to pursuing that because it is the only path for. there is no other path forward. nobody is strong enough to assert control. they can go back to the civil war. picking the back into all kinds of fighting between them, but i think a resolution is in the interests of the parties as well. we have to work to determine what the elements will be. >> to go back to your discussion of the civilian surge, obviously we are talking about the need to draw down the military surge. how do you look at the reduction

of the civilian surge? several weeks ago this committee issued a report that talked about the false economy that is being created in afghanistan by the amount of money that is available and at what that is doing to the afghan economy. looking at at and looking at civilian efforts and the economic efforts put in there, how do you see that being drawn down, or do you as we get closer to 2014? >> we do. i think the recommendations the committee made are ones that we are very seriously looking at. the committee recommended that the administration and congress should work together on civilian assistance. the problem with that is we do not get multi-year civilian

assistance, we get multi-year military commitments. we have no disagreement that it would be great if we could. kerry-lugar-bermann was the first effort to commit to pakistan. we certainly will be looking at the programs we are running that are in conflict zones. another point the committee made is why 80% of the funding is spent in one region. it is because the military was very insistent that there needed to be a marrying up of civilian efforts. the example i gave in my testimony is a very good example. finally, we the to focus on sustainability of our programs said the afghans can continue them. we are looking at that as well. we do not agree with all the recommendations or all of the conclusions that the committee reports, but we wish we could

get multi-year programs that could be at limited and we had the flexibility and agility. the committee, for example, talks about commander response funds. we do not have this. i cannot send a diplomat or development expert help with $100,000 in his back pocket, but young captains and majors can do that. we have learned a lot from this. we will do our very best to try to implement those lessons. i, working with our team, have been trying to wrestle to the ground how we get more accountability and more measurable outcomes from our assistance. we are going to be changing in light of the military changes, but also in light of the lessons we have learned. >> thank you. >> madam secretary, i wanted to thank you protest the morning here today. it has been engaging and

compelling and very constructive. i am crapo park cemetery to -- for convening this series up -- i am thankful for senator kerrey for conveying this hearing. after traveling to afghanistan for the first time in my life, i have spent a lot of time wrestling with what is the best path forward. i have concluded that we need to make a change in strategy in afghanistan. while i welcome the president's decision to redeploy the surged troops next summer, my view is that we should not really focused on the number of troops as much as the strategy driving them. for a variety of reasons we have heard discussed counterinsurgency strategy. it is not sustainable.

it is not likely matter how many years we pursue it. for a number of reasons, i have advocated for a change to our counterterrorism strategy. in order to have the resources, the capacity for other important threats to deal with yemen and somalia with an emerging nuclear iran, a appreciably with pakistan, i do think that we see to allocate it beginning to emerge in yemen in a way that is challenging for -- allocate the beginning to emerge in yemen in a way that -- al qaeda emerging in yemen in a way that is challenging for us. we need the resources to make the engagement with pakistan successful. let me move to three relatively brief questions. first, i wonder about what additional steps we can and

should take to engage india more effectively in stabilizing what, i think, you compellingly described as a difficult, complex relationship with pakistan. i would be interested in hearing what you are doing to successfully engage india. second, in the past is that senator web referred to, i was struck to hear you make reference to iran as being one of the regional parties being engaged successfully in a political resolution. obviously they did work with us in overthrowing the taliban. they have a shared interest with us again ending narcotics trafficking in afghanistan. but they -- but the emerging world threats is the nuclear power threat. it is challenging for the world at our critical ally, israel. how would you assess the degree to which we could have allied

interests with iran in developing some political resolutions in afghanistan? any input you might to offer in how we could refocus our efforts to bring more vitality and energy to the engagement with pakistan giving be very -- given the very troubling circumstances there. >> those are quite complex questions. let me start by saying this debate between kantor insurgency and counter-terrorism is unfortunate -- counterinsurgency and counter- terrorism is unfortunate. there is no real contradiction between the two in so much as there is a phase in between one and the other. the president decided and i agreed back in 2009 that if we did not have a significant enough presence, we would have one off victories, but we would

not change the momentum of the taliban and we would be facing a situation that would have been very difficult for us to control. i think what the president has decided now, which i also agree, is that we have made substantial progress in reversing gallivant momentum. now we have to see how sustainable -- taliban momentum. now we have to see how sustainable it is. i do not think it is an either or, i think it is a boat and. we have been running counterterrorism operations consistently. we have also had a very aggressive effort against taliban and al qaeda and their allies. with respect to india, we are working very hard on our strategic partnership with india.

it is fair to say that india looks at pakistan and believes that their continuing support for elements of insurgency against india in kashmir and across the border into india proper makes it very difficult for them to know what path to choose, but i have been encouraged by the cricket diplomacy between the prime ministers. i have been encouraged by the resumption of talks that had broken off in 2008. we have urged both sides to go as far as they could to build more confidence and to try to be able to develop that atmosphere of greater cooperation. i do not want to be misunderstood about iran. i am not saying that iran is a partner in this process or is playing a constructive role. i am merely saying that iran is a player.

the core group is strictly the court. afghanistan, pakistan, and the united states. there is a concentric circle that goes out and gets wider and wider. in that has to be china, iran, said to asia, etc. one of the insights holbrooke brought to this is that you had to have a lot of bite in from a large group of nations and institutions in order to pull every lever possible. for example, iraq was arrested by an organization of the islamic conference. that never would have happened to put five years ago. all the sudden they think they have a stake in try to push towards some kind of political resolution. with respect to pakistan, we are going to focus, refocused, and we focus again because it is an important relationship. it requires a lot of effort. there is no easy course forward, but there are many different

approaches we are trying within the context of trying to enlist them in a resolution in afghanistan. >> thank you very much. >> madam secretary, thank you for being here. i thank you for your service. it is a pleasure seeing a huge year. there was a week we shared in our public lives whenever forget. if it began with the tragedy of 9/11. it ended three days later when we both joined in voting for the resolution that authorized the president of the united states to find those responsible and those who supported them and bring them to justice. i voted for that enthusiastically as you did. i do not vote for many war resolutions, but that was the right one. if someone would have said to me on september 14, 2001, "we are still going to be there 10 years from now in the longest war in american history. we will have lost 1600 american

lives and possibly more, not to mention the casualty's and injuries, we would be spending $120 billion a year, roughly four times as much in military spending in afghanistan as the annual gross national product of afghanistan, and in the and would still be years away, i would have found it hard to believe. we were going after osama bin laden, al qaeda, and the people who made this evil opportunity possible. now we are doing something else. i would have to join in what was said earlier by senator mendez. i have a real skepticism about our mission in afghanistan at this moment. i do not have great confidence in the leadership in afghanistan either in its competence or its honesty. i worry about the money that we

are shoveling into this country. i have gotten reports and it seemed the contractors we are paying to get there to do things and even this committee says the accountability is very limited in what we are trying to see. -- in what we are trying to achieve. in seen it firsthand. we're talking about captains and majors with thousands of dollars to spend. they built a city hall and the community building built with those funds. the afghans were not looking for that, but we build it anyway. so i come to this with some skepticism and i bring another element to it as well. if we cannot win this on a military basis, senator kerry said no military solution -- you said in your speech will never

kill enough insurgents to end this war -- we still have to knowledge that 100,000 brave americans are risking your -- their lives when we tell them you cannot win this, but perform your mission. i want to ask a few more questions. what is the likelihood that we can't use the standard you set out in your asia society speech to engage the taliban in a meaningful discussion that will come up with a political solution? >> senator, your comments to me back to that very difficult time that we did share together as members of the senate. i certainly agree with you that we committed to going after al qaeda, but we also, in my view, did not follow through the way we should have early on.

and that is not meant as criticism, just a statement of fact. i think that president obama faced an incredibly difficult choice. it was difficult politically, substantively, it was difficult personally. but upon very careful reflection and review, he made the decision that i thought were the right decisions given what he had inherited. i think he is now on the right path towards resolving our involvement in afghanistan in the best way possible out of a lot of very difficult choices. i would answer the question in this late -- i do not think it is a matter of winning or losing, i think it is a matter of how we measure the success we are seeking in afghanistan.

i do believe it is possible to construct a political and diplomatic resolution. i will know more about that at the end of this year than in there now because we were not in a position, frankly, to pursue that until recently. why? because the taliban and were not interested in talking to us because they thought they were going to make a big comeback. i remember when president george w. bush basically said the taliban -- turn over bin laden and al qaeda and we are done. we are not going to come after you. i would not do it. they never had agreed to do it. only now are we beginning to see the kind of outreach that evidence is a willingness to discuss the future.

absent president obama's very difficult assessment that led to his decision. good people and very smart people can disagree about the way forward. that is what this hearing has demonstrated. i have the highest regard for every member of this committee. every single man and woman was to do what is best for america, was to do what is best for our troops, what it is our assessment, taking into account what we have said that we now have a chance to bring this to a political and diplomatic end. it is over the next year.

i wish it was eight years ago when a different choices then par. >> i urge you. as the we can bring our troops home. i do that to support it. thank you. >> thank you for your service. i think all of our colleagues. they appreciate your service. i want to breed -- i do not want

to. -- i do not want to repeat a lot about what i said. he said it was sheltering this. they had organized this terrorist attack on us. this is all gone. we are at the point where we should be looking at what many of our allies are remembering. i remember in the time it bought obama was there.with

they said disney's to be laid out. it lets us know the only pass off. do you think we have a deadline in terms of all of our combat forces being out of afghanistan? >> that has been the agreed upon .axpaye we have a final deadline of 2014. we made it clear that this was

it. it would order the implementation. i agree with you. we need to set a deadline in order to make it clear that there would be a transition. that was 2.5 years ago that the president began a testament. it is fair to say that it is working. there is a lot that has to be done in terms of building up clear.

there are lots of factors that we cannot really hold .ccountable clea it has been accomplished in part against the backdrop of the deadline. we do have a deadline. we are acting upon the parenit. >> all the forces will be out by 2014 of again stand? >> that is the agreement. of afghanistan? >> that is the agreement. >> we use the term a lot.

you hear this about conditions on the ground. this is how they step up to the plate. from all the reports i have heard, they have come along. they may not be ready. i know there was a high official. he was a controversy 01. -- controversial one. his opinion was that it would take 100 years to get the police and army to the point where we would feel they were

acceptable. i hope that we are not going down the road. we are saying that we do have a deadline. it declined to be based on conditions on the ground. -- it is going to be based on conditions on the grounds. there is the fact that the afghan army and police are not able to take this over. i hope that we can quicken this. i hope that we can move more quickly to an accelerated transition. each you are able to do that, i'm going to be here to support the. i thank you for your service. thank you are holding these hearings. thank you for allowing us to participate. thank you. >> thank you very much. madam secretary, thank you.

i apologize for this. i want to say it has been very tonstructive and help talthy have this exchange for them to plots on the table. i want to thank you for being thorough. i think this is generally constructive. what a person to use thank you for your many courtesies -- i want to personally tell you thank you for your many courtesies and what a great job your doing. we are grateful to you for your seemingly endless reserve of energy. thank you very much. i look forward to following appeared we stand adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

>> of the doing business with iran. tomorrow, they testify about the sanctions. live coverage from foreign affairs as begins at 9:00 a.m. eastern wil. also, remarks from sheila bair. she is stepping down as the head of the federal deposit insurance corp. in july. from the national press club at 1:00 p.m. eastern epic

there are 11 and retired justices. this includes an interview elena kagan and with the enhanced books to add to your experience. >> to think a youtube rap video on economics to become popular? ♪

this weekend we will talk to the creators. >> we are trying to reach people who are interested in how the world works. that is everyone from a high school student whose curious about economics could personages tried to make a living and get along. >> sunday night and on c-span's q &a. >> john mccain and lindegren spoke on the senate floor about the strategy in afghanistan.

they have search forces by september 2012. representatives will likely vote on a measure to limit the use of u.s. funding for u to only -- quote -- "nonkinetic activities." in other words, noncomb activities. so that no limited strike mission toss suppress air defenses or predator strikes against qadhafi's forces, which we're doing very little of already. the only military actions for which the commander i chief could commit our armed forces would be supporting msions from search and rescue to aerial refueling to intelligence. that is the provisions in what is very likely to be voted on and psed by the house of representatives tomorrow. now, some may not see a connection between these decisions, but the connection is

pro found. we're having a profound debate in this country right now that i suect will continue for some time. critical questions are being asked and discussed. how could -- how should we in the united states define our national interests? what is the proper role for america in the world? how do we balance our commitments abroad and the global demands for u.s. leadership with anmerican public that is justifiably war weary after a decade of conflict and that is rightly concerned with our unsustainable levels of government spending and national debt. these are vital questions. they willetermine the future of our nation and indeed the future of the world. reasonable americans can disagree over what the right answers are, and although our disagreements may be heated and passnate, we should always remember that we're all americans, that we're all

patriotic and that we all wt to do what is best for the nation we love. the discussions we are now having over libya and afghanistan go right to the heart of this broader debate, and this is where we see the real practical impact of the decisions all of us in public life must make and be accounted for. we're all trying to define america's interests and role in the world, to separate that which we can and must do from that which is beyond our capacity and our benefit to try to accomplish. we're all striving for a balanced approach to america's interest abroad, and it is for that reason i am very concerned about both the president's decision on afghanistan and the house's pending vote on libya. i agree with the president that thanks especially to the sacrifice and courage of our fighting men and women, we're making amazing progress in

afghanistan. this progress is real and it's remarkable, but as our commanders on the ground all point out, it is also fragile and reversible. our commanders also say that what will be decisive is t fighting season next year the warmer spring and summer months when the insurgency historically picks up its operations after resting and regrouping a bit during the colder months. this will be our opportunity to consolidate our gains in southern afghanistan and being transitioning more and more of that fight to our afghan friends while increasing numbers of u.s. forces shift their main effort to eastern afghanistan where the hakani networks, al qaeda and other regional mill clant groups are still present and -- militant groups are still present and operating actively. the reason our commanders had to take this sequential approach is because they did not get all the forces they requested in 2009,

40,000 troops as opposed to the 33,000 the president gave them. what this means in practice is that our commanders in afghanistan still need next year's fighting season to deal the same crushing blow to al qaeda and the taliban in the east as our forces have dealt them in the south. however, under the president's plan which calls for having all of our surge units out of afghanistan by september, those troops will begin -- will begin flog out of afghanistan right at the time that the taliban, al qaeda and their allies begin stepping up their operations, especially in eastern afghanistan. this is the irony of it all. the president's decision in december, 2009, had the effect of making this war longer and costlier by forcing our commanders to tackle our enemies in sthern and eastern

afghanistan sequentially over two years rather than simultaneously in one decisive action over one year, and now just at the moment when our troops could finish our main objective and begin ending our combat operations in a responsible way, just when they are one year away from turning over a battered and bron enemy in both southern and etern afghanistan to our afghan partners, the president has now decided to deny them the forces that our commanders believe they need to accomplish their objective. i hope i am wrong. i hopthe president is right. this decision will not endanger the hard-won gains thatur troops have made or the decisive progress that they still need to make next year. i hope that proves correct, but i'm very concerned that the president's decision poses an unnecessary risk to the progress we have made thus far to our

mission and to our men and women in uniform. our troops are not exhausted. they are excited that after ten years we finally have a winning strategy that's turning this war around, and anyone who says that our troops are exhausted should go out and talk to them. they wan to stay at this until the job is done, we have sacrificed too much. america has a vital national interest in succeeding in afghanistan after all that we have given to this mission, the money we have committed to it, the decade we have devoted to it and the precious lives we have lost thrghout it. why would we do anything now that puts our mission at greater risk of failure? i would offer the same counsel to my republican friends in the house with regards to our mission in libya. i know that my colleagues in congress arengry with the

administration and its libya policy, and they have every right to be. from the disrespect and disregard the administration has shown congress to their bizarre assertion that we are not really engaged in hostilities in libya t lack of resolve with which they have prosecuted this fight and made the public case for it, the administration has done an unfortunate amount to earn the ier of -- ire of congress. but we can't forget the main point. in the midst of the most ground-breaking geopolitical event in two decades at least, as peaceful protests for democracy are sweeping the middle east, with qadhafi's forces ready to strike at the gates of benghazi and with arabs and muslims in libya and across the region pleading for the united states military to stop the bloodshed, the united states and our allies took action and prevented the massacre that qadhafi had promised to commit

in a city of 700,000 people, and by doing so began creating conditions that are increasing the pressure on qadhafi to give up per. yes, the progress towards this goal has been slower than many had hopednd the administration is doing less to achieve it than i and others would like, but here are the facts. we are succeeding in libya. qadhafi is going to fall. it is just a matter of time. so i would ask my colleagues is this the time for congress to turn against this policy? is this the time to ride to the rescue of an antiamerican tyrant when the writing is on the wall that he is collapsing? is this the time for congress to declare to the world, to qadhafi and his inner circle, to qadhafi's opponents who are fighting for their freedom and

to our nato allies who are carrying a far heavier burden in this conflict than we are, is this the time for america to tell all of these people that our heart is not in this and that we won't see this mission through, that we will abandon our bestriends and allies on a whim? this all comes back as to how we americans define our national interests and act on them. we canll agree that none of us are averse to doing what is necessary to defendmerica and our allies when we face a clear threat in the world. in that way, we're likely -- we are like any other nation in history, but what sets us apart from those other nations, what makes us exceptional, what makes us the united states of america is that we define our interests more broadly than that. our interests also encompass the fact that we are the leader of

the free world, that the circle of nations that want us to play that role is growing, not dinishing, and that this position of leadership also confers responsibilities that are greater than our own immediate andaterial self-interests. it is the responsibility that we have to the universal ideals of freedom and justice and human rights of which our nation is both the greatest embodiment and the greatest champion in human histor that is not to say that we can or should be involved everywhere. that is not to say that we must act wherever and whenever our ideals are threatened. this is not to say that military action is always the right answer, nor is this a recipe for endless conflict and commitment. america's powerful, but we are not omnipotent. we must make hard choices about where to spend our blood and

treasure. there will be more occasions than not that we will choose not intervene either because our interests do not warrant it or because we don't have the capacity to doo or because greater american involvement will not improve the situation. and when we choose not to intervene forcefully in places where the cause of justice is calling out to us, be it sud or the congo or syria or countless other places where i and others have argued against intervention, we will be assailed a hypocritical and inconsistent. that is unfair, but it's nothing new for america what we can never forget is that our nation's interests are forever colored by our values, that america has always belied that the success of freedom and democracy in other lands does not just make our world more just. it makes it a safer, more secure

and better place for americans and our children. we can never afford to define our interests so narrowly that we wou have sat back as an anti-american tyrant slaughtered his own people, thereby destroying one of the most historic attempts by millions of arabs and muslims to build better and more stable governments. that would have served neither our moral nor our strategic interests. similarly, once we are engaged in a fight as we are now in libya and afghanistan, and when we still have a clear path to succeed, as we do in both countries, it is in both our moral and strategic interests to finish the job, even if it is difficult and costly and unpopular. but failure is the only cost that we truly cannot afford. america cannot make the world perfect, but we can make it

better, freer, more just,ore prosperous. that's what's always made us an exceptional nation. that is what has always been the greatest source of our national security. that is what has always made us america. and that's how we must remn. mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the following articles, "wall street journal" article this morning entitled "libya and republicans." "the washington post" editorial this morning entitledend of a surge." and a "wall street journal" article also entled "unplugging the afghan surge" be inserted in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. a senator: mr. president? mr. mccain: i note my friend from south carolina here today. the senator from south carolina, as many of us tphoerbgs is a reserve -- know, is a reserve

colonel in the united states air force j.a.g. corps. he has spend more time in afghanistan than any member of congress, more than most members of congress combined. he has observe closely in afghanistan the surge, its success, its i am pedestrianments. -- its impediments. i ask unanimous consent to engage in a colloquy with my friend from south carolina. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. mccain: i wonder if my friend has seen general kean, the architecture of the surge in iraq, on one of the networks this morning describing his views on the president's decision concerning drawing down our troops in afghanistan? mr. graham: i did. about your statement on the floor, i'd like to associate myself with it.

it was a very well articulated statement about the tim in which we live. afghanistan, for about 18 months we've had additional military capacity that was never known to afghanistan. to all, because of president obama's decision to send 33,000 troops at general petraeus's request. the request was for 40. but at the time i said i do appreciate president obama giving the commander the resources to do the job, but you have to do it differently. general kean is the architect of insurgency. he is a mentor of general petraeus. he and general petraeus and others came up with the strategy that succeeded in iraq. here's what's happened from my point of view. i go every three months. about two years ago i was afraid we were going to lose. how could the taliban come back with 100,000 nato forces in

afghanistan? rules of engagement for nato were law enforcement rules. we were looking at this from the eyes of a law enforcement activity, and the number of american forces with a about 30,000. that wasn't enough to help build the afghan army, train and equip the afghan army, control the population, provide safety, give governance a chance to flourish through better security. that's why we needed more troops. and to all the commanders before general petraeus, you were holding afghanian together in many ways with duck tape. i believe iraq is a potal moment in the war on terror, but it is a fair observation to make that because of the war in iraq resource wr-s taken away from afghanistan. even though we have been there for ten years, we really only have been there with the capacity to bring about kpaepbg for only -- change for8

months. what's happened in 18 months? forces were sent to the southern part of afghanistan. this is a fight between the taban, a radical element of the pashtun community and a majority of pashtuns and other afghans who want a different way. kandahar is in the south, the spiritual home of omar. there is an american operating base within a mile of his compound. you can get on the rule of his prison there and see omar's compound. the argument is if we can win in the south we can win anywhere. we took 30,000 troops into the southern part of afghanistan and broke the enemy's back and we have allowed the afghan army and security forces to develop. in september 2009, senator mccain, there were 800 people a monthoining the afghan army,

2,000 a month leaving. i'm not very good at math, but that's not a way to build up an army. from december 2009 until the present, we've been recruiting 6,000 a month in the army, 3,000 in police. what happened? better pay and a sense that we were going to win. so, in 17 months we've built up the afghan security forces by 90,000. we'll have 305,000 by the end of this tkwraoer. what's the problem -- end of this year. what's the problem with the president's drawdown of forces? why can't you do it with the numbers we have. counterinsurgency is a very labor-intensive operation. its goal is to provide population security, focus on training by fighting with a unit, instead of training them during the day and hoping they do well at night, you go out and live with theolice and the army. it is a lor-intensive active

but it is the way to build capacity. here's the problem. the surge under the president's withdrawal plan are going to compromise next summer. drawing 10,000 down this year is going to make it hard to finish out the fighting season we're engaged in now. here's general allen's dilemma. because we had 30, not 40, we couldn't go to r.c. east and fight the taliban at the same me. we took our full force of the surge and put it against the taliban, the south. we broke their back. we've been holding r.c. east and the game plan was to take those surge forces out of the south and go to r.c. east next summer and deliver a decisive blow to the haqqani network. that way the two forces fhting in afghanistan would be put at bay. beuse of the president's rejection of the advice, come

next summer the surge forces will be all gone by september and general allen is in a box. how does he hang on to the security gains in r.c. south because the enemy's will has been broken, they have been put on their knees but they are not yet defeated because they can go across the border to afghanistan. next summer the surge forces we were going to have available for general all are going to be gone, and r.c. east cannot be engaged in the same fashion as r.c. south. what does that all matter? that means that one of the enemies of the afghan people are going to get, is getting a reprieve in the ability to develop security forceall over the country so that when we leave they can fight and win has been compromised. counterinsurgency requires math. you need a certain amount of soldiers against the enemy. i was asked last night, there are only 50 al qaeda. why do you need so many troops? one navy seal could defeat 50 al

qaeda. those who suggest that simplistic formula don't understand what we're trying to do. we're trying to take a country that's been beaten down, involved in civil war for 30 years, and provide better governance through better security. and theay you beat the taliban is you go and take them on with an overwhelming show of force. you inspire the local population to come your way and get off the sidelines, because they don't want the taliban to win, but they're afraid at the end of the dawe're going to leave and the taliban will take over. because of the surge, the people in the sth jumped our way. and this is what's so heartbreaking. we're on the verge of being able in two summers to deliver decisive blows to two enemies of us and the afghan people. the radical element of the taliban and the haqqani network

in the east. but because of this adjustment in strategy, we now have lost, i think, capability, and general allen's going to have a muc more difficult job. things to watch, senator mccain. mr. mccain: according to "the washington post" this morning editorial, "end of the surge: the mismatch between president obama's strategy and his troop withdrawal timetable," mr. obama's withdrawal decision with no clear basis and strategy increases the risk of failure. the only other issue i would like -- and i think the senator from south carolina is very well qualified to describe it -- i hear over and over again, especially from those who are opposed to this, our involvement in this conflict -- quote -- "the troops are exhausted. the troops are exhausted." and yet general kean this morning on one of the news channel said they're not

exhausted. they're exhilarated because they're winning. they know they've sack tpaoeusd so many of -- sacrificed so many of their comrades killed and wounded. they're not exhausted, but they certainly, certainly don't want to come home in defeat, something that i saw a long time ago. mr. graham: that's a very good question. who are these people and what makes them tick? why would people who could leave by just, you know, not reenlisting, why do they keep going back to iraq and afghanistan? my view of our force is that they see the face of the enemy. they believe they've got a strategy that's working. and they don't want their kids to go back. and so when you u the troops as a reason to shortcut this war, i don't think you're really listening to what they say and what they do. if they thought -- if they were exhausted and hopeless, they would change careers. i have never seen afghanistan change as much as i have in the

last year. and my fear is that the successes we have achieved or got to be compromised for no good reason, pwoebgt of us -- both of us believe that you could at the end of 2012, if you do this right, remove all the surge forces. but what we have been trying to argue to the president and anyone else who will listen, that this fighting season and the next fighting season are the best chance we'll have in our lifetime to bring about permanent sustainable change. and general petraeus, i think, has been trying to tell the country and the president give general allen the ability to take the fight to the east like we did to the south. and from the troop's point of view, the reason they go to afghanistan and iq over and over again is that they understand this enemy better than you and i. they see what the enemy's capae of doing.

they saw it in amvar where children were killed in front of their parents by al qaeda. they see when the taliban hang a nine-year-old boy because they believe he was providing information to the coalition forces. i think our troops understand the danger america faces to the point that they're willing to leave their families time and time again to protect all of us back here at home. and if you don't believe afghanistan matters, then i think you're going to be in for a rude awakening. if it goes bad in afghanistan, if the taliban can survive and wait us out and they begin to reemerge, a lot of people who helped us, senator mccain, are going to get killed. and when america goes off to some future conflict to help the

oppressed, we're going to be seen as an unreliable ally, and our enemies are going to be stronger. one final thought. this is a consequential week. the negotiations dealing with our national debt have broke down. my colleagues in the house, who i really respect, are about to vote to cut off funding, which will send a signal to moammar qadhafi that i think is unhealthy. at the end of the day, the decisions we make here in congress are going to affect our nation long after me and you leave this body. qadhafi is on the hopes. nato has limited capacity, but if the american congress tells qadhafi we're out of the fight, i'm afraid that that's going to give him a sense of hope he doesn't have today.

and what does it matter if he stays? i think logically you can expect if he outlasts nato, t arab spring is over. we can't go into syria, but he will take it out on h people. i think it will affect the price of oil. that will be the end of nato because nato taking on qadhafi and losing is going to be very hard for that organization to go off to another war and be taken seriously. so senator mccain, i hope that we can survive this week,hat cooler heads will prevail, and i'm going to tell joe allen, when you come to get confirmed for this job, please let us know if you're having to make hard decisions because of a lack of resources, give the president that information, let congress know so we can adjust the strategy. i hope the president is right and that we're both wrong, but general cain and general

petraeus have come up with a strategy that i think given time and patience will work. this new strategy is something that is untested, that is unnecessarily risky. and the way to keep america safe, ronald reagan said, was that when people who love freedom -- how do you prevent a war? he said when people who love freedom are strong, not weak, that's the best way to prevent war. mr. mccain: in summary, and i want to thank the senator from connecticut for his forbearance. i agree with the senator from south carolina, obviously. i say to my friends on the other side of the capitol that although it may fall on deaf ears at this moment, i hope they know that we understand their frustration about the president's failure to recognize that the war power act exists, about the failure of the

administration to consult and brief members of congress on the situation in libya, about many of the aspects of the way that this conflict has been condued where america's -- quote -- " leading from behind." but i want to repeat from the senator from south carolina said. this could mean the end of nato. if nato can't defeat a third-te military power,hen nato is probly going to go out of business. if we don't succeed in libya and oust qadhafi, as is the president's policy, you will see a cenr for terrorist activities. you will see a return of al qaeda to libya, certainly a dramatically increased influence. and, frankly, it will send a message to the world that even though we say that a dictator and a brutal killer and murderer like qadhafi, it is our policy that he be removed from power, we are either unwilling or

unable to do so, and i would caution again my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, i hope they wouldn't do anything that would enhance the ability of this brutal dictator to remain in power and continue to perpetrate the murders and crimes that he is so well known for.

.or.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> men and women for whom integrity and analysis is the watch word. i have served closely with many of them since 9/11 and i cannot say enough about them and the sacrifices they and their families make for our country.

serving as their director would be a tremendous honor and privilege. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, general petraeus. do you agree to appear before the committee here or other venues when invited? >> yes, i do. >> do you agree when invited? >> i do. >> do you agree to provide documents requested by the committee in order to carry out its legislative responsibility? >> yes, i doo. >> i will. do you agree to inform to the fullest extent possible all members of this committee activities and covert actions? >> yes, i do. >> thank you very much, general. i know this is not the subject

but because of president obama's announcement last night, i would like to put that behind us and then go on to other things. when we talk, you mentioned that you had presented to the president certain options and we didn't discuss what they were. i would just like to ask this question. how do you view the president's decision with respect to bringing home certain troops and maintaining others for the rest of the time prior to 2014? >> >> perhaps i can just walk through the process because it was quite a substantial one although in a brief period of time including three meetings, after the first meeting i was given homework assignment which i answered sbi the second meeting and the third meeting is the one where the president ultimately reached the decision. in that kind of situation my job

is to provide options to the president. that's what i did. associated with each of those options was the assessment of risk. risk having to do with the ability to achieve objectives of the military campaign plan acknowledging that at every level of the chain of command above me there are different considerations and that each person above me and including the president has a broader purview and broader considerations that are brought to bear in evaluating all of those different considerations including certainly the commander on the ground but also many others as well. i provided such options. i provided assessments of risk and recommendations. we discussed all of this again

at considerable length. the president made the decision. the commander in chief has decided and it is the responsibility of those in uniform to do everything humanly possible to execute it. as chairman mullen stated today before the house armed services committee, the ultimate decision was a more aggressive formulation, if you will, in terms of the timeline, than what we had recommended. again, that is understandable in the sense that there are broader consideration beyond just those to have military commander. the fact is there has never been a commander in history who has had all the forces that he would like to have with all the time and money and authorities. so there is always a process of assessing risk and it is typically in a case like this as the chairman put it today risk

at the margin. we're talking about small differences. albeit significant from a military commander point of view. so that's how i would lay out again the process that took place. the very good discussion. this was indeed vigorous. all voices were heard in the situation room and ultimately the decision has been made and with the decision made obviously i support that and will do all that i can during my remaining time as commander of i sap to implement it to do likewise so that we can achieve the objectives of the campaign planned also if confirmed as the director of the central intelligence agency to do the same from that position as well. >> thank you. i have one minute left. i have been concerned by many of president karzai's statements.

we all know what this country has done in the last 10 careers and it seems to me to be the development of an adversarial relationship. how do you view his recent statements? >> well, first of all, let me just say that there have been times when -- first of all, we have not always seen issues the same way. and we have worked very hard to resolve such situation. secondly, there have been times where we think that perhaps communication to domestic audiences led to some of the kinds of statements that we have heard, which i think have caused legitimate concern among some who have heard those and that is very understandable. i should note that i have sat down with presidents karzai on numerable occasions and people ask what is the relationship

like and i say it is a productive forthright relationship and one that we do not always see issues from the same perspective initially but typically when we have batted these around, we have come to mutually acceptable solutions. secretary gates has observed i think rightly that there have been times that we have not listened closely enough to president karzai. i think this is an important element of the relationship. at times we need to think about walking a mile or kilometer in his shoes and to understand again that perspective and the need to maintain again this political foundation that is so challenging there but without which he cannot operate. so i have a degree of understanding in this case for president karzai with whom i have partnered other the past

year. during which time we have made significant gains on the security front in the greater kabul security area in kandahar and other areas in the face of a resilient insurgency. we have resolved some of the important issues that have been problematic in the past. we have reduced civilian casualties each year. we did it in 2010. they are down -- the losses due to to isap or afghan operations are down this year over 10%, but that is not good enough, we understand, and we have to continue to do that. afghan forces lead, they do not just accompany us or partner us. they lead 25% of the night raids which are very, very important to the overall effort although not the be all and end all because this requires a

comprehensive approach that also has to include a viret of other elements in this campaign that we are executing. indeed, i think that we have to continue to dialogue and partnership and there are times understandably, there are stresses on that relationship, addressing those is not optional and that is indeed the way that we approach that relationship and i work to help the individual who is the elected leader of a sovereign country trying reach the same kinds of goals that we have for his land there. >> thank you very much. mr. chairman ? >> thanks, madam chairman. in listening to the president last night, i was somewhat disappointed with the scale of the drawdown particularly the the short term and the reason that i was disappointed is because i have visited with you on any number of occasions where

you have been very attentive to making sure that we understood what your goals were in afghanistan, particularly with the now halfway complete surge. from a timeline standpoint and you often talked about needing to make gains in hell mon hell monday and kandahar province. as i look back at your testimony in june of 2010, just after the president had made his west point speech, you talked about him making two -- giving two two messages in that speech. one of commitment and one of urgency. i want to quote you. you said the urgency was july 2011 piece noting that what happens in july 2011 is a beginning of a process for transition that its

condition-based and the beginning of a process of responsible drawdown. you also said this n that testimony as we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take will be irreversible. we'll give one shot attrition and we need to get it right. now the reason that i'm concerned about what the president said last night is that i know you made gains in the south. i know you made some gains in the east and i know that you have some additional plans for moving more aggressively in the east and i'm concerned because if we are now talking about pulling down 10,000 or 1/3 of the troops this year that are part of the surge or the balance of them, by tend of next summer before the fighting season ends next year, what is the risk of losing those gains that you

talked about or are reversible but need to be irreversible in your testimony back in june of last year? >> let me just vice chairman, mention that first of all transition will begin this summer. it begins next month, in fact, as you know, it will be conducted in seven different locations. three provinces, one of which is kabul. that is one district and then four different municipal districts. as i said, it will begin this summer and it will include a substantial number of afghan since the. nearly 25% of the population. now the fact is in each of these locations, transition essentially already has taken place. this has been ongoing for a period of time. this is made possible because over the course of time, indeed,

isap forces have thinned out and afghan forces have very much stood up to the point where there are no isap forces in the streets nor are they in kabul, i might add. we believe very strongly and this is certainly the right course to take. it is what we recommended. there will be another tranch in the fall and another in the spring and another in the fall of next year and we have an eye on that schedule. now the fact is that we will have our surge forces again. certainly 10,000 will come down by the end of this year. we have flexibility. there are already some that are coming home without replacement decisions that were already made. and others identified and we'll shape this and scope it again, based on conditions, based on assessments of the mission.

we're constantly refining and updating our campaign plan. we'll do another round of that, needless to say with the decision having been made. basically we're taking out 33,000 u.s. forces over the course of a 15-month period. perhaps as late as september or so something like that. during that time, i might add, that there will be some 70,000 additional afghan forces added based on our projections. there will be about 50,000 additional afghan national army and afghan national police. there will also be probably some 20,000 or so what are called afghan protection force which are the private security contractors coming underneath the controlled ministry to have interior, a very important action that is just beginning now and then there will be some other nonstandard elements that are supported by vrs agencies and international elements such

as counterterrorist pursuit teams turned intelligence service and so forth. it will be critical that we obviously accelerate this as much as we can. something we have always been about doing so that we can indeed do that handoff as our forces come out of locations as we really thin out because we're not just going to come out and hand off. we will thin off and indeed hand off to afghan forces. again, throughout this process, we'll be constantly examining, assessing conditions and provide forthright advice. people have always asked me if something happens that is unexpected or increases the level of risk beyond what you provided will you provide your forthright advice, in my remaining time, that will be the case and general allen, i can assure you that he will do the same as well. >> thank you.

>> thank you very much, mr. vice chairman. we'll go regular order. five-minute round. senator rockefeller? >> thank you, madam chairman. general petraeus, when we talked, we talked more about the nature of the c.i.a. the evolution of the c.i.a.. and it is interesting to me and you know, you made this statement. i got to get out of the car all by myself. you won't have a uniform on. you will be in a sense a new person to them. i say this because i care tremendously about the morale of the c.i.a. and the personnel. i think it is in pretty good shape now because i think leon panetta was pretty good. he worked at it. he brought two people with him but no more. others i think have been less effective.

some have demoralized the c.i.a. and some have developed a close band of advisors around them to whom they turn but have not been very good at reaching down -- if you get a phone call all of a sudden reaching out the usual chain of command. it is my impression first of all that unit to be a champion for the c.i.a. that is very important to you. it is also my impression that you want to focus on your duties there and you use the phrase in your testimony that you understand you will be commanding a very large agency and you will be involved in public policy but not necessarily the nation's leading discussor of policy on "meet the press." the c.i.a. will look at you first and they will be very, very pressed as obviously everybody is by what you have done. but by the very, very excellence of your performance, they will also be nervous.

because they will be receiving as their leader somebody who comes in alone and somebody who is kind of the superstar on the military and intellectual side but who they don't know. so my questions to you are the following. one, it is hard to walk into a building, you're still general petraeus. and to simply develop a sense of confidence. i have believed so strongly in the c.i.a. i think they need the -- kind of trust in their leader. i would go so far as to say i think the whole -- the entire operation, it is a very large agency, will turn to a better day's work or less good day's work based upon how they see you. so my questions are the

following. you will take nobody in with you but you will have a strategy as to how you are going to make yourself close to the c.i.a. without in a sense enforcing yourself on them but you will draw them to you and we successed that in my office and you had some very interesting thoughts and ideas and i wish you would talk about them. >> ok. thanks very much, senator. first of all, i agree with you absolutely in your assessment of the agency. as i told you behind closed doors, i'll say here, i wanted this job. this is something that was not a month or two or three in the making. secretary gates and i discussed this all the way back last year. i'm taking off the uniform that i have worn proudly for 37 years to do this job, i think, in the right way.

i think the agency and its people, having worked very closely with them in the past 10 years in particular and i feel privileged just to have been nominated to lead them. you should know day one after being sworn in wherever that is, i will indeed get out of the vehicle alone, i will go to the auditorium. we'll do an all hands and have folks piped in as well and i will tell them upfront right there that you all should know i'm here to recruit you and i know that you're here to recruit me and i also know that the director to have national clandestine service is my case officer. i'll use a lot of same techniques applied to a different organization that i tried to use in the military. reaching out, reaching down. we talked for example, about a dissension. it is called ask the director and there are an awful lot of great questions that come in for

the director apparently and i'll stress that they should know that and beyond that i'll even give it my personal email address which should be readily available on the system anyway and if it is like the military there won't be any hesitation in the junior ranks at providing unso liss ited input to their boss. actually mothers and fathers and marines and coast guards occasional take advantage of that as well and i'm delighted to answer them. did discuss today, in fact, this morning with the deputy director and the associate deputy director, i appreciate your reck nation of mike morrell as a truly superb officer and who'll be very well taken care of in the interim. both are long-time members of the agency. we have talked about the kind of strategies that can be used to

embrace the agency and to show how much i believe in them and the missions that they perform in their enormous contributions to our country's security and interests. and there is a whole variety of these. i mean, it even starts out by going to the cafeteria a few days a week and inviting groups to your office. going out to work spaces and visiting them rather than summoning them to the seventh floor and indeed summoning some to the seventh floor. i've been given a number of good ideas like that and i will seek to implement them but again, i appreciate very much your feeling for the agency because it is one that i share very deeply. >> and just finally, general petraeus, the idea of red lining, having people come at

you systematically challenging decisions that you are about to arrive at or perhaps you have arrived at as well as just picking up the phone and calling some analyst or police officer somewhere in the building or somewhere else in the world and saying what do you think about this and what do you think about that? that kind of thing spreads wildly fast. >> i believe red teaming is an important part of any such organization. something i have sought to do as i mentioned. people who are eyes and ears for you as well reaching down into the organization, two individuals and indeed welcoming and saying look, this is not a military chain of command here. this is an organization that prides itself on its flatness and the vigor of its discussions and debates and thrrked not be a case where someone walks out of my office and goes down hall and says man, i wish i had said this

or that. that should not be the case and i have got to try and cry conditions to where people are willing again not only for the agency for there to be truth spoken to power on the seventh floor of the headquarters as well. >> thank you. >> thank you very much, senator rockefeller. senator snowe? >> thank you, madam chair. welcome general petraeus. i want to join everyone in congratulating you and expressing my profound gratitude to your more than three decades of extraordinary service to this country. you are more than simply filling a position at the helm of the c.i.a. you a man of our times during this pivotal moment in this country, the challenges confronting the agency and this country and the fact that you bring a real world operational

experience on the backdrop in afghanistan and iraq and the commander over the u.s. central command and so i want to congratulate you and also say thank you to you and your family and magnificent wife holy. we -- holly. we owe you a dremmed amount of gratitude. -- tremendous amount of gratitude. i would like to go back to the question of afghanistan because obviously people in this country rightfully and all the sacrifices that the military families and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, those who have been injured during the course of this decade-long war, it is about where the future is with respect to the ultimate end game strategy and particularly in light of the president's proposed redeployment and drawdown. you have said in your march testimony that obviously that we

must ensure that afghanistan does not again want to become a -- to al qaeda. we made important advances in recent months against al qaeda but you also said back in march that our efforts are fragile and reversible. presuming on the basis that you need a certain level of troops and the president indicated in his speech last night in reference to pakistan that they will have to expand the capability to root out cancer and the violent extremists. irrespective of troop levels of irrespective of -- at the national army, is it possible to end this insurgency without the pakistanis' cooperation, their willingness to take durable unambiguous steps to eliminating

terrorist afe havens? i know your predecessor said it is one of the most frustrating relationships with pakistan. the real key to all of this is if pakistan doesn't cooperate in eliminating those sanctuaries along the borders then will we ever get to the point where that the situation will not be fragile and reversible? >> senator, first of all, thanks for your kind words. second, i think it is important to note what pakistan has done over the course of more than two years now. if you remember back around say 30 months or so ago, virtually, all of the then northwest frontier province were controlled by the pakistani taliban. other agencies of the tribal

area were controlled by the taliban pakistani and it was very clear to the political leaders, the citizens, the religious leaders and the military leaders that this posed the most pressing exsent the rble threat to the very -- exsent the rble threat that existed at that time. extreme flu vaccine the province. -- extreme valleys. we're working hard to coordinate on the other side of the border where they at times take or the -- for our operations and we are the anvil for their operations. so i think it is sfloornt we

give them credit for what they have done and for the enormous number of carnlts. thousands of soldiers. -- casualties. thousands of sold areas and police and citizens have lost their lives to these extremists inside pakistan. having said that, there is also a very clear recognition that more needs to be done not only against those extremist elements threatening the security of pakistan but also against those that are causing problems for neighboring countries, afghanistan foremost among them and indeed posing a threat to the rest of the world and that al qaeda senior leadership is known to be in various locations again in the rugged tribal border areas so there is more that needs to be done. some of these areas we have been able to coordinate to share

intelligence and so forth but in some areas as director panetta has noted that has not been the case. that is difficult. there is no question that the order of difficulty, the magnitude and the difficulty for the effort in afghanistan is greater as a result of the niblet deal with some of those very significant threats that reside in places like north wazir stan, down in certain areas. we have got to work this relationship. there are hugely important mutual objectives that we need to work together to achieve clearly this has been a time when that relationship has been frouth for -- fraught for a whole variety of different reasons. can we achieve our objectives in afghanistan?

certainly much more difficult if there is not the assistance there and in those case what is we have done is layer defenses. back from the borders and agencies in which these groups rely most heavily. for example, in host province down to the southeast of kabul which borders north waziristan, there is quite a substantial afghan establishment there. there is another line of defense and another line of defense just at the southern end of the two provinces south of kabul and the greater kabul province area and within kabul, afghan security forces are in the lead conducting all operations as the lead elements including some absolutely suburb special operations forces which indeed we do seek to support and enable with certain indeed intelligence tools and assets.

but which conduct the operations on their own pursuant to arrest warrants issued by afghan authorities. so again, more difficult without question, i'm not sure, though, that i would say not doable. >> thank you. thank you very much, senator snowe. senator wyden? >> thank you, general chair. let me join my colleague in expressing my gratitude for your service. i think what sls important in the director position is we get the straight story. i'm convinced you will be a straight shooter. i appreciate that. i brought with me a new issue of "foreign affairs" magazine. it talked about the arab revolt. it had a big caption, "why no one saw it coming."

so what i would like to do is begin by asking you what you believe is reasonable for policy makers to expect the intelligence committee to be able to anticipate in terms of major geopolitical events and i would like to take it really as something of a case study. certainly over the last few months, the reporting that we have got frontline the intelligence community has been quite good but in december or january when the revolutions were getting started, the intelligence agencies appeared to be about as surprised as everybody else. in fact, the director told the committee a few months ago that the intelligence community first realized that the mubarak regime was going to have trouble hanging on in europe when the leader of tunisia stepped down in mid january. now obviously not every surprise

or instability can be predicted. but i would like to hear your thoughts about whether it is reasonable for policy makers to expect the c.i.a. and other intelligence agencies to see events like the arab revolution coming. so my question is what should policy makers expect you to know and when should we expect you to know it? >> well, i think senator, that it is reasonable to expect the intelligence community and the c.i.a. in particular to do everything humanly possible to identify new developments, emerging developments like to arab spring. as you noted, i think the reporting on that has gotten better over time. i don't know whether it is reasonable to expect the intelligence community to be able to anticipate that the

self-mutilation of a street vendor would bring down a long standing leader of a country, dictator of tunisia. i have some degree of understanding there frankly. i think over time that the intelligence -- because i have followed it. some of it is from countries from my central command days and which i retain interest, has improved. this really comes to the point that i made in my opening statement and that is that the ealingt has to, on the one hand -- agency has to, on the one hand, absolutely maintain its focus on prosecuting the global war on terror, going after the violent extremists who pose such an important threat to our country and to our allies and our troops in a number of locations, but we also can't turn that into a game of magnet ball to use the kids' soccer analogy that everybody can't

focus on the ball, flock to it and there by lose sight of the rest of the field. having discussed it with agency leaders, they are keenly awear of the tension between this focus that -- aware of the tension. a fight that resulted in the death of oblee but also -- osama bin laden but also enis that your the mission continues so that indeed new developments don't end up being new surprises to policy makers. >> what concerns me, general, and we'll talk more about it. there is no question that the intelligence community saw that ordinary arab citizens have a lot of grievances against their respective governments. so the question is going to be and we'll be talking a lot about it since we are spending billions and billions of dollars

on intelligence, what can we get for that investment so that we really get an improved early warning system with respect to how serious these matters are and suffice it to say, will continue it. i look forward to supporting you. thank you, madam chair. >> thank you very much, senator wyden. senator burr? >> thank you. thank you many times to you and your family for your service. a number of us have had the opportunity to to see you in action in iraq and afghanistan. i think we have seen first hand, you don't say things you don't mean. given that you have made a statement numerous times on the day that you were sworn in you're going to get out of your car by yourself, given that you were the only named person in bin laden's documents, i hope you will change your mind and

take somebody with you. agency-provided security. if not all of the finished intelligence that our committee has provided is finished analysis and that is derived from reports and other raw intelligence material that we don't see. i might say we don't always need to see. in order to assure that our tax dollars are put to good use in the intelligence community, would you agree that part of the committee's duty is to conduct successful quality oversight of that analysis? >> absolutely. and as i stated, i think this is not just about keeping the committee informed. i think it is about a partnership. i know that is the trajectory on which leon panetta has the agency and i think that is what we want to continue to do. >> i know as we go forward that

you will agree on a case by case basis that there are times that the committee needs that raw toges make this successful judgment on the accuracy of the analytic product that we are providing. 9/11, the relationship between our intelligence committee and specifically the house and senate intelligence committee changed. i think it became much more transparent. a michigan more open line of communication an -- a much more open line of communication and we had a common goal and i believe that this committee should as has been notified as fully as possible on a very quick basis. on anything that was significant, especially as it related to changes in threats. this committee should have that information in a very timely fashion.

we continued to be plagued with a process of leaks. some of that may deal with changes that we need to make in clearance. i'm not sure. but staff contractors of the c.i.a. must pass a polly graph in order to have access to classified information. oversight screst access to some of the most sensitive information from the c.i.a. given this access, what is your personal opinion on whether oversight committees should be required to meet the same minimum polygraph standards as all contractors? >> senator, with respect, that is not something that i have discussed with the leadership and the agency and before making a judgment on that before the committee, what i would like to do really is to discuss it and then to come back to you for the

record if i could on that. >> i appreciate that and i think i speak for the entire committee. we would like to try again to make sure that we don't read about the things that we discuss in the intelligence committee. i know chairman has a deep interest in that that and any suggestions that you might have that help us to plug those holes, we would greatly appreciate. thank you. >> thank you very much senator burr. senator mcincludes ki? >> i just want to echo my thanks for your continued service and really as someone who has a substantial number of military -- special kudos to mrs. petraeus the way she is protecting them from financial predatory behavior.

i so enjoyed our conversation in my office and listening to your testimony here because you know in our conversation, i wanted to know not about general petraeus who i tremendously respect and admire but who is going to be mr. petraeus? who is going to be dr. petraeus and who the sheck going to be director petraeus. now you answered a lot of those questions both with me and senator rockefeller's question. when being c.e.o. of c.i.a. we also talked about you as a reformer at c.i.a. because you have certainly been a reformer in the military. so much is the work of the c.i.a. over the last 10 years has been contracted out. there has been just a tremendous

-- of contractors many of which to do work of dubious quality and some pretty dirty. i wonder if you have had the chance as you go through your transition documents to take a look at the contractor issue and do you see the need for reform there? both in terms of expenditures in money and functions performed and also the so-called dirty work that we didn't want to know too much about? >> well, i have. in fact, i discussed that. it is a topic i have discussed with the leadership of the agency. in fact, by the way, it came up when i was briefed on the agency budget. if i might note briefly i know that budget is classified. i won't get into the numbers but i will tell you that coming from the military, i kept asking surely there has got to be something more you're not telling me about because our country gets the great c.i.a. for that amount of budget, it is

the best bargain we have as a nation. now, having said that, there is no question, but that quite a substantial component goes for contractors. there is, as you know, senator, an effort already ongoing to reduce the number of contractors and i can tell you that that efforts will continue, that indeed, that thrust is present for a variety of different ares. substantive reasons. it should be done and then also because over the fiscal constraints that all elements of government are going to have to deal with in the years that lie ahead. >> well, can i have your word that as the c.e.o. to have c.i.a. that you will thoroughly scrub this issue of the use of contractors. i don't dispute the need. i'm talking about the appropriate need, value for the

dollar and then this whole way of i found, the way that if it was tough interrogation and even questionable tactics, we use that. >> you have my word. >> the job of the c.i.a. is to recruit and deploy spies but also to -- policy makers from the president to the congress on potential threats and emerging threats. that takes me to cybersecurity. you mentioned this on page five. i would like to hear your comments from the perspective of the c.i.a. my own view is during war, coming out of the white house, the policy has been -- lack of urgency, cohesiveness and muscle. i wonder from your per speblingtive as we were going a more muscular focused you are

jnt policy how you see the c.i.a. and without revealing your pack ticks, your plans, i know it is a complicated question in a public forum. >> i would be happy to. i was one of the more vocal proponents of the u.s. cybercommand. happens to be a classmate of mine. a long time friend. the expert's he has developed over the years and his leadership in the community and carries out a substantial portion of activities in this arena. clearly the agency has to focus very intently on the defenses against cyberthreats. intrusion and so forth. there is this -- this is where you do have this tension between

need to share and need to protect. and that is something that indeed i look forward to working with the leadership of the agency. but we should also remember that the agency has a unique role to play as the human intelligence collection agency if you will, first and foremost that is a charter of the c.i.a. in terms of helping other agencies get in the networks and so i indeed look forward to working that role very hard and a number of different ways partnering with general alexander and the hero rs at n.s.a. and the sishe command to assist as is appropriate in that regard as well. >> thank you, general. mr. doctor, director, petraeus. we look forward to working with

you. i believe we do protect -- i have really great anxiety about preakting dot-gov and dot.com and look forward to working with you. >> senator blunt, you're next. >> thanks, madam chairman. general, thank you for being here. i want to join my colleagues in thanking you and your family for yours service. you mentioned your west point colleague, general alexander. i know there are a couple here today. mcfarland from missouri and travis griffin from maine. i believe you and your leadership and your example are a great role model for those who serve us. i think the questions of my colleagues have been good and don't need to be repeated. there are a couple of things i would like to pursue a little bit. one, i just want to mention in my prepared remarks for the statement which i will submit, i made the comments that you made

how it is critically important, as a matter of fact, i'm going to read three sentences interest that. by assessing most of the c.i.a.'s activities out of view and under cover. that cover shouldn't be used from elected officials to hide and protecting our accountability must be a partnership. senator bird, you mentioned it must be a -- senator burr, you mentioned it. i want to talk about drones and the use of drones. as i told you in my office a couple of days ago, i am very supportive of the decisions the president made regarding the -- and one of the result s of that decision was the -- well, i think we can talk about what i want to talk about here.

>> i think we had the conversation. >> the only thing i'm going to say is we were able to lead with information in addition to the principle goal which was justice for osama bin laden. what i was going ask you in a general context was what kind of evaluation should go into that decision of how much information might be there whether you use a drone or not or whether you make the decision to try and capture the information as well as nate the individual. >> thanks. as we -- eliminate the individual. >> thanks, our targets operations, again speaking now for the military, but it has application more broadly, is to capture individuals so that you can indeed interrogate them so

that you can develop knowledge about the organizations they are part of so that you can build if you will the link diagramses, the architectural chart of these organizations and understand the hierarchy and generally continue to pull the string in as you develop a ever more granule ar and nuanced understanding of these organizations we are seeking to combat. there are occasions where we cannot for a variety of different reasons carry out that type of operation. obviously kinetic activity is a course of action whether by drone or other platforms for ma matter or other kinetic elements, and so that does provide an option to us.

other than, again, where you can not carry out a capture operation. i would note that the experience of the military with unmanned veebs is that the precision is quite impressive. that there is a very low incident of civilian casualties in the course of such operations. the warheads actually tend to this many cases are as small as the hellfire of course so these are not large mune i guesses and as a result i think the -- munitions. it is constantly growing with the proliferation of various platforms that allow us to have an understanding of the targets before they are attacked. >> i appreciate that. i do think the sense of what might be available and who else might be there and all of those things are things that as the director you need to be involved

in and look forward to that leadership and other leadership and like others on this committee, i respect your service. i respect your capacity as an individual and look forward to being supportive both during this process and as i expect will happen, your director to be supportive of your actions and to help move forward that partnership that you mentioned is such a critical part of this part of our security right now >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, senator blunt. senator nelson? >> general, i enjoyed talking to you and ampifying on senator rockefeller's comments to you. you and i discussed before that having come out of a military command structure where so often it is of necessity top down command structure that when you

get into the intelligence community, the collaboration structure is so much more essential to the effective achieving of the mission and you shared some very interesting thoughts on that with me. would you repeat them for the folks here? >> well, thanks, senator, indeed, this ability to foster collaboration in an organization like this and of course it is not strictly unique to the agency. there are huge almosts within the military among those very intelligence elements in which we seek to shake shape that same kind of collaboration and sharing. critical to the agency in particular is the sharing of all disciplines of intelligence, the

fusion of all dispeninsula. the interaction of operators and analysts and then the collaboration of all members of the intelligence community as well. i think that is critical. as we discussed, there certainly have been break throughs in every intelligence since 9/11 whether it is signals intelligence, imagery intelligence or proliferation of various platforms or unmanned vehicles and the of human intelligence because of some of the sophisticated packages and optics in some of our platforms. there have been breakthroughs but the fact is the biggest breakthrough is occasional overlooked and that is fusion of all of these products and disciplines and bringing that all together. that fusion is carried out by people. yes, you can have the massive

databases. you can throw lots of databases into. at the end of the day, the use of it, the employment of it is by people. and it is by people who work together, who are encouraged to do that, tpwhor the counterterrorist snir and so forth and with leaders who indeed bring them together and ensure that all know that team work is not optional. now again, i think the tone for this, the culture of this, obviously it has to start at the top as is the case with any organization. every team does at the end of the day have a coach and if i'm privileged to be the coach of team c.i.a., indeed, i will try to foster that kind of approach. i will try to, indeed encourage that but by my own actions, and initiatives include some of those that we discussed for

senator rockefeller earlier, reaching down, reaching out, making contact with individuals well down organization, allowing to send channels, welcoming red team contributions and so forth. >> describe what you think to be the state of the fight now with al qaeda and what do we need to do to make sure that al qaeda no longer poses a meaningful threat? >> we have to maintain that effort. again that, relentless pressure resulting in al qaeda being a considerably diminished organization but noting that it still has considerable capability. obviously the loss of the only leader al qaeda had ever known, an iconic figure is a tremendous blow to the organization and to the organization as as in the

franchise, if you will, as well. and indeed, i think even some of the images that came out of that subsequently diminish the perception of osama bin laden and the way in which he was living and so forth i think was contrary to what i would assume many of his followers would have expected of him. also of course over the course of recent years, the number three position in al qaeda was the most hazardous job in the world, but having said all of that, there still is al qaeda senior leadership. there is a new leader of al qaeda reportedly and indeed there will be efforts to regenerate, to resurrect and to continue the efforts to carry out attacks on our homeland and on the homelands of some of our allies and as you know, these franchises elsewhere, al qaeda and the arabian peninsula was a concern of mine even before i

left iraq, before even going into central manned and over the course of years there, there has been increased pressure on that as is reasonably well reported. al qaeda and africa sustained a substantial loss. every now and then you actually get a break and that appears to have been the case there with a significant leader being killed in a checkpoint. al qaeda. it bears very careful watching in al qaeda and iraq. noticeably diminished but still capable of carrying out attacks. the fact is that we cannot ever get into a game of whack a mole. what we have to do is whack all the moles simultaneously. we have to pressure that network with our own network and one of the major developments since 9/11 has been the establishment of this networ