we would then enter into a conversation about how narrowly tailored the rules are, and so forth, and not class them as not speech. justice kennedy concurs, but he says this presents an important applied challenge rather than a facial challenge. he calls attention to the fact that i do think is quite troubling, the the line drawing about what matters and a legislator has an interest in are going to be very difficult. i was struck in our discussion of citizens united with justice kennedy,'s statement in the earlier case that ingratiation and access are not corruption. ingratiation seems to be exactly the interest for which this nevada legislature was

recused, because it is his campaign manager who has a claim on his affections and loyalty. that is what this is about. i think kennedy is being consistent in being worried about this in both context. >> will you take the question? heather? >> what is interesting is the way it fits into the long- running court argument about this question, where both have expressed dimensions. the kennedy/scalia divide it goes very far back with protest votes. kennedy, the first amendment romantic, sees expressive dimensions to it. it gets the court tangled up. here i think scully it is -- scalia is being consistent. but i do not think the rest of the court has figured it out,

these controversies over disclosing people who give money to initiatives. there was a recent case involving sun in the referendum, -- just signing a referendum whether that was a public act that could be disclosed or something more like a boat that had to be kept quiet. on the way to the court right now is the case involving prop. 8. people who give money on the same-sex marriage question in california were confronted by gay-rights advocates for what they did. some of their stores have been boycotted. people have been fired on these grounds. the question is what are you doing when you are giving money to prop 8. are you a legislature because it is your vote and is a powerful moment, it is an exercise of power? or is it something more private and expressive? the court has not come down with the position. the argument keeps popping up, but they have never pin down what they think of it.

>> i think a big worry about the nevada at the commission's case is that the majority is inadvertently taking sides on a classic issue of political theory. they do not even seem to realize they are doing so. let me read you two crucial sentences. the legislature that casts his vote is a trustee for his constituents, not the prerogative of personal power. voting by a legislator is different than voting from a citizen. a voter's franchise is a personal right. you see why a majority has to say that. if voters are trustees for someone else, they would be subject to the same logic in their vote would not count as protected speech either. but that is a classic view in political theory, articulated by john stuart mill most famously. the vote for citizens is not like a piece of private property.

it is a function you exercise as a trustee for the rest of the citizen body. justice scalia assumes a way that line of argument in a way that i think would require a lot more work to sustain. >> it is a question for mike. as you describe well, the court says a legislative vote is not speech. the court goes on to say that the legislator at issue does not have the right to vote and so it is permissive to ban the legislator from participating in a legislative session as a valid time, place, and manner restriction. speech during a session is speech. it is not a vote. my question is maybe that is right. i do not know who else has a right to speak during the legislative session if they are not point to be voting. but it did in the court frivolously and seamlessly move from one conclusion to the next. i wonder if it is more complicated.

>> i agree. it is one short paragraph in this opinion that addresses the advocacy side of the recusal wall. i was not satisfied with the logic of this. there are people who have a right to advocate on the floor without voting. for example, representatives of territories do not vote in congress, but they do have a right to speak. there also are numerous other arrangements in city councils, for example, where there is often a time when citizens have the right to speak to the council, and so forth. i am not really sure where the court comes off -- exactly what the real logic is extending the recusal provision to advocacy. i think it is troubling. >> would you like to move on to other first amendment cases?

>> the key to victory for the first amendment side in the -- the key in the nevada case is the court deciding the citizens' speech. once you get the court to see this action as being speech, speech protection things kick in. this is even in cases where it is a matter of legitimate dispute whether what was at stake is speech. here in sorrel versus imf health, there is an interesting case. this case involves information that pharmacies get through government-mandated procedures when doctors send in procedures.

-- send in prescriptions. the information is kept so the pharmacies know what kind of drugs individual doctors are prescribing. this information can be used for health specialists to be studying issues of an old prescription, and for help economists to consider such things as the use of generic drugs. it can be used for a variety of purposes. but state law in several states forbid a pharmacist from selling disinformation to drug companies. the reason drug companies want this information is that they send their representatives to do what is called detailing, which is meeting with doctors to suggest they subscribe certain drugs. if a drug company knows what

drugs a doctor is inclined to describe, that enables them to target this marketing more effectively. i thing it is exactly what goes on on the internet when the internet tracks your purchases and mysteriously at start appearing on web pages that are targeted directly to you. some people on the internet think this is a good thing. i like it. it means advertising is something that is going to be of use to me. but some people do not like it. they think it is either an interference with their privacy or for some other reason objectionable. this is effectively a non- internet version of the same thing.

two courts of appeals split on this. one court of appeal said this use of the doctor-specific information is no more freedom of speech -- this is just regulating a commodity. this information being sold is a commodity, the court said, just like beef jerky. regulating it is a matter of regulating a business. the supreme court took the opposite view. it took the view that it is speech because this is information and the purveying of information, even for sale, is a form of speech. sale, is a form of speech. it does not matter that there is a profit motive. the lot of information for sale is out of the profit motive. the new york times, for example,

gives us information every day not out of the goodness of its heart but because they are in the profit-making business of selling newspapers. so also authors and bookstores. a great deal of speech is generated in the for-profit making purposes. the court then notes there is a discrimination in the law about which speakers and which subjects this information can be used for. it can be used by researchers for educational and scientific purposes and public health purposes and so forth. it cannot be used by drug companies from marketing. the court said that this kind of speaker discrimination and subject matter discrimination with respect to speech is

subject to tighten scrutiny. in this case, because it is commercial, the court says they do not have to decide whether it is strict scrutiny or commercial speech intermediate scrutiny. either way, the government has to establish that it has a substantial interest in the regulation and that is being served in an appropriately narrowly tailored way. i think this is a rather progressive free speech case. it again shows how important it is to get within that free speech box. it is interesting to compare this case with the nevada ethics case. the nevada ethics case, and a legislator voting and advocating for legislation, not speech. hear, selling data mining about a government-regulated --

information generated as a result of government regulations, that is speech. that accounts for the difference in the questions. one wonders whether there is not some tension in the propensity of the court to see what is and is not speech. to throw in one further example from last term, and the court found a law school religious group's insistence that those who conduct their bible studies actually believe in the bible, that is believed in their own religious views -- that was described as the majority -- by the majority as conduct rather than speech and therefore could be suppressed on the basis of a regulation that is merely reasonable and not viewpoint discriminatory. defining the sort of speech, the speech-related tax, a speech or

conduct is outcome determinative, and not necessarily intuitive. >> when you think about this it post-1937, there is a general assumption that courts are not meant to second-guess legislators on social and economic issues. are the commercial speech cases starting back in the 70's and now including sorrell -- are they narrowing that position and displacing that generalization with the notion that if you can characterize it as speech it becomes something appropriate for judicial review? is this another addition to that line of cases? >> i think it is. just as briar -- just as brier - justice bryer has an interesting

descent. he said it is business and should be treated as ordinary commercial regulation. there is an earlier case involving advertising of food products in which the court did just treat the matter as one of economic regulation. to me, economic or not economic is not the line the court is using. i think it has to do with what rights are protected by the constitution and which are not. much of the problem with the lord mayor area -- of the law firm -- of the loughner area is that there is no general economic freedom protected. there is no general what freedom

to engage in contracts that you want to. instead, what i think the court has come to say with the exception of some of the very controversial substitute due process cases is we are going to protect what is in the constitution and are not going to protect the stuff that is not in the constitution. there is a line in sorrel that supports this. i think it is a response, and implicit response to justice breyer. and i think i can quote it. he says the constitution does not embody herbert spencer's social ethics. a famous line from the justice holmes.

and he says, "but it does have a first amendment. i think it can lead the's point is that the first amendment protect speech. this is speech. >> there was another case on the docket this term, a first amendment case. is that another example of defining in and finding out? you had the court concerned they might open the floodgate to retaliations. it is being seen as first amendment issues. that seemed a little like an example of the nevada case, an exception to the general tack with the first amendment. they seem not to want to bring that conduct within the scope of the first amendment. >> it is conceptually one of the most interesting cases of the term. this was brought under the petition clause. there are precious few supreme court cases ever under the petition cause. this is a case in which by all

rights, everyone agrees the plaintiff would have lost with the free speech clause. the question is whether the petition cause provides a separate and independent protection. this is the public employee. he is the chief of police. he files various labor grievances and also some more political grievances against the city, and the city council fires him as a result. under longstanding, although i think rather odd and unpersuasive, but nonetheless longstanding, supreme court doctrine, public employees cannot be fired in retaliation for their speech. but it is only protected if it is on a matter of public concern. you might also want to think

about snyder against phelps. if his liver -- labor grievances are his private concern, it is not protected under the free- speech clause at all. the chief of police does not go under the free-speech clause. instead, he sues under the petition clause. the significant point about the petition cause is we know historically that petitions are frequently, maybe even quintessentially, on matters of private as well as public concern. you can submit petitions on matters of public concern, but the vast majority of petitions that would have been known to the farmers of the first amendment or matters of private concern. if you had a problem with the government, you send in a petition asking for it to be dealt with. his point is that the first

amendment has different protections. the free-speech clause is not the only thing there. there is the speech clause. there is protection. there is assembly. there is free exercise of the establishment related to religion. he says if you look at the purposes of the speech clause it may be logical to give greater protection for matters of public concern, but if you are looking at the petition cause it does not have within it and the preference or greater importance for public rather than private. if anything, it has the other way. the majority opinion written by justice kennedy essentially reduces the petition close to the speech clause, applies the same distinction to the petition cause, and says he loses. justice scalia wrote a fantastic

descent -- dissent, my candidate for best of the term. he takes the majority to task for failure to recognize that these are for different causes to the first amendment. each stands on its own. i said it is a idss -- dissent. it is actually a concurrence. he says the key distinction and the reason the chief of police should lose is that when you are petitioning the government in its sovereign capacity because applies. but when you are petitioning your employer in the capacity of being your employer, that is not a petition covered by the first amendment. so it is a distinction between public concern and private concern, but whether the employer is the recipient of the petition acting in a government

capacity or employment capacity. the strikes and as a much more consistent with the history and purpose of these clauses that i do not understand why did not attract more -- justice thomas agreed with that. i do not know why it did not attract more votes. what is this important? it is part of a trend over the past several years of collapse and all the various parts of the first amendment into freedom of speech. i think this was a serious mistake. last year in the christian legal society case, this religious group or referred to brought freedom of association, the modern way we used to speak of what the framers spoke of as assembly. they have a separate claim. we have a right to constitute our group with our leaders being people who agree with our beliefs. that is an essential part of freedom of association. and we can not be penalized by

that -- for that by being excluded from otherwise generally available public benefits like being able to meet in classrooms at a public law school. the supreme court last year said, essentially, that it would be anomalous to give the group greater rights under the freedom of association than they would have an entitled to under freedom of speech. that is the entirety of the logic, that it would be anomalous. i think on the contrary it is not at all anomalous to say that the different provisions of the freedom of the first amendment are protecting different aspects of communication, and in slightly different ways. what is anomalous is for the court to bomb them altogether -- glom them all together and say we have a free-speech clause and no other cause provides

additional protections. we would be able to say the same thing of press, which has been reduced to freedom of speech. association reduced to freedom of speech. the addition largely reduced to freedom of speech. this seems to me to be an unwarranted development. >> thank you. you see mike is right. it was a big first amendment term. time is running. we want to be sure to give ample time to federalism and the important cases this term. >> by my count, there were five pre-emption cases this past term. i am not going to try to subject to to my exegesis on each of them. instead, i will try to treat them illicitly and identify three questions that i think are worth puzzling over about these pre-emption cases. they are not perhaps the most

exciting of the term, but i think several are important. the first question is why so many pre-emption cases not just this term but term after term in general. second, it is the robert court fairly described as the pro- preemption court backs if that characterization is accurate? -- a fairly described as a pro pre-emption court? if it is characterized that way, is there any reason to be concerned about this from a federalism perspective? >> first, why are there so many pre-emption cases? i am going to briefly summarize the subject matter of these cases. i think that will go a long way towards eliminating why we have so many of them. the chamber of commerce against ". the issue was whether an arizona law imposing licensing sanctions on employers is pre-

empted by federal immigration law. at&t mobility against conception. the question is whether the federal arbitration act provide the to the rule of california contract law, the self discovery law, which deemed class action waivers unenforceable when certain criteria are met. [unintelligible] against wyatt concerned federal vaccine law and whether it prevented defect claims against vaccine manufacturers. williamson against mazda motor questioned whether safety standards preempted state tort suits against ottoman the factors. finally, a court case concerned federal drug regulations applicable to the generic drug manufacturers and whether they preempt state law tort claims alleging a failure to look -- a failure to warn.

what did these tell us about why there are some of the pre- emption cases? they tell us pre-emption cases are sites of ongoing disagreement about multiple issues simultaneously. pre-emption cases foremost are cases about federalism, about federal-state relations. people care about about this. that often end of disagreements over the government regulation of business. in the roberts court, people care about about government regulation of business. when they care enough, then make a federal case out of it. pre-emption cases also indicate conflicts over how certain social problems are best regulated -- through to an agency paradigm, a regulatory paradigm, or two judges and common-law decision making? finally, pre-emption cases often arise when states take action

with respect to hot-button issues of the day. for example, immigration reform. for all of these reasons, we have a lot of pre-emption cases. i do not think that is when to change. i want to add an additional reason or hypothesis. that is because pre-emption cases are hard. they are very hard. why are they very hard? because the touchstone is congressional intent. congress often does the rest of us no favors as we try to figure out what congress had in mind when they wrote a law. do we look at the structure of the statute? do we look more broadly at statutory context, including history and a broader congressional purposes? do we look at all of them, or only some of them? i think the fact that pre- emption cases are difficult because pre-emption -- because congressional intent is so hard

to discern is that judges will make judgment calls. those are contemptible. the will and that this agreement. the court will be moved to disappear -- move to intervene and make a judgment call. how does one go about divining congressional intent? that is not easy to answer in the abstract and across the board. the same justices do with the question of congressional intent differently in different cases. i think two of the most important cases of the term illustrate this nicely -- waiting and conception. in writing, - whiting, the court said this arizona law which imposed sanctions on those who hire illegal immigrants, was not prohibited -- was not pre- emption of federal immigration

law. in the majority opinion, chief justice rehnquist emphasized the preemption provision of the statute, specifically the reference to licensing and similar laws. it argued that arizona had enacted a licensing statute which fell within the scope of the savings clause. in dissent, justice prior -- breyer made arguments for why congress could not have had in mind what the court attributive because the savings clause would blow up the preemption provision and undermine a statute more broadly, congress's concern about protecting unauthorized workers from race or national origin discrimination. that is a case in which you

have one court arguing language structure and the other arguing statutory context. contrast that with conception. the court argued it was a law that the in class-action unenforceable. the california rule stood as an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress. you have the same set, -- split, essentially. you have keyed justice roberts, scalia, kennedy, and coleco in the majority. and you have the others in dissent. in this case, justice scalia does not emphasize the language of the federal arbitration act.

instead, he emphasizes what he called the principal purpose, which he described as insuring enforcement of arbitration agreements. the discretion allows for a streamlined procedures pertaining to the type of dispute. arbitration interfered with this when it was compelled by state law. in contrast, justice breyer emphasized the plan language of the statute, and specifically he argued that what california had done fell directly within the spoke -- the scope of the act exception permitting courts to refuse to arbitrate agreements for the revocation of any contract. he was treating class arbitration waivers the way it treats the other contractual

waiters found to be unconscionable. you have the same justices trying to define a congressional attempt -- intent in different ways depending on the case. that suggests to me divining congressional intent is difficult. so that is why so many cases. the second question is whether it is fair to characterize roberts as a pro-preemption court. it is one term with only five cases. if you look at the numbers, the boat is 3-2. the court found preemption in three cases and did not in two. that is as close to 50/50 as you can get with an odd number of cases. however, not every case is worth the same amount as any other case. i think white tin -- whiting is an important case. but i think concepcion is one

that is important that did not stand against pre-emption. this presumption has been around for many decades and is designed as a protector of federalist values. that is federal law can reasonably read not -- if federal law can reasonably be read not to preempt state law, it will be read that way. i also think [unintelligible] is an important decision in which the court splits with the chief justice, scalia, kennedy, and alito on one side, made it hard to make a case of impossibility preemption. they invoke the doctrine to say that federal law immunizes drug manufacturers from state law claims because generic

manufacturers cannot change the labels on their own, and might brand name manufacturers. generic manufacturers have to petition the fda. you have justice sotomayor saying we have never found it so easy to make out a case of preemption. the majority, she wrote, presumed the drug manufacturer was not obligated under federal law to petition to change the label if the manufacturer was chris with the label did not provide adequate warning. she would have found at the very least the manufacturer was obliged to bring such a petition to the fda. the court found otherwise and again did not mention the presumption against pre-emption. in a very significant development, a plurality of the court, in a part justice kennedy

did not join, appeared to reject the presumption against pre- emption. this is a major development. it is four justices, including the chief. it is based on a novel, texture list, and original interpretation of the supremacy clause that arose in a law review article by caleb nelson of the university of virginia. it was left to justice sotomayor to reject the move toward a more original list understanding of the supremacy clause. i think it is an important sense in which the roberts court is a pro-preemption court. but the jury is still out. justice kennedy did not join this part of the agreement, but did join opinions in which a presumption against pre-emption makes no appearance. the last question i want to talk

about briefly is why this matters. if this is a pro-preemption court, is there cause for concern from a federalist perspective? i think the answer is yes. i am relying on the scholarship of my colleagues at duke, ernie young. he says if you care about federalism you ought to care about preemption. we live in a world of very broad congressional power when it comes to the commerce clause under article 1, section 8. if you look at these cases together, there is significant congressional power. i do not see that changing soon. but pre-emption cases have been all the time. they are the ways in which federalism is worked out day to day in our system. the more preemption this -- the court finds, the less there is left for states to do. the less you give them options in the federal system -- you

ought to care about the presumption decisions in this court. >> i agree with most of that, but the very end up so much. i think it is a mistake to talk about federalism with a capital f. as if every issue of division of power between the national government and the states is driven by a single federal laws and principles. you are either for the states or for the federal government. what we have is a very complicated allocation of authority to four different areas between states and federal government. there should be no consistency across each of these areas, because the constitution itself gives congress power over certain things and not so much over others. i would say, looking at the pre- emption cases, that three of them have to do with product liability, corporations to distribute products on a nationwide market, where

congress has set up a comprehensive regulatory scheme to violate safety and warnings and so forth. i would have thought that cases of this sort were at the heart of the kind of power the framers did give congress -- that one of the key things about the essence of the commerce clause was to create a common market within the united states, so the goods and services in the national market can flow freely from one state to the other rather than be balkanized by different concerns. to my mind, to be pro-preemption with respect to product liability, where there is a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, makes a great deal of sense. i am much less persuaded in a case like concepcion, where it seems to me that the question of

enforceability of particular contracts between employers and employees is a traditionally state function. i am not saying it is unconstitutional for congress to get into that. but there is no obvious national uniformity and no obvious need because of the common market concern. i would say that if we were interested in a more textured idea of federalism that there should be less of a presumption in favor of preemption there than in the others. i do not like the idea that we should treat preemption and federalism as one size fits all. i think different categories of these things are different. i would say the whiting case falls within another area of overwhelmingly federal interest. immigration is something which

is a national concern. i think that case is probably rightly decided, but only because congress itself said that states may use licensing laws to achieve their own local regulatory purposes, not because of any kind of the presumption in favor of states are against pre-emption. >> i think i agree with much of what might says in general, although i think i disagree with some of the specifics. i think you are exactly right that it is not just about being for the states are against them. i think you need a nuanced understanding of what kinds of problems are for the federal government and what problems are for the state. i think constitutional statutory federalism overlaps in that way. i think where i disagree with the specifics is the way you characterize the fda regulations in some of these

short liability cases as a comprehensive federal scheme. if it is comprehensible -- and -- is comprehensive, the federal government is regulating it and there is not much left to the states to do. i do not think that reflects reality. everyone knows the fda does not have the resources and personnel to monitor brand name and generic drug manufacturers. the fda relies on these manufacturers to bring it to fda attention if their levels are not up to speed. the court assumed in its decision that the generic manufacturers or under a state law obligation to petition the fda to change the labels. nonetheless, the court said the federal law that gives them an obligation to bring it to the fda pre-empts state law of tort liability claims.

i think my disagreement in the details is about how comprehensive the federal scheme is here. i think it is not just a presumption against pre-emption in general. it is a presumption where the states have long regulated. some of the court liability cases at issue are areas in which states have long regulated and the federal government has not regulated as comprehensively as some of your comments would suggest. >> we are almost out of time, but i hate to wrap things up without saying something about the walmart case. >> walmart was a gigantic class action involving 1.5 million plaintiffs. women at walmart brought a claim that said in essence that the walmart policy of giving a great deal of discretion to lower level managers and a highly decentralized system of promotion ended up hurting women. that these decisions were made in a discriminatory fashion and

therefore the entire class of women ought to be able to bring a suit. i think there are two key pieces of the decision. one has to do with procedure and one with discrimination. the procedure rule is simple. for those of you back in the days of rule 23, under rule 23 be to and, in order to bring a class action you typically bring a claim. for example, a housing desegregation plan. everyone in the class is going to be affected by the same order. the plaintiffs brought their claim under rule 23 b2 even though they were seeking individual back pay awards. this is the back pay awards did not predominate over the common claim. the court unanimously held that this was inappropriate. those back pay claims were more

importantly brought under 23 b3, which allows for notice and opt out. the more important case is employment discrimination. this is where the court divided. justice scalia said for the majority there was no common claim among the plaintiffs of discrimination. but it was not enough simply to say there was a common policy of giving our level managers discretion. justice ginsburg said that was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of rule 23a, the commonality requirement. as often happens, what is really moving the justices of the court are completely different pictures of what discrimination is. justice scalia describes a more conventional account, potential actors intentionally discrediting women. he cannot imagine that 1.5

million women are sharing the same crime. he imagines there are better and worse actors, some people who do not discriminate and others to discriminate quite a bit. justice ginsberg says the discrimination we are talking about is subconscious. this is pre-thought. it is the way we think about women in the workplace. it is the fact that we are less likely to see women being successful managers. that in fact any discretionary decision. justice ginsburg find it easy to imagine this constituted discrimination that would affect all women. she cites a study of orchestras. when orchestras began to use blind triads, where you could not see the gender of the person behind it, the number of women in orchestras increase dramatically. why was that? it is not as though the people before that thought they did not like women. the study suggests that what happened was that people used to think men were better musicians.

so when they heard a man play thought his music was better than when they heard a woman play. when you blinded them to the gender of the person behind the screen, you increase the number of women. that is what justice ginsberg thinks is going on. i will say by way of conclusion that social science does back justice ginsburg. there is a lot of evidence that we all have these pre-cognitive biases. before we think about what we are going to do, we have these ways of classifying people. they do not disappear in the workplace. if you think about what the court can do, you might ask this question. harcourt's well-suited to dealing with structural inequalities rather than bad actors? our courts well suited to dealing with questions of implicit motivation, pre-card to decisions that affect everyone? or is it possible that in the path to equality the courts can only lead us so far and the

lawsuit may not be the right way to correct workplace inequality going forward? >> thank you. there are more cases we could have talked about, but i hope you will agree it is better to do a thorough job of the work cases rather than superficial coverage of a lot of cases. there is more to read. the opinions are there. i am sure if time permits after we conclude that if you have a question or two for the panelists the mike linder. we have not included a question and answer session. i apologize, but you can understand why. it has been difficult to do at all. you have been a wonderful audience. thank you for being here this morning. chief justice, i turn it back over to you. [applause] >> we are now at the conclusion of the program. i have a few things to make. the first is to some phelps and his staff. things have gone smoothly. i think we owe them a round of

applause. [applause] things have gone smoothly, particularly when you consider the number of people here. people think it must be easy to do. it has involved a lot of work. we are appreciative. judge keenan and all the folks from west virginia, thank you for planning the great program. it has done well and been well- received. i think everything has been great. i declare this the best caucus we have ever had. we know conclude the 77 judicial caucus for the fourth circuit. have a safe trip home. i think you. -- thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] -- i thank you.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> the supreme court is now available as a standard and enhanced ebook. 11 original c-span interviews with current and retired justices. it includes an interview with the newest supreme court justice, elena kagan. add to your experience by watching multimedia clips. available wherever e-books are sols. >> next, a memorial service for former secretary of state lawrence eagleburger. after that, a house hearing on the federal assistance to general motors.

then chief justice john roberts of life on the supreme court. >> www.c-span.org launched a new website for politics in the 2012 election. bio the information on the candidates, twitter feeds and facebook updates and links to candidatets. s. visit us at c- span.org/campaign 2012. >> tomorrow night, ron paul discusses his previous presidential bids, his strategy, his years as a doctor, service and the military and his views on congress. road to the white house at 9:30 eastern and pacific on c-span. former secretary of state lawrence eagleburger died early this month after a short

illness. he was secretary of state for george h.w. bush in the early 1990's and served in the state department under the right and administration. in 1984, he became president of a consulting firm founded by henry kissinger. at his memorial service this week, officials from the state department including secretary of state clinton and former secretary of state kissinger honored his life and work. >> some folks to come to washington are lessons in their own mind, but not lawrence eagleburger. he came to our nation's capital filled with more than hopes of fame.

he did such a wonderful job that he became a legend in the minds of everyone who knew him. wisconsin doctor and his schoolteacher wife, this onetime u.s. army lt. became quite simply a superb american diplomat. when he was first suggested to me that larry might be a perfect deputy, i had serious reservations. after all, he was a walking medical miracle who relied and the assistance of canes and plume of cigarette smoke always seemed to follow him wherever he went. i liked button-down. e was known as henry's man, and i needed my own person. of course, history was against him. only one other foreign service officer had risen to deputy secretary of state.

still, larry came highly recommended for having a mind filled with institutional knowledge and a briefcase loaded with good ideas. larry knew how to anticipate problems and how to solve them before they happened. he appreciated the bureaucratic dreamwork that other people found a way to avoid. and nobody ever accused him of having his own agenda. even richard nixon spoke admiringly of lawrence eagleburger, telling me proudly that larry was utterly loyal, will not have his own agenda, and was as smart as an outhouse rat. that latter phrase was high praise from nixon. [laughter] so, after he came to houston, i made one of the wise is personnel decisions i have ever made. i hired him.

i soon learned everything i heard about him was true. he was one of the kind who drove a red corvette and who smoked in no smoking building, all the while using the inhaler of his to counter the effects of the smoke. he was blunt. he spoke the truth, a rare commodity in this town. he was absolutely fearless when it came to excepting difficult jobs. deputies in cabinet departments get all of the work and none of the credit. that was certainly true at foggy bottom. as my number tow.wo, larry was e sheriff that had the responsibility of making sure things run smoothly. blood pressures rose in the offices of ambassadors and state department officials with the word came in that eagleburger was on his way.

even more so when they heard that the eagle has landed. by larry was more than that. he was an astute diplomat who always rose to the occasion. when we needed somebody to represent the state department during discussions with chinese officials in the aftermath of tiananmen square, larry eagleburger was the man. when we needed someone to travel to panama at in the aftermath of the u.s. invasion in 1989, larry eagleburger was the man. as brent mentioned, when we needed someone to persuade prime minister shamir not returned fire against iraq during desert storm, when saddam hussein was sending scuds into israel, eagleburger was the man. larry did it all with that rise sense of ironic humor that never

waned. even during the most trying moments. when he was attempting to convince shamir not to retaliate against iraq, an action that could destroy their international coalition against saddam hussein, larry began to meet resistance. shamir was unhappy with what he perceived is the linkage between u.s. assistance and israeli promise not to fight back. as expected, larry came with a solution that unique by washington standards. he took a fall. he told shamir this was his idea. his cable to be said, if my solution does not meet with your approval, please wait until i get back. i need a plane to come back on. his approach worked. powder dry. her

i was fortunate to have first right deputies at the white house and treasury or at state, but of all of them, ladies and gentlemen, larry eagleburger stands out. i think i can imagine the scene when larry arrived at the pearly gates. st. peter was there. after greeting larry he announced to the multitudes and haven't, thin heaven, the eagles landed. larry, it was a privilege to be your friend and colleague. we miss you. we honor your service to our country and we will see you on the other side.

>> members of the eagleburger family, distinguished guests, who of his associates can ever forget larry at work? on short sleeves, asthma inhaler in one hand, cigarette in the other, cough drops in front of him, a telephone squeezed between shoulder and ear and loud opera music blairing from his recorder. larry was indispensable. as an associate and friend. a designer and executor of policies and as our conscience. larry lifted our spirits, enobled our perspective and held

a succession of administrations to fulfill america's aspirations. the only foreign service officer ever to reach the office of secretary of state, lararry intimated the values of continuity, wisdom, loyalty, and experience of one of our countries great institutions. at the same time, the foreign service cannot always overcome its suspicion that secretaries of state are in sore need of instruction. because they probably could not have passed the foreign service examination. [laughter] so in the period we worked together, larry had a dual