of the progress she had made in the last seven years. i thought that was pretty striking. that was a resignation to the economic realities. a couple of opportunities were passed by to criticize washington. she was very public that she would not seek a third term but would love a job in the obama administration. >> the governors tend to say they've don't have as much rancor in their ranks. everyone was at the meeting this weekend continue that is not necessarily the case. these governors have serious divides even on what kind of spending cuts should be made. the one thing that unites them is their struggle to move forward for a state revenues are improving but they are in difficult shape. many things the federal government does ties to their hands in terms of what they can produce and cannot. that is why you didn't try to

strike a conciliatory tone. they know eventually that they have to balance their budget. they cannot raise a debt ceiling for a state. host: both of you talked about how governors work with the various factions within their states to get things done is there a lesson learned given the current economic discussions? >> spent one week in minnesota covering the government shut down. we have the washingtonization of these states. republicans and democrats used to work together because the states are smaller. that is changing. we are seeing more and more partisan polarizing rancor in states. gregoire downplays what is happening in washington. she has a unified legislature. she faced a lot of criticism for not raising taxes and was passed

budget. in minnesota, wisconsin, new jersey, you are seeing more battles just like the disfunction we see in washington. host: this goes to the larger picture of job creation. >> absolutely, this will not be the last time this year we hear about job creation. every former republican governor who would like to be in the race in 2012 was talking about job creation. it is interesting to see what the records are and how much you can do as a governor. governor gregoire dr. of infrastructure but those and other things that happen overnight. those are things you may start during your term of the impact does not come until five or 10 years down the road and you don't get credit for that. >> when gregoire took office after 2006, she came in during a huge swell of revenues from natural economic cycles. choose able to increase spending by $5 billion. many governors are now coming in in a bad economic climate and

did not get to spend money when times are good and they're forced to make tough sacrifices. host: james holman and sarah murray pat been our guest on "newsmakers." >> our coverage of the national governors' association wraps up today when thomas friedman talks with the governors about advancing competitiveness. that is live beginning at 1:30 p.m. here on c-span. interested in what i call disappearing america. in america that may not be here 25 years from now. >> for 30 years, carol highsmith this troubled united states document in the country through our camera lens. every photo donated and available at the library of congress, followed her story tonight on"q &a." it is a prelude to our original

documentary," of the library of congress." >> this week, british prime minister david cameron takes questions on the phone hacking scandal and the arrest of his communications chief, andy colson. aboutl -- they'll talk robert murdoch plus deal with british sky broadcasting. prime minister questions tonight at 9:30 p.m. eastern on c-span. airport security was the subject of wednesday's hearing by the house oversight and government reform subcommittee on national security. the committee heard testimony from officials of the government accountability office and the transportation security administration, the former director of security in tel aviv and i can inspector of the amtrak police department. this is about one hour, 45 minutes.

>> of like to thank our ranking member and members of the audience participating with us and those of you watching on television these proceedings are the second in a series of hearings to evaluate airport security and the policies employed by the department of homeland security. there are a number of concerns that have highlighted in will be drawn out today. we have learned that there have been 25,000 security breaches at u.s. airports since november of 2001. i appreciate the tse tracking and providing that data but those of the ones we know about. what about the ones we don't know about? we also are deeply concerned about the tsa failing to identify threats.

in 2009, there were 87% of these airports that have not had these threat assessments done and that number has not changed. the tsa lacks the control to secure airports. the nation's 457 commercial airports have not been guided by unifying national strategy. concern about more than 900,000 security badges at these 457 airports. and the dangers the complete to and the challenges that presents. we're also concerned about what is happening at some of our nation's airports like jfk. investigate reports show that at least a quarter mile of the perimeter fence is down leaving a gaping hole of security along the main runway. this is four years behind schedule we're concerned about what happened at the dallas love

field. it has been damaged almost 20 times in four years. pilots were unsure what to do when a pickup truck crash to a fence and drove onto the tarmac in 2010. what the pilots as the tower of what the protocol was. the airport control tower said to hold position. we are concerned what is happening at lax and the 8 miles of fence there. we will have spent nearly $500 million on ait machines, the whole body imaging machines by the year we get to 2013. there are gaps in that security that don't work. i happen to believe there is a smarter way to do this that is more secure and less invasive and we will hear testimony today

talking about the k-9 units of what they are able to do. we're also concerned that these ait machines have not found some of the weapons that were attempted to be used in the december, 2009 incident. the list goes on. tsa has spent millions of dollars on technology that has not worked. remember the 207 puffer machines and those were put back on the shelf. the challenge before us is great and real and we have to deal with that threat to our nation. it will not go away. there is no end to the creativity of terrorists. i have heard press recounts say that we have to remember that the 25,000 security breaches are less than 1%, unfortunately, we have to be right all the time. terrorists only have to get lucky ones.

much of what we had been anticipating is security theater and has not done the job to secure the airport to the degree we need to. one personal challenge is how do we become more secure and less invasive and we don't give up every personal liberty in the name of security? we have to find a proper balance which is difficult knowing the threat is real. i look forward to this hearing today. rather than a wax on, i would like to hear from the panel. i would like to recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, the gentleman from massachusetts for his opening statement. useseffectt

random screening but behavioral the losses may not be a way to suspect potential terrorists. they spent $750 million on this and they're asking for another $250 million. it is critical that we take a good look and scrutinize whether this program actually is effective in identifying potential threats to security. we will also discuss the screening of checked badges. -- baggage. congress mandated 100% of checked baggage but it has been slow to implement those standards across the country. the general accountability office said despite the regulations being in effect in 2005, the positive detection policy was put in place from 2009. on perimeter security, there have been high-profile be -- breaches. we will hear today about a tragic incident that occurred

outside of boston's logan airport. a young man felt my plane as it approached the airport for landing. according to news reports, he likely gained access to the plan after breaching airport perimeter security in charlotte. this is not a unique incident. we have also heard about the serial security breaches by mr. ronald blog was able to make it onto a plane leaving jfk to san francisco with a stolen boarding pass. the general accountability offices raised concerned about perimeter security at our nation's airports. they found that tsa had failed to implement a national security to implement security. this raises serious questions that have to be addressed. it is important for us to take the time to understand what security functions tsa is not

responsible for one of those is the perimeter area. they are not principally responsible for that at airports. that security is primarily the responsibility of airport operators but the tsa is responsible for making sure they adhere to a plan. the agency has a difficult and unenviable task but it is our role to provide constructive criticism with which tsa can strike the balance between security and cost. and hope are hearing today can help tsa do just that. >> will now recognize the chairman of the transportation committee and a member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from florida. >> q. -- thank you for your leadership. and thank you for pursuing very important issues relating to transportation security and

holding a very important agency accountable. having been involved with tsa and picked the name for the agency and helped craft its enabling legislation some 10 years ago, have had a chance to monitor its activities closely. unfortunately, i have become more concerned with the billions of dollars that are being expanded, that just stands may. -- some of it just astounds me. they have run palle mile away from security and turned into a huge on thinking non-risk-based bureaucracy. everywhere i turn i am appalled at what is taking place. i had the opportunity to go to

our state capital recently in tallahassee. i left the airport to pick up a rental car. the airport is located on about a 16-foot embankment that is across the entire length of the airport. this is the front of the airport and here is the embankment, 16 feet high. we're talking in airport security and parameters. how idiotic we could be in implementation of any requirement like this? this is the parking space for rental cars and this is a 16- foot embankment and you can see where cars go through the entrance at the airport. there is a new airport administrator.

was not familiar with all the details but we will do a thorough investigation on this. this is just one instance of eight non-banking agency. i don't know of any explosive device that could possibly penetrate 16 feet except maybe a nuclear weapon. it cost tow how much put these barriers here by forcing a small airport or if tsa paid for, and idiotic expense, not to mention the cost to the taxpayer or the airport, but then they would never consider the economic loss to the car rental firm or the revenue of the airport. everywhere i turn, i see a disregard for the taxpayer. this is just one instance and -- in one small community.

thyssen on thinking agency. their budget is $8 billion or so? i opened the paper a week or two when i return to washington and i looked at this ad. the humane society is looking for a vice president of federal affairs. i have eight 1/6 of a paige: we have a four-color have page ad for a deputy assistant administrator for legislative affairs in this and other capitol hill publications. it shows total disregard for taxpayer resources. that is how you can expend money whether it is a venture like this.

i got to request an accounting for expenditure. if tsa refuses to cooperate with the transportation committee, i will continue to have the cooperation of both the subcommittee on which has served in the full committee and chairman here have agreed to get this information and we'll get the data whether it is this or other activities such as you have refused to provide information to us on regarding your expenditure of your national deployment where you can hire people or people leave their jobs and you have to fly them in and put them up at hotels and pay their expenses and pay them a per diem. whether it is that issue for

more than a dozen pending items, we will get the information and we will investigate and we will protect the taxpayers who are paying the bulk of the expenses for this fiasco. thank you for holding this hearing and we will get to some issues and questions in a few minutes. i yield back. >> thank you. the gentleman from massachusetts, mr. lynch, would you like an opening statement? >> thank you. very briefly -- obviously, the interest of airport permitted security is tremendous for all of us. we have spent enormously on the safety and security of the processes within our airports. this is something that the security of our parameters of these airports has become much more of a concern since the fairly recent incidents that

involved my district. the young man who was apparently stowed away above on an aircraft recently from south carolina, i believe, to logan airport in washington -- logan airport in boston was from my district in the town of milton. i was able to see up close the tremendous concern generated by this and a hardship on the family and the concerns of all the people involved. and the concern within the aviation community. i think it is worthwhile to spend some time to redouble our efforts and focus our resources on an area that we believe has been neglected. i want to thank the witnesses here for their willingness to come before us and help us with

this task and help the committee to make sure that we are being thorough and our examination and we are not overlooking anything and as a result of this incident and some others, that at the end of this process, the american flying public will be safer and our communities will be safer. and our air force will be more secure. that is the goal here for both democrats and republicans. that is our intent here. i want to thank the witnesses for coming before this committee to help us with our work. i yield back. >> thank you. i would like to introduce our panel. mr. john salmon, mr. stephen lord, mr. gerry orr, mr. raffi

ran is that former director of security at the tel aviv ben- gurion airport. and inspector william parker is the commander of amtrak police department's k-9 unit. we appreciate you being here as well call witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. please rise if you would then raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you, you may be seated. let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. we would appreciate if you limit your verbal testimony to 5 minutes or less. your entire written statement will be entered into the record. with that, we'll start with mr. salmon.

>> good morning. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the transportation security administration responsibility regarding perimeter security at u.s. commercial airports. i would like to emphasize three points -- first, every airport has an individualized security plan which burst -- perimeter security is an important piece. two, airport authority is responsible for executing the plan. 3, tsa is responsible for uploading -- approving the plan and getting compliance. unlike checkpoint security, airport authority people and investments playfully role in carrying out airport perimeter security. tsa conducts inspections to beef up security and mitigate risk.

tsa analyzes the results to develop mitigation strategy that enhances an airport security posture and to determine if any changes are required. perimeter-related airport compliance has been inspected 27,031 tons of the last six months. every commercial airport receives an annual security assessment to include assessment of perimeter and access controls. allier this year, tsa's those of security operations instituted an assessment and inspection of all airports evaluating perimeter security including fencing, non-fans manmade barriers, natural barriers, closed-circuit television, electronic intrusion, and motion detection devices.

assessments are complete for the largest airports with the smaller airports expected to be complete by september 30, 2011. the result of the inspection were collaborative improvements and also violations was may result in civil penalties. going beyond compliance, we work collaborative lee. tsa issued updated and improved security as well as innovative measures which highlighted best practices in airports of all sizes across the united states. this is the first of its kind to activate the baseline of security and the exercise control and other key areas. over 700 measures and practices from over 100 airports were assessed as far as the ground breaking initiative. because of that effort, airports now have a self-assessment

module i resource allocation tool. that and corporate tax scenario, vulnerable to scores, consequence scores, and countermeasures to assess by abilities. viabilities. it will provide the greatest risk reduction. tsa's goal is to work with airport authorities to stay ahead of the evolving terrorist threats while protecting passenger privacy and facilitating the efficient flow travelers in legitimate commerce. the airport's the room -- perimeter security measure is one part of the comprehensive effort. want to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the support issue and i am pleased to answer any questions you may have. >> thank you. we will now recognize mr. delors from the government accountability office. >> thank you.

thanks for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security issues. the attempted 2009 christmas day attack provides a rare -- a vivid reminder that civil aviation remains an attractive terrorist target and underscores the importance of today's hearing. securing commercial aviation operations is difficult given the hundreds of airports, thousands of daily flights with millions of passengers and pieces of checked baggagetsa spent several billion dollars each year to secure the system. risks to the system remain. i would like to discuss three layers of this system. tsa's behavior detection program called spot and their checked baggage screening system. on the behavior detection program, there has been action to undergo -- evaluate the

underlying action. based on our past reporting, more action is needed. tsa deployed its program on a nationwide basis without first demonstrating that was based on valid science. according to tsa, spot was deployed before a valuation was completed. dhs completed an evaluation study earlier this year and found the program was more effective than random screening in identifying so-called high- risk passengers. it is noted in the study that the assessment was just the first step. additional research is needed -- is going to be needed to fully validate the program. some of the recommendations made in the latest of a mirror those we made in our may, 2000 report. it is still an open question

whether behavior detection principles can be successfully applied on large scale. would like to discuss some of the key findings from our 2009 report on airport perimeter security. wifehoodtsa has made many strides. tsa has made many strides. they have not completed a comprehensive risk assessment as called for by dhs. tsa subsequently completed such an assessment in july, 2010. the assessment did not include an assessment of the so-called insider threat which tsa views as a significant threat. the rest will be included in the next update due later this year. e also recommended that c.tsa

may culmer build the assessments. these are a key tool in the toolbox and are completed in conjunction with the fbi. 83% of its airports are not assessed. the tsa efforts to assess baggage screenings. as one of the largest programs as highlighted in the report released to rep yesterday. they have upgraded the explosive detection requirement for this equipment and faces challenges in meeting these requirements. the explosive detection requirement for checked baggage and chains were established in 1998 and subsequently revised in 2005 and 2010 to better

address current threats. current checked baggage screening process does not meet the 200 -- does not meet the 2010 requirement for its machines are operating at the levels established in 2005. the report describes some of the challenges tsa faces in procuring and deploying this very complicated technology. for example, dhs and tsa encounter challenges collecting data on the explosives physical and chemical properties. there are six recommendations for improving -- improving the process for acquiring these specific systems. tsa has agreed to take action to implement all six of these recommendations. mr. chairman, this concludes my statement and i look forward to answering your questions. thank you. >> thank you. i recognize mr. orr, who is the

operator of the charlotte international airport. >> my name is jerry orr and i and the aviation director at the charlotte airport. i work for 36 years on their apartment and was a small business owner for 13 years before that. i am here today to testify and airport perimeter security. i have been critical of the performance of the tsa since its inception. i am not critical of its goal but its measures. my judgment, the effectiveness of the tsa is compromised by rigid attitude of arrogance and bureaucracy. in november of last year, the body of a young man was discovered in milton, mass. who

was thought to have fallen from aircraft. i learned about a possible connection to charlotte in the media and reached out to our federal securities director. he did not want tsa to take the lead and recommended i ask our municipal police department to head up an investigation. tsa would assist them. the bible evidence could never prove or disprove that a security breach that occurred. the police and tsa pierre have a young man may have access and aircraft. the can up with an assumption about what might have a happened which excludes interest through a checkpoint. they could not conclusively rule out this possibility because tsa had failed to preserve their surveillance videos of should the checkpoints. some of it was lost. i'm not saying the young man tsa checkpointough a

but he deflected attention elsewhere. this protects the agency at the cost of real security needs. the investigation focused national attention on the airport perimeter security. in charlotte, we have 19 miles a six-foot high chain-link fence with three strands of barbed wire closing the airport. this offends me to all federal requirements3 s. we spent half a million dollars annually maintaining defense. we spend an additional $3,000,000.75 personnel with perimeter security responsibility. the fence is a deterrent and says keep out. however, the final line security is the eyes and ears of the 20,000 people who work inside teh fence. tsa believes that airports are automatically and violation of a

regulation even when they did everything they were obligated to do and it's simply did not work. that is like saying that customs and for protection itself as violating laws each time an illegal alien crosses into the united states. we recently asked tsa to explain their security business and legal authority for directing us to do something. tsa failed or refused to respond or even acknowledge our questions. tsa has conflicting roles and operational and regulatory capacities that are not kept separate. having an agency interpret the rules and implement action and judge their effectiveness, lenticel to the possibility of abuse. i am confident that i am not the only airport operator with significant concerns about the effectiveness of gsa. tsa.

what can be done to improve our ability to focus on real needs of our nation's airports? congress should continue to support -- give support allowing airports to opt out of using tsa and insure that the bureaucracy does not go return of arbitrer roadblocks. any entity working with airports and airlines to achieve security must do just that. -- work with them. the current tsa structure does not promote cooperation. the operators must the matter with the airport's vulnerabilities or strength and they're well-equipped to make up to -- efficient enhancements for its safety and security are our number one priority. there can always be more security but the challenge is to

provide better security. we need to spend money where it counts on things that matter. often securities to be reasonable and collaborative. if airports are given the resources they need, the traffic public will be the beneficiary. >> we will now recognize raffi ran, the former director of ben- gurion airport. >> thank you, mr. chairman for inviting me to testify today. i would like to draw the committee's attention to three factors that i believe they are playing a key role in many of the shortcomings in airport security. the first one is the imbalance that was created surely after 9/11 when the gsa had the overwhelming task of recording

trading and selling technology in airports around the country. this is something that was difficult within tsa./ at the same time, the airport facilities and security has received much less attention. not only is the screening of passengers where most of the attention and, the funding went into this but it was executed badly. why was the rest of the left for the local authorities to take care of? funding was relatively short. the standards for performance of the security task, local level

are not very clear and in many cases, don't even exist. the issue a permit to security start.ood zero for a pair o one can notice that there's very little consistency in our airports as far as a perimeter security is concerned. secondly, most of our airports today are still not protected by operating a perimeter intrusion collection service. we don't know when a breach occurs. we get to know that only when it is addressed by somebody or we end up with a story.

the young man lost his love is not a reasonable standard. -- lost his life is not a reasonable standard. the issue of jurisdiction is not very clear. when it comes to the security facility or the operation at the airport, it is local law enforcement agency or department that is responsible to do this. most or many of the police department's that provide that service at airports of implementing their role as a low in full -- as a law enforcement agency rather than a security agency and their information differs between the two.

it look at the perimeter as a for reflection of these problems, you can see that the role that the local police to pardon is taking on its perimeter security at airports is minimal and is usually based on responding to calls rather n prevention. there are two areas that need to be addressed. one is the role and funding of local authorities as far as the airport facility security is concerned. secondly, the need for standards which are consistent and high-level performance that will characterize the security in airports around the country. i thank you very much. 5 >> thank you.

a little bit of explanation -- why would we invite someone from amtrak police to be here? one of the questions that is legitimate that while the tsa has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in whole body imaging machines and technology, there are those of the pentagon who have come to the conclusion that dogs are the single best way to find explosive devices. i would like to enter into the record -- there was a press conference by lieutenant general who says dogs of the best protectors. magazine in a man who in their last edition, it says there is

no technology proved more affected than the detection of its laws than the canine. are we investing enough in technology that we know that works, having spent tens of billions of dollars. we truly its book -- which will vote -- we truly appreciate inspector parker being here. he will give testimony and then give a demonstration. i will let him explain how we will conduct this. anybody in the audience, stay put and if you have something, we are glad you are here inspector. we will do a bit of a demonstration. we appreciate the leeway here at the committee. specter parker, come on up. >> good morning. my name is william parker and i

am the inspector commander of the amtrak policeman's k-9 unit. i'm honored to be here today. a well-trained dog is more capable, useful, reliable and effective than equipment. dogs do not appreciate like machines do. it dogs are trained properly, training is consistent and their skill level will increase with experience. perimeter security is of great concern to airports and the transportation administration. many airports rely on surveillance to protect their perimeters. if nothing appears or the law does not go off, you cannot assume nothing is there. someone has to respond to make sure no one is hiding from the camera. well-trained law-enforcement with a well-trained patrol boat confine that person without waiting for back up. on september 11, 2001, you -- we

use this to sweep airport terminals. i saw a real surge in interest in can capability after 9/11. people realized dogs were effective in crowded in garments were they are supposed to screen individuals, or better in crowds than technology. amtrak now trades around in swept for explosives before boarding. we keep an explosive team president of the boarding gate to provide a detection capability and immediate response. dogs are effective in detecting explosives but also as a deterrent in many environments when deployed properly. amtrak has many challenges as airport authorities, particularly the need to secure open face areas that intruders

could use to come into our property. we have been able to implement some new procedures that could be used in airports i have helped pioneer a new application of canines called vapor-wake. they smell the chemicals of explosives in the air after a person trapped -- passes by. this application is being developed. in closing, i would like to reiterate my position as a good k-9 program which is an excellent investment for an agency that needs to secure high traffic areas or facility perimeter provided the program is properly funded and supported with a strong infrastructure. to this point, i have brought two teams with me to give a brief demonstration.

after we conclude the demo, i would be happy to answer any questions you may have. thank you again for this opportunity. what you will see in these demos -- i explain to you about zapor weight technology. it is not interested. on my right, we will have people come to the door and see if the dog is protecting she is at a checkpoint. people come in of the dog will be able to detect who came in with something on there. we are waiting on a crowd of people, your staffers.

the dog is not interested lee hurting anyone. as the person walks by, the dog is walking. this is a response that the dog would give. this individual has ankle weights on that have explosives on his ankle. you can look at him physically and not see anything. he has about 5 pounds in explosives on his ankle. can you show the committee? in that is smokeless powder. the second demonstration is when a person passes through an area

[laughter] as a person passes through an area, you'll see a person walking through the room to your left. she will walk and sit down and we will have a dog come through that same area. that person has already set down and the dog will come in and follow the scent and determine where she is located. we want to give the time because in theory has been on the summit could walk through the area 50 minutes said they have passed through and the dog could still pick that up. that is a scientific fact.

they are coming in. good girl. let's give the doggett round of applause. [applause] i want to thank you for this opportunity and any questions you may have. >> very impressive.

i will now recognize myself for five minutes. we will go from there. i want to start with mr. salmon and the gao. the report on page 12 and 13 says the analysis of tsa datasets from 2004 through july 1, 2011, they conducted joint vulnerable the assessments at 17% of regulated airports that existed at the time thus leaving about 83% of airports and assessed. how can that be? in september, 2009, there was a report this a 87% of those airports have not moved and we had only moved that number to 17% assessment? ">> the joint guilty assessments are done in conjunction with the

fbi. there are extensive assessment and done in a limited number of locations. every single commercial airport receives an annual security assessment -- jva's aren't there 100% done? >> tsa does complete security assessments included garibaldi airports every year including 27,000 inspections -- >> i am asking about the joint venture. >> there are different assessments. >> what is your goal? do you have the goal of getting to one of the%? >> we will not get to 100% of 450 airports with the help of the fbi every year. >> it is at some point -- you have looked into this. what were your findings in this area? >> when we first looked at it, the number was actually 13%.

at was from 2004-2008 timeframe. we asked tsa for updated allen -- analysis of those numbers have gone up. it is now 7% these are in tents of examinations focus on high- risk airports and tsa considers them the gold standard. they conduct a whole host of other activities and inspections and testing. there are quite a few things they do. we thought this was a worthwhile to single out given the significance. we recognize they are difficult to do quickly. you have to give the fbi involved. >> given the knowledge and understanding that we are only as strong as the weakest link and maybe that's small airport as we saw on 9/11 when that person got out a plane and got into the system and behind a security line. why is the tsa working toward

getting toward 100%. why are and 457 airports for getting this jva guide? >> not all airports will be done. understandtely don't that. i think it is unacceptable. mr. orr, you said the tsa is yet to approve its airport security program for you said we have been trying to get revisions to our approval for about one year now. can you explain that more? >> yes, sir, we are required to amend our security plans any time there's a change in our security procedures. we submitted an amendment to the local federal security director over one year ago,

heard nothing for six or seven months, got a comment and addressed the comment and day laid low for a couple of months. our system security director that we have been working with appeared. the process started all over. >> mr. salmon? >> the request to rewrite or change or amend the security plan was in progress and was initiated about one year ago. there was a joint vulnerability assessment with the fbi conducted in the fall of 2010. it is my understanding that the parties agreed to hold off on completing rewriting the airport's security plan until we understand the results of the joint vulnerability assessment.

the joint vulnerability assessment in terms of its analysis of brandperimeter secus not to flee flattery. >> it sounds like he has been waiting for a year. >> both parties agreed to wait until something you grow up last time, the joint vulnerability assessment, and that should be very insightful in terms of what you do with security plans. >> we have had two joint vulnerability assessments, one in 2007 and one in 2010. at the conclusion of each one, we asked for additional information to help us understand what you are talking about here. in both cases, we have not received that. we submitted our plan, our amendment, we heard nothing. we checked on a a couple times.

they said it was in the works. >> you are telling me that you have no gold to get to one other% of joint vulnerable to assessments. he made an improvement from 30%- 17% and we have an airport where you have done a jva and you're not getting the responsiveness. this is collaborative efforts. you're supposed to be the expert in the middle of this. my time has expired. >> thank you very much. mr. lord, what is your analysis of how likely it is that 100% of the airports could undergo that particular scrutiny every year? >> we don't think that would be inappropriate to do it every year. perhaps a rowling basis which is how they do it now. they have a target within a three-year timeframe.

on high-to tryjva's risk airports. they are expensive and in need to get fbi corporation. there is a three-year time frame to do 100% of the airports. that would be difficult to achieve. mr. salmon would know more about that. >> your understanding is that is the plan? >> the current goal is not to do what%. my point is that they do them on a rolling three-year basis. >> how many high-risk airports would be done on the three-year basis? >> i would have to get back to our operations people to get you an answer. >> would be closed 1 & dax >> i would have to check with the fbi to see where they are. we need fbi cooperation. getting fbi resources, review

the product and so on is not -- we don't run this thing by ourselves. >> the screening passenger observation techniques, the spot program, can you differentiate that from the usual type of random search? >> yes,mr. ran is an expert in this. we are looking for micra facial anomalies. the way people behave with facial movements they have as they approach the checkpoint, the spot programs resulted in more than 2000 arrests since 2000 arrest -- since 2006. the science is based upon micro facial anomalies and the way people look and that is what they are trained to. it is more than random.

you're looking at the crowd and looking for people who would have somewhat aberrant looks. >> we're about $1 billion into this. is that worth of the money? >> i think that the investment in the behavior observation certainly makes sense. other things we're doing are limited to detection of items. i think 10 years after 9/11 with the attempted attacks that we had during the next exposure of time. we reached a conclusion that we need to pay more attention on people rather than just on items. the observing behavior is one of the basic tools that can be used at the airport but it is only one single tool in a much wider and more complex strategy.

>> what kind of technology is involved in the spot program? >> it depends on the way you define technology. if we're looking at technology from the point of view of machines that are in vogue her or computers involved in the process, this is not a highly technological process for this more of a human-based process. there is certainly-- but there m to expand that into the technological area by use of surveillance technology -- smart smell -- smart surveillance technology, not just cameras we can identify certain types of behavior -- they can respond to it in real time. >> at a granular level, it could be done with trained human beings exercising a process that is involved. >> it is mostly training human

beings right now. >> i imagine you will start getting remote possibilities. that will be enormous cost. >> you talk about having been -- allowing opt out of tsa. would you be willing to take out the full responsibility and liability for our failures to succeed? >> yes, sir. >> recognize the transportation committee chairman. >> as of last week, my figures are 39,500 people in washington, supposedly working for tsa. 27% of the more in supervisory and administrative capacities, making on average over $104,000.

how many of them are dedicated to doing the vulnerability assessments that we're talking about what mark >> -- about? >> a limited number. >> one doesn't, half a dozen? >> i would have to get you -- want to get to accurate numbers. >> you have 9056 administrative personnel in the field. how many of those folks are involved in the vulnerability assessments. those are administrative people, not screeners. >> i would give the same answer. >> they are trying to -- having trouble getting back to people like mr. orr and others because organizations like the fbi did not cooperate? >> i will look into that.

>> maybe you can check into the people making over $100,000. none of those people project on the security plans to protect the perimeter of the charlotte airport. if you set the protocols and standards in washington -- >> the plan is approved for washington, but it takes -- >> if anyone contacts you and there is any intimidation after you are testifying today or any indication that they're giving you a hard time in any way, i want you to let this committee now immediately. i have seen the way these people operate. the intimidation. you are pretty brave to be with us today. what is the current, most

serious risk that we face? but in terms of nonmetallic explosives coming in on airplanes -- >> in terms of nonmetallic exposes coming in on airplanes from overseas. >> that is a good point. in 2010, we were told we were in the risk-management business, being a risk-based intelligent organization. i support that goal. do we have a plan to move towards that? >> i do not have a plan. i recommend that the committee work with the administrator. >> can you provide us with an update on where you are going with that? >> i will tell you that he is working on a number of alternatives and he hopes to announce something soon. >> we are looking forward to that. you mention most of the risk is coming in from out of the united

states. there was the issue bomber, the diaper, christmas-day bomber. the london liquid, the yemen toner. at last count, we had under 100 tsa personnel overseas. it was really 54 when i checked. do you know what the number is? can you get in contact with the secretary of state and others to try to increase the presence of tsa overseas? >> we work with overseas companies -- >> could you provide the latest information to the committee? you said the threats -- we spend half a billion dollars on this equipment. the deployment -- it is

probably in $1 billion range. march 16, i asked the question -- we know that terrorist are moving to a body cavity in -- inserts. does whole-body imaging equipment detect this kind of threat? the answer from all experts was it does not. >> i cannot discuss it in this setting. i would be happy to have a classified update. >> ok. they said it did not. this is a bbc news release from 2009, september, 2009, that terrorists -- they use the bomb on a terrorist implant, it blew up in front of a saudi prince, killing himself. i mentioned this back in -- what is today? -- march.

that appears to be a threat. they are moving -- now gone from shoes to diapers to liquids to cartridges. wouldn't you say it looks like the body implants might be a way to go? >> i dispute the bbc report, but i cannot discuss it here. >> there is no dispute he blew the crap out of the guy. in any event, this was also mentioned that the equipment we spend $1 billion on cannot do anything about it. tsa finally gets to july 6, as recently get -- has asked for updates on terrorist target organizations, naming this threat of body implants. is that something you issued? >> i would be happy to discuss

the specific of that in a classified setting. >> so it took you till july to finally tell them? it did you tell them this might pose a threat before that? >> we have been working with the airlines on nonmetallic threats for a considerable amount of time. >> most of the committee -- most of the testing on that equipment, both by this committee, by gao, has been unsuccessful, both in the reports that have been published and also in the gao reports but also look at your back up system, which is the spot program, which they termed almost a total failure. >> i totally disagree with you in terms of -- people are looking for ways to get around

technology. >> you are aware of the hearing that was conducted by the science and technology committee where the chairman questioned the current application of stand-up behavior detection, which you employee now versus -- employ now versus the testing and is done in the israeli system. >> i think they're both very good. >> everyone who testified said the tsa system is a total failure, which further validated the findings of gao. >> i am not familiar with the witnesses. >> i was in tel aviv at ben- gurion airport and i saw that this could be done on an interactive basis if we go to risk-based, rather than leaving

-- i yield back the balance of my time. >> i would encourage you to speak with the administrator. >> we tried. we tried to get the senior-most people to come to this committee and they refused. it is no surprise. we would love to work with them, but it does not happen. >> chairman, just a point of procedure. i would be willing -- i would advocate that we do subpoena the appropriate personnel. they send us people like this, who cannot provide us with the information. this is the chief investigative committee of the united states house of representatives. they are going to appear one way or another or cooperate one way or another. i put them on notice again today. >> i now recognize the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much.

sitting on committees that have the most jurisdiction over tsa -- is it on this committee. -- i sit on this committee. these are issues that deeply concerns me in my work in congress. i'm happy we are here to discuss this again. i am probably the recipient -- i have gotten more tsa pat downs since i have been in congress and i have gotten pat downs for my wife -- from my wife. since the topic is airport perimeter security, to what degree does the tsa coordinate with the ave, for instance, on spending on airport security -- with the faa, for instance, on spending on airport security? is there action in determining where dollars are best spent? >> since the gao reports you have seen come out, a number of

things -- we have been working for several years to address these issues. first, we worked with the airport community to come up with recommended design guidelines for airport planning and construction. a lot of the money they airports used came from the faa. we worked with homeland security to develop a best practices from all the airports -- >> i'm sorry. i have a short amount of time. you are sending you are now working regularly with the other agencies to make sure the right hand knows what the left hand is doing? >> there is a tool, a specific computer program that can be run through the system. the idea is to work with the airports to come up with the optimal security spending for airports. it is not the same everywhere. >> you talk about high-risk airports. what is not a high-risk airport, when i can get on a computer

jet anywhere in the country and the going to the biggest hub in the world? >> what would not being -- i agree one and a%. the report showed that there were 700 major -- airports as small as in certain counties. it is a mixture of big and small airports that go into the best practices in terms of what's appropriate for each airport. >> i have a lot of precedent in a limited amount of time. you're talking about baggage screening equipment. the airport i use the most is in corpus christi. we have american and continental, three regional jets, southwest with 737's. each airline has a screening machines staffed by two tsa agents. we bought three machines for the corpus christi airport.

probably a fourth one, because delta used to be there. why could there not be just one? there are never that many people there. do we have any idea why we are spending multiple -- thata has a program they're trying to move toward, optimal solutions for each airport. they are trying to remove the stand-alone machines and use more efficient systems or even so-called in-line systems, which require less personnel to operate. i am not sure if that particular airport is on track to get that system. >> one of the things i hear consistently from my constituents -- try saying that three times fast -- is why don't we faller -- follow more of the israeli model of dealing with people instead of things.

the answer i have gotten from a lot of people within our government is that israel on the house a couple of reports and not nearly the amount of traffic we have -- is that israel only has a couple of airports and not nearly the amount of traffic we have. could we import the kind of system? >> the solution is not really an issue when it comes to volume. i do not think this is the main consideration. the main consideration is that the israeli legal and cultural impairment is very different from the american one. therefore, -- cultural environment is very different from the american one. therefore, i strongly recommend that the concept that is driving the israeli solution, which is identifying billable of risk of individual -- identifying billable of risk of individual passengers and -- bell level -- the level of risk

of individual passengers and questioning them -- it should be implemented. >> thank you rematch. i am out of questions. i hope we will have a second round of questioning. >> thank you. i now recognize the gentleman from arizona for five minutes. >> classes. inspector, we have deployed 500 advanced imaging technology devices. we have spent $122 million on the advanced-imaging technology. we have spend millions on the puffer machines -- spent millions on the puffer machines. investmente return on bu on dogs? that animal moves. it covers a wide range of ground. tell me what the return on investment is.

>> the return is mobility. you do not have to spend money to integrate any new equipment. the dog is better than technology. we can introduce the new vans to them in the two or three weeks. -- new things to them in two or three weeks. people walk through. we do this at and track all the time. like dogs?

>> khatami the active lifetime of a canine -- tommy the active life time of the canine -- tell me the active lifetime of a canine. >> seven or eight years, a good five years without adding any software are getting a new breed -- or getting a new breed. we just add another older for them to detect. >> what is the cost of that canine? but it ain't the same cost as technology, sir. >> would use a little bit or a lot less? >> a lot less. -- do not appreciate. they go up in value. they are more effective when they get training. >> there also keen about detecting behavior, are they not? >> yes, sir.

>> dogs are very in neat about picking up differences in how people -- in people. of the things i have seen is -- one of the things i have seen is on coordination of coordination. i had to put a bill to break down jurisdictional boundaries between two agencies.

it seems to me let the big problem is, tell me who the lead is, who is the kingpin? who dictates how all surveillance or perimeter security should be dictated? >> as i said in the opening, every airport has a plan. the airport is responsible for executing the plan with their people and resources. >> is it homeland security? who oversees the process of these aspects of the perimeter surveillance. >> tsa overseas and inspects the plan. >> so you have jurisdiction to do so? >> if there are failures, we can level penalties and fines. >> you can make sure that everybody is lined up without delays. i have seen it happen.

i know it can happen. the buck stops with you. >> what we want to do -- one of the things with gao is a comprehensive look -- >> i am very aware of what government does. it studies and studies. by the time you get a study out, it is antiquated. there seems that there should be a minimum standard acquitted across the board. it seems like we're missing the point. we have to have some minimal standards. i am also from arizona. i know those numbers are not right. just to give you a quick example, we're talking about the security breaches that you know about. there are ones that you do not know anything about. on the border, we apprehend one of four. i hope these are not the same

kinds of numbers. in previous testimony, there are a lot of people carrying badges that we do not have any recollection of or their background. >> you have about 850,000 people with criminal history background checks and terrorist watch list checks, in addition to other checks. >> that is inadequate. we can take a grandmother and a stripper down -- and strip her down and then we have for nationalist who gets through -- for an nationalist to get through. we are not coordinating with regional communicating -- communities well enough. that means to change. i am out of time. >> this allows every airport, in

conjunction with the security director, to do the evaluation of boehner abilities -- they are unique. there is not one standard. you take those standards and apply them based on the vulnerability is, the attack scenarios that are possible at that airport, for each airport to come up with an optimal solution, so that they can apply their dollars in the best way, the best bang for their buck. it is done in collaboration with the airports and airport authorities. charlotte is not particularly active in the national organization which has security committees. they are not active in these organizations. the people who worked on this -- charleston is not in there. on monday, i had the ceo of dallas-work worth airport fly in with his senior staff to sit

down with our group and tell us that they're very happy working with tsa. what they wanted was to the volunteer for any pilot projects they could have. in terms of how the relationship -- it may vary across the country, but there is a lot of work to get the tools that will enable them to do the best, most popular security assessments and reports -- the way forward for these airports. >> it seems like you want this nimble approach. maybe charlotte needs a different tlc. you're giving in individualized plan. make sure you elevate that into an individualistic plan. be careful what you ask for. just because somebody is complying -- to give you an example. the teacher is only asking you to repeat what they want you to.

it does not tell you about the knowledge of the student. you have to go further, sometimes. sometimes, the squeaky wheel is the one doing something a little bit different. i think it was you at the top, to understand what they were doing and why. >> what we did was go beyond compliance to get the best, innovative security measures from airports around the country, because compliance is not sufficient. i would agree. >> the idea that you have not conducted joint vulnerability assessments in the 83% of our nation's airports is not acceptable. we need to figure out how to solve that. as it relates to dallas, i would hope it would be one of the first ones in here. they had 20 security breaches in the past five years. they had a truck came across the field, as i noted in my opening statement.

there's a lot of work to be done at a big airports such as dallas, for instance. my understanding of the dollars and the metrics, again, if we cannot -- my understanding is that costs about $175,000 per each whole-body imaging machine. it is $20, 000 -- $20,000, $30,000 to train a dog. the whole-body imaging machines have something that the machines -- dogs do not have. they have lobbyists. we have to increase security. we have to become more secure, but we cannot give up every civil liberty. we should not be looking at every passenger naked in order to secure the airplane. the pentagon, having spent $19 billion, came to the conclusion that the single best way to find

a bomb-making device or bomb- making material is the canine. we're not putting enough emphasis on expanding the use of canines. they are friendly, non infective. they are a simple way to find and fight these explosive devices. >> in terms of the dogs that you have seen, tsa supports the amtrak program. we have supported about 1/3 of the dog teams that they have. a fully equipped team with the trainer, the dog, so on and so forth, is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. >> per year? you think that is per year? hundreds of thousands of dollars? inspector parker, can you give me a sense of what a dog handler makes at amtrak? what is their annual salary, if you had to guess?

>> it depends on their rank. $50,000 to $70,000. >> how do you come up with that figure? paul pope only costs so much -- dog food only cost so much. you said hundreds of thousands of dollars per dog. i challenge you to verify that number. i assume that your whole-body imaging machines requiring operator that requires a salary. in corpus christi, it requires at least two, three. >> they are all expensive systems. they each have their own -- >> you are suggesting that the whole-body imaging machine is a cheaper alternative then using the canine. i tell you what, i would love to

do this. you take 1000 people and put them in a room. i will give you 10 whole-body imaging machines. you give me 1000 people in another room and one of his dogs and we will find a bomb before you do. that's the problem. there is a better, smarter way. the tsa is not prioritizing this. if you look at the lobbying work to put through those machines, you should be ashamed. the pentagon study the technology and that is what they're doing -- you do not see whole body imaging machines in kandahar, but you do see dog teams. lives are on the line every day. let's look at what is more expensive, the whole-body imaging machine, which we know isn't effective, and a k-9. let's see who could find more bombs? >> the dog does not work all

day. >> inspector parker, how long does though dog work? >> the dogs work two to three hours. you take a break, then work another two to three hours. that is how it works. >> let's keep going. i believe the dogs are better and smarter solution. one of the challenges the tsa is having to deal with is the fact there we have over 900,000 security -- out there. roughly 16,000 just at dulles airport. how often are those checked? how do you deal with the fact that we have 1 million people with security badges at airports? >> there are probably 850,000 people with badges. they go through criminal history background checks. >> who does the check? >> it goes through airport authorities to the fbi. then they do watch list, which

goes through tsa. those are perpetuallyv etted -- perpetually vetted on a watch- list basis -- basis. they are redone every two years. >> do you have plans to deal with vulnerability from an insider attack? >> there are a number of things -- >> is there an actual plan? >> there are many forms of insider attack. >> i just wonder if there is a plan to deal with the fact that you have 900,000 people -- >> yes. >> you have an understanding of the situation. >> our commentary was on the so- called tisra. a notable caveat was that it

excluded the threat of the insider attack in various forms. tsa acknowledge it needed to look at that in the next iteration. the later version will include that threat. >> mr. sammon said that he had it. them that i am not sure he looked at it in terms of this analysis. -- >> i am not sure he looked at it in terms of this analysis. >> tisra was the first of its kind of cross-all-modes -- a cross-all-modes scenario. insider attacks will be included in the second one. >> it is difficult to get any analysis over this. is there a month-by-month analysis you could share with us.

>> it could be anything from a bad left behind to door left open. >> we're hoping the tsa can provide us some details. we want to understand whether the trend is going up or down? is that something you can provide to the committee? >> i will go back and check and will provide that to the committee. >> if it is -- >> it depends on the security. >> the perimeter fence at the jfk airport, based on investigative reports done by news organizations, i understand that the project to fix the fences running four years behind. what is your knowledge of the situation? >> i know that they're looking at it once did the hard detergent -- intrusion detection technology.

-- that they are looking at installing intrusion-detection technology. >> i am worried about the 1/4 miles of fence at jfk and been behind schedule. >> i do not know and we'll get back to you. >> please describe your roles and responsibility. >> my responsibility is working with various pipelines, freight carriers, pipelines -- >> so it is not limited to airports? >> no, sir. >> jfk has got to be one of the largest targets out there. >> the committee would appreciate more understanding of why this project is four years behind schedule. i understand there is a local

component, but from the tsa side, that would be much into -- much appreciated. lax -- an airport official noted that the fence complies with regulations, but that it has no consistent security standard. is there a consistent security standard for parameters? >> the standard is based on the location of the facility -- >> but it is not going to vary in an airport, right? it may very between lax and bozeman, montana. >> it may very on the location. >> those standards are the work we have done. i showed the committee this earlier today. it does vary within and airports. >> what is your understanding of this situation? >> i would have to differ to my colleague on that. whether the standards vary

within an airport, i do not have the expertise. >> one study found that "the tsa lacks a unified common national standard -- unified, national standard." where does that stand? >> we were concerned about the number of stakeholders and tsa have a lack of oversight role. we thought it was important to have a game plan to unify the current effort. as i understand, a draft strategy has currently been included as an act -- as an annex to the tisra. that is currently under agency review. >> the software updates. as inspector parker pointed out, the hardware needs software. the software needs updating.

some of the software is as old as 1998, is my understanding based on what i have read. is that your understanding? what is the agency doing to update that software? >> all new equipment is being purchased at the 2010 standard. the 1998 standards are more stringent than anything in the world. there is a plan to update come into your -- update come incrementally, the machines that are out there to bring them to the 2010 standard. >> would you care to comment? >> i agree. >> are you prioritizing the 1998 machines? >> i will have to get back to you with the specific plan. i do not have that with me. >> thank you for the opportunity for a second round of questioning. i want to start with the actual topic that we -- we have gone into a lot of areas. perimeter security -- within the

perimeter of the airport, there is the potential of doing damage. what is being done to address the much easier access to the tarmac area from those involved in the general aviation, as opposed to those in commercial aviation. -- aviation? i board my friends private airplane and i wander over and sneak something on to a commercial plane. >> we extended the badging requirements. it caused quite a lot of fuss. there's a lot to push back -- there was a lot of pushback. if you are regularly on an airport, you have got to have a badge. if you have proximity to the tarmac at a commercial airport -- and this caused quite a bit of our raucous, when we expanded the requirements --

>> but i do not need a badge to get onto the tarmac in the general aviation area. i do not need any thing. by you have to accompany the aircraft back and forth -- >> you have to accompany the aircraft back and forth. you could be challenged by anyone at the facility if you were there. >> it appears to be common sense that there ought to be a focus on the ground staff that does not go up on the airplanes. the 9/11 box cutters were put on the plane by ground crew. the ground crew does not cope with the plane. their life is not at risk in an attack. it seems like there should be a re.ong focus their -- thei >> that is why there is a pope is on random screening on the

tarmac. >> "like to me" -- is this a science -- i watch "lie to me." is this a science that works? has it helped apprehend anyone who had contraband at the airport? >> i believe it happened a few years ago in orlando. someone had something in his bags and he was detected as he came through the door by his behavior. he was screened found -- and found that -- >> so, we've gotten one. >> i would like to respectfully disagree. i am not sure he was detected through that program. he had such an unusual appearance that the ticket agent may have alerted the locals.

i am not sure it was a behavior- detection success. as i recall from reading the case file, he was in the iraqi war veteran suffering from post- traumatic stress disorder and was not on his medication at the time. >> would you like to comment on that? the israelis were pioneers on this. >> behavior detection is part of water principle of identifying levels of risk -- part of a principle of identifying all levels of risk. you have to look at it in context. the bdo program, despite the fact that it has been noted, both by gao and the committee of

science, there is no support -- it does not by itself improve -- [unintelligible] what we have worked with on this issue -- we have had the ambition -- a level of success. >> if i were to become president and i appointed you as head of tsa, what are the top five changes he would make to improve security and efficiency -- you would make to improve security and efficiency? >> i will start with two. first, i would redirect the strategy towards real risk-based strategy that identifies the level of risk of the individual passenger by the access to

information now we have studied prior to his arrival at the airport. later on, the ability to talk to just a very few passengers that we find as high-risk passenger is based on our earlier analysis, not just searching them, but also talking to them to a level that would provide us with more information. >> i went from chris christie to washington, d.c., without saying anything other than -- corpus christi to washington, d.c., without saying anything other than "thank you" to anyone who spoke to me. >> the contact between security people and passengers is one of our greatest shortcomings. we focused -- we're doomed to

failure because the technology is not good enough to provide us with the level of protection. >> thank you. >> i wanted to make comments with respect to that. >> i do not disagree with what he is saying. in terms of -- the fundamental part is access to information. the more information you have, the more you know about people -- most of the people going to the airport everyday and are to be trusted. they just want to get on their way. the challenge is to have the information that differentiates one group of people from the larger group. getting that information prior to the arrival at the airport. right now, we know the name, date of birth, where they're coming from, where they are going to. we cannot even track or they have been for the past three

years. right now, we are in a situation of looking at how we do better risk-based security and also what kind of information can you have access to to do a better job. that is one of the challenges. >> thank you. the committee would appreciate the opportunity to ask additional questions. would it be alright that we submit those? i would ask -- some of the panel members were not here today. i would ask that we submit those within seven days. we would like a copy of the incident reports. we would appreciate if you would provide those to us. we would also like to have a briefing on this risk-based approach, something you offered earlier -- it probably needs to be in the secure setting -- but something that we need to work out with the tsa.

i would also appreciate some definitions, if you will, and some specific statistics on the number of the stowaways. it is and then we have asked for. the tsa has not yet -- it is something that we have asked for. tsa has not provided it yet. is there any reason those things cannot happen? >> i will check on the status of those requests. >> a couple of those are new, but the stowaways was a previous request. last question about transportation security inspectors, tsi's. how many are there? how many civil penalties have imposed over the years? >> it would be a good request. i do not have the data with me. it would merely be conjecture. we could give you the total number of inspectors and the

number of penalties and number of open cases. there are also, when in terms of findings, sometimes they resolve the issue on the spot. we can get to a good breakout on that ishat is concise -- concise and accurate let's go down the line. what is the number-one thing you would like -- and accurate. >> let's go down the line. what is the number-one thing you would like to see happen? memo -- >> we want to go forward with breast-based security. we are focused in that direction. it will -- risc-based security -- risk-based security. we are focused in that direction.

that is where we are trying to go. >> on behalf of the gao, we are ready to support the committee's efforts to oversee tsa's effort to move to more of our risk -- a sk-based approach. i agree that we need to learn about dangerous people, not just objects. >> most of our joint vulnerability assessment noted no compliance. we need to refer compliance with all of the regulations. i think i would like to see -- what i would like to see is a collaborative partnership between us and the gsa to address -- tsa to address the real issues. >> thank you. >> beyond the need for a better risk-based approach, i would

strongly recommend a better balance between the airport facility security and the passenger and baggage screening operation. right now, we are spending most of our efforts on the front door when the back door is not secured at all. >> thank you. inspector parker. >> i would like to see continued support for the canine programs. amtrak is doing a lot. we appreciate what congress has done to fund us. >> thank you. thank you all for being here. it takes a lot of time, effort, and preparation for you to be here today. we do appreciate it. we thank you and wish you the best. our mutual goal on both sides of the aisle is to make this country as safe and secure as possible. at the same time, we need to make sure we are filling those gaps and asking the hard questions. that is what makes this country great, our ability and opportunity to do that.

this meeting is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> next, we continue with the discussion on the effectiveness of government programs targeting airport security. this is from today's "washington journal." host: we want to welcome clark

kent irving. tsa getting a lot of complaints for 25,000 security breaches from 2001 until 2011. what has happened? guest: it was a troubling report. tsa says it is a relatively small percentage. some of these are innocent ones wear a bag that asserted been checked passed through and was lost by the traveler. 6000 times, people may get to the check points without proper scrutiny. 25,000 is a big number when we know one incident can be catastrophic the fatal. we spend $20 billion plus since

9/11. we have something to show for that. some pilots and flight attendants are armed. the number of here marshalls was only 11 at the time. nothere are many more. notwithstanding all of that, year after year, we see these inspector general reports and media investigations that show is still possible to get guns and knives past screeners. host: we saw that this past week with a taser gun found on a jetblue fight. guest: new work is an airport of

particular concern, because it is an airport through which 9/11 hijackers transported some of the items in. the nigerian man a few weeks ago managed to board alight from york to jfk los angeles and got on without a valid identification or boarding pass. it was an expired boarding pass. all of these incidents are tremendous -- tremendously troubling. we know that al qaeda is fixated on a nation. it has a worldwide economic impact. it would show that for all of these reasons, we need to take

these efforts seriously. host: we go through the airport's security lines. we have to raise our hands like we are criminals. we are often detained because there is a questionable item in your bag. you are always treated like a criminal and going through airport check points. guest: there haveeen examples, and we have experienced them, where screeners have been insensitive and rude to passengers. i am of the view that we have to assume the worst about every traveler. there will be less scrutiny -- we do not know in advance who is

a terrorist. they can appear to be a clean cut person without a terrorist background. everyone has to be subjected to the same level of scrutiny. anyone can be a terror threat. host: what would you change in the system? guest: we need to make sure people are who they say they are. of a put increased emphasis on training screeners. i would pay them better to give them greater motivation. there is no silver bullet. a key point is technology. there are limits to what human beings can do. psychological and physical limits. we seem to be one step behind the terrorist. well we are addressing the threat of items on a person.

we have imagery that can see through clothing. now there is talk of terrorist surgically implanting explosives inside of their body cavity. we do not have the technology to address this. we need to take advantage of these investigations and to redouble efforts to deploy efforts -- deploying this. host: there is a clip of changes that have ourred over the years. >> they have tried to better address current threats. tsa has occurred screening

system that does not meet the 2010 requirements. some of the machines are operating at a level of standard ed 2005. the report describes some of the challenges that tsa faces in securing and deploying this very complicated technology. safely collecting data on the explosive physical and chemical properties. guest: he is a very respected analysts. he points out another vulnerability. we do not have state of the art baggage technology. some of these machines are not up to 2011 standards. i want to stress that i am not suggesting that we can have a perfect security in the aviation

sector. these are obvious security gaps that we have had it 10 years to focus on. we know that al qaeda is focused on aviation. we need to address these obvious threats. host: you can board and amtrak train or bus with little security. guest: that is a concern as well. we have spent $9 per passenger on the aviation sector, and we still have these difficulties. only 4 cents per passenger on mass transit. we know from madrid, moscow, terrorist abroad are fixated on mass transit and vulnerabilities.

we know it is within the terrorist sites, must tons a -- mass transit. it is wide open. on the other hand, in the right place, mass transit could easily surpassed the number of people killed on 9/11. more police officers, more bomb detection technology. these are very tight budgetary times.

host: we will get to your calls in just a moment. the phone numrs are at the bottom of your screen. you can send us an e-mail or comment through twitter. if you go to a number of airports, you see long lines for airport security. then there are trusted traveler programs. how will this expand and what does it involve? guest: john pistol has done a great job at tsa. he rolled out a pilot program that will begin in e fall. it will be applicable to only certain airlines, delta and american. available in atlanta, dallas,

detroit, and miami. it is available to passengers that are frequent fliers to those airlines and participate in certain programs in the customs department like global traveler. those passengers had given extensive biographical information to tsa, paid a fee so there biometrics are taken. in exchange for this, they will have a faster line, but they will not have to undergo inconveniences'hat others do such as taking off their shoes, taking out their laptops, taking off their jackets. i do believe this is the way of the future. they can segregate those aware

of the most is known we will see what happens as a result of this. host: some say it looks discriminatory. guest: not only is it is discriminatory, but it is a huge security gap. the cargo passengers are not subject to any scrutiny. it can be a carrier for terrorists. i am very concerned about it. host: jim is joining us from buffalo, n.y., indepennt line. caller: 5 travel a lot from my

job. i have never run into a rout tsa agent. if israel does this better than anybody else because of the heightened security, why don't we invite them over to revamp our system? guest: i get that question a lot. there is a lot we can learn from israel. there are many differences between the united states and israel. it is a much smaller country. there is a greater willingness on the israeli public, given the day the security concerns that the country has tengage in the hour-long scrutiny that takes place at the airport in israel.

tsa is incorporating the behavior detection approach that israel takes. they have people trained to detectnomalous behavior. concerns have been raised about the program. people who are drug dealers, traffickers, have been engaged in a of their ordinary crime, illegal immigrants have also to been found, but no terrorist has yet to be a identified. there are concerns about the program. we are attempting to learn what recant but should not attempt to replicate the system.

caller: some of our travels are on private jets. we have to submit an itinerary as to who will be on the plane. does it get checked anywhere? guest: it does get a check. the passengers and luggage are not searched. we have a relatively tight security regime. it is a security gap that we cannot afford. caller: i am concerned about the radiation from these x-ray machines. are they in danger to us? guest: a number of studies have been done to indicate that

radiation exposure is minim. it is no higher than one is naturally exposed to walking around doing one's business. i think medical and health concerns in the privacy concern have been overblown. they have gone out of their way to address the medical and privacy issue. they want to make sure that people do t see genitalia. the american people have to make a choice, whether they want more security or more privacy. there is a trade-off between the two. host: why is it necessary to raise your hands going through these security check points? guest: it suggests that we are

being frisked. but we are a common criminal. that is the way the machines work. you have to raise your park beach pocket -- you have to raise your arms, empty your pocket. is time consuming. that is one of the objections to these whole body amateurs. host: one person with a steel implants in his hips had trouble getting through security. guest: he handled it with good grace and humor. host: bob is joining us from chicago, a republican line. caller: to the federal government prevented pilots from carrying guns in the cockpit.

who has more incentive to protect the flyers? the government, who when they fail, they kit for money and power, or the airlines and their insurance companies, and they fail, take a loss and go out of business? guest: we cannot leave security entirely to airlines. screeners were under contract to the airlines before 9/11 and were poorly paid and trained and motivated. 9/11 was the result. we do not have perfect security now, but i think it is far better than it was before, because the government only has one motivation, security. it does not have to compete with the profit motivation. the primary criterion at

airports should be secured a not profit. pilots were prohibited from carrying guns before 9/11. an egyptian pilot a few years ago used- it took a plane down. we have a flight deck officers program so that every pilot wants to be armed can be. they have to go through rigorous training to make sure they know how to properly use and store the weapon. host: 80 in chicago says, like to remind your guess that every 9/11 hijacker came to the country legally, and we still do not know how that is possible. guest: that is right. these are toxic times. i think the nexus between illegal immigration and security

is rather small. i guess there are still counts in a berlin borders. all of the 9/11 hijackers came through legally, and there are still considerable problems. host: democrats line. caller: i want to make a couple of points. i find it ridiculous into this part in debt the american traveling public, they seem to be demandingn both ends. they are demanding of everyone that they have security in flight, but seem unwilling to submit to what seems to be

reasonable and necessary a check to ensure flying safety. i think the media in this country has contributed to the part -- problem. en there is an incident or two and it seems to me that the number of incidents have been quite few, they have hired it to the means. americans have to decide to they want to ensure their safety on aircraft travel? that means you are subjected to may be a 15 or 20 minute delay, or do they want to be subct to these terroris or other people that want to do us harm? i want to be saved as air travel on the aircraft. we all know going in and that

these procedures are in place. if we plan properly, the time is available to -- if you plan your route out properly, you move through the process. it greatly enhances our security. a tremendous difference between what existed prior to tsa taking this over. the contractors that were in place for airline security work absolutely incompetent. they had people that somimes could not speak english. it seems to me that the level of quality these inspectors may not be perfect, but it is greatly improved from what it was. these complainers that are constantly whining about airport

security in my opinion, will be the very first ones to point the finger of blame at someone when there is an incident if they relax these procedures. gut: i a creigh with all three of the points he made. -- i agree with all threef the points he ma. people have to decide if they want security or a hassle free travel experience. we cannot have a completely hassle-free travel experience with the the recession 11. tsa is working hard to minimize the inconvenience for passengers. a considerable degree of scrutiny will always be merited, because potential terrorist attacks will remain with us in

the future. there has to be a balance. i am huge opponent of the for the reasons i said earlier. i'm on the screen years to have one motivation and that is protecting the american people, not have the competing motivation. host: these random checks, is it

truly random, or is there a level of profilg involved? guest: are really think that and we know that the case.

host: there somebody scanners used in a recent hearing. here's part of that exchange. >> i will give you 10 body imaging machines. you give me 5000 people and one of his dogs and he will find that bomb before you find yours. that is the problem. there is a better, safer way to do this a the psa is not prioritizing. if you look at those lobbyist and additionally is aimed at themselves. -- they should be ashamed at themselves. i am ashamed of the pentagon. you did not seek body imaging machines in canada are, but reduce the dog teams. -- in khandahar. guest: i agree that 25,000 is a large number. i disagree abo the body imager

machines. he has been one of the most vocal opponents. i said earlier that i think the tea as a struck the right balance and that is the best technology we have right now to detect the primary threat. and they use cines to a nsiderable degree of. there are limits. there are limits they can detect. we need to supplement screeners with canines, canines with technology, and we need to move beyond full body and managers. they can detect the next terrorist threat. the immediate condemnaon and technologies and techniques.

caller: what we have done since 9/11, i heard earlier that you're talking about expanding to public transportation, buses, trains, and to me it becomes a question of security versus control meeting could you imagine how hitler would have salivated having this type of control? if this control got into the wrong hands, i think it is a very dangerous tng. guest: i am not sure how respond to that. i guess i go back to the discussion we were having earlier about the trade-off between security and privacy and

security and convenience. i would just reiterate the point that i am very, very concerned, not just about aviation security, but about mass transit security. it is something that has been exploitable in has been the subject of threats already. bin laden was determined to attack from the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and there will be, i am afraid to say, and mass transit attack. if there is one, then we will institute these kinds of more draconian security measures in the mass transit sector. the question always is to reinstitute these measures before terrorist stryker afterwards? some want to get ahead of the terrorist production curve. i want to implement thebefore they strike. we always tend to be a least one step behind. host there will be services here in washington, d.c., and in new york beginning september

11th and we will have live coverage throughout the day on the c-span networks. this is from one of our tweeters. guest: they can apply through the dhs web site and the website. -- the tsa website. young people are really needed by the government than by the national security apparatus and the government more specifically and especially by the department of homeland security. this is something that's secretary napolitano has said. we need young people excited about public service like they were in the kennedy years, and especially for security. i am confident this country can put a man on the moon, project apollo. and the country that has

developed nuclear weapons in the 1940's still is developable -- capable of developing the next technology to cut some of us from terrorism. it seems there is not the same urgency or involvement to unless these best and brightest minds. i hope is young people will focus on homeland security as a career choice going forward. host: next caller from ohio on the republican line. caller: good morning. the question of igoing to ask was about profiling. you covered that a little better earlier. one of the things your guests said is that al qaeda is recruiting new members that do not fit the profile. i was going to rest about profiling. .- i'm going to ask the answer to that question struck me as funny that they are recruiting new members who do

not fit the profile. i kind of want to ask so out qaeda is recruiting baptists, presbyterians, atheists? guest: the incident -- the answer is yes. jihad jane, blond haired blue- eyed females cannot mails, caucasians, former christians. it is the hong world threat that we have not talked about that are inspired by al qaeda. al qaeda has come in their terrorist trading -- training camps, theyre peopled by western europeans and americans that are caucasians and former christians. one of the majo spokespeople is american, grew up in california who is of jewish heritage.

the caller said it, basically, that it is common sense to profile. it is not common sense, however, because as i said al qaeda knows that we have in our mind and arab looking a male between 16- 45 and that is why they are recruiting contrary stereotypes. host: mike from safety harbor, fla., welcome to the conversation. caller: i was not going to take you to task until you said that he is a director -- please, i have a few comments and i will be very quick. you said the tsa director was doing a good job. do you approved the 95-year-old cancer patient being stripped searched? host: we will get a response.

guest: the administrator did not engage in behavior that you just referenced. there are occasions when screeners have been rude, insensitive, and have not used common sense. in this particular instance of the 90-year-old woman who had to remove her underwear, that should not need to happen. the larger point is wdo not know who is a terrorist. it is likely that terrorists will know they are recruiting against the stereotype, my approach is to apply the same security measures to everyone. caller: i will steer the conversation to this then. you say we do not know terrorists, but it is widely known when he was on the flight with fruit -- farouk abdul

muttalah did not have a passport. another gentleman made sure he got on the plane. because of that security breach, which seemed to be a government official or someone's government being involved, someone with enough poll that could get a citizen without proper identification on to an airplane, that was allowed to happen and then the knee-jerk response are these body scanners. it is it true that michael chertoff is involved with these body scanners through a firm that he is representing? that is a definite conflict of interest. it is a problem summary action, solution. you create the problem and then come up with a solution. the solution is that i lose my freedom. guest: secretary chertoff did

nocreate the problem. the problem was created by terrorists, i would say. it is my understanding that former secretary chertoff was a suppter and worked for rapid scanning, one of the makers of these body imagery machines. he is not in office now and it is not a conflict of interest. i believe that these body imagers, and that is the proper name, is the best technology to detect these explosives hidden on a person's body. the former secretary is no longer involved with this anner. i did not say that is a conflict of interest. he is supporting the best technology we have. host: susan makes this point in. we also had the caller earlier

asking who was making money off of these machines. guest: the aernative, if you are in a security line with a whole body imager, you have the choice but to go through, but the alternative is to subject yourself to a physical pat down. to me, that is far more interested in invasive than these old body scanners. a lot of travelers are not. even in the airports where they are deployed, they are not at every checkpoint. it is possible for infrequent travelers never to of experienced this. last thanksgiving, there was a big scare and it turned out to fizzle went, it turns out, people got to thanksgiving and saw there was much less of a problem than they expected. tsa struck the right balance with concerns.

they are not perfect, but they're the best answer. host: donna joins us from west palm beach. caller: gd morning, c-span. it has been 30 years and i have never been able to make it through. oh, my goodness. i was just recently flying and they had the metal detector open and they put the yellow tape around to makeeople go for the body scanner. there was no way i was going through it. my concern is that it definitely is going to cause cancer. when we get radiation or have a cat scan, anything, an x-ray, we have to put something over russ. on this, there is nothing to protect us. what is going to happen? i opted out.

what is going to happen when a lot of people wake up and start opting out? are we going to be waiting at airports for six-seven hours to get on an airplane? will they eventually get rid of them it everyone ops out? dogs are a lot cheaper than these machines. thank you. host: thank you, donna. hopefully it will not be another 30 yrs before we hear from you. guest: we already spoke about dogs, so i will address the scanners. the health concerns, and the radiation risk is minimal. it is no greater risk than what naturally occurs. as don said, you do have the alternative and of engaging in a physical path down which is more invasive than the body imaging process. what happens if people opt out? will that slowed down the line? the answer is yes.

last thanksgiving, there was the fear of that, but people got to the report concerned about the body in ledgers on privacy grounds, health concerns, or both and they saw the concerns were overblown and is it possible we will see that going forward? i guess the answer is yes. now that they have been in place for nearly one year now, i think the vast majority of the american people understand that the risk is small and the benefit is commensurately grter. host: we have some tweets bringing this up again. guest: that is a common feeling. depending on how often you travel, everyone, at one time or another, has experienced rude

behavior on behalf of a screener. that is tremendously unfortunate. i know that the leadership spends a lot of time with supervisors and managers urging them to tell the screeners to be as courteous as they can be. to be fair to the screeners, it is mind numbing work. they are still relatively low paid. to be fair, passengers can be and are very rude to them so this is a two-way street. there is no excuse for that unless they get physical or verbally abusive. tsa needs to focus on that. host: two more calls for clark kent ervin. caller: two quick points on profiling. it is common knowledge that all suppose it women in full bur

does are not touched, not put through the screening. not all muslims are terrorist but all terrorists are muslim. guest: on a point of women, it is the case that women in traditional dress are subjected to scrutiny. the way it works, there is gender-specific, a woman will pat down a woman or apply the screening, and the same is true for men. on the issue of all terrorists been muslim, timothy mcveigh carried out a devastating terror attack in the united states, the oklahoma city bombing, and he was not a muslim. as a matter of fact, it is very clear that is not the case. host: lascall from denver on

the independent line. caller: good morning. how are you? i have three quick key points. point number one, it has been in e news media, although it was not very out there, but tsa agents are coming out with cancer, the ones who handled the machines. that leads me to point number two. why were those machines refused to be handed over to labs and be tested? the government said no. point number three, i want to ask our est which one of our founding fathers said the ones who are willing to give up some of their liberties for security

does not deserve neither. thank you. host: how would you respond to his last point of view from denver? guest: that was tom lester person and i agree. we need to strike a balance between security -- that was thomas jefferson and i agree. we need to strike a balance between security and liberty. ticking off shoes is a minor inconvenience for the arts side benefit of preventing another shoot bomber from destroying aircraft. -- shoe bomber. eight years ago, there was the attempt by the nsa to get a record of every single telephone call made in the united states, even from those who are not suspected terrorists. that is the exact opposite end of the spectrum. we need to weigh each measure by

how much security is obtained by virtue of it obverses how much liberty has to be compromised as a result. i think, with regard to a whole body in ledgers, and advanced imaging technology, the right >> on "newsmakers," washington gov. christine gregoire talks about issues facing states and this week's meeting of the national governors' association in salt lake city. "newsmakers," today at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span gues this is . >> this is the main reading room at the library of congress. do you know which photographs the letter reconsiders its most

famous? you will find out answers about this unique library in c-span's original documentary, "the library of congress," airing this monday night. we will tour the jefferson at including the reading room. and presidential papers from george washington to calvin coolidge. and we will learn how the library is using technology to discover hidden secrets in their collection and to preserve its holdings for future generations. join us for "the library of congress come close with this monday night at 8:00 eastern this it -- for "at the library of congress," this monday night at 8:00 eastern-pacific. >> our coverage of the summer meeting of the national governors' association continues at 1:30 eastern with author and "new york times" columnist thomas friedman.

as we wait for that session to begin, here is friday's opening news conference, with washington gov. christine gregoire, this year's share, and nebraska gov. dave heineman, vice chair. >> it is my pleasure to welcome not only you folks here, but the folks behind me -- christine gregoire to my right, chairman of the national governors' association and governor of the great state of washington, and dave heineman, a vice chair of the national governors' association, from the great state of nebraska. on my far left over here, lincoln chafee, governor of .hode island gu w

we are here representing approximately 32-plus governors attending this conference in some form or fashion over this weekend, as we get together for the national governors' association. my name is gary herbert, governor of the greats did it utah -- a great state of utah, who has the opportunity to host this significant event. this is one of the more spectacular views here in utah. as you look at this great valley -- don't if that is what brigham young envisioned when he came into the -- i don't know if that is what the brigham young in vision when he came into the valley, but we as utah are proud and pleased tons -- as utahns are proud and pleased to hold this significant event. it has been about 64 years since we had this great opportunity.

things have changed a bit. for example, alaska and hawaii were not states when we last posted. we are pleased to welcome them to the union. [laughter] opportunity to host them, and they will be participating, to. i will may be mentioned just the comment that it is a great opportunity for us to host the governor's. i am a big believer in the importance of the state's and governors getting together to discuss issues of importance, not only for their states, but collectively for the nation. it has been a proud tradition of governors to get together in a very bipartisan way and talk about issues of the day and learn from each other the best practices, find out what is going on in other parts of the country, try to adopt some of the best practices and learned that some of the challenges and see if we can help each other to

overcome the challenges we face as states. the national governors' association is a very good forum for that. when not only of governors here, -- we not only have governors here, we have a provincial governors from china and will participate also. again, emblematic of the fact we all face what is a global marketplace in the economy. we have to look outside of our own borders now as we have opportunities at necessity to compete in a global marketplace. we have some special visitors. and we are going to talk about economic development, jobs with our friends from china as we have two great nations coming together in salt lake city for this weekend. i will conclude my part and say that what has not changed over time is the governors' commitment to promote a visionary state leadership, share best practices, speak with

a collective voice on national policy. i think as we all understand states to be laboratories of democracy, we have opportunities as the experiment and work together to do good things, innovative and creative solutions to some of the challenges of the day. i am proud to be the host gov.. utah welcomes people across this great land and literally across the world to the national governors' association, and we are pleased to be the host. with that, let me turn some time to the great chairman, gov. christine gregoire from washington state. [applause] >> good morning, and welcome to the annual meeting. i want to give up reading to gov. herbert and the first lady of this -- give it a greeting to

gov. herbert and the first and this state for such a warm welcome. thank you for doing everything you can to roll out the hospitality for everything you off got here. it is an effort, i know, but you have done everything he can to ensure that the governors and guests have the opportunity to experience the wonders of the great state of utah while at the same time we get it nation's business done. i want to acknowledge our the vice chair, nebraska gov. dave heineman gu. he will speak about some of the speakers we are delighted to have with us over the next few days. i admire the governor's dedication to the great state of nebraska and to the association. i can say without a doubt that it has been a pleasure to work with dave heineman, to get to know him. ours has been a true partnership during difficult times. i am grateful for his leadership. nga has two business meetings a

year. there is what we hold in "the other washington" in february, and the annual meeting in summertime. this year for the nation's governors has been filled with many challenges. we had been asked to do more with less, people are struggling to make ends meet at home, state finances are just now starting to recover. but we have not yet recovered in full, and we still have to make very tough choices while investing in our future so that we have an economic future that is second to none. many of us, and our citizens have endured natural disasters and times have been hard. still the governors are called upon to lead through these challenging times. as governors, we face is very similar situations, some unique, but many often very similar.

for example, whatever challenge in half in the state of washington, i feel comfortable calling up my vice chair, dave heineman, and saying, "have you experienced this," getting his thoughts, sharing best practices through the national governors' association about how we can share and his best practices going on in other states. with the challenges the governors are facing comes great opportunity, and we have the opportunity now here up close and personal to share our experiences, share our institutional knowledge. we have 29 new governors. that is historic in the history of the national governors association. all of them from a varied backgrounds, different perspectives. when these forces are joined, there is no limit to what we believe we can accomplish. the theme for the next three days is that education is our path to good jobs and to economic success for our future.

economic growth and job creation continue to be the top our priorities for virtually every governor across the nation. we must find ways to create jobs for those who need them, strengthening our economic means and making sure that more of our residents have the skills for the 21st century. some of them are losing jobs that they will never be able to return to. we need to make sure it they get the opportunity for new skills, new training. i education is an economic engine in each of our states -- higher education as an economic engine in each of our states and this great university is an example. it is the underpinning of our economic future. by fostering innovation and increasing competitiveness, even in these tough times we will lay a path for the future of our great nation. this includes all of us understanding that it is essential that our universities partner with the private sector. when we do, there is nothing that those two, business

community and higher education institutions cannot accomplish. we must hold them accountable to deliver -- deliver to our taxpayers, delivered to the students, and deliver to the businesses that need the work force. as nga chair, i and clinchehaven privileged to work on these issues, and we are much more effective when we work in a bipartisan way. each governor has their own initiative. compete,"ompletet t to to increase college completion for economic activity in the united states. to graduate from high school is not enough. they have to go on and get a certification or protest ship. if yesterday they were satisfied with an aa, hopefully they will

go on to get a bb.a. far too many are just shy of getting there to greet. 2/3 of jobs will require a degree beyond high school, whether it is a university degree, a technical program, or other credentials. at present, our country is not prepared to meet the work force demands of tomorrow. the u.s. has fallen from first in the world to 12th in the students that are completing a decrease. if unaddressed, in just the span of the next seven years, states will fall 3 million to grease behind what is our work force need. -- 3 million degrees behind what is our workers need. you may think that with unemployment over 9%, we also have jobs unfilled today because we don't have the skilled work force to fill those jobs brought

to ensure that states and citizens are prepared to compete in what is an absolute global economy, we must develop sound policies that enable more individuals to complete the degrees and increase the efficiency of our higher education institutions. i believe we can and must improve higher education performance, must identify promising state policies, the first step to retain excellence and regaining access to higher education brought together, we can work to increase the number of college graduates and ultimately increase our nation's ability to compete internationally. i want to thank my colleagues for their participation and their insights during this initiative process. much of what we will discuss during the next session today -- i am looking forwarded to the next three days. the need bipartisan structure of our association enables us to put politics aside, crossed party lines and have a good solid conversations with

colleagues from across the country to develop innovative an improved approach to governing. it governors don't have a choice. they are having to balance budgets, and they are having to make tough decisions, they are having to lead to the future. only if we work together, partisanship aside, no bickering, while our sleeves and work together, can be set a path forward for the united states. that is the purpose for the next three days and i'm encouraged by our attendance and the willingness of our governors to do just that in one of the most trying times in our nation's history. it is my pleasure to introduce our vice chair, the governor of the great state of nebraska, dave heineman, will walk through it a little bit of what our schedule entails the next few days. [applause] >> good morning, and thank you very much. let me start by commenting on the relationship between gov. gregoire and myself.

we have had an extraordinary partnership. i have learned a lot from her and she is a great leader for her state. for sally and i, it is a great privilege to become more quiet with her. in a true bipartisan spirit, we did not know this was going to happen in the fall, the university of nebraska played the university of washington and we won that game. then we turned around and played the university of washington again in a bowl game, and we decided to let the university of washington win that game -- >> oh. [laughter] >> as a result of the true partnership, i center omaha -- sent her omaha steaks. we truly enjoyed our relationship. that is what we do in the statehouse. regardless of party identification, we try to work together to solve issues.

annual meeting our opportunities to have discussions of real solutions to the challenges we face. nga is an important bipartisan organization that brings the governors together to discuss and develop policies on a range of critical issues at to share information on emerging trends and innovations in state government. we focus on issues common to all states during this meeting. education, innovation and competitiveness to just name a few. three governors-only sessions will provide a candid forum. our standing committees will discuss policy proposals that will be considered by the full association at sunny's closing session. our work begins shortly. today's opening session, "higher education: catalyst for economic growth," will focus on the vital role universities play in

nurturing innovation and economic growth through collaboration and engagement with the private sector. we will be joined by the president of mit and a visiting scholar and adviser to the provost at the university of southern california and former chief scientist at xerox corp. later this afternoon, a unique peer-to-peer exchange will take place with the chinese governor's forum. saturday, a discussion about international trade and investment's role in domestic job growth and job creation. following are the sessions, the governors will meet with members of their respective standing committees. the health and human services committee will look at the health insurance exchange implementation issue. the natural resources committee will engage in discussion on job

creation in the energy sector .ue8 to the education early child and workforce committee will discuss leveraging higher education to increase competitiveness. a special committee on homeland security and public safety will focus on remembering september 11 with a discussion on protection of our borders and communities. the annual meeting will conclude sunday morning with a session on the global challenges facing america today and the role education plays in u.s. competitiveness. "new york times" columnist and pulitzer prize-winning author tom friedman will join us for that session. we want to thank you for joining us in salt lake city, and we want to thank governor robert and his wife for hosting us and for the extraordinary -- gov. herbert and his wife for hosting us and for the extraordinary job they are already doing. we are prepared to answer

questions. [applause] >> can we take questions, please? >> gov. gregoire, what is your feeling about -- >> let me tell you what is going on in washington, d.c. i think that is more to the point. across the nation, we can ill afford the debate going on in washington, d.c. we are in a fragile state of recovery. the fact that we're not moving forward to solve the debt issue is resulting -- i can tell you in my own home state, where i am not an income tax state, i am a sales tax state, consumers are not buying goods. businesses that have the money to hire or not hiring because people are concerned about this. it is time we put this issue behind us and got on with the issue confronting every american, do i have a job, will

i have a job tomorrow? at the end of the day, i am one who believes personally, and i am sure it there is difference of opinion here, that we need to have a balanced solution here, that we have trimmed everywhere we can and that is what every governor across the country has done, that we've looked at tax loopholes and stepped up to them, the afflicted and the opportunity where revenue is being -- that we have looked at every opportunity where revenue is being disproportionately paid by people who shouldn't be. i do not want this to be on the backs of the poor and middle- class. i think all governors agree, get on with 8. i walked into my legislative session in january, democratic house, democratic senate, democratic gov.. i said to my colleagues and the legislature, forget your partisanship, no bickering, roll up your sleeves, get the job done. it was historic. they got the job done. that is what is necessary in

washington, d.c. >> the pledge for cut cap and balance -- is he wrong? >> every individual governor makes their own decision. if that is the pledge of gov. herbert, so be it. it is not the pledge i will take. >> you take a very different approach than gov. herbert and, i assume, governor heineman. if this is bipartisanship at work and you have such a wide disagreement here, how can you bridge the divide? >> just this past saturday, in a bipartisan way, we the governors sent a message to the leaders of the house and senate and the administration, and that is that if you are talking about cutting medicaid to the tune of what we have heard, $100 billion, let us

share with you with the consequences are to the states. will you take us to the brink of another recession? will you do it on the backs of the poor? what we said bluntly to everyone is work with us [captioning performed by national captioning institute] -- work with us. we want to address the nation's debt problem but we don't want to do it if you don't understand what the consequences are for the states. let's talk about how best to do this. for a decade we've been working on what is called dual-eligible population, those who are chronically ill and have highest costs. we were able to meet an agreement with the administration. we will deliver high-quality care to that segment of the population, reduce costs, and share the savings. that is what you get when you work with the governors. the administration did exactly that. that is what we are exact --

what we're asking congress and the administration to continue to do. do what you did on a dual- eligible, work with us. you make decisions without consulting us an understanding the consequences back home, then that leads to disaster. and consequences you may not be aware of. we stand united, dave and i signed a letter together. we want to work with you. that is what we do what we work together. >> let me take it this way. i think that to assume, for example, that we don't have differences of opinion would be naive. clearly, each governor comes from a different perspective, not only different parties, but if a demographic and challenges in their own states. that is why we believe the state's voices need to be heard.

we ought to be partners with washington, d.c. and they ought not to be subservient. we ought to be coequal. i believe in federalism. that said, sometimes party liberals get in the way of resolving issues. principles, though, will unite us. the principles of fiscal restraint and responsibility is something that democrats and republicans all agree on. what we disagree on is how to get from here to there. that is something we debate and discuss amongst ourselves as well as when we work with our congressional delegation. governors do have to go back and balance their budgets, they have to execute. a little different than sitting on the sidelines, where we see a lot into the kitchen and not enough action. -- a lot of putts of vacation and not enough action. fiscal a -- a lot of pontification and not enough action. one other fact --