>> yes, and to a certain degree, he is correct, they the are the major opponents of this. they are not alone. i spent a lot of time talking to the aftermarket auto parts industry, which i didn't realize was having a difficult time but they're getting killed by the big warehouses that are selling to the folks who like to buy car parts, and, but this isn't just a main street versus internet, because all these internet companies are on main street somewhere. and what happens when we get to the point where everybody is internet? aren't we all just main street? , and aren't we then in the same exact position as we are today where the inter internet, main street retailer in downtown sioux falls, south dakota is competing 3 the internet main street retailer in ogden, utah without the price differential, butting heads against each other trying to steal each other's local customers.

# wanted to fix this problem given that there would not be any mainstream stores. i was taken aback because i could not figure a response. i could always think their response. it made me think.

what have you tried? what if there is not mean streak in the sense that we think of it today? you can go online to the store around the corner by something dumb and have it shipped to you. i am shopping around the corner on my and they still have to apply sales tax. nearly 50% compete -- of computers are sold on line. consumer electronics are sold on line. look at circuit city. they're gone. some of the others are big supporters because they are scared to death they will be the next to go. big box retail will be a thing of the past, which might be good for small-town retailers, but i

am not sure that is good for retailing. >> this is getting some attention in congress. senator durbin and therefore cannot be main street fairness act. what do you want to see congress to do? >> we want them to adopt the main street fairness act as they have been working on for 10 years now which gives states the authority to require retailers to collect their sales tax if those states have done the minimum simplification of things that the state, local governments, and businesses have worked the last 10 years to establish. give states to make the effort salesight to enforce their wil tax. this is about tax enforcement. >> last question. >> in your view, is legislation necessary? we brought up the question that

congress is the body to regulate. could this be done without regulation, or are senator durbin's efforts necessary? >> that is the never-ending debate. our preface -- preference would be legislation. if you go back to the court with the wrong set of facts, we could all end up in a situation where a non group of people to collect and our preference is that everybody above a certain small- business exemption would collect and they would follow the same rules. every state not to do something to make their tax system better. >> scott peterson, executive director of the streamlined tax board which presents states rights to collect sales tax.

thehill.com. thank you for being on the communicators. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> it representative john larsen offers his perspective on the debt ceiling negotiation, entitlement programs, and what it means for future legislative efforts. "newsmakers" tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. at 6:00 p.m. eastern. the head of the nuclear regulatory commission has called on his agency to complete recommendation new safety organizations and there would have by years to implement any new changes. he spoke monday at the national press club for about one hour. >> i am pleased and honored to be here today speaking at this institution. the national press club is a venue like another and it has been the center of washington journalism and news for more than 100 years.

i was doing some research to prepare for this and my staff did some investigation into the press club and they noticed the historic emblem was that of the now all which symbolizes wisdom, awareness, and long nights on the job. i will not claim wisdom and i will let you judge resins' awareness, but i can definitely relate to the long nights spent sleepless on the job. as chairman of the nuclear regulatory commission, one of the best aspects of my job is having the opportunity to lead a staff of nearly 4000 talented, dedicated public servants. like a regulatory agency, we hear from all sides and all perspectives about both our own safety record and that of the industry that we regulate. we know we can always do better and we always strive to do better i have absolute confidence, and i believe that the american people should, as

well, in the experience, expertise, and professionalism of the nrc staff. i have brought three excellent representatives with me and i would like to introduce them to you. as a resident inspector, she is the eyes and the years at that plant. she and fellow inspectors are the front line of the staff who conducted the orders. arthur working on our production plans for two nuclear plants, he has worked on improving fire protection all across the country for the past 11 years at

the nrc. this is a very important long standing issue and he has been a big part of the nrc's progress on this issue. finally, endeavor has been with the agency for 18 years and she is a doctor in nuclear engineering from mit, and we helped pursue that opportunity. she helps to make a decision on on where the nrc spends research money to best advanced nuclear safety. most recently, she was a part of a 24/7 operations team during the japan crisis. because for expertise, she was asked to serve on the international atomic agency fact-finding mission in japan. these three outstanding professionals are representative of the thousands of individuals who work day in and day out to make sure we meet our responsibilities for nuclear safety to the public.

-assure the recent -- i am sure the recent events in japan are foremost in chevron's mind. since the even sit on bold, the nrc has taken immediate actions to ensure the continued safety. in light of the events in japan, the commission has undertaken a methodical review of the nrc nuclear safety program. this review had both short and long term components and it has moved forward with a strong sense of urgency given the significant safety issues under examination. to spearhead this effort, we established a task force made up of some of the agency's most experienced expert staff. all together with the six members, they represent more than 135 years of regulatory experience. around the review, they have had

full access to all the other stop at headquarters, in our regions, and the nrc staff continue to work in japan to help the japanese government as they continue to respond. the task force reached out to the federal emergency management agency to benefit from their expertise in emergency management as well as the institute for nuclear power operations to understand the industry's response. additionally, the task force considered information received from stakeholders and monitored reports by the international atomic energy agency in the nuclear energy agency as well as other organizations. last week, the task force completed its 90-day review, part of the short term review assigned by the commission, and submitted recommendations to the commission for consideration. in line with the nrc commitment to transparency and openness,

the commission has made this fall report publicly available for everyone to see. the task force will formally present to the commission at a public meeting tomorrow. i want to thank the members of the task force for their work. it is clear their focus remains first and foremost on nuclear safety. i want to of knowledge charlie miller who delayed his retirement in order to lead this effort. we still have people retiring soon, but we are doing our best to talk him out of it. this task force developed a set of 12 recommendations, many was short and long term elements, and they were recommendations needed to strengthen nuclear safety in this country. in the review, the task force did not find imminent risk from the continued operation of the nation's nuclear power plants. the task force was clear, however, that any accidents involving damage to reactor fuel

or uncontrolled radioactive releases the magnitude of fukushima, even ones without significant health consequences is inherently an acceptable. this is the same reaction i have seen as i have attended meetings threat the country in the world. quite simply, many of us who work in this field thought that this kind of accident could not and would not happen again. to the challenge for the congress, the industry, the public, and the agency, how to better insure an accident, like the one in japan, will not happen in the u.s. like the accredit -- like the socratic both, we must not do harm to nuclear safety. i hope to share with you some thoughts today on how i think we can do that. as you can tell, i am tremendously proud of the work of the task force who have given us an excellent starting point

to tackle this important question and challenge. over the next 90 days, just like the task force to 90 days, i call on the commission to do its job to systematically and methodically review these recommendations in a republican transparent way including all the relevant stakeholders. regardless of your view on the recommendations, this is a step i think we can all agree on. this is by no means the first time we've contemplated significant changes in our approach to nuclear safety. throughout the safety -- drably years, our approach has necessarily of alda's new scientific intermission and operational experience has given us a better understanding of nuclear technology and its risks. although this process has primarily and pulled it incrementally through piecemeal and patrick changes along the way, the history of nuclear power has also been punctuated

by several significant events that challenged all truths. in 1975, the browns ferry fire occurred at a nuclear power plant which led us to rethink fire protection, an issue we continue to work on to this day. in 1979, the three mile island accident led us to rethink a large number of safety improvements and perches to say the nuclear power plants including a strong focus and emphasis on the control rooms and have people working in those environments could best deal with the challenging situations like the accident at three mile island. and of course the 9/11 terrorist attack was another watershed event that caused us to do radically rethink how we approach nuclear security in this country. these events lead to dramatic changes in both how the nrc

regulations and how the nuclear industry operates, changes that remain with us to this day. based on the task force analysis and recommendations, it is clear that the accident that fukushima dai-ichi is another such event. in regulating for the next century, we have charted a path forward on how we can fundamentally strengthen the nrc safety program. the task force recommendations are to extend some for me -- extensive for me to discuss today and range from the venting of hydrogen and emergency preparedness. they include a proposed new requirements to evaluate and upgrade the seismic and flooding protection, to strengthen the ability to deal with prolonged loss of power, and to develop an emergency plan that specifically contemplates the possibility of events involving multiple

reactors. throughout the report, the task force emphasizes that effective nrc action is essential in addressing each challenge in the voluntary initiatives are no substitute for strong and effective oversight. in addition to these specific recommendations, the task force calls on the commission to redefine the adequate protection in light of what we have learned from cooper shima. for those of you who are not steeped in parlance, adequate protection is likely not a familiar term. ultimately, the statutory responsibility as safety. is the touchstone of what we do as regulators and it is the standard of safety that the nrc must require of nuclear power plants and other licensees in order to operate. over the last 25 years, there have been a few occasions where the commission has deemed it necessary to revisit the standard and redefine what

safety means,. we did so after 9/11, and now the task force, established by the commission, believes we should do so again, given the inside to to push him up plant has provided about rare catastrophic events. the decision on another to redefine the core definition of safety is one for the commission to make it, but by examining the recommendations, it is clear that if fukushima was an unacceptable accident and we need to take strong steps to ensure that kind of accident does not happen in the united states in. as we consider and respond to these recommendations, a commission is committed to involving the public and their stakeholders in this process. at the nrc, we never forget that nuclear regulation is the public's business and that we have the responsibility to conduct our work openly and transparently. since my very first speech after joining the commission seven

years ago, i have emphasized openness and transparency as indispensable ingredient for effective decision making. in order to move forward transparently, i have proposed to my colleagues a road map for taking action on this report. the centerpiece of this proposal is a series of public commission meetings with nrc staff and stakeholders who will doubtless they have opinions about the record. in the lead up to these meetings, there would be an opportunity to provide feedback on task force recommendations and for nrc staff to provide additional information to the commission about their thoughts on the task force recommendations. i believe this approach will help insure the commission benefits from the information and perspectives that are stakeholders bring to the table. we are in a stronger position today to be able to move forward quickly and effectively because the task force did an

outstanding job with a tremendously challenging spawns ability. it is time for my commission colleagues and i to do our part. we have the responsibility to the american people to diligently and expeditiously review these recommendations and make the best decisions to ensure the continued safety of the public. in light of the taskforce's worker, i see no reason why the commission cannot provide clear direction on either of these recommendations in less than 90 days. that is the time we gave the task force to do its job, and that is more than enough time for the commission to outline a clear path forward. i do not think that means that the agency will be able to take final action on all of these matters,.

some of the recommendations themselves are requirements for changes to our regulations that in and of themselves may take months or years to develop. i believe we have enough information at this time to take the necessary interim steps on issues identified by the task force and initiate the long-term changes to our regulation that will allow for full and meaningful for dissipation by the public. -- meaningful participation by the public. it is up to us to think about how to do things differently. it should not be unexpected since these are not normal times for the nrc or our licensees. we know that some changes are in order and none of us want to make rushed, poor decisions. we must move forward with the urgency called for by these safety. s chairman, i am committed to ensuring that the commission has all the information it needs to

make timely decisions and take do -- decisive actions. as i alluded to earlier in my remarks, this is, by no means, the first time we have taken a significant look at this. we embarked on strengthening the nuclear plants in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. while we move forward of short- term changes come it has taken the nrc and the agency 10 years to fully develop and implement the new free-market. i believe it would be unacceptable for our current efforts take that long. that is why i am calling to date for the nrc and the industry to commit to complete and implement a process of learning and applying the lessons of the fukushima dai-ichi accident within five years, 2015. this will take a lot of hard work, strong and decisive

leadership, and a stronger commitment by our licensees to make safety the number one priority we ultimately have no other choice in this regard. i did the task force has been done an excellent start and we are more than up to the task of seeing this effort through. ultimately, this is not a challenge or a problem for me, the members of the commission, the agency, or the nuclear industry. it is a challenge for all of us as we continue to ensure that nuclear power can be used safely and securely. this is not an nrc problem or an industry problem. this is a nuclear safety imperative it. there are looking to everyone from the operators, regulators, members of the public to participate in our process to do their part in continuing to protect the public. this is something on which we must deliver. i think you for your attention

and would be happy to answer any questions you might have it. i think you. -- thank you. [applause] >> @ thank you. we do have a lot of questions today as evidenced by a fair number of working reporters covering this story today. let us talk about the core of your speech, so to speak, and which of the recommendations in the report, do you think, are the most urgent? >> the task force did a nice job of breaking down the recommendations into several categories. there were a number of recommendations in which they recommended immediate action, those that would require orders. that would be done through a longer term process like regulation. i can go through the list where they really thought the more

immediate actions could be taken, but they are in the cleared areas, like when you lose all electric power, that is clearly a challenge we saw in japan. the importance of fully understanding the impact of the natural hazards, flooding, and earthquakes on a site. the importance of being able to monitor spent fuel pools in the event of an accident. in short, and perhaps more appropriately, this is what the commission needs to work through. the next 90 days, figuring out which recommendations are most important, which we want to implement in the short term timeframe and which we want to implement on a long-term time frame. the task force has given us a good place to start. >> perhaps this has already been answered, but have been quoted as saying you want to fast-track the recommendations. was that parallel to your

comment? >> in order to get to the decision, we have to start somewhere. the place to start is with this task force and their recommendations. the commission asked for this report and the stock was assembled to completed. they did their job in 90 days. it is reasonable for us to go through those recommendations and review them. it does not mean we are done. many of the recommendations suggest the need for a longer term review and action by the commission. this will begin the start of a process that i would like to see a goal of completing in five years. >> they asked for the report to be created, but have you consulted with your fellow commissioners on the time line? what do you think you need to do to gain support fa? >> this morning, i had a meeting

with my colleagues where we laid out a proposal for getting this first step done in 90 days. we will continue to have discussions of the next several weeks as we begin the process of examining and redeeming this report. we have a meeting tomorrow where the commission will meet to talk about this. this is always an involved process when we have sweeping changes to our regulation and it is important that we hear from stakeholders and a large number of people to make sure that we move forward in an appropriate way. i believe we can act in 90 days. >> you believe you have sufficient support? >> we will see. >> very well. you mentioned the 90 days. why is that timeline so important? if there is no imminent threat to safety, why?

>> as the task force laid out, there are a number of actions that should be taken immediately. that does not mean that there is an imminent threat. if there were, we would be issuing orders to shut down facilities. it is important to know that is not what we are suggesting, but the process of any type of regulatory action we take is invariably a process that takes time. if it is a process that involves changing regulation, that will invariably take one year or more to complete. following that, there are likely changes the licensees would have to make. that's what all add up to several years or more. it is important that we begin with the simple task of reviewing the recommendations in the report and coming to a final decision on those. the other point i would like to emphasize is that if you look at the commission scheduled right now, the work we have in front of us is varied, but a big piece of that is looking at the

licensing and potential review of new reactor licenses. for the first time in this country, right now we are on schedule to complete those sometime by the end of this year. i think it would not be appropriate for us to go forward with those new reviews if we have not yet looked at the recommendations in the task force. we have to understand what they will mean for new licenses and if we need to keep that moving forward at a reasonable pace company to first come to a resolution with these recommendations. >> since you brought up applications, i will ask a follow-up to that. give people an idea of the landscape of the u.s. of how many nuclear plants are out there and how many people would like to build? >> we have 104 operating plants in the country right now and we have a number of applications in front of the commission to license new reactors. if you look at that group of

applications, there are a handful or fewer of plants that if they were to receive a license would move to construction. right now, there is a plant in georgia and one in south carolina where there is pre- construction work is going on to prepare for the potential of a new reactor given the green light. there are just a few plants that are moving forward, if they were to receive a licensing. >> can you talk about visiting japan for the first time after the accident? what did you expect to see? maybe, on the one hand the technical things you witnessed, and the other hand, the human things you witnessed. >> i visited japan in the very early days about two weeks after the fed started. i went to tokyo on a very short trip to meet with my

counterparts in japan and to see the team that the nrc had sent to assist the japanese government. probably one of the most memorable moments for me during that event was the effort and dedication involved for those dealing with this very difficult situation. this clearly was a very challenging situation for the people of japan. to see people from the nrc, people from other u.s. agencies all working there to help our japanese colleagues was a real reinforcement for me about the strong bond that we have with our colleagues in japan. i was very impressed with the efforts and the focus of the people who were there and their dedication on all sides to try and work for what were some very difficult issues in a very challenging environment. >> how do you think they are doing? >> ultimately, i am not in any

position to judge. i do not think any of us can truly understand and appreciate the magnitude of the crisis and the magnitude of the challenge in japan. what i think we can do best that the nrc is provide expertise as they requested and helping them best handle a very challenging situation. as i said, what i did see was a lot of people. dedicated to resolving some very difficult and challenging situations. >> you are in position to try and figure out what they did well and did not do well and apply that to the landscape in the u.s. can you break that down as to lessons learned from bad? specific to the japanese situation, you saw something that was good, not so good, and apply it to that, if you would, please.

>> as the task force laid out, clearly we all want to have a better understanding of the types of natural hazards that can impact any nuclear power plant. clearly, i think there's an appreciation that you want to be able to manage a situation in which you lose all electric power and be able to manage that with more certainty and maintain safety systems and instrumentation and control systems for much longer period of time that our plants are designed for. there are some obvious lessons we have seen so far and there will be more specific lessons coming out of the work that was spearheaded by jennifer working with the iaea. we will learn more in the coming year that will give us more

specifics about what types of things we need to change. we have to make sure we consider some of the things i mentioned as well as the impact of the spent fuel pools as well as the fact you could of multiple reactors having challenges. i think our colleagues in japan responded in a way they thought was best and with the limited resources that a larger earthquake like that could present and the challenges of a dramatic, difficult situation. >> in your opinion, what is the future of nuclear energy in japan after all this trouble? >> i do not think i want to speculate on the future of nuclear power in japan. that is a decision of the japanese government, how they intend to move forward. my focus, and the focus for the nrc, will be on insuring that in this country we continue to do what we need to do to expand the

safety net, if you will, to make it bigger, capture some of the things that may have been fallen through in japan. that is what i think the task force did. >> do you think evacuation and plans for people living near plants are adequate? should you allow drills of real people bo? >> we have a system of evacuation around two models. one is a 10-mile area where we plan and prepare for evacuation in the short term. beyond that, we have a plan for the ability to take action to secure food or other materials that could lead to radiation being ingested in an individual from the aftermath of an accident. i think that forms a basis for

ross for now. again, one of the things the task force looked at and made recommendations in this area, one was that the facilities in the short term need to make sure they can plan for the potential of a long-term loss of electric power. until the address that to enhance our ability to deal with that, we want to make sure that from an emergency perspective that they are looking to see ways they can address that type of situation. one of the recommendations the task force had was to take a look at how we consider the impact of multiple units. what kind of impact might that have on emergency preparedness programs? there are some things we need to look at long-term, but right now, we believe we have a system that is adequate to deal with the challenges as we know them. again, i would remind people that in the event of an

accident, it is a very unlikely chance, but the appropriate steps would be taken by the licensee is working with state and local government to take the steps to protect the public. that is the focus for our program, and i think we have a good basis. >> and ease the severe recommendations on the power back up issue you made? what do people have to do right now? what are the current requirements? what would become a dare i say come ideal? >> the loss of electric power is an important area. they recommend that we begin immediately to change our regulation in two ways. one, to change the scope of how we deal with the loss of electric power to ensure that we can at least cope with that for eight hours.

in addition, if we were to get into a more severe scenario, that you have the ability in an extended way to cope for another 72 hours. that is a very important recommendation that the task force land itself to the long- term analysis that needs to be changed in our regulation. the second. that they suggested it was that we institute an order right now to take equipment that we already have on-site and basically ensure that equipment, which would help mitigate this long term extended loss of power, and put it in places and locations in which it is more likely to be able to withstand the kinds of things we with saw in japan, the potential for significant flooding, the potential for earthquake. it is a two-pronged approach. in the short term, we would shore up the equipment we already have in place that

performs a mitigation function if we were to be in a more severe situation and a couple that to be able to deal with a situation for much longer than requirement. >> why eight hours and 72 hours? >> some of them are the virtue of historical information. right now, generally nuclear power plants respond or are required to cope for about 4-8 hours. the task force looked at this issue and they found eight hours was an appropriate time to ultimately put the plant in a position in which they could take all other action needed to do the more extended coping. eight hours buys you the time that you need to prepare and set up everything else that you need to do to get the much longer 72 hours.

this is something which i think there'll be tremendous debate and discussion about because these are the kinds of things that we want to hear from stakeholders and have more refined analysis which is widely recommended doing this as part of a change to regulation. >> to the best of your knowledge, has anyone died or been seriously injured as a result of the accidents in japan? is there any prognosis on how the workers of the nuclear power plant may have been affected overall? what do know of their health? >> members of the public were evacuated to reduce the potential long-term impact from the accident. there are some workers who have received doses in excess of what we typically would lookout for an emergency worker in a situation like this. that is not necessarily

unexpected given the challenges of the site. there have been a few workers to have received some skin exposures to our significant, but at this point, certainly nothing that appears to have any impact ultimately for immediate health impacts. the challenges, really, are on dealing with the population displaced from their homes which, personally, i believe it is often missing or not discussed as an impact to people. being told to leave your home for an extended time is not something that i think any of us would want to deal with and i do not think we consider that to be something that is of no impact. when we talk about the health impacts, we normally just talk about exposure. because of the robustness of the programs that we have, they were

able to look at that, which is a good thing. as i talk to people in the international community and in this country, there is no one believed that what happened in japan would be acceptable here. that is why we of recommendations to help us work through that. >> here in the nation's capital, we are in an important neighborhood. people want to know about the players and how they interact. can you talk about the nrc's relationship with the winehouse and how can other agencies help your efforts, if they do? >> as an independent regulatory agency, we have a role in setting a clear policy. during the events of the crisis in japan, there was a tremendous amount of coordination between the nrc and many different agencies in the federal government. the nrc staff went over to

japan and did not go over as an nrc team but part of a usaid team there for a humanitarian assistance. there are a number people who have offered their assistance. while the nuclear may have seen many of the headlines, it was not the biggest piece of the u.s. response. in general, but i have seen through my interactions as chairman is that we have worked kolar bradley and cooperatively -- with the white house. >> how do you determine balance between regulatory agency and industry? tryan ideal world, indusr

would be self-policing. how do you see it working now and how would you like to? >> in general, the systems work well. the nrc establishes safety requirements. they're responsible for implementing those and ultimately has an immediate day- to-day responsibility for safety. there is also a self-regulatory organization which plays a role in providing an excellence. i think we have many different pieces working on this. of course we have the public. one of the things i continue to be amazed by is the level of engagement we get from members of the public on all of these issues. whenever you bring a lot of different views together, it is always more challenging to make

decisions, but in the end, it is the right one. this is a difficult area in which to make decisions, so by design it is a system that tends to be open and transparent and use the input from a lot of different stakeholders. >> from a horrible accident, there's an opportunity to improve regulation. is that the benefit of this disaster? the question are makes a point that any presses good press. is that an opportunity your presented? >> i not think there is anyone who would prefer not to have this opportunity presented to them. this is not something that we wanted to be faced with a common nordic think the people in japan. given the challenges, we have an obligation to do what we think is right for the american people. as i have said, that is a

process that will need to involve all the stakeholders. as i said, we talk a lot about impact. the impact of the changes that we, as a regulator, make. as i talked to some licensees, one of the things that have impressed upon me, which is an important point, that as we make these changes, we need to ensure the continued safe operation of the plants in this country. there is not imminent turn -- concern are threat, but we need to go about these changes in a systematic way that does not create unnecessary challenges that would not touch a mentally challenged the safety of the nuclear facilities in this country. that is where we need to have the discussion on the understanding of where to move forward. >> one more question. are you surprised by the tone of the report which lamented the patchwork regulations. are things really that about?

>> i would not say that "patchwork" is a bad thing. the task force was trying to say that looking back now, with some degree of hindsight, when you put together the pieces of our regulatory system, what you find is that there have been incidents in changes and modifications. what i think this task force did, which i applaud them on, is that they looked at this from the big picture perspective and realized that there may be better organizing principle for all of the changes we have made over the years. i do not view that as a bad thing, simply a recognition that as issues come up, we have addressed them. there have maybe been enough issues now that some trends have developed. the task force said that the incidents in this country fall into two categories. there are things we want to make sure the plant is protected against, design-based accidents.

we want them to withstand earthquakes and flooding, but there may also be some type of natural disaster we have not envisioned. we have to have something be on the, which they have turned an extensive design-basis. the have looked at the things the commission did without calling it an extended design basis and have added on additional requirements which has created a patchwork of. it is not necessarily a problem, simply a historical development and the nature of what we do. now we have an opportunity to take all of those things and put them in some more consistent been is that as we go forward will provide the way for new regulation requirements to respond to new incidents. it will give us a better sense of what a fall in coming basic things need to do for safety or

design-based, as opposed to those things dealing with the mitigation of the design based events that you cannot quite consider. >> gemini -- germany has voted to complete the shutdown their nuclear reactors. is that an overreaction? do you expect potentially other countries following suit? >> my focus is first and foremost year on the u.s. to make sure we have the appropriate reaction here to the even selling japan. ultimately, it is up to the german people and government to decide what is appropriate to them given their circumstances. >> do you think other countries might follow? >> i do not know. it is hard to say. will will be important is for here in the united states come for us to take the task force recommendations and work through them in a systematic way to make some kind of approach.

ultimately, if those approaches are focused on nuclear safety, in the end, then there will be good informational with which to make a decision about the long- term prospects. >> as a scientist, as easy a country trying to juggle its energy needs, is nuclear a necessary part of that balance? >> the day i took the oath of office to be a commissioner, i stopped having an opinion about that. ultimately, my job is nuclear safety. there are a lot of people in washington and around the country you have good ideas about what our mix of energy should be, what our approach to energy should be. i would humbly defer to them and know that my focus is on safety. >> we will ask you that a few years down the road. there is some news today about the food supply in japan being contaminated.

is that to be expected under the circumstances? >> from what i have seen, the levels of contamination are measurable. they are not levels that are immediately harmful to anyone, but i think as you deal with a situation like this, there will always be challenges in maintaining and communicating with people producing food. in this country, we have the 50- mile area outside of a nuclear power plant where we've prepare and pre-planned to be able to take appropriate action for livestock or other food production that could ultimately allow radioactive material to get into the food supply. any system you have will have challenges, and that is a part of why there is monitoring to ensure the integrity of that food supply. >> we have had a lot of questions about yuca mountain.

they seem to boil down to this question which is a legal approach. the federal appeals court said in a ruling that the nrc must act on the d.o.t. application for nuclear waste. will the nrc act on that application? what must be done essentially to move forward on that? what will become of the application process? >> i cannot comment to specifically because this is an active matter in front of the commission and this is a legal question. i have certainly read the opinion from the court and the commission has that and still deliberating. >> what are the options for a long term storage out there? >> the secretary of energy has appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine options for long-term storage in this country.

that is something that they have a focus on. for the nrc, our focus, and ultimately, is on safety and security. we have taken a good look at the fuel out there. we believe it can be maintained safely and securely for at least 60 years beyond the time a plant would shut down which gives you 100 years or more of save storage and secure storage. the commission, just last year, went one step further and asked the agency and our staff to begin exploring a time beyond that, maybe 200, 300, 400 years to see if there would be any reason to cause us to do it differently. we have engaged on that, and we will be working to see what we can do. right now, we did not seek an immediate concern with the safety of yuca mountain.

>> does extreme weather pose a greater risk? if so, does that embodied any recommendation? >> that is precisely one of the recommendations, to make sure we have an understanding of the natural phenomenon that can occur. we look at what we think the worst thing that could happen a stork and make sure the plant is designed to deal with that kind of hazard. as we get new information, better ways to understand and predict what could happen, we always want to revise and update our requirements. in fact, the commission, prior to the events in japan, were working on it reexamining two fundamental issues that deal with natural hazards, one having to deal with earthquakes in the central and eastern portion of the u.s., and our understanding was not as good as we was when we initially licensed those facilities.

the other had to do with flooding and the potential for a more significant flooding event than we had initially planned on. there is no immediate concern. it shows that we are constantly learning organization and when we get new information, we work to apply it. >> those of us who are old enough to remember, there was a fair amount of public protest about nuclear power and this person is referencing what they see out there today. ultimately, the question is what you think of the level of public support for nuclear power? as a follow up, is there an increased level of opposition in the u.s. as a result of the japanese disaster? >> that is a difficult one for me to answer. generally, what i see is what i read in the newspaper. there is support for nuclear

power in this country. i think there is concern and opposition, as well. i had a chance a few months ago to go up to the indian point power plants in new york that has a lot of public interest and outside the gate of the plant, there were maybe 10 people protesting and were their partially because i was visiting, i think. we held a press conference, did a tour of the plant, visited, and on my way out, i got out to talk to some of the people. in general, there are people who have very legitimate questions about the safety of nuclear power. ultimately, it is the job of the nrc to make sure that we take the appropriate steps to the ultimately ensure the safety of the public. in the seven years i have been at the nrc, i have found is that

the people who work for the agency are dedicated everyday to doing that, make sure that we protect public health and safety. it is what we do. i have been impressed to see this in some in different ways as a commissioner and now as chairman. >> i will ask the to stand by. we have a few housekeeping matters to take care of. , like to remind our audience about upcoming speakers. congresswoman michele bachmann will be out here. august 19th, gov. gary johnson, former governor of new mexico, also a presidential candidate. department of transportation secretary ray lahood. and in early november, tom brokaw. officially, i would like to present our guest with the traditional npc mug. i have one last question. i can remember growing up there

were a number of movies that tended to demonize nuclear power. "china syndrome." and now we have the popular "the simpsons" where homer does seem to have the level of intelligence you have. when you see that, does it bother you? >> i would not say that it bothers me at all. i think "the simpsons" is funny. it is our job to communicate to the public what we do. the people who work at the nrc are dedicated to nuclear safety and they are a tremendously talented group of people. as a look down at the nuclear power plants in this country, there are dedicated people at those plants as well. that does not mean we do not have disagreements, but in the and, if everyone does their job

right, we will get there. >> how about a round of applause for our guest speaker? [applause] i would like to thank you all for coming and our staff for organizing today's events. you can find more informational but the national press club on our website, press.org, and you can find a copy of today's program and screaming future events on there as well. thank you very much and we are adjourned.

>> it takes a behind the set look -- a behind the stacks look, says "broadcasting and cable," it's required tv viewing, says the "l.a. times." "the library of congress," sunday at 9:00 eastern on c-span. >> revisit the c-span -- the vivel war history this weekend on c-span3. we're live on the 150th anniversary of the battle of anniversary of the battle of bull run.