association has been a trusted partner with t.s.a. and industry in bringing about many improvements. terrorists are constantly changing their methodologies and a question for this group, for this panel, is where do they go from here? one size fits all security paradigm that worked fairly well when it was introduced in the 1960's is inadequate to meet today's threat. we need to shift and i am confident we are heading in that direction to a risk- identification, a risk- mitigation strategy to stay ahead. the general security culture needs to change. advanced screening technologies, while important, are not a

panacea, they are not a silver bullet. you cannot treat all passengers as an equal threat and search for harmful objects only. we must look for evil intent. in doing so, we will enhance, i believe, passenger privacy, facilitate passenger flow, and better focus our limited screening resources. pilots, ffdo's, leo's, flight attendants and other aviation employees whose identity, employment status, and background are known should be accommodated in a fashion consistent with their known status. that theased administrator has announced his intentions to build on the known crew member program with the

known travel program and that will advance the risk-based philosophy and drive toward a better and more efficient system. another risk mitigation opportunities that are before us, all cargo airline operations continued to be conducted we believe under reduced security requirements when compared to passenger operations. there's a lack of parity in such requirements unescorted activity and lack of hardware doors and no mandated training for, strategy and all but contributes. we need to work on that. the ffdo program in this era of financial austerity is an underserved resource. there are thousands of pilots

who are volunteering their services to the government to provide this line of defense on the flight deck yet the program's budget, and we understand that the budget has not increase in many years. we want to work harder on that. space management -- pilots in command of airport aircraft should be notified in real time of the events that are going on. in such circumstances, improved ground-air communications will better enable pilots and commands to protect their passengers, there crew, their cargo, their aircraft. it will also allow them to be more vigilant when they know there is another event taking place. secondary barriers -- we are pleased the rtca special committee will soon issue its final report on the value of

these permanently installed secondary flight deck of barriers and alpa urges the government to consider the security benefit provided by these devices. this is a long time coming and we have gone for a process and it is time we solve this issue. we should have the secondary barrier. security training for aviation workers and individuals who make the aviation industry go should be viewed as a part of the solution rather than as a part of a problem. in summary, the pilots are ultimately in charge of the safety and security of the airplane, passengers, crew, and cargo at we are working diligently to protect those resources. our lives literally depend on our successes and our failures in this effort. the airline pilots association commands tsa administrator

petzel for the courage and wisdom for approving the known crewmember program and we commend the ata for taking the step with us to jointly sponsor a known remember program. the program now is rolled out and we are confident it will pass the test over the next few months and rapidly move through some 80 u.s. airports in the coming year. we would also like to commend our other industry partners asi who share our vision of security. in order to achieve success, we encourage the tsa to reach out to the experts and i truly meaningful dialogue while policies are being shaped, not after the fact, and i think these recent successes are a great example of that. we all have much in common on

risc-based security and making it a reality. alpa stands ready to partner with anyone. we are trusted, capable partners and we will bring solutions to the table. thank you. >> thank you for the moderation here. thank you for the invitation to speak. and the opportunity to be on this panel it seems like a lot of issues i would discuss have already been touched upon. i have three points i would make today. one that the threats are real and the ball the and second of that risk-based security makes sense and third, partnerships are critical. we know that al qaeda has focused on aviation going back

years and years. they continue to have an interest as we have seen going from 9/11 using the aircraft as a weapon to the ied a tent with the shoe bomber and the christmas day attempt and the attempt to involve liquids from the u.k. and the cargo plot from yemen that was previously mentioned passenger and cargo aviation remains a target and that is what the threats are real and evolving. we face an enemy that is determined and focused on the design, construction, and concealment of ied's that will defeat our security apparatus. because it is a global supply chain, that is our weakest link in that is what partnerships are so critical. risc-based security makes sense. the whole approach we're taking

is to try to work in partnership to provide the most effective security and -- in the most efficient way. risc-based security addresses that and several facets. we cannot try to do the same type of security screen for each and every of the 1.8 million passengers every day to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way. the same thing on the cargo fraud. in the first three months of this year, over 700 million pounds of cargo came into the u.s.. we have to make sure how we can focus on a higher risk cargo in a way that focuses on known shippers and known shipments. we have great industry cooperation in moving forward in that area. i want to applaud alpa along with ata. a lot of work has been done prior to my time. i applaud the work that has been

done in that realm. the ina has been a vocal supporter of what we are doing. the key is that we have a number of different tools and intelligence is the most effective tool. it comes from an number of sources. very likely, it could be from industry rather than a government source and that is why those partnerships comeback into play. one-size-fits-all one approach but i think we can do better and that is why we are working in close collaboration with our partners. known crewmember is something i am supportive of and we're pleased to see that the concept has worked well at o'hare airport and we look forward to expanding that in the near future as technology and checkpoints allow that. clearly, the policy is there to move forward with that. the same thing with trusted

traveler/known traveler. we're interested how we do this. in early october, we will see at least four airports piloting those concepts. that is part of that partnership and collaboration. the other part of that is global entry. we are supportive of what customs and border protection has already existing. it is an entry point for those who want to have the possibility of expedited physical screening because we are doing additional intelligence screening on the front end. partnerships are critical especially for -- especially with alpa but also associations and the traveling public. as president lincoln said the best defense of democracy is an informed electorate, clearly when it comes to passenger security, and informed traveling

public is one of our most effective tools in terms of being aware of surroundings, see something, say something but be prepared to go every check, so we can focus on those we know the least about. there was another program we discussed. it is something we believe is another recognition of pilots as being the most trusted persons in the air. if we cannot trust pilots, who can we trust? the whole known crew member and the jump sheet program are motet facilitating in that regard. we are undertaking initiatives another area with automatic target recognition which gives a generic outline of persons. the assessor program at logan airport, the screening of

children 12 and under that we are working through different options there, recognizing that in the great likelihood that a child is not being used as a terrorist but we are aware of adults using children in that regard elsewhere. the world war two veterans if they are on a charter, we do risky-based security with them using the intelligence driven approach. there are no 100% guarantees. risk mitigation is the watchword, not risk elimination. there is a stain in the fbi courtyard. -- there is a saying in the fbi courtyard -- as the look of the 10th anniversary of 9/11, it would be the most effective tool in the fight against terrorism

is cooperation worldwide, thank you. [applause] >> thank you mr. pistol. wonderful introductory, cyprus said way to get into questions for our panel. -- wonderful introduction and a wonderful way to get into questions for our panel. there is no specific need for one or all or any to answer. all these questions address issues which we certainly will -- all have in common. since the christmas day attack on northwest airlines flight 253, it has become more clear there's a global trend toward more risk debased approach to passenger screening. i would like to start by asking each of you about the evolving

threats of aviation security and how we best manage that ever- changing threat and what is needed from your perspectives. perspective,a's leveraging information and data to really focus on the application of technology and screening resources on the individuals and items in cargo, for that matter, which we know the least about is the right approach. clearly, that is the one being taken under the administrator's leadership now. we are fully supportive. >> i will take a pass. well i have said already and others have said pretty much cover this. we need to continue what we are doing now. >> i like that. >> the only thing i would add is the solution is what we are

doing here today. we are all working together and sharing information and having a system set up that when you see something that is not quite right, you have a way of communicating that and that information his communicated throughout the system so we can adapt and make adjustments in real time of necessary. >> the only thing i would add to that is the more we can know about either individuals or cargo, the better judgment we can make in terms of what type of physical screening would be appropriate. we recognize, given the latest intelligence, that terrorists talking about doing surgically- in planted explosives in an individual present additional challenges but that is why intelligence is the most important tool we have. we did not know about the

traditional physical screening in the yemen cargo plot. it is critical and some of the best intelligence comes from industry. >> looking ahead, what obstacles and issues arise as we try to evolve the processes to deal with the balding risk and how do we stay one step ahead of -- with the balding risk and how do we stay one step ahead of the terrorists? -- the evolving risk and how do we stay ahead of the terrorists? >> we want to make sure the intelligence is flowing freely. i start every day with intelligence briefings from around the world. because tsa is almost exclusively domestic, we have to make sure our international partners are informed and able to take steps to detect and deter the terrorists.

the challenge is up to any actual intelligence that is timely and credible and gives us a basis of doing some things. most often times, it is threw industry partners -- it is through industry partners. >> all i would add is that from the pilot and command perspective, the sharing of intelligence and the briefs prior to flights are what you need in order to combat and insure that everyone stays vigilant. vigilance is key because the underwear bomber -- who would have thought there would be an underwear bomber? that should have been a shock and a wake-up call to what end they will go to. multiple events, sharing of

information, real-time updates, routine updates will combat the problem we have in order for the pilots to remain vigilant. >> the only thing i would add to that is i think public acceptance in the sense that the public needs to be aware and educated about the threats so there is greater acceptance of what needs to be done on a day- to-day basis by the government and the partners sitting up here to make things happen and make sure that things don't happen. >> with regard to the challenges that lie ahead, >> is the microphone working? >> with regard to the challenges that lie ahead, i think in the

face of pressure to do 100% is no truenow there is t water% -- the decision to come here and walk across the street, we need in the face of that pressure, we need to maintain the delicate balance between the appropriate level of security and the efficiency that is inherent and essential to the aviation system. back to an earlier comment reciprocating the way we get there is through partnerships and working together. >> will just keep on going back and forth to keep the flow going. -- we will just keep going back and forth to keep the flow going.

there has been intelligence and the law-enforcement community i'm curious about what you think in the additional next steps are needed to improve collaboration? >> we have come a long way with regard to intelligence sharing and leveraging boots on the ground. there is a two-way information flow. tsa provides intelligence information to airports and airport law enforcement officers. that information is utilize to make adjustments to the security baseline at airports. at the same time, airport law enforcement officers and airports collect information about events, situations, and provide it tsa and back in the incredibly useful as a situation unfolds. >> airlines are currently provided classified briefings on emerging and existing threats. we think the partnership is good

with our government partners. we would like to see it expanded so there is more. of an operational perspective put in at an earlier time but overall, we thank the intelligence sharing is going very well. >> on a real-time event going on, we want to continue to do the things we have been doing and enhance that as we go forward. with all the air crews that are airborne during an event. they go through flight planning or post-flight. more constant coordination. >> all risk based security initiative will we are working with our partners on is designed to focus on the unknowns recognizing that the more we know, the better informed

judgments we can make. right now, there are probably 20-23 heads of security for passenger and cargo carriers tsa headquarters preceding a classified briefing on intelligence. i met with them this morning to outline where we are. we can be informed by industry as to what they see and we can inform them of what the u.s. government is collecting internationally as to the latest trends, tactics, and techniques. >> public perception is cheap. his important to know how to get buy-in from the general public. the known the traveler program should help obtain b publicuy- in. what will it provide to the traveling public?

>> from tsa perspective, it allows us to do more screening before people get to the checkpoint. as people voluntarily share information with us and whether that is for global entry, those existing programs, or through the prototypes with elite frequent-flier is initially because there is a rich set of data that if they're willing to share, we can make informed judgments. that is the first part of it, to allow us to spend time on those we know nothing more than a name, date of birth, and gender. that is one of the keys. i will leave it at that. >> for the customer, i think it will be an improved experience to get through the airport. i think that will improve the customer moods.

it is exactly what he said, a better allocation of resources where the threats lie. it has to be a matter of educating the public. i just read an article in the "washington post"complaining about the known travel program and what it would cost you, giving up your privacy. the key is the public have to know there are people who travel more and there are people who can give up some of their privacy to get that pre-arrival at the airport screen to be expedited through the process and allowing the general public who is now willing to do so to get to the airport quicker. >> there are three benefits in my view. the first of which has been touched upon by the panelists and that is in terms of security with the additional that tsa would get under this program that allows them to target

resources on individuals about which less is known. the second is efficiency. this would be in terms of efficiency processing at checkpoints. i think it will make the whole process more efficient and then the third is predictability for participants who would receive expedited processing for passenger security checkpoints with the potential that has been discussed of relieving some of the items that have been identified over the years as hassle factors like shoes, coats, and laptops, removal of those items. this program has the potential to benefit industry, government, and the traveling public. thank you. >> this next question is for the whole panel. do you think the need for more

security should include more thorough information about travellers so we know exactly was boarding the aircraft? >> currently, there is a lot of tsa that is available to and the airlines about passengers. when you look in the name record or reservation, there is the data that the passengers provide under secure flight. tsa can utilize that information to do the wash v listetting right now -- the watch list vetting right now providing the passengers get more information. there is the automated passenger information system. there's information on the passport, but global entry information.

one of the keys to that and that is the beauty of this program is that it will be voluntary. >> yes. [laughter] >> i like that. the effective aviation security is a blend of six -- technology and human intervention. >> that is why we are doing the risk based security. data mine t todt information on people who are not willing to provide that information i want to use all the available information that people share but that has got to

be voluntary. >> by definition, the pilots are sharing all that information about themselves. the known crewmember program is moving forward and it will be very effective. we are more than happy to share. >> there are privacy considerations and back to the previous comment about these being voluntary programs, those individuals that don't wish to provide additional data don't have to do so. they with all that information with the full recognition that they may not receive the benefits of providing the data which would be increased efficiency. >> it is a choice. it has to be stressed as a choice. it is a choice i made with global entry. it is a choice i would make with the known traveler program. i want that efficiency and what that expedited screening process i also don't want somebody telling all passengers

that they cannot have that because they don't want it. >> with approximately 628 million passengers traveling three u.s. airports each year, tremendous assets are devoted to screen for potential threats in the most efficient manner possible. the shift to a risk-based security system, will it enhance the secure process and what are the cost implications of this change? >> i think there is potential for some up-front costs to support the networking of databases and what not. when you look at the ability of what would be provided through that net working to provide additional data on a voluntary basis to tsa to assist in the risk assessment, that allows the focusing of resources and

screening technologies on those we know the least about and in the long run, that will serve to reduce costs. you may not need suite of technologies available at every single screening lane. you could have certain lanes dedicated to those who the least of which is known. >> i could not have said it better myself. >> the whole goal of this is to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way. and the efficiencies we can achieve through this process like spending less time physically screening pilots who are in the most trusted position, that allows more efficiency at the checkpoints. that is what we are trying to do here. >> the only thing i would like to add is pretty remarkable when you look at the numbers, 628 million passengers going through these checkpoints.

it is an incredible job tsa has done every day and they don't get a lot of credit. there is a lot of late-night comedy routines on that but the pilots we thank them for the great job they do every day. the trend is more people flying, especially for the next several years. the shift to risk based is the way to go. >> if you have any questions that you would like to present to the panel, write them down on one of the pieces of paper in front of you. you can pass them for to the middle but you hold them up, one of our staff members will grab them for you. along those lines, let me say that i hope you are enjoying the forum. i have told these laser-proof glasses are good.

you could wear them if you want to. here is the first audience question. what role the airport and airline employees take and this trend for this purpose needed? >> clearly, see something to say something comes home to the airport employees and the vendors who are on the premises. we are of -- we have talked about doing training that goes beyond what they normally would have from their employers to give them a baseline and a greater awareness of what may be suspicious activity. there's a cost to doing that. is that something be employers pay? there are issues there but clearly, anybody who can be a force for an answer for aviation security is welcome. >> i agree.

>> every employee plays a role in security. what we have seen and has been identified as a real innovative security enhancement. some airports have supported -- have provided security awareness training to all employees including janitors. that results in a feed of information that goes to the airport. some of that information that is pertinent can be passed a t ontosa that helps guide the application of resources. every employee plays a role. >> next question -- should the government's increased deficits on risk assessment as pertains to passengers reduce its plans to acquire greater quantities of advanced screening equipment?

>> i would defer to the administrator but one would hope that the greater allocation of resources to threats over time will allow them to make the evaluation that they don't need some machinery at every checkpoint you don't need the full an array of equipment at every different checkpoint. >> we were watching this closely to see how the risk-based security initiative rolls out and how many people are impacted and the demands that are placed and our technology. i see security as a human- enabled and technology-enabled. ait gives us the best opportunity to do technology with non-metallic devices. we have to be careful and recognize there are no guarantees and anybody even in a

trusted status could be somebody who could do something bad. i have worked with fbi agents who turned out to be russian spies. there was an officer and a doctor that does bad things. the key is that we have technology that we can use to enhance the screening experience for security purposes for those we don't know. the total roll out a ait does not cover all 2200 checkpoints at the 450 airports around the country. it is to be deployed in a risk- based scenario looking at were the highest risk may be. >> one commented to add-on -- i

would say that it is absolutely the administrators call on this one but my comment would be that we need to continue a r &d process to make sure we have cutting edge technologies available. at the same time, i would encourage our government to work with other governments around the world. aviation security is a shared challenge for the development of mutually recognized standards for the development of screening technologies. the manufacturers are open to this. it will result in a lower cost and more highly effective units and back to the question, the risk-based security process, the results from that will help guide the application and investment in security screening technologies. thank you. >> another audience question --

how can a risk-based security program be used to protect all areas of the airport and not just passenger screening? >> i would be glad to take that. tsa has a shared responsibility with airport police and law enforcement agencies. along with the airline security personnel so it is a shared responsibility. we are very much aware of what happened in glasgow or in moscow in terms of the check the baggage area. there are vulnerabilities that terrorists will try to exploit. our most effective tool his intelligence and hopefully there is a trip wire in place someplace across u.s. law enforcement or the intelligence or security community that would

identify this person or persons especially if it is an active shooter scenario like mumbai where we would have intelligence about that before it happened pretty if it doesn't, it becomes a question of what are the error' security plan and how did they rehearse an active shooter something like that. that becomes part of the training opportunities that people all ts witha and airport police said. >> we spend a lot of time talking about passenger screening and passenger security by u.s. airports have cargo operations also. the cvp after 9/11, the amount of cargo coming in in the u.s. for non-aviation modes of

transportation really forced upon them a risk-based security model right at the get go. with our cargo carriers, we were shocked back into reality in october, 2010, with the car -- the ink cartridge bombs. recently, we have had a couple of cargo accidents, one in dubai and one off the coast of korea, not knowing the cause of those accidents by taking a good hard look at everything that could have happened. risk-based models and cargo security is key and need to know what is going on on the cargo and as well as the passenger and. >> we're making good progress. we need to move the risk assessment further and the information gathering as far up the supply chain as possible so you get the information earlier

and get better information at the same time. >> there is also a need to rely on the partnership's and leverage the intelligence information you can glean from those partnerships. airports to do exercises to test and evaluate and learn from various scenarios, some of which have been mentioned today. these are done in coordination with the airlines, withtsa, local at the ilo law- enforcement. then it is applied to their security programs to make further enhancements. airports have done a number of things that are separate and apart from regulation to enhance security. this is in terms of the

implementation of different processes and procedures and technology is to enhance the security deposies. one of the efficiencies that has benefit is for passengers to get through airports more expeditiously. thank you. >> this next audience question is directed at mr. petzel. pistol. >> what cooperation our domestic airports getting from international airports? >> we try to work on this security regimen. there has been a series of world wide conferences to ensure that the baseline that all countries in their civil aviation security meet the standards.

there is a great interest from the standpoint of how this would affect what they do for passengers coming to the u.s. we are limiting this initially just to domestic flights because of the impact on international standards and protocols. we want to make sure we get it right in the u.s. assuming that works. then we would look at expanding either bilaterally or multilaterally with the eu in terms of reciprocity. there is a lot of interest there and they are looking to is to see how that will work here. >> thank you. this is probably premature -- how well are the airports embracing the known crew member program in terms of initial setup and cooperation and collaboration?

>> the airports of work in close collaboration alpa with and tsa to facilitate the rollout of known crewmember programs. it is something that airports have identified as a security enhancement at the same time, and efficiency. those partnerships cheverly streamlined the rollout of the program. >> the airlines would say there has been good cooperation. each airport may present different challenges for the setup of the program and we have been working through that with tsa and alpa and the airports. >> i have been getting nothing but good reports from airports, from pilots utilizing the who iss t fromsfrom tsa

provided the labor for the screen. nothing but good. >> what safeguards are being used to ensure background data of known individuals such as passengers will not be able to be exploited? the same question pertains to the unknown crewmember program. -- the same question pertains to the known crew member program. >> we are interested in work alpa in with and looked in atata for the frequent fliers or the programs that exist now. we're not interested in pulling that information in tsa.

we just want to make a judgment that if that person is part of this program, then we can make a determination, a by mary of either they are in or out. -- a binary of either they are in or out. as the program matures and we can use more intelligence information and technology to refine and get greater granular to, that is something that we don't want to the holders of that information that could be exploited in some other way with someone hack into government systems. for the passenger has made a reservation, are they part of this known traveler said. set. there's a likelihood they would receive the expedited screening. >> we're interested in the

databases that known crewmembers access in their security. >> i will go to the one of the ahead of time questions. the partnership between the fbi and the private sector and state and local law enforcement agencies and other law- enforcement agencies to prevent hostile acts against the u.s. aviation infrastructure -- now that you have given us some feedback, can you give us a little bit more of an assessment of how the current system of sharing intelligence is working? >> with my fbi background, this started in 1985 and terms of a public/private partnership where companies across the board can

share information and a trusted client type of setting online. if there had been a cyber attack on axyz company, they could share with the method of attack was and things like that. that would be without identifying what the company would be. others to learn from that and take precautionary steps. that is the model that this question is referring to. it has worked very well from my perspective. i think there are many models like that in public/private realms. is there information that could be used by us collaborative event helps inform our decisions as to the best possible security provided more efficiently?

that is what we come back to. >> the sharing of intelligence information is something that has improved significantly over the years. tsa sponsors industry representatives to get approved for clearances and tsa provides classified briefings to those individuals. one of the newtsa initiatives is field intelligence officers and they are regional and local in nature and can provide that connectivity with airports and airlines to increase the efficiency of the flow of information in both directions which is a significant enhancement. >> next audience question -- 9/11 cause a total shutdown of

the u.s. aviation system. how much progress has been made developing a prioritize plan to control our airspace if we witness significant attacks? are the agency's partnering with other agencies within the government's security world for a permanent solution? >> there have been a number of exercises that have been conducted at senior levels within the government, some of which have involved industry representatives to address this very topic. i think there has been a lot of progress made. depending on the scenario, that will really drive whether it is a localized shut down for a broader shutdown. >> i think it is pretty well

known that there has been good progress made by all parties. i think there is a lot of things going on that are non-public and have to remain so. >> there has been significant progress developments since 9/11. the 9/11 commission referred to the active 9/11 as being a failure by the u.s. government to anticipate that. given lessons learned from that, there has been a huge investment made in the resiliency issue. that goes to why the department of homeland security was created to do everything possible with partners throughout the law enforcement and intelligence community to prevent another terrorist a. attack in the event something happens, this would insure the resiliency of industry, the american people, the livelihood, the

survival of people who have been affected by that attack or that national disaster. tsa make sure that another attack does not happen. in the event something happens, we have a very robust plan through the interagency to address that resiliency issue. >> next question -- this is a two-part question from the audience. if you walk into a cart a shipping office and pay the shipping cost and the packages airborne. how can the flight crew be assured there is no explosives on board the aircraft and is there a move for a trusted sugar program to act in the same manner as the known crewmember program? >> 100% of the high-risk cargo

is not a flaw in public life. -- is not flown publicly. they are screened and there are various methods of screening. that is the starting point. the whole focus of a known shipper, known shipman program and national cargo security program that we're working with other countries to recognize our key steps in implementing that along with the advanced cargo information c thatbp utilizes. there are a number of avenues. the reassurance that the pilot and flight crew and anybody on that flight has is that there

are robust procedures in place now that recognize we are facing a creative and determined anime looking for how they can get in between. if it is a cargo ball , i don't necessarily anticipate it would come out of yemen. i would anticipate they would get it to a low risk area that would be seen as a good opportunity to inject. >> the only thing i would add is that we focus a lot on risk mitigation. the tsa, through its coordination with our air carriers and its coordination and training for pilots, that coordination comes into play because all operations are

around the globe. not only do passenger flights originated in the u.s., many of these flights originated overseas. the air carrier -- the country will have a responsibility for security but the air carrier will have an ax -- increased responsibility for security and in some places, the pilots' responsibility is increase. that is why it is key that we are coordinating that intelligence as being gathered and communicated. we have training programs and we ensure there are vigilant crews and company personnel on the ground. in those locations. >> i think this is part and parcel of everything we have been talking about today, increased intelligence, and partnerships to figure out a problem. there has been a lot of work

that has gone on a t betweensa, dhs, the pilots and all parties involved on the cargo issue. >> earlier this year, the department of homeland security constituted working groups and charged government and industry representatives of looking at different aspects of the cargo system with the specific task to identify recommendations in these various areas. those recommendations came back and not surprisingly one was in support of the development of a trusted the shipper program. currently t,sa and customs and border protection are working together to flesh that out. there are some targeting initiatives in support of that right now. >> i will do one more question before i thank the panel. the question is from the audience.

could we get an update on the status of the secure flight system and anything else we have not addressed in this panel? >> secure flight is up and running since last fall. we became fully operational so all individuals flying either in or through the u.s. and some overflight is vetted through secure flights and we know whether they are on a terrorist watch list or no-fly list. every morning we start with an intelligence briefing and we look ahead. we look for the passengers who want to fly or are scheduled to fly. this is so weak and make decisions. there -- this is so we can make decisions.

intelligence is being used. even though it was working somewhat prior to tse taking over, we saw an increase in the number of no-fly is being identified particularly from certain airlines that were not identifying many people it just gets back to the whole intelligence cycle where we can take the information and notified my former colleagues at the fbi. they may not know they are traveling and we have had several examples where we have shared that information to inform their ongoing investigation. secure flight is a significant advance in terms of the intelligence and technology. >> i will wrap things up.

regardless if you are a pilot, crew member, mechanic, consumer walking through the airport, we are all consumers and passengers and coming into airports and leaving airports. this stuff is just incredibly important for us to discuss i think it has been an incredible privilege and i think you would agree that we have the leadership here, the folks who iraq -- are at the tip of the spear giving us insights and answering questions. it has been a real privilege to stand with this group of here. i hope you would agree with me. on behalf of the airline pilots association, i would like to express my sincere thanks for your part in this panel today. i hope you enjoy the rest of the event, thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011]

[no audio] >> in a few moments, today's headlines and your calls on "washington journal live on." at 10:00, the national business group on health will talk about a cert -- a survey on employer benefit costs. also a discussion have democrats may affect the next election and the gallup organization releases its annual look at public opinion of the u.s. education system at 3:00 p.m. easter and. in about 45 minutes, we will talk aut