requirements that we do not know yet. i hate to speculate about what the details will be. host: sam dillon from the "new york times" has been talking about education. we will have a political roundtable on sunday. we will hear from a retired lieutenant colonel talking about iraq and recent violence. peter gaytan will talk about unemployment and veterans tomorrow. if you want to hear more about education, you can hear the

conversation with arne duncan right after this program at 10:00. thank you for joining us. we will see you tomorrow. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> sunday on "newsmakers," education secretary arne duncan. he talks about how u.s. companies compare with other companies in can it -- in preparing for jobs. >> jobs are going to go where the knowledge workers are. we are not competing for jobs in

our districts, our states, or our country. we are competing in south korea and singapore. our children are as smart and talented as children anywhere in the world. i want to give them a chance to compete on a level playing field and be successful. other countries are out- educating us. >> you can see the entire interview on "newsmakers" sunday at 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. -- and 10:00 a.m. on c-span. up next, a panel discussion on its emerging non-pilot movements around the world. they will this -- not-violent movements around the world. this is one hour, 40 minutes.

>> we have a lot of shared values. pragmatic solutions exist amongst all conflicts. the next generation among global peace and security leaders must be educated in conflict resolution. the most effective way to educate future leaders to tackle the momentous global issues is

through intensive training led by the peace and security field's current leaders. the first outcome is the symposium on conflict resolution. we just finished the second annual program in italy. it is a month-long intensive training. we have some of the alumni in the room tonight. if you have questions about that program, you can ask them. we have a table with materials as well. this is the actual second the outcome of the association. this is the first at what will be three yearly panel discussions on issues we believe our part to the time. we can all agree that 2011 has been a year declined by tremendous social of people across the globe. some of the of people has been

successful. some has had tragic consequences for those involved. some of the upheaval has been extremely violent. some have come to a close with little or no bloodshed. from trees and thailand, egypt to chilly, and london to wisconsin, -- from tunisia to thailand, italy to chile, london to wisconsin. we have panelists that have a wide range of education. why does 9-violence take root in some situations -- non-by let's take root in some situations and not -- non-violence take root in some situations and not others? we have jack duvall.

his book, "eighth force more powerful," -- "a force more powerful," is a must read. his documentary outlines the history of strategic non-violent conflict around the world. it has been reviewed in over 80 countries. second, dr. cynthia irmer. she leads interagency teams from the u.s. government to prevent non-violent conflict and to mitigate its effects. she has worked all over the world with significant time spent in southeast asia and africa. gimena sanchez-garzoli is a senior associate for the office

on latin america. she is a leading expert on refugees and human rights. she has fought tirelessly for the rights of over 4 million displaced persons in colombia. she worked on the brookings institution's project on internal displacement. last but not least, dr. i. william zartman, who was the founder of the conflict management department here. he is one of the most respected speakers in the world on conflict management. we can take mr. zartman or concepts like rightness. he also happens to be the chairman of the board for the

international peace and security institute. the way this is going to work is that each one of our speakers will have 10-15 minutes to give their opinions on the stated topic. we will have a 30 minute q & a. thank you. i will go to jack duvall and start the panel. >> thank you. many had to beg and beseech audiences to gather and hear a little about the subject 10 years ago. the time of the relevance of this has never been more acute than it is now. what i would like to do is set the table for the discussion by surveying what has happened

historically with respect to the use of non-violent change and the fine for you what i believe -- define the movements when they are successful. i will give you a rundown of some of the lesser known nonviolent struggles that are occurring today that are not as conspicuous. they have become less conspicuous because of the general media attention on the arab spring. the record of the success of non-violent resistance as a way to struggle for rights, freedom, and justice is quite startling when you look at it from the level of our big. within the last 100 years, there have been dozens of successful movements. all of us know about the ones

that are usually mentioned in the first few minutes of the general media report about this. just to survey that again for you, the indian independence struggle in the 1920's and 1930's principled by mohandas gandhi. in 1944, at a much less well known struggle against a dictator in el salvador was successful for something that lasted only 30 days. then the 40 year-long nonviolent struggle in african americans under the leadership of dr. martin luther king jr. in the united states. was an1970's, there extraordinary struggle that unfolded in argentina that was launched by the mothers of the disappeared in buenos aires against the military junta in argentina and the scale of its

oppression in that country. this led to the dissolution of that regime. the movement against the dictatorship of pinochet in chile which led to him having to resign, the long-running movement in eastern unit -- in eastern europe under the former soviet union, which is best represented by the solidarity movement in poland. the people power revolution by filipinos who did in 1986 to remove part in the marcos from power. in tackle slovakia, -- in

czechoslavakia, there was also a movement. there was a movement in mongolia in 1989 and 1990. the nonviolent transition to democracy in mali in 1991. the attempted coup against yeltsin in 1991. the long-running struggle, which was also successful, to accomplish a regime change in south africa, the anti-apartheid struggle led by the african national congress in the 1980's. then the so-called color revolutions in serbia, ga., and the ukraine, each different from the other. -- serbia, georgia, and the

ukraine, each different from the other. the orange revolution in the ukraine, which was a defense of an election more than a fully, nation changing democratic movement. there are lots of ways to solve all of this up. there was a study done in 2005, which noted that in the 35 years between 1970 and 2005, there were 67 transitions around the world. in 50 of those 67 transitions, the pivotal force was some sort of non-violent coalition, some sort of civic group of those engaging in protest strikes and demonstrations to be the instigator of the transition. not all of those transitions were revolutionary. revolution is a word that is over used with respect to these

kind of transitions. in almost all of those, there was some form of non-violent force. an even larger study was finished a couple of years ago. a book was published by the columbia university press called, "y civil resistance works'." that "-- "why civil resistance works." that it violates the that that -- that evaluated 300 nonviolent campaigns. in 26% of the violent cases -- 106% -- 106 of those cases were

believed to be successful. the first five minutes of any coverage is not the most objective fact of what is going on. they did not see it, in many cases, even as it is happening. gawdy's work in india from a historical point -- gandhi's work in india was a symbol. he was also a master strategist of non-violent conflict. he put extraordinary strategic pressure on his opponent. his work prompted an american scholar to identify hundreds of different nonviolent tactics and

grouped them in accordance with three categories. tactics of noncooperation. we withdraw our cooperation from the state or the oppressor. we raise the cost of oppression. tactics of physical intervention to impose greater pressure on the zero presser. the dynamic of the use of civil resistance -- tactics of physical intervention to impose greater pressure on the oppressor. using these tactics in a sequenced way advertises to the rest of the country that they are depriving an oppressor of their consent. they are saying we do not believe you adeserve to call the

shots. that reduces the perceived legitimacy of the existing system. that is a weakening of the concept, the idea behind the whole control that the system has. whether or not people participate in this withdrawal of cooperation -- that increases the cost of holding control. the police have to work overtime. soldiers have to go to parts of the country to confront demonstrators. real costs are being borne to a system in order to hold control. this is not simply be seeking an oppressor to stand down. this is putting so much pressure on that system that those who are even defending and enforcing

it began to have doubts about whether it is sustainable. most of them are not tethered ideologically to the oppressive system. they are only working for the system. they are taking a paycheck. they have to begin to think. if this group is not going to be in power in 5410 years, where will that leave me? once this question pervades the state or the system, not only do you have hard physical cost being paid and legitimacy being challenged, but what appears to be a legitimate campaign or movement are talking about the -- is talking about the form it takes when challenging an authority an -- an authoritarian leader. the ability of that system to hold control begins to be challenged. the movements and campaigns going on today not only have

authoritarian structures. they are important struggles going on against occupation and for autonomy and independence. they are struggles for social justice that take the political form of struggle against systemic injustice. the state is unable to control it because it is paid to stay out of the action. there are protracted struggles that continue, some of which have made real progress in the last decade in palestine, burma and zimbabwe. they are overlooked by the media. in vietnam and in the sahara, a great deal is going on. in fiji, a struggle against a military coup. there are larger countries in which there is a great deal of disaggregated resistance that

challenge the system. in india, in brazil, in nigeria, in russia. there are the initial size of this in saudi arabia. there are brand new movements against system and violence in mexico that is a movement against political corruption within the state itself. there are a number of others that i have not mentioned. all of these meat a few criteria of whether or not they are a movement. -- meet a few criteria of whether or not they are a movement. political change. there are a self-organized coalition or individual groups and people campaigning around clusters of issues. in the course of events that these movements are protagonists for, you will see bids that

involved an outrageous method they stand -- and outrageous manifestation of behavior. they decide, now is the moment. this is why there has to be action. in tunisia, this took the lid off of the enormous political and social discontent in the arab world. i hope i have drawn the picture for you of what we have seen historically of what we have been looking at historically and what is happening around the world. >> i guess we are just moving right along. i am next. i am is sitting closest. i will give a slightly different perspective on this question, answering this question for the reason that my background is not non-violent

conflict, engaging in non- violent conflict. i am honored to be here with this battle. i am always honored to be on the panel with bill zartman. i thank you for being here and allowing me to be here and present to you. i work for the united states government. i work in the state department. that will tell you a little bit about my perspective. everything you will hear coming out of my mouth will be the opinion of cynthia irmer and not the perspective or view of the united states government. as i thought about the question, why you are not there, it

occurred to me -- why here and not there, my most truthful response to you is that i do not know. i am not sure any of us know. i can speak from the perspective of the conflict resolution, conflict analysis field, the peace study field. part of the reason we do not know the why from that perspective is that we are most often looking at the mechanism of how conflict becomes violent. it is not a good understanding. we have some systematic and regular lives -- regularized thinking. some of that includes the basic

human need, grievances of identity groups, key actors, the things that motivates them, and the way they have to organize and mobilize people around their grievances. these are the kind of things we think about that help us understand how a situation can become violent. it occurs to me that if we really want to get to understanding be why -- the why, we may have to ask ourselves some different questions. we may have to shift our focus. we may need a new world view. i think i can safely say that to this room full of people. you cannot say that to every room full of people. we may need to say that if we are going to look at key actors, maybe in addition if not instead

of looking at political states and non-state actors at a high level, not only looking at actors who have enormous resources and can get into the news media everyday, we may need to look at key actors who look more like wise people our sages our community activists, people we may not always be looking for. we may be looking at a different scale of analysis. in addition to looking at the state level of conflict, we may need to start looking at conflict that the community level. that may sound overwhelming to us. it may sound like something we cannot do. i am beginning to believe that there is no way we can

understand why the violence if we do not understand community. if we do not have a sense of why people who are living in a violent condition or in a passive non-violent resistance -- if we do not understand what community means to them in their words, not in our projections on to them of what we think of that community, but what it means to them in their words, how community coalesces, how do people come together and what do they come together around and why? questions that help us understand that are of utmost importance if we want to understand why nonviolence. also, how communities vivify.

how do they get energized? what gives them the ability to move through space and time and stand up together and to resist when that is what they do? we need to understand that. i do not even have the beginnings of understanding that except to say at think it is critically important that we understand that. in addition to that, how communities manifest. what can we see? not only in our description, not only standing back and saying, corrupt, rebel, anything -- but it's going and listening to people who are looking at that and saying, what are you saying? many have not thought of it. we will get good answers if we ask those kinds of questions and get them thinking about it

rather than us speculating about it. it moves us one step further away from reality when we speculate. it moves us closer to reality when we asked. let somebody struggle with an answer and listen to their answer in their words and not try to translate it into our words. finally, manifest. how do communities manifest? they coalesce, they vivify, they take life. what do they show up as? do they show up as peaceful resistance? to the show up as people angry with guns and bombs who will destroy things because they feel unheard and unacknowledged? it would be helpful from my perspective for us to take the

mirror and go to up and say, how does community coalesce and manifest here in the state department, here in the united states of america? those kinds of questions would be useful because it gives us more information about what our world view is and how it may be filled during the information coming in. ok. the thing about this, too, is that it sounds a little different. we do not have to reinvent the wheel. if we want to take this into community and understand why nonviolence, we can take a few pages out of the lesson books of other movements, other activities, other events that have already occurred. some of these things are known to us as civil organizing, civic

organizing. our very own president of the united states wrote a book about this. there are lessons about how they go about doing this, what they understand, what connections need to be made that we would do well to understand why the violence, why nonviolence. there is a big body of work called public participation. i don't know how many of you are familiar with that. 2 1/2 decades of work, working with the public and getting them to engage and be part of decision making that affects their lives. this can help us understand that. the third one that would be useful for us to look into the approach used and the underlying philosophy is community mediation. mediations that are done on a community scale.

a lot of things already exist, so we do not have to start over from zero. thank you. i would like to end on a high note. this is as high as i get. my high note is that it is my opinion, not the opinion of the united states government, is that the president of the united states is allied with this kind of thinking. -- aligned with this kind of thinking. this is a good part of working in the u.s. government. it is part of what allows me to go to work with a smile on my face and energy in my bones. not only the president, but the secretary of state. i do not know how many of the thought of the things that she does. from my perspective of a government employee, when she g called as think q

qddr. she said conflict prevention is a quart capacity of the state department. -- core capacity of the state department. that is huge. knowing this is already resident in those leaders of hours at the level of the president of the united states and the secretary of state is very empowering. the office that i currently work for -- the coordinator for stabilization and the construction -- is going away. there will be a new bureau. it is my sincere desire as a government employee that many of the things we are already doing in this bureau will show up in this new bureau from things like

the tools that you may have seen on the table out there. we have already used around the world. we are going out and listening to people and analyzing conflict and social, local, indigenous strains. what is strong and what is already working right here? how can we see that growing up in a way that u.s. foreign assistance supports it. ? it is grounded in local an indigenous strains and science. thank you very much. >> i would like to begin by thanking the organizers for inviting me to this special event. it's great to be back act sais. everything seems small to me.

what i would like to talk about this event is non-violent resistance, what is known as resistance communities in colombia. colombia has been embroiled in a protracted, horrible conflict since 1964. this conflict has had great cost in terms of human lives and human rights violations. it has also been a conflict that has led to the displacement of over 5 million persons, mostly rural peasant communities, many of them afro descendants, indigenous, as well and mestizo communities. when you read about colombia, you hear about it violent groups. you are about the drug traffickers and the military taking over one way or another. you are about the guerrilla movement and the actions they

commit among civilians. what you do not hear about -- and we would love to see that change -- is the real courageous colombians. they are out where these things are taking place. they are trying to figure a way out of the conflict for their own benefit and for their security, to be able to feed themselves and do their daily lives. they see that the military solution and the solution to the conflict is not working and have not worked. in terms of these nine pilot movements, there are several different categories -- non- violent movement, there are several different categories. one is the peace communities. the peace committee concept is an idea that came about in the mid-1990s. internally displaced persons returning to their homes decided that they were going to designate a certain area where there were going to live and

they would indicate that area with signs and fences and put big posters up stating that in that area, only civilians could be present. all of the armed groups, whether they be official or unofficial, could not be in that space, could not be in that area. all of the members of that tomunity with plays an olath not carry arms and ammunition and not engage the armed group when they had conflict between themselves. the idea was to designate a whole area where the population could live in peace and go about its business. since many of these peace communities were developed in areas where people were surrounded by these armed groups, it meant their livelihood were at stake. they cannot travel from one place to another due to

restrictions of movement. the peace committee goes further and developed a community project that develops sustain in that land. working together to make sure the committee has what it needs to feed itself and remain in that space, especially during times of blockades. the most well-known peace committee in colombia is located in the northwestern part of colombia. that is the most well-known community, but it is not the only one. another part of civilian resistance was initiated by internally displaced persons who decided to go back to areas with the conflict was still taking place. they are the humanitarian zones

and the biodiversity zones. we see these in different parts of colombia. they apply international humanitarian law on the ground. they take the geneva conventions and the principles of civilians not being engaged were forced to be engaged by the armed groups in the conflict and make it a reality also designating a certain area where they live and work. they did not go as far as the peace community in terms of making sure all of their needs are met within that zone. another form of community resistance we have seen that has been a more utilize zone is where there is a high rates of = of narco-rate trafficking.

this is in the south area of the pacific. colombians have decided that the problems are not just the internal, armed conflicts. these armed groups come in and they force us to grow cocoa. they recruit our people and when they get mad at us, they kill our people. we have to get rid of the cocoa. rural farmers have come together and eradicate the crops themselves. i do in in numbers of 300 or 200, it makes it difficult for the guerrillas to kill all of them. it makes them look really awful and its pressures the guerrillas into accepting the fact -- and

its pressures the guerrillas into accepting the fact that -- it pressures the guerrillas into accepting the fact that they do not want to be a part of this. some of these movements are joining together. you have seen the afro-colombian movements and other movements joining together to figure out a way forward to go beyond their local situation so that they can promote peace in the country. since the topic of this evening is why, i was trying to think why these nonviolent resistance movements? one thing they all have in common is that they agreed that the military solution to the conflict is not working. you need to find another way. they are a commentary on the political and social events in

the country. they are not solving the problem. there is a high-level corruption within the social and political elite groups. there are paramilitary groups and others. as rural farmers, they decided they would take this on themselves. another reason why these movements continue to develop and gained ground is because there is the practical need for these people to find a way to live amongst the armed people. 5 million colombians have been did -- have been internally displaced. even within the country, they cannot find an area of refuge because they are stigmatized or seen as suspicious by one group or another because they come from a certain region.

or they face tremendous discrimination. this is a practical solution that the victims of the conflict are at high risk and are becoming victims. justice is a big part of peace promotion. in the case of the peace committee, they have documented over 180 human rights abuses committed against them during the time they were formed until now. they have also been able to document and get a trial moving on some of the massacres that have taken place. they have not gotten far. what you see among these different movements is back -- is back -- is that fighting

human-rights and community the hand-in-hand in forming a community that leads to peace. have these committees been a success? it depends on how you look at it. on the one hand you can say, no, it is not a success. you still have internal conflict. you have multiple failed peace efforts. these are localized solutions to conflict resolution and mediation. it has not worked. or you can look added -- you can look at it and say the ones that have been able to gain the possibility to prevent further displacement and have a certain level of security have been these groups. it has established some localized peace efforts for them. it has kept colombia, four different parts of the international committee, in the spotlight. -- for different parts of the

international community, in the spotlight. one of the reasons why it has not transformed in terms of the movement from the localized movement to the broader movement has been a failure of the international community. it has been a failure of the international community decided that a president that was elected on a platform of a military solution and taking a hard-hitting approach to civilians around the country in order to gain military ground -- something that the international community has accepted as a positive or as a given -- and not decided that they wanted to push for support or other ways of resolving the conflict. it has also exposed the lack of

political will on the part of all of the armed groups that are a party of the conflict in terms of caring about seeing if they could not move forward for peace. in many cases, especially in the case of the guerrillas, being so tied to the drug trade, there are self sustaining movements able to perpetrate a kick themselves going without your usual -- keep themselves going without your usual mechanisms. if there is anything i would say about these movements, it would be that the people involved are incredibly courageous. it costs them a lot in terms of deaths and so forth to keep this going. there is tremendous hope in these movements. in closing i would say that it is important for practitioners

of conflict management and policy makers to learn more about these movements and see how they can support them and see how they can find a way to transform what is a localized, practical solution to something that leads to an end to the conflict. >> i am here to talk about the arab spring. by now, the arab summer. maybe the arab autumn. certainly, not the arab fall. that is what brought us here and that is what brings up the subject. i would like to go back to the beginning of those defense to try to understand what happened and why and to look at some characteristics of them and to see why not and to see why and where else. to begin with, it is important to recognize that what has been

going on is an exhilarating it banned. it is a spontaneous, wide -- his an exhilarating event. the state is arrogant and does not care about its people. you know about the tunisian incident. it embodies the kind of nature of the protest and is a good symbol of it. the economists will tell you that everything is economic. i am its political scientists. i will tell you everything is political. -- i am a political scientist. i will tell you everything is political. there were not a lot of jobs for the young people. that is the supporting elements for what i will describe as a

protest against the legitimate protest against the state. it is not the leading element. we have conditions that we would call proneness, characteristics we have found in the states in the arab spring. we can find those conditions everywhere else throughout the arab world. probably more specifically throughout the arab world and through much of the african world or other places beyond my knowledge. places in that general areas of the world. two other specific characteristics that help us sort out the arab spring where it has occurred and where it has not occurred. in all places except one, we had

a revolt against an aging leader who was about to disappear anyhow and did not have an accepted successor. accepted is important because in the case of mubarak, he was grooming his son. intelligent as the sun is, he was not accepted by the population -- as intelligent as his son is, he is not accepted by the population. he was going to go anyhow and that added to the rightness ,to the proneness of the situation that led to the intifada. the other factor is whether the army will fire on its people or not. in two cases where the change of regime or the overthrow of the

old regime is accomplished, the army decided not to fire on its people. they were part of the decision for the leader to step down. in yemen, half of the army decided not to fire and the other half decided to fire. we have a big defense. in bahrain, the army decided to fire on its people. word these peaceful protests, non-violent protests? a started out that way. we have any been that brings out 50% of success -- we have any event that brings out 50% of success. when it did not succeed, it turned non-violent -- its turned violent. violence was effectively used

against portions of the government. not effectively against tanks. we have the 25% of success when it turned violent. that is why we are up in the air in the cases like bahrain and syria. we are dangling. it is much more complicated. the outcome is somewhat in doubt in yemen. where else might this occur it? why has it not occurred in some other places -- where else like this occur? why has it not occurred in other places? one place is algeria. you can cite it as a classic place.

in algeria, the two conditions are relevant. we have been aging leader who is going to disappear at some point and has no designated heir at all, let alone and accepted one. there's the question of the army. you know the army will fire on the people. that is all it fires on. that is the chilling aspect of algeria and helps explain why nothing has happened there. another part that has to be added to algeria is that the army notion has to be strengthened. in algeria, they have had two years of violence led by extremist islamic groups and led by army led retaliation against them and other people who might be suspected of being sympathizers to them.

the public is tired of taking on the state. the state is clever in algeria. when protests are rise, and there are protests, manifestations in a jury. not riots, but that the stations. the state comes in in that wonderful word that we use-- it satisfices them. if he buys the protesters and moves on. we have an interesting case -- it divides the protesters and moves on. in jordan, we have serious protests. we have a strong state hand. we have a serious, but not

adequate reform movement, constitutional revisions that have been introduced and had to get through the mechanism of the state. this leaves the king and the forces in control. the third cases morocco. one thing -- the third case is morocco. you do not have been old king, but taking who is of the generation of those -- you do not have an old king, but a king who is of the generation of those protesting. the state has responded with changes, including arrangements within the state.

in morocco, the explanation for why it has not occurred is that the system is still legitimate and the people are warily awful. -- hopeful. we have said that what people are rising up against is the old order. they want to put in effect a new order. they want to bring in a new regime. what is it like? the striking thing is that nobody knows. the people who were rising up against the old regime has one demands. they have expressed it in a number of ways -- the people are rising up against the old regime

has one demand. they say, we have to get the old regime down and we will think about what we want to replace it with. that is a big thought to be thinking about. it takes a lot of time. in tunisia, we see that the regime is bumbling along trying to deal with elections and sequences of constitution making and so on. it is making sincere, but slow, progress. in egypt, we see that there is a force that is present, the army. it does not want to takeover. it wants to preserve its privileges. it has to deal with the number of forces from different directions. the process is slow and perhaps

less open, less hopeful that in tunisia. people are getting impatient. the young people who started the intifada are saying, where is this new bridging? where are -- where is this new regime? where are our jobs? jobs are not going to appear just like that. when a regime falls, economics go down. jobs become scarce. it is unrealistic to say, where are our jobs? it is a natural demands. people are getting concerned about it. in a little town in tunisia, a group of young people said, you better get us something quick or you will see it all over again. we should be looking for that. the questions now are, where

does it go in there is an early -- if there is an early or late overthrow of be bridging. if we have an early overthrow -- early or late overthrow of the regime. people are looking for the replacement of the bridging and the institution of a new order. we think we know from past experience that that leads to a hardening of the uprising, a hardening of demands, a radicalization of the uprising and a hardening of groups within the uprising by the then a cooperation. they are focus now of that one demand, the overthrow of the regime. we are standing before a continuation of these events.

a continuation of a search for answers for what went down in the first place. do not be misled about what we hear in the papers about subversions of these movements. people say in yemen, there is an al qaeda member among the groups trying to overthrow the regime. in egypt, there is the brother of a. everybody will be tried to find out -- in egypt, there is the brotherhood. the basic demand of the people is for an open, accountable regime. they may not be able to pull this off. the fact that other people like try to push forward does not need it is lost. it means it remains an exhilarating and exciting and open a series of events that will take a long time before it works itself out. where else can this happen

outside of this part of the world? the proneness is not the same on the rest of the continent. the old leader who is ready to go, the army who is on the fence about firing on its people or not are not around in many cases. people have cited the case of uganda. there is a place where we see a initial signs, and they might cross the sahara, and that is in senegal. you have an old leader who wants to run again, and he is also grooming his son who has to zero qualifications for it, except for being the son of his father. if there have already been

demonstrations in the street against the legitimacy of the regime. unlikelye army's most to fire on its people, and therefore we have the possibility of a crossing of the sahara. there is, of course, another place that comes to mind, and that is in zimbabwe. it has been tried, and the kind of reaction when the army will fire willingly is borne out there. there are possibilities south of the sahara, and it is limited by the conditions we have seen in the northern part of the continent, and the arab world, but we might just find little pieces of an african fall. [applause]

>> so, i know there will be a lot of questions. just a couple of ground rules. please leave it to only one question, no multi-part question. if we have gone through everybody, and you want to ask the second part of your questions, you can ask them. all questions and with a question mark. try to keep them to less than 30 seconds. will take two or three questions at a time. three questions at a time? bill has decided. just raise your hands. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> first, thank you for an enlightened panel.

my question has to do with your views on having, or the need for the value of a unified leader. as a part of a resistance movement. aka ghandi or martin luther king. what value do you think that would have in your experience? thanks. >> thank you again. i have enjoyed this so much so far. looking forward to hearing your answers. i wanted to know, i feel like so often non-violent protests and movements have such good intentions but they feel like you mentioned. they failed to put real pressure on the oppressive force. i know it is -- must have some

any answers to such a broad question. we even want a good example. something that can predict a positive outcome. you mentioned in is easy to predict what will lead to violence. maybe if you could enlighten us with some predictions of successful nonviolent movement. thank you. >> i am with csis. my question has to do with i'm wondering after the regime transition. has there been any pattern in the american response to regime, whether that is intervention. we talked about how there have been transitions within the last hundred years. has there been any kind of pattern?

>> and mr. first. a unifying -- unifying leaders are rare. another characteristic was there was no leader. there is no group. even in places in tunisia and egypt, where there is a group -- guru in waiting, he wasn't the leader and they were slow in coming in. a leader would be nice. the nice thing about pluralism, about the diversity and not quite knowing where you're going but having to work it out is that is the beginning of a more open system. rather than one in which some the men in the white horse likes of their and stays.

there are great down sides to having a strong leader. it is a predictor for peaceful protests. is it likely the army will fire on its people? you can make an evaluation of what the army will do. it was predictable in tunisia that it would knock -- would not and not in senegal. what is the u.s. response? i will let my colleague talk about that more. unofficially. i do think we have to understand one thing. a country like the u.s. and there are not any other countries like the united states, has to make a forward looking bet. there are two parts of that

that is important. it should not just make a backward looking bed. often the u.s. said this guy was our friend through thick and then and we're going to stick with him. that is irrelevant. we're grateful for what he did in the past but we do not want to go down with him. there is a lot of criticism about the u.s. not sticking with the beard. you did not remain stickable. you outlasted yourself. there is criticism of the u.s. being slow to react. in hindsight that is true. we should have seen where things were growing. a little hard to see where things were going in an event like this and you do not want to be in a position like we are in libya. backing the people who are not winning and killing civilians

for the purpose of saving civilian lives. and coming in kind of late when it was more difficult, when it would have been easier to do the same kind of thing had we come in earlier. it is not an easy call. >> in terms of the communities in columbia, what we have seen is a shift away from the leader. we have -- leaders have been killed. by teaching the idea of the collective and committee, if you lose people, it goes on. and we're seeing that a lot. in terms of when some of these non violent efforts have -- what would be the way for them to put real pressure, cohesion and the message has been one

way. finding a way to shame the parties and embarrass them internationally, figuring out a way to get economic pressure and to give one example, the peace community in 2004, the colombian military along with paramilitary members dismembered several members of the committee. while that action -- a land -- only in that case were they were able to get the united states evolved -- involved. it would free a portion of military aid. you saw this tremendous pressure that leveled the playing field between the community and the government. it does work.

also when you have media attention and international support in the case of another community, we had a series of people who are about to be evicted. it was something that was going to happen but the media and the international support made it thabo -- made the political cost too great for that to happen. it is a question of the tactics used and the cohesion of the message. >> i would like to talk about the question of leadership. it is a common misconception that a non-violent movement needs a single charismatic leader. the exception who was gondi -- gandhi does not prove the rule. less was known about how to devise, plan, and then instruct people on how to use different kinds of resistance tactics in the 1920's and 1930's that is known today.

today you can download hundreds of thousands of pages on how to do nonviolent resistance and they are doing it all over the world. the knowledge, the accessibility of knowledge about how to plan and execute nonviolent resistance is orders of magnitude. > it was 70 or 80 years ago. it was much more necessary in his circumstances to be a single leader. speaking of gandhi. the question is how to build the capacity of a part to support it -- participatory are present -- rep campaign or movement to do the kind of pressure that one of the questioners asked about. movements have to exhibit unity, diversity, and representation so they can have legitimacy, so they can accumulate political force. and how to do that is a form of

knowledge. it is a skill. you have to acquire that skill. you have to learn how to plan a campaign. and you have to know how to remain disciplined which most important means not to be violent. that is a serious problem in trying to cause the military or security force to hesitate or stall. you can i get someone to defect to your side. it does not work that way. all these things have to do with the skills or the movement. the skills to not have to be channeled into one or through one individual. once a movement or campaign to acquire skills and capacities, you may not need as much rightness. because conditions do not dictate whether movements or campaigns was successful. it is the collective

intelligence, they will and the ability to put that will into a fact or a campaign that a movement requires. they are nascent political parties. there was -- just as a political party needs to acquire certain political and organizing capabilities, so too does and non violent campaign or movement. those skills have to be broadly distributed. within, there is no such thing as an effective movement that is not an educational organization. that trains its people, that imparts those and distributes those skills. what a movement really does if it is a movement trying to campaign for democracy, it does the work of democracy before democracy is open for business. when it does then began to

acquire those capacities they're able to bring the kind of pressure you're talking about. >> great answers. i would just add my own thoughts with regard to the leadership. i do not necessarily -- i go along with jack here. i do not equate leadership with a single person or single identity or ego. i believe that leadership is necessary that you do not need one single person to do it. that is worth quoting. i believe that the best predictor for success might the leadership, that is about service. in service of what? you can see the greater good but in service of the goal of a group of people being represented by the sense of

leadership. do we see a pattern, the only pattern i have seen is people at the state department, very credibly struggle with each one of these things. the comments about it is hard to say before something unfolds, what is you need to be doing is right on point. and i see people, the people who are assigned the task of looking at each of these developing policy for the response, really wrestling with this each day and reaching out hoping to get input from different offices. will we keep trying to make the right decision, i hope so. i am not one of those people making the decisions but i believe so.

thank you. >> my question is do think the happenings in the arab world could influence countries like central asia. if you think so, do you think that impact will be positive or negative for the young generation in central asia? thank you. >> i want to ask about the influence of religion and ethnicity as far as non violent conflicts are concerned. it looks as if religion and ethnicity play a major role.

>> my question is about whether or not it is important to have a reduction in support for the oppressive government, whoever it is. does that make a difference? does that hard in the resistance? thank you. -- harden the resistance? thank you. >> ok, that last one was two questions. i may only answer the first part. it does not make a difference. i think it will say -- i will say yes. there is no evidence to prove one way or the other. it seems reasonable to assume it would make a difference, and

would it cause the opposition to harden? everything i learned about conflict analysis and resolution tells me the right answer is yes. i do not know other than just making my own: a. central asia, will be impacted by what is going on in the arab spring? i am no good at predictions. i grew up as a lawyer. i do not cancel -- answer a hypothetical questions. one thing that bill brought this up before. this is an exhilarating time. i do not know if you noticed. exhilaration, passion, joye, those kinds of things catch john oliver. -- on all over.

people feel it and get carried away with it. could it? yap. will it? i have no clue. it is definitely something that is inspiring. that is what exhilaration does for you. i would say my feeling about that are they are two things around which this kind of movement can call us. this is one i talked about communities. these are easy things to do that around. can they play an important role? yes. must it be ethnicity and religion that calls for revolt and peaceful or violent revolt? i do not think that is required. i would not call that at this need. i would call that a sense of

this is my home with that. >> let me jump in on the question of the extent to which an international power can inhibit the work of a movement or campaign. in general, the influence of external actors is exaggerated. there are many examples of campaigns or movements against authoritarian regimes that have been successful despite the support of the united states for the regime. there are other examples of movement and campaigns that have not been quickly successful. that have inhibited themselves by spending too much time worrying about whether they could acquire external support and not enough time developing internal capacities of their own. societies are complex. there are specific to themselves. although their cases and categories and there can be

templates and generic plans, every society must make a decision for itself about what its future is going to be. and the idea that there could be either external assistance or -- in addition to political events going on, in a country. i think overrates the knowledge and the intelligence of external factors, usually. having said that, there are some examples of external sanctions as well as external support. that has been well timed at particular moments and has assisted in robust movements are campaign. the best example is south africa. where external economic sanctions were effective. why? because the whole world

participated in those sanctions including united states corporations and when economically, the ability of a particular authoritarian regime to operate successfully, financially and in trade terms around the world is seriously challenged, even if that power is a super power. by the community of nations, you bet your life that can have a significant effect. i would go so far as to suggest a democratic transition in south africa was driven more by economic factors in the -- more than any other. half of that was factors of strikes by blacks in south africa. putting pressure upon institutions across the board. within the apartheid state. the objective is to summon pressure and poes costs and drive up the costs of the

oppression so it is not sustainable any longer. if an external power is able to do that, fine. that is a double-edged sword. it appears as if a regime is being extremely challenge, it can use that to challenge the legitimacy of the internal movement. i do not think it is a useful strategy for an internal movement to over-identify with, much less to ally with an external power. there is a contest for legitimacy with in the country itself. one additional comment about religion. it is not so much religious faith or belief that has played an important role as it is religious institutions and leaders. who because of their internal legitimacy, once the become alive with a civilian movement or defect from silence about the non-violent movement into active support, can make a change.

that was the case with catholic prelates in chile and the philippines. given -- giving material support, space, planning space, to people involved in the challenges to peter shaye and markers. also explicit terms providing support to the leadership and to the organizations and groups involved in challenging those authoritarian leaders. those were, the catholic in chile and poland, poland, chile, and the philippines were respected sufficiently within the civilian population so that where they were taping was noticeable and could help to enhance the political momentum of a group for campaign within the country. i would put that dimension on the value perhaps of religion, religious leaders and

institutions, within a country if they are already important social players. >> in terms of the influence of religion, and business today, i would say that the movements i have described have not really been supported by institutionalized religion. religion has not been the main role that has led to these movements. however, that said, there are individual related actors that have supported these movements and have lived with these communities or that have played a role such as a prominent jesuit who played a big role, speaking out in the media and so forth and supporting these communities. with us and the -- ethnicity, when it comes to the after- colombian indigenous movements, it played a huge role. it was not until 1991 that the

constitution was changed for there to be acceptance of a plural ethnics society and these groups have collective lander wrote -- rights and so on. and part of these movements is the concept of ethno-education. creating their own educators so that the world is seen through the perspective of ethnicity. in terms of the regional influences in the case of columbia, the u.s. and colombia are interlinked politically, financially, and in the anti- narcotics efforts and their the u.s. plays a major role in terms of opinion, shipping in colombia in perception. it has been in terms of these movements, the u.s. has given

colombia over $7.50 billion since 1999 mostly in military aid. and anti-narcotic efforts. the same government has pushed for justice and protection in the cases of these communities and then had a huge role in these movements being able to last as long as they have. when you talk to the people of these resistance communities, all of them reject u.s. funding because they see the u.s. as a player, as a party to the conflict. because of the military aid. as such, they would want to have no engagement with funding. however, political engagement they do have with the u.s. >> could the arab revolt have an impact on the near abroad?

it can have some impact in all but not -- not all the impact is the same. you have kazakhstan and turkmenistan that has continued itself from one generation to the next. but -- you had a revolt of a type in kurdistan. yes, in a limited way, but you cannot transplanting is completely. does a regional support matter? i think it matters a good deal. that is what you see with -- what the arab states have doing. increasing condemnation of assaad's behavior.

but not by everyone. that is a crucial factor in what the west can do in this case. we could save lives in libya but it is more dangerous to intervene and save lives in syria. although more lives are being lost. libya is our hit man when the syrians blow up a disco in berlin, we bombed libya. and libya is a place where we have taken an active intervening role. they were reluctant to do so. because of the repercussions this might have in the rest of the arab world. ethnicity and religion. -- ethnicity and religion are both the visit factors. even when the country is the

same ethnicity, the division's go down the next level. -- the divisions go down the next level. that is not coming through, either. is that coming through? ok. all those good things i said are lost? so, ethnicity is very divisive and religion is divisive. there is nothing more divisive than the drive for religious unity. and the fact that they are muslim in this part of the world merely opens it up to different interpretations. a couple weeks ago i was in tunisia. they were saying to their representatives of the party, you are muslim, you say you are a muslim party, we are muslim.

why are you -- are you more muslim that we are? why should we vote for a moslem party -- muslim party? what difference will it make when you come into power? what is your program about a muslim? there was a lot of questioning from the inside, so to speak. about this. these are two very divisive types of alamance. there are now rallying points for this kind of intifada. -- they are now rallying point for this kind of intifada. >> i am melinda, and i wanted to ask the question with regard to the arab spring.

specifically in regard to egypt. what are your thoughts on the role of the international community in supporting constitutional reform and the shift from non violent movements and to institutional and government changed? can there be a role played or should there be if these places are unique democracies according to the region. >> given the deepening economic inequality in the u.s., and beyond that, economic

vulnerability and low levels of participation in various communities, one might we learn about the spirit and tactics of the arab spring about pathways for social change here, in the u.s.? >> than nancy haven from the university of maryland school of public policy. i heard different depictions of the arab spring. i heard a spontaneous revolution, and then a very strategic, well-thought-out use of campaigns. somewhere in between, the truth probably lies, and could you comment on what is most likely the history as we look back on that? >> well, i do not know there is a great deal of distance between

us. in the seven or eight countries in the arab world in which there have been at least significant protest, if not deliberate and systematic work by a movement, organized in some fashion, there has been a great deal of spontaneity also, which is to say the occasion and the moment was largely provoked by what appeared to be a quickly successful, largely nonviolent uprising in a single country, and then a so-called contagion effect happened, and protests began in other countries. in egypt, over 10 years, there had been systematic organizing, occasional mobilizing, campaigns focus on various labor as well as political, and constitutional

questions. at our summer institute this year, we gave an award to a member of the so-called egyptian revolution, and we decided to recognize her because she had been part of just about all of these events, and was a personal emblem of the necessity of repetitive, persistent, organizing of action over time. 80% of the people in tahrir square were not there spontaneously. they were possessed by the spirit of the occasion in order to be able to rally support of what then looked like a revolution, but that as the of 11th-hour in organizing the sequence of events. that had not happened in libya. that had half, or one-third, or

one-quarter happened in syria. the resources for be sent existed, and there was a certain tolerance for dissent, and much more was going on that is even visible today in the way of ordination and planning, nowhere near as much as this rolling increase opposition. i do not know that there is a lot of difference between the two of us with respect to that question. the first question about egypt, and the second about the united states share something in common. there is a factor i can address. resistance in democracies is different from resistance in on democracies, to the extent that what you do tactically and how

you'd do it is effected by the degree to which you initially have space to organize. when i first began talking about non-violent resistance publicly 10 years ago after the release of our first documentary series, won a part documentary's would be shown, i would speak, there would be questions, and an activist what said i want to know how we can have a non- violent resolution revolution in the united states. one advantage americans have is there is a lot of organizing space. i wonder how that space is being used, and whether it is used to resistance against particular targets and action on which pressure can be placed on order to -- in order to force a response. by the way, this is all about power, and how you summon power

on people, and focus it and apply it in a particular circumstance. i think that one of the effects nonviolent year's resistance, which is similar to 1989 historically, will be there will be increased use in the united states, which i devoutly hope there is because it is away of keeping those who are elected, much less those who have none democratically achieved power honest and accountable. frederick douglass said that power is never accountable, and must use force it to be accountable, regardless of what the -- unless you force it to be accountable, regardless of the political conditions. there is ample notice taken, there are signs of that, and there is that spirit.

there is a great deal to learn. movements in non-democracies can be learned from to be taken as needed, as the civil rights movement was in the united states 40 or 50 years ago. so, those campaigns can be seen in the united states as well. >> i will pick that up. it is a shame i cannot come in fighting with my fellow panelist, but i like that 80% figure -- 8% spontaneity. i think that is a good characterization. think of it as a strain that has burst, and there are globs debt clanged together, but the fact is what happened then was

spontaneous, and the people in that spontaneous movement were lots of little pieces of organization, many of them frustrated for not been effected in the past. they are now looking out for who their friends are, who they agree with, who they want to coalesce with, and what kind of movement are we letting it build up? it is testimony to the unpreparedness, despite things in the background that the people in the uprising say do not have elections early. give us time. there are a couple of people out there who have been organized, and we do not want them running away with our revolution. i put "revolution" in quotes.

i do not think we are that different in our characterization in the united states. in the united states, we're not looking for non-violent protests because there is so much organizing space that we are looking for greater participation. that is another thing that is exhilarating here -- the use turnout in the obama election, and then you see, brace yourself, tea party, which is also a public manifestation of people getting together. we are full of it here. [laughter] >> we do not need encouragement to nonviolent protest. we had it. let's see, what else have we got? international support of egypt, of the constitutional movement -- the first thing we have to remember, and it leads to a

strained when i am going to talk about is that -- strain in what i am going to talk about, and that is it is their movement. the interesting thing is that they often imitate terms and pick up terms and run with them in ways we would never recognize. what they are going to work out is what they are working out. it is a contradiction to say we impose democracy credit democracy is government by the people that are putting -- democracy. democracy is a government by the people that are putting in place. we should be happy with the idea, even if we are not happy with what it is doing. we can help them. we can be useful as resource

people. we can help them to discuss together. the conference i was at in tunisia that i refer to was set up by a group, the center for the study of islam and democracy, which was based in the united states, and it tries to work on these themes, led by a tunisian-american, and its purpose was goaded by an earlier conference held by the national endowment of democracy on tunisia, which just the same question -- what can we do? they got the same answer i am going through, and then the csid held this meeting, in which they got people together -- a couple of outsiders like myself -- but for the most part they were tunisian, and we felt enormously successful after presentations,

they turned their backs to us and argue with each other across the table. that is what we can do, and we hope that the fervor we can bring and support can be useful. >> all right. i think we will go ahead and let that be the last word. on behalf of the national peace and securities institute, i want to say thank you to all of you for spending your evening with us. we can continue the conversation in the room to your left where we will have food and refreshments. thank you very much. [applause] >> sunday on "newsmakers" education secretary r. duncan,

on the state of the u.s. education system and how other countries compare in preparing for jobs. >> jobs will go to where the knowledge workers are. we are competing for jobs with india, china, south korea, singapore, and i think our children are as smart as children anywhere in the world. i want to give them a chance to compete on a level playing field, a chance to be successful, and right now, the brutal truth is other countries are out-educating us, and they will beat us down the road. dickensian tire interview on "newsmakers -- >> you can see the entire interview on "newsmakers" sunday, and also online at c-span.org. >> watch more and video of the

candidates, see what reporters are saying, and track contributions with c-span's website for campaign 2012. there are links to c-span media partners in the early primary and caucus states, all at c- span.or/campaign2012. >> next, you'll hear from david shedd and john mclaughlin on the success and challenges of the u.s. intelligence community. this runs one hour and 20 minutes. >> the topic of today is a broad topic -- secrets and security: intelligence today.

we will do a broad horizon of the issues, talking about a bit about the reforms that have been undertaken in the intelligence community over the last few years. both of these gentlemen have been through that, and helped to shape it. i thought it might be useful to start with an introduction of our panelists. you have their biographies. nonetheless, i thought it would be worth highlighting some of their really impressive experience. let me start with john mclaughlin. he is former deputy director of the cia, and former acting director of the cia. he spent more than 30 years in the cia, starting in 1972, with a focus on european, russian, in

eurasian issues as the director of intelligence. he had a variety of titles before becoming deputy director for intelligence, heading up the analytical core of the agency. while deputy director for intelligence, i thought it was interesting that he showed concern about the health of the workforce and about bringing in the next generation, making sure that they were well-situated in the intelligence community. he created the senior analytic service, a senior -- a cia career track that allows senior analysts to rise to all ranks, pay, and stature without going into management ranks, which is a salutary the initiative. he also created the school for intelligence analysis, an institution that teaches the history, mission, and essential

skills of the analytical profession to new cia employees. during the closing months of the clinton administration, and the beginning of the bush administration, he served as deputy director, acting director, and then again deputy director before retiring in late-2004. he is now senior fellow, and distinguished practitioner at the senator for strategic studies at the school of advanced international studies in washington, d.c. he has been appointed to head up a group of national security experts to investigate various intelligence failures, if you will, and to make recommendations for possible fixes. he is an accomplished magician. he has lectured on magic before

big conventions of magicians. if i only thought to ask him to do a magic trick before we got on stage here, he would have done one, but now i think he is not prepared to do one that all of you can see, he tells me, and he tells me it is important that you be able to see it. the cameras might be able to see that, but anyway, we will leave that to the questions and answers. david shedd was named deputy director of intelligence agency in august, 2010, and helps manage a workforce of military civilian employees worldwide, and leads what is called the defense intelligence the enterprise, and all of the organizations within the department of defense. i heard him describe his career as follows -- 27 years as a cia

officer, 4.5 years on the national security council staff, and then years at the very top of the office of the director of national intelligence, helping to shape that institution before moving to his current post in at cia. these are subject to correction by you gentlemen. he served from may, 2007, to august, 2010, as a director for policy, responsible for overseeing formulation to implementation of major policies across a fill spectrum of issues from information-sharing, too analytic standards and more. in particular, he led the review

of the executive order 12333, the foundational u.s. intelligence policy which was revised by president bush in july, 2007. he developed and implemented the national intelligence strategy, published in august 2009, for the intelligence community, and led all strategic planning efforts to determine future priorities for the community and the nation. so, we had two highly- experienced people here, who know all of the ins and outs of the intelligence community, and i thought we might start by asking a broad question about the intelligence community, let them talk a little bit about how they see the intelligence community today, in light of the reforms that have come, dni camely since the on on the scene, and david, perhaps

in your remarks, you might tell us if the national strategy and developed and published two years ago is holding up in light of developments since then. so, why don't we start, since you are closest to me, with you, john, if that is okay? >> thank you. it is a pleasure to be here, not only with this great audience from across the government, but also with my former colleague and good friend, david shedd. just to elaborate on the introduction about david, it is rare to find an individual who has worked at so many different places at the senior levels -- white house, military intelligence, civilian intelligence, and at the top of the community, working with dni. david bianco experience is

quite invest here. -- david's experience is quite fast. david -- the first question, let me just make three points. i think that what you think about intelligence depends a little bit on how you think about intelligence. i actually do not use the word "reform." i talk about it having been transformed, rather than reformed. my experience -- let me put it this way. i look at it in the long term, historically, and a major point i would make to you his intelligence as a discipline of national security is relatively new in the united states compared to other countries. look at china, for example. their military strategist was writing about all the things we talked about here in very sophisticated ways in the sixth

century, d.c., and we have been doing this since 1947, and that is when the cia was created. we were the last major country to actually create a national intelligence service. we had intelligence before then, but it was largely in pockets of the military, and so forth. you can divide it into eras, and the era of innocence is from the revolution up until world war two, where we did not pay much attention to the entire field of intelligence. world war ii is the era of transformation where we learn about all the classic disciplines of intelligence from the british, basically, and our experience from fighting a worldwide struggle against two other powers. in that time, we invent imagery from space after world war two, until the berlin wall falling, that is a time of great transformation where we do

things we have not done much in the past. then, we enter the 1990's, where there is this dip in interest, and era of uncertainty. many of you working the government, so you remember we were cut dramatically, particularly in national security, and then september 11 happens, and we enter another area, not by name, but another transformation. that is accelerated by a restructuring that happened in 2004, the creation of dni, but my point to you is that intelligence has been brought to of the new, and in a state of transformation for the last couple of decades. the second point i would make about the big restructuring that happened in 2004 is complicated, but, fundamentally, i should confess that i started out as an opponent of this

because it essentially both the leadership of the intelligence community from the position i , the director of central intelligence, to another office that was created in the director of national intelligence. over the five or six years that has happened, i have come to view it as a positive thing, in part because of what it liberates the cia to do. it is very hard to run an entire community of 16, 17, depending on how you count, agencies, when you are also running a global agency that has worldwide responsibilities. it is now possible for a director to focus intensely on those things that he or she is responsible for, and the dni can drive things no one else can do -- integration of sources,

effort, common standards for many different things across the community. so, i think we could say more about it, but fundamentally, what people often say is that it is still being defined. we are on our fourth dni, and each brings a new twist. the current director is emphasizing integration of efforts and analysis, and collections, basically, but my sense is that that is progressing pretty well, and david can collaborate on that. the final point i would make is that judging intelligence is hard. you ask how are we doing? my answer is pretty well, but it depends a bit, as a friend of mine says, and whether you think intelligence is essentially a competitive game,

right? you are competing in a world of at the series that are seeking to deceive you, deny you information. -- that are seeking -- world of competitors that are seeking to deceive you and deny you of information. basketball and football hopes. if you are in -- helps. if you are in basketball, you had 85% or 95% of your foul shots, or you are not succeeding. if you're playing baseball, you can get into the all-star game with a 300 batting average. there is something about the difficulty of those two endeavors. think how tough intelligence is. you are working against an adversary that is seeking to deceive you, yet an atmosphere where information is hard to come by, so i would not put a

grade on it, but you always want to be at the 90% end of the scale, of course, but the other thing that makes it hard is intelligence succeeds when nothing happens. i can remember an instance in the summer before 9/11 where i would call the deputy of state and say you need to evacuate an embassy because we have a report that indicates there is an attack. we were confident of that. retrospectively, i know the reports were accurate. the embassy was not attacked, and nobody hears about that. intelligence also succeeds when it is woven into the fabric of a successful policy, something like the balkans in the 1990's, for example. intelligence was active there, seen as a policy success, but the role was quite invisible. .. .

that tension between those two things kind of defines the nature of the discipline, i think. so i would stop there. >> wulled you add to john's rarkeds, please. >> thank you. die an, helen, thank you for this event. it is indeed an honor to be here next to u john, worked

side by side with him and then had the opportunity with the several dnis to do reviews that paid high dividends. let me just build off of what john has said. as i look over a 30-year career, i won't start with george washington as john did. but in those 30 years just how dramatic the changes have been. and let me put them in three categories. mission, people, and now again the budget. because it's all in that context as well that we need to look at intelligence. the people. are one of the greatest contributors to the craft of intelligence for fulfilling the mission. but the mission itself has changed dramatically. when i think of who do we produce for, i think of my

first 20 years very much pre-9 /11 thinking almost exclusively of support to the president, if national security establishment, as we know it through the statute not the nsc that supports it but the nsc setchts and providing that intelligence with the objective and goal of creating decision advantage with decision confidence. and i'll talk about that a little more. and then post-9/11 the dramatic increase of the intelligence demand from the combatant commanders, the war fighters, and in that category in where we have seen a meld of integrating tactical with national intelligence, national intelligence with tactical. and increasingly indistinguishable in terms of trying to measure the net contribution of one over the

other. that's a dramatic change in the mission. the third category bei don't know that is state local tribal law enforcement. the fusion centers, the d.h.s. mandates intelligence and analysis in the office there that karen wag anywhere runs, when i think of intelligence and what we have instituted still imperfectly but writing for release, writing for below a tear line concept. so that you give that law enforcement community that decision advantage with the confidence advantage to understanding what value that information has in terms of taking action on it. still within that mission dramatic change over the past decade is a much greater demand for actionable information than i certainly remember from my first 20 years or so. the people.

we are at dia somewhere in the 65 to 70% range and i think it's very close to that throughout the intelligence community of hires that have come in post -- the 9/11 period. obviously now it's a decade and that isn't far off. but you have to also look in the first five years. it was already at 45 or 50%. so the dramatic change in the makeup of your workforce. it is said that at any given time our workforce has four generations in it. and as we look at the challenges, any of you who are parents of teenagers or perhaps in their early 20s compared to how you see the world and how they see it, i call it the pda world. they're literally in their world of virtual space before they go into physical contact with friends in a way that they think differently about the world that they're in. in many ways i consider it a

world that the adversary also in that generation sees as having no boundaries. physical boundaries as we have known them are dropped dramatically as a result of the cyber space and the social network that they reside in. so how we look at the intelligence business and how they view the world in that jen x, jen y millenials and so forth is very important to me as a leader inside dia but is as well for my colleagues across the 16, 17 agencies with the dni's office. finally, the budget. what we are trying to do under the direction or the leadership, i should say, of jim clapper as the director of national intelligence is to really look at lessons learned from the 1990s. i think judging from most of the ages in this room you'll remember very clearly the so

called peace dividend that we thought we were able to harvest in terms of the fall of the wall and the fall of the soviet union. that is not the case today in terms of the demand signal for intelligence against those three big broad categories that we support but within those categories the demand is increasing at a time that the budget is slinking. that drives me naturally toward an idea that perhaps in many ways foreshadowed in 2004 this idea of a dni relieving the dcia or the dci to run c.i.a. as dcia today and having this full-time responsibility actually put on the shoulders of a director of national intelligence by any other name but the creation of that person. because now as we go into these this fiscal environment that we're in -- and i tend to

remind our people as well asday often. we've often been resorsed the cl strained. we're simply going into a much more resourced constrained environment where that demand for intelligence either flattens or increases and i would say it's the latter we have to have a different formulation as to how we're going to work together. and that will drive us toward greater integration. duplication of that effort will collapse around single efforts of where agencies will do more together if you think of the spectrum of coordination, and i believe as an intelligence community we graduated from that a long time ago. we coordinate pretty well. that doesn't mean there aren't occasions where that falls through between a c.i.a. and an f.b.i. or an n.s.a. with an n.g.a. and who forth, that whole alphabet soup but we have been doing that well for many, many years.

the collaboration moving toward that center. again, i think the past decade we've shown a jointness at collaborating a whole lot better. that is, simply two parts coming together and saying what's the task at hand? what's the challenge we're facing? let's work together toward it. i'll put in my pieces, you put in your pieces. i'm talking about a different model at integration. not on every single subject, not on every effort. but where it makes sense. you bring the human capabilities integrated against that same target set in terms of what the defense, hument effort is with the national clan destine service as one example. of course, cyber is concerned you integrate the focus on that problem set rather than having it separate and still collaborating. so i think i have given you a bit of a sense of where i think

we're going while still giving you an idea of where i think we've come from over the past decade in particular as we look at this very broad and capable intelligence community simply building obwhat john already said. >> thank you, david. let me follow up on one thing you said. you talked about the dramatic change that has national intelligence melding with tactical intelligence to support the war fighter. and it brought to mind an experience i had when i went to the air force base in kuwait and they showed us there the video of the use of a predator with an army tactical squad in baghdad, a block away from an apartment building and the predator was there and taking a picture of the apartment

building where there was a sniper. and so it had a cursor that was focused on one level of the apartment building and the squad radioed their commanders and said no, this is, you need to move over two apartments and down two levels. and that was communicated somehow by satellite, et cetera, to the operator of the predator who was sitting in a trailer in las vegas who then made the adjustment to the targeting and blew the sniper out of the apartment building. that's amazing melding of technology and tactics et cetera. i don't know whether that's classic intelligence but that's one little anecdote. can you tell us, give us a little color, if you will, on how that operates on the ground now as one instance but i know there are many others. >> i often recount the story about zarqawi and his demise in

iraq. and where he was clearly the amir for al qaeda iraq at the time attacking our troops, our men and women in anbar in particular but baghdad and so forth. and the questions asked of me which intelligence discipline was the one responsible, which trade craft was applicable to his demise, and the answer simply to me, that i give back is, i don't know. and that's actually a very good answer in this particular case. the reason is because the melding of intelligence both tactical and national in that case, and by the way including open source, i include that in terms of information, that contributed to his takedown, is that i am not here to give more weight to one over the other. what i am here to tell you is that our intelligence analysts

who were working that target on the ground were able to meld intelligence in real time at network speed in order to take him down. and that is the story of zarqawi's end. and that has been repeated in the ballot field time and time again. and i think that is testament to the fact that our intelligence disciplines are incredibly important as disciplines in terms of the capabilities of those analysts who do, who understand imagery and the gee on it or understand the signals intelligence product for what it is. but then melding it, fusing it together in order to be able to take action on the battlefield and the example that you gave or the example of zarqawi. i believe the same model, the same template is actually

applicable for national policy as well and that the all-source analyst then has the benefit of looking at all that information because sometimes it's not intelligence, it's certainly not classical intelligence that enables him or her to be able to make that judgment. tim, let me go back to a question that you asked about the strategy at the outset. by developing this strategy i think one of the tests of time is always will it survive one particular leadership, and this would have been admiral blare as dni when it was developed and promulgated as a strategy to another d.n.i. and it has. and it has survived that particular relatively short test of time with four d.n.i.s in a relatively short period of time. but it is important that it went beyond the boundaries of

one particular d.n.i. in terms of its focus. the second thing is that it does now serve as a very good road map for the intelligence community to go and develop as d.i.a. has, as n.g.a. is doing and so forth in developing their strategies. what are their primary goals, what are the objectives you should those goals? and it allows you to move from that national level for national intelligence to where it's applicable to your particular agency or element of the intelligence community. also, informed by the national security strategy that has been issued as well as the quadrennial reports and so forth. other documents that help form it. but since you had asked specifically about the national intelligence strategy of 2009, that applied there, too. >> thank you, john.

let's talk a little bit about the explosion of information and how that affects the conduct of intelligence gathering and analysis. everybody knows that there's been exponential explosion of information with cell phones and the web and so on. my question has to do with what is proving to be most difficult and most valuable in gathering and assessing intelligence on key issues? perhaps you could talk a little bit about the role of human intelligence, the question of month rg these huge flows of data, the capability of high-tech satellite and air borne imagery. all of those are important but is there -- where is the emphasis falling as between those various activities as we

seek to improve our intelligence capabilities? >> this actually i think is the major question of our times on intelligence, because much of what david just talked about and what tim asked in the previous question having to do with integration of practically every intelligence success i can think of depends on the integration of various sources of intelligence. and what's made that more dramatic and more effective is technology, really. because now i've done that forever of course but now you can do it more rapidly because you can move information so rapidly. you can move it visually, you can move it electricically, you can move it on a screen in front of you. so technology is our friend, but in some respects it's also a challenge and an adversary. and i think it is really the main story of our times when it comes to intelligence. you know, if you went back to 1952, that's the year the national security agency was

created, that's the agency that intercepts messages, there were only 5,000 computers in the world. ok? today we have an internet population of over 1 billion going to lord knows how many sites. the last count i saw depends on how you count, 3 billion or so. computering power is doubling every 18 months. the miniaturization of circuitry is the untold story behind all of this. if you look at a microprocessor for example, the kind of thing you have in your cell phones right now, going back to 1980 there were in that microprocessor about 29, 30,000 transsisters. today there were more than 1 billion. ok? so that's why we now have in our hands the computing power that if you are as old as i am you remember once was housed in a big building and we used

punch cards and waited for the error message overnight. it's the untold story of our time when it comes to technology. that allows us to do all of this stuff. so that creates a -- this is our flend. ok? because -- friend. if you went back to before the invention of the telegraph in 1844 or there abouts, we didn't move information invissably. once the telegraph was invented we began to move information invisibly. and that's where intelligence began to change. and then through world war one and world war ii we developed techniques for trying to grab that information that was being moved invisibly. and now we're very, very good at it but now we're too good at it in a way. the national intelligence agency can scoop up, it can have the capability to scoop up within three or four hours the equivalent in bits and bytes of

what's in the library of congress. and so when i did the study that tim referred to for the d.n.i. about a year and a half ago, one of the things i discovered looking back at the attempted bombing of an airliner over detroit in christmas of 2009, do you recall that? the so-called underwear bomber? what a great metaphor. it failed. but the only thing that failed was basically the detonation. had it worked, a lot of people would have died and that would be a different story. but the question was, why was it so hard for us to detect this in advance? and that's a long story that i can elaborate on but one of the reasons is that the volume of material that the average person had, the average analyst had to go through to anticipate such a thing had grown dramatically from let's say a couple hundred to multiples of thousands. and so it becomes increasingly difficult for an analyst to

remember that on january 3rd i saw a piece of paper or an image on my screen which resonates with what i'm seeing today four months later from another source that adds to that. that then requires, so the challenge for intelligence today on this score and david will be more current on what is currently being done. but my sense is we're still not where we need to be in terms of anlitic tools basically software tools that allow us to as an intelligence community with this vast volume of information to do what you do when you go and order a book on amazon. you know, you ask for a book and amazon says you might also be interested in. ok? so in intelligence terms that means i have a report that says a guy from -- i'll make up a

country. a guy from elbonia -- my favorite made-up country -- has just visited a very bad extremist in yemen. and i would want my computer then to say, you might also be interested in. well, david will i think know more than i do on this, but i suspect we're getting better on that but we're probably not bet where we ideally want to be on that score. and it isn't a matter of not trying. we're also balancing the two requirements here again as a way in which intelligence is different than what i do now. i work in the academic community and we do research. you don't have to worry in that world about balancing two things. the need to share the information and the need to protect it. obviously you need to protect it for a whole variety of

reasons. imagine if we hadn't protected the information that was gathered before the bin laden operation. very few people knew about that. and that's one of the major reasons it sick seeded. at the same time, it -- succeeded. at the same time it had to be shared among a lot of people because as david pointed out taking that operation as an example, every conceiveable int agency was involved. so the tension between those two things is what makes information tech knowledge management so difficult in the intelligence business. so i would stop there on that score but just emphasize again i think this question tim raised is probably the core question about intelligence today. i would add one thought to that. and that is that because basically my point is we're in the middle of the greatest technological revolution that i think we can document in modern history i suppose if you went back to the invention of the wheel they would have said the

same thing. but in modern history, there is no time that we have, -- that i have lived through where technology is changing faster than we can come up with names for it. ok? kids are doing that for us. but for intelligence, what this means is we have the potential now to break out of the paradimes that we developed in that age of transformation i talk about from say world war 2 up through the fall of the berlin wall when we developed most of the techniques we currently use, taking pictures from space, listening to intercepted communications, and so forth. we have the potential through technology to break out of those paradigms or elaborate on them in ways that frankly the average person can hardly imagine. because intelligence always has to be tech logically ahead of everyone else. why? because your adversary has

everything that's available. so you've always got to be better than them tech logically. and i think without going into the details the intelligence community is. but the challenge is technology is changing so quickly that you've really got to be quick and fast and agile and there's no time to waste. >> david, part of my question had to do with the role of human intelligence. you talked about the 70% turnover in the ranks of the c.i.a. in the past decade. many of those people, new people were brought in, were from communities, foreign language speakers and so on that changed the face of the c.i.a. a bit so that we could more easily integrate with the communities that we need to be

gathering intelligence from. what -- could you talk a little bit about the importance of human intelligence in a context that javen has just so well laid out where you're also trying to monitor huge amounts of data flows, et cetera. how important is human intelligence today? >> well, tim, human intelligence remains absolutely critical to an understanding of the plans and intentions at the core. the difficulty that i have seen over the years in the pursuit of the trade craft of human intelligence is knowing what to go after and how to pursue that so that you are investing that very precious resource against the highest payoff. and that requires, it's back to

thinking of all source information in order to be informed about what you have to collect and where that secret resides that you would get through our human penetration. the other high-value for human intelligence is that it's also an enabler to the technological collection or the technology collection. in other words, it points the finger at the right place for the national security agency to pursue something as opposed to, as john described, purely theoretically, the capability of nsa to simply gather all that information in the volume that he referred to. and by having that human penetration, that human individual that's sitting in the place next to the right server, the right switch and so

forth, allows then the effort to be far more targeted as well. finally, that human source is one who will give -- and i promise to come back to this -- this decision advantage that gives something the machine does not generally give, which is the atmospherics. around a situation. so as a human source that's in a circle of influence or a circle of power that we're interested in, that individual is able to give the sense of the environment as well as just the facts. an enormous amount of effort has to then go into the vetting of that source, the weighing of that information properly weighed against the value of other information collected on that environment as well.

but that becomes very, very important to the decision-maker. so by that decision advantage and then that confidence advantage, let me tell you what i'm talking about. the decision advantage is being one step ahead of the adversary in terms of that collection objective that gives the decision maker on our end that ability to make choices that he or she otherwise would not have. that could be the president, that could be the combatant commander, it could be the war fighter down in the humvee or as the law enforcement community chief of police and ray kelly in new york or in los angeles. wherever it might be in the local law enforcement environment. the decision confidence is a way to think about counter intelligence. it's the weight that you give that information. and for those familiar with the human intelligence reporting, there's a source description.

i'll say an individual, an official with close good access with close ties to this reporting judged to be fairly reliable. that fairly reliable has to go with a definition that really is a definition of a counter intelligence message to the reader. it says on balance, he's fair to midland, but be careful. he's not a generally reliable source yet. the vetting hasn't gone into it that needs to go into it. and in time it may get there, it may not, depending on the situation of that source. so your decision advantage is married up together with decision confidence. and to me, it's a very critical combination and one that if you look back on the intelligence

challenges that we've had to outright failures, it's been in the balance of those two things, that decision advantage that you are bringing to the decision maker with that confidence level. if the analysts don't know that for source protection you've changed that source description three or four times but it's still the same source, you won't be able to have that decision confidence balanced properly to the decision advantage that you're trying to give that reader. so human intelligence remains critical. it is not obveeyated by technology. it is in fact enabled by technology and in reverse the human operations can actually serve to drive focused technology operations. >> i think we would be remiss if we didn't follow up that these two answers with by talking a little bit about the hunt for bin laden.

and of course there has been a lot of writing about this. there was a terrific piece in the new yorker just a week or two ago about the hunt for bin laden. and it talks about satellite imagery, air borne photography, i believe we had people on the ground and in nearby building, and so -- and it also reflected this article did on levels of cooperation between various parts of the u.s. government as we looked for bin laden. so let me just throw out a general question. maybe you can start, john, on how you see the role of intelligence and the components of intelligence, if you will, as operating as we sought to find bin laden. >> well, i think the first

thing to say is that the successful outcome there was the result of literally years of effort that accelerated in the last several years. now, bear in mind i'm not in the government so i was not part of that. david u will have a fresher and more informed perspective on that. but what i do know is that the information collected over many years helped us to get there. i would go back almost 15 years. because it's in 19 96 that the c.i.a. begins to focus intensely on bin laden and on al qaeda. 19 96 when he moves from sudan to afghanistan, the c.i.a. notices this is a finance yir of intelligence who is also getting into operations.

and you know the story from there on. the embassy bombings in 1998. the attack on the uss coal warship. 9/11 itself. and throughout that period, the c.i.a. was even the 9/11 commission will acknowledge the agency that focused most intensely on bin laden and al qaeda. with some success before 9/11, and obviously a big setback on 9/11, a huge loss. which will be commented on extensively in the next couple of weeks, i'm sure. but in that period of time, the agency and the rest of the intelligence community began to develop a picture of al qaeda. this accelerated dramatically after 9/11. if you recall those days, and many people do, from roughly 2001 to 2005 or so, the community i think led

principally by the agency in that period of time essentially took down the 9/11 eraship of 9/11 and in the years since then that has accelerated in terms of attacking the infrastructure of that organization. and those by attacking, i mean killing and capturing. and the data that came out of those operations in terms of captured elect tronic media, the detention program that produced many, many reports about the nature of the business, the nature of the al qaeda organization, and so forth, the technical intelligence collected all came together in a way that brought us the result we saw with an accelerated development of intelligence in the last two to three years. and there's no point in me repeating what's been in the press here. you know that the focus was on

a courier, once the agency had figured out that bin laden relied principally on cure yrs for communication, the focus then was on one particular courier who became to be known as the one most close to bin laden and that's what you do in intelligence. you focus in on this clue and you start peeling away the layers of the unknowns until you figure out who is that courier, what's that courier's real name, where does that courier live? what does that courier do all day long, how does that courier communicate, how does that courier drive and so forth. and eventually you get to the compound that you all now know about. what i can tell you with some confidence is at the point when all of that information came together, technical intelligence, human intelligence, open source intelligence, layers of it from years of collection, the agency

was still -- and let me say everyone was involved in this. the national security agency, the national geospatial intelligence agency, the defense intelligence agency, everyone who has intelligence in their title was somehow in this. putting that altogether, the confidence level was still not 100% that he was there. but it was the best case that inn was able to make up to -- anyone was able to make up to that point. and i understand now when i reflect on something leon panetta said, because he said something publicly that i think tells me why the president in part why the president decided to go lead. the case that he was there was strong enough that had he not been there, i think this is what leon said, you could present that case in public and defend it.

in other words, the public would understand why you acted on this. the case was that strong. but it wasn't 100%. and that is almost always the case in intelligence. i don't know what i would add beyond that. >> david, do you have a thought on that? >> sure. one of the things that i look forward to is being out of government and being able to say what he said. but i still want my job tomorrow. but i gave you no classified information. >> no. >> but coming from me, i would be confirming the details of the new yorker and elsewhere that's been in the press. i will say this, i'm actually a critic about how much has come out in the press. >> so am i, by the way. >> i know, john. i think that -- no. i know -- i can drop i think.

i know that our tools are limited by definition and with as much exposure across the whole ambit of counter terrorism in what comes out in the media really does hurt our ability to fight the next iteration of the war on terror. i will say this, and i will come back to this time and time again. you could not have mounted the 1 may operation without the integration of the information and intelligence as john described it. that i will say catgoerically. and time and time again, as john as alluded to, the successes that we have had in the intelligence community many by unsung heroes in the background because they aren't revealed in terms of the disruptions, occur as a result of integrating those efforts in terms of the collection capabilities and the anlitic

coming together with the collection that's been enabled by great men and women. >> i would just add to what david said about -- i too am distressed by how much has been revealed about the operation. but what i said here was not particularly sensitive, i don't think. but all of that comes from information that's been officially put out there, i think. here's why i worry about it a little bit. in my very first comments i said intelligence is very new to the united states. ok? one reason i said that is we still don't know how to deal with it. we really don't. we're an open -- and i in my course i have a whole section that i do, the day that i do, the teaching i do now called intelligence in an open and free society. and there is a tension here between the obvious values we hold as american citizens,

which i of course fully support, and the fact that we need to have a secret intelligence organization -- organizations -- in order to manage our affairs in the world. we have more trouble with that than any other country that i'm aware of, any other major country. and with the tension between those two things. and here's the bottom line. for our adversaries who aren't as strong as we are, ok, either conventionly, tech logically, or otherwise, they have to seek advantages that are, to use the term everyone employs these day, asymmetric. that is things they can do to help them overcome our great power. and one of the things they can do? keep secrets. secrecy is a tool they use as an asim metic tool to overcome our great advantages.

i don't think we've figured that out. >> i would follow that up a little bit by observing and maybe asking you to comment further, john. the accounts in the media are accounts that portray this operation as highly successful. that is the sources for this were people in the government. some of whom anyway, and there are perhaps many of whom, wanted that information to come out. so because it portrayed the success that could be attributed to the white house decisiveness, et cetera, et cetera. i don't know b that's the case but it may very well be. i'm sure david can't comment on this. >> ok. i'm just trying to take care of you here. >> yes. so -- >> that's natural. and let me say first off, and i

can say these things. i worked for how many, seven, eight administrations republican and democrat. generally when an intelligence success occurs people like to talk about it. it's not confined to one political party or one political season. but generally, if there's a big intelligence success, people tend to talk about it. that's not true of every intelligence success because most of them are incremental and not spectacular like this one. but it's just a tendency we have as a country, and i would say it's one we need to think hard about. >> tim, let me just add. because of terrorism and counter terrorism, i'm referring to international terrorism in this case, has taken on such a public profile

in terms of the political stance that one takes on counter terrorism all the way down to the local district, obviously at the state level and at the national level that my concern goes well beyond what's been said publicly about the events of 1 may. it's on counter terrorism more generally. and it is the rush to the microphones and the cameras to tell the story even if it's a half-baked story on the counter terrorism success, that being a disruption. and very quickly leads to the second and third iteration of questions that come from it. how did you know? how did you disrupt it? who was involved? what governments, friendly allies who might have supported it? that's what i'm referring to, to the larger cost of the public debate. and all i would submit is that

there is a tension between how much is put out publicly in the interest of the american people knowing obviously that our representatives are actively engaged on the topic and protecting the secrets that enable the very success that they're talking about. that's really the context of my comments. >> thank you. i'd like to open the microphones to questions from the audience. we have two people with mikes and i see john there who has a question. and there may be others. so john stand up and they'll bring a mike to you. at least i thought they were. all right. >> john department from public service and thank you very much for your comments and thank you for the service that you

provide to the country. i want to just get back to the workforce issue one more time. the federal government in the next few years will be under great pressure to reduce eengspendturs. what do we need to do, what does the u.s. government need to do to make sure going forward that we are able to still recruit and hire the kind of tall we need in the intelligence community that we invest in that talent the growth and development of that talent that we can retain the workforce that we need in the intelligence community? what is your advice? >> why don't you repeat the question a little bit for the benefit of the cameras among other things. >> sure. what would be our views in terms of the workforce makeup and attracting the talent that we need in the intelligence community against a fiscally constrained environment.

to put it susinchingsly. at the top of our intelligence community list of things to not do as we did in the 1980s -- 1990s, with the peace dividend, is to protect our people and keeping the hiring active during this period that we're currently going into or already find ourselves in, and certainly going forward. and that at all costs you continue to attract the talent. one of the things -- and i believe i speak for john when i say that it is so incredibly encouraging are, is the caliber of the applicants that we're getting in the intelligence community today and i see no diminution of that talent that's coming forward. it's driven by a desire for service. it is driven by a desire to give back to their country.

and, frankly, i believe it's driven by a wonderful curiosity about intelligence. and i think that's a wonderful thing to tap into. i am a huge proponent though of one thing that has to change dramatically and it's starting to but it needs to change far more in the intelligence community when it comes to its personnel. and that is we need to over a period of 20 to 30 years offer viable entry and exit ramps to our personnel. when i think back over 30 years, if i had left the government at year -- pick any year, 15, i would have been branded as someone who, ok, good-bye, have a good life. you left the service. i think we need to change that dramatically. and i think the demographics tell us in our society today

that the average young person will have four or five careers. the intelligence community has to be able to adapt and adjust to that and bring that talent back in at various stages as he or she has gone off to do something different and bring that back into the community by way of experience. and not brand them as somehow with a little d, disloyal in terms of their commitment to the intelligence work. and we need to tap that. inside d.i.a. that is one of my initiatives to design a process in which the individual keeps an active clearance while they're gone and comes back two to five years later, welcomed back, comes back, there's a place for them not where they left off but perhaps an advancement. that's fine. so that's another aspect john to your question in terms of

not only your recruitingen of it and the need to protect the people. we have to design through creative ways how not only do we retain individuals but offer these other opportunities. >> david said it perfectly. i would only add one thought. i'm a big fan of increasing the diversity within the intelligence community not as a feel good idea, it is that of course. but because it's a business imperative. one of the things you have to do in intelligence is have people who have different perspectives because you're examining question force which the answers are usually elusive. so you want a lot of different perspectives brought to bear on it. also, you know, we need to blend in, in parts of the world. so our new recruits, some of them i hope look like me but most of them shouldn't. and most of them don't these days. >> and most of them don't. >> in many ways. >> i blend in in ireland.

>> it doesn't help you. so but that's -- so ethnically and linguistically it's important to have that diversity. people who speak many languages and who blend in in the world and who come from different environments and therefore bring different perspectives formed in a different way to problems that are hard to answer. >> do we have a question on this side of the room? >> could you identify yourself please. >> kristin. limited to humiditien. i'm hoping you mite comment on the priority you lend to determining and balancing you mentioned the need to know versus the responsibility to protect. with regard to meaningful deliberate targeted burden sharing with foreign partners. thank you. >> with foreign partners. >> so the question is how to balance our collection of

hument and -- ok. [inaudible] >> well, i would just say first you have to have foreign partners. there are many people who will argue that, well, why doesn't the american intelligence community doesn't do it itself. you need foreign partners because there are parts of the world where you need to be able to pick up the phone and say to a foreign intelligence service i need you to go to a certain place in your country, if you would, please, and look for someone. i will give you the photograph of the person we're looking for. or look for a transaction that we're trying to track and so forth. and they can do that where as we would be noticed doing it. so you need them. that's just one example. but you need them. and david will want to comment

on this i'm sure because he had a career, part of his career in this classic espionage base essentially. but it seems to me one of the things you have to do is build trust with foreign intelligence services. and you do that by doing joint operations with them. now, just reading the papers you know we have some problems with some foreign intelligence services now. but you've read about all the tensions with pakistan, for example. but nonetheless, i would bet if i recall still in the community i would discover that we still have people within the pakistani service that we can trust because you build trust with a certain number of people in these services that with whom you do joint operations. and once you've kind of put your hand in the fire together of something of great consequence and you both performed well, it's like everything else in life, you test people in your

partnerships, and you find out who you can trust and then you work closely with those people. and it's not neat and tidy but -- and it's -- it requires again referring to something dade said about human intelligence it requires an awful lot of exquisite judgment about people. but it must be done. and i think it's done pretty darned well right now. >> three comments to your question. the first is given the transnational aspects of our adversaries in the topics that being counter terrorism as we've discussed, we haven't mentioned wmd, weapons of mass destruction, as an issue. the whole cyber arena. tells me that our dependencies and codependencies on partnerships with allies is critical. my second comment is i don't

think we ought to be constrained by how we define those relationships. some will be transactional. and the relationship will be because that service, that other country provides a comparative advantage against the issue that we're looking at. others, and it's well known our relationship with our british colleagues, our canadian colleagues, australians, new zealanders, is one where it's a much more comprehensive relationship. my third comment is i am concerned about each of these countries to one degree or another but certainly led by the u.k. that is undergoing fiscal constraints itself. and the burden sharing portion. that is of no desire of those services. so this doesn't reflect -- i'm talking about the country itself and the impact that that will have. and so we're working very

closely with all our allies and friends and part ners against the austerity aspects of this as well as we look at a world in a post arab spring environment where you look at a surge that begins in earnest at the early part of this year that will probably in steady state will be far closer to the surge numbers than where we were in december or in mid january of 2011. and then how do you work with your partners on those kind of issues as well? and that would be on the collection side as well as analysis. >> thank you. do we have another question from the audience? right here.

>> good morning. i'm jeff from northrup grummond. i have a question for dade. if we look through the next three to five years and a lot of the changes that we anticipate in intelligence and defense, as a contractor do you have any specific comments on how you might utilize the contractors' capabilities and workforce differently? and if so, what types of changes can we expect? and what could we get better at to support your mission? >> it's a great question, joe. one big word. innovation. speaking for d.i.a. but i know from my colleagues across the community this is a critical area. somewhere in the 1984 to 1986 period, the private sector -- and i will throw in the international private sector, overtook government in the r. and d. area and it is nearly a

vertical curve today and we've mentioned in terms of technology. and our ability to quote/unquote catch up with that is zero and we shouldn't even attempt it. that's not what government ought to be doing. but rather, it needs to be tapping into the capabilities of the private sector through the contractor community to bring innovation into government. and adapt that innovation to the requirements. so that i would put that, if not at the top of my list in terms of the contractor community, i would put it very close to it. the second view of the future that i have is we need to continue to identify with our overserious in congress, obviously rightly important to us, where it makes more sense to continue to rely on the

contractors. i think there is a big hand out there that just says contractors emerged after the 9/11 events and they haven't gone home and now we're absolutely reliant on them. the answer is yes. and for some very good reasons. if i look at it, for example, for us to recreate that internally with the fast-changing pace that john described of every 17 months in terms of computing power and that, is -- it makes no sense. but then we have to articulate exactly how we're going to use contractors for the needs and services of the next several years in a context of where there is at times a presumption that we're too contractor dependent. so i would put that in.

some of that overlaps with what i said innovation, but some of it is goods and service that is are better provided by the contractor community. and i'm absolutely fine with that. it's my job andnd the job of the leadership of the i.c. and director clapper to articulate back to our congressional overseors as to where those areas are. . .

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp 2011] >> i didn't want to pass on the opportunity to take advantage of what you guys know. >> well, i guess they get too much. here's what i would say --

>> well, i don't know that that proves anything. >> one thing you can be certain of, and that is that counterintelligence and spying have been with us since biblical time. people are always trying to gain the secret information that we have. the people change from decade to decade and errand to errand. so there is a huge effort within the intelligence community and specialists who spend their time working on counterintelligence. that is, trying to detect, and often successfully detecting penetrations of our systems. now, this is changing for all the technological reasons that i talked about earlier. it used to be that it was spy upon spy. if you went back to 1960, 1970, 1980, the stories you remember

is about americans being p.n.g. for spying. that is, persona no one gr -- non grata for spying. you have with it now the whole issue of cyber-security. that is the capacity of getting our information more by a keystroke than by a human agent. so the whole field of intelligence has become more difficult and complex. about all i can tell you, without going into the inards of that business is that there is a constant ongoing effort at very senior levels supported by substantial staff in places like, particularly, the f.b.i. and the c.i.a. and parts of u.s. military to detect unwarranted

pen -- penetrations of our systems by human agents or by cyber. i would just say it is getting harder. this is also just facilitated by the openness about our secrets that i think david and i both lamented. you don't have to work as hard to learn things about us as we have to work to learn things about some of our adversaries. >> let me follow up on that by asking you both to talk maybe a little more about cyber-security. we didn't bring it up as a topic specifically, but there is huge concern there are penetrations of the military of the defense department every day. hundreds and hundreds of defense contractors. what is the role of intelligence. a lot of people are working on

this problem. what is the key role of intelligence in combating this problem? is it identifying? is it trying to identify who the cyber-attackers are? is that the main role, or is there some other role? >> i can do it if you want. >> i can start it and pick up from there. i believe a significant step was taken in the creation of the sub unified command under general keith alexander at n.s.a. in giving him the duel hat for looking at cyber-security as a mission set under strategic command. the reap i believe that -- the reason i believe that is so significant is our ability to defend is directly proportionate to the ability to detect what the adversary is doing in cyberspace. by building then the

partnership, the national security/cyber-command with the department of homeland security for that which is cyber inside the united states, i think we have a roadmap -- far from having arrived at our destination -- but a roadmap of how to share the information of what our adversaries are doing to us and then protecting inside the homeland through the d.h.s. avenue. but intelligence is at the core of understanding what our adversary is doing in cyberspace because our ability to detect in that arena is predicated on our ability to see and do peer review, shall we say, with what the adversary is doing. i just came back from the aspen

security fore-- forum, and everyone is talking about it these days. it is a complicated field. we haven't had a cyber-pearl harbor yet. we all imagine what it might look like. all our a.t.m.'s being taken down or an attack on our electrical grid. we haven't had that yet. just as 9/11 cystalized terrorism -- crystalized terrorism for people, there have not been incidents like that. there are been incidents in georgia and parts of the baltic states, but we haven't had that incident which throws it all into bold relief for everyone. i hope we never do. the second thing is that -- and

david, i think, was alluding to this. we have what we can do with intelligence in the government to secure military systems, systems you work on, intelligence systems. then you have the whole private sector where much of the information that adversaries want is actually in the private sector. what did we talk about earlier? technology innovations. where does that occur? mostly in the private sector. that's where a lot of our adversaries will go for that information. does the private sector want n.s.a. looking into its business? maybe, maybe not. those are still things being sorted through. >> here's what i asked in the security forum, among cyber-specialists, is this -- it is a cultural idea. as we go forward, we have a whole generation of people coming along who don't care much about privacy.

it is an interesting idea of thinking of, you know, my kids and others -- let's leave my kids out of it. this might be on television. but we have a generation of young people who are throwing a lot of stuff out there on facebook and linkedin and everything else without the kinds of concerns about privacy that my generation grew up with. so when we look ahead, it is not that we don't want to protect vital information, but the whole idea of -- basically americans like government when their security is threatened. they don't like government when their privacy is threatened or when their communications are threatened. going forward, that's an interesting thing to think about.

culturally we may be evolving into a society or a world where a lot of people don't particularly care if you are tromping about in their cyberspace. >> let me see, i should note that a government executive has just published a special issue on cyber-security, and our terrific technology web site has a lot of other information in addition to what was public -- published in print on that topic. that is nextgov.com. i think we have run out of time, but we have covered some interesting territory i think. why don't we give john and the others a round of applause. [applause]

>> today a look at aviation security and improvements since 9/11. after that, senator tom coburn on budgetary challenges in the u.s. and at 3:40, how demographics in the u.s. could affect the 2012 election. sunday on "newsmakers" education secretary arnie duncan. he talks about the state of the u.s. education and jobs. >> jobs are going to go to where the workers are.

we're competing for jobs with india, china, south korea, singapore, and i think our children are as smart and creative and as talented and entrepreneurial as anywhere in the world. i just want to give them a chance to be successful. right now, unfortunately, the brutal truth is other countries are out-educating us. countries that out-educate us today are going to out-compete us down the road. >> you can see the entire interview with education secretary arne duncan sunday at 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. eastern time on "newsmakers." >> search, watch, and share all our programs any time with c-span video library.

we are on the road bringing our resources to local communities and showing events from around the country. it is washington your way. the c-span networks created by cable, provided as a public service. >> next a discussion on aviation security. you will he will you please stand to be

recognized. we are proud to have you on our team. we now begin the important task of keeping our airport aviation safe. security is about mitigatinging risk. the question is, how do you continue to stop a threat when resources are getting scarce? discussing that now will be an all-star panel. including -- included in that panel is captain sean cassidy of alaska airlines. sean? >> good afternoon, and welcome. i'm captain sean cassidy and i'm a pilot for alaska airlines.

we're pleased and honored to be joined by the chief executives of the airport aviation administration and by airports international who will discuss current aviation security and many of its aspects to identify potential risks, risk analysis, and implementing effective risk mitigation strategies. the subject is of great interest. after 9/11 showed us, it is important to stay one step ahead of our adversaries in order to protect not only aviation but our current economy. we cannot be more pleased than under administrative leadership that is now being done. as background, i would like to offer historical perspective.

civil aviation is here to protect aircrafts, airports, and the people who occupy them. in view of the terrorist attacks perpetuated by al-qaeda on 9/11, the attack by richard reed, and the most recent attack by umar farouk on northwest airlines christmas 2003, it remains an important topic on the minds of the aviation community. let's look at the previous history. 1968 to 1969 was a peak in airplane hijackings. most hijacking demands were

political or financial in nature. subsequently our response strategy was one of accommodation more than confrontation. at strong urging in the early 19 70's the government required screening so no unlawful or dangerous weapons were carried on board our aircraft. from 1973 to 2001, the security system was predicated on acts and worked well for its purposes. that brings us to the post-9/11 era. in congressional testimony given two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the then acting f.a.a. executive administrator, mone belger said, "the nature of the threat facing america has changed. what we faced on september 11 it was a new phenomenon.

hijackers taking over flights for the sole purpose of turning them into human-guided terrorist bombs. in november 2001, congress passed the aviation security act. this act charged the agency with the responsibility for all moats modes of transportation. government's response was understandable as it attempted to counter the repeat of the 9 /lench -- 9/11 style of attack. all passengers were subject to the same airport screening techniques. a notably disabled grandparent, or a person with the highest security possible were all treated as a subject with

unknown verification. in an effort to better harness security, the u.s. proposed a more sophisticated version of the computer assisted passenger prescreening system. that program was replaced by c.a.p.s. 2 to accomplish -- to establish a travelers cred tensions. it was to be replaced by the security flight program. regarding use of intelligence, the senate select committee on intelligence offered some con includings at its may 18, 2010 report. notably, the individuals not placed on the government's terrorist screening data base or no-fly list. the state department should have, but did not revoke, a

passenger's travel visa. scently in 2010, the announcement was made that all passengers on flights are now on a government watch list under the implementation of t.s.a.'s safe flight program. in spite of seemingly equal application of fiscal screening techniques, four nationals were allowed to board aircraft while wearing clothing which made positive identification virtually impossible. in october 2010 a young man dawned a mask which made him appear to be much older. you remember the old mission impossible series will probably know what we are talking about. that demonstrated the ability to

defeat a system that didn't pay enough attention to the individual being screened. we have seen the x-ray machines replace with a more intricate screening technology. detection of equipment can identify small amounts of explosive material. a.i.t. had become prevale had b airports and ren generated much public concern due to health and privacy concerns. in addition to relying on airport technology and in airport screening, we are witnessing an improvement in passenger observation techniques .

just as it was at the forefront in the 1970's for passenger screening so it was also at the forefront for government in a collaborative way. in joon january 2010 -- in janua risk-based security which primarily seeks to identify prohibited items through reliance on technology. since that time, public awareness and support for this project has been raised globally as for an overwhelming number of people calling for a risk-based system.

t.s.a. has characterized the known crew member program as a result of alternate screening which allows us better utilization of t.s.a. resources and ascertaining, confirming, and drming valid threats to -- determining valid threats to safety. in summa aviation security screening measures implemented by many governments have seen limited success in ,ifferentiating between those who pose a legitimate threat to aviation and those who do not. with that, i believe i've offered enough food for thought on this complicated subject.

we're very pleased to have chris with us here today. that concludes my opening comments. as far as what the rules of engagement are for today, what we're going to do is i'm gagng

to start to my left. i'll give each of the panelists a chance to speak, and then we have questions we've been we rking on in collaboration wh many of our security professionals. then about the last 15 minutes or so we will have audience participation in which questions are submitted ahead of time to some of our staff members in the back, and then they will be submitted to me. i invite chris bidwell to start off. >> thank you very much, captain cassidy. i would like to take this moment to thank the airline pilots association for inviting alpha to speak at this meeting. over the yea ah i have had a chance to know the panelists. i can't list them all bec lase there are many alpha representatives, and i can say aanuha contibales to be a great

partner to airports and to t.s.a. to supportfor iou on security initiatives. i also appreciate the opportunity to speak with such a ,istinguished panel. as chris mentioned greg could not be here bec lase he had a family emergency. being an avid sports fan, i am sure he would have opened with a baseball witicism, so as a pinch hitter, i will say i will do as well as us home team, the kanss city royals. i would like to discuss the policies, procedures, programs and technologies that have shaped the enhanshansed security we have today. security happens at airports, and for that reason it is

essential for d.h.s. and t.s.a. to coordinate with airports on t.s.a. initiatives. just this morning secretary napalatano speaking on the topic of homeland security since 9/11, looking back, looking forward, commented that the arole of the private -- commented that the role of the private sector is important and security is a shared responsibility. north america security & heillation agrees. we would like other ways to work with the n.h.s. and t.s.a. to further enhance airline security. one of the piney aspects of tha that we3 e easing to touch on is by leveraging intelligence information and data. so along those lines, the timely sharing of intelligence info, cation is critical. this is evidenced by the yemen plot.

a significant amount of innoencetion is critical. through collaborative relationsh sos, potentially working in the classified setting, there is the potential for t.s.a. airports, airlines to identify strategies that enhance security while pineeping in min the need to balance that with customer service and eefficienhris. in addition, we believe that there should be an ongoing government industry initiative to review processes and procedures out there. to that end, there has been a lot of discussion over the years about an orange level review, and thys took the initiative, building upon our strategic partne ahhip with t.s.a. to l lanch what we call an in-dept security review. through that process, what we do is collaboratively work with our

members, t.s.a., and other indce atry assmomiations to tak look at security measures. all current measures, some that predated 9/11, and identify those that are out-moded, duplicative, or need to be thrown out completely. although those security measures have been completely rescinded, they were no longer necessary. this really allowed plimented resources to be redirected to bowl center other areas -- bowl center other areas -- allowed prelimina be redirected to bolster other areas. they have installed varioce a intrusion systems, closed- circuit televisions, and provided security ieyormation to employees. many of these airport security

epolancements were made withouta mandate to do so. they also improved eefficienhri to the core of the discussion today, t.s.a.'s risk-based security initiatives are in coordillytion with a key -- fro a practical perspective, risked -based security helps guide the application of screening resources. the most inencesive screening technology and procedures should be, and will be, ubbed under these programs reserved and applied to individuals, items, and car go about which the least is known. a.c.i. supports t.s.a.'s risha based security initiative

and looks forward to rolling out the non-crew program and the non-traveler program. these also ensure it is sustainable over the next 10 yea ah when passengerve olumes e expected to top one billion anbalally. every part of the aviation industry plays a critical role in contrimauting to security. aed to div. recognizes the many security initiatives advanced by aanuha and we look forward to continuing to work with our colleagues in support of their shared goal providing efficient and effective security. t.look forward to the touestions. thank you. >> thank you, chris. one note, too, while we're gagng through this panel and why you are sending in your questions,

.ou -- whilefor iou are sending your questions, jot them down, and we will get tofor iour questions. >> this is a critical issue. on september 11, 2001, the terrorists were not afacting the airlines. they were looking for the most potent way to disrupt the worldwide economy and our way of life. thys thought it out pretty welt airlines are really the physical internet, and aviation drives a we rldwide economy as well as e u.s. economy. a.f.a.'s priorities are pretty simple. we want a risk-based approach to security epolances safety and security, makes the screening process better and touicker for passengers, and also helps to facilitate the movement of goods worldwide.

that's why w. 3 partner with alpa on the known crew member project. w. 3 that program for others. we commend t.s.a. for working with us on it. it takes available information and people who are less risk or no risk, and moves them through the system which is gagng to oyst else along the way in the process. that's w, m we, too, look foupad and slayport the no traveler program, and look forward to a known careas program. i'd just like to take the opportunity before saying i'm willing to move on to questions after the others, ad mrtor pistol is leading the exactly right kind of apprvanch to scumplet it is based on solid intelligence and data sharing. it is something very much needed and can very much help the

process. thank you. >> hey, thanks for the panel. oyst for showing up. it is pinind of a unique role f me to be on a panel with captain cassiyst monitoring it. it usually might be the other way around. as we approach the 10-e aar anniversary of 9/11, as we go back a couplefor iea ah aeas, i we were all shocked a little bit, and we were fortunate, and the event that occurred on christmas day 2009 with the underwear bomber with his attack on northwest airlines 253, and then following on with what oversurred in 2 them0 with the printer cartridys attacks on the federal express u.p.s. and all careas aircraft provided a reminder that there is a determined adaptive adve ahary

that remains fmomce aed on attacking civil aviation, and that we mce at beve usilant. that we mce at continue to work together. that we must not let our gproce down. it goes without saying, and i ne on the panel that civil aviation is a critical component of the llytion's ieyraste. global economy. you know, pilots have a vested interest in security. the ultimate command of the aircraft and the responsibility ne on board. once we're airborne, problems are sealed ipti we can'tlsece at pull over to t cufrpblt -- curb. it is important working together we combat those problems on the ground before we are in the air. t.s.a. and the indce atry have brought about many improvements.

eanown crew member, crew pass, creff member self-defense, carg security. andfor iou pinnomus terrorists constanlly y changing their methodologies. a touestion for this grolay for this panel is where do they go from here? .ou pinnomus one-size-fits-all security pair time that -- paradigm that was working in the 1970's needs to be adjce ated t today. we are moving to a risha mitigation strategy in order to stay ahead. the general security culture neea c to chanys. advanced screening technologies, while important are not a pan seian th- panacea. .ou can't treat all passengers as a threat in search of harmful objects only.

we must look for evil intent. now doing so will enhance, i å7elieve, passenger priencecy, facilitate passenger flow, and å7etter focus our limited resources. pilots, flight attendants, other aviation emploe aes whose identite ae employment status, d background are known, should be accommodated in a t alshion tha is consistent. we need a more efficient

passenger screening model. all cargo airline racials that continue to be conducted, we å7elieve, under redrtoed securi requirements when compared to passenysr operations. there is a lack of parity insider requirements, background vetting of individprocels, and access to aircraft. all that contributes. we need to work on that. the ffdo program in this era of financial austerity is, i believe, an undernowerved resource. there are thousands of pilots who areve olunteering their services to the government to provide this line of defense on the flight deck. yet the program's budget, and we understand tha ev the bthis yst

not been increased in many years. we want to work harder on that. threatened airbase management. pilots and those about to take off should be notified real time of events that are going on. in some circu 2 tathe ground-toeff ir com benications will better allow 0 pilots in command to better identify their crew, their cargo, their aircraft. it will also allow them to be moreve igilant when they know there is another event taking place. seconda we are pleased that the r.t.a. heirec>>l committee 221 will so issue its final report on the value of these permanently installed stecked seconda flight deck barriers. alpa asks them to careful

me consider these. we have gone through a process. it is time we solve this issue. this should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the prther.lem. w. 3 protect those resources. our lives depend on our suversesses and our failures in this effort. heor the surys, wisilum, an partnering with us on the program. ãon te commend the a.t.a. for tg

the step with us to jointly sponsor the known crew member program. the program now is rolled out, and we are confident it will pass the test over the neck fef months and rapidly move through some 8 with70s. airports over t coming e aars. ãon te wour i also like to comm our other partners who share our vision on security. in order to achieve srtocess we encourage the t.s.a. to reach out to the indce atry subject matter experts in a truly meaningful dialogue while policies are being shaped not after the fact. i think these recent successes are a great example of that. we all have much in common on risk-based security. ãon te are te.

partners, and we'll bring .a thank yo70 >> thank you, sean, for the moderation here. and thaent d nou captain mvank the invitation to speak and for the oppor banity to speak on th panel. thank you for your leadership of a.t.a. and slayport and chris thaent d nou for becung here to i have three brief points. the tin ceats are real and evolving, the risk-based security makes sense, and action is criticasuc ãon te know al-qaeda in particu has focused on aviation gagng backd nea, continue to have interest as we've seen gagng from 9/11 using the aircre ct as a weapon to th

attempts with the shoe bomber and then with the cin cistmas d, and then the attempts involving the liquia c from the u.k. in august of 2ckd6, and then of course the cargo plot from yemen that was previously mentioned. aviation, passenger and cargo, remain a target and that's w, m the tin ceats are real and evolving. we face an enemy that is determined and is fvitce aed one design, construction, and concealment of i.e.d.'s that ãon till defeat our security apparatus. because of the glther.al slay.e chain, we know we are only as strong as our weakest link. second, risha based security makes sense. the whole approach we are taking is to try to work in partne, to hcare the most effective security in the most efficient ãon tivi. risha based security addresses that in several facets.

ystting back to the tin ceats being real, we can't try to do the same type of security h wreening for each and eve the 1.8 million passengers every ith tivi to provide effective security in the most efficient way. eryame thing on the. over 7ckd million pounds of caro in the u.s., we have to make sure we have a parse.ership to address how we can focus on the high-risk careas in a wivi that focuses on known shippers and known shipments. ãon te have great indce atry cooperation moving forward in that area. i want to applathis a a particular me along with a% i.a. in terms of risk-based measures. a frot of this has been done prior to my coming to t.s.a., but it points out the work tha/1s been done in that relevant many. a.t.i. has also been a vvital erylayporter of wha the key, from my perspective, is

that we have a number of different tools. intelligence is the most important toosuc intellusence comes from many sources. that's why those partnershsevs come back into .eivi. one-size-fits-all dimension, and that is one approach. i thient we can do bettehar that's why we're working in such close collaboration with our parse.ers thatd nou see up here. the crew member is the initial proof concept. ãon te also frook forward to expanding that in the near fronure as both technology and checkpoints allow that. but clearly, the policy is there to move forwaase with that. same thing with trusted traveler, knowe c travelerve er interesting measure in in tew wo the proofs of conduct this fall. op -- ear

me octther.er w. 3 those four pilot prodge -- projects. the other part of that is global entry. they are very supportive of what cce atoms has already existing, and there is an additional entry point for additional screening å7ecaese w. 3 intelligence screening on the ve eont enw, ãon thich brings me to the thia point, partnership is critical not what w. 3 ãon tith a , a.t.i., and i.s.a. but also with the traveling c. i thient it was president lincn who said the best defense of ith temvitraen is electorate. clearly when it comes to passenger securitaddr an il traveling public is one of our most effective fools in ter3 of å7ecung aware of surroundings, e something, say something. being prepared to go tin cough

checkpoint so we can focus on those that we know the least aboron. the j inp seat program is something captain lucas and i dih wce ased awhoer he took od early this year is another recognition of pilots becung th most te. so if we can't trust pilots, then who can we trce at. clear me the jump seat program are aimed at facilitating plot -- pilots in that regaase. we are doing screening of children 12 and under that we are working tin cough, did options there, recognizing that in theve ery great frik grihood that a child is not being used

as a terrorist, but unfortunat gry we are aware of adults using children in that regard elseffhere. of cou, world war ii veterans, if they are on a charter, we do risk-based security with them due to the intelligence-based approach. the bottom line is there are no 100% guarantees in this å7ce ainess. to conwiththis from my last job, almost 27 ncoars at the f.b.im m there is ughying in the f.b.i. head quarters of pennsylvania avewne that i'll parotein cas the most effective tool in the paght agais. cooperation with the american people. i would sivi as we frook at the h artuiverugh update that it would be the most ed orlainst terrorism is the cooperation of freedom-loving peng,le worvowide. thank you. [applause]

>> wonderful intromed ctory comments. a perfect seguay for the rest of our panel todivi. i couvo kot thient of a better way to launch the rest of the forum today. there is no pesk keed for one or all or any to -- there is no speci pac keed for one or all o any to as. we all have a stake in the same sium atio, tin tese peo.ee on pquium with me. since northwest airlines 253 it has become clear there is a glther.al trend for a more risk-based approach to airport passenger screening. i would like to start by asking each of you aboron the ei.,, an threat to aviation security and how we best manage that ever-changing tin cead threat a what is needed from your perspectives. yo whwant to fread od

>josure. from a.c.i.'s perspective we thient that freverorling a ter intellusence information and data to really focus the application of screening resources on the individuals and items in cargo is the rusht oteprugch. that's the approach being taken on the administratorqui âeeade, riright now and w. 3 fully supportive. >> i want to take a pass becaese feap and what chris just said pretty much covers it. ãon te need to contiwne what w.3 doing now. >> i like that. in s the only thing i wouvo ai sea, is the solution is what we're doing here today. wecarer all working together, partnering, sharing information and having a system set u rithat whene'ou see something that's not quite right, you have a way

of comty anicating that, and th information is communicated throughout the system so that ww can ng.otet and make adjce atme real time if necessary. >> the ofrom y thing i wouvo aio that is the more we can know what kind of judgments we can ma[a in ter3 of what physical screening would be appropriate. a suicide bomber presents ng.ditional challeneos, bron that's why i say intelligence is the m, t roaportant tool that hcar intelligence, for example, the yemen cargo plot we d.i kot, about that physical screening and did kot detect tin tese. thatqui w i w it is critical. some of the best intelligence comes from indce atry. ãke> frooking aheng., what obsts

and issues could arrive as we t stop the risk? >> that is the day-to-day challenge i deal with to make sure the intelligence is flowing freely. i start od around the world. that being said, we have to make rspure our internatioate.l part are informed and also able to take steersp that kot ofrom y d but deter tin tese punitive terrorists. so thaetes the challeneo, is ther.taining acum al intelligen that is timely, it is credible, and it gives us a basis for doing something.

most oftentimes it is through most oftentimes it is through inmed st take place. for example, with fedex and u.p.s. in s i wouvo aion, with the pi in perspective, the sharing of intellusence and the briefs prior to flights are what you need in order to cohtat and ne stallu vigilant. individual lance is [ay. the underwear bombehat i mean, who would have thought there wouvo be an underwear bombehar that sin teuld have been a shoc and a wake-up call to what end they will go to. å7ottom frine, multiple events, sharing of information, real >roae updates will com and p. you know, the problem that we have by something kot hotepenin

every divi in order for the pilots to remain vigilant. ãkejoi wouvo aion, that i think c acceptance in that the public needs to be aware and emed cated aboron the tin ceats that the public knows what needs to be done on a divi >o-day basis to ma[a things happen. more precisely, to make sure things don'tligeotepen. ãke> with rek yase to the challs that lie ahead, i think that in the face of pressure to nee 1ex, which we know there is no true 100% --e'ou, ay frlotes, the decision

to come here, get in the cab, walk acr, s the streep. whatever, we need to, in the face of that pressur to maintain that d% yicate balance between the appropriate level of security and the ef pa anen anes that is inherent and essential to the aviation rspllutem. and and ck to a comment that captain moak made, the way to eot there is thro w h these paruierships and working together. in s i thiua what we'll do is weawl, just to keep the flow going. the int% ylieothe done a key role in risk-based security. ãon te thiua they have done a g job of including the intelligence in the fraw enforc6 c13 pent comty anity in the risk-based process. so i'm kind of curioce a whate' think a feron this and what additional next steps are necepthrary for this ce ila feration.

>> clearly we have come a long way with intellusence sharing and freverorling boots on the ground. there is really a tnh-wivi infohaeation flow. t.s.a. provides intelligence information to airports and aialaort laa senfoe ah6 c13 pent officers and that information is used at aialaorts. ort officers collect information a feron events, site dtions, an pre nide it to t.s.a. that can be incredibly useful a in the site dtion udine ipor. >> airplanes airlines are currently providing clapthr andied t on emerging and existing threats. we think the paruierwe is good ãon tith our cleave tement paru we would like to see it expanded rspo that there is mors wh i thiua cotetain moak said this on more of an operational

pe, f bron overall we think the intelligence sharing is going very well. in s on anceeal-time event tha going well we want to continue to do the things to this point and we want to enhance that as we go forward with all the a6 c3 we go forward with all the a6 c3 crews that are a6 c13 event, going through flight .eanning, bron more constant coordiate.tion. >> i would add two points. t is the win telenceisk- and sed security initiative that we are working with our partners are designed to focce a on tin tese unknowns, recognizing that the more we knowou the better idinormed jrekgments we can mak the second thing is right now, there are pro 20 to 22.

i met with them for a brief time to outline the risk-based security initiatlots wh ãon te can be informed by airli we can be informed what the u.s. ge nernment is ce ilecting internationally as to what tactics terrorists are using. in s ped blic perception is ke. it is important to know how we oaet that from the traveling public as these processes change. the ko travel pr parram sin teu is% yp obtain public buy-in whafment will it provide for the traveling ped blic from the tn . perspective? >> from the t.s.a.'s perc kective, it alle more screening on the front end before someone gets to the checkpoint. the idea is people voluntarily

share idinormation with us, ãon thether that is through flo entry, nexus entry, or through the prote owe types, the proof -- the prototypes, the proof of contest, there is anceisk of daa there if they are willing to share, we can make those idinormed providgments. n the thaetes the first part o to allow us to spend time on tin tese that we, about than the name, date of birth on the flight. i thiua thaetes the, iawl just leave it at that. >> for the cce atomehat i thiu ãon till be an improved experie in getting through the airport. i thiua that will ition isrove customers' moods. i think it will be a better all a where do the major threats lie?