world listed in a variety of initiatives across there and they have it all very colored nicely within the lines so as to come up with how it would be spent across the deal. that's the front end of it. can you tell us afterwards if that is what happened and they dropped their head and said we really can't do that, so my sion is one of the benefits of the system per say is not only on the front and we plan to spend in a variety of areas but after that is done we know that is actually what happened. so getting your commitment is appreciated. >> as a program manager twice, i can attest even at the program manager level it's a challenge to watch execuon and a lot of it is because we simply don't have the tools in order to watch how the money is actually being spent after it's been program, so that's another object if here and that's why i very much support.

>> thank you mrs. schakowsky? >> i want to thank both of the chairman and the ranking member for this open hearing. i think that we can see all pretty how useful these open hearings are particularly this 1i think it's good for our security nd our democracy. i want to associate myself also with the chairman feinstein's comments and concerns that you raised about contractors, and at this moment i want to congratulate president obama for his leadership and the intelligence community for its careful work and our navy seals fortheir goods and making sure that osama bin laden will never threaten our country aain. here is the nature of my question. the president's new counterterrorism strategy stresses adherence to the u.s. core values such as respecting human rights balancing, security and transparency in upholding

the rule of law. i'm going to ask a series of questions and hope to do that quickly so you can answer them. in view of the u.s. engagement in enhanced interrogation techniques, electronic surveillance of u.s. persons and similar practices did the u.s. violate its core values in the aftermath of 9/11? the "los angeles times" recently published an article entitled the key september 11th legacy, more domestic surveillance, the article reportsconcerns by both public and private sector of servers that the approach of using electronic surveillance in the u.s. to find patterns that lead to evidence of terrorism is the opposite of the legal tradition to start with the suspect before conducting such surveillance. do you agree that one of legacy of 9/11 as the increase of the domestic surveillance and ten years later do you believe that this level of surveillance in the u.s. is just a fight? the media recently reported that

the cia and new york police department have worked closely together, so closely together in monitoring muslim american neighborhoods for terrorism activities a blur the line the to domestic and foreign spying without commenting specifically on the new york situation do you believe the domestic activity by the federal intelligence agencies particularly the cia has crossed the line and finally do you believe that the intelligence communty relies too heavily on the counterterrorism cooperation of foreign ations that violates american values and principles? thank you if director petraeus will have a comment as well. i apprecie your perspective. i guess i wouldn't characterize it quite as you have that this is an egregious violation of american values it would seem some of things that are done in

the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and i think that in itself is a very imptant fact to remember what was the atmosphere and the conditions then that led to certain of these actions? i do not believe that there is, quote, too much domestic surveillance. you have to remember that the lion's share of the world's internet is carried through transmitted through this country we go to extraordinary lengths whether it is the patrio actr whatever to oversee to ensure there are not violations of american civil liberties for privacy i care deeply about the values and these privacies and my own celebrities something i take very seriously.

as far i asked general petraeus to speak to this, the cia involvement in the new york city police department there has been held given their and there has been an embedded analyst, not everyone from the cia who was out on the streets collecting and it's my personal view that's not a good optic to have the cia involved in any city level police department but the cia is going to address th. the acting director before director petraeus arrived ask for the ig investigation to look into the specifically the propriety of that. >> first all if i could start with the contraors because we are working very hard in fact to look at that as indeed one of the areas we are going to achievethe contractors sit alongside of our officers and

that they are not just as we say blue badgers represented by the gold stars on the wall on the entry to the cia headquarters but also contractors who have given as abraham lincoln in the last measure for the country. you will recall congresswoman because we've had discussions about this before that in fact i published a memo titled liing our values as the commander in iraq i have done subsequent actions elsewhere the same year we published the counterinsurgency field manual less known was that we also oversaw the development and publication of the army field manual that lays out what is acceptable and interrogation techniques no one hs overseen detainees at least in recent decades that i have commandin both in afghanistan and iraq and

in central command. we believe in that field manual. we believe that it is appropriate and that it is in line with the geneva convention and also the techniques that work. my thought on that. i would second, however with the dni set the context in the mediate wake of my 11th for what it's worth my sense is that it's now time to take the rear view mirror of the bus to look forward to practice what we have learned works and what we believe is right and move on in this regard. with respect to the cia support for the nypd indeed there is an adviser who is and tries to ensure that there is a sharing of information as that is the central and advisable noting

that we are very sensitive to the civil liberties and privacy and indeed that there is an ig investigation that is requested by the acting director and for the position of the director but will continue to follow on just to ensure that we are doing the right thing if you well in that particular case. >> thank you, madam chairman. we tend to focus oftentimes on iraq, afghanistan and where we spent the last ten years trip to petraeus and clapper however it seems oftentimes in the media we fail to pay attention to the problems that are very close to home. be it from california we are facing ever-growing challenges with the violence at the border especially with criminal gang activity.

you only been on the job of weeks i will hold you accountable for this but i would like to get both of your thoughts as to the ever calating violence that w are watching across strictly across the border from last if there's anything this committee should be doing to ensure our borders are safe and that nothing bad happens, which i think the more unrest there is at the border the more likely to miss shift can occur by not just the mexican drug cartels but possibly would invite folks from other parts of the world to participate in the mistress and i would liketo get your thoughts on that. >> first, you alluded to -- let me start here but you a limited to something that is a great and a growing concern to all of us the intelligence community and particularly in the ct domain if you will, which is of

the homegrown variety of the extremists fed by and moivated by engaging on line with al qae and other extremist forms. the reason that is such a critical challenge for us is the home grown very often doesn't use signures if you will, beatles signatures that are detectable like the classical intelligence means that also i think and endorsement of the need for the involvement for the state and local officials notably state and local police officials i have one of my few remaining advisory groups as a homeland defense and law enforcement group which consists of a number of a very

distinguished law enforcement officials from allver the country, and i wll be in chicago next month to speak to part of these international associations of the chiefs of police for the 15 major metropolitan areas, and it is in my second year as an initiative i need to push harder which is an outreach to the state and local. the other issue that you raise which is of great concern is what we are doing with mexico as partners there are a number of intelligence initiatives working with the mexican government which would probably be best discussed in the closed session. but believe me, we are as concerned as they are about the effect on the national security of both of he country's. >> director petraeus? >> if i could augment that a bit. really what your question speaks to, congressman, i the issue again of the gbal coverage.

again, rightly we should be absolutely riveted on the counter terrorist mission. we must continue to prosecute that very aggressively. it's the most immediate threat if you will but whe we are doing that we can't be like little kids and a soccer game and play magnate paul with that and lose sight of the rest of the field and this is part of the rest of the field and that is thpart that is coming enormous concern and the proximity of the country and of course we are talking not just about mexico with other countries in central and south america where some of this emanates from the first place. theris a good whole of government approach in this regard not just the intelligence community but in deed other elements of the interagency and certainlythe military for the northern command and southern command recently to become reasonably familiar but this isn't an area that is going to get much more in deed over time as an overseas travel convinces

the will be high on the list of the places to visit given the serious concern that mexico has in addition to the concerns that we have. >> i just want to reflect similar comments that you've heard from other folks here on the panel but thank you both for your service to the country and congratulations, director petraeus on your role. i yield back madame chair. >> mr. schiff? >> thank you madam chair and gentlemen both for your extraordinary lifetime of service grateful to you. general petraeus, the 9/11 commission recommended that the lead responsibility for the paramilitary conducted operations whether covert or clandestine should transfer from the intelligence community to the defense department. that hasn't happened. i would be interested to know and you are in a unique position to comment on this whher you think that should happen and clearly there are some pros and

cons to that. is that something you push for in your prior occupation of our current occupation or do you think that the recommendations of the commission also sound of the time has been overtaken by events and improved coperation between the cia and the defense department from and general clapper, let me try to get this question in if we have time. the air of a spring that it has been the most significant development since the war in afghanistan. the litary efforts there and in pakistan have done more to provide a military body to the commandnd control of al qaeda than anything else, but the end of spring has been a body blow to the philosophical and all ideological underpinnings of al qaeda. how will our intelligence approach change in light of this really phenomenal opportunity to undermine the whole reason for

being for a qaeda indy 500 i'm very familiar with the issue of the title tenet title l we have the forces that carry it out in the counter terrorist operations and then also having provided title ten foes to the title 50 to the agency to conduct the title 50 operations on a number of occasions. m very clear on which is which at any given time i was very comfortable with the geographic combatant commanders the central command in addition to when i was the commander in the war in iraq and afghanistan with the respective roles of the agency and of conventional regular soft wheat and the so-called special mission units that werender my operational control in those different situations. i think it's worth noting the

special operations commander, the most recent one testified he didn't think there was a need for all of these operations to be under the military. when i've been in charge of these differen operations again in iraq and afghanistan and more broadly in central command there's more than enough work to go around and e have a very good cooperation and coordinati and that has improved substantially on their way that the courses with this i think but there have been others as well model of which have been publicized which is appropriate given the title 50 operations that are covert. so again, i really quite comfortable with of the way that this has evolved since the recommendations were made to assure that level and i can assure you with secretary leon panetta and admiral craven with

of the new jsoc commander and where i am with other commissions to the to positions this is going to be very much a team effort and the coordination of cooperation has been the essential to some of the past successes and would be augmented and improved in the months and years ahead. >> i would simply add to that that i think that there is a great strength in having both capability resident in both places simply to give the president the commander chief as many in his quiver as possible with the arnove spurring we have done a lot of introspection on that. i have some pretty direct guidance from the president on that as a matter of fact, and i think that what it has shown as you mentioned it has served a messy as it is marginalized the al qaeda missiles come al qaeda

is in the position of trying to catch the train after it's already left the station was up in the nineveh spring isn't consistent with al qaeda as has been advocated how will it change us? i think what it is reinforced something we knew it is the importance of being attention to the social media and what a barometer that an be for the sentiment for the people in the street it is not the panacea but yet is another and the intelligence arsenal to understand what's going on but will not enable us to predict future events. there is a certain amount of i like to point out at least i think it's a good thing to remember the distinction between the mysteries of secrets and they're kind of noble and

mysteries are not and too often people will hold us in the intelligence community to the same standard for the defining both and we cannot. > mr. lobiondo? >> mr. thompson? >> thank you madame share and general. >> excuse me, i made a mistake. senator udall next. >> madame chair, i am happy to yield to the congressman lobiondo if my time remains intact. >> for mr. thompson out of deference tomy former colleagues. if i could follow up, congressman. >> you have been gracious. cynics before senator udall. general, thank you both for being here today and for your service to our country. i'd like to know, general

clapper, how we are doing in regard to the guidelines that you have set forth in regard to the gao of the government accountability office working with the intelligence community when that's appropriate. as you know, when this committee and congress has taken a very keen interest in mang sure that we have this corporation, you had some experience with this in regard to the reform efforts on the security clearance issue i'd like to know how we are doing in that regard what sort of progress we are making and since you issue the guidelines were we stand. >> we do have some intense but i think professional discussions with the general accounting office and i think that we did a ride out what i believe is a

good compromise document which is fairly general as those things tend to be what at least in my mind is let's try this out and develop a body of law and see if we have issues we can't work out. and to this point, we have not had any issues. i had a lot of experience with the general accounting office, the investigations and studies in the previous incarnations. most notably, as you elude it to in the clearance reform and where i believe the gao performed a very useful service by keeping after lst and keeping us honest sustaining the amendment and the pressure to bring about clarence reform which is still ongoing. there is a case we have made huge head ways and progrs but ere's more to be done. so in answer to your question, i

would -- since the directive is only about two months old, i would suggest we watch how this unfolds and see what comes up in the way of the studies and investigations the gao wants to do, and i've pledged to them privately and i will publicly that we will cooperate to the maxum extent possible. >> thank you. director petraeus and colleagues that outlined them and i think that you did also. we have tremendous tactical intelligence success in this fight against terrorism. i am interested in the strategic intelligence successes and whether or not we are devoting enough resources and we have the information that we need to strategically go after to this issue, and do we know -- and we

have the resources and diverting the resources necessary for the motivations and the goals of the folks who are trying to do less harm and if not what do we need to be doing differently and how do we need to redistribute those resources in order to get to that? i think that's a very important part of the overall fight against terrorism. .. why as someone willing to blow themselves up for an extremist

cause? there is an attraction among some elements of the global society to what osama bin laden was us dowsing, and that is a huge concern. -- was espousing, and that is a huge occurring. understanding what motivates individuals to do this is very important. we have put a lot of effort into that in the intelligence community. we think we have a reasonable understanding, and some of these are greater cystitis of society, a lack of education, law -- a lack of opportunity, and so on. d just in the past few days by the state department in this broader area of information that has potential, but, again, this takes -- this is not

something that can just be handled withpublic affairs efforts, but it requires in many cases real reforms within societies so that extremists are discredited. i think it's very important to note as the dni did a moment ago that the fact that the arab spring has resulted in changes to these long tenured regimes, and that it came about because of the people, because of popular movements, not because of the violence in extremism that bin laden said was necessary to change the regimes. in that sense, that narrative has been discredited, but, indeed, there are other elements of the nationtive that still -- narrative that still with some individuals they are found to ring true, and that i a big problem, and one that we have to continue, not only to study, but then to try to figure out how do you help the governments of

these countries to address the root causes of the problems. >> thank you, mr. thompson. senator udall? >> thank you, chairman. two comments, and then a couple questions i have. i've been in and out of the hearing this morning, but i want to acknowledge the tremendous work that went into assuring that the events all over the country on sund came off without a hitch, and i think that's a tribute to the intelligence communication that's been expanded since the terrible events of ten years ago. at the same time, i think we all acknowledge that we have to be right every time. our enemies only have to be right one time. secondly, general petraeus, great to see you here in your new role. you and i had conversations about enhanced integration. >> right. >> i don't want to continue that conversation today, 3wu i want to go -- but i want to go on the record i'm a strong opponent of

investigation, and i base that on constituents and others. if -- it undercuts our capacity to do so. >> let me respond then because that's pretty important they are imp kateed that i'm for i.t., and i'm not. i've been clear, again, earlier, it was on my watch that we dwoched the army field manual based under executive order governs how interrogations are conducted. i've overseen them, we adhere to the manual and before we had that as division commander, we said we'll follow the geneva convention period, and not go beyond that, beyond that, the

army manuals work. there's no implication and our values direction to the troopers as variety dimes as ale, and also, of course, the agency doesn't do interrogations at this point anyway. >> that's fair. your point is sterling in this regard, you've been a leader, and i thank you for that. >> thank you. >> let me ask a simple questions, ten years passed since the years of 9/11, do you believe al die da exists ten years from now as well as other violent groups as well. general clapper, turning to you to kick it off. >> i don't believe al-qaeda ten years from now will necessarily exist in the form today or what it was ten years ago, buthat i do see is the so-called franchises we talked about i

think will probably be a threat to us so the aqaps, aqis, am's erst, there could be other chapters of those. i think we achieved dramatic successes in taking down and damaging core al-qaeda, but the whole notion of franchises or variance thereof will be with us for some time. >> i would agree wi that. i moreover say extremist groups at large will exist, not all of them necessarily motivated by something root in misreading of the islamic faith, but perhaps some as they are now. not all is extremist groups or are islamic extremist groups. there's a variety of others if you look at the designation of the state department. there will be, unfortutely, movements out there motivated by a variety of different objectives that will carry out

extremist activities. > i think that speaks to congressman thompson's point with the strategic view as well and superempowered small groups. >> exactly. >> let me jump around with the time i have remaining. the country has the privacy and civil liberties oversight board as you two know, and i know most agencies, if not all, have their own privacy officers. can you describe the interagency process where civil liberty concerns are reviewed by the board i mentioned and brought to your attention and thathe others. general clapper, i don't know if that's more directed towards yo given general petraeus' 8th day on the job. >> and counting. >> and counting. >> i would first, closer to home, something i am very familiar with is the function of the civil liberties and privacy

officer by law is required as a part of the office of director of national intelligence. that function i have learned in my tenure as dni is extremely important, and i attempt to engage alex joel, wo's known to manyn both committees, who is a superb intelligence officer, but very, very mindful of the importae of civil liberties and privacy. i endeavor to engage him as much as i possibly can along with the general council assigned to as a part of my office in these very, very important endeavors. we have many overseers in addition in this respect. nobly the president's intelligence advisory board, oversight board, and, of course, you all here provide, i think,

very detailed and mullayered -- which is important -- oversight over the protection of civil liberties and privacy. one of the functions of this office is to do outreach wi the constituent groups, aclu and groups like that. it's very important to maintain an open and complete dialogue with such organizations. we don't always necessary all agree, but we dialogue and try to be as transz parent on these -- transparent on these things as we possibly can to anyone in a legitimate position of oversight. >> thank y for that, and i count on you to continue to be really focused in this, and i'll end with this note. franklin said famously a society exchanging essential liberties for short term security deserves neither. easy to say, challenge to

implement. this is really, really crucial, and i'm counting on you two gentlemen to help us keep faith with franklin. thank you. >> thank you. senator wyden? >> thank you, madam chair and chair rogers as well for this important session today. yes mep, i want to ask a couple questions about intelligence reform. let me start with you director petraeus because you've had a chance to look at intelligence reform both as a senior military officer and now in your current capacity as cia directer. my question, i think, to start, director petraeus, have there been instances where you have said thank god there is a director of national intelligence or thank god there's a national counterterrorism center? can you give us a couple examples since you've had both of these experiences where you looked at specific up stances and said this is a place where intell reform has made a big

difference. >> well, in fact, this past weekend, in fact, as we were working through to confirm various threat streams and as i mtioned earlier, this -- there was a credible threat, and it was an important one, not just because of 9/11, but because of all the piec that seemed to be coming together. it started with informati gathered by agency individuals, and, indeed, we've very quickly, the ctc, the counterterrorism center within the cia which also has interagency reps, but began piecing all this together and opened up very quickly the dialogue with the nctc, and that's how, indeed, you get it into the law enforcement agencies and share it throughout the rest of the interagencies. i didn't -- i can't honestly say

that i blurted out loud thank god, but i was appreciative of the role of nctc and the olson and his team and what they did in cooperation with the cictc and variety of other elements, fbi and others in seeking to get to the bottom of this to follow leads, to take various actions to alert law enforcement at the local state and national level, so i think that's a very, you know, topical example of that. beyond that, if i could go all the way back to where i was on 9/11, i happened to be in bosnia at the time. i was a one star general as the assistant cief of operations for the nato command there, but i was dual hatted as deputy commander of a special unit engaged in the war criminal hunt, and we had at that time, the largest special mission deployment in the world, and in the wake of 9/11, we started

doing counterterrorist operations. it turned out bosnia was a conduit into europe for extremists coming from pakistan, and, indeed, that there were residual elements and ngo's and others facilitating this activity. we developed very good coordination there. we literally established a joint interagency force for counterterrorism and found the information left that that entered a stove pipe. there was an fbi stove pipe, a cia stove pipe, and then dia, nga, and all of the other military intelligence agencies remitted there as well -- represented there as well. what was very good coordination at tactical level broke down as it went back to washington. since that time, i think in part, in large part because of intelligence reform, the establishment of the dni position, and, indeed, aggressive oversight by these

two committees, those stove pipes have been broken down. there are still some out there, some even within my agency itself, and we're working to do that. we talk about -- this is not just the need to share. you have to share responsibly, so that we don't have exposure of material to individuals who don't have it a need to know in that case, but it needs to be accessible to those who do have a need to know and have a deed to share and to sha responsibly. it's still not there, but it's been improved. >> those are good examples. maybe i can get you in the second question i wanted to ask. director clapper, you were very visible advocate for intelligence reform. you mentioned positive examples. maybe as i wrap up, can you give me a sense of what the big challenges are that remain to be tackled in intelligence reform, and if you and director petraeus because i think it almost picks

up where director petraeus left off. give me sense of what the big charges are in your view remains with intelligence reform. >> well, we are going to have a big challenge here in managing the cuts to intelligence funding, so how we do that and still attend to the intellignce community will be a huge challenge. my own personal agenda, if you will, now is to focus much more on the domestic realm. we've made a lot of progress in opening up the cooperation and flow of information both to state, local, tribal, and private sectors, and the other way. there needs to be more focus on that and one of the things i'm going toocus on is the intelligence enterprise as it

applies to domestic arena. they will be working closely with the deptment of homeland security, but this is an area where i need to place more emphasis. that whole realm if you will is not as mature because we have not been doing it as long. that's a profound change occurring over the last 10 years. i was around before that, and, as you well know, sure, there's a fire wall between foreign and domestic, and now we have to figure out -- we're working on ways to break that fire wa down and ensure that appropriate legitimate information is shared sensibly and responsibly with our domestic partners. >> thank you. madam chair? >> if i can pile on quickly because i think the big challenge in my view is to make the existing structure processes, organizations, and systems work and work well. work effectively, quickly, and smoothly, and that can only be done by working together.

everybody has to work as a team. we have to make way together. team work is not optional in this important area. >> thankyou. congressman roon ey? >> [inaudibl >> excuse me. congressman? >> thank you, both, director clapper and director petraeus. director petraeus on your new role in the cia. you'll do a great job, every place you've been, you flourish. we appreciate all you've done over the last decade for this country and look forward to watching you progress in the next few weeks and months. i do have a question about our foreign lang capabilities, and, you know, one of the united states greatest weaknesses is

collecting intelligence around the world beuse we have a small group of intelligence officials with enough foreign language capability and specific areas of expertise to access denied areas and blend in like locals, we just don't have enough people who have at expertise, but coness has supported programs like ncep, the boren psychological lores and -- scholars and fello, and my question is what has the intelligence community learned about penetrating terrorist groups over the past decade? have we made sufficient strides in develops foreign language capability, and have we seen any improvement in our ability to collect intelligence as a result? >> well, i think the short answer is, yes, we have. i think there have been tremendous strides made in

penetration in general. i think, though, that details on that probably best left to closed session, but there have been many successes, many new techniques that did not exist ten years ago that we have developed and refined. language will continue to be a allenge for us. the cia is -- obviously, director petraeus will want to speak to that, has been leader there. director panetta set a pretty high barfor language training and the requirements for progression within the agency. across the board, and this applies as well to the military. it has been a challenge developing native lev fluenty

among americans wth these exotic langs we find in the middle east that we must find proefficiency in. it was easier for us to raise and have a kodre of linguists in russian and east european languages which comes to our people much more naturally than do the middle east languages. this is going to be a challenge. it's something we're working at, and we'll continue to do so, but we're probably not where we want to be. >> director petraeus? well, foreign language capabilities are critical. they are the point of the realm for some of our operators and officers in the field needless to say. director panetta established ambitious goals by 2015. the agcy is generally on project ri to achieve those with

recruiting ando forth. we do need to do more. i'll provide for the record what the goals are and how we're doing in terms of meeting them and what kind of slope we're on. there's improvement, but, again, we need to do more. diversity in the work force in terms of recruits a absolutely essential. we are working to hav ople who can, again, operate in countries, cultures, languages that are very different from our own and to do so successfully, and so that's another important component of this. as the dni mentioned, there have been important improvements in terms of penetration of various groups, and, again, happy to provide that in a closed session as well. >> okay. thank you, both, very much. i yield back. >> thank you very much. congressmaneck? >> thank you for being here and for your service of selflessness to our nation. we heard about infmation

sharing. this morning, and area of prime concern is working as emergency planner at the state and local levelnd working the joint interagency piece. director clapper in the opinion piece, you talk about changing the ic culture of one to need to know to a responsibility to cher. wiehle theyive proved, there's the growth of fusion centers and local high profile failures including the kris mall day bombings, and it's clear the information did not get outside the cylinder of excellence. now, we're teen years post-9/11. what more is needed to achieve that seamless informaon sharing that we try to atta in the intelligence community, and in light of the persistence of difficulties in information sharing, how do you say the odni is seen as value added at not

just another layer of bureaucracy? >> well, excellent question, sir, and very relevant and pertinent, and it's the center of what i worry about in this job. i think, though, in the minds of many, there is -- it is though it was a simple formula to be applied so that on a matter of automa tisty we can collect automatically without due regard the messages. there's a -- classic balance we have to achieve with sharing on one hand -- responsible sharing, and then security on the other. i think -- and this is a case o developing kind of a body of law here and practice, and i think

we're getting better and better at it. the fusion centers, which i think are a great step forward, something that didn't exist ten ears ago, and there are now some 72 of them, and very candidly, some are much better than others. i visited some that i think are extremely capable. there is a federal an nexus to ensure that preparely designated information is shared quickly with state and local officials, and, again, as i mentioned earlier as something i want to work on the second year of my tenure is improving that domestic intelligence enterprise. i've had that request made by many state and local officials at international chiefs

association and oers that said we need this, and so i'm going to take that on, and in that see what wecan do to improve, but i don't -- on sharing, butno silver bullet. it's just something we have to work at. obviously, wikileaks exposure and revelations there, there's been a wakeup call on in the minds of many on too much sharing, too much desemination of information of people who don't need it, and so we're instituting corrections there particularly in terms of auditing and monitoring what people are downloadingand all this sort of thing, and this is 5 part of the balance effort between the two, but i assure you if this was a simple proposition of a mathematical formula, we would have applied it a long time ago, but it's much more complex than that.

>> thank you very much. >> thank you very much, first of all, i want to welcome general petraeus, now director petraeus, and thank you for your great service, and both of you i've had a chance to work with directly over the years. now, one of the -- one of the hard things in intelligence is sometimes we have the information, but we don't act upon it, or it doesn't get to the right people. this may have been asked. i apologize if it has alrey, b i'd like to go to this question. while the nctc improved counterterrorism coordination, there have been recent high profile failures. for example, various segments of the intelligence communities such as the fbi, the department of defense, people at walter reed knew about nidal malik hasan before he opened on a base in fort hood in november.

similar failures existed with the attempted attack by umar farouk abdulmutallab that would be the underwear bomber before he boarded a plane in detroit on december 25th, 2009. the information known about these individuals did not get to the right people to prevent the attacks, and how do we improve that? i mean, i know -- i don't expect us to be perfection, but if -- there's always frustrating -- like 9/11, we had information about these people being trained. it came to the fbi, the fbi did not act upon it. can you tell me what you're trying --you know, director clapper, wh you're trying to do to make sure when we have the information it gets to the counterterrorism center and somebody acting on it. >> well, sir, there's the old saw that youearn in intelligence school early on. you know, there's just two conditions in life, intelligence failure or operational policy

success. i would say that in the intelligence community like the adversaries has to be, and i believe is, a learning organization, and so in the case of the christmas bomber, for example, the intelligence committee did an outstanding piece of critique for us which, you know, lessons learned from that experience, and what we need to do to improve. one of the things that has been done to hopefully preclude a similar experience has been the availability of more information that could possibly shed light on potential terrorist travel, so travel records, immigration records, these kind of things that were not previously freely available to the nctc now are, and so we have -- thanks to

former direcr mike leiter who led enhancements, whereby the analysts can spend less time, you know, listening and lining up material and canpend more time on analysis, so we've tried to go to school on -- as we always do -- on how to improve from a potential problem, and clearly, you know, luck plays 5 part here, so we need to learn from those experiences. i can tell you we'll endeavor to continue to be a learning organization, and not only try to profit from past experience, but to use that to anticipate what are other scenarios we might have to take on. >> general petraeus? >> well, chairman, it's great to see you again. i think this comes down to integration, sharing, and comes

down to actually ensuring the information gets to the right people as best organizations k and, of course, the ctc at the central intelligence agency where you have this integration of operators and animal cysts which is hugely important, and the various fusion centers out there, the advent of increasingly larger data bases with applications also helps, but i think at the end of the day it comes down topeople, and it comes down to people like the leader of our ctc, for example, who has been at this for a number of years, the leaders on the di and then national service side in that center, for example, who have been doing this for years, one of whom has turned down three promotions over the years and was critical on piecing all the -- connecting all the dots that led to the success of the intelligence that was provided for the raid, and at the end of the day, that's

why we have to take care of the people even in con -- fiscally constrained times, continue to investment them, continue to attract the best and brightest, and provide meaningful jobs and activities for them. >> the two greatest attacks on the united states, pearl harbor and 9/11. we had information in both cases, so i think that this is an ongoing challenge is to make sure that people act upon the information. i don't mind having this exercise we went through this weekend. i think that's totally appropriate. if we have good information that's relatively good, we have to act on it, and i'd rather do that four or five times and prevent things from happening than not act when we know what the consequences can be. thank you. >> thank you. >> may i ask one more question?

>> of course, mr. chairman. >> thank you. you know, one of the major problems here has been your predecessors, mr. clapper, only served for a very short time, and finally i think you and leon panetta were able to work out a relationship. i think this is very important that the dni, the role for the dni be accepted, you know, the relationship with the white house, director petraeus, you're going to play a role in this that we've got to make this relationship work, and i think it's fundamental to the entire intelligence community, and i just urge you both to put aside petty, you know, politics or organizational competition and make this relationship work. it's very important for the country in my judgment. thank you. >> thank you. >> let me take that just very

briefly if i could, chairman dicks. >> of course. >> the bottomline is first of all, director clapper and i have known each other for years and years in a variety of positions for each of us, worked together closely, cooperatively, and smoothly. secondly, before my confirmation hearing, i went out, sat with the dni, and we talked through some of the issues that emerged as friction appointments with previous individuals in positions, and i watched this at various times, first as a central command commander at principles committee meetings and so forth, and then, of course, from afar in afghanistan, and we talked through those, and i like this think on both sides there's pragmatic approaches to this. as i mentioned in responseo an earlier question here today, i think the time has come now, the focus should be on making what intelligence reform has brought about in terms of organizations, processes, and various elements work, and the only way to do

that, again is to work together and for everyone to cooperate in this very important endeavor in which we're engaged. >> thank you very much, mr. dicks. on that note, i'd like to thank our two witnesses. i think it's been an excellent hearing. i'd like to thank the members and turn it back to the chairman. >> thank you very much, senator feinstein. thanks to everyone in the senate and house, vice chairs on both sides, i think it's important that we do this occasionally again to let the public understand what is a difficult and -- because of its classifications, so thank you for taking the time to have that public dialogue, and we appreciate it, and we also look forward to a robust dialogue in closed session, and, again, to both of you, thank you, ad thank you for yur service, and with that, the committee -- the committee is now

adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> fbi agents last week searched the headquarters of the solar manufacturing company, solyndra, after it filed for bankruptcy. a hearing will be held on may energy department one made to the company, part of the 2009 stimulus package. live coverage of 9:30 a.m. eastern on c-span3. later in the day on c-span3 a hearing on refinancing or restructuring mortgage loans in trouble. david stevens is among those testifying. live coverage starts at 2:00 p.m. eastern from the senate

banking subcommittee on housing. >> follow what members of the arecit reduction committee saying on twitter. from our twitter page, click on the lists tab under our profile and selected the list you want to see. get the latest week from committee members. c-span on twitter -- follow us. >> "washington journal" is coming up next. we will take your phone calls, e-mails, and tweets. the houses in at 10:00 a.m., with legislative miss this at noon eastern. they are working on a resolution of disapproval on the debt ceiling legislation. you can see live coverage on c- span. on c-span. coming up this hour, we will talk with maryland congressman