he supported the lra and its to ethiopia -- [inaudible] formation. that isn't -- that is when al qaeda was in sudan. >> i came in after the election to. >> did it happen right before all of them together, is there any evidence that the bashir you became ambassador? did the winners of that election government is supporting the lra then take over the government? or did they arrest those who won today? >> we have not seen any the election? intelligence are evidence since >> the answer to your question the middle 2000's or beyond. we have had very close -- discussions with the sudanese >> there wrested those. >> the issue was city hall did government on these issues. we have not seen that support. >> what about the lra's not take their seats. in the context that there were activities in the southern arrested -- sudan? >> the answer to that question are they there as this new is that they arrested those who country is trying to put lost -- who won the election. together its government? those who lost the election stayed in power and those who won the election were tossed are they there and any large into jail. opec decided there were several

numbers, and what have they been cases in ethiopia that where able to do and will they be a part of the training? >> the lra has operated in american citizens own property, southern sudan. the ethiopian government run by those who did not win the election but imprisoned those part of the displaced people are who did, that the ethiopian in southern sudan there are government had expropriated property of americans and was illegally using it -- not probably 250 core fighters in the lra, plus a company people, getting it back to them. opec still has that standard, still has that finding. do you agree with that? all in that area. >> what about a special advisor >> the carter center declared the election winners, the to the great lakes region that has been suggested -- you use winners. that was their position very >> the word special envoy -- but is the government declared that. >> know, the carter center. this in the making? what is the prospect of that? we abide by what the carter >> be of taken it under indictment very seriously. center and the other international observers stated. -- we have taken it under as far as opaque, the person you advisement very seriously based on the recommendation of your are referring to was

committee. >> the fact that we know that investigated -- >> i am not talking about a there is an expense of mobile person. i am talking about the general phones and fm radio, will you be theory that americans have using that technology to try to property claims not adjudicated get word out to ask for by the ethiopian government. defection from the lra fighters? >> we have tried to help >> that is correct, sir. adjudicate with the government -- there are cell towers and the >> we have, that is correct. use of cellphones and right now that is why opec declared that they are using other radio ethiopia was no longer eligible waves. for opec loan guarantees. many communities are calling in they have not yet changed that policy, correct? on a regular basis to say where the lra is. so we need better coordination. >> thank you. yes, and the restrictions were >> mr. duncan of south carolina based on the fact that american is recognized. citizens still have a property >> thank you madam chairman. claims not being met. back in the spring of march or back to ethiopia and eritrea. april, the deputy assistant there was an agreement to abide by an arbitration. security advisor was talking in the end, it is my about a libyan involvement. he said this. understanding that the corporate "we are enforcing a resolution burris decided for a major part that has a very clear set of of that in eritrea's favor. goals which is protecting the if we permitted the government libyan people, averting a

of ethiopia to renege on the humanitarian crisis, and setting agreement to follow the up a no-fly zone. arbiters. >> in 2003, we announced -- we that involves kinetic military action on the front end, but the nature of our commitment is that we are not in an open-ended land helped -- we held both parties accountable to the result. invasion in libya." >> mr. rivera's time has according to global expired. i want to thank our witnesses intelligence, we have helped finance regional military for appearing before us. efforts to capture lra commanders where we have spent we look forward to your written answers. i remind the committee members $497 million strengthening the ugandan army. that if you could join me to say hello to ellen, it is a true presently the lra is estimated to have somewhere between 204 delight and an honor to have you hundred fighters, which lacks with us. and the committee is now the numbers or the weapons from adjourned. what i understand for [captioning performed by national captioning institute] sophisticated insurgency. as we delve into this, i have [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] asked you all today, before deciding to deploy of possibly 100 u.s. military personnel, is the amount -- did the administration received a

request to provide this assistance? >> if this has been a continuing effort, as you just said. we have been working in partnership with the regional states and they have welcomed the assistance to date. they have been indicating that additional support would be needed. we have looked at the experience from 2008 when we did provide advisers to uganda at their >> spend this week in in knoxville, tenn. with book tv in request. american history tv. >> did they specifically asked for american personnel? look behind the scenes at the >> as we have a judge, they lack history and literary life of the marble city. on book tv on c-span2, the is critical capability of using university of tennessee's body intelligence with the operational work. farm, four acres of decomposing human remains. but they have made significant progress in degrading the lra. also, all looked at alex haley but they are still out there and his life in moscow. committing the atrocities. they have indicated they would how haley fell in love with the welcome his hands on training. city during a 1982 visit. >> what we are doing this all american history tv on c- training, mainly.

no predator drones, no -- could span3, of visit to the sequoia birthplace museum. you define kinetic military action? what does that mean? hollen indian silversmith successfully created a system of >> i understand the term to writing for the cherokee language. mean actual legal force. also, of is that the secret city, oak ridge laboratory, on >> will we use kinetic military the development of the atomic action in libya, legal force? bomb. >> at the front end of the is not solid truce southern operation, we used considerable city? the history and its future. conn forced to take out the air defenses of libya as part of today and at 6:00 p.m. eastern, the first two weeks of the operation. watch throughout the weekend on book tv and american history tv then most of the kinetic in knoxville, tennessee. activity was carried out by our partners in nato allies with the >> coming up on "washington journal," we take your questions and comments. after that, at edward the marco lions and share of the air strikes. -- edward demarco. we did when necessary support the air strikes and get on then a focus on key presidential occasion used on predators for specific targets that no other allies had the capability to hit. >> in this action in uganda, did contenders. this week, the life of thomas e. dewey.

we draw on tangible support from other countries like the uk or >> this morning a discussion on the 2012 presidential campaign france, or are we there alone? and occupy wall street >> and i'll defer to my colleagues who may know more. >> we had careful coordination with our french and u.k. and ugandan allies. but we're providing the bulk of assistance as far list of military training, and the other nations are doing humanitarian assistance and reconciliation. >> ok. how long do we anticipate u.s. forces being there? some sort of timetable at all? >> we do not have a specific timetable. we are talking months, but i would not put a number on it at this point. we will review the operation and a few months to see whether it is achieving the desired effect to enhance qualitative changes

in the nature of the training we are providing, to say whether it is happening on the ground in terms of further eroding the lra. >> what do you defined as excess? >> first and foremost on the basis of whether kony and other commanders are captured, further fracturing of the lra, whether we see a tangible improvement in our partners capacity is out in the field to succeed. that includes not just to connect ridge and the kinetic parts of it but engaging with the local population to develop the climate in which people report on and turn and lra sympathizers. in when we put americans in harm's way like this, we need be -- we need to be very clear what we do and be very clear when the president comes to congress with the war powers resolution.

i yield back. >> mr. carnahan is recognized. >> thank you, madam chair, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. i want to start with really a general question about how the u.s. is working with the international and regional partners to strengthen coordination. in particular, what are the strategies and approaches but diplomatically and otherwise that the u.s. government is utilizing to ensure a more effective collaboration among key actors to counter lra efforts? let me start with the ambassador yamamato. >> we have not only been talking directly with the presidents at that level, but also within their command structures, militarily as well as diplomatically, to see how we can coordinate better on all of

our efforts, not just militarily, but comprehensively against the lra. we're talking to the african union, the regional groups, as well as to the donor communities to see how we can all bring to bear some of our own specific actions. we will do the military training program, for instance, uk and france and others are doing a mandatary and programs, the african union is doing coordination between the countries. jane ambassador vershbow. >> also add that what we're doing in this specific case is a subset of a broader efforts that we're making throughout africa to support for nationalization of military, promote capacity of the african countries to solve their own problems. part of that is to invite countries to participate in

training and exercises which hopefully inculcate a greater pattern of cooperation among them. i think this initiative in addition to hopefully achieving the specific goal of taking joseph kony off the battlefield, will also encourage greater military cooperation among the four key states involved. that would be a factor for longer-term stability in the region so that we do not have to intervene in the future. >> let me next turn to a more particular question for these operations. is this in your opinion a unique model that is being used in central africa? or is this comparable to some other operations, like in the southern philippines. chairman rohrabacher led a delegation there a few months ago where we got to see a unique

operation there, a limited number of u.s. military advising, not engaging in combat, but trying to be very focused on the terror safe-haven and training camps there. is this a unique model or drawing and other experiences that have work? and let me start with ambassador vershbow. >> congressmen, this is not unique model in the sense that training and equipping partner forces is something that we have done in many parts of the world. my experience, if you look at my biography, it is more in europe. with that training programs to train the bosnian army forces after the dayton accord, we train the georgian forces to deal with terrorist forces in the border regions with the russian federation. each mission is tailored to the

specific circumstances and the requirements of the partner involved. but this sort of advise and assist so that they can deal with the problem more effectively and professionally is a well established model that has proven its value. >> ambassador yamamato. >> in the context of looking at africa as far as a really good cooperation and coordination between the department of defense and the department of state, and how we can do training, and a wide. 160,000trained about troops for peacekeeping operations in 24 countries. we have died in senate by sen coordination in this context as well. you have the state department helping to do diplomatic corps nation, also assistance as far as money to provide logistical

support. defense is providing the actual individuals to do training. those are issues that are a model for this area, but also we are looking at other areas in parts of africa. >> thank you, mr. carnahan. ms. schmidt of ohio is recognized. >> thank you very much. ambassador vershbow, i read your report and i am little confused on one point on page 4. he referred to this as being nothing more than what we already do with the africon -- the thing that we have in place in africa. i have stated that and that is basically an educational thing that we used to help african nations develop a more professional military. we also do some building of

schools and hospitals on the ground. but you add in your report that the reason why we had to go -- the president had to go to congress, is because there might be a potential need to defend themselves, the troops on the ground, and therefore the war powers resolution was put into place. what confuses me -- is this what we do under africon or is this different? under africon, there is always the danger that they might need to defend themselves. so there would not be a need to come to congress because the war powers act was invoked. and are we anticipating, and not just anticipating but expecting conflicts to arise? that is question no. one. question no. 2 -- in their report, you thought that we would be more of the deployment and how we would judge success of the mission, and yet i did

not hear any real answers as to what success is, or the timing of this deployment. and my final -- someone should know what the cost is per day for these trips to be on the ground. real cost right now and anticipated costs if they have to go in the conflict. those are my two questions. >> thank you, congressman. good questions and i am sorry that my statement confused you a bit. i think that when we say that this is not fundamentally different from previous afric on missions, it is because of the advise and assist is the watchword of africon. >> yes, we created it because we wanted specific attention to the region.

>> annette gives a better way to deal with foot region rather than borrowing forces. this is different in specifics and that we do not always put hard visors and trainers with the forces that will be carrying out the actual military operations. in this specific case, that led to the judgment by our military planners and commanders and then by the president when he approved it that despite their mission not including any engagement in combat, they could be in a hostile environment in some circumstances and they should carry the types of weapons to defend themselves that triggered the war powers notification. we do not anticipate that they will get into the midst of conflict but i do not want to

exclude that possibility. they will have the capacity to defend themselves if the need should arise. in terms of defining success -- beyond the very specific metric of capturing or killing joseph kony and other commanders, it will be a judgment call as to whether our partners are making substantial gains or effective use of their additional training, that they have learned this fusion of intelligence and operational planning that we think is the missing piece that has prevented them from going from reducing the lra to it actually eliminating the threat. but we will consult with the congress in inform you of our assessment of the operation as it unfolds, because as i say, this is a unique example of executive/legislative collaboration. we want to work with you all the way along. in terms of the cost, i

apologize for not having the bottom line. i can say more about the state department defends -- expenses. africon is using existing funds to support the operation but we are locked working on an overall cost assessment. he will provided to the committee was that estimate has been refined. >> do you know when we will get that cost -- tomorrow or the next day? it should be relatively easy. and i do not want to give you a specific commitment. it should be very soon. >> mr. connolly is recognized. >> thank you, madam chairman. i am sir mr. assistance secretary -- the sensitivity about the cost of military operations, the previous ministration lowball the cost of iraq and afghanistan and here we are well in excess of $1 trillion later, a significant

contributor to the united states debt which more so many of our colleagues expressed concern about, and yet we accepted very list assurances about those costs. i think it is a reasonable question to ask, your estimate of what is going to cost and to get that information in a timely fashion. let me ask -- what is the rationale for putting troops -- u.s. military adviser -- into uganda? what is the goal? >> congressman, i reiterate that we will get to the cost figures as soon as we can. >> thank you. this will certainly be much more modest than the cost of actual combat operations. as for the reasons why we are there, there's a continued threat to civilians and stability in the region.

we think is very discreet, specific increase in the scale and form of our military assistance can make a difference in ending the threat of the lra. >> ok, mr. assistant secretary. so is the goal, given what you just said, to in fact defeat the lra and disbanded? or is the goal to lessen the threat to civilian control in the region? >> we would certainly hope that this additional support will lead to the breakthrough of capture of joseph kony and the other commanders, and a literal destruction of the lra. but we will not necessarily wait for that to happen. this will be in operation there runs in the months, not an open- ended operation. we will evaluate whether the assistance has achieved its

purpose, so in terms of raising the capacity of our partners, henry made disengage even as they continue to fight on their room. >> is the ultimate goal that opposing of mr. kony predicted the posing of mr. kony and the disbanding of the lra? >> that is the stated goal. that is one of the four parts of the strategy. it is very important that we have a clear mission. >> there is a broader objective that we are serving which is to support partners in africa so that they can address the threat to their citizens to achieve stability and become more productive contributors to security in the region and more broadly. we have seen some of them stepping up as has been mentioned in somalia at great risk and loss of life. this is a problem that is debilitating to several countries so this is something we can help them finally put an

end to this threat. it will help their security and make them better partners for us. >> was there a perception in making this decision that our partners were on their own not capable of meeting that goal? >> yes, congressman. while they had made a lot of progress, we had seen the lra's size reduced substantially, but going that final distance to destruction of the lra was something that they were not quite capable of. and that this assistance could make a difference. >> moving to 30,000 feet, a devil's advocate question to you as well, ambassador. what is the strategic interest of the united states in doing this? i mean, that are a lot of unpleasant people in the world. there are lots of insurgencies

and terrorist movements in the united states. the united states cannot the throne everyone of them. -- dethrone everyone of them. >> we have seen that everything is increasingly connected to the extent that eastern and northeastern africa is unstable, under develop, and on governed states in which these kinds of rapacious terrorists and extremists can run amok. it also creates the conditions in which other radical threats could emerge. we've seen in the worst case in somalia with both the breakdown of governance and the rise of the al shabaab a terrorist movement. it is a challenge to stability

in the region that ultimately jeopardize is our interest. >> thank you, mr. connolly. mr. turner is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chair. a question for ambassador vershbow. if the stated goal is to decapitate the leadership of the lra, as i understood from the question before, we are not using aerial drones or observations. would we be authorized to take out the leadership with drones if they were being observed? >> congressman, at the present time, the use of drones is not envisaged in this operation. i think that kind of intelligence that is most

important to the success of this operation is the human intelligence gathered on the ground. that depends on closer ties between the military forces of the countries involved and the local populations. our training and assistance has as part of its broader objective helping them to acquire and make better use of that kind of ground intelligence that could make a difference. i think the question of a party sama for drone strikes against extremist terrorist groups is a more delicate matter which is probably not suitable for commenting on in this open session. but the focus is on a advising and assisting the groups on the ground to gather and use intelligence more effectively to do the job. >> thank you, and i yield back. >> thank you very much, mr.

turner. mr. higgins also of new york is recognized. >> thank you, madam chair. the lord's resistance army emerged from a no. you've done this in the 1990's. -- from northern uganda in the 1990's. it has killed and mutilated tens of thousands of people. john kony was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity and the tribunal at the hague. connie is also dignity -- kony is also designated as a special global terrorist. some 3000 fighters originating out of uganda, now more prevalent in central africa -- i mean, the united states the ploy's 100 military advisers to happen to be special forces. i think we should call this what it is. it is a killing capture mission.

i would ask you to comment on that. >> congressman, i think we certainly are trying to enhance the capacity of our partners to capture or kill joseph kony and other commanders, but they will be doing the actual military mission on the ground. we will be advising and assisting them so that they will be more effective in doing it. yes, i do not disagree with you in terms of one of the end results, if it works, but i think it makes sense from the united states point of view to enable partners to act when they have the capacity to do so. as we've said, they have some capacity and they have done a lot. and we have helped them get to the stage. but to go the final distance requires this additional

support and we think it is a good investment in our long-term security and theirs. >> ambassador? you're absolutely correct. the main objective is to support these countries to do the jobs themselves and to build this capacity. that is what we have been tried to do for the last decade. >> i just think that there is a tendency to dance around this bout. obviously john kony is a bad guy doing bad things to otherwise good people. it is in a region that is strategically important to us. i just think that sometimes we need to call it what it is. this clearly to me -- that region of central africa and north africa, we scented pfizer's there, obviously very well-trained, upping their

expertise in doing other things, including keeping bad people out. this is indicative of that. is this a religious group, the lords it resistance army, presumably islamic? published reports indicate that it is. >> with statements, ideology suggests that they are terrorists. they released information that they are related to christ. >> any relationship to al qaeda? >> none. >> ok. i yield back. vaining the lord's name in is not a good thing. i am pleased to yield to mr. ford very. >> thank you, madam chair. -- mr. ford antenberry.

>> thank you madam chair. we need to make sure that our efforts are not piecemeal. we have requested through a number of hearings the reappointment of a special envoy to the great lakes region. ambassador yamamoto, you said that we continue to take that under advisement. we have gone this direction before, but can you explain, if you are resistant as to why this has not happened, or are there other concerns that we may not be aware of? >> we had this special envoy who did a special job -- a fantastic job. after that, the issue is to assess where do we go from here. we heard loud and clear from the congress that a special envoy is needed. >> how long has the position been vacant? >> over a year now. a year-and-a-half.

>> again, given the heightened intensity of these measures, i think this is an appropriate time to revisit this question with a certain sense of urgency. let's return as well to gain a broader understanding of the other international partners involved here. specifically in military operations. we talked about other international donors for relief work. and specifically, what is the ugandan army's effort going to be? it has been in the past to specifically mobilize. >> the specific amount of assistance on military supporting the army in this in advance -- in this is the united states. $40 million in the last three years specifically aimed at providing logistical support as the lra move from state to

state. theou're talking about affected countries, not other international donors. >> as far as the other countries, the of condoms themselves are also providing support an assistant -- the ugandans themselves are providing support and assistance. there is a coordination effort with other troops from the car. ugandan troops are in car, and so there is a coordination effort -- and so they are the primary driver is currently of the military operation. >> correct. but the lra has gone out between two different countries.

are there other international countries such as france to engage militarily? >> only as far as training car troops. >> france is involved in car. what other international actors are involved in the on the military operations -- involved, be on the military operations, and rehabilitation and reintegration efforts? >> united nations and the african union. they're basically coordinating the efforts between -- >> we probably need to stop using that acronyms. it is too confusing the congolese troops and ugandan troops coordinate together. >> but then the african union's

involvement. >> the african union is not as extensive as ithe un. they're discussing with the presidents and the leaderships in these countries on the lra problem that they need to get that job under >> the african union effectively is not involved here. is that a potential development? >> if is. >> the reason for pressing the issue is that clearly the united states cannot solve problems for all people. you have been authorized by congress to engage in this activity. we are all hopeful for a positive and quick outcome. but you continued to press the international community and needs to be a part of this broader comprehensive effort. >> mr. rohrabacher is recognized

for five minutes. >> thank you, madam chairman. first of all, let me note -- i do not know if i am disappointed or what. not even having a cost estimate from moscow, rigid for us, coming before congress, letting us know that there is a military operation -- have these at 100 troops already been sent? are they on the way? >> only some of the initial personnel have arrived. the full 100 have not yet deployed. >> so the mission is actually under way. you have people already sent, but you do not have a cost estimate? even investment? >> i apologize, congressman. i'm embarrassed not have a more specific answer for you. the forces already there are being funded by regular operations. but when we get further along,

there will be more cost incurred in we will definitely have that estimate to you. >> i take it they will also bring with them their equipment. >> correct. >> i do not think it is our place to ask about specific equipment going into a combat area. but that is considerably costly as well. i noticed in your testimony that you said that this lra has been reduced to approximately 200 core fighters? so it might be significant for us to know if the cost of this mission is going to be $500 million or whether it is going to be $100 million, or $20 million, in terms of the cost of getting 200 fighters who are

people -- criminals, we could basically call them -- 200 organized criminals in central africa. and i take it also that if they are reduced to 200 men, and what the heck out of the armies of these various countries you are talking about, we are talking about 200 men who are now fighting thousands of other armed troops, but we feel compelled to send 200 of our own troops there. i am not sure whether or not -- all look closely at this and i think the american people will as well as to whether this was the right decision or not. the sit tribal loyalties have anything to do with -- you think that tribal loyalties have anything to do with the lra string? >> my colleague knows more about

the context. originally was based in northern uganda, but it has gone into groups into the southern sudan, the condo. it do you think that tribal allegiances have something to do with a survivability i and the effectiveness of the lra? >> it is the open areas that are terribly hard to attract people. that is his cover. that has how he has escaped for two decades. >> i take it that was a yes. so we're sending our troops in to take have gone this whole tribal challenge in africa. let me note that that does not sound very good to me in terms of possible success. but this force may be evil enough to justify sending our troops in.

let me ask you -- you are involved in ethiopia. you were our ambassador to ethiopia. >> yes, sir. >> during that time appeared, there was a border dispute between ethiopia and eritrea that went to arbitration. it ended up deciding what? >> they made a determination on the border between ethiopia and yttrium. >> decided basically that eritrea had the right position, is that correct? >> only in the bottom land area. the rest went to ethiopia. >> so our government at that time, while your ambassador, did we recommend that the ethiopians respect the arbiters? we did. >> right. >> and when ethiopia rejected the arbitration over arabize, what did we do? what was your position -- what

was our government's position on ethiopia, considering that we have since the time that they decided not to sell their disputes through arbitration, but instead try to -- decided to thumb their nose at arbiters, have we provided ethiopia with weapons and training and guns since then? >> we have not provided weapons. we have provided training because of their forces in darfur and other places. >> no weapons or anything. all right, thank you. >> thank you very much. mr. marino will now be recognized. i think he will be asking questions that had been submitted to our committees website, which connects our constituents more directly to our work in congress. we are also asking the public to enter their questions when we have the honor of having

secretary clinton appear before our committee on thursday. thank you, mr. marino, for using those questions. >> thank you, madam chair. in addition to these questions submitted, i have a website for my district. i asked my constituents to send me questions prior to our hearings. these questions will be repetitive, but if you could answer them, please bear in mind i have less than 4.5 minutes. please be sustained. anyone who feels they can answer the question to satisfy my constituents, a jump in. the first question comes from sharron. who will be paying for this troop deployment and what the anticipated costs and how many troops be in widget -- will be involved for how long? >> in the united states will pay for this operation. as i said sheepishly to congressman rohrabacher, we do not have precise cause.

but it will be in the tens of millions of dollars, not hundreds of millions. we think it is an investment worth making in terms of advising and assisting local forces to eliminate a very evil force from the earth. >> if the lra is removed, will that improve the economic and social stability of the region -- are what another military force replacing? >> is the efforts of usaid, the u.s. diplomatic efforts, and coordination with the international donor communities, and the regional states to look at establishing the economic development of these countries. >> from michael, what the europeans and their allies doing to help stop the lra?

>> raising consciousness, deploying and assisting with rehabilitation of victims, and also supporting the governments in their efforts to go after the lra. >> how about any money? >> again, our money so far for the region has been around $50 million in total for the last three years. just on the lra operations, but overall on the lra operations, the europeans, the un, and other organizations are contributing money and i do not have a specific amount. >> is as a peacekeeping/humanitarian mission, for more of an advisor role? >> clearly an advisory mission, helping to prepare partner forces to do the jobs themselves more effectively. but it certainly has a humanitarian motivation, namely that there has been long

suffering by the population at the hands of the lord's resistance army. >> this is from daniel. first of all, and shall enshrine dead cover both sides of the spectrum, -- and to show i am covering both sides of the side of the spectrum, thank you to the members of congress that people who have suffered at the hands of the lra matter and have taken steps to bring them to justice. could you gentleman be more specific about the ways in which the troops deployed had been trained to advise specifically in the hunt for kony as opposed to other large-scale tactical planning? >> it should be understood that our forces are going there to help train and improve the capabilities of the local militaries who will then carry out the actual operations in the field. the key thing we hope to help them with is using the intelligence information with the operational plans so that

they can more quickly respond to reports that the lra is active and engaged. we hope eliminate the remaining leadership of the lra. we are not taking on a combat role ourselves. >> most of these questions were from my constituents in pennsylvania-10, north central and northeastern pennsylvania. here is mine. do you have an exit strategy? >> we do. as we said from the outset, this is not an open-ended mission in terms of its goals or duration. we certainly hope that it achieves the overarching goal, eliminating joseph kony and the other commanders from the battlefield. but we will not go on indefinitely, even if it has not been achieved. we will judge whether we have been effective in training our

partners to reduce the threat. and then we will pull back and we hope they will be able to continue with this training to finish the job yes and no from both of you. all week following the money for handing it to cover? >> following. >> are we just handing a check over? >> we are following the money. we will be there on the ground ensuring that we use the taxpayers' money for is achieving a positive development. >> thank you, jim and. -- a gentleman. >> you have very wise constituents. they ask excellent question. i encourage all of our members to bring our constituents into the committee process. thank you, mr. marino. mr. sherman from california is recognized. >> mr. yamamoto, in this

enterprise, are we introducing american on forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated? >> the reason why they are there is -- mainly for advice and support and assistance. however, to defend themselves, they need to be fully equipped. >> the u.s. marines in the london embassy would defend themselves. in vietnam, we use the term "training" to mean american troops going out on combat missions accompanied by indigenous forces. are they in safe areas training, or are they out training to engaging the enemy? >> congressman, some of the

training will take place and save areas and bases far removed from the area of conflict. but in the commission approved by the president, forces will have the possibility based on what the commanders judge to the most effective and based on what the partners feel would be most affected, to deploy to the field to abies and assist at the front line level. we do not believe that it is highly likely that our forces will be engaged. >> will we be shooting at the enemy? >> only in self-defense. >> will we be placing ourselves within 100 yards of the enemy? such that self-defense would obviously be necessary? >> congressman, i obviously do not know whether they would be within 100 yards or 200. at this point it is hypothetical

because it is in the early stages. >> the constitution provides congress with the authority to declare war and engage in war. now you're telling me that decision will be made by lieutenants. mike, we have seen in libya a terrible lesson brought home to the american people. if you shred the war powers provisions of the constitution's, good things happen in the world. my fear is that you're going to be teaching the american people this less than a second time. that is to say, i think you may very well accomplish something good in eastern africa. but will we do so in a way that constitutes a second intentional violation of the war powers act? but if you have been rather vague on what our forces are going to do except that the tenants and majors and captains on the ground will decide --

except that lieutenants and majors and captains on the ground will decide what to do. will they be authorized to bring their forces into hostilities? mr. vershbow? >> either short answer is no. the only condition in which they might use the weapons they are carrying if they are fired upon in an act of self-defense. i would have to defer to my legal experts. >> that would be -- that is as good an answer as i am likely to get. let's say the mission changes, mr. yamamoto, and in fact it is necessary to introduce the armed forces of united states into situations where imminent involvement of hostilities is indicated by the circumstances.

will the administration follow the war powers act? >> we are following the war powers act in this instance. >> are you acting in serendipity -- acting parallel to the wars act -- war powers act or are you conforming to the war powers act? >> we are respecting the intent of the u.s. congress in providing that. >> are you respecting the law or just the free-floating intend? >> no, the law. >> it is the law the landing you will follow it. thank you, that is all that i needed. >> mr. rivera, my colleague from florida, is recognized. >> with your permission, may i yield to my chairman, mr. rohrabacher. >> yes. >> we have pointed questions, but that should not necessarily indicate whether we support or

oppose this particular mission. i happen to believe that missions like this are positive and can play a positive role and a positive strategy post-cold war strategy, helping other people fight for their freedom. but cost is really an important factor. the united states cannot afford to pay the price to win everyone's else's freedom in the world. the libyan operation that this administration just engage dustman, perhaps is a good example of that -- just engage us in, perhaps it is a good example of that. i would challenge the libyan authorities to step forward to repay every time that we spent in helping them win their freedom. we are and a financial crisis and they are sitting on the

biggest deposits of oil and gas in the world. they should repay us. if indeed they do, then it was the right thing for us to help the people of libya overthrew their tyrant. if indeed the cost of this mission is repaid to us from those who benefit from loss -- from it, then this type of mission, helping others fight against evil forces in the world, is justified and speaks well of the united states of america. what does not speak well of us is when we become intertwined with dictatorships. that is why i am acting -- asking questions about ethiopia. i'll ask our former ambassador