>> secretary of state, thank you very much for coming before us. we are conscious of the fact you have been in position for seven weeks now. you have been spending a lot of your time traveling and visiting troops in operational areas, which is entirely the right priority for you, and we do not expect you to know absolutely everything about absolutely everything, because of a concentration that you have had to get to that. please do not feel any concern that we are going to be asking you to know the details about everything, because we do not expect that. but we would like to know that you, coming into this job, have some priorities, and we would like to know what they are and how you see things.

so if you liked to give us an eye of debt of that, that would be most helpful. >> absolutely, and thank you for those opening remarks. it is as you say of finely balanced decision whether to go out and visit the troops in operational areas and meet international commitments that my predecessor has made with regard to visits, conferences, meetings, and so on, or get a report to get straight down to the internal challenges of transformation in budgeting. i hope that i have got the balance right by spending the first four weeks or so trying to do the former, and now focusing very much on the latter. i said on the day after i was appointed that my first priority of course as must be the case for any holder of this office is that successful cowlitz project completion of operations. at the time that men our engagement in afghanistan and our engagement in operation

ellamy in libya. fortunately, operation ellamy has satisfactorily concluded but the operational priority are run afghanistan remains. i'm very conscious that the future sustainability of our defense posture relies on this is the best portrait on the successful implementation of that transformation program. to deliver the force configuration that we need to be able to meet our standing commitments and have an effective contingency capability by the time we get to 2020. to have day ministry of defense that is structured properly to support that activity, and crucially to have a defense equipment program which is sustainable within a budget which the fiscal position, the public finances, can afford, so

that we have a sustainable position going forward. and that we can move away from what i conceive to be it the major problem that defense faces, living hand to mouth, constantly trying to fit a short-term cash flow problem by moving projects and programs to the right, incurring significant additional cost in doing so, and in fact in the long term making the problem worse. we have to get from that hand to mouth living to a sustainable program with sufficient headroom and flexibility in it to deal internally with budget shocks. i think it would be wrong to suggest that getting from where we are to where we need to be is going to be easy or pain free. it will be a very challenging process and it will involve some very painful decisions, and it is going to involved in the short term not having some things that we would much prefer to have. but i think all of this has to be done to achieve a long-term

sustainable position that we have set out in the sdsr. >> we will come back to that later. may ask a brief question about working in alliances, and the anglo-french treaty, for the franco-british trading, depending on which way you look at it? >> anglo-french treaty is the way that i look at it. >> that joint industrial projects that were foreseen in those anglo-french treaties, we a vast industry what progress has been made, and the answer has been, well, actually none. i am not suggesting that it is not in the british interest to make a huge degree of progress, or that we should do so anyway, but i wonder whether this is something which is one of those things you intend to get a grip

of as a matter of urgency. >> it is. i have already visited paris and had successful meetings with my french counterpart and with the relevant presidential advisers in anticipation of the summit which was going to occur last friday. it was cancelled due to pressure on the president's time because of the eurozone crisis. the discussion around industrial cooperation has centered initially on work on unmanned aerial vehicles, and work has been going on to prepare an announcement of around a commitment to the assessment phase for an unmanned aerial vehicle project. if the summit had gone ahead, i think it's safe to say that expectation was that an announcement would have been made at the summit. and we will look for an opportunity probably next year

to make a joint announcement to that effect. >> as a understand it, the civil senior servant who was dealing with that issue, stephen french, has now retired and has not been replaced. it would be helpful if you could concentrate on that. and also helpful if you could concentrate on the protection of intellectual property, both for france and the united kingdom. perhaps you could give that some thought over the coming weeks, because it is a matter of some urgency and a matter of huge complications. >> i agree that all these things are very complicated. i think that there are some pretty irreversible drivers behind the process. both the u.k. and france will

face major budget challenges ahead. we have already recognized what our budget challenges are likely to look like, and i suspect that the french, post a presidential election, will have to look very hard at their budget plans for the future. and i think the french military and the military procurement establishment is already beginning to think about how to do things more effectively and efficiently, and collaboration has to be a part of that process. and we clearly have a profile of defense commitment and defense spending which within europe looks more like that of the french than any other potential partner. so i think there are further strong drivers, practical, pragmatic drivers behind this collaboration. and i have to say on my visit to paris, i was pleasantly surprised by the clear enthusiasm on the french size, and commitment on the burnside to taking this forward.

so i recognize that there are some complex challenges, but i think the underlying drivers are very powerful and will propel us in the direction of cooperation on specific projects where it makes sense for both of us in the future. >> of russell. >> secretary of state, on the anglo-french discussions, is there any israeli involvement in those discussions at any stage? >> not as far as i am aware. >> thank you. >> there is an israeli involvement in the uav's that are made for the united kingdom, isn't there? >> there is involvement in the technology, but as i understand it -- >> if and not in relation to the anglo-french treaties? >> the project that we're talking about with the french is about developing an anglo-french uav, which would essentially be a substitute for current products that are based on israeli technologies.

>> you've just mentioned the financial stringency that we in the french will be going through. moving on to the autumn statement, and john glen \ . >> i have two questions concerning finances. on july 18, your predecessor announced a real terms increase of 1% in the defense equipment budget from 2015-2016 to 2021, and first, could you confirm how you see that fitting into the overall uplift was very much required to meet future force 2020 as a consequence of the sdsr? is that sufficient? in the chancellor's statement last week, he described as 0.9% real turn decrease in the overall total manage expenditure

for the two years beyond the currentcsr period. how easy this impacting on the pressures that the ministry of defense faces and ordered to read the future for 2020 aspirations? >> clearly the further two years of fiscal constraints have not yet been allocated in terms of the department budgets, and they will not be allocated until the next pending review process, so it can make no assumptions about the stage at the impact of the overall defense budget. i ever assurance -- i have a reassurance from the treasury that the commitment to the 1% increase in the equipment budget remains firm, and whatever happens to the overall package, that part of the budget will be protected. >> but that in itself, that 1% real term increase in the defense equipment budget has sufficient to reach the aspirations of future for 2020? is that enough of note -- ave

uplift in that time period to reach what you need in the minister of defense budget, or more be required? >> i am very clear that we have to live within the budgets that we have. i think that my predecessor said that one of the greatest strategic stress that we face is the threat of persistently on balanced public finances. i completely agree with him on a point. defense cannot be immune from the process of fiscal correction, so we have to live within the budget that we are given. we have set out the strategy for 2020, and we will have to tailor how we deliver that strategy to the budget that is available and our working assumption is that we will have flat we'll be working -- our working assumption has been that we will have flat real budget with a 1% uplift in the equipment budget. we will have to wait until it's done now expending review to find out whether that is a safe assumption or not.

>> so when the prime minister says that it is his own personal wish and personal view that there ought to be an increase in the defense budget, that is what you regard as fulfilling that personal wish? >> i cannot speak for the prime minister's personal wish, but we have a clear commitment that there will be a 1% increase in the equipment budget, and i have been reassured since the autumn statement that that commitment will be protected. and clearly, i suspect i can speak for the prime minister and many other colleagues in saying that we would all wish to see the ability to have a larger defense budget, but that will depend entirely on the fiscal circumstances, which in turn will defend -- depend on the if -- depend on the put warrants of the u.k. economy. >> but surely you must have a

view as an incoming secretary of state of what you need the budget to look like in order to fill those future force 2020 obligations and the vision that has been set out. what you seem to be saying is that if that money is not forthcoming over and above the 1% increase in the defense equipment budget, then there may need to be some changes to that package of reforms and spending. because quite obviously if you do not have the money, you cannot spend it. that seems to be where you're coming from, rather than saying that we need this as an irreducible core for the ministry of defense. >> one of the problems if i may say so and i am only speaking with seven weeks of experience, one of the problems has been the tendency to look from a inputs, rather than looking at required outcomes. and on the other tendencies has been to assume that concepts like efficiency, which every other department in whitehall would recognize, do not

necessarily apply. there is a budget constraint, we know what the outcomes we have to deliver our, and as with every other department, the clever bit -- the bet that we're paid to do -- is to work out how to get the required outcomes within the budget constraints. clearly they cannot be without limit. is not possible to deliver any outcome with any level of budget support, but my working assumption is that i should plan a round a flat real budget in the non-equipment area, 1% real terms in the equipment and support program, and that my challenge is to deliver the required outputs for the future force 2020 within that budget on below. i am now working my way to the process. the department has something like 21,000 open contracts at the moment which will contributed one way or another

to that, so this will not be a quicker easy process, but that is the sort of framework that i set myself as part of their exercise. >> and that commitment you're giving the country will also include not postponing decisions beyond 2020, because it will be easier to achieve your obligations of 2020 by pushing off in the -- expenditure beyond that. >> the outcome commitment is to have the ability to deliver the capabilities that future force 2020 envisages by 2020. that is the challenge that we face. simply pushing programs into the future is starkly as increase their cost and delivered poorer value for money for the taxpayer. and i think if there is one clear lesson, it is that we have to move away from managing this business for cash to managing it for value, and that is the transition process that we're now into.

>> if you are remembered for that, you'll be a great secretary of state. >> thank you. >> that last thing is partly what i wanted ask you. having a budget is one thing, having that money available to you throughout the period is another thing, and the cash flow and perhaps having a guarantee that you'll get that money for an operation, but having to find the money in the first place, our concern is that you did have a three-year delay before you get a payback you from the treasury. having the money available you to you in a constant flow across the period is something that we've raised concerns about. we've also raise concerns about you potentially having the ability to have a 10-year budget, if possibly longer, help you plan the process. have you have any thoughts about that? >> i think it goes without saying that anybody running a spending department would like to have a long as possible period of budget certainty. certainly when you are planning for long lead time projects, long-term budget certainty would

be helpful, but i recognize that the realities of public finance does not make that easily deliverable. i think the commitment of the after the next pending review to a real term increase in the equipment and support budget is a very significant concession, and i am sure it will have been delivered only with of very considerable amount of hand- wringing in the treasury. it cuts against a lot of treasury theology, so i think we have secured quite a significant concession from the treasury in getting that commitment. >> in your recent speech to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and families association at its annual defense industry dinner, you said that unpicking the sdsr piece by piece was simply not an option. did anything about recent operations, particularly libya,

make you think differently about the balance of the sdsr decisions? >> no, i do not think so. i think that what libya showed is that the aspiration of future force 2020 to have the ability to deliver on our standing commitments, and also to have an adaptable, flexible, and rapidly deployable capability to meet contingencies was exactly what we needed to deal with a situation like libya. i think it is fair to say that this time last year no one was envisaging an intervention in libya or anywhere in that area. and yet our armed forces were able on really very short notice to deploy and mobilize for that operation, and to bring it to a successful conclusion very effectively. i think that reflected huge credit on the skill of our armed

forces and the quality of the equipment platforms. >> do you feel that the operation in libya has restricted us strategically in the future in relation to iran and the middle east generally, syria? >> i am not quite sure that i understand the logic of the question. i think frankly that our diplomatic position with iran is such that what we do or do not do in libya it is unlikely to significantly affected. i do not think it it -- that it affects our position with syria at all. syria is a very different situation from libya, as the foreign secretary has made clear. >> to you not think that the russian and chinese vetoes on various resolutions in relation to, for example, syria and possibly iran, were caused by the activities of nato in libya?

>> i have to say that i think that is a question for the foreign secretary. >> the foreign secretary is not here. >> that has not occurred to me as a logic for the russian and chinese position in syria. >> i thought i was what they expressly stated, but i will leave that with you. >> the following from mrs. moon's question, surly you except that -- i say this is someone who has spoken voted in favor of the action -- are blatant targeting of only one side or the other is what has driven the russians and chinese to say, we are not again going to allow nato to lead an operation. because we were given the freedom by the un, i do not care what your predecessor said, we did take a site in the conflict and the chinese and russians will not let us to again.

>> well, i think we took the side of the libyan people, and sought to protect civilians as we were mandated to do under the united nations resolution. i have to say that i think this is attributing to the russian diplomatic position over syria are rather altruistic motives. russia has certainly significant strategic and commercial interests in syria which it is clearly seeking to protect. >> bob stewart. >> what d.c. is the most challenging parts of the sdsr? are we on schedule, and what parts are we certainly not up to speed on? did and that is a very big question and we could probably spend the rest of the afternoon on that. the sdsr sets out a strategic

aspiration of where we need to get to in our perception is that it accurately reflects our needs looking at the 2020. it sets out some of the steps that we have to take and we have taken many of them already, some very painful steps around nimrod, for example, a round downsizing the navy, around harrier. i think the process, and i think i have alluded to this already, both in terms of the military structure and the supporting civilian structure, how we actually managing -- manage the transformation process, driving that ford, really a massive program of change, bearing the capital cost of implementing net change, the frictional costs of the transition, while at the same time delivering business as usual and maintaining an effective defense posture, is a i think the big challenge.

are we on track? the first round of actions have already been taken. we are now in this a more complex territory around defense material strategy and so on. i think we are broadly on track, although there are some areas that i want to look at it much more detail before i stick my neck right out on the block and say we are on track. >> so you can not -- you will not identified the areas where there are problems in this forum. >> i do not think it is about areas where are the problems. i think it is a hugely ambitious transformation program and we're moving from the stage of identifying at very high level to creating a detailed blueprint, the blueprint for the shape of the department at the end of the process, and in a transformation plan, which in great detail will have to set out how we go about from moving from where we are now to where

we need to be. and doing that process, conducting a process with a minimum of outside support. the department has chosen, for a perfectly sensible and understandable reasons, to avoid the temptation to have armies of consultants advising on this and to do primarily with internal resources. that is, as others have pointed out, a very big undertaking and a very big challenge against the backdrop of having to maintain the business as usual posture at the same time. and i want to go through that program in a significant amount of detail and understand it and make sure that what we set out, the plan that we set out, the milestones that we set ourselves, which we will publish in due course, that they are deliverable and within the capability and resources of the department to deliver. >> in your first major speech,

secretary state, on october 25, if you said, the armed forces that will emerge from the implementation of the strategic defense and security review will be formidable, flexible, and adaptable, structured to defend the country can project power abroad, equipped with some of the best and most advanced technology in the world. that is quite a challenge to achieve that. personally i think it is very optimistic to think that we would have that sort of power in 2020. can i ask you for your comments? were you being a trifle optimistic or do you really believe that we were -- we will be able to project power abroad as we have done in the past, because i find it quite difficult? >> i think i clearly believe we

will be able to project power abroad. we organizing our armed forces specifically to be able to project power abroad, to be able to deal with contingencies of to a brigade level the plug on a sustained basis. when you look around the world at countries with that kind of military capability, not just phenomenal force numbers, but the capability effectively to deploy them with equipment that will work on a sustainable basis, and to supply them on a sustained basis, i suspect -- you may be better placed to comment on this than me -- but i suspect that there are very, very few countries other than the united states that can realistically aspire to do that. we have and our equipment program some of the most formidable weapon systems in the

world. you not be surprised another part of my early commitments have been in supports of defense exports, particularly typhoon in the far east and middle east. this is clearly of affordable -- a formidable aircraft. everybody that i've spoken to in foreign countries at technical level, at an air force level, is convinced that it is the superior option. the type 45 destroyers clearly is a best in class ship. it delivers a capability that we have not had before and no one else has at the moment. so i have no hesitation in saying that we will have the configuration of forces and we will have the equipment platforms to deliver a formidable power. now that does not mean power they would match that of the united states, of course it does not. but it means a formidable

capability to intervene in regional conflicts, to conduct stabilization operations, to deal with threats from non-state actors, and all that is before we take into account the quality about people. and i like to think and i have always believed that over and above the equipment capabilities we have and the organization and cultural benefits that we have, people givesf oour us an edge that we will continue to sustain in the future. >> one final question. what we're talking about in practical terms beyond 2020, the ability to project upper grade level operation overseas, and support and sustain a. that is what we are aiming at and that is the maximum we could do. >> i could find it in my notes, but i will try to do it from memory. it is to be able to project a brigade-level operation and

sustainment, and at the same time to be able to conduct two significantly smaller level operations, or to be able to conduct a short-term intervention at a level of about 30,000 person now for a short, non-sustained operation. >> 30,000? >> 30,000. >> that is quite a bit small operation. >> for short period of time. that is a search capability, 30,000. >> that is quite a lot. [unintelligible] >> the strategic defense and security review the annual update was published earlier today, and the prime minister's name, i suspect, rather than around. it says that the government is held accountable by parliament select committees including the joint committee on the national security strategy and house of

commons defense committee which recently reported for the second time on the sdsr. we did. however we have had no parliamentary debate about any of these things and we're in a position where we do not think we are able to secure any quality time to have a debate about the fence for about the past 16 months pre the only real debate we had was about arms services person off just before armistice day, but that was a particular discussion and rightly so. but the broader agenda including the whole strategic redefinition, we have had a discussion about. so can i ask you for your good offices, can you insure that we get a debate and a better examination of the public document, but more importantly the other issues within a, can you assist us of getting us a better examination that we have been able to secure in the past under the revised parliamentary processes, as opposed to

competing against the newspaper's latest campaign? >> it is a fair point and i will undertake to discuss it with the business managers. the problem of courses that in a department that does not have significant amounts of legislation and in an environment in which the backbencher business committee is controlling a significant amount of the available non- government build business time, it is quite challenging to find opportunities for debate. how will pressure point with the leader of the house. i had not appreciated that there have been no defense debates rather than the debate on the on forces personnel and i will look into it. >> thank you very much. >> before, to my question, and you may have noticed that there's not much legislation going to the house of commons right now, maybe would not be too difficult -- >> that is true this week. >> or last week or next week. >> or next week. let me take you back to when you

talk about a strategic aspiration. having come to the job, which you say that the review was strategic? and if it was, do you think that you struck the right balance between the choices we make in the things which are non negotiable, such as we are an island, which requires a navy? and we will come to equipment later on, but i am asking my overall strategic priority. so far your answers have been beautifully technocratic and bureaucratic, but i haven't yet got the sense of what the secretary of state for defence things are strategic needs really are. do you think we've struck the right balance? >> yes, i do. i think we have gone a very long period without a strategic defense review. during that period, the world has changed very significantly. it would be a brave person who ever said it permanently, but it looks as though the change in

focus is likely to be long term. we face a situation where the threats are likely to come from on stable regions of the world and from non-state actors, and yet we still have tens of thousands of men and armor deployed on the north german plain, which is not the obvious place to focus our defenses. i think the sdsr was about identifying were threats are likely to come from in the medium term, which is as far as we could sensibly project, and making sure that we have the appropriate foreskins figuration to respond to those threat -- appropriate force configuration to respond to those threats. it is about facing up to the reality, or rather of embracing the reality that we are most likely, with a degree almost a

certainty, to operate in alliance with partners and allies in responding to those threats. i can think of only one of our commitments, the south atlantic, where we might not be operating with the support of allies and partners. and also of course, because i do think as i said earlier that the budgetary position is a strategic threat, we also have to configure defenses to deliver the all puts that we require within the fiscal constraints that the country can afford. that is the reality of the situation and it would be pointless to conduct a strategic defense review without any consideration of the resource envelopes available to support defense and might be available to support defense in the future. >> i want to take you back a little bit to the two answers that you gave to the differently spelled starts in the room.

-- stuarts in the room. you did a very good job of selling typhoon as a platform, and you discussed this wonderful capability. you said in the future, it will be in partnerships and alliances, apart from the south the atlantic. how much is our future defense and the capability that we will focus on going to be one where we look more and more at our nato allies, what their capabilities are, and what niche areas will we be looking to complement that? are we going to be able to look at where we can stand alone in the future, do you think? >> it is a very fair question. it does make sense, if we are operating in an alliance, to look at the capabilities of our allies. as for example we have done in the decision around the nimrod

maritime aircraft. we have allies who have maritime patrol aircraft available for nato tasks. i have two thoughts on this. i think it would be wrong for us to give up without a very great deal of very careful thought and the core competency is which we might need in the future if the defense threats that we face were different and the fiscal position that we were in was different. i think we should try to retain core competencies, for example in relation to a flying aircraft off carriers, not vertical takeoff aircraft but normal fast jets off carriers. that is a capability that we lost 30 years ago.

we're now having to relearn the capability with the support of u.s. navy, in anticipation of having our own carrier capability again by the end of the decade. when you surrender a body of knowledge, skill, and experience with in your armed forces, it can take you a very long time to recover it. i think we should be very careful about that when we think about how we work with allies and how we interface with them. i think the other reality is that we need to think about in our alliance structure is which of our capabilities delivers the most value to the alliance. so in particular, are most apparent alliance with united states, i think we need to constantly have in our minds those areas of our capability which add significantly to the value of the alliance to the united states, so that we do not

inadvertently discard the chips which we play into that game in which bayh's very considerable access to u.s. support in u.s. capability. >> could i just mentioned minesweeper capability? that seemed to be something where there is a gap to ever created. >> that is a good, clear example. the u.s. recognizes our mind countermeasures capability as superior to their own -- mine countermeasures capability as superior to their own, and what we have deployed in the cold this depended on by the united states. we are an important part of their force protection arrangements in the coffin they expect us to maintain those arrangements as part of our commitment to the allies. >> if you do not see it as an

area that you produced and cut back in? >> mine countermeasures? no. the message that i get from the u.s. is that it is very happy with the commitment to mine countermeasures provisions in the call. >> on the issue of mine countermeasures, my understanding is that the squadron based in bahrain in the gulf is funded out a contingency in afghanistan. have you secured agreement for how they will be funded post- 2014, when the money comes to the end? >> if bayh understanding that it is nothing to do with afghanistan. it is an operation that does not part of the court tasking of the ministry of defence. therefore it is funded from the treasury reserve is an operation over above the core task. the treasury makes separate provisions for operation kipion. >> so crucially they will not be coming to an end in 2014? >> if is an annual task set by

the national security council and funded by the treasury. i cannot give you a commitment that it will not be coming to an end by any particular point, because i will be a decision for the national security council. judith but it is not tied to the end of operations? >> it is not tied to afghanistan. >> if it is not looking terribly positive and ask can stand. the haqqani network seems to be very active. you had the assassination of general daud, the attempted assassination of general wardak , and the killing of u.s. special forces. it attacks by rogue soldiers, the police, and the taliban increasing, and the yesterday's attack described as an all three of adult future. -- augury of a dark future. is it still our policy to be no longer involved in a combat role after 2014, is that still

realistic? >> our policy is that we will have withdrawn from a combat role, and that we will have withdrawn the vast majority of our forces by the end of 2014. >> so what roles and capabilities do you see as retaining their post-2014? >> that is a subject that the national security council will be considering in due course, that we will approach with our eyes half allies -- isaf allies. it has to start from decisions that will be taken in the united states about the level of commitment, both financial and in terms of force levels, that the united states will be making a over the next few months. i think we and the rest of the alliance will wait for the outcome of that process in the united states before deciding our own posture. both for strategic reasons and for future force protection reasons, it will be necessary to know what the u.s. is doing.

>> does that not make it difficult for us to plant our financial consequences of those decisions being made in america? it is all very well for america to make those decisions but the financial consequences will be felt here. is that not going to impact on our budget capability in the ministry of defense? >> we've made clear that we will be coming out of a combat role by the end of 2014. and that the great majority of our forces will have been withdrawn by that time. any forces to remain in a training or mentoring role will be strictly limited. but it is also clear that there will be a need for the international community to continue supporting the government of afghanistan beyond 2014. the strategy is to transition fromisaf-led security to afghan national security forces-led security. the afghan national security

forces will be served to 352,000. the discussion that now needs to be concluded is about a sustained level ansf post-2014 and who is going to pay for, because the afghan government clearly does not have the capability to sustain security forces at a level that will be required to take over from isaf and to deliver effective security, so the international community will have to deliver support to the analysis is medically that it expects its international partners to deliver an important portion of that support, and we are clear that we will have to play our part in delivering that. >> have you made any assessment of the level of force, the numbers that we will actually be leaving behind? >> of u.k. forces? >> yes.

>> that question that we have not yet had. it is clear that it will be a small number. we made only one clear commitments so far, and that is to providing the majority of the staffing capability for the afghan national ormer -- national army officer training academy outside kaful, to which we will begin trading just over 100 uk personnel on an ongoing basis. if there to be further commitments beyond that, they will be decided in view course by the national security council. >> the talk about a minimum of around 100. you have a top-level? are we talking 500 or are we talking about 3000? what you see the range being within that limited capability? >> the nsc has not had this discussion it, but if you're asking me for my assessment of what colleagues on nsc are thinking about, i think we're talking in hundreds, not

thousands. >> is there a danger do you feel that those few hundred could be drawn back into a combat role? >> no, they will not be there in a combat role. if we've made that very clear. they will be training, mentoring, and perhaps support at ministerial level in kabul and strategic security planning. that kind of operation. >> see you do not see the recent events in afghanistan over the last two weeks as hampering progress toward peace and security, bearing in mind the conflicts on the border, the attack on the pakistan border, you do not see any of that as indicating a change toward a dark future? >> i think that is probably rather premature. clearly the last two weeks as seen some significant setbacks. yesterday's attack in particular is of very unwelcome development that effectively on the face of it opens a new

front, but i think it would be hugely premature to suggest that that will deflect the process of transition to afghan-led security. on a recent visit to afghanistan, one of the things that's slightly surprised me and very much impressed me was the growing confidence in the afghan national security forces by british and american troops, and i do not mean just commanders in kabul. i mean people in the canteens. they feel comfortable with the afghans. they feel that they are confident and committed to the fight. they are still pending onisaf forces for and enablers for a very significant extent, but they are regarded as were the colleagues in arms, and they are doing the heavy lifting many areas. certainly an lashkar gar, where

we a transition to the afghans, it is very clear when you talk to british commanders that they are surprised by the a little called that has been made on them to provide support to the afghan-led security operation. it is and as a -- it has been a pleasant surprise to them. >> can i challenge you a little further? i am sure that the national security council make the decision, but can you tell us what you will say at the national security council? on november 23, air chief marshal dalton told a television program that the royal air force could be asked to provide support to the afghan government beyond the nato withdrawal date. he said, i am not sure exactly how long will we beat -- we will be required to stay help. it would certainly be a possibility and an opportunity which our government will have to make a decision on. what is your thinking on that?

>> if is right that the royal air force could be required to provide support -- >> yes, but he would not say that on the program if it was just a wild speculation. >> if did you say that the royal air force could be required that it could be asked? >> could be asked to provide support. >> but use it could be required, secretary state. >> if clearly the afghans are going to require enablers beyond 2014, and the u.s. has indicated that it will provide some enabling forces. it is not my view that the national security council is likely to agree to the u.k. providing frontline enablers, such as any kind of airlift of the one to combat zones. >> 7 not include apaches. >> i would not expect so, but the national security council has not yet had this discussion. the prime ministers met a very clear that he expects us to have

exited any combat role by the end of 2014. i would think that that means the prime minister is not envisaging apaches been deployed in afghanistan after december 2014. >> just to tick off what may or may not be going to some people's minds, are you ruling out tornadoes and uav's? depending on your viewpoint, they may or may not be frontline but there certainly combat vehicles. >> i think we have to listen to the prime minister. it said it will not be in a combat role beyond this -- beyond december 2014. have repeatedly said, the national security council has not yet had this discussion, but i would think in the planned use of language that if tornadoes were deployed, that will likely be a combat operation. >> and uav's? >> it depends so what they're doing. gathering intelligence might not be seen as a combat role. >> could be air-traffic control. it could be air bridge.

i'm sure that you have discussed his remarks with the air chief marshal, so what did he have in mind? >> i have not discussed his remarks with the air chief marshal. i suspect he was simply pointing out that the raf stands ready to do what ever this task to do, but the prime ministers made clear that we will be out of a combat role, and we have focused on the commitment that we have made to continue training the officer cadre, the afghan national security forces. we may make specific commitments beyond that, but we have not yet decided on any. and we will certainly want to take into account what commitments in this case makes to supporting the afghans beyond 2014. >> i think that is helpful. center osborn.

-- sandra osborne. >> was not premature to set a specific date for the end of combat roles in the first place? has that not encourage the taliban? is in not providing the impetus for the sectarian violence that we're now seeing? what is that violence increases? your categorically ruling out a combat role. how will you react if the situation deteriorates it really badly in afghanistan and people are led down by the international community moving out before they have a peaceful settlement? >> first of all i'm sure you did not mean to suggest that there is any link between the decision to end the, the role of the inning -- at the end of 2014 in the sectarian violence that now very unfortunately has broken up. -- broken out. i do not think there is any link all between those things. it is important to be clear that we're not talking about the cessation of combat against the insurgency at the end of 2014.

we're talking about the transition to afghan-let operations containing that insurgency. at the afghans are showing increase competency and greater numbers, and being able to do that. so as far as the insurgents are concerned, they are even now increasingly facing afghan troops and afghan uniformed police and afghan special police operations. over the next three years, there will be further progress so that it becomes the norm for these operations to be afghan-led across greater and greater proportions of the country. >> ok, but as you said, the national security council has yet to consider these. what is the timescale that these things will be considered? >> that is a very good question. obviously the bonn conference has taken place and fired the

starting gun on a process. a personal view is that it is quite important that the international community has a clear position by the chicago conference in may -- the nato chicago conference -- to which the afghans will be invited. i would certainly hope that, around the time scale, first of all, the u.s. will be clear about its intentions for post- 2014 and its willingness to fund the afghan national security forces post-2014, so that the rest of the world can in turn to side on all levels of commitment that the various nations are prepared to make alongside the u.s. >> ok, thank you very much. we will now move on to the issues of reserves. >> there was a report on rebuke -- on reserve forces produced in july of this year, and we're wondering about its outcome or decision making based upon it.

that made a radical set of suggestions. the figures were 3100 and reserves, royal marines and navy, 30,000 in the territorial army, 1800 in the auxiliary air force and so on. it talked about 30,000 in the army with 8000 training reserves. this is a big strategic shift for a periodic up to 2015 and on to future force 2020, which you are familiar with. that is what we are asking about. could you please give us any information that you have about a detailed response to all that will come, and whether it comes with a time table of implementation if they may be different from the one recommended in the report itself? >> yes. the resources that were referred to in that amount, about 1.5 billion pound package, will start to become available from april 2012.

there is already, i believe, a major recruiting campaign. 3 million pound territorial army campaign, and at 2.1 million pound -- 2.4 million pound tri- service multi-channel marketing campaign, whatever one of those is, and that will commence in the new year. there is always a process or the way it -- there is already a process that is under way. each of the individual services have developed plans to reinvigorate their reserves, but the overall program of reinvigoration of the reserves is coupled with a longer-term work of army 2020. so the great bulk of this is an army program, and it is embedded in the wider review of the structure of the army. >> that is interesting because i had discussions with some of the people who are involved in the meticulous of what you describe. could you give us an idea about who is driving this program, or is it based on individual

services? for example, army recruitment and tri-service group -- tri- service recruitment -- house that been driven and by whom? >> if it has been driven by the vice chief of the defense staff, who is taking this board. general sir nicolas houghton. >> i do not know if you've had time yet to have any flavor of how the regular forces are viewing this. you will probably heard, like everyone else, that when you go around the bazaars, and there is suspicion that some of the regular components might not be happy about the speed of transition and so on, and may be accommodating in in their own varied ways. perhaps you could give us an insight into this time table of transition? >> one of the things i have already learned is that there is a good-natured suspicion between all sections of the armed forces

of each other. >> body is a good-natured? >> because i think it generally is good-natured, chairman. in terms of the reserves exercises, i understand and i think that people who are involved in the reserve understand that to make this a credible proposal, it has to come with a clear plan for making reserve training effective and for making a commitment which does not leave the reserves always as the flexible element when there is any budget pressure. the commitment to reserve training and to reserve service must be clear. we must convey the message that we are serious about making the reserves is serious part of our 2024 structure. we are absolutely clear that

this has to happen. and i recognize that there will be some areas of residual skepticism. it is for us and for the reserve forces themselves to overcome that by demonstrating commitment, capability, and confidence. >> can i go back to my original? ? -- can i go back to my original question? when is the committee in the public in general going to have a detailed animation response to all of this crash marked the moment what seems to be happening is that some of the things you have said are known to those directly involved, but it does not seem to be clear, coherent response. there are individual measures gradually taking place. is there going to be a detailed response that sets out the program, the time lines, responsibilities and so on? >> >> yes. there have been a number of steps that have already been taken.

at future reserves 20 program manager has already been appointed. there's been an implementation team and our reserves executive committee in place. i am committed and my predecessor has committed me but i will repeat the commitment today to set out my response to the commission's report shortly in the new year. that will set out the plan, the trajectory for delivering the plan, and hopefully will give you the reassurance you're seeking. >> i do not want to be cheeky, but the year is 12 months. in the new year, in the next year, we're getting it this year. is that before april or any particular april? >> in the new year to me means before we put the clocks forward, probably. >> if pohl would put the clocks forward. -- before we put the clocks forward. [laughter] that is a new one. i have not heard that one

before. very good, thank you very much. >> secretary of state, the back of a goal that came with the announcement of fr20 actually chemicals quickly from the treasury. there was a welcome announcement that it was coming. the word on the street is that the money that is being committed to the reserves in the early years is a lot less, the percentage of the packages, on the basis that they will supposedly get a larger proportion of that after 2015. . after 2015. there is a feeling throughout in the reserves community they have heard this before. most of what has been announced is welcome. but the proposal was that there should be to take the army as an example, 30,000 are trained by 2015. they are convinced they can do that. there are recruits pouring in.

but the worry is the money isn't there. >> well there obviously be a buildup to the trained force level of 30,000 as you're aware. and because there will be a buildup, the money will need to be profiled to reflect that buildup. but i can assure the committee that the discussions that i'ved what the vice chief of the defense staff and all of the programming that i have seen indicates a buildup to a trained force level of 30,000 by 2015. that's building up the numbers exactly in accordance of what's been announced and the cash will be profiled to meet that delivery requirement. >> by 2015, that trained by -- trained by -- >> that's the figure i've sneen the discussions i've had. >> i'm pleased to hear that. can i give two examples of

things they there will have to do early the first is phase one training regionally. the present situation of trying to get reservists on the back and squeeze them into the regular staffs simply won't do it in time. and the second one is the officer recruiting and phase two training are very, very long way below par. we are short of officers and our phase two training is behind ore english-speaking countries. there is no word throughout on tackling those at all although there is anecdotal evidence that recruits are coming in. >> not every "i" is dotted and "t" crossed but i will set out

how the department intends to rise to the challenges. i'm aware of them because you have raised them with me. but i'm aware of the specific challenges -- >> now that -- now i had finished. >> on the same thing and he's right to raise it with you. saber, for example, it's the offer to employers as well and the explanation to the people's families and certainty about the employment model that comes with it. the detailed questions that are inhibiters at the minute in terms of having the quality of conversations they need to have to bring that program forward. that's why we raise the concern. there doesn't seem to have been a comprehensive description of all of the elements together, how they sequence so that people have a coherent people and have an intelligent discussion other than bits and pieces. that's the reason for the asking

the question. >> i can assure you that internally that discussion is going on. i have had those discussions specifically around what the offer to employers is, what the employment model and deployment model is going to look like. what assurances can be given to make service in the reserves an attractive proposition to recruits and make the employment of reservists an attractive proposition to employers. and both ends of that are critically important and the work is going on. >> and a great leap forward and we'll know when the clocks jump forward? >> we will address and set out a plan for delivering the future reserve structure and it will of course have to address all of these areas. they're a critical part of it. and to my mind, i said this already but just to repeat it i know there is a degree of

skepticism among those in the regular army. and is it for us to dispel that skepticism by setting out a program for terms of service and deployment that is clearly credible and that will allow the army to plan around the reserve levels that we've set out and make that, you know, incorporate that into the planning. >> we will be looking carefully at where the royal air force fits in the program. >> of -- >> of course i recognize that. i think the -- the army is in a slightly difficult place because we have the question of deployment of formed reserve units as well as individual deployments. i suspect although i may not be fully indoctrinated in this area

i suspect in the air reserve and naval reserve we are talking more about individual deployments. >> just a couple of final points. just to echo the point, part of the package is around the issue of how much one goes down the route of encouragement and one of compulsion. could i urge you to look at best practice abroad? most other english speaking countries get high level of turnout without come plulgs. >> would you like to answer that question? >> you are urging me to do something that i've already set in train. that clearly from the point of view of someone considering becoming a reservist, the balance between voluntary service and compulsory service is critically important to their

decision. >> particularly good to hear you are engaged with employers. i have a huge respect for vice chief and serving under him was an equally great experience as serving under this chairman. but i do hope you will be able to meet the senior reserve officers and indeed also you will find time to visit the reserve units. >> i have already made a commitment to you that i will seek a meeting before i make this announcement with the duke of westminster. he is the keep person you want me to meet. i'm happy to do that. i'm happy the meet a reserve unit. i know there's an excellent unit london scottish just around the road. perhaps that's something i can get without difficulty. >> can i recommend you do it

before the current co hands over to his regular counter part? >> the chairman would like us to take this offline? >> oh, sure. >> just one point. you said there is skepticism and certain amount of alarm in the regular army. the worry is that the 30,000 won't be reached but you have assured us it will be reached by the appropriate time. the alarm in the regular army is also because the sdsr suggested the regular army will go down to 92,000 but they are taking another substantive cut down to 82,000. that is a huge amount out of the army and the sdsr thought that we could manage on 92,000 not 82,000. i'm delighted about the reserves but worried that we take a great slice out of the instantly

deployable regular army. and that worries me. i have to say. >> is it not, of course, the case whether we have 82,000 or 92,000, the whole of the regular army instantly deployable. and part of the future force 2020 program is to define what we need in terms of rapidly deployable elements. the message that i'm getting from the generals no general is going to tell you he'd rather have fewer troops than more but the message i'm getting from the generals is that the military tasks and the contingent capability are deliverable within the configuration of 82,000 or thereabouts regular troops and 30,000 trained reservists. that is deliverable on that basis. but it does make the assumption that the trained reservists are

functional effective. and i think that is where the concern is. i haven't heard a concern about the numbers the concern is about whether they really be properly trained and deployable reservists. we clearly have to deliver that if this is a credible solution to delivering the outputs that are required. >> and it would be nice, secretary of state if you were to ask further down the chain too if they believe 82,000 is manageable. people i speak to think it's wrong. but you can only go on what the generals say. >> that's not true. you can go on your own judgment. >> i can go on my own judgment and i have the opportunity to talk to middle ranking officers as well. yesterday, the prime minister held a reception for members of the armed forces who took part

in operation enemy. and i met reservists who had taken part in the operation and were not slow about giving me views of the reserves in the future. >> one final question on the reserves. in your reply to this committee's report on the sdsr, on as it happens, page 22 of your reply, there is reference to a report from the council of reserve forces and cadet associations subgroup which is going to be presented to you and you are then going to do a report to parliament. can you take away the fact, please, that we would like to see a copy of that report which is going to be presented to you in a -- in its complete version if that would be possible. >> okay. i will take that away and have a look at that request.

yeah. >> thank you very much. aircraft carriers. thomas? >> before aircraft carriers, secretary of state, you'll be aware, i assume of your parliamentary secretary's comments on arctic convoys. have you seen your secretary's comments zbled. >> i have seen them reported be you not read the text. >> i would bother reading out the full transcript but he has offense to veterans and their families. would you like to take the opportunity to apologize for your junior minister's comments? >> i don't think he intended to cause offense but the words he used did cause offense. it was an unfortunate just that position of references. these are people that performed an incredible service to our

country. the role of the arctic convoys in the successful conclusion of the second world war is well known and undoubted. if any offense has been caused i deeply regret that. i'm surgeon that the undersecretary regrets it as well. >> on the issue of aircraft carriers by what date do you expect to have carriers with fast jet on them? >> around 2020. >> that was two answers. >> i mean at this stage in the maturity of the program, to say whether it would be you know, late 2019, early 2021 is too fine grained. but 2020 is the central date that we are shooting for and i expect to achieve that or something close to it. >> i'm sure you have had an opportunity to read the

committee's report. >> i did read it. i looked at the summary. >> they're not quite the same thing. paragraph 126 talks about the challenges on the aircraft carrier capability which you'll be i'm sure briefed on. >> yes. >> spinning back up the carrier is a formidable capability. >> yes. >> challenge on air crew side and on deck side. can you update the committee on the progress that the ministry of defense is making on the regeneration of that capability? >> yes. my understanding. i'm not in the minute detail of it. but my understanding is that we have a clear agreement with the united states navy in terms of training personnel. this will be by way of personnel being embedded for long periods over the period between now and the coming into operation of the carriers to acquire deep skills

in deck operation and in flying operations. i think i'm right in saying the first uk personnel are already deployed? somebody might tell me if that is right. >> we have three pilots currently. >> there you are. and i had an opportunity to talk to the u.s. secretary of the navy and he assured me that the u.s. is fully committed to cooperating with us on this program and delighted with that we are reacquiring carrier capability and will do everything necessary to support us in regenerating the capability. by the way, i perhaps should just say that i had the opportunity to talk to the chinese naval attache at the defense council reception and he has an aviation r aircraft carrier the skills he has to

learn from scotch without the support of the united states or any other partner. and he said is it a major challenge and we are lucky to have an alli that is prepared to support us in this way. >> can you confirm that we have no intention of selling to the chinese [ indiscernible ]. there has been some speculation about it. >> i have not thought of selling to the chinese and no one has suggested it to me. >> one thing that this committee asked for is updates on the capability. are you going to guarantee to give the written updates? >> unless there are security reasons i can't i would be happy to do so. >> on the issue of the fast jet that will be flying off the prince of wales or queen elizabeth or hopefully both are you convinced that the f 35 c

offered the best aircraft for the money? >> i believe so. but you'll appreciate that i'm probably not yet in a position to give an unqualified answer to that question. it's going to take me a little bit longer to fully understand all the issues around the capabilities of the different aircrafts and the through life costs. >> that strikes me that you are studying this question. >> currently studying is ambitious but it is on my list of things i need to look at and understand fully. the way i'm -- the way i'm -- there are a large number of very important and very complex subprojects within the defense agenda. the way i'm trying to deal with this is on a systematic and manageable basis to get the people who are the experts to

brief me on a fairly detailed basis so that i can acquire in an hour or two what would have been 17, 18 months worth of buildup of understanding had i been in this job since the beginning of the government. it's not a process i started in detail yet but it's high on my list of things to do. >> thank you. >> you are still new to the job. i'm interested to get you views on how you see the capability working in practice. i'm thinking particularly much has been made of the ten-year gap we have in the capability. but once we have it we will still potentially have gaps, minigaps if you like because we only have one operational carrier. what's your understanding of actually how we will ensure that

we have this important capability when we need it? >> well of course first of all i should say no decision has been made about what will be done with the second carrier yet. that is a future decision against a future sdsr backdrop. the carrier force that we will be generating will give us a capability to operate on our own, a formidable capability to operate on our own. but because of the interoperability that we will gain it will enable us to operate as a fully integrated functional part of a u.s. carrier task group or in different circumstances to operate alongside the french. so there will be options around how we deploy the carrier and i would expect that we would adopt

different postures at different times. we will want to have fully exercised the option of a fully integrated level of operation with a u.s. carrier fleet and also want to buildup and maintain the ability to deploy on a solo operation should we find the need to do so. >> okay. thank you. >> secretary of state, the issue of where the sufficient helicopters has been provided to front line troops has been a contentious one for some time and that was mentioned to you when you were on monday visiting 16 air assault brigade. is that correct? >> i was happy to visit the 16 air assault brigade on monday to

see the helicopter capabilities that the joint command has available. and, yes, in afghanistan, it was an issue that i raised because clearly in the past it has been an issue of great political salience. i looked at the figures in advance of this session. i know that between november 2006 and june 2011 the number of rotary wing flying hours has increased by more than 145% and over the last year, on average, the available flying hours have been underused by 16% per month. so we have the rotary wing capability that we need in theater. commanders are not exhausting the available flying hours at

least they haven't over the last year on a monthly basis. it reflects a greater capability in theater and decrease in insurgent activity over the last year. but it also reflects the fact that we are operating in a much more concentrated area of operations which clearly reduces the demands on helicopter lift. we are traveling shorter distances to get between the operating bases that we are involved in. >> if it was an issue it is historic? >> i think so. i don't think we can be complacent. but i think the problems that we were highlighting members of parliament were highlights on a regular basis four, five, six years ago have been largely addressed. >> my apologies for not being

with you on monday but four cabinet ministers at the same time. >> it was a deliberate tactic. >> it worked. it worked. i was only able to be with two of them. >> a multi-barreled assault. >> i'm not sure if you read the defense weekly for november. i haven't but i do have an extract which perhaps i could put you. m.o.d. chiefs are to see the defense rotary wing strategy cor cuts in spending on the helicopter routes of the royal navy, we'll know the first weekend in december. i'd like to enlighten the committee as to what that strategy of documents says or has it yet arrived at you? >> it hasn't yet arrived on my desk. what i can tell you is that we have -- i was able to see it

tuesday -- monday. monday. the upgraded version of the links, which will of course in due course be replaced by the wild cat when that's delivered in service that as you know we've committed to the delivery of 14 additional chinooks which will take our fleet to 60 aircraft, and we have -- we are already under way with the upgrading of the puma fleet, the first upgraded aircraft have been delivered. so there are a number of steps in place to maintain the helicopter fleet at the level that is required for current operations and to support the contingency element. >> i want to just press you on the strategy document or the capability study, call it what you like. when you say it hasn't reached your desk, is that a diplomatic

way of saying it hasn't yet arrived or it just hasn't reached you? >> a further defense rotary wing capability study is being conducted to ensure that we are operating and maintaining our helicopter fleet as effectively as possible. it hasn't yet reached my desk. so it's -- it's at least under way. james is being telling us it's delivered -- >> i think we will all read the next issue to see what's happened. and secretary -- >> can i just -- it does talk about my briefing note says that this study is about ensuring that we're operating and maintaining our fleet as effectively as possible. i think this just comes back to something i said at the very beginning. there does seem to be a slight tendency in defense to assume spending less means getting less output. we have learned that we have to be able to get smarter so we have to be able to do the same

for less money and things like helicopter maintenance and support are the kind of areas where i would expect us to find ways of saving money but still delivering the same output. >> you may have answered this in the next question in part but i will just press it. in 2004, '05, the then secretary is this still the case and if not what's happened to change it? >> well i think i have probably answered that, i think the increase in flying hours, 145% between 2006 and the middle of 2011, the decrease in the level of insurgent activity, the decrease in the area of operation that uk forces are trying to cover all combine to have eliminated that deficit in rotary wing capability. >> so who with this shortfall

against future force 2020? >> i don't believe so, my understanding is that the programs that we have in place including the lynx replacement, the puma upgrade, the chinooks -- >> on a session, you come before us, but my final question chairman is actually are you in position either today or subsequent to act like the timetable for bringing rotary wing capability into balance? >> i'm not sure what you mean by bring it into balance. >> well, you're telling the committee

test test test. test test at the. thank you chairman. >> very quick, this point on cost effectiveness in helicopters, could i urge you to look at secretary state at what the royal navy is doing with reservists in the helicopter area? because there may be lessons for the other two services. >> thank you. >> moving on to which you've already referred briefly. >> i want to press the matter of nimrod can i ask you to repeat what measures you are taking to mitigate the risk of the loss of the capability presented by

nimrod not being brought into service. >> the -- i mean, this was a tough decision, clearly. this was not a decision that anybody would have chosen to take. but i think it's important to recognize that it was a decision that was taken partly as a result of the severe pressure on the public finances, but partly because the aircraft was still suffering from technical problems with no clear path to resolution of those problems. so not only was this a hugely expensive program with ongoing, very high operating costs but there was something of an open ended commitment because the thing frankly wasn't working. and the decision was taken to cancel the program because we had to prioritize between different capabilities and the

conclusion was that this was a manageable risk that we could take. because of our investment in other capabilities, because of the capabilities that our allies have available around maritime reconnaissance and, again, not the most comfortable of decisions, but we're not in the ideal world, we are dealing with a massive black hole in the defense budget and a large dose of reality has had to be delivered to it to stand any chance of us being able to get this thing back on track and create a sustainable base for our armed forces in the future. >> forgive me but may i declare a kind of interest my brother andrew stewart was tour of squadron so i declare that

chairman, so my particular concern is i know that we are talking about allies doing the job at least in part of the nimrod to make up the gap. i am concerned because some of the tasks carried out by nimrod are very, very confidential and i just can't see an ally doing some of those tasks. and that is actually the seat of my concern, that we will not have -- it is hugely risky not having this capability controlled by our own national assets. i suspect you know that. >> i say again, none of these were comfortable decisions to take, but when you have a massively overcommitted budget and you need to move to a position of budget sustainability, something has to

go. that doesn't mean that there are programs that are cost free or risk free that can be removed, it means that you have to look at the costs and the risks around the different programs and come to a view about the priorities. and that will involve a number of different things. it will involve one of them will be the availability of similar equipment available from allies, another will be the ability to, if we did find ourselves facing a changed threat position, whether it would be possible to reacquire capability in relatively short notice. and i think the contingency plan here, and there are u.s. aircraft types that could be acquired, if not quite off the shelf, quite quickly, should we find that for some strategic reason that we can't see now

this became a capability we have to replace we would be able to do so sort of semi off the shelf. >> my final point is just a point that you might want to respect, clearly the most important factor in this decision was the huge cost and the waste of money that's gone into this program which actually was -- took paramountcy over the operation of requirement, in this case it was more important. >> well, the problem as i understand it was that the -- this was not an aircraft that could deliver the task that was required. we still had an open ended problem with the aircraft, technical problem with the aircraft. so this was not something that we scrapped rather than fly it operationally. the choice was scrap it now or invest potentially unlimited further amounts of money to see it sitting on the ground for

perhaps an indefinite period of time. there was a capability gap that already existed because the previous government had scrapped capability, so we know that we have managed to live with this capability gap, uncomfortably perhaps, but we have managed to live with it, and the decision was taken that this was a risk that we could manage. and across the defense program we have had to take active and conscious decisions to accept risk and manage it as we transition from completely unsustainable equipment program to something that will be sustainable in terms of the budget envelope and structured in a way to be able to cope with any short-term fluctuations or shocks we need to accommodate in the way the program we inherited did not. it did not have that flexibility in it. >> i don't want to take any more

of the time. >> i listened to your arguments in relation to the scrapping of the nimrod. can i draw your attention to the defense select committee for the review into the sdssr by dr. sue robinson. dr. sue robinson was in fact the subject matter export -- expert on electronic support measure systems for the nimrod mra 4. she worked on behalf of the ministry defense in evaluation of the system and advised on changes to the system. i think you'll find that all of the arguments that you've put forward for the scrapping of the mra 4 she would dispute are actually accurate. but moving on, i want to go to our report where we asked the government what was going to replace the mra 4 and we were told in our reply that we would continue to maximize the use of other assets such as the type 23

frigates, merlin helicopter century and the c-130 to contribute to anti-submarine war fair, search and rescue and counterterrorism. dr. robertson says in her response to us that she didn't ever consider that they would try -- that the ministry of defense would try to use helicopters, type 23 frigates and the c-130, none of which acting alone or together can provide an adequate substitute for the nimrod. if we take it aside the platform itself, it's the loss of maritime patrol capability that i think the committee is particularly concerned about, and i'm sure in your answer you also indicated that concern. you talked about the safe for less money. when we went to northwood we

were told the loss of the mra 4 in terms of counterpiracy was equivalent to the loss of 12 ships. has that loss been factored in to the decision to remove maritime control capability. >> let's be clear, we're not removing maritime patrol capability. >> a platform that was coming in. >> we had a platform sitting on the ground with unresolved techal problems and an open ended budget, so we were not removing a capability, we were recognizing the reality that in a very constrained budget environment, if we continued to pour money on an open-ended basis into this project there would have to be other projects, other priorities that were sacrificed. and the decision was made, in trying to address the black hole in the defense budget that we inherited, that this was one of the least worst options. not a good option, but one of the least worst options

presented us with a risk that the m.o.d. had been managing and we could continue to manage in the future. i don't pretend it's a comfortable position to be in, but we had to set priorities and that was the decision that was taken. and i don't propose -- well, it's too late to reverse it now, but it's not a decision that needs to be reversed. >> to state that the report, 2011, had 53 recommendations which the m.o.d. accepted, i'd just like to turn to your view on the implementation of those pretty radical organizational transformation proposals and changes. obviously simultaneous with implementing that, there are considerable challenges in terms of reducing manpower, changes, rebasing program.

what do you see in your mind as the main metrics and milestones for measuring the successful implementation of the levine report? there are a number of things in there, for example reduzing the number of senior military points would be one we'd be looking for as a measure of success. how do you see the challenges in doing so? >> i think there will be a number of outputs like the reduction of senior military posts that will clearly be measures of the progress that have been made but i think the really important issues here are around structure. and accountability. the department's problems in the past clearly arise from the structures that have been operated and the lack of clear accountabilities for delivering on budget. so the creation of the defense infrastructure organization, the defense business services, the

work that's going on around defense equipment and supplies and the new structure that in due course we will have there, we're looking at the options, now i think it's -- i think the options that are under consideration are in the public domain, although they haven't been formally published. in due course, there will be change there. getting these changes right, getting the senior people to have the right accountabilities and the right incentives is the key to delivering. you can't micromanage an organization the size of the m.o.d. from the top. you've got to ensure the structures are in place. the budget holders at all levels are incentivized to deliver the outputs and the outcomes we require, and are not distracted by perverse incentives of which there have been quite a lot as i see it in the way the m.o.d. has

operated in the past. people doing things which are perfectly rational from the point of view of their narrow view, but which do not contribute to the overall success of the department. and our job is to make sure that individual rational decision making by budget holders throughout the organization always points in the same direction and pulls in the same direction. >> and i'm persuaded by your logic, but given in the reports, lord levine's report annex, 70% of these major organizational change pieces fail, what do you see is the key issues that you need to overcome in order to put in place those accountable structures that you i think you might be rightly assess need to be in place to bring better decision making? >> i don't think anybody's

underestimating the scale of the challenge in making these reforms work. this is a very big change to a large and somewhat unwieldy organization while requiring it to downsize and deliver business as usual at the same time. and as i said earlier, this is something that the department has proposed to do without significant external support, for all the reasons that we will all understand. and i need -- one of the things that i need to do is to convince myself that this is deliverable without external support, if i come to the conclusion that some additional external support is required, i shan't hesitate to say so. i think it's right that the department has sought to do it without external support but some limited external support may be necessary to ensure successful delivery. >> back to my original question, in terms of what we can see as a deliverable, if you like, from this place of change, what

should we look for? >> we're going to -- we will publish the blueprint in the new ye year, we'll publish the blueprint of the sort of steady state of the department once it has been restructured and then a transformation plan to get from where we are now to that steady state blueprint, that will have a series of milestones in it for which we will clearly be held to account. so i think those are the sort of short term tactical points at which we can be held to account for the delivery program. perhaps the most important thing which is slightly intangible, though, is the change in the culture. and i -- i have to say that i have been pleasantly surprised since arriving in the m.o.d., i was braced for finding a culture

of conservatism with a small c, resistant to change and perhaps not embracing the idea that there was even a problem that needed to be solved. i haven't found that at all. i found the organization accepting there is an issue that has to be addressed, recognizing that it's going to be difficult and painful to address, but i haven't heard anybody among the senior management dissenting from the view that these changes are essential and that they have to be delivered if we're going to have a sustainable platform for uk defense in the future. >> every secretary has found that, the individuals you deal with are of outstanding quality but there is somehow an immune system within the ministry of defense itself which makes it impossible to achieve change. so we do seriously hope that you are successful in what every other secretary of state -- >> well, thank you, i recognize the warning and i will hope that

i am successful in delivering an adrenaline shock to the system that will overcome that resistance. >> thank you. >> vice chairman. >> right. >> last sort of topic, withdrawal from germany, small local difficulty. clearly there is a political dimension to this, and as we understand it, there should be a formal notification to the german authorities, they're clearly dealing with similar moves from america and it's creating some uncertainty for them. the reverse of that is if you bring in people back the issues for local authorities basing and so on. clearly they have declared potential savings of this over a period of time but there are also initial costs. so can you give us better insight into how that is all working, what your costs would be, the eventual dividend as it

were and what is happening in terms of the planning process. because it's a very sort of ambitious declaration, half of them out by 2015 and the whole lot out by 2020. >> yeah. well, the -- i think the strategy for rebasing was clearly set out. since then, of course, the july statement -- >> final topic. we won't be able to get through it in a couple minutes, so on the assumption that there is one thing -- >> is it just in -- we have

discussion by this. it is true that we are on a vote, if anyone feels it essential to vote -- let us carry on. >> you can never trust someone that spells their name with a "u." >> we move back to the question of germany. you were telling us --? >> yeah. this is now the rebasing strategy is now of course to some extent interwoven with the restructuring exercise that the army is doing, so that is a work

in progress. and, of course, the challenge to which you referred of finding appropriate accommodation for returning forces is somewhat reduced by the fact that we are now looking at a smaller overall regular force size. nonetheless, there will be a significant up front cost in the rebasing exercise which we'll deliver, as you said, substantial savings on an ongoing basis into the future. discussions with local authorities in germany i understand are under way and have been under way for some time, and discussions with local authorities in the uk will take place when it is -- when we have enough information to make them appropriate. i think in some cases i think preliminary discussions have already been held. the key, i think the key point for us in the uk is that where

bases are changing uses, we need to try to ensure the minimum possible period of nonoccupation in order to maintain support to local economies, and particularly local health and education services. clearly if we -- it would be very inefficient from a public service point of view if we close a base and seek to repop late it. that kind of coordination with local service providers and authorities is critically important and the army recognizes that and will have proper regard to that in its rebasing exercise that is going on around the restructuring review. >> okay. i think we just wanted a little bit more insight as well into costs and savings. i mean there's a sort of declared eventual dividend if i can describe it that way of sort of $215 million was it, $250 million, sorry, a year.

it said it could save us. i mean, clearly there are savings that are direct to the minister of defense maybe, a savings of a different nature, possibly expenditures as you say to -- you know, the generality of government expenditure. do you perhaps at some point tell us what all of that broader sort of economic benefit or this benefit is going to be? >> yeah. the figure, which i can't just find in my notes, but going from memory was that we expect there now to be an up front cost in the region of 2 billion pounds with a continuing saving of around 250 million pounds a year. so on a discounted cash flow basis that clearly makes -- that's an investment that makes sense. >> can i press you about one area, then? clearly there's a lot of work and we'll find about that as it goes along. the question about training, though, raises itself,

particularly of the type that is done in germany and i notice recently there's some discussion of arrangements with turkey, possibly other locations which certainly heavy armor and other things might be. can you perhaps tell us more about what training element germany will be, whether it's being done partly in the uk or elsewhere, how will that be maintained? >> yes, we will have the capability to conduct the necessary training in the uk. you're absolutely right. the week before last i signed a defense dlab relaticollaboratiol allow us now access to training areas in turkey. but the expectation is that we can provide all the training requirements in the uk, we already have areas of armored training capability and, of course, we're reducing our

armored capability. the germans and also the poles are very keen to host us if we require overseas training facilities. so we are not in any sense being squeezed out of the training grounds in germany and indeed we're being invited to use training facilities in poland. so there are a range of options open to us, and the army will want to maintain flexibility as it look s at the basing, which basing options it wishes to select and then decide on the most cost effective training solution. >> right. so we have training, uk training, training hungary, poland, germany, turkey. >> precisely. >> a mixture. >> precisely. clearly there are tradeoffs if we're using training facilities overseas there are transportation costs to take into account. on the other hand, in the case

of germany and poland, these training facilities already exist that don't require any capital investment. so we will have to look -- >> the one gar issening element taken back into the uk rather than other elements. is that? >> well we have no commitment to maintain the training facilities in germany, the implications we're getting from the german authorities are that they would be very happy to continue to host us for training in germany if that was -- >> so these costs and benefits are to do with those and not the training then. >> the costs and benefits are based on the permanent garrison, the withdrawal from germany. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. >> yes, just really a quick point on the interplay with the new personnel model, really just to -- express a concern that some of the documents floating about seem to be hinting life

will be a hell of a lot easier in terms of the army, everything from perhaps people going off to making careers easier and so on, and really just say that -- or to ask you about what sort of factors you're going to take into account to decide where to put the troops that come home. because not all our existing bases are particularly suitable for either, for example, home ownership or spouses come to mind immediately and some of the another options. >> those are factors that will weigh in the decision, supposal employment in particular is an important factor. but it's clear to me that from an economic and from a social perspective, if we can cut down the instinct to continually move people around, this will be a big gain. and if we can create an

environment in which people can expect much greater stability, except when they're on operations, then they have had in the past, that will be a benefit both to the army and to service personnel and service family life. >> very quick supplementary on that, if i may. yes for a large part of the forces but i would just urge you to recognize that for certain key people, both your officers say some of the technical people to maintain a career structure that's in the interest of the service is likely to continue to involve a lot of moving about. i mean, very obvious example, if -- >> is there a point you could make to the secretary of state as he put it off line? >> i think my point's been covered. >> okay.

unless there are any further questions to the secretary of state i want first to thank the committee for having been concise and disciplined in covering a large range of questions. and second, to thank you, secretary of state. i think the concerns that i expressed at the beginning about your being new to the job and your having been spending the last seven weeks traveling around places, concerns which you sort of partially echoed, have not been born out at all by this evidence session, you've been clear and clearly in command of your brief, short time so we are grateful to you for your evidence. >> thank you. >> just looking at it from my point of view, i haven't discussed it with the