years, whatever that time period maybe? one of the things that we are not yet up to speed on is our contingency planning, particularly with regard to china. china will play a significant role in the survival or thechina significant role in this arrival or the demise of north korea. and we want to ensure that we are on a relatively same page of the music, if you will, when that occurs, that we are not at cross purposes. that is going to be very difficult to do. the chinese will be very reluctant to engage in that. what we do behind the scenes will be critical in that regard. the second part of that is you still have to live on what you are dealt with, and that is a this regime may or may not be stable, that probably is not going to move toward reform, but we have obligations to try to find those opportunities, those

figures that we can exploit. and that may be done on a relatively modest basis. whether we attempt directly or in directly to engage in human rights. it is interesting that on monday, the day of the announcement of kim jong il's death, the united nations passed this condemnation of north korean team and rights. -- human rights. but there is an area where the new image of north korea, that there is going to be a new image, may been -- maybe open to dialogue or discussion. i do not hang a lot of hopes on that but it is an area we ought to explore. we have begun the process of reevaluating and are looking for a dialogue and a level of cooperation. we need to increase that and to put as much effort as possible. getting u.s. personnel on the ground in whatever limited

capacity will help in both our intelligence while understanding at a low level and not very significant dialogue with the north korean military. we also have, as victor was alluding to, the potential of the new term, nutritional assistance, it used to be food aid -- but now will come in the form of baby bottles, for which no military officer will be seen drinking from. but nonetheless, it is an area in which it is going to be difficult, because quite frankly, i believe there has been a linkage of the potential opening of bringing back the iaea inspectors and the food assistance. however much we would deny it, i think there is some linkage there. it will be difficult to get back in that area. a couple of areas that we could try to pursue to see if we pull the string and how far it goes. i am not optimistic that we

will get very far, but we certainly have an obligation to explore all of those options and any more that we can think of. >> scott. >> i agree with everything that jack said but i would add that this transitional period being an opportunity to create new decision points for north korea, as it grapples with its survivability. precisely because north korea is going to fell vulnerable on this point. they may be more willing to make some kind of tradeoffs. the hard thing is to keep to them as we saw on the agreement with 1991 which was also a critical point where north korea was worried about its survival in the context of the fall of the soviet union. >> i mean, i partially agree with that.

certainly when you're dealing with a system that is as rigid and opaque, you should welcome the opportunity for change and there clearly is one here. on the other hand, it is that the limit for the united states or any power outside of north korea, because if we take the example of that decision point, you can create a new decision point, but in order for the north to take them, you must have some sort of contact. i just not know and i believe this is the u.s. government position and now, i just did not know if it is an opportune time to make any sort of contact with anyone inside of north korea. you can contact the new leader but you may undermine him by doing that, if you are the united states, and you can contact people outside the new leader, in which you would be definitely undermining the great successor. it is like a fish bowl. we are all looking and trying to figure out things that are

happening, but no one dares stick their finger in there. you have no idea what it is going to do, and what sort of counter reaction will be created by the chinese, south koreans, or others. the ideal thing is to coordinate, u.s., china, we should all coordinate in terms of creating new decision points. as an academic, i agree that is what we should do. but in the real world of policy, that is virtually impossible. >> i am pleased to speak from inexperience. [laughter] >> whatever we do that is overt and whatever we try to take advantage of and create new decision points, for me it is very clear that that the underlying message, and it may be relatively private to the north korean, is that there is only one path.

we will make it easy for you to choose, but there are no other long-term options. that will be a message very difficult to reinforce, as victor has indicated, in a consistent way among all the parties involved, but we have to do our best. >> greg, thank you. now we will open up the microphone to the audience for questions. some house rules. basically, please raise your hand and i will recognize you. we have two roaming mics, paul there, raise your hand, one microphone, and we have marie with the other microphone on the other side of the room. please keep your questions brief. identify yourself, and please ask a question.

with that, we will go with bob warren here. up here. third row, third row. >> he is the one that has former kei president on his lapel. >> thanks for a fascinating address. i would like to ask the panel, what should be the short run decision point for the u.s. administration? should we send someone to the funeral, should we send condolences, should we show our concern? >> let me start off. the secretary of state has issued something very well crafted as the talks about our concern for the north korean people and the potential for opportunities down the road. that is the best it is going to

be and it will be seen to be what north koreans want, as a measure of condolence for the people there. >> i think as you know well, the rule of thumb on this is on the u.s. government state department, it is always easy to talk to the north korean people. to say you're for the north korean people and you are sorry for the north korean people and that is basically the formula line that they use. my understanding is that the north has said they are not going to invite any foreigners to the funeral so that precludes making a decision on this. personally i do not think it is a good idea for the u.s. government to issue an official and formal condolences about the death of the north korean leader. i do not think that that is appropriate. i think they have it just about right right now. very cautious, very much wait- and-see, and that is all that they can do right now.

>> just one thing on this. there is the prior experience of kim il sung's death, in which they issued condolences. the north koreans will compare what happened then with what will happen today. at the same time, i do think it is possible but the north koreans could actually see what they have gotten so far as a step short of where they were previously. >> let's see. let's take two questions. this gentleman first and then we will take ellen. >> i thank you for a wonderful all-star panel. my question builds on what

ambassador pritchard said about the strategic planning by the united states and its obligations. i recall a constant refrain from the bush administration that it was hard to get china to talk about contingencies the bank during that same time, for example, the u.s. military has their plans for a meltdown in north korea and the previous progressive governments in seoul were fairly allergic to talking about that. now in 2012 where we have other leadership transitions including in china, what sort of conversations do we want to have early and often, especially with the chinese? one quick comment and two quick questions. a comment -- forcing the decision points could backfire. you may not get the result you want out of that. it may be seen as a challenge to the regime as opposed to an opportunity. accepting jack's point about kim jong il having rebalanced

power between the party andthe military, scott, on what basis today is the military seeking to have a dominant role? does kim jong un have any leverage to push back on this? he is not kim jong il. i'm interested on that. and jack, assuming that the military is going to play this role, a dominant sort, what is the implication of that beyond not moving ahead with reform? >> thank you. >> i would just say that precisely because of what you're pointing out about the transitioning from a military- first role to something that is probably not called military- second, but is a different formulation, it is a real challenge. i think that means that kim jong un himself is likely to be

relatively weak within this. and the interesting question is how they try to involve into transition from what was there before kim jong il and military first, do something that is sustainable? the he critical constituencies are all internal. we have to recognize that. that is the limitation of our analysis. >> let me go back to paul's question in terms of conversations that we have with china. and this is not something that the u.s. government and the state department and others are not doing and thinking about, but you really have to approach the chinese in a very slow process. and that is not to say that we know they're going to fail so

let's start talking about military contingency plans. but to engage them on the other way. if they were to succeed, how do we do that? and as you begin to engage the chinese, you have got to earn the trust in terms of when the wisps of smoke that victor is talking about appear, then you have as gentle a conversation that will lead to more serious conversation with the chinese, or they cannot dispute where this may be headed and it is in their own national interest to do that. it is easier said than done. this is an extraordinarily difficult proposition, but you can not get around the basic fact that the chinese are going to hold the driver's seat with the survival and demise of north korea. with regard to allen's question

in terms of implication, i would start by saying i do not believe any military can govern, over a significant period of time, civil society. and so by the north korean military exerting more and more over control over business and industry and social life, it will become the ripping apart of north korea. it will be to the demise of the military and that is the implication from my point of view. >> i think the -- as paul mentioned, the bush administration did try to engage south korean government on planning for some sort of internal contingency in north korea, at that point, the progressive government was totally against it. they did not want to do it. they did not want to be as they saw as party to a regime change strategy in their own minds. and after the stroke of kim jong il in 2008, i think on

official and unofficial levels, the u.s. tried to engage the chinese on these efforts. we did a track ii dialogue on this that was not very successful. they tried to do a track 1.5 on this and had limited success. it is just not in the chinese interest to do that. i think the interesting question -- what the chinese would do, the way we would engage them, we would not engage them and say, the tragic death of kim jong il, we would say about environmental disasters on

the sino-north korean border, or a nuclear accident? that would be the avenue to pursue with them. given what has happened, will the chinese be more open to these sorts of conversations? maybe not at the official level, but maybe in an unofficial level. and here, i think, i would agree -- one way to approach this is to talk about how people would react to a successful -- do things that the chinese are comfortable with, but the other way to do it is to basically go in and have all parties, u.s., china, those would be the key parties, going in and trying to have, and i know it is difficult but try have a conversation about what we all

fear with the collapse in north korea today because our biggest enemy among the three countries is something weird happening, our biggest enemy is not what is happening in north korea, but miscalculation among the parties in response to smoke they see in north korea. that is how things happen, miscalculation, right? trying to get a degree of transparency into what might motivate each country as they respond to address perceived vulnerabilities when the smoke starts rising from north korea, that is the really important first step. this is very difficult to do, but maybe it is easier to do at an unofficial level. >> and there are other areas, i think, mentions of this problem

that involved possibilities for limited cooperation. especially the humanitarian side. it may be possible to start with those kinds of discussions. my experience of listening to the chinese on this issue is that they are more forthcoming in that area even now, it is interesting. i tried to write a scenario for the types of discussions with the chinese have one time, and began with the sentence, kim jong il is dead. at that time, it was too shocking. but now it is reality. so it is definitely worth, i think, having an effort to try to get the chinese interlocuters to respond to realities rather than a hypothetical.

>> larry, and the gentleman -- >> and question about the older son,>> speaking of kim jong nam, the older brother, who has been in exile and macao. he has given a couple of interviews to the japanese press in the last couple of years, and a couple of other publications in which he has said, within the north korean context some very politically incorrect things. even about his father's policies. what reading might there be on the question of whether he will be allowed into the country for the funeral on december the

29th? or whether he will be kept out? and if he is allowed back in the country, what happens to him then? afterwards? can we read anything into whatever decisions are made about his relationship to the funeral? also, in examining chinese policies toward north korea, did we or do we have a pretty good reading about the chinese government's relationship with kim jong nam? how close it is or whether it is distant and whether there might be the potential for a kind of chinese candidacy for this eldest son, should this scenario of kim jong un's loss

of status come about? in the near future. >> thank you. the gentleman right there? >> suppose you look at this purely at the view of the chinese, what opportunities and what options do they have to promote their own interests, independent of our own in north korea? >> let me start with the question about kim jong nam. i think there is an advantage in kim jong un and whatever process that that would allow kim jong nam back in for the funeral. there is a sense of solidarity. we all know as you have alluded

to, there been suggestions that kim jong un has attempted to eliminate his older brother, things of that nature. what you're getting at, how will they let him leave or incarcerate him or eliminate him as a future threat? i was just not. -- i would suggest not. i think he would come come and go to the funeral, and the exiled and never seen again in north korea. that is the best that can happen and i would not think of the north koreans would be following him with a poisoned umbrella tip. it just does not help them in the near term. >> i think it is going to be -- i did not know what will happen but it will be a great opportunity to observe, because who will be at the funeral? will all three sons be at the funeral? what about the daughters?

there are rumors that one daughter is sick also. it will be very interesting to watch in to see what happens, because again, we've had so little opportunity to view this. they will probably release some pictures, so it will be interesting to see -- and we will make our own decisions about politics as a result of this, but as a scholar and analyst following this, it will be a great opportunity to understand how things are operating within the north. it takes an extraordinary event like this to get those glances, but i think we will have a good glimpse of what is happening. on china's interest in north korea, robert's question, i think the chinese as we all do face a core dilemma here.

on the one hand, the chinese are just not wanting to support the -- naturally in grain to to support the status quo rather than to try to address fundamental change. and they could put off any question of fundamental change as long as kim jong il look like he is stable and securely in power. i am naturally inclined to this process, even in the face of nuclear tests and other things, the sort of support the status quo. this is a completely different situation. chinese support to secure the kim jong il regime is very different from china essentially having to underwrite a system that is in transition with an untested leader. presumably it would require a much bigger commitment from china, them being the first to

make statements and even those statements to offer, to be open to an early visit by the new leader of north korea. they look right now like they will fully underwrite this thing and then the question becomes, one, would it still be a debate inside of china about whether this is the right thing for china to do, strategic liability versus trying to hold on to this strategically declining asset? and if they decide to hold on, how long? there are clearly going to be much higher costs involved with their relationship with north korea under kim jong un then there was under kim jong il. and in the third piece of this, as i wrote in the "new york times" this morning, this will be in many ways the first major foreign policy decision of the new chinese leadership.

so do they want this to be their first major policy decision? they basically say, remember that albatross around their neck at the previous china's leadership? well, we turned that into a much bigger albatross and we're going take that. it will be interesting to see how they respond to that. >> very hard to get traction on the chinese government's relationship with kim jong nam. sometimes it seems he has greater freedom of speech than many chinese dissidents. it is a very perplexing circumstance. the real question is, does china have the means or desire to be the kingmaker in north korea? and if so, how they go about doing it? as victor has suggested, i think the chinese leadership is quite risk-adverse, and the concerns about blowback in the

event of the failure of any effort to try to choose a leader will prevent them from doing it. instead, they hold the key to success, the leader is going have to come to china in order to get the resources necessary to be able to survive. in that respect, i do not think that china can be a kingmaker, but they can enable the success of anybody that they see as a likely winner in any leadership contest. >> professor kim here, and then we have chad monitoring our twitter world. we are also mystreaming the program today, people watching online, and they are submitting questions.

>> we are viewing things from the top down. as we know, the arab spring started from bottom up. in north korea, the currency reforms failed and there were grievances. the north koreans' minds are being opened through cultural products, through information delivered through south korean movies and we are aware that there is a wide viewing of this. what is the likelihood of something coming from the grass roots? >> chad. >> a question -- this should be for you, jack. can we expect a military incident in the coming months? thanks. >> let me take the second one first. we have seen a lot of analysts in the last couple of days talk about their concerns about provocations, that there is a

high probability. this is where i differ. i think there is a lower probability that as they talk about -- and why would this occur? kim jong un. that was done in 2010 and it was done at a cost in the relationship with china, and caused them to make decisions where there were strategic and not at the time, the chinese concern about the fragility of the regime caused them to publicly back the north koreans. and there was a cost involved, a cost in their own relationship with the south koreans. to the contrary, i think that a provocation at this point would damage the potential for china to be a larger scale backer at a critical point in time.

it would undermine what would be seen as overall control. so, from my point of view, i think there is a much lower probability -- probably not zero but extraordinarily low, certainly in the next several months, if not a year. so, i am not concerned about that. let me just throw in one thing on the arab spring thing. one of the things for me in looking at other bottom-of revolutions that have occurred is the speed of the transfer of information, the ability to go from facebook, twitter, to cellphone. it does not exist in north korea. so, however scenario or model you want to create, i don't think there is the wherewithal for that kind of movement to happen in the speed that is required. >> on the arab spring question,

all revolutions never look the same. they all look different. and while it is difficult to imagine the north korean people suddenly rising up and marching on the gate some of kim il-sung 's mausoleum, we did not see it happening. but having said that, one of the things we have to remember that kim jong-il left in terms of his legacy in north korea, and addition to nuclear weapons, was chronically he left -- in north korea. if he had not failed -- that the government's at the close the ration system the -- they would not have discovered markets as today. that process has been in place now for nearly 20 years. we know from defector accounts that there is a market mentality

in north korea. there is an independence of mind in north korea society that arguably did not exist when kim il-sung died in 1994. we know it is there. we did not know how it will manifest itself in terms of the independence of mind. but at the same time, you have this leadership problem in the north. so, how this will all play out, we don't know. just like before the arab spring, we had no idea how these things would play out. but i would point out after the arab spring, every analyst you could find said, we knew this was going to happen. youth bulge, twitter, high unemployment. so, if and when something happens in north korea, we will look back and say we know this was going to happen. broken economy, starving

country, untested leaders, sudden death of kim janel. could sayt think you the arab spring will replicate itself in north korea, but every revolution looks different and i think you have variables here in both the elite side and a mass level we have not had before. and so, i would say, never say never. >> i actually believe that while the bottom-up changes are exciting to look at, it is hard to make an argument they are consequential at this stage. so, i have been focusing not so much of the middle east but on myanmar as an example of the top down shift, in that case, led by a former military who realized they were falling behind. the problem and no. 3 is the

military is probably the most isolated among north korean believes that if you look at bottom-up, we are 10 or 15 years away in north korea where s top down, there is no way of predicting whether there is a potential possibility at any moment. >> dr. cho and the gentleman back there. >> cho chung -- trade association. said what the united states and korea and other countries can do is basically to wait and see. whether it is the bottom-of the revolution or been some kind of collapse of the north korean regime, what is china going to

do, and will there be any real vacation judy reunification? -- reunification? >> university of new hampshire. i want to follow up on where scott was just beginning to go in terms of burma. there is speculation some evidence -- is that ok? in connection with burma, it seems to me that this is from the p'yongyang's viewpoint, the changes in burma are not a good development. particularly for scott and victor, and jack as well. is it your sense that changes in burma, potentially better relationship with the united states, is that likely to become a drag of any significance to

north korea? i gather it has been -- the burma-north korea route has been useful in terms of money transactions and other things. is there some opening potentially there to maybe see some better prospects? >> i would just try to answer that very quickly. i think the opening to burma is bad news for north korea, but primarily because secretary clinton and explicitly targeted the military relationship, which i think is one of -- burma policy has been one of north korea's better customers in recent years, so there is a direct financial loss that most command -- korea may face as a result of the shift. and so, that i think is the immediate costs associated with that relationship. whether or not it has broader

implications, i think it is, especially in the context of the last couple of days, it is harder to make >> on burma, the only thing i would add is -- i agree with scott's assessment. if you look at least from a u.s. perspective on what was happening with burma in terms of u.s. targeted policy on north korea -- the united states of the past years has been relatively successful in persuading many former purchases -- purchasers of north korean hardware to stop buying. burma being the most recent case. but then, of course, iraq, libya, these are other cases. maybe not successful with iran just yet but certainly in some of the other cases, quite successful.

on the question of unification with south korea, it is interesting that in all of the swirl of discussion today and over the past 24 hours, a lot of talk about dprk the united states, china, but not so much about south korea and yet this is probably the most important event the south koreans have seen really since the war. i think it is very challenging because someone hand, many south koreans probably see tremendous opportunity at this moment, yet the same time there is this realization that this is part of a larger international picture. it is difficult, and it is not advisable, for south korea to act on its own, even if it is there -- and it is important to coordinate particularly with the united states and china in

terms of moving forward. so, i think that requires a great deal of deficit -- discipline on the part of the current south korean government. i get the sense that -- sense that the current south korean government is being disciplined on this and taking measured steps. even though small, they indicate that no one is going to be sort of an offensive realist on this. the decision not to like the christmas tree at the dmz, the statement of condolences, i think these are all showing very measured on the part of the south korean government. but there is no denying this is a hugely important event for south koreans. and i think as this, -- plays out over the weeks and months, the rok role will get bigger and bigger. >> let us take a question here

-- and one more. >> actually, victor covered a lot of the question i wanted to ask. as a south korean person, the first thing that actually came to mind, on the news of the passing of kim jong il was the reunification possibilities in my lifetime. if so, or actually is it still a possibility or is it just wishful thinking? what is it that we want from the south korean point of view, from the american point of view, chinese, and japanese?

>> andrew -- washington, d.c. you mention china underwriting north korea and the markets earlier. i am just wondering what happens to the north korean economy going forward, the special economic zones along forward under the new leadership? >> on that question, in part it depends on north korean port and in part it depends on south korea. if the current government and future government of south korea continues to hold open these opportunities and other projects for the next north korean leadership, and whether the north korean leadership will accept some of the opportunities. going back to some of our earlier discussion, it is hard for me to imagine -- any leadership in north korea is going to have to make money.

the question is how are they going to do that. the hope is they will do it with some sort of reform -- such as we saw in vietnam or in china, which means giving up some degree of political control. that is the hope. the hopeful opinion is they will rely on tried and true of getting money, which minimizes the possibility of losing political control. which would make them still attractive projects. every time we see efforts of some sort of economic interaction, i am always skeptical to jump on the bandwagon and say they have seen the light and they are ready to reform. it is really a case of trying to accumulate hard currency and minimizing the risk on the political side. on the professor's question on unification, it is a hard one to

answer. in many ways, for koreans, i do not think it is a question with the koreans want it or don't want it. if it happens, it will fall into their laps whether they like it or not. i think in that sense, comparing friday to today, i think we are definitely closer to unification than we were last friday. now, we cannot put probabilities on the. we do not know when or the timeframe. but the sudden death of the north korean leader, it is hard to imagine we are not closer than we were before. >> if i could pick up on the question of whether north korea's economy goes, just on a couple of things. you can think through a scenario that suggests that initially the

north koreans are going to welcome an infusion of chinese -- of activity. they are going to need that initially. the tension in the relationship that has always existed will emerge and someone will start making judgments in terms of do we really want this and much chinese? is there another way? i am not predicting this, but you could suggest that, as an example of -- that all of a sudden there isn't suggestion from the north koreans, and apology for the death of the taurus, and some other opening that mentioned -- welcomes the south koreans back in. under those circumstances, would the south koreans come back in, knowing if they do not, all that assets that have now been confiscated will in fact close to the chinese. so, there is some opportunity

there. but we are talking margins, i think. >> the lady in the back. >> from the korean embassy. next year is supposed to be the year that the north korean regime fulfills its promise of reaching a mighty and prosperous nation. as a young leader, but nevertheless, the great-grandson of the great leader, how would you manage such expectations on that promise? and as a young leader, what kind of policy options would you use to make the best efforts to at least -- >> thank you for the opportunity.

my question is very simple what do you think about the future of the six party talks under this new leadership? what is your expectation or perspective? thank you. >> i think in politics, whether it is in democracies or autocracies, for leadership, the biggest obstacle is high expectations. and talk about high expectations. here is this young fellow, he is going to take over and he has to be there for the big april 2012 celebration of "rich nation, strong army." these are the highest expectations you can imagine. one of the reasons why all of us are a little skeptical

whether this can all be carried off. your question was then if there are these expectations, how is he going to do this? i just don't know. i don't see an easy way to do this. aside from -- to borrow a term the obama administration -- aside from going all in, going all in and the with the pitted to china. thus is really the only way. and then the question is, does it china one that? i think it is very difficult. on the six-party talks, ambassador prichard mentioned prior to the news on sunday night it looked like we were headed in the direction of slowly getting back to a more sustained dialogue with the possibility of food agreements, a pow/mia remains recovery

projects and rumors of another bilateral this week. that has obviously been put on hold. what does it mean for the future? it is really impossible to tell. all we have it is history to remind us that when kim il-sung died in 1994 there was a period of ndialogue. there was supposed to be a summit and the u.s. was in negotiations with north korea and then there was a delay. but in a october they were back at the table in geneva and actually got an agreement. i think it is difficult to say. i think at least part of getting back to six party talks is the two parties have to want to get back there. the united states and north korea. china always wants to go back. but you have to have these two parties who want to go back. at least the initial signals from the u.s. administration is we were headed back to the

direction, so it really depends on what north korea wants to do. then i would suggest that -- >> i would suggest any serious discussion -- if ne sears discussion is not going to conclude where you wanted. when you are talking about is the phrase no administration wants to hear, is toxic for talks sake. but in this particular situation where you have the sudden change in government and an unknown -- where are we going to go in the future -- all right. in terms of where are we going to go in the future, there is some merit for talks for talks sake, if you really understand it will not conclude in the resolution of the nuclear issue.

one other point that i will throw another piece of confusion rather than a clarification -- we talk about the april 15 celebration of the prosperous and mighty nation. you have another celebration that we would have had, on february 16, which would have been the 70th birthday of kim jong il. it would not have been 90 days and three months. it will be interesting to see how the north koreans observe that. is it the end of morning or just the midpoint and then they will really ramped up with the celebration of the 100th anniversary of kim il sung. >> want to say something about the expectations for 2012. i actually think that this transition really reframes expectations and down the benchmark will be -- the north korean version of are you better

off than you were 70 years ago, at the time of the last transition? we know a famine unfolded, and that creates a very low set of expectations. i think if kim jong room -- un and survive and muddle through, that could constitute success. and i think talk of great and prosperous nation will be just that and then it will fade out from the picture. >> going to take one final question. my old mentor, bill, you've got the final question. >> i think we have come to the conclusion that the probabilities that kim jong un will survive what's going on right now are fairly low. but then i am flashing back to

16 or 70 years ago and kim jong- il, and how would that ever survive? his regime? the guy was the womanizer, the largest porno film collection in the world, shooting of street lights out of mercedes? going on and on. unless you talk to his professors, which kills someone in need to do, to understand his -- which can jump -- kim il- sung would need to do, saying he was brilliant and an intellectual. but is there any difference except the age of kim jong un? any real changes or differences other than age that say kim jong un cannot make it? >> north korea 2011 is very

different from north korea 1994. i think it is more penetrated from the outside world. i think the institutions have atrophied compared to 1994. and i think that money is the route of success, not ideology. so, those are factors that i think make the sustainability of the transition, the strategy versus sustainability, different from them. >> i would agree with that. in addition, i would say one of the other differences is that kim jong-il had a lot more time to prepare. kim il-sung's death was sudden, of course, but kim jong-il had already been put in a position where he was expected to succeed over a decade before

july of 1994. that is certainly not the case for kim jong un. and i think this point about -- north korean society in 1994 is just so different than today. it is more penetrated, as we discussed. there is a market mentality that did not exist before. there's a clear understanding that among many in north korean society, the social contract, the no. 3 in social contract between the government and society in many ways has failed. so i think it is a very different situation. >> i would only just reiterate in terms of the preparedness. when you think back to 1994 and the immediate aftermath, people were saying, can he survive? but yet, he had been in the preparatory phase for 20 years, but more importantly, he had actually been in control on a day-to-day basis. that is not the case here. and it is a significant

difference between a 52-year- old could draw back to his experiences, and having witnessed the interplay of watching his father developed a country and control the levers of power -- what is this guy going to turn back to? the last backs -- the last basketball game he watched? so i think there is a significant difference and it is far more fraught with danger than it was then? >> i am sure we will be continuing to watch these developments with great interest as we move forward, and please, -- help me think our panelists. [applause] >> still got a little bit of a voice.

>> here is what is ahead on c- span. up next, a congressional hearing looking at the safety of nuclear reactors. and the wilson center looks at the future of turkey, saudi arabia, and iran. 8:00 p.m. eastern, more from our "contenders" series. >> with the iowa caucuses and new hampshire primary next month, "the contenders" looks back at 40 men who ran for president and lost but had a long-lasting impact.

tonight, charles evans hughes, chief justice of the united states. saturday, house smith, followed by a businessman and member of the liberal wing of the gop, wendell willkie. next week, starting monday with thomas e. dewey. every night at 10:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> have you tried the free c- span radio ap? p here is what users are saying. >> fast, easy-to-use, and visual appealing and the audio quality is convincingly clear. insanely great deal, considering it is also free. awesome application. it took about 10 seconds to learn how to use it. >> anytime, anywhere, get audio of c-span radio as well as all three c-span television networks, including live coverage of congress, and listen to our interview programs. c-span, it is available wherever you are. find out more at c- span.org/radioapp.

>> last week, a joint hearing looking at nuclear reactor safety quickly changed focus to allegations of mismanagement and mistreatment of the employees by the nuclear regulatory commission chair. the chair, along with the four commissioners, testified before the environment and public works committee and subcommittee on clean air and nuclear safety. this is just over three and a half hours. >> the committee will come to order. let me start by saying happy holidays to everybody. merry christmas. happy hanukkah. whatever is your preference. and we welcome you all here. >> does that mean we will be home for christmas? >> if i have anything to say about it, absolutely. it is the responsibility of the environment and public works committee to conduct oversight of the nuclear regulatory commission and to ensure that the nuclear energy -- industry

maintains the highest level of safety for the american people. let me start, as i often do, by reading nrc's mission statement -- the mission of the nrc is to license and regulate the nation's civilian use of byproduct source and special nuclear materials in order to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense of security, and protect the environment. so, today is the fifth time the members of this committee have gathered in this room to discuss nuclear safety following the fukushima crisis in japan in march. at each of those meetings, i have repeatedly asked the nrc to heed the wake-up call from fukushima, to reevaluate the safety and security of nuclear plants in the united states, and to implement the recommendations of the near-term task force as soon as possible. in fact, at our last nrc hearing

on august 2, four of you made the commitment to me and to this committee that you would move forward on some or all of the near term task force recommendations within 90 days. to my great disappointment, that has not happened. although the chairman repeatedly asked you to keep your commitment to move it expeditiously on safety, you are more than a month overdue on that commitment. it does not appear to me that such action is set to occur anytime soon, and i am hopeful maybe the commission -- all of you, especially the chairman -- tell me if i am wrong on that. i would hope there is less than a week after the report was delivered, the chairman laid out a road map to address the lessons learned from the fukushima. he set a deadline of december

21st and was proactive. without a specific timetable for these common-sense safety measures, the nrc will not live up to its message, as we just saw, to require nuclear power plants to be safe and reliable. instead of taking action, every commissioner wanted to delay a review. guess what the result was? the review came to the first conclusions of the first one. here we are coming december 15th, and not one of the safety recommendations has been enacted on. it is inexcusable. putting on reforms after a disaster like fukushima were widespread must not be an option. a house committee conducted what i considered to be a witch hunt

in an attempt to assassinate the character of the dedicated public servant. frankly, i was shocked and appalled. let me tell you what my staff and found about this accusation. the chairman, according to one respected female staffer, was " the most fair person she has ever met." she went on to say, "he treats everyone equally." "he invites people to dissent and have never seen him mistreat others." "i am appalled by the conduct of the other commissioners." inre fortunate to have greg

the seat because he is a leader. without his leadership on the commission, the nrc maybe never would have implemented the important regulations made after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. it took 10 years, but it was the chairman that made it happen finally. the nrc must focus on safety and must take action without delay of nuclear powers to maintain the public trust. i want to shari part of a new york times editorial. "if nuclear power is to have a future, americans need to have confidence that regulators and the industry are learning the lessons of fukushima and taking all steps necessary." their faith was shaken by the crisis.

the american public wants to make sure there's are the sickest in the world. but we tell you what happens when people lose confidence in the nrc and the nuclear industry. there's a petition circulating in my state for a ballot initiative which would effectively shut down the two nuclear plants we have in california. you know about them because i have questioned about them. i met one of the commissioners there and we went and investigated. there's a lot of concern. in one case, tens of millions of people live within 50 miles. how many is it? 7.4 million people live within 50 miles. the other one is about 500,000 people. here's what happened.

if the nrc does not do its job, if the american people see that they are not being protected, if they feel all this is about is a battle about who should be chairman and who will score political points in your distracting from what your head -- distracted from what you have to do, you will see more of these across the country. there are many old power plants with similar characteristics of fukushima. i speak to from the heart. can you stop this battling and talk to each other like human beings? what happened it was horrible setbacks, but it is not too late to recover. we should be focusing on the work that you have to do, not heady politics and personal ambition.

i hope that going forward we will focus on safety. we will stay away from the politics of personal destruction. senator in half -- inhofe. >> i would use some of the same words, shocked and appalled, the character assassination that have attempted to attack the character of four people. i chaired a subcommittee back in 1996 and we have gone several years without any oversight and we totally changed. it has been doing very well since then. i have to say that i am just blown away by the numerous reports of chairman jaczko's intimidation and retaliation against agency staff to

undermine the commission and to perhaps allegedly for his own objectives. his efforts to withhold information also from fellow commissioners. what surprises me is that the white house appears to condone the behavior and dismiss it as merely differences. the "management differences" that we have here are severe. but one belize bullying staffas acceptable in order to further his own agenda and i would disagree. in 2006, one of the late commissioners -- and i think everyone remembers him and never would help him in such high esteem. he made a speech to the nrc employees and i think it is appropriate to read that speech. he said, "you come to an institution, the nrc, that is routinely subject to basis --

baseless attacks by nuclear watchdog that need to demonize the nrc, you come and mean to find themselves in their anti- nuclear agenda. when i arrived here in 1996, i had spent two decades working on national-security issues as a foreign service officer then as an aide to senator jeff bingaman. i did not know that i was a demon, but it did not take the long based upon my technical judgement that we were not to the liking of the anti-nuclear zealots, became a demon." he went on to say -- incidentally this is the same year i became chairman of this subcommittee, and this is still his same speech to the employees. "honor often involve telling people what they do not want to

hear. make your enemies, but stories i could tell you from my own career would persuade year that you can afford such enemies but you cannot afford to compromise yourself." i think it is appropriate to read his statement. what we saw this weekend was an immediate concern and a very public attempt to demonize four public servants whose only crime was to conduct themselves with honor optimistic assistance as a last resort from the white house to address problems and had not been able to resolve on their own in risking their professional reputations and came forward. on behalf of the employees that now work in a hostile our environment, they're forced to choose between what they believe is right and what chairman jaczko wants them to do. chairman jaczko's actions cannot

be ignored. his actions have not impaired their ability to execute their ability, to protect public health and safety net. -- yet. the the president waiting until this happens? after all we have learned and how president obama can still believe in chairman jaczko as the best person to serve in this post, i did not know what will need to happen for him to change his mind. thank you. >> senator sanders. >> thank you. i think many of us are not happy about what we are reading in terms of what is going on with the nrc because your job is an enormously important one, to protect the safety of the

american people in our nuclear power plants. that is an enormous responsibility given what we are seeing recently in japan. clearly, the nrc has to be vigilant and rigorous in enforcing safety regime to give the american people confidence. in my state, we have the same model nuclear reactor that melted down and in japan. in my state, the people are not confident and they want to know the nrc is doing everything they can to protect the safety of the american people. the media are happily reporting but we have a major personality conflict on the commission. i do not know of that is true or not. i suspect there's more going on here other than a personality conflict. the media, some of them, have characterized, madam chair, what is going on as a coup to remove

chairman jaczko 2 has been pushing for safety reform. i think what we may have here is a situation where some commissioners did not understand the function of the chairman and were some, having a philosophical disagreements with the chairman on safety and transparency. madame chair, what i hope we will look at today's to go beyond personality conflicts and maybe understand some of the votes that have taken place and why we do not know some of them because there's a lack of transparency at the nrc. on the point of the administration on the commission, it appears the other commissioners are upset about chairman jaczko's management and that the white house chief of staff has voted -- the congress voted for the nrc to have a strong chairman. this has dated back to 1999,

long before he was chairman. madame chair, when i was mayor in burlington, we used to have a conflict. i was the mayor and we would have commissioners. there were disagreements about to have responsibility for what. the record is clear. the rules in terms of the nrc are clear and have changed over the years to create a strong chairman for the nrc. there may be some confusion about that. i think we all know that president carter put together a reorganization plan in 1980 following three mile island which clearly states, "the plan clarifies the duty of the chairman as the principal executive officer. in addition to directing the day-to-day operations of the agency, the chair will take charge of the commission's response to nuclear emergencies. on the issue of transparency, madam chair, three commissioners were confirmed on this

committee. they told this committee that they supported the chairman's proposal to open up the nrc voting process to more transparent to. today come each nrc commissioner boats, as i understand it, by writing his or her own opinion behind closed doors obscuring the process from public view and making it difficult to know how a result is reached. in addition, it takes weeks, sometimes months, after a boat is initiated for the public to learn results. as far as i'm aware, no progress has been made toward a more open and transparent public meeting process. perhaps this is a part of its philosophical difference. if so, we need to get into the issue of transparency and find out why some commissioners opposed more openness. i can remember, on a personal

level, for the state of vermont, we are right now engaged in illegal dispute in the courts with a large energy company. i asked the commissioners to tell me, and i understood there was a vote, 3-2, were the nrc had urged an appropriately and i asked, "tell me. ? how did ? " i did not get a clear answer. did you vote? did you not? in general, we need more transparent to. maya understanding is that the chairman was fighting for transparency and some of the war not. that is not a personality difference, but a political or a philosophical difference. the nrc should be concerned with safety. we are perching the one-year anniversary of fukushima in march. but we have 23 nuclear reactors as the same as the one that

melted down in japan, including one in my state. yet, the nrc has not yet acted to implement said all 12 recommendations made by the task force of senior nrc staff to reform safety at u.s. plants. the chairman has made very clear that he is ready to move on all 12 recommendations, but not all commissioners, as i understand it, agreed. 48 reactors still do not comply with prior safety rules established in 1980 and amended in 2004 to ensure that buyers do not affect a backup water systems that could prevent a meltdown, yet, madam chair, we have four commissioners against and voted to approve a delay for compliance through 2014. that is not a personality difference. that is a point of view in terms of whether you will be

aggressive on safety or not. there was one person voting for about, jaczko, four against it. it is a difference about the function of the nrc. these are just two of many instances i am aware of where chairman jaczko has been the lone vote or in the minority voting for stronger safety measures. i hope the debate today is not about personalities. all of us what safety. this means that there is, in fact, a philosophical divide, which is ok. it does not mean the commission does not function, but we need to get to the bottom of what the divide is. some of the fellow commissioners apparently desire, instead of talking about safety, to talk about personality conflicts. i call on all members of the commission to go back to doing their job which is to protect

the safety of our nuclear power plants and the well-being of the people of this country. thank you, madam chair. >> according to a rival, senator alexander. >> thank you, madam chairman. to the members of the commission, welcome. i remember the hearing for three new members of the commission. three appointees of president obama and how pleased i was in the president's appointments. two democrats, one republican, but one was a distinguished, and is, prof. at mit. one was a person with broad experience as having had actually operated reactors for the navy. one with broad experience within the energy department.

it is not always that republicans and democratic presidents appoint such well qualified people to these positions. i was very pleased by the president's appointments. in the same way, i am extremely troubled by this extraordinary action of having four of the five members of the commission write a letter to the chief of staff of the white house saying that the chairman has undermined the ability of the commission to auction and they're concerned about the health and safety of the american people. some senators say we should talk about safety, and that is what this letter says, concerns about safety. in my experience in public life, i have never seen anything like this before, four well-respected members of the commission taking it upon themselves to go to the

white house, to the president with these kinds of concerns about a chairman. i know the chairman very well. he has come to tennessee and he has looked at our reactors, and i greatly appreciate that. i welcome visits in my office, but i am deeply disturbed by this. i do not know all the answers, but i do know we have a lot of work to do in the nuclear regulatory commission. just making a short list, they're trying to restart a nuclear industry in tennessee using reactors. commissioners jaczko and ostendorff have both been there to see that things are safe, and we appreciate that. in georgia and south carolina, two reactors are being built with new designs before the

commission. i'm hoping that small modular reactors may be coming along. we have 104 reactors operating every day providing 20% of our electricity from 7% of our clean electricity. we are trying to learn the lessons of coca shima, which is simple, that it was a huge cyclone hurricane tidal wave and the electricity that brings water to cool the rods did not work. that was the problem. the nrc is working on ways to fix it, and as we have said, many times the gold standard for safety in the world is in the united states of america, and there has never been a debt because of its civilian nuclear reactor and no one was even heard in three mile island. i am very disturbed. i am particularly disturbed, and i'd like to hear today what is going on?

i would like to get back to the issues. of course the chairman has more responsibility during a disaster, that is law. each member of the commission shall have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions of the commission and shall have a full access to all information. the chairman can delay providing information, which is in the law. it is important to note whether these distinguished members of the commission feel that they cannot do their jobs because they are not having equal access to information. if someone is right here and someone is wrong, we should not just shrug it off as a personality disorder. we should ask the commissioners they can resolve it themselves, and that would be best. but apparently four of them, the reappointed by president obama, all of them distinguished reputation as a gone to extraordinary lengths with a letter to the white house.

i hope, mr. chairman, for whom i have great respect, and the other members of the commission, of whom i have great respect from canton was what is going on and that you yourselves can solve the problem to focus not just on lessons from fukushima -- we know what happened there. but we need to focus on the other issues to start producing more reliable clean electricity. when it forward to hearing the testimony and the opportunity to ask questions. >> thank you, senator. senator carpo? senator lautenberg, you are next. can you move your microphone closer to you, please? we need to hear you. >> i spent 30 years in the computer business. i cannot get these things. madam chairman, what we're seeing today is what happens

when an agency that has traditionally been controlled by the industry it serves, it regulates, it meets a chairman that puts the safety of the american people ahead of the interests of profit, the interests of the industry. chairman jaczko, the first chairman in history of the nuclear regulatory commission that has not come from the industry. he is a scientist. he runs his agency based on science. clearly, some powerful people do not like his style. that is what they think it comes down to come and i would like to hear something about that shortly.

after the accident that fukushima, i sat down with chairman jaczko for more than one hour and i was impressed with the sharp focus of making sure that our plants and felt good about what was being done to make sure our plans for safe and secure. in the months since that time, it appears to me he has done everything he can to move quickly to further improve our nuclear regulatory system, but that has meant taking on some entrenched and powerful interests. in july, the nrc task force proposed recommendations to improve safety after the fukushima, but the nuclear industry wants to delay or block some of the recommendations. according to report released last week, even the chairman's pellett commissioners tried to

delay the commission of the task force, slowing down the release of his recommendations. that was not the first time the other members of the commission conspired against safety measures. at least on eight other occasions, and the chairman pursued safety improvements that were blocked by other commissioners. faced with the late tactics and other structures, chairman jaczko has used all the legal tools available to him to improve nuclear safety. it is no safety at nuclear companies would rather have an nrc chairman that lets the industry right the wrong rules, but that is not the way government is supposed to work. make no mistake. after seeing the nuclear crisis that threatened japan this year, the american people want to know their government is doing everything in its power as promptly as can be done to make sure that the nuclear nightmare

does not happen here. the american people want officials in washington to stand up for them, not for the special interests. in my belief, that is what chairman jaczko is doing. he serves his country well, and i urge him to keep pushing forward. we need strong regulators who gets the interest of the public above the interests of industry and wakes up every day looking for ways to make our country safer. mr. jaczko as committed to approving his work relationship with other commissioners. i hope that the nrc commissioners will but this dispute behind them so we can get on with our tasks, and above all our safety must be priority. we must make sure the plants are safe, but a number of recommendations exist to make

our plans say for. our mission now must be to implement these recommendations quickly and completely. it is important to the people in my state, new jersey, where four nuclear reactors provide our state with half of our electricity. one of the new jersey reactors, it is the nation's oldest and shares the same redesign as the damaged reactor is in japan. people are counting on us to make sure that safety and security remain our highest priorities. if there is a difference in style, in demeanor, it seems to me if that is the case, then perhaps we can bear that out in a private meeting. let's let it all hang out.

i know one thing. i served in europe in world war ii. one of the most in temperate people we had was general patton. guess what? he got it done. thank you very much. >> senator sessions. >> thank you. i do not believe this is a disagreement over personality. i am confident, from what i have read in the record that the chairman has violated the explicit rules of the commission and has been abusive in his treatment of staff and other commissioners. it is not safe to have a chairman filter, screen, and alter reports on a task force the you have referred to, the task force that he collected without the input of the other members. he did not follow the procedures

that the other members believed were appropriate. i strongly believe that the assumption of emergency power that took shima was clearly in violation of law. i'm looking a letter i will put in the record, the former chairman of this commission, a ph.d., he wrote, "i can see no reason to invoke emergency powers because nothing would require a suspension of normal operating procedures. nothing in the incident would qualify legally either." it goes on to say, "i never declared emergency, and had i done so, i would have so stated in writing, would have called my fellow commissioners, and most importantly solicited their report for my actions.

furthermore, i would vindicated when the authority was expected to end, and i never would have kept them out of the center." this is just unthinkable. that is why you're commissioners are concerned about your leadership. during the august hearing, i asked mr. jaczko about the emergency powers, and i have since received a written report about his activities during that time and i find his report deficient. he did not answer the two most fundamental questions. one, why did he decide to exercise emergency power. why did he feel he could not operate with the board in a normal way? it clearly states that those powers are only available for an emergency concerning a particular facility or material

licensed for regulated by the commission. fukushima was not licensed or regulated by the nrc and had no right, i believe, to execute those powers. it two, he did not address how he declared the use of powers. he said a declaration was not necessary. he said it would just distract him from the work he was doing. andou're going to take over aggregate the responsibilities of the members of the commission, i think the american public, in talking about transparency, need to know immediately that the normal procedures are being followed. beyond by, he provided a brief report, just over five pages, and not a complete report about performance during the emergency declaration that is required. the report was not timely. what was produced in september after we had complained about it in the emergency occurred in

march. this report did not set forth each action he took court decision that he made pursuant to his assumed emergency powers, not even noticed to his fellow commissioners and it talks in vague generalities and it would certainly require a detailed explanation and record of the actions taken. i did not discuss the request for information that he and his staff received from the other commissioners during this time. they requested information on precisely how he sought to provide it. commissioner magwood clearly testified yesterday that there have been situations where mr. jaczko bill to provide important formation that the commissioners requested. the nrc's executive director of operations also testified, "the chairman influences the intermission and timing of information that is provided to

the commission." is that improving safety in america? one man gets to decide with the duly unlawful and constituted commission receives its information? 2cs is in violation of2 that says, "the chairman shall be responsible to make sure the commission is informed about the matters within its function." if we do not have that, if the chairman is not willing to comply with thought, he should not be chairman. it is that simple. it is logical. it is the right thing to do and is required by statutory acts. he has been abusive, personally, and created a workplace environment that has been very uneasy and troubling for a lot of people. i think that is an additional problem that we have here.

this behavior by the chairman raises a high level of concern. i believe the testimony we will hear today will show that be the case. this is a sad commentary, and i'm sorry we're having to have this meeting. i wish it were not so, but it seems to me, madam chairman, from what i have seen by the interviews conducted and virtually all of the high-level staff members are very troubled by the leadership of the chairman. >> senator, i want to make a couple of points. this particular hearing was called well before any of this sniping began. a look at the title, "review of the near-term task force recommendation for enhancing reactor safety in the 21st century." that is what this hearing is supposed to be about, but it is totally inappropriate for people on both sides to comment on

these other issues. i ask unanimous consent place in the record two documents, on the testimony of the general counsel of the nrc which for future claims and, second, the investigation by the inspector general that reduce your charges as well. we will have what you said next to -- let me just make that unanimous consent request and then i will take yours. is there objection? senator, do you want to put something in the record? >> i have a letter. >> of course we will put that in the record a right next to the ig report and the general counsel. >> i do not necessarily agree with the summary analysis of that report as the chairman expressed it, but i do not object to being a part of the

record. >> people can read both and make the wrong decision. >> they will move on to senator crapo. >> thank you, madam chairman. i believe it goes without saying that we are all very disturbed by what is happening here. it seems to me that it is a remarkable circumstance when four members of a five member commission, from both parties, come forward with a letter to the president to state they feel the operation of the commission on which they are serving is jeopardized. then to see those four members vilified in a corporate -- in a retaliatory attack.

they have been accused of being controlled by others in their actions. they have been accused of trying to undermine the security and safety of our nuclear operations in the united states. they have been accused of trying to block transparency in the agency. these accusations are not minor. it appears to me that it is something we ought to look into in this committee because it is very disturbing. pier read the letter that was sent, these commissioners said just the opposite. they express a concern that the nrc's essential mission to protect the health and safety of the american people is being adversely affected. it has been said they're trying to undermine a proper response

to the fukushima accident. they have made the point that they feel the chairman has attempted to intimidate the advisory committee on reactor safeguards, a legislatively chartered group of independent and risers to prevent them from revealing certain aspects of their analysis. we have a very different versions about what is going on here, but the bottom line to me is we have four members of a five member commission and, again, clearly from both parties, people who have been appointed by the current president, president obama, three out of four, i believe, and the accusations in addition to those i mentioned, also that they do not understand along and they do not really have the authority to be concerned about the issues that they are raising. i also find that to be a remarkable response.

uzziah understand it, the law says, "each member of the commission, including the chairman, shall have equal responsibility and authority on all actions and should have access to all information relating to the performance of his/her duties and spots billy's and shall have one vote. in a 1980 review of the commission, it was concluded that the chairman may not withhold or the by providing information requested by the commission. individual member shall have full access to what information in order to ensure diversity use it are properly informed. this report goes on to say that the commission's functions with intermission relating shall be given to the commissioners immediately and without any alteration. winders and there is an authority of the chair of the commission to discuss an

emergency, and maybe we will get into a bottle over whether the chairman can simply eliminate the irrelevance of the other four members of the commission by declaring an emergency, but it seems to me we are getting into some pretty dangerous territory if we start, as a committee, involving ourselves in an effort to personally attack and undermine the character of any of the members of this commission. we should look into these facts to find out what has been happening and see whether we need to take any action in that regard. i'm very disturbed not only by the dynamics of the fact that four members have had to come forward with a letter to the president, but everybody in america can see how remarkable it is that four members of the commission would deem it necessary to do that. i do not think anyone would believe that they did this lightly.

and then to see the retaliation that has occurred in response? it is truly disheartening. thank you, madam chairman. >> thank you very much. we will turn to senator -- barrasso. sorry. >> i appreciate the opportunity to talk. i have great concerns. ever since the disaster in fukushima, the world at large has been discussing the need to improve nuclear safety. the american people want us to ensure there will not be a repeat of the nuclear disaster we saw in japan. communities across the country want to be safe from harm and people around the country understand the nuclear regulatory commission is tasked with protecting us. it is not a responsibility that is to be taken lightly. the october 13th letter to bill

daley by 4 commissioners raises serious concerns about public safety. it was noted in the press and in the house oversight hearing yesterday that the letters describe the chairman's actions and his behavior as "causing serious damage" to the nrc and "creating a chill the work environment" at the agency. the letter states that the chairman "intimidated and bullied senior staff to the degree that he has created a high level of fear and anxiety resulting in a chilled work environment." most importantly, it states that the commission along her functions as effectively as it should. this is not the first time this committee has heard such charges. before the committee earlier this year, i raised the question

of the june inspector general report which stated, "several current and former commission staff members said the chairman's behavior caused an intimidating work environment. with former chairman told the officer of the inspector general that the chairman would yell at people and his tactics have a negative effect on people. they describe the behavior as "ruling by intimidation peak of that is on page 43. -- ruling by intimidation." he said there were a number of the interviewees and several former and current staff to echo what the four commissioners who are here today with us have told the white house. nearly the entire nrc out to get the chairman? or is there some truth to the concerns being raised by the many individuals trying to get this agency back on track? the must get back to the mission at hand.

we need proper oversight to see that the agency gets back from track. we of four commissioners here who say the agency is not working as effectively as it should. that means that this agency, tasked with protecting the american people, is not fulfilling its mission under the chairman's leadership. white house chief of staff bill daley said he apologized by the destruction caused by the present pension and has taken responsibility for improving communication among the commissioners." apologizing for calling it a distraction, to me, is not a distraction. this is about public safety. the commissioner need to apologize to the public for letting things get to this point. his call to have all the commissioners meet with a trusted third-party to work everything out with the chairman ignores the claims made about verbal harassment by women

by others, the hostile work environment, and in other -- no other work place would such charges be simply ignored. the accuser would never be told to "work everything out." the white house needs to do much more. as ranking member of the subcommittee on clean air, i ask the chairman of the subcommittee and the full committee to hold additional meetings to find out how this agency has gotten off track and how we can get it back on track. thank you, madam chairman. >> and next, we will hear from senator vitter. >> thank you, madam chair come and thank you to our witnesses. i want to _ in the strongest possible terms, all of these concerns that have been voiced. we are in a time following the

japanese disaster in one of the two most sensitive and important nuclearegarding civilian ne safety. we did not have a crisis situation in terms of our reactors, in terms of an immediate safety concerns come in terms of the industry, the state of the industry, the state of our technology, but the bad news is two crisis summit government and a crisis of leadership as evidenced by this discussion and the leadership style of the chairman. again, i want to repeat because it is so unimportant, that these concerns are coming from four other commissioners, two democrats, two republican, three appointed under president obama. by definition, this is obviously not some purely

partisan disagreement. i think we need to take it extremely seriously because nuclear safety is involved and it has reached, unfortunately, a crisis of government and leadership in the person of the chairman. i also strongly agree with my colleagues that, first, this committee should take a strong, active, aggressive role in fixing the problem because we owe it to our constituents. secondly, we need to urge the president to get actively involved because, in some sense, only he and the white house can really, truly fix this. i certainly agree with previous comments that a suggestion of bringing in some third-party mediator-type to deal with everyone is not getting truly and seriously involved. we need leadership here from the

president and the white house to fix this really quickly. i urge that, as well. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, madam chair. quickly in the interest of time, the purpose of the hearing today, to discuss fukushima and the aftermath, how we can prevent it from happening here come on all this is so important, but i think the real problem -- and i think we would all agree for whatever reason, the commission is pretty dysfunctional. i have not been around here as much as some, but this is probably a unique thing. it should not be a partisan issue, and i do not think it is in the sense that we have democrats and republicans

serving on the committee. the career staffers are having arelems and i'm sure there democrats and republicans, but we have a real problem. i would very much like -- we are charged with oversight. i would like us to figure out what ever steps we need to take to help solve the problem. like i said, i think fed is really important. for whatever reason, and we have a major problem here at a time when this is one of the commission that is so unimportant. after the aftermath, we have seen what happens with lax supervision. again, right now come we have a significant problem. i would hope that the committee does its job in doing the oversight to get this figure out and saw the problem.

with that, i look forward to the testimony. thank you. >> to our commissioners, thank you for joining us. i remember when we had the meeting for the three nominees, we were especially proud for the selections that he made. i remember the first time the five of you came before us as a committee to testify. i was feeling proud, knowing that it was in your hand, the leadership for the regulatory commission. a year or two later, to be here today, on the heels of the hearing in the house of representatives yesterday and been letters sent to the white

house and my conversations with each and every one of you, i share with you the dismay of my colleagues. others have said it, and i will say it again, 20% of the electricity in this country comes from nuclear power. that means less air pollution, less of a reliance on fossil fuels. we have greater energy independence, and frankly a lot of good paying jobs help provide us the electricity we need to run this country and our economy. we need this commission to bring its "a" game to work together every day. it is not perfect, make it better. there's a lot that you do well. i do not think the nrc is dysfunctional,, but frankly

where we serve, we have not brought our "a" game either. i see wonderful, smart people come of it hearted people, dedicated people. instead of the synergy in the senate, we will get sometimes just the opposite. to have a group of by people as talented and capable as you are not to be able to work together is just dismaying. i had the opportunity to chair the committee and with your blessing and that of senator inhofe, i would love to take a more active role in helping to get to the bottom of why the nrc

leadership is unable to function better. leadership is a key thing of anything i had never been a part of. when i was in the navy come on a submarine,, and i know he knows something about leadership, and i do, too. as a leader around here, when people are happy with me here, i go into their office. i go to their office. when i heard someone, i apologize. i cannot wait for them to come to me. there are things that sometimes a leader has to do in order to create that environment those are the skills that we learned, and i think the commissioner,

the leader here, may need to learn some of those lessons. this is a guy who has the potential of being a very fine share. the long as you are the chairman, i want to make sure that is the kind you will be. let me just say we have gone through an experience where we have been selected as the best air force base in the world and we went through experience were people were not doing the best job every day. three people blew the whistle on what they felt was inappropriate behavior regarding remains of our fallen heroes. what happened to them? they became demonized. one was fired and one was put on administrative leave, for what? because they told the truth. the other four commissioners

that were whistleblowing, i do not want to be a part of demonizing them, but i want to find out in the context of this conversation today that we can end up not with recrimination, not with finger-pointing, not with political gamesmanship, but we end up with a nuclear regulatory commission that will actually did the three things they're supposed to do everyday, protect the health of the american people, protect our safety, protect our security, and make sure the 104 nuclear power plants that still operate operate as close to perfect as they still can. thank you. >> thank you, senator. now, we turn to the commissioners. we have five minutes by the chairman for each of you, if you would like to, can have up to three minutes each. chairman, welcome. >> thank you, chairman boxer,

ranking member inhofe, and members of the committee. we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to update you on the nrc review of the fukushima accident in the 2011 accomplishments of the agency. before provide these updates, i would like to take a moment to make a few brief comments. as many of the have indicated, over the past several days there has been a flurry of attention paid to the dynamics of the commission. i regret these internal matters have been elevated to the public forum, and i accept my share responsibility for the situation. as i have indicated, i committed on working these issues and better understand their concerns. i have great respect for the experience and expertise of my colleagues, and i'm committed in working forward with the them to ensure the safety of nuclear materials and power plants in the u.s. in the aftermath of fukushima,

they established the near term task force to spearhead the methodical review of the nuclear reactor safety program. its members included some of the most experienced and death -- expert staff collectively more than 135 years of experience. their efforts were independent at all access to the entire nrc staff with more than a hundred hours of briefings. they also spend thousands of hours reviewing product information and consulted closely with japan. when we last pier before you, they had submitted their report for consideration. in its report, the task force outlined a comprehensive set of 12 recommendations that touch on a broad range of issues including the loss of a lack of power, earthquakes, applauding, spent fuel pools, venting them and emergency preparedness. the task force recommendations have undergone two additional reviews, one by the nrc staff

and another by the advisory committee on safety. we have benefited from the insight and perspective of industry leaders, members of the public. the staff review endorsed nearly all the task force recommendations and identified several additional issues for consideration. they also endorsed all the task force recommendations that they had a chance to examine thus far and proposed additional steps. the commission has now directed staff to begin implementing immediately partially or fully recommendations from the task force and set goals of rulemaking within 24-30 months in completing all of the responsible lessons learned from fukushima within five years. in addition, just this morning, the commission has finalized the recommendations or comments on an additional set of

prioritization recommendations made by staff of the agency in regards to the remaining recommendations. in summary, with the benefit of staff expertise, and a critical state called rampant, the commission is moving forward with these recommendations. we all agree this past year has been exceptionally challenging and a productive year for the nrc. for the nrc. we are proud to score again in the top tier of federal government agencies. the staff and commission have done an outstanding job over the past year. and in spite of these challenges, our staff remains focused on their critical safety commission and all current million -- and ultimately kept

the public health and safety at the forefront of its actions. thank you. >> thank you very much. to you have any comments? you have three minutes. >> good morning, chairman boxer, and thank you for the opportunity to speak with you again on this important topic. when we last convened, chairman boxer criticize the importance of applying the lessons of fukushima to this country's infrastructure. we have completed two task recommendations. we agreed unanimously with stakeholders to identify within three weeks those actions that could be implemented without delay, the approach i suggested. this has led to what is called the 21-day paper, and as a

result of this decision, work is underway. the nrc staff has caused numerous meetings with members of the public to formulate will making and other tools to implement several of the higher priority recommendations. we have also read finalized our guidance, as the chairman said a few minutes ago -- read- finalized our guidance, as the chairman said a few minutes ago. -- re-finalized our guidance. we will , for example, consider the need to filter events. we will consider the loss of the heat sink on our agenda, as well as the potassium iodine. fukushima daiichi provides important insights for all these issues and we can use that tool enhance our insurance safety for the united states.

the in our c review -- the nrc review -- the asrs has had continues strong involvement in this effort. the commission directed the staff to implement all its has learned from fukushima within five years. and recommend an approach that recognizes some elements have more safety imports and others and should be completed as quickly as possible. in particular, the leading voice on the commission will make sure this will making is complete as quickly as possible. we've made tremendous progress in a short time. that said, we should focus that the lessons of fukushima do not distract from the existing

regulatory work that may have equal or greater safety benefits. is vital that we prioritize our work to ensure we have the resources for those tasks. thank you offered -- thank you for your attention. >> thank you. >> thank you, chairman of boxer -- chairman boxer, for the opportunity to appear before you today. i do want to think the nrc staff for their tireless work and unflagging efforts. the near-term task force recommendations touch on a broad range of important safety areas, including the loss of power due to earthquakes, flooding, or natural disasters, to be further scrutiny of emergency preparedness activities. it includes proposals to

upgrade seismic and flooding protection to develop emergency plans the specifically contemplate the possibility of events. the task force recommendations have undergone review by the nrc staff and the advisory committee. the broad range of stakeholders have engaged in multiple public meetings. we have benefited from the inside of industry leaders, environmental groups, and the public. in several public meetings, the commission itself as her from a diverse range of stakeholders. i believe all of these efforts have strengthened the nrc's activities in response to the fukushima events. we will assess the impact of such information, and determine whether additional actions are needed. additionally, we have a special report on the nuclear accident

at the fukushima nuclear plant, which provides a detailed timeline of events after the earthquake and tsunami in japan. we will evaluate the emergent information as it becomes available, identify any additional recommended actions, and assess any impact on actions under way. in addition, i would like to acknowledge extraordinary efforts of the advisory committee, and having responded quickly to the commission's request and all the agencies stakeholders that participated in our public meetings today. i believe there sustained involvement will strengthen our meetings as we move ahead. thank you. >> thank you. yes, the honorable george -- >> ranking members, members of the committee, good morning. i am proud to testify today on

the progress that we at the nrc have made. recently some of my fellow commissioners and i have been accused of conspiring to weaken the nrc response by deliberately delaying the implementation of these recommendations. i regret such an accusation. we have acted methodically. i find it deeply offensive that these motives are ascribed to was. nuclear safety matters are technically complex. this is one of the reasons we have the commission. these decisions should not be made without careful deliberation. such deliberations include reviews of statutory advisory committees with regard to safeguards, and interest from government stakeholders. this open and transparent process -- because of the task

force conclusion that the continued operation of nuclear power plants and continued licensing activities did not pose any risk to public health and safety. as a result, the implementation of task force recommendations has been strengthened, and additional issues have been identified. in particular, members have identified containment events, the loss of the ultimate heat sink. recommendations related to seismic and flood evaluations. finally, public stakeholders to make contributions on issues such as potassium iodine. i would now like to highlight recommendation one as presenting

an enormous challenge. the task for arrested men -- the task force recommends that the commission provide a proper protection that appropriately balances risk considerations. this would take conspire -- this would take significant restructuring of the nrc framework. this decision has enabled the nrc staff to begin working on those recommendations that can provide the most immediate safety benefit. the process for reaching decisions has been transparent. thank you very much. >> thank you. last but not least, the honorable -- >> thank you, madam chairman. it has been four months since my last appearance before this committee. i am pleased to say to the

commission has provided clear directions to nrc staff. and for approving regulatory actions that can be implemented without delay. since i last appeared before you in august, have taken steps towards the understanding of these issues. it is beyond design-basis events and natural hazards. in october, i visited diablo canyon in california. during this visit, a sudden -- seismic protection walls and other aspects of emergency preparedness. the st. louis board of supervisors and state emergency officials have listened to their feedback. i also travelled to a plant in kansas and a plant in michigan to review measures for a

blackout. the commission has set an ambitious schedule for a series of voting papers for the nrc staff. the last 20 months as a commissioner, i developed great appreciation and respect for the professionalism of the nrc staff. this input is vitally important, which is why i voted to ensure their technical expertise is provided to the commission. the three fukushima-related votes i have passed since being here with you in august have benefited from this insight. we have been accused of being slow walking, not taking steps for safety. i share the sentiment of a fence at the statements. the statements are inaccurate. -- the sentiment of a fence at

the statements. the statements are inaccurate. they are misleading. is a complicated, highly technical matters that require responsible decision making. the steering committee that we have as a commission charter has provided recommendations and prioritization of actions. i am proud to say that i am personally confident employees of where the commission is making these decisions. i appreciate the committee's oversight role and look forward to questions. >> thank you. thank you, all, for your testimony. address the statement to all of us here. i think there is a reason why the public approval of the congress is at 9% and most of the 9% are probably families. if we do not get home by christmas, they will be bus, to

o -- leave us, too. [laughter] people will give us and they see as it involved in personal attacks. ,". -- us. rather than dealing with the policy. there is nothing wrong with having a policy dispute. i think we do very well. i am very disappointed with my colleagues on the other side. i think that this hearing, they almost tried to turn it into what chairman issa did yesterday, rather than the issues you all addressed. good for you. be safety questions. here is the thing. in our committee is charged with ensuring that you do your job to make certain our nuclear plants are as safe as they can be. we all know that. i will tell you, as long as i am

chairman, because some people ask about board hearings on personnel matters and such. i will be clear. maybe you can get another chairman. i hope not. i hope you trust me enough. i have to say, i will not allow this committee to conduct witch hunts against anybody. anybody. that is not what our function is. also, and i mentioned this to senator carper, when i look of the nuclear industry over the years, because i have watched it, we have various experiences with nuclear power in california. most communities, they decided they would rather go another way. i will tell you this. the whistle-blowers are the ones to blow the whistle on safety problems. they are not the whistle-blowers who blow the whistle on people they do not like.

being a whistle-blower is not -- is in the eye of the beholder. talking about safety issues, i want to ask this question. i got a commitment for four out of the five that in 90 days -- well, it is very complicated, it took longer. ok. when will you have a meeting where you will vote on these recommendations? from fukushima? what is your plan? >> we will not take this point. we have taken them piecemeal and are implementing them in various ways. we do not have meetings on activities. >> ok. so, when will you began -- do you vote on the various recommendations? put it that way? >> generally, what we vote on is the process to have the staff began looking of the recommendations. i would say in the first vote i

cast, i endorsed all the recommendations. in bits and pieces, the commission has looked at various recommendations. i would not say we of given a clear up or down vote on each of them. >> in your opinion as chairman, how many of those recommendations is there a majority support for going forward? >> i would say the clearest of the ones for which we have set our short-term recommendations. that is basically five of the recommendations. there is majority support to move forward on those. >> would you and your fellow commissioners send a letter outlining which of those five those would be? >> absolutely. >> according to experts, the loss of electricity triggered the meltdown at the fukushima plants because the reactor was improperly cooled. experts recommended that nuclear

plants demonstrate they can run a central cooling and monitoring systems for up to 72 hours without being connected to the electricity grid. yes or no, do you agree with that recommendation? >> i think that the recommendation -- the specifics of the problem i had with the. 72 hours may not be the right number. we started the process finding out how to approach that. staff is working on -- >> so, do you support having a system working for a period of time without being hooked up? do you support that? >> yes. >> how about you? >> i did vote in support of that activity. >> you, sir? >> chairman boxer, i voted on this on september 16, and also

positive this should be high priority decision making. the commission has concurred on nunn's additional recommendation -- on that additional recommendation. >> thank you. mr. chairman, up will you send me a letter, will you respond to questions i have about other recommendations? one is recommending the reactor technologies that would prevent the sort of hydrogen implosion we saw in japan. the other -- this is very important to my state -- it recommended that every 10 years nuclear reactor safety standards should incorporate any new information on the strength of earthquakes, as tsunamis, other natural disasters. please let me know your view, and please confer with the others to make sure you adequately represented there's. >> absolutely. >> there is a non-profit called

the partnership for public service and they did a survey of more than to hundred 500 thousand played -- to enter 50,000 employees. of the last five years, nrc employees have ranked the nrc number one or number two. must be very pleased. it does not seem to indicate that you are the kind of person who goes around terrorizing people. >> i was very pleased. that is a strong statement from the staff and the agency that they have confidence in the leadership and the organization and in themselves. that is a very strong note of support. >> mr. chairman, you have been attacked mightily from a lot of people from the status -- from this dais from a lot of people about your character. i think it is wrong.

i think it is harsh. i think that is the way to think about it. is wrong. you had a paper regarding your expectations concerning your view on the task force recommendations. this is what you said. "i welcome your non- concurrences. i am not telling you to non- concur. i am not telling you to say anything other than what you think. i welcome what you think. but there just needs to be a reason and you need to be able to articulate it, because the task force deserves to know that. i deserve to know that. the commission deserves to know that. the american people deserve to know that." and i put this out here because these are your words. this is what you have told your staff. it is what i would hope most leaders do, which is to say to your staff -- as a lot of us do, i hope -- tell the truth. tell us what you think.

we might not want to. . but i need to know from you. if that is what your style of leadership has continually been, to tell your people the truth, but now they have to back it up with fact. >> that is the way i like to lead, and i challenge people to defend and support their views. i think that makes it stronger. it makes it better to understand. i can appreciate how sometimes people may find that challenging sometimes and difficult. and if i ever do that in a way that causes someone to feel uncomfortable, i always want to know and would immediately address that and correct it. a thing we have very good staff but the agency. i think what we deal with is a very important subjects, and it is important to get at the bottom of the issues and pursue them to their fullest. >> i agree. i think the future of nuclear power is at stake when i look to

my own state and the people who live near those nuclear plants. they are very worried. they will be a lot less worried, commissioners, if you step up to the plate on these recommendations. if you don't step up to the plate, and it is a slow walk for whatever reason -- if i insult anyone, i do not mean to -- they are going to take matters into their hands. they are going to say, you know what? we are done with these old plants. and people do not want that to happen. is a lot of responsibility. it is not only to protect people, but the future of the industry. >> thank you, madam chairman. it is my intention to stay for the entire meeting. however, i will have to leave for a short while if called. let me say, when you were first talked about, discussed in this position, i was at a daily is of

people coming to me and saying you should not be in this position, because you are bringing your agenda in. i remember talking to you about that in confirmation hearings right here and in my office, a privately. i became convinced they were wrong. now i am convinced they were right and i was wrong. i will ask you a series of questions. they are yes or no questions. i do not want collaboration on this because these are very specific. when you hear them, you'll understand. first of all, you wrote "as chairman of our collegial body, i take responsibility for improving level of our dialogue ." >> yes. >> the nrc's office of public affairs reports directly to you. this came with the reorganization we talked about from up here. the report to you? is that correct? >> guest.

>> the director of that office reports directly to you? >> correct. >> here's what the website says. is says the office of public affairs manager is the agency's public affairs program and develops key strategies that contribute to increasing public confidence. this includes keeping top management informed of the public's interest in and news coverage of nrc's regulatory activities as well as providing timely, clear, and accurate information on inner sea activities to the public, and the media releases this information through fact sheets, interviews, web postings, and videos. i say this because i think we can all agree that is what is supposed to be happening. and yet, or is that coaster? and yet, representative markey,

who i guess was your boss at one time, released a report entitled -- and i will read the title of the. "regulatory -- how four regulatory commissioners conspired to delay and weaken nuclear reactor safety and the wake of fukushima." representative marty, your former boss, said in a statement -- "the actions of these four commissioner since the fukushima nuclear disaster has caused our regulatory meltdown that has left america's nuclear fleet and the general public at risk. instead of doing what they have been sworn to do, these four commissioners have attempted a coup on at the chairman and have abdicated their responsibility to the american people." that is in this report. i have an e-mail here, and i

will ask it will be made part of the record. it was sent by eliot brenner, the director of public affairs, at the nrc, to our reporter. sense that, my staff has contacted other reporters. 3 others have confirmed this. i have to conclude that all reporters were contacted to receive similar information on this e-mail. i would like to have a redacted version of this entered into the record, which i have already done. this is eliot brenner talking to reporters. "as we approach the wednesday hearing, it would be a useful exercise to read two things. 1918 plan with an emphasis -- in 1980 and this is -- the 1980 plan with an emphasis on the role of directors and the chairman, and also the markey

report." this is instructions to the reporters covering yesterday's meeting to read this report up here, which was about these four commissioners. i would say, it you believe rep is an accurate characterization of nrc activities? >> i was deeply disturbed when i saw the content of many of those e-mails. >> do you think this increase is public confidence? >> no, i do not. >> u.s. answer the question. it does not increase public confidence. i agree with you on that. i would argue the same characterization's at the chairman. the idea that an official

spokesman would encourage the media to read a report that is clearly designed to denigrate four commissioners, to attack the agency's capability, and to undermine public confidence, i think it is reprehensible. i have to echo some of the statements made by my colleagues. i have never seen anything like that. you committed to improve the level of dialogue. did he know you're going to use your authority as the official spokesman increased media interest into a report that denigrates and personally attacks your colleagues? >> no, i never discussed this with mr. daly. >> you never discussed this with mr. markey? you were a part of that then?

>> no. >> he did not ask you any questions? >> any questions it had to do with e-mail i provided. >> you were aware of the report and the content of the report. you wrote "i can -- i continue to be unbelievably proud of the nrc staff and their single- minded focus on the agency's mission. the staff that you are so proud of, are they the same ones rep markey speaks of saying they conspired to alter the near term task force report for fukushima? >> i am not going to comment. >> these are senior staff. >> it is more appropriate to ask congressman markey. >> they may say it is not illegal. they may be correct. a lot of things are not a legal.

is still not right. i think you owe apologies to your colleagues. in your letter, he wrote and i am quoting again, "i assure you that i come to work every day to do my job better than the day before. let me suggest to you, sir, that you reached a depth on saturday that no nrc chairman has reached during my time on this committee. @ think when you read the report and see that the person who answers to you, mr. chairman, is the one who is responsible for sending out the mission statement from this committee, and it is one where he is saying, you need to read this report by representative markey, that it is totally unreasonable that this could be happening.

the fact that he refers directly to you, brings you into it, and i told you just as responsible. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator carper? >> in your testimony, you mentioned that the commission has agreed to move forward on at 7 recommendations. may be fewer. maybe 5. could you give us the time line for when you think those recommendations could be implemented by staff and the commission? >> it is not clear at this point. moustapha is not fully developed a timeline for completion. the last information i received. at some of those near term could not be done until may or june. i indicated to stop that was unacceptable. that was too much time.

some of the letters are so- called 4 f letters. those would likely be done all of it sooner. it will get down to the point where the staff will be working to engage with the licensees. we would hope we would be far along at this point, but we are where we are. >> just to follow up, the commission as a statement that it hopes to complete all the lessons learned from the fukushima accident within five years. that would be 2016. based on the progress so far, to you think the nrc is likely to meet that goal? >> i think it is difficult to said. at this point, we have not really laid down a clear enough path to get to those five years.

i am hopeful we will be able to accomplishment, but i have not seen a plan that will get us there in 5 years. >> do you agree with this time lines. -- do you agree with those time ones? >> i agree that there are not detailed timeline as yet, but i still think that it is a reasonable target. >> thank you. some of my colleagues, and maybe even the commission have talked about the powers of the chairman, and the powers of the chairman -- they were found to be not clearly delineated. powers of the chair were not as clearly delineated as they should have been. my understanding of history is, because of that belief, after the three mile island accident,

at the urging of president carter, the chairman was given powers for emergencies and day- to-day authority. not every chairman has fully elected to use those powers. by understanding is the chairman has decided to use those powers were others have chosen not to. -- my understanding. i think of times in my own life where we had the authority to do a certain thing and chose to do something a little differently. i think we have built the interest in -- in team stability. i think you should keep that in mind, mr. chairman. a colleague of ours, blanche lincoln, i dearly beloved colleague from arkansas, she

used to say to the chair -- remember this? i cannot imagine what you're going through right now, yesterday or today. it is not going to kill you. didn't make you stronger -- it may make you stronger. my question is, will it make you a better leader? will it make you a better chair? if so, how? >> some of these questions i talked about yesterday and i have offered to reach out and talk to colleagues to discuss these issues and better understand where my interpretation of the statute or where any of my actions have been -- have caused concern on their part. if there willing to engage in that dialogue, i think we will make the commission stronger. in yen, my leadership is defined

by higher -- in the end, my leadership is divined by -- defined by higher authority. i do not think we will not have disagreements. i do not think that is realistic. we will have to find a way to disagree without being personal accusations are things of that nature. >> the chaplain of the senate will convene a bible study group thursday at 11:00. let's hope that those of us need the most health show what -- need the most help show up. we're supposed to be humble. tried to channel humility. he reminds as we are servants.

we're not to be served. need to keep that in mind. he reminds us to treat others the way we want to be treated. he describes the golden rule of the new testament. it is good price for everyone on this side of the dais. i will advise you take that to heart as we do every week. >> [unintelligible] >> thank you, senator. we will turn to senator alexander. >> thank you, madam chairman. mr. chairman, do you believe the 104 civilian nuclear reactors in the united states or operating safely? >> we have varying degrees of operation. just a day or so ago, the staff did indicate that we replaced one of our plants and in what is called chapter 350, which is a

very strong statement by the agency that we have real concerns about the safe operation of the facility. it is currently non-operating. it is shut down. with the exception of that facility, all plants operating safely with varying levels, i think, a successful performance. >> thank you. that includes the 23 boiling water reactors that are like the reactor that was in fukushima? >> we have all of those plants generally operating on six levels. -- safe levels. >> trying to understand the recommendations, to you agree some of the recommendations are different from others and there ought to be a priority in addressing them? >> the way i look at priorities is i try to step back and figure out constraints, because you

prioritize the situation draws is it appropriate -- prioritize the situation draws is inappropriate? >> on principle, yes. >> by acting, you cannot mean complete your work on them, you mean set up a process. is that correct? >> no, i think getting to the point where plants are making modifications. >> recommendation #one was technical and complex in the take a good time to complete. is he wrong about that? >> i do not agree that one will. it is more of a philosophical description of what we do about those events that are considered beyond basis events. i think what the task force was really saying is that we have never given them a label.

this is something many other of our regulatory counterparts in many other countries do. i think that is something we can move forward on. from a practical standpoint, it is not necessarily changing the decisions at the plants. >> according to united states code 5841, each member of the commission will have equal responsibility in all decisions and the actions of the committee will have full access to all of the information. >> absolutely not, senator. >> it is still the law though, right?

>> i will follow up with that. i would sector point. how about the provision from 1980 that the chairman will not withhold or delay information requested by the commission? members will still the full access to information. is that correct still? >> the end of that provision states for ensuring those matters within his functions -- that is where the tension exists. the commission clearly, all information cannot be provided to the commission. i do not have access to all the information within the agency. what i have tried to do is one of the recommendations of the inspector general, to institute a more rigorous agenda planning

process. >> i am going to save 32nd so i do not go over my time. been nk senator carper's m making good statements about leadership. i found my colleagues and reasonable. i listened to them. at least it provided a way to move forward. it is an extraordinary event when four members of the commission, including the current president, say they are not able to do their jobs. madam chairman, i would hope that he would reconsider your thoughts -- you would reconsider your thoughts. senator carper is a fair-minded individual. is your responsibility to string it out. >> since you asked me what i

said, i said we're not going to have a witch hunt. when i said was, we're absolutely going to continue this. i will let hearings every three months and bring commissioners back -- i will have hearings every three months and bring commissioners back. we are not on track to get these recommendations done. the senior staff at the nrc, we are not on track to do this within five years and that is the problem. absolutely we will have a hearing and people will ask whatever questions they want. i will not be holding a hearing like chairman issa did to delve into personal matters, because i do not think that is appropriate. >> that is good. i am glad. we're all in agreement.

>> thank you, madam chairman. i would like to begin by a -- suggesting that reporters read a report published by a congressman, a veteran member of the house, certainly one of the environmental leaders of the congress. i would suggest that there's probably no member of this committee and no member of the united states congress who heads or reject himself or herself reported this coming from the dave criticize someone working for the agency -- they have criticized someone working for the agency. --am chair >> ok, let's freeze the time.

the statement that i read -- this is what the markey report said, and this is what the employee that you referred to oust the reporters -- referred to ask the reporters. fleet andnuclear general public is at risk. instead of doing what they are sworn to do, these four commissioners have attempted a coup on the chairman and have abdicated their responsibility to american public to ensure the safety of -- i am not going to ask you if you think that is appropriate. i do not think that it is inappropriate thing for them to go to the media to have them believe something before the hearing takes place. >> in all due respect, you and

your staff have asked reporters to look it some situation on global warming which many of us think are beyond comprehension. you are entitled to your use. you may disagree. you every right in the world to disagree with that. is not anything outrageous or ron -- or ron. i am not saying you do not agree with the. maybe i agree with it. i have not read it. let me get back to -- if i might, madam chair, where i want to go. i want to get back to the point of a lot of what we're hearing today. philosophical disagreements with the nrc in terms of nuclear safety. people are entitled to have different points of view on the committee. we disagree, correct? it does not mean i am not a

decent and good person. as i enter stand at -- correct me if i am wrong -- there are 48 reactors in this nation that cannot comply with fire safety rules established in 1980 and amended in 2004 to ensure that fires do not threaten backup power systems. this year, as in your standard, four commissioners voted to approve a delay for compliance until 2014. you, mr. chairman, did not. where are your differences of opinion with the other four members? >> i think the big difference is -- even though our enforcement processes were not moving forward with the new provisions. i felt that after all of these

years, if the plants were not going to the new regulatory system, they should be subject to having their violation counted in our enforcement process. if they had areas where they were not meeting our standards, those needed to be processed for normal enforcement. i thought that would be a strong way to encourage plans to ultimately get to complying with this new regulation. the other area where there is strong disagreement, i believe this new regulatory structure or program, which i think is much better for safety, should be mandatory. that we should not be in the business of giving licensee's the option of pursuing a new regulation. that way, we would get to the business of adopting these requirements. >> let me ask you another question. after fukushima, as i understand

it, a senior nrc staff made recommendations for these nuclear power plants within the united states. as i understand it. you ask your colleagues to make a final decision about what changes so that action could be taken. as i understand it, a majority of the commission instead asked for the staff to provide even more information, some of which could take years to develop before making any decisions. why did you vote one way and a majority vote the other way on that issue? >> again, i cannot say what the others did. i felt i had enough information at that point to endorse the recommendations. i also provided the commission a plan for how we could solicit additional stakeholder input before we made a final decision and how we could solicit

additional input from the staff and our advisory committee. the plan was designed to gather up all that information. i felt a responsibility having helped establish that task force with the commission's concurrence. i felt a responsibility to support the recommendations. it worked very hard. the recommendations have withstood all the other reviews and demonstrated they were solid recommendations. i was comfortable. >> madam chair, thank you. >> by thank you, senator. we now turn to senator sessions. >> thank you, senator carper, for your wise advice to all this. let me ask you this. the former chairman, when he

declared emergency powers after 9/11, declared openly he was doing so. he did so in consultation with fellow commissioners and he assigned his fellow commissioners specific duties and tasks said they were involved in all aspects of this. you have a distinguished military record. would it be fair to say -- i think it would be fair to say you know a thing or two about crisis management. are you aware, and did the chairman make any formal announcement that emergency powers had been exercised when he was doing so? >> senators sessions, i agree with the chairman's characterization. @ think the information flow is what was happening in japan -- as to what was happening in japan was a corporate. i do not think we have the

clarity on the emergency power declaration. i discussed this. there was a lack of clarity here. >> when someone assumes command of a situation, often the normal chain of command, that should be clear, should it not? >> from my experience, yes, sir. >> do you believe under the reorganization, the chairman is allowed to withhold information? >> there is certain information -- in particular budget information -- that is not provided to the commission. that has been established in our procedures. doubt, theever

commission has the ability to specifically state that they want the information in the information is provided. >> i believe senator alexander is correct. i hope you understand that. it is still in effect. is says "each chairman will have equal responsibility in all of the decisions and will have full access to all the information." do you agree with that, or you are not bound by it? the chairman can decide what he wants to reveal to the other members and the screen information going to the other members? >> as i said, the 1980 reorganization act indicates the commission is to be currently informed of its functions. there is some information with any agency that is not within a function of the commission and that is not routinely provided

to the commission. >> i believe you're misinterpreting the plane statute. is there any other information that you think you have a right to deny the other members? >> senator, certainly when it comes to voting matters, i always provide information to the commission. my colleagues have had all the information they have needed to carry out their voting responsibilities. where i think, again, there are areas where we can continue to work and better understand the situation, those areas that are not routinely within the functions of the commission. in providing that information has sometimes been an area of dispute. that is where i want to continue to have a dialogue. >> i think the dispute is you do not acknowledge you of a full duty to respond to the immediate increase of your commissioners

and share any information you have on any matter related to the commission. if you do not acknowledge that, think we have a real problem. i do not believe it is a personality problem. i believe it is a question about management according to the law of the united states. isn't it true that the inspector general on june 6 in his report found that you control information and that you act as a gatekeeper for information that goes to the commission? but i do not believe the inspector general meant that as a function -- >> i do not believe the inspector general meant that as a function. i believe -- i would have to check the record though. >> let me ask the other members of the commission. to hat they have concerns -- do they have concerns that the chairman -- >> we are going to move along.

>> thank you, madam chairman. i want to ask -- >> chairman jaczko. you may correct the record if you wish, after he finishes. >> i apologize. i wanted to make sure nothing was misheard or misunderstood. you have said there's been criticism for the commission to act so quickly to make and recommend in the wake of the progress she much disaster. why were you so insistent that the nrc move quickly on these recommendations, being cloaked in what i think is a little bit in direct language? was it too hasty?

>> i do not think it was too hasty. we asked the task force to complete their work within 90 days. the bulk of the work was done then. the report was a very thorough and readable report. it had done a tremendous amount of research and investigation. i thought the commission could review that information and respond to it within about the same amount of time, 90 days. >> i am reading from the markey report, the committee report that says the report commissions, or report commissioners attended to -- four commissioners attempted to delay, impede the nrc near term task force. it goes on to make an accusation.

they conspired with each other and other senior nrc staff to delay after the nrc near-term task force. so, this policy difference -- can you imagine why is -- why it is that more time would be employed and not rush this thing along? do you want to respond to that? >> thank you, senator. as i recall, there was never any discussion about delaying the formation of the task force. i think we're very supportive of it. it happened very quickly. regarding your term task force

report, the only discussion i recall about the playing it was to provide a couple days for the commission to actually read the -- i recall about delaying it was to provide a couple days for the commission to actually read the report. it made sense to release the report the day became available compared to giving us the report -- >> is that were one of the most serious criticisms late? -- lay? do you think the chairman was hasty in moving to get the report done? >> no, of course not. >> no, because it is characterized as a blemish, and i do not really understand why that is. while in chatting with you, -- am chatting with you, when you

were nominated to the nrc, more than 100 environmental groups wrote letters protesting, saying -- to protect the public health, safety, and environment. when you were being sworn in, the nrc report says -- makes noted the fact that you have a distinguished career in the nuclear field, public service, but also pointed out that you served four years as associate director of the office of nuclear energy the associate director for technology and programs. that is a fairly high comfort level with the industry, and i would wonder whether they were a

help to you in trying to move schedules along and things of that nature. >> no, my role was an advanced technology, so i spent most of my time working with national laboratories. we also engaged with the industry, but it was not the principlpal area of work. mike industry interactions were pretty limited. we work with international partners on research corp., so -- research cooperation. >> we have to move. i am so sorry to interrupt my friends. senator barrasso? >> today, "the new york times,"

accused chairman of bullying tactics. the first paragraph, and exchanges that ranged from testate to caustic, four members of the commission told a house committee on wednesday there chairman had withheld that information from them, berated the industry's professional staff, reduced female employees to tears, and created a chilled atmosphere that was hurting the agency possibility the function. i ask the chairman, and the hearing yesterday, commissioner magwood alluded to three court women who were humiliated by your actions. i think these are the same instances the commissioner svinicki called outbursts of rage by you.

the democrat ranking member of that committee yesterday said he was concerned as a father of two daughters. he said it concerns me. he wondered if the allegations were true. your answers were not clear. are these allegations true, yes or no? >> no, i was shocked and i have the same mortified to hear those statements. i have a wife, i have a sister had a daughter just about 12 days ago, and i have interacted and worked with a tremendous number of people at the agency, including a norwich -- a large number of women. i have never intimidated any member of the staff. i can at times be passionate, the intensive questioning, and if that is ever, ever leading to

an emotional reaction by some of him i want to know that and i will address it immediately. >> commissioner, that mr. de's hearing, you spoke about a growing cancer of the chilled work environment. you talked about verbal abuse, pointed language toward women. the white house recommends a third-party mediator should try to work things out. based on her long experience, is that the type of solution that the private sector would do to respond to charges of harassment in a hostile work environment? should we say work it out? >> i think the private sector , clean not, but this is not the private sector. i should say whenever -- whenever those four, it is my

determination that i will continue to serve my commissioner as best i can. >> esther date and congressman asked a question -- yes today congressman asked if anything had been done wrong. it is a simple question. are any of the charges made against you from but the other commissioners or from the nrc staff true? >> my experience has been there is not a chilled work environment. the staff tell me their views candidly. i have not seen a situation where people are afraid to raise their views with me. i can be passionate, intense, i am committed to the safety job i have, and if that is ever -- that has ever been misconstrued, i want to know that immediately so i can address that and assure people that it is not the case.

i have had for two and a half years the same core group of senior managers. i have had over 15 or more staff working in my personal office, 10 of whom at this time are when and. none of them has ever express' any concern to me -- expressed any concern to me, and they have very much enjoyed working with me. >> to all the other commissioners, he testified he believed you have fulfilled your oath by signing a letter to the white house expressing your serious concern about the children work environment at the nrc. -- chilled work environment. did you believe you were fulfilling the oath of office by signing the letter? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. i agree. thank you for fulfilling your

oath of office. >> we will now turn to senator sanders. >> i'm so sorry. senator udall. >> thank you. the "the new york times" article talked about withholding information. as the commission received the necessary information to implement the task force recommendation, and if not, what additional information is needed? it seems to me there is a simple answer to that. have you received all the necessary information that you have needed in order to act upon these task force recommendations? >> yes. >> yes, senator. >> yes, with one exception, and

this is noted that the original paper presented to the commission on july 12 did not contain the detailed staff recommendations that were cordially forward it to staff. >> have you received those now? >> i have received a number of different versions of these. that paper was withdrawn shortly after that. other than that particular piece, i believe i have received the information i have needed for this report. >> thank you. >> if i could just add, that is one of the areas that my colleagues have expressed concern about. i would note there was a paper that was provided that the not contain any specific recommendations, and in my discussions with senior staff, i felt this characterized --

ized.arachter i felt it was not properly characterized the situation. i notified my colleagues in person i was going to have that paper withdrawn and replaced with a straight cover memo. at that time, none of my colleagues expressed an objection to that course of action or expressed any concern about that course of action. >> thank you. chairman, the nrc in your task force issued 12 recommendations for u.s. nuclear plant safety to be improved, and i understand the commission has directed implementation of seven of the recommendations and did that on october 20. when you look at the recommendations, they are very concrete things. i pick out a few here.

order plans to evaluate and upgrade the necessary seismic and flooding protections, strengthen blackout mitigation, order reliable hardened vents, enhance the capabilities of .pent fuel pools have these recommendations been fully implemented? what has been done on the ground at this point, and mind you, everybody should know that march 11 was when the incident. we are approaching an anniversary year and a couple of months. >> we have not done much on the ground. the industry to the credit has begun to do some of those things on their country -- on the r own. in a meeting a few weeks ago, in direct terms that i have not heard from the chairman about advising the committee, he stated that we had spent the

last eight months doing a lot of talking and it was time to getting down to doing actual work. that was a good wake-up call for the commission that we need to get on with the business of getting these recommendations into the plant and getting changes made in the plants. we're at the point now where we can begin that. >> when do you think that will happen? what is your sense of the timing right now? >> the most near term has to do with a series of orders and what the staff has told me at this point is they were targeting for may or june. i told them they need to rethink that and come up with a tighter time frame. i have not heard what the result of that is, but i expect it to be sooner than may or june. >> thank you very much. itter?ator v >> mr. chairman, i am concerned

as i have stated some of these specific suggestions that have come up. you had an exchange with by colleague senator paris soaked a few minutes ago, and i want to visit it. i'm not asking you about your intention. i'm asking, did you ever have an exchange with staff that led to that involved staff breaking down in tears? >> not in my presence, no. >> did you have an exchange that led to their breaking down in tears shortly afterward outside of your presence? >> i learned of these events in the last several days prior to the hearing yesterday. >> so you have learned of that, and how many instances have you learned off? , only what has been stated -- >> only what has been stated in the hearings. >> you may understand why they

might not have approached you. does this concern you? >> absolutely. if i have ever done anything -- i would be more than happy to discuss it with the individuals if they want and remedy it in whatever way is appropriate. >> and what in terms of your future behavior? >> i would want to understand what in my approach led to that, and of course i would not take any kind of action that could lead reaction like that. >> that me ask the other commissioners, without naming names, the you know of such instances? -- do you know of such instances? >> i am aware of three females who have been yelled at by the chairman, and one of them has

told me directly she was utterly humiliated by that interaction. >> i have not had personal experience of this. >> i am aware of these events. >> commissioner, how many events are you aware of? >> i am aware of three events. >> there are three of them that i have had personal contact the women involved and have talked about incidents. >> i guess these women do not have a conversation with you for obvious reasons, so what are you prepared to do about this in terms of those events and maybe even more parlor -- more importantly in terms of your future behavior? >> it is something i would be happy to talk to my colleagues about and they can give me

specifics about what caused the concern, and i will do whatever i -- >> right now you have no guess caused the reaction? >> there are times when i can question people in tensely, and that is something i am aware of in my style -- >> do you plan to change that style? >> i work on it every day to do it better. >> let me ask the commissioners, in terms of instances of not receiving requested information, can you outline instances of what were requesting and did not receive adequate information coming in your opinion? >> i've already mentioned the withdrawal of the paper, and the chairman acknowledged i discussed that with him.

i did not agree with how he handled that. i do not agree but this federation -- with his characterization of the staff. i have had concerns on the other information of the commission. a prospective paper came up in august that i did not believe recommended how we should proceed with that licensing. for global nuclear power plants. >> any other commissioners? >> i received the paper recently that i cannot name, because it is in front of the commission, but it had four options, and the recommendation was to go with option d, and then i learned from the staff that the staff really thought that would have recommended option b.

>> can i follow through? >> i am holding everybody. >> i would like to finish my previous question -- >> we have changed that, and i have cut off democratic and republican senators because we're running out of time. we are going to move on, but there is on to be another -- >> madam chair, that all happened after the question -- >> no, we do not have the time, but we are going to have another five minutes apiece. >> we better make the time for this. >> i will sit here as long as you want. i will sit here as long as you want. i am a fair person. we are going to have a second round, and i'm giving up my slot anders.tor senato

>> i'm not comfortable with that questioning. the door has been opened by mr. barrasso, and we are asking the chairman to testify on questions he is not aware of. the door has been opened. it was opened by mr. barrasso and senator vitter. let me quote from the huffington post. this is the huffington post says on december 12, 2011. with the man at the center of the effort to the overthrow of the chairman of the nuclear regulatory commission, and if the move is successful, he served as a consultant for the japanese company that owned the

fukushima nuclear power plant. another comet and huffington post, when magwood was nominated to become the commissioner, nearly 100 environmental groups urged his defeat in the senate, arguing he was too close to the industry to be tasked with regulating it. magwood has coordinated with the panel to delay and water down the state reforms pushed by jaczko. major hasn't made a effort to increase -- has made a major effort to increase safety standards. let me ask, and i am not comfortable in doing it, but

after hearing mr. barrasso, we have to ask questions as well, and that is, mr. magwood, this article suggests that for whatever reason, mr. jaczko was forced from his job that you are ready to take over. are you prepared to tell us as a member that that is not the case, that mr. jaczko left his job that you would not take a position of chairman of the nrc? >> as i mentioned yesterday, when i was asked a question about whether the chairman should be removed and i get the opinion it is not myrick responsibility -- it is my responsibility to provide truthful information as i saw it. i am not calling to make a recommendation. >> that was not my question, mr. magwood. >> i would not make a comment

about what my role would be either. >> that is in an interesting point, because according to the huffington -- i am not saying it is right or wrong. according to the of the deposed, you have been involved in something to get rid of mr. jaczko. you may be in line to become the chairman. i am asking you is a question. will you tell us that that is not true and that you would not accept chairman at mr. jaczko left? >> i do not think my characterization as a coup leader is correct. i do not think there was a coup leader. why i was singled out, i can only guess, but i'm not even a senior democrat on the commission. why people.

finger at me -- >> i am not saying i agree with what the huffington post road. i am quoting from a publication. you did not answer a question. as a result up political pressure, if mr. jaczko was forced out of his job, will you tell us now that some suggest that you are involved in that action, and you are tell us you're not interested in becoming chairman? >> i have never expressed interest in being chairman. it is a time-consuming job. i had not exactly that in mind. if the president asked me to a role like that, i would turn it down. >> i find that as a very interesting remark. thank you very much. >> a would suggest the president will be making that decision in

the way, and i seriously doubt that let me quickly, mr. just, the nrc reports directly to the chairman, is that correct? the inspector general reports directly to the chairman, that is you? >> it is a list reporting -- >> that is what i understand from the change is that are there. i assume you would say yes. >> with all due respect -- >> would you seek to delay the investigation? >> no. >> i know the process here. i understand a new reactor applicant sent a letter to the nrc asking the agency waived a delay between approval of a new plant license and its effective date. , i understand nrc staff

presented a paper to the commission recommending retention of the delay. is that correct? >> yes. >> the delay is benefit to the applicant. >> will help clarify the senator victor question -- vitter question. the paper -- we're talking the same paper. the staff told us there was no nuclear safety issue at all involved in the process once this federal register notice is transferred down to the office and budget.t the effective date of this rule would be timed to the check date

of transmission to omb. >> both the director of the nuclear agreed? >> new reactors, correct. >> did the delay had any safety indications? >> no, it did not. >> i will go ahead and yield my last couple minutes to senator vitter. >> i do not understand your previous comment that the budget information should not be provided on request. >> based on the statutory

history, the chairman is solely responsible for preparation of the budget. >> this is eight voting matter. would it not be reasonable that any budget matter, when they are betting on the budget, for that commissioner be able to get it? >> is not true. last year plus budget, there was a misunderstanding on my part about how information was provided, when the budget was transmitted. this year with the budgets middle i provided all previous draft versions related to the budget. that was provided to each commission office when they receive the budget to begin their deliberations. >> what was the instance where they ask for information and it was not provided? >> i do not recall pared the budget is a large -- >> your request in may, that

request will be honored timely? >> issued is more about timing. there has been a tradition -- the budget development is a process. there has been a tradition to give the chairman and opportunity to do some of the sausage making and present that to the commissioner. >> that is the other commissioners, to chime in about issues they think still exist here? anyone? >> i would like to move on. if they are not getting information time the, that is the same thing as not getting information. time is of the essence. >> senator carper.

>> a crist question for dr. apostolakis. -- a quick question for dr. apostolakis. i believe these actions would ensure we could monitor all wider levels in the spent fuel pools which was an issue during the felicia crisis. -- fukushima crisis . could you explain why, very quickly. >> it was not included in the ones that were supposed to be acted upon without delay. subsequently, it was. i am a bit confused. commissioner >> , is that your understanding? >> it has a tier 1, 2, and 3

approach. the staff candidate spent fuel implementation to the list. this has been approved by the commission. >> this is a good example of how competent people have different views. receiving information is always a good thing, but if we think it terms of the constraints, resources, the chairman mentioned earlier they felt it was of paramount importance to be done without delay. eventually we said yes to it, but it is an example of how

competent people have different views. i was surprised when they told me -- >> thank you very much. next, a question of the chairman. with work on the fukushima report and the discord between the commissioners, as the database work been compromised? >> i am not aware. >> not that i am aware of. >> where is the commission on the licensing process of potentially new reactors and the relicensing of current reactors? >> for new licensing, that is under deliberation. we have a final decision on the ap 1000 design, and then we have in front of the commission possible actions on licenses

for vogel and the summer is sites. we have a number of hearings going for a license renewal cases, which are either in front of the commission or in front of our licensing boards. in the interest of candor, this may be an area in which if we have resource constraints as a result of the foot fishing activities, we may look at license renewal as an area to pool resources. if ever to the case i do not anticipate it will have an impact on the renewals because they come in advance of the time they need their actual approvals. >> to any other commissioners want add to what the chairman said? the other thing i would say, going back to the comments of

senator alexander, senator alexander used to be an aide to senator baker. he was president of the university of tennessee, chairman of the national governors' association, and there have been times we offended people and we did not know it. in some cases we did. when he and i have done for years and all the roles we play, as we have gone to the person who is offended and said, if i have done something to offend you, i apologize. i have done that routinely. the door has always been open to let me in. i want to say to the other commissioners, when this man because you and says he wants to talk to you, and had a good heart to heart, have the door open, have a good discussion, and give him a shot.

i would say, mr. chairman, when they make the most of of -- when they do, make the most of it. >> of inhofe would be next, and is it senator sessions next? >> i would like to pursue the report issued and the chairman's -- the allegations the chairman feels is appropriate to be -- with regard to information that gets to the other members of the board, because that is pretty important with regard to the integrity of everything that you do. as board members, you have a right to insist on that. asked about that yesterday by chairman issa, mr. jaczko, is it

correct any information you have has ever been withheld on your request, and he replied, not that i am aware of. i work every day to ensure the commission has the information it needs. i guess i would ask mr. ostendorff, don't you think the commission -- that the chairman is not entitled to decide information you need that you are entitled to have the information that the commission and its staff has pro? >> in order for us to fulfil our responsibilities, we need to have the full information and the full the views on influenced by the senior staff. -- uninfluenced by the senior staff. we have provided examples of that is, and there is a concern

of ours, and that is a key fact that led to us writing this letter, when we did not believe our senior staff -- talked to a bunch of them, and they did not feel they can always present their views that might be different from those of the chairman. >> when you asked for a staff report and evaluation about an weight theirwyou recommendation berries harris. >> this is one of the key efforts that manifest the need to hear from staff. in my view not all the recommendations made by the force had safety significance. some were really important. station blackout is really important. the value of hearing from staff,

their recommendations, was where can i get the biggest bang of bach with suspected safety enhancements? >> the report you got, was it unfiltered or filtered, in your opinion? >> we had concerns respect to the withdrawal of the paper in july that appeared to remove the commission recommendations of staff about how to move forward. >> mr. apostolakis, do you agree that you have concerns in that area, that the staff reports are not getting to you unfiltered on occasion? >> i do, because there have been occasions where the staff comes directly and says what is in the report is not what we think.

that does not happen every day. in some instances it has happened, and that is not a healthy situation, it seems to me. >> do you share the same concern? >> yes, i rely on staff providing independent recommendations and i have concerns that i have not had their views in an unvarnished form. >> every experience my colleagues have talked about, i have seen the same thing. staff say papers did not represent their views or they cannot get it to us. we have had those conversations many times. >> are you aware of the incident any issa report were that chairman became shaking angry and accused the director of operations for being less than

honest when a vote paper already significantly altered to confirm the chairman's vision that did not confirmed his views? do you know incident that might be referring to? are you referring to the other that the chairman used his supervising authority -- >> time is up. we will have another round. we will stay here as long as we can. ok, we will move to senator lautenberg. >> thank you, madam chairman. is there a difference among the commissioners in how quickly the task force should implement task force recommendations? is anybody a look answer that?

what kind of a time frame? what kind of rush gets put on these things? >> i think from the conversations i have had we're pretty much on the same wavelength. we arunderstand things pretty common. we have been moving to the issues as quickly as we can. >> as quickly as we can, ok, thank you. >> i agree with commissioner magwood. >> yes, and i believe the goal of completing everything in five years is a good one. >> i s chairman jaczko who has been -we- agree that is an upper

recalled. the paper dated in october 2000 and is a paper provided to the commission, and it has a detailed plan. it does not have every single day to end there. there is a plan to move forward do this in a responsible time period. >> why is it felt that the commissioners wanted to delay the task force report on fukushima? i want ask you this question. we have heard about the scoldings that took place, and that is not nice. i ran a company that now has 45,000 employees, and i was ceo, and sometimes i will be darned if i did not lose my head and

scold somebody. i had the job for a long time. i would ask you, and i will go in order. is chairman jaczko unfit or incompetent to serve in his capacity? >> i would say that my experience with the chairman is he is an extraordinarily bright, competent individual. i have never questioned his commitment to the mission of the nrc or two nuclear safety. i have had reservations of how he conducts himself with colleagues and staff, and we have had some frank discussions in these areas. there have been a real disconnect -- concerns. >> i cannot add to that.

admire theat's chairman's grasp of regulatory issues. we have had conversations that have demonstrated that. again, however, there are other issues which i think overwhelmed the positive attributes and created a lot of problems for us. >> that is pretty heavy hollering to say you both admire his skills and knowledge, and, ms. svinicki? do you think chairman jaczko is competent? >> these decisions ultimately rests in the hands of others, and i leave them to judge whether --

>> have no opinion about it? mr. atta stockless? -- mr. aposolakis? >> as a said yesterday, he has to control his temper and not impede the flow of information to the commissioners. >> thank you. everybody thinks that the chairman is competent and that he has to be careful about hollering at people, as i understand its. this job, it seems like it is pretty sketchy. >> i am sorry to interrupt you, but we will move to senator barrasso. >> the house ranking member

yesterday warned of internal disagreements among commissioners should not become a weapon of mass destruction from the issue of focusing on nuclear safety. i want to focus on safety as people on both sides of the aisle here. when employees and commissioners within an agency are expected to execute the mission of protecting the public from nuclear disasters, is investigating allegations of hostile or environments -- is it a weapon of mass destruction that we should ignore and move on, or is this something we should investigate? >> i welcome congressional oversight, and i think it is healthy for us as an organization have that. i welcome these issues. if there are challenges, and i want to address them. i have said that repeatedly, and i have indicated it would be a good opportunity to sit down

with colleagues and talk about these issues. that is something i've proposed a year ago with my colleagues, that we work through some of these issues, and there was not an interest to do that. i continue and am committed to have a better dialogue and understand where i am exercising my party in a way that is leading them to feel they are not getting full access to information. i feel like i am working to provide that, and i would say there is a tremendous amount of information that comes to commission offices. there is a tremendous amount of information within the agency as a whole. our commission procedures specifically state when there are resources challenges and when there are multiple requests for information from commission offices, that has to be balanced somewhere within the

resource needs of the agency. that is ultimately the responsibility of the chairman. >> mr. magwood, at yesterday bus hearing, he spoke of misleading reports and a smear campaign against the four commissioners who wrote the white house. you stated you do not intend this tactic to succeed. are there things you would like to respond to in terms of any attacks? >> i appreciate that. it was disturbing to see some of these reports in the media focusing on my background. as i think i mentioned to senator sanders, my background is one that focused on research and development. i do not see myself as a representative of the industry. a lot of people in the industry have never been happy with me because they see me as an internationalist.

did have a consulting business after i left doe. i did two small reports on a policy level issues that have nothing to do with the work of the nrc. one was on an emergency planning. these are not things that influenced me today. they are things i think about. i do not have relations as with people in the industry that i consider to be inappropriate. i find these allegations to be irresponsible. the larger allegations against i thought was completely outrageous. >> thank you. commissioner ostendorff, where testimony earlier stated the white house chief of staff is

miss characterize a -- has mischarachterized the situation. >> i would tell this committee this is an unprecedented action. is not something we decided on a spur of the moment to do this. this was the culmination of many months where we have been frustrated. we have seen things that are wrong. we have an obligation to stand up and be counted. responseke mr. daly's to us is not about lack of communication among the commissioners, not about internal disagreements. it is more about doing damage to the agency, about me and the commissioners receive bank reports from senior executives about a hostile environment at nrc. >> thank you, madam chairman.

>> thank you. mr. magwood, he said it was disturbing to see reports in the media about yourself. do you think it was disturbing to the chairman to see what you said about him in terms of his relationships staff? >> i'm sure it was. >> senator vitter opened up the treatment of women. i will take that up. what is said here it reminds me of the days of joe mccarthy. i have in my pocket a list of three people he said this and they are anti-american. i know of one incident and i know of three. let me tell you, that is our greatest character assassination. what we did is we went over and we talked to several women to

find out anecdotally if what you are saying is universally true. one respected woman said that the chairman is the most fair person. she went on to say he treats everyone equally. others said he invites people to dissent and i have never seen him mystery others read one woman said what i am floored by is the concept of the other commissioners. let's put this thing to bed here. i have to be honest with everybody. there are times when i am in tents when i talk to my staff. -- intense when i talk to my staff. holier than thou. not be holier than that, because that is hard for people to take. senator barrasso proved there is

a witch hunt going on against the chairman. he puts in the record the reports from yesterday's hearing, which is a witch hunt, and he quotes on the report of the witch hunt. he puts them in the record. that is what it was. you know, mr. chairman, when you are in public life, any one of us can tell you that anyone can say anything about you, and mr. magwood is finding that out, too. so i am sorry. i'm really sorry about this. and i think what it is about is something entirely different. i think it is about how fast we are going to move on safety at our nuclear power plants. there are a lot of people who do not want to move expeditiously. that is not a fact unknown. you have to look at what happened after 9/11.

it took 10 years, and without the chairman topos leadership, itchairman's lee alicia, would never have been done. it was my understanding i septembern -- a said the staff believed all the recommendations if adopted would enhance safety, and is that agreed to move forward with each of these recommendations. the commission is slow walking the staff, and then blaming the chairman. these people have 135 years of experience. i have to say, mr. magwood, when we last saw each other, it was not the most pleasant. i asked you the following question on june 16. would you assure me the report containing the recommendation is delivered to my office today it

is delivered to the commission? you said yes. i have an e-mail from july 5 that shows your chief of staff suggested you had wiggle room and whether to meet this commitment and asked if she could contact other offices and you read back it is a prepared to discuss this with other chiefs of staff and see what they are thinking. i cannot know why you felt you needed wiggle room from turning over a report to the ranking member and myself. i mean, there are other examples of this, which i will put in the record. i think this is all about safety all dressed up as something else. i got to tell you, if i go back areas, where the have nuclear plants, millions of people live nearby, they would not be happy if a chairman was strong or maybe a little bit in

tents with the staff member, but they want the chairman and every one of you to make their nuclear power plants safe. and with that, i will call on senator vitter. >> thank you, madam chair. commissioner ostendorff, i want to go to one instance of the flow of information. the staff recommendation was different than you expected. why was that, and did the director of the new reactor's program explain the change? >> on august 10, i had a routine periodic with mike johnson. he had discussed this upcoming paper we would proceed in two weeks, with respect to this timing of the license

effectiveness pitch he told me he recommended that effectiveness be concurred with the day nrc sent a notice to the office of management and budget. we discussed it at great length there is no public safety, nuclear safety issue at all. i had a brief on another topic. i was a price on august 25 and the recommendation -- i was surprised on august 25 when the recommendation was something that i will did not think it would be. this was the same paper mr. apostolakis referred to. there was an interchange about this issue, and the chairman's request, the recommendation was changed. >> mr. apostolakis, could you comment as well?

>> the commissioner gave your more details of what i am aware of, but i was informed that what we received was not the staff's original accommodation. -- recommendation. >> in your letter to mr. daly, you use the daly"-- he used -- you used the word "apologize" once. >> i take great pride in my chairman. part of that job is insuring my colleagues fully trust and are willing to work with me. clearly, i have work to do in that area. i am committed to improving that

situation. a lot has been made of this particular paper. to put it in prospective -- perspective -- >> that strikes me as a classic non apology apology. what are you apologizing for? so besides apologizing for the destruction, do you plan to apologizing for anyone anytime soon about anything else? >> i intend to talk to my colleagues understand their concerns, and based on that discussion, i intend to do what ever is a program to remedy the situation. >> a while ago, when senator inhofe was asking questions, he asked, do you agree with the bond line of the markey report,

and i believe your answer was yes, based on emails you have seen from your commissioners. that is a bold answer, so i wanted to -- >> that was not my answer. >> would you agree with the report, that all this hubbub from your commissioners is really a coup attempt and it is all about slow walking safety? >> i will not comment on any congressman's comments. i was disappointed to see the content of many of those emails. those were conversations that were going on without my office's knowledge. that is not in the spirit of the openness in which we pride ourselves as a commission, and it is clearly indicative of a need for better communication among commissioners. i was disappointed when i saw a

lot of those emails. >> unless you want to clarify, i will take that as yes. i find that staggering. d you think the other commissioners hold nuclear safety in a lower priority than you do? >> no, i think we all -- i believe we have different interpretations. that is why we have a commission. >> senator sanders. >> this has been a very interesting hearing. there to issues -- there are two issues. the concern that is -- the issue of concern to the united states is we make sure our nuclear plants are as safe as they can possibly be. there is a lot of concern, especially since fukushima about the safety of nuclear power in

this country. i suspect what we have here among five intelligent people, all of whom i am convinced are concerned about nuclear safety, is perhaps a difference of opinion as to how aggressively and rapidly one moves forward. i suspect there are differences of opinion and in some cases those are being cooked as personal attacks against the chairman. against the chairman. my suspicion is looking at some of the votes that have been cast and there are differences of opinion among intelligent people. the second issue that concerns me are some of the personal attacks that have been made. he has been asked to respond to charges of which he is not aware. as i understand, there is a charge you have intimidated, brought to tears, some of your employees and you have indicated

to your -- to this committee you have not -- you are not aware of that. >> i was made aware that this week. >> you have been charged with having a temper. he is being of forced to respond to something he is not aware of. have you ever lost your temper before other people with you work with? >> no. >> that's interesting. >> i did not attend -- i tend to get quiet if i am upset. >> any chance you may have upset someone in the course of your discussions? >> yes. >> any chance? >> i remember when i was in command of a submarine and i recognized that and apologize in of the entire people who

witnessed it. >> and maybe i could ask my co members of the senate who i am sure in their long careers ever said anything they were feeling badly about to any of their staff members. i have no idea what kind of workplace and what goes on at the nrc that someone who is aggressive in trying to do the job that may have hurt the feelings of other people. i suspect it is possible. i suspect in all of our lives -- i have lost my temper and i suspect i inadvertently hurt people's feelings. what we have to focus on is everybody here has to do everything we can to make certain the people of the united states of america understand that nuclear power in this country is as safe as it can

possibly be. that is all i have to say. >> thank you very much, senator. senator sessions? >> thank you. ourst don't believe that problem here is a policy difference. our chairman said she thought this was about moving expeditiously and about safety and the four commissioners didn't agree with at as a matter of policy and this explains your criticism of the chairman in your letter to the president. let me ask each of you, is that the reason for you writing a letter, that you disagree about moving expeditiously to insure safety? >> not at all. as a matter of fact, the

commission has taken additional action on all the recommendations except for the first one at this point. it has actually added to the agenda and i feel we have moved forward aggressively and comprehensively. >> do you agree that this complaint you have made is only about moving faster for safety? >> i do not agree with that. >> it has nothing to do with fukushima. >> this has nothing to do with moving forward on fukushima. >> i think i did not get to complete my question about the staff -- it was reported that chairman used his supervisory authority to berate and compel staff to withdraw a voting paper that included a suggestion

contrary to his preferred course of action. you have talked about that in general. are you aware of that concern? >> this was referenced in our letter to the white house, the withdrawal of the original staff paper. it what -- it had a detailed recommendation and presented by his deputy as to how to move forward with fukushima of recommendations. that paper was replaced by cover sheet. >> that denied you and the commission members important information as you were proceeding to make a decision? >> -- >> i could have had that -- it could have had that effect? >> it could have. >> one of the allegations is the chairman used -- introduced

political considerations as part of his discussions with a democratic -- with democratic appointees. are you aware of any instance in which you were urged for political loyalty or other reasons to vote one way or another on an issue? >> i would like to not answer that question right now. i would like to perhaps get back to you for the record. >> fair enough. >> a long time ago, there was a hint -- i will ask about the

instance of abuse of women. your chief of staff stated that sometimes the tactics of the chairmen are threatening and intimidating. i understand this is a recipient of the president's award and distinguished service award. t have any reason to question her comments about dealing with the chairman? >> i do not. but i also don't think she has had any personal experience in that direction. >> thank you for allowing this full hearing. we have had some disagreements. i would urge the majority, madam chairman, to understand i believe this is divorced from policy differences. i think it is a matter of the

lawful operation of a commission has to depend on the reports and advice they get and be able to be sure the judgment of the chairman and declaring an emergency in which he then becomes the sole authority of the commission and is a very real and i thank the chair. >> i just want to say before my good friend leaves, and he is my good friend, that the chairman checked with the general council immediately before taking on any of his powers and with six or seven days of fukushima, and i will put it in the record, he got a letter back explaining exactly what he was permitted to do. i think -- that is why this is about culture and safety issues. this is interesting. i think you will find it fascinating. at the same time these

commissioners were exchanging e- mail or what ever they did, against the chairman, there was a confidential survey of all of the employees at every federal agency. this is what happens. this is supposed to be a man without leadership and a man who is cruel to his staff? listen to what happened. on the issue of effective leadership, it was rated one of the 30 agencies. on the issue of fairness, one out of 30 agencies. the issue of fairness of supervisors -- on the issue of family friendly culture and benefits, one out of 30 while colleagues on the other side make it sound like you don't care about people's feelings. your agency came out on top. one out of 30.

why is it i st. this is -- a diversion as a nice way to put it. i think it is subterfuge for something else. it is very disturbing to me. you did have opposition from 100 groups and i wound up voting for you because you came before us and said i firmly believe maintaining uncompromisingly high levels of safety is the first and most important job of any agencies that handles nuclear material. you had every single big player support you. don't say you did not because i have the list and i will put them in the record because they are all in the nuclear energy institute. why i am so troubled, i sent the nrc a letter emphasizing the importance of urging it to act

promptly to implement task force recommendations. that was a letter i sent to all of the. you have not done it and it's a nightmare to think this going to take 10 years and that is a disaster, but we will talk more about that. i have a document showing one day after i sent the letter, your chief of staff wrote to you saying attached is a letter on the task force report. i don't know if there is going to be a counter letter and you said it would be nice if someone did. why do you need a counter letter to a straightforward letter that says will you be transparent and we'll act promptly? why do you feel the need to want a counter letter to my very open letter? >> to be honest, i don't remember that exchange. but it was never in my view that there was never a possibility or

any question we're going to release a task force quickly. it was a conversation about whether to release a immediately or give the commissioner chance to read the report. >> wait a minute. and going to send this to you. that is not right. if you come before us to get our votes and i have to stand up to 100 environmental groups that i respect and say you know what? he convinced me, and many have to get a counter letter from my good friend and adversary on certain issues when all i am asking for is transparency and quick action, it is extremely disturbing. that is why i say i think we have proved, i believe -- now i bring to bear a certain prejudice about my own

arguments, but i think we proved today this cannot possibly be about what you say because your own staff rates this agency high in leadership and family friendliness. it's not about that. it's not about grabbing power because your general counsel told you exactly what to do and although there was lots in the report in that -- much that was disturbing, his -- they never found you did anything improper. you said if it was a matter of style, i will change it. >> thank you. do you think these other commissioners who are with you have a lower commitment to safety than you do? >> i have worked on the commission for a long time and all commissioners, with a different idea of what safety is.

it comes to how safe is safe enough in my voting record shows i tend to be -- i don't know what the right word is -- perhaps conservative when it comes to safety decisions and this and i am willing to perhaps require more of licensees and my colleagues are, though that varies issue by issue. in somed to say -- cases, i do tend to take positions that are more restrictive is the best way to put it. >> i'm looking at the letter you sent eight days ago to the white house chief of staff. unfortunately, you say, all too often when faced with tough policy calls, a majority of this commission has taken an approach that is not as protective of public health and safety than is

necessary. that makes us believe you do not have the same commitment to public safety. >> i think that they matter of voting records. we have disagreements on policy and i don't have a problem but those differences on policy, but if you look at our voting records, there are differences in our take on the approach to safety and what is appropriate. >> given everything that has happened and your repeated attempts to solve the problem internally, do you have the confidence that the chairman's behavior will change? is there anything else before the would like to add? >> i don't think add anything further to add. i am skeptical that change will occur.

one can always hope, skepticism is quite high. >> i do not have anything additional to add. it's a personal matter and not in my nature to completely give up on people. i do not approach relationships that way. >> i am hoping he will. >> this is an extraordinarily difficult issue. i know that the four of us have done what we think is right. we have had grave concerns and felt an obligation because of the damage we saw being done to the agency. i'd take the chairman at is word that if he is committed to changing his way of doing business and behavior, i will listen to his proposed changes, but i will tell you if we had great confidence things are

going to change, we would not have sent the letter to the white house when we did. >> if i read this letter -- you can answer any of your name because he said all of view -- the majority of this commission has taken the approach as not as protective as necessary for public health and safety in the country. do you believe you take the positions that are protective of public health and safety in this country? >> yes, i do. >> absolutely. >> yes. >> absolutely. >> thank you very much. >> i think it's important to reiterate and make sure we have it in the record that after all the attacks about the hostile work environment, in the major surveys that are done of various government agencies in

terms of being the best places to work, time after time on issue after issue, that nrc comes out to be no. 1 and no. 2 out of 31 agencies. that is pretty good and i would congratulate the leadership of the agency for making that happen. there is an issue that has concerned me for a while and that is when members of the senate have to vote, we go down to the table and we say yes or we say no and into seconds, the whole world knows how we vote. but you guys have a much more obscure and complicated process. it concerns me very much. ask a very simple question. to increase accountability so, the american people know how you are addressing and voting on very important issues, will

each of you commit to conducting votes in public where people can see for themselves how you fill your responsibility to protect public health and safety. >> i'm not sure i understand the question. we do vote in public to affirm our decisions, which -- >> when we vote, we go down and say yes or no on an issue. sometimes you vote and people don't know but until weeks later. sometimes your votes are in reports that you make. that's an unusual way to do democracy. what i'm asking is will you commit to us to conduct votes in public where people can see for themselves how you vote? >> let me commit to follow up with you later.

i'm still not sure i understand exactly -- >> it's not a complicated question. people would think we are silly if we go down and vote this afternoon but nobody knows how we vote and two weeks later, we issue a report describing how we voted. people want to know, did you vote yes or did you vote no. >> the chairman has a practice of releasing his votes within two days of casting his votes. that's the sort of thing you are talking about, that is something i would be willing to consider. >> >> my understanding is the voting process is similar to that used at many boards and commissions. when a decision is arrived at, our votes are posted to the website and made public. fundamentally a different voting system than just yes or no would be a real departure from the way we vote now, which is to vote

on complicated, 100 page reports. we often vote with a lot of commentary. >> sometimes we vote on 1000 page reports, but we do it and three seconds later, we get telephone calls from angry constituents asking why we voted the way we voted. will you support changing that? >> i support the process we use now. it allows us to consider the complexity of these issues and it has been used since the beginning. >> in all due respect, commissioner, some of the issues we have to deal with are fairly complex as well. >> i believe we should return to some of the practices that were undertaken by the commission in the past. the commission conducted the actual deliberations voting in public meetings and conducted the actual process of voting in public meetings so that the

notation process was introduced in the 1980's by a particular chairman and it has been refined over the years, but a return back to the actual voting session where we get in the room and we've discussed and do it in public, simultaneously rather than the process we use currently. >> there is great value in the notation voting process we have now. there are very intense deliberations in my office with my staff and all that and i don't lose that. i am all for public information and votes and so on, as long as i don't lose that. i'm not sure deliberating in the public is as easy as the chairman presents it, but i am willing to listen. but the vote is public.

they are delayed sometimes, but they are public. >> i'm looking at my vote cast on july 22nd on the fukushima report, i 5 page, single spaced report made public a couple of weeks after was cast. the notation voting process we currently undergo provides a full explanation of our position and is transparent. >> what does that mean? you voted yes or no and then you gave an explanation as to why you voted. >> i worked as a counsel for the house armed services committee and i've seen many votes in the senate and house and most of those areas are no votes. we have a different process that deals with notation to explain our positions. these are complicated matters. >> i appreciate that they are complicated matters. virtually everything the united

states congress does is enormously complicated. but the end of the day, to agree we could bring forward transparency, everybody agrees there should be debate, fulsome debate and take as much time as you can to argue with each other and work out compromises and do what you do. but the degree that could be done under public scrutiny and your votes are made public on the day that he makes them, i can't see why that is not a positive thing? >> any of colleagues on the other side wish to make a comment before i close? >> i would say thank you, madam chairman, you have been here and allow us to have our question that we have had a healthy debate. we disagree on lot of motivation and how this thing happened and i would just express my appreciation to those members who felt it was necessary and to raise with the

white house the problems that he saw. i believe you did it with integrity and interest for the government and i believe as a factual basis, as well established to justify your concerns. thank you, madam chairman. >> thank you. >> madam chairman, we have four members of the commission who are here. two republican, to democrat. all unanimously confirmed by the united states senate. three appointed by president obama. it is historic to sign a letter like this and it is courageous and i want to thank you for your committed to public safety and public service and i'm grateful you are all members of this commission. thank you for being with us today. >> thank you very much. i'd like to thank all of the commissioners for being here at like to say to the chairman, you are one strong, good man.

you are a good man. as i look at the history of nuclear power in this country, the people who are calling for safety get pounded i get back to that because there is no proof to a mike colleagues are saying about your leadership when just at the time they are writing a letter complaining and this and that, you are rated by your own staff and your own employee as one out of 30 on effective leadership in terms of the way you run the place. at what has gone on and i had hints of this the last time we met and i urge you the last time, please call all of you sit down and do what is right for the country. all of us took chances when we voted for you. on both sides of the aisle.

this agency is not about partisanship. it's about safety of the highest degree because look at what happened that fukushima. god forbid something like that ever happened. it has put that country on its head and whether it never recovers, history will note. but it will never be the same. we are not dealing with some harmless waste material. you know that. you are all smart on this. each one ask you question. you must answer yes or no. it is not a hard question. i'm going to send you a letter with senator sanders and others, i will have to circulated. it's going ask each of you individually, of the 12 recommendations made by the task force, which the field can be

accomplished within a timetable of 90 days, six months, one year, we will give you some chance to explain. today if you you would answer that letter to the best of your ability. if you do not know, that's unfortunate. you should know at this point. my fear is we're going to wait 10 years to get this done and my people at home may shut down the nuclear plants with an initiative. they need to know that you, we are doing our jobs. that letter is very important. yet said yes another blow -- another locations but if you feel you cannot answer that letter, say no. will you please respond to me? i will share it with all members of the committee on which 12

recommendations you think can be done within 90 days, six months, your best analytical answer for each of those. will you answer the letter? >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> you mean implement? >> a decision to send your decision to send out the order to the plans? >> yes. >> yes. >> i could not be happier. i have great suggestion. why don't you guys go out and celebrate the holidays together? [laughter] i will buy -- honestly. i feel you are also smart, let's get on the same team and let's do what's right for the country. thank you very much. we stand adjourned.

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>> with the i/o caucuses and new hampshire primary next month, "the contenders" looks back of 14 men who ran for president but lost and had a long-lasting impact. tonight, charles evans hughes. on saturday, al smith, followed by businessman and liberal wing of the gop, wendell willkie. then thomas e. dewey. that's "the contenders" every night on c-span.

>> this weekend, three days of american history tv. on saturday, visit the congressional cemetery on " american artifacts. at 8:00, a professor on american prosperity in the 1950's and 1960's. on sunday evening, would meet at the white house chefs dating back to the carter administration. then, highlights of the 70th anniversary of the japanese attack on pearl harbor. at 7:30, the history of native american military service. the experience american history tv on "c-span3." >> michele bachmann is here and she is thinking about running for president, which is weird because i hear she was born in canada. [laughter] yes, this is how it starts.

>> it is so amazing to be in washington d.c., all this history and yes, here we are at the hilton. the red carpet outside was amazing, who are you wearing? what does the matter? going into a helton. >> with more than 900 million views of president obama's appearance, c-span's coverage of the white house correspondents' dinner were some of the most viewed c-span videos on youtube. arab political uprisings and the iranian nuclear program have caused significant shifts between the relationship of that cut me -- that country, saudi arabia, and turkey. up next, a discussion on three of the middle east's most influential countries. the speakers talk about a new alliance between turkey and saudi arabia and the stakes in

iran of the current government in syria falls apart. this is about 90 minutes. good afternoon. i run the middle east program at the woodrow wilson international center for scholars. welcome to today's meeting and knees or allies in the new middle east -- turkey, iran, and saudi arabia. this meeting is part of an

ongoing series of meetings we have had for a whole year since the beginning of the revolution in tunisia, egypt, libya, and yemen and also the ongoing events in syria and bahrain. our speakers today include a senior scholar at the woodrow wilson center and former cairo bureau chief for the washington post. we have the biographies of the speakers distributed, so i will be very brief.

david's last paper as part of our occasional paper series was saudi arabia in that shadow of the arab revolt. we have a few copies still left. i would urge you to pick one on your way out. our second speaker is a former fellow at the wilson center. he is a professor of international relations at lehigh university. i just received a copy of his latest book -- "iraq, its neighbors, and at the united states." @ is -- our third speaker is the president's of the iranian -- a

national iranian american council, a former public policy scholar at the wilson center. his upcoming book is a single roll of the dive -- obama's diplomacy with iran. that will be coming out in that new year and we have plans to book talks in february. i think i would stop here and ask each of our speakers to speak for 15 minutes so we have enough time for a discussion. there is an overflow on the fourth floor and we will take questions in writing from the overflow. focus on theto recent rapprochement between saudi arabia and turkey and look

at it from the turkish viewpoint more than the saudi view point. -- from the saudi viewpoint rather than the turkish few point which i have a feeling we will deal with later. the first thing that strikes me about this new relationship between saudi arabia and turkey is that if you look at their histories, you would not a immediately say they would ever become friends. this was brought home to me earlier this month. i was in riyadh for a conference and they took us through the history -- the museum of natural history, which is the whole history of the arabian peninsula back to the big bang when the world began. on there's a whole section the three wahhabi states and

there is quite a bit about the relationship between saudi arabia and the ottoman empire. there was a startling reminder to me of how these to have historical the interacted and been enemies and foes. just to mention a few things -- the ottoman empire and its struggle with the portuguese established an outpost in an oasis in the eastern province in 1551 and stayed there until they were driven out in 1680. mecca came under ottoman rule in 1517 and fought the army of the first wahhabi saudi state -- an alliance between a religious leader and the saudi family. that is how the whole thing got

going and continues until this day. but the first saudi state began forming in 1744. immediately went to war against the armies of the ottoman empire. the sultan put an albanian ruler in charge of regaining control of mecca, the holiest site in the muslim world that have been lost in 18 03. in 1818, his son reached what had been the capital of the first saudi state, he captured it and destroyed the first saudi state. worse than that, he -- he sent

abdallah back to constantinople to be executed. that is quite an interesting history. the ottomans were in control of the western coast of saudi arabia until 1916, when the share of when to revolt with the help of t. e. lawrence and he tried to set up a kingdom there and the saudis captured it in 1924. the point is this relationship between saudi arabia and turkey carries a lot of historic baggage and helped keep them apart for many decades. but this began changing after 9/11. this was because of three developments happening simultaneously during the past decade. first was the fallout from 9/11.

the second was the party coming to power in turkey in 2002. the third was iran accelerating its nuclear program. what happened after 9/11, as you all may remember, is there were endless debates here and in saudi arabia about whether we saw each other as friend or foe because 15 of the hijackers were from saudi arabia and osama bin laden was behind it and there was a lot of tension in the relationship and the saudis decided they had to look for allies elsewhere other than the united states and, indeed, they did. when abdallah became king in 2005, one of his first trips was to beijing, just to indicate where they were thinking they were going to get major help. but in august 2006, he led to

his temple. this began a series of exchanges between the senior leaders of the two countries. the prime minister and president of turkey spent eight years working for the islamic development bank. he news saudi arabia and they knew him. off there is a flurry of diplomatic contacts and relationships between the two. initially, the motives were different. the turks were looking for new business. turkish foreign policy is very much driven by its economic foreign-policy and trade policy. they were looking for new markets. but the saudis were looking for a suny counterweight -- a sunni

counterweight. but they kept turkey from coming out on the side of the kingdom and a few between saudi arabia and iran. furthermore, turkey was buying gas from iran and they economic relations. we will hear more about this, but the turks seemed anxious not to alienate iran. strangely enough, things did not begin to change until the arabs bring this year. one by one, the turks and saudis on themselves more or less on the same side in libya. it took turkey awhile to come over to the side of the rebels there and the saudis were behind

them from the beginning. more importantly, syria, where they are now on the same side working with the opposition to overthrow the regime, though not for the same reasons. in the case of turkey, i think it is more a personal the trail. -- it's more a personal betrayal. the saudi position is to eliminate iranian influence in syria and to get even for what happened in iraq where the american invasion created a shiite-dominated government tilted toward iran which is a major loss in the saudi constellation thinking about the arab world.

here they are -- in the same side, fighting to overthrow the government. then, in september, turkey decides it is going to host the nato early-warning anti-missile system aimed mostly against iran. this publicly puts turkey on the saudi-arab sunni side of the conflict. i think that's a major turning point in double relationship because that is where turkey commits itself militarily to being on the arab side of the conflict. you might ask so how solid is this new rapprochement between the saudis and the kurds? in my view, it's mostly based on

immediate state interests and if it has political rather than security meaning for the saudi kingdom. yes, it is true the turkish decision to host the nato early- warning system is militarily important to the saudis, but turkey cannot replace the united states as the ultimate guarantor of the kingdom's security. i think turks are unlikely to ever send troops into the kingdom because of their past history. if it comes to a military showdown between iran and saudi arabia, i think they're much more likely to look for pakistan and the americans to defend them and then they will turn to turkey for their protection. you have the saudis welcoming

turkey's new engagement in the arab world and saying they see no competition for leadership. unofficially, the saudis remain wary of the turkish bid for leadership in the arab world. one because of the historic baggage between the two, secondly, the turkish model of multi-party democracy, even if it is islamic-oriented, they're not interested in any form of democracy. then, you get these vibes -- i have had occasion during the economic forum in march, there was a speech before a largely saudi audience. he spoke for 20 minutes about the wonders of the new turkish government and what they were doing overseas. at the end of his speech, he

got heard the applause of all and i was struck by the lack of excitement in the saudi audience. there are some other strange things going on. the saudi ambassador, the last one left earlier this year and the saudis have not replaced him. they have named him, but he has not gone back for reasons that remain somewhat obscure to me, except it may have to do it a changing of the guard in the saudi leadership highest levels. but there is some tension between the two. i expect you will see a lot of publicity about this new relationship on both sides because it suits their interests and there is no doubt about it that the turkish turned against

assad is the news for the saudis and the king has all sorts of reasons he wants to get rid of him. i think what you will see is the two will line up, depending on the issue. iran will help keep them together and to me, it's not impossible they will begin working together to help the sunni fraction side of the a equation and have a voice in the government there. i would say with what we're seeing is all about arab real politik and it is important,

particularly to the saudis and one of the major new developments in saudi arabia's new search for allies around the world. >> thank you. >> thank you for inviting me. i am thankful for this presentation. we keep talking about friends and enemies. maybe we need to come up with new words to explain things. the only word that came to my mind was acquaintances, but that's not very satisfying either. this in many ways captures the essence of the relationship between the three. we're not talking about friends or enemies. we're talking about states making do with what they have.

when you look back not very far back to 2010, people were talking about this great turkish-syrian-iranian axis. the fact of the matter is the events happen. some of them are momentous and there are uncertain times for the middle east. but things will change and these countries will adapt. probably what exists is an enduring competition for resources, influence, and just to be able to say i'm the no. 1 in their region. there is no question that with arabs bring and the iraq war, three countries have been taken out of the current equation --

iraq, syria, and egypt. they do not have been the influence and that leaves saudi arabia, iran and turkey. of these, the saudis are the only arab country. in many ways, the saudis see themselves very much in a do and die -- do or die confrontation with the iranians. partially as sectarian and partially it is unclear. they see the emergence of the iraqi state as a major loss for their own strategic position and they resent the fact that the company -- that the country has a prime minister and day for president. -- and a kurd for president. they may take -- their main ally, syria, is in deep trouble

and the regime there may collapse. with it, that would be a serious blow not just to iran, but also with respect to have a lot -- with respect to hezbollah. both in syria and in iraq, you see the saudis at loggerheads. you can look at the turks as a potential balance. it is ruled by a party with her religious roots that are sunni in orientation, but it is also not exactly an islamic country. it is a secular country and the prime minister went on a victory tour in north africa basically saying individuals cannot be secular but governments have to

be secular. so it is a government in turkey that is still a member of the west, has alliances with the west, but is increasingly playing an important role in foreign policy both in the region and beyond. when you look at turkish foreign policy, as to drivers. number one is that turkey wants to be an important global player. it is not just regional. the region is a stepping stone for greater glory, if you want. the turks are part of many international institutions. they're part of the g-20, they are trying to play an international role. but what happened with the arabs bring has opened up many new opportunities. the other driver which david alluded to is commercial.

hear, the turks, when you look at the turkish economy, if you look at turkish exports since 2000 and this is a transformation in the turkish economy -- it goes up exponentially in terms of the rate at which is increasing. commerce and exports are critical to turkey. when you look at turkey's problems with its neighbors policy, it was driven by this imperative to open up markets and sell more things to the neighbors which had been in this government's perception ignored in previous times. to some extent, this need for a zero problems and that this need to be able to export has driven turkey to the status-quo

oriented. it did not want change or chaos. chaos came but it never saw it. in part, it did not seek it because it did not want to upset commercial relations. when you look at their relationship with syria, libya, all the regional countries, it was not problems with neighbors, it was problems with regimes. it is regimes with which they established relationships and that's understandable because the regime's control all the access to trade. at the same time, the turks have proven to be quite pragmatic and adaptable. things changed when relations with israel change, for instance, they took advantage. they turned that deteriorating

relationship to their advantage. they used it to camouflage some of the changes they made with respect to libya and syria. but nonetheless, it helped and they used it to create sympathy and support on the arab street and i don't know to what extent we should believe them, but there's no question that these opinion polls done by the university of maryland show both turkey and abdullah are very popular. but the turks have proven to be very adaptable. day realized small-market of the was the problem -- they realized gaddafi was the problem. assad was the poster child for turkey's problems with the neighbors. they went from almost war to a

situation where the two countries were talking about two peoples, one government, so much integration between the two and yet, there was a change. and the changes pragmatism. there is a little bit, as david mentioned, toward the south, but it is a calculation the turks made that assad is not going to survive and the sooner he goes, the better for turkey. a country mired in civil war with this type of instability is not likely to be a very good trading partner for turkey or any type of partner for turkey. so the sooner egos and is replaced and the turks can build a relationship, this -- the sooner he goes and is replaced, the eight turks can build a better relationship.

you see this change in iraq, where for many years, the turkish government could not even utter the words of the kurdistan regional government. today, they're one of turkey's most important trading partners. if you go to northern iraq, just about every other shop is full with turkish goods, turkish banks are there and everything is turkish. it is in both syria and iraq that ec -- that you see competition for a lack of a better word, yes the iranians and the turks have carved up in the north, the turks are far more prominent and dominant. they see a relationship with ank

a to the west as their most important link. the shyatt south is obviously much more dependent on iran and the center, of course, is still, if there is any influence, the iranians are probably more powerful there, but nonetheless i think we should not exaggerate the iranians' or anyone else's influence in the wake of the americans' departure from iraq. iraq will chart its own course. and let's face it. iran-iraq do this bitter memories. there were still border issues. still the iran-iraq war as a memory. but clearly there is competition and clearly the top saudis are also involved and the saudis are trying to support the sunni position, if you want.

so that competition will exist. before i talk to syria, let me talk about the turkish-aaronian relationship. it has gone through ups and downs but technically it is a relationship that is solid but unexciting. the two countries do have very strong commercial ties. the turks are completely energy dependent on imports of energy, whether from russia, the primary gas supplier. iran is the number two supplier. it's not just gas they import but ian:. and that energy need

continuously increases and therefore the turkish are not in a position to alienate the iranians. pipelines are not like tankers. you can't just ship it from one nation to another. so both nations know that they have to co-exist with each other. there have been times when the turks have been very nice to the iranians. the turks never criticize the problems with the neighboring regimes. they never criticized the 2010 election with putin and chavez the first to congratulate him on his glorious victory. the pressure on the united nationses when they were on the security council they came up with an agreement with the

brazilians that really upset the units and created a huge -- united states and created a huge crisis with the united states. but on the other hand you see for instance, that the oinians are upset with what the turks are doing in the arab spring and we heard iranian officials saying if there is an attack on iran, one of the first targets of the iranian retaliation will be where the radar is. but god knows when that radar is going to come in so they will be bombing empty places. but let's face it. if you're an iranian, did you think that the turks had a choice when it came to the radar? had the turks said know -- no it

would have been the only country in nato that would have gone against the nato consensus and would certainly have gone against the united states. and given some of the tensions that exist in that city, that would have been played right into the hands of -- so the iranians understand that yes, they will make some noise about it but i don't think it was ever a serious issue. but sierra will be the most important -- syria will be the most important task. syria is two critical for iran and the loss of syria would be devastating because it stops access to hezbollah. it isn't so much that the turks have taken a position against bashar. they're now actively engaged in

undermining bashar. the turks have been instrumental in helping this opposition come together. they have engaged in some -- some sanctions, but they have, in many ways -- it's like the turkish position on bashar, the decision to support bashar is like the good housekeeping seal because they were so close. they were really part like one family. so for add wan to turn around and -- adwan to turned around and -- turn around and go to bashar, this is what is upsetting the iranians more. but the question is if there is a civil war in syria what will the turks do? let's not forget that turkey, because of its long -- land border and also the proximity of

the coasts. turkey is the only country that can play a very active role in the event of the decision to intervene mill stormy or a civil war, etc. and that's when we'll see whether the iranians -- iranians reacts against syri. a. thank you. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. it's a great pleasure being here. thank you for your kind invitation. as always you pick the timeliest issues to discuss and the question of turkey, iran and saudi arabia is critical in shaping the regional security in the region. my talk will focus primarily on looking at this from that gee political perspective. looking at the region, you see that iran has been a longtime opponent of the status quo and the american-led securement order.

long harboring aspirations for regional preemnenls. the current order or what's left of it is an order favoring states and that tends to punish any opposition to american leadership or to israeli interests. and one of the most powerful states in the region, iran is not part of any security arrangement wilkes-barre the region. in fact -- within the region. iran has no volleys. has no seat at the table and if you are not at the table you are essentially on the menu, or that's the way the iranians view it. as such, the iranians have welcomed american decline and taken advantage of washington's many mistakes in the last couple of years. in the period prior to 2009, the iranians managed to extend their

influence both by declining american power but by expanding its soft power base. on the other side of the sprect rum you have saudi arabia, a key benefactor of the old american order. it is an order that has crumbled and as washington has come to recognize that the status quo is ten nl, saudi arabia and israel have emerged as the two states as the most probable to resurrect the old order. it's an order that contained iraq and iran. it's an order that made sure that the west backed the pro-western governments in the region in spite of their lack of domestic popularity or legitimacy. it's also an order that made sure that the american-salled

relationship was on a strong footing and that at least made some calls for an end to the palestinian-iranian conflict. it was saudi arabia in the moderate states. but since the invasion of iraq, iran has been unleashed as a result of the defeat of saddam and the taliban. iraq has fallen into the hands of a pro-iranian shyatt regime, as saudi arabia views it. washington has, in the eyes of the saudis, betrayed his -- its long-standing allies in the region by signing with some of the pro-democracy movements and all of that has as a resulted in -- resulted in tense relation

between the united states and saudis. saudi arabia would be squarely on the wrong side of history, at least according to the defense by president obama. turkey, on the other hand, is a more comply kayed case, as henri said. saudi arabia only began openly defying washington once it deemed that obama had abandoned the desire to resurrect the old order. turkey has been a pretty loyal ally that only turned definite in in order to hasten and secure a new position in the new order once it realized the united states no longer had the ability to turn the clock back. washington's ant to restore to orlando is lacking and now turkey sees in this transition, in the arab spring, an opportunity for itself to expand its leadership and fill some of

that vacuum and there i think it's oftentimes been viewed that turkey programs has become a lost ally or perhaps a perot iranian power, whereas it seems much of turkish positioning has been aimed at countering iran's attempts to turn a post american order into a pro-iranian order. recognizing the propensity for a hostile relation with iran, turkey has sought a balance by expanding as many areas of corporation as possible. the turks realize the damage this could do and as a state with a foot in europe, it also recognizes the benefits that come by trance signaturing the security bar -- par dial towards collective security. you can contain rivals and make

sure they turnless instructive. the upheaval in the last year has put the exiting tensions to the fore. saudi arabia's quest to contain and box in iran is now in the open. private conversations about cutting off the head of the snake seem increasingly part of public policy. turkey's no-problem policy in attempt to maintain a healthi balance with iran has essentially prematurely ended as a result of what is happening in syria and iran's endeavor to use its soft and hard power to clinch a lim role in the aftermath of america's exit has fallen behind due to its own treatment of its own population in 2009 and the depletion of iran's regional soft power. iran is a regional state that has lost its momentum.

there are a few things that can be said about tehran's slaringses and maneuvering. after initially underestimating turkey's intent and capacity, they're realizing that they're putting up a real challenge to iran's leadership in the lay-up. iran lim rested on the idea of islamic existence against a less relevant west, an idea that enjoyed maximum support as long as the rift between the arab population and regimes were at the greatest and at the present time iran was one of the few states that adopted that position. turkey's assertiveness and build for lim rests on its ability to combine secular, democratic, political system with a strong identity. tehran has been taken a little

bit off-guard by the rise of turkey. you can increasingly see anti-turkish columns in the papers. and tehran is increasingly putting turkey rhetorically in the same camp as israel and saudi arabia, both to warn about the falling in their view of putting it eggs in the western basket but also to discelebrity credit turkey in the regional auld by lumping it with israel. there have been some indications of cooperation and closer relations between china and russia. the russians have no interest to see the pro--- and as a result

seeing states such as syria and iran becoming targets is not something that the russians and chinese would view lightly. this has enabled closer coordination between tehran and moscow. whether it's long lasting remains to be seen. i would argue that tehran realizes that it faces few short-term opportunities to expand its influence. in the short term, iran is on the defensive. it's on the defensive vis-a-vis turkey. it is on the defensive to vis-a-vis saudi arabia and on the united states and vis-a-vis the situation in syria. but that's not necessarily the same as assessing themselves as being weak.

i think the iranians are adopting a longer term view when they count on the short-term setbacks to be offset by the regional states' natural gravitation away from the west and towards more independent postures, particularly if the islamic movements continue to scorme wins at the boxes. that is the way the hard liners predict that the arc of history will bend. >> thank you very much. we open the floor now. question to you. after the incident that the aaron iran rans were trying to a sass natt this ambassador in washington, the iranians denied it and just last week, the

iranian intelligence minister went to saudi arabia. what do we hear from the salledy side? the iranian side i believe was relatively quite about this trip and it came out first in the arab press and then the iranians have -- what is the read of the saudi? >> i haven't heard that but the saudis and iranians have, even when relation are really bad -- have always kept lines open and we've just seen the two cooperate on opec, despite their differences and they will continue to exchange messages and talk to each other when things are really so serious that they're in danger of con that graduation. dd whether or not it's true that

they did try to asass natt the saudi dfer is assassinate is saudi ambassador, i think they expect things like that from the iranians. >> i think you're right. this was a very controversial visit in tehran and did not necessarily have the full support of the political establishment. there was a fear that this would come across that iran was the weaker party. there was another visit by a deputy foreign minister that was supposed to take place at the saudi council. but the collaboration in opec that took place and one of the factors that apparently led the iranians to believe they could go with somewhat of a strong

card is the drone conversation. >> do you care to comment on each other's presentation? >> no. the only thing i would say in -- one thing i want to say about the turkish position is i think the turks enjoy the facts that the iranians are on the defensive. they're on the defensive and they'll need them and that's exactly where the turks want the iranians. so, although the turks have been explicit in their opposition for any kind of military action in iran. they also say the same for syria. nevertheless i think they like the fact that the war is essentially ganging up on iran. and they'll need turkish good will more often and there's going to be a price for that.

>> i am not a proponent of the american decline in the middle east. i've been wandering around the middle east since 960 and i never thought i would say -- see the day when arab countries called an nato so come in and overthrow an arab leader led by the two former colonial powers of the middle east, britain and france, and with the united states doing all the logistics, etc. that, to me, is just an extraordinary event, what happened in libya in terms of not the decline but the return of american influence to libya and the calls for no-fly zones. i just came bam from khartoum, saddam, the opposition is calling for a no-fly zone. some of the southeastern oppositions are talking dob sirian oppositions are calling for it.

when it comes to the gulf, the united states has just signed a $60 million arms -- 60 billion articles -- arms agreement with saudi arabia, the largest in its history. we are going to be providing arms to every part of the salledy military. this san extraordinary development. the gulf of mexico cooperation states have just agreed finally to set up an seems to be grated early warning anti-missile system to protect them from iran. the united states is providing the equipment, the expertise, the training and i suggest probably the running of this seems to be grated anti-missile defense system for some time to come. so i don't see america in decline in the middle east. it's taking different forms. we're trying to go from one type of rhythm to other.

but particular in -- particularly in the gulf of mexico, iran has se meanted the u.s. g.c.c.--- cemented the g.c.c.-gulf of mexico council relationship. >> opening the floor to your questions. yes, please. can you please wait for the mike and each yourself? thank you. >> thank you all for the wonderful presentations. david correctly talked about the zero policies of turkey but i suggest that saudi arabia has basically had similar type of policy on their -- when gulov was actually crowned prince. he -- after hodamy was elected in 197, tried to resolve their land issues with other

neighboring countries. with ohman, with yemen and others. we see quite a different an dolla now and the shift is un believable. it's very similar to what we see in turkey. it looks lucky there is match there. but as far as turkey is concerned, yes, we've seen some sharp moves by the prime minister there and i'm not sure if it's going to be well-taken in the arab world. basically they would probably see it as a very opportunistic move by turkey in that -- in that case. but as far as the popularity, yes, he's more popularity but so was ahman dean jaled before the 2009 -- dd hakeem olajuwon c5

ack monodean jad before the 2009 election. nobody mentioned their own problem with the kurds. but they also have major problems. you mentioned the ottoman problems and so on, which is true, but they have not been welcomed by the your skeens they would never be welcomed by the your penals. but also, with the fall of the former soviet union, they were basically rejected in other areas in the region in the central araba republic, basically. so, in fact, i think iran is probably their best option and their very natural ally it seems. i'd like to take your input on that and your thoughts. >> i'm not quite sure was the

question was. >> isn't iran the most natural ally? >> look, the arab world today is more than ever sunni versus shyatt and that's the way, unfortunately, you might well argue, the way the saudis are reading the whole struggle in the gulf. i'm talking about the gulf in the la haven't. and that's the way the -- lavant. and that's the way the sawedies have decided to play the game and they're turning into a sunni-shyatt struggle and they're not going to allow shiite toirnl make any more gains. that's why they sent troops into aran, -- bahrain. so from the saudi point of view, the sectarian nature in the gulf

arab world is somewhat dominates. >> look, when it comes to turkey being opportunistic, i don't think there's anything wrong with adopting such a policy. you try to make -- if you have lemons you try to make lemonade with it. i don't necessarily think it's a bad thing. however, when you look at the eric reaction to this -- there might be some reaction to turkey, however, what the turks have done, and i would argue that had it not been for the break of israel and not just the break but the stringent or the diatribe against israel, the demilitaryization, if you want, without that, which provides essentially an come flange, if you want, turkey would not have had that much ease in terms of shifting policies in the region.

that gives it a lot of ma numblete. they've used it well to their advantage. >> i would agree that the turks are going to go to quite an extent to avoid any real open hostility with iran. whether they would view iran as a natural ally or not, i'm not sure. it's a very different turkey today than the turkey you had 10, 15 years ago but one of the common fleds that both turkey and iran face is exactly the type of framing of the region that david presents, that the salledies have been able to run this very, very hard gamble on dividing the region between sunni and show imet. earlier we've seen similar attempts to divide the region

between skashese non-arabs. the saudis oftentimes talk about the iranian influence as being in arab affairs. turkey is also a non-arab state. these are going to be problems both for iran and turkey. it does show some of the weaknesses of a longer term partnership between turkey and saudi arabia. >> yes, i just want to add one thing. there's one very odd policy position of the turks given how they've sided with essentially -- in favor of change in the region. that's bahrain. it has done absolutely nothing on -- about what's going on in bahrain. so in that since, maybe they bind what david is talking about. that sunni-shiite divide.

who cares about bahrain? it's not that important and saudi arabia is much more important. >> yes, please, and then wait for the mike and identify yourself and then the gentleman here. >> one of the arguments one hears frequently in the irani and nuclear debate is that if the iranians get nuclear weapons, all the varies other regional powers will start trying to get the nuclear weapons too. is this a given or is there another possible alternatives to what the regional countries will do. i'd like your take on this. >> getting nuclear weapons is not very easy. you don't go to kmart and buy

one. that's what i was going to say. maybe that's a walmart. so the saudis may have that option. we don't really know what the arrangement is between the saudis and pakistanis but when it comes to turks -- the turks don't have a nuclear power plant yet. so if you're talking about getting a nuclear weapon, you're talking a very long gestation period. they have to build a power plant first. that would take us 10 years. secondly, there are 60 tactical weapons in nateo and safe guidance in turkey. so technically they are covered by the nuke larp umbrella. yes, you believe in a nuclear-free middle east. does this mean that you're going to get rid of your 60 weapons? they say no.

from that perspective they're having their cake and eating it at the same time. >> i don't think it's a tsunami that should be dismissed. i think there is a risk for that and it is one of the factors why it is important to address the challenge with a lot of foresight. but one of the weapons they use by the states that do want to see the united states take on a tougher position to, start looking into their own nuclear program. that immediately feeds into the argument that we're seeing post-iranian proliferation. as a result it is critical to take a strong position via volunteer iran. it may be exadgerapetted but i don't think it is completely unfounded. >> you want to say something? yes. it's here.

>> thank you. my question will be related to the first one -- going back to the sectarian division problem and kind of two related questions. the question of syria. al-assad is playing the sectarian card and to what extent do you think he'll be able to continue his position, and maybe even strentheninging -- strengthen his position by playing the southeastern card rather than pop -- syrian camplt the second aspect is how will the actors, not just in the area but also over -- all over as a force of anti-shiite propaganda. do you see that as a force which

can play against snoirn not only in the middle east but to what extent do you see that as a viable tool of policy? thank you. >> be i think -- i think they'll be hesitant in playing the sectarian card. one is assad is trying to consolidate his own power. we're on the same boat. don't think by getting rid of me you're going to solve the problem between the shiite and syria. so he, too, is playing the syrian card just like the saudis are. the saudis are trying to main stream wall up. it's a very strong part of their build. there's this whole religious war between iran and sawed skrabe

one the leading shiite power and the other the salledies. the custodian of the two holy morvings. so it's very intense and has been ever since 1979 and the saudis play it all the time. then they try and have a national dialogue at home to relieve the tensions between sunies and shia, which is kind after ironic but they have this national dialogue going of the they're going in two different directions on this. >> we have 35 people in the overflow so i'm taking one of their questions. it's to all three of you. have the influences of individual i ma'ams, islamic religious leaders, increased on any of the governments of saudi arabia, iran, and turkey?

start with turkey. >> i mean, in turkey you have -- you really don't have any important religious leader except for one and that is somebody by the name of gulin who happens to live in pennsylvania in the united states and has an enormously long following and has media enterprises, businesses, associations and by and large, who i will while the organization does not agree with the government all the time has supported the a.t.p. but they were influential before. what the difference between now and prea.k. spmplet not there, they are much more legit, up in the mainstream and they don't have to hide. >> i think irani could have a situation that is somewhat the

opposite. i think, though it's difficult to make clear cut positions on exactly what the power cut is between various power centers in iran,ic a trend that has been viewed over the last 15 years is a decline of the influence to have clerge illinois at the suspense, of course, of some other elements such as the irgc, etc. there seems to have been a trend away and you can see greater descent against hop they and the current interpretation. you have worries in skoirn what will happen in iraq and will they be able to adjust as a shiite ideological challenger. there's very little following for najav for the mainstream

shiite school of thought. it's not sufficient to say that the regime is about to collapse but it is a different iran compared to 15 years ago. >> i'd say the influence is sort of the same ambiguous relationship. the saudi family has had with the sheikh oregon the descent ants of mousmed. sometimes the officials -- the wahhabi establishment there is sub search yent to the government. it's helped the government battle al qaeda and islamic streamism inside the king do. on the other hand, they fight each other over whether women should be able to drive. whether there should be an

overhaul of education system. domestically you have a struggle going on between the al-soon and al-sheikh about whether women should be allowed to have sports in their schools. can you even believe it? that sort of thing. they're really in battle with each other. >> yes, please. the mike is coming. thank you. >> none of you have mentioned the word "egypt" in an hour and a half. ok? apologizes. in passing. could you then review the three states vis-a-vis egypt and particularly their take on the outcome of the elections? >> you want to go?

>> i think the saudi -- the saudis want to see stability in egypt. they're not crazy about democracy, obviously. in fact, they used to have strong support from mubarak in struggling with the united states that was trying to push democracy on both of them. i think they're very worried about the stability there. i think they would prefer to see the military stay there and continue to play, they would hope, a stabilizing role. now we're not so sure that they can play a stabilizing role. but they would side on having the military stay. and, you know, they've committed $4 billion since this allegan, to egypt. so far they've given half a billion dollars to help them

with their financial situation which, is far from what the egyptians need, but they've committed to putting up to $-- $2 billion of the $4 billion into stabilizing the financial situation of the country. so they're not trying to isolate egypt. now, the elections the way they're going, it's going to bring the muslim brotherhood -- is going to have the plurality of votes and will probably lead a coalition government. the rhythm between the salledies and the muslim brother hood is extremely ambiguous. the muslim brother hood during the first golf war sided with saddam hussein this infuriated the saudis who had taken in thousands and thousands and thousands of muslim brethren in the 1950's and 1960's after nasa

sar turned against the -- nassar turned against the muslim brother hood. so here they had schett -- sheltered them for decades and felt betrayed by them during the first gulf war. furthermore, they blamed the muslim brother hood for politicizing islam and created what some calm neo wahhabis, which is a mix which you have of wahhabis and muslim brethren, but very pliltly minded. so i don't think they're happy to see the muslim brother hood win as big a vote they've gotten. on the other hand i think they're happy to -- happen to see the salafis doing well because many have an allegiance to the wahhabis and saudi arabia. >> mubarak was called on to step

down and he feels one of the first western leaders to do so. there was not much love lost. mubarak was very poor for the united states. stood in the way of adwan's ambition in the region. because it was the center of the arab world. it was always mubarak who call it would final shots and not the turks as they wanted to. in the final analyze when the turks want is to see egypt get back together and reestablish some type of stability. the long-term interests is commercial. there were a lot of companies that were doing business in jiments. lots of tech stock companies have moved to egypt because of

lowo costs. and part of adwan's comments regarding secularism, which angered some in the muslim brotherhood i think had to do with that, basically saying come on, get up with it. set up your state and move on and i think that's basically what the turkish interest is in egypt. egypt is not a real player in the regional power. it works to the turks' advantage but also they did not want to see egypt crumble or clams. >> i think the egyptian case is very interesting, as it shows that some of the initial predictions that the arab spring , particularly with mubarak, would lead to an immediate plus for the iranians and about a year into it i don't think we've seen much of that so far. we have not seen the relations

be reestablished between the two countries. that may still happen. i think looking at the election i think the iranians are probably quite comfortable with seeing the muslim brother hood coming to power in egypt because they have managed to take advantage of that ambiguity that exists between the brotherhood and other players, such as saudi arabia. look, for instance, at the relationship between skoirn hamas. hamas, who earlier on received most of its funding from saudi arabia and later on they've managed to take advantage of some rifts there and expand its influence in gaza. i think the iranians are looking at these things as opportunities. but it's not the time of clear-cut win that i think some in washington feared. physical -- it will be a loss for the iranians if assad falls. but the regime in syria is not

limited to assad. it's essentially in the security apparatus and even if it becomes a loss for the iranians, most likely the scenario will be that syria will turn into another weak states in the arena that become a proxy arena for the other states to fight each other rather than squarely falling into the camp of the other side. >> yes. >> henri, you mentioned the crisis that erupted between washington and ankarrah dealing with iran on the nuclear issue, particularly the deal with brazil. and it seems like, when you look at the issue of -- actually turkey in the u.s. -- aside from the obama-ered wan chemistry.

one of the things that have brought them back together is turkey being a vocal advocate for iran. but as things get harder for iran, possibly them coming back to turkey and what are the conditions for that wit happening again, driving a wedge between washington and dankorrah? >> i think when you look at if rhythm at the moment, everybody will tell you that it probably has never been so good. in large measure it has to do with syria. i suspect this is probably why we're seeing corporation between the two countries.

as i said earlier, whatever happens in syria, turkey is going to be critical. the land border. the coastal links so if you are washington and you're doing contingency planning, you have to be working with the turks constantly. there's not that much that will endanger the american-turkish relationship at the moment. but there's been some things in the turkish press and by some officials indirectly that the iranians, in order to send a signal have supported some of the attacks against turkish military targets, which were quite effective. i think there's a split in the bb k. between hardliners and moderate ones.

the hardliners have traditionally been more poor iranians. but even there but they'll have to be careful. the iranians do not want to anger the turks. they want to continue this relationship. it's not a zero sum necessarily relationship between iran and turkey. what happens in syria, again, it's very, very difficult to play it out. the turkish intervention designed to overthrow asan. that would be seen by iran as a very, very hostile act. but beyond that i don't see anything that will happen. >> next, please? >> i was wondering what's the situation surrounding hezbollah?

i know that saudi arabia strongly supports the anti-hezbollah units within lebanon but will turkey have an through on that in the future? >> i mean, the turks -- again, when you look at the whole of syria, there's not much -- no doubt that hezbollah is probably in its most vulnerable position historicly. especially from bashar goes. hezbollah ask a weakling that cannot defend itself. but it is definitely going to make life very difficult and they've come out swinging in favor of bashar. if there is a regime change in

syria, syria is not going to change position on the golan, on syria for the most part but it will change its position on hezbollah, precisely because of that and what the turks are worried about, and they sent a warning about 10 days ago not to do something crazy in the region. because the fear has been that in desperation, maybe bashar is going to use hezbollah. not necessarily that hezbollah is an instrument of bashar, but you can create a scenario in which events happen that engages the hezbollah indirectly and then you have a firefight of the lebanon which would maybe work to bashar's advantage in terms of galvanizing the puppets of the region.

the turks do not want to see that because it will work against the whole region and themselves. >> does iran want to see a confrontation? >> between? >> hezbollah and -- >> no, i don't think that's what they're looking for in the short term. if you look at iran in the last year and a half they've been struck by assassinations, major sanctions as well as things blowing up left and right around torain and elsewhere as well. -- tehran and elsewhere. i think the real question where is the iranian opposition and why aren't they doing single one reason may be that at the end of the day, however costly and

propmatic these problems are, they can still absorb all of this and still outpace the west in their nuclear program, because it's still continuing. slower than before but it's still advancing. but if they risk a confrontation, the dynamic may change and they could end up in a much poorer situation. at this point i think that may be part of the reasons why they're not doing it. the question is how long can they absorb these things without retaliating. i suspect that the israelis are testing that right now. >> let me ask one question to put it to all three panelists. we have met early december a year ago. the region would have been whatever it was then, very normal.

where will will be a year from now? will bashar be still in place? what will the situation be in morocco in tunisia? >> a year from now? >> uh-huh. december 2012. [laughter] you go first. >> um, i think what's going to override everything is some kind of more serious confrontation with iran. if the west goes ahead with its attempts to squeeze iran on oil exports, i think you're talking about when are they going to retaliate -- that this could trigger something. and i know the western

governments and the united states are studying in great detail, together with help from the saudis, about how do you shut down or at least decrease iran's oil sales without sending prices sky high? and, you know, call it a journalist's vibes in the air. as you go around the region and talk to people -- i just get a feeling that something is going to happen with iran that's going to overshadow whatever -- you know, the pro democracy movements in all these arab countries and this will force people to choose sides and either be on the side of the united states and the west or the side of iran. >> making predictions is

difficult but making predictions about the future is even more difficult. let me say that bashar will be gone 12 months from now. if he's not don't ask me why, but i don't know. but i think bashar will be gone. the issue i think is going to be chaos in syria and probably in iraq because there's a way in which what's happening in syria is also affecting iraq now and we see it in terms of the way the different communities in iraq are positioning themselves. you know, the maliki government supporting bashar, his allowing suicide bombers to cross his country into iraq. saudi bombers into iraq and blowing up targets. in that sense i think what happens in syria is going to spill over into iraq and that

naturally will pull in other countries to play the game, but i don't see a major con that graduation. i just see more and more chaos in the region. >> he may have known a lot about making predictions but he did not live in the era of c-span. it's much worse making predictions live in the era of c-span. i would think that the big game changer is not necessarily syria but it is whether something happens between the yilingtse and iran and david mentioned the oil issue. i think that's a very, very critical issue. i would add a couple of other factors that makes this mix quite explosive and very difficult to control. you have, on the other hand, the fact that politically it would be far less costly for the israelis if they were to choose to embark on preempive military

strikes on iran in the mitcheds of an american election year. we've seen the rhetoric from the republican side and since the tensions in the u.s. in the past has been an important factor for the zealies to make a decision, i think that's going to be something to watch out for. you also have, of course, the fact that the iranians are putting cascades into fordu and will probably be completed sometime within the next six months. the israelis are presenting that as a new red line. there have been plenty of these in the past that much turned out to be far more pink than red but this one does have some logical foundation to it. because taking out an installment there is quite different from taking out a facility that is above ground. if they become operational it

would ring some clear alarm bells in washington. and then to add to that, we still don't have any real sustainable diplomacy that brings about the deesque la torrey mechanisms that ensures that even if there is a con that graduation you can bring it back. scombren mullen warned about the risks of an accidental war in the united states because the lack of communication brings about misperceptions which leads to miscalculations, this then leads to escalation. that to me is the biggest game changer in the region 12 months forward. >> with that very happy note, let's end this meeting. thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captions copyright national