number. we will never get to all of them. hubert hamer keeps track of what is happening with american farmers. he has been writing about it as a journalist and covering foreign policy. the senate is working on the policy. thank you gentlemen for being here this morning. >> next, a discussion on islamic religious groups impact on politics. after >> the u.s. supreme court has turned down requests from news organizations for live televised coverage of this month oral argument challenges to president obama's health care law. the court did agree to release saudi recordings of the arguments within two hours of the end of the proceedings each -- to released audio recordings

of the arguments within two hours of the end of the proceedings each day. it begins monday march 26. c-span 3, c-span area, and c- span.org will air the audio -- c-span 3, c-span radio, and c- span.org will air the recordings. georgetown university posted policy experts to discuss religious groups in the arab world after a year of upheaval. we will see how -- a look at the arabs spring from the perspective of the bush and obama administration's. this is one hour 30 minutes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012]

>> i am a sincere director of the religious freedom project. it is my pleasure and privilege to introduce the second of are three panels today. the panel the we're calling your keynote conversationally policy implications and the policy lessons that can be drawn from the connection between religious freedom and religious extremism, especially for those countries of north africa and the middle east that have been affected by the arab spring. the idea that religious freedom may be an effective policy strategy for addressing religious extremism is not new. consider the policies that for theoore designed island of utopia.

he writes of oakwood there have been constant quarrels about religion -- he writes, "there have been constant quarrels about religion. then a new leader kim long who made -- a new leader came along homemade a new law." "if he failed to convince them, he was not allowed to employ violence or personal abuse." in his "utopia," the policy of religious freedom was the effective solution for the problem of religious extremism, religious conflict, and religious violence. but that was utopia. what about the real world?

to discuss that question, we are delighted that we have an all- star panel of experience policymakers who have something like 50 or so years experience between them making policy, not for utopia, but for the united states government. [laughter] and to lead us in the discussion of this crucial issue, we are thrilled to have willem oden was himself a policy all-star and who is a fellow with their religious freedom project. he is assistant professor at the lbj school public affairs and a distinguished scholar for international security and law at the university of texas austin. is a fellow with the german marshall fund of the united states.

he is referred as the of senior vice president of the love got to institute and senior director for strategic planning on the security council at the white house. he has also worked at the department of state as a member of the policy planning staff and as a special adviser in the office of international religious freedom and also had significant experience on capitol hill. it is a great privilege to have will who is moderating the discussion. >> thank you everyone for turning out on this lunchtime on a friday for what we hope will be very stimulating, baca, and insightful discussion. i am humbled to be in the presence of these three. i will not go through their link the bios. -- their lengthy bios. the fact they have agreed to come together for a conversation his enriching. there is a tremendous amount of

state track experience on this panel. our members together have served in seven presidential administrations, everyone literally since the ford administration. during that time, they presided over some tremendously significant geopolitical events and, relevant for purposes of it, have worked on some profound democratic transitions -- relevant for our purposes today, have worked on some profound democratic transitions. lest that description link its they like they're senile, are very young. [laughter] anyway, we will do a structured conversation. i will be putting a number of questions to our panelists then

we will turn it over to the audience for questions from our audience as well. >steve, during his presidency, president bush spoke often of his belief that the peoples of the arab world both desired and deserved democracy. would you view the events of the arab spring as a cautionary tale? >> i think the place we have to start is the revolutions of the middle east are being made by the people of the middle east. this is their revolution. this is not made in america. this is not made by george bush. one thing we can say is that president bush, looking at 9/11, he was willing to say that

u.s. policy had been wrong for about 50 years, that it was premised on the notion that you could support tyrants and authoritarian in the middle east and get stability. we thought we needed that stability for oil and to keep out the soviets and all kinds of things. one of the lessons he drew from 9/11 was that that was a bad deal. supporting of the rotarians instead of getting stability, we really got -- supporting authoritarians, instead of getting stability, we really got terrorism. it was lack of hope that made the middle east their recruiting ground for extremism. he came out and said that very clearly and that the right people to take control of their own future.

that was not only the right the people, but also would come over time, lead to a real kind of stability, a stability based on democracy and freedom. and he was right. i think he takes some -- celebrates with the people of the middle east that freedom and democracy are finally coming to the middle east. people talk about hairspring have someone said it is not. it is arab awakening and we will have spring, fall, winter, up, down. it will take a long time. but at least we can say that freedom and democracy are beginning to be on the margin -- on the march in the middle east and that is a good thing. >> dennis, it appeared at times from the outside like the obama administration was caught by surprise by the initial advent

of the arab spring. can you reflect from your time there on the inside how this played out within the obama administration? what do you think the administration got right? what do you think they may be got wrong in responding to these events in real time? >> first, you are right. they were caught by surprise t. no one predicted what would happen. in the summer 2010, the president signed out a decision memorandum that was to launch a whole government review of our approach to the middle eaceast. premise that on the promis the reality of the region was

creating an illusion of stability but not the factor of stability. the form it was in was not going to be sustainable over time. our relationship with some of our arab friends, of authoritarian regimes in traditional points of interest, or at some level, but the cost of association would go up. their ability to maintain it would become problematic. in the course of doing this review and taking a hard look at the lot of questions associated with our relations, when natalie had a lot of internal discussions, we -- we not only had a lot of internal discussions, we brought in 30 activists from the region.

i met with them. this was six weeks before mohammed said himself on fire and effectively set the region on fire. they were from every region. almost everyone of them had been arrested. they all had a huge stake in the league and commitment in transforming the realities in the region. at one point, i asked, how soon you think the change could come? they were from morocco, tunisia, egypt, yemen, bahrain -- meaning they covered the whole region. not one of them thought change would come soon. this is six weeks before mohammed and zz set himself on fire. they looked at the situation like many of us did. as we look at this in the abstract, we said the this is not a sustainable reality.

but when they looked at the reality trying to change governments that they viewed as having a monopoly with means of violence, a determination to keep themselves in power, a sense that they themselves were not organized in a way that was necessary -- that would necessarily produce change, they drew the conclusion that we would not seek change happen very quickly. so people who had the greatest stake in change themselves -- it was not that they represented geographically the region, but demographically, different age groups -- and they did not see it coming. and we can go through all the reasons why it eventually arrested. the fact that they did not see it coming does not come as a huge surprise that we did not see it coming when it came.

there were a lot of immediate dilemmas. there were debates. it represents the sweep of history. there were those who felt that, particularly when you looked at the tip -- at egypt and saudi relationship with small barack -- with -- at egypt and you saw our relationship with mubarak, a lot of people were calling and then saying, what about us? in policy-making, you have to make choices between options many of which are not all that desirable. sometimes you choose the ones that you think are least bad.

in this particular case, it was to try to convince that mubarak that his own desire to preserve a kind of egypt that he himself put a premium on that he should go to transition. even within the context of what i described, there was a debate on how to push that to versus how to manage these. the basic decision that in the end was made was a decision that would have the president speak to mubarak. to try to manage a transition. again, when you look at the debate, you can imagine that

the debate between those who are saying that it is not only the strategic interest of some of our friends in the region who will be highly unsettled because it looks like you're walking away from a friend of 30 years, but also there's the question of what will replace some? -- what will replace him? and what is the reality of trying to manage the transition? we are not the ones who are creating this. we're not the people -- we were not the two million people in the street. how much influence do we have? what is the best way to exercise this? there was a conversation that the president had with mubarak that can only be described as a dialogue of the deaf. the president was saying to him, you know, you're a child of

egypt. you're a patriot. you have done a great deal for your country. and now the greatest thing you can do for your country is to help manage that transition. and mubarak says, and these are words that echoed through my yearears -- i have dealt with mubarak and he would tell me i was not leave, that i did not understand -- i was naive and that i did not understand. that i did not understand his people and he did. the muslim brotherhood would take over. he would paint these scary scenarios. i would explain to him that it

is hard to see how, if things did not change, he would face it anyway. the president to try to persuade him and he said you do not understand my people. you will see this will all blow over in a few days. and the president was saying to them, what if you're wrong? you could be wrong. and membemubarak said, no. he was living in complete denial. i will say this. after he made his initial speech, we got a lot of feedback from a lot of the people in the opposition. that night after he made the initial speech where he talked about leaving, that he would

wait until september and that his son would walk-in, the mood was, all right, we have succeeded because he will actually leave. and every change to the next day when suddenly those who identified with him descended upon the demonstrators everything switched and the game was over. he still did not understand it. you still in denial -- he was still in denial. the administration got right that you had to manage transitions, but you also had to realize the limits of how much we would be able to manage the transitions. the effort to identify with the spirit of what was in the street was right.

one can debate the question of whether we should have done more soon. what is it exactly we could have done sooner? there was an effort made that i think was right to realize that we, ourselves, were unlikely to have the kind of credibility -- we were to associated for too mubarak regime.averic i spoke with a number of egyptians who basically were saying what does the united states know about transition? poland knows something about transitions. chili knows something about transitions. but when did you have your transition? and one of the things that we try to focus on early on was not just working with the eu, but working with a number of those countries that have had transitions to see if we could

develop a common set of themes because that would have a greater likelihood of receptivity and accountability. could we have done more to help the forces that needed greater identity and organization? we certainly could have tried and i think we did to some extent. in retrospect, i am not sure. on the issue of what we could have been doing and saying publicly, we were basically right. on the issue of how we could have tried to orchestrate the others more or sooner -- maybe we could have done more. uildealt,ue of how we builand

there were a lot of high level in treaties to them -- high- level entreaties. there was a need to acknowledge how they were responding, real freedom of speech. i think they were also creatures of habit. it was hard for them to break with that. the short answer is, getting this exactly right may be easy to describe theoretically and hard to do practically. >> thank you. eliot, during this part of the bush administration, you had the white house point man on democracy and rights and religious freedom promotions and middle east policy.

you heard steve reflected the bet on president bush's strategic vision for the region. as you look back at the bush administration, if you can add some reflection and self criticism perhaps, what do you think the administration got right and what could it have done on human rights, religious freedom in the broader middle east? >> self criticism. this is very chinese. [laughter] >> 1952 and the new head up to the countryside. [laughter] >> they look like undergrad, but their presence. [laughter] -- they are peasants. [laughter] >> there was an effort to understand what happened, why did it happen?

why this hatred? the hatred of what? i think he came to a view that was beginning to be more broadly expressed in the region from the 2002 arab development report that there was a freedom deficit in the region. what osama bin laden was against was the regime. you could see this as a problem in the political organization of these regimes. we saw this freedom deficit.

i think that analysis was correct. it led the president to the view that these regimes were knocked stable. -- were unstable. he did not say, mark my words, in a year, this will all be gone. but i think the fundamental analysis that these were not stable regimes because they relied exclusively on force was correct. i am speaking of the monarchies that have some legitimacy. but in these six republics, what do they have to say for themselves? they were repressive and violence. and the ones producing it -- if you want to compare to china -- you cannot say, look over generations, how many people have been moved out of poverty.

there's nothing in favor of these regimes except inertia. you could talk about why, in theory, they would all fall. but people have been hearing about that for a long time. in the arab world, the only regina had fallen was the one the we brought down in iraq. -- the only regime that had fallen was the one that we brought down in iraq. the president began to act on this. could we have done more? yes. the pressures against doing more were very great. the united states government is

not an ngo. and ngo which has the luxury of having one enters -- -- one enters -- -- one interest, religious freedom, the united states has many interests. the administration was pushing hard again for an israeli- palestinian peace treaty. the view of president mubarak solve this because he was very useful. indeed, the egyptians are still very useful. i think this was a mistake. someone who was in cairo recently and met with secular

and moslem brotherhood officials, they said, where remember fondly 2004, 2005, 2006 when you were pushing mubarak to open the political space some. i think the pursued a policy over 35 years to 40 years of greater pressure on these regimes, more political space would have been created which would have benefited us in that people would not just remember those years, but you were always on our side against these regimes. and it would benefit them. what has happened now, regimes where there was no politics -- tunisia, libya, egypt -- now are open for politics and they have no practice.

they have not moved slowly and steadily into greater degrees of political activity. they go from 0 to 100 m.p.h. and maybe if the united states had over five or six president, we go back to ford, maybe if we had been pushing harder all along, maybe there would have been greater political space and the shock of trying to develop it from nothing would be less. i have to make one more point. it would be especially useful to the people who the united states tends to view the closest u.s. -- that is to say liberals in the general sense, people who want a kind of secular liberal state.

they're the ones who have had zero experience whereas the brotherhoods in various countries seem to. when i would argue is that friends who bemoan the passing politically of president mubarak, one of the things i point out is we are where we are and they are who they are in part because of mubarak. he crushed the center. that is one of the reasons that the center is quite weak and got 20% in the election. >> we have heard each of our panelists reflect in some ways in his own time in office. one thing that i am struck by is

the existence of a thick, if you will, the policymakers from the freeze have for each other -- from both parties have for each other. for those who have actually been there, it is something else altogether. you do feel like you have a sense of what can and cannot be done. with that preface, let's give our panelists assess each other's administration. steve, if we can start with you, what would be your assessment of the obama administration's record so far on democracy and religious freedom in the arab spring. >> i get a couple of questions and i see this one and i laughed out loud. [laughter]

sorry, well, we will let do that. these are very difficult issues and one to give you one more been yet which is relevant to what eliot talk about. in 2005 -- there are experts here -- egypt those three elections and the first one is the presidential election and the second one is parliamentary and it is in 2005 and 2006 in two stages. i invite omar suleyman to come to washington. conte and i have dinner -- condi and i have dinner. we said to him this is your

chance. this is mubarak's chance. ands let diane out of jail -- let the man out of jail and have an election. mubarak will win. have a free and fair election. have him campaign and have given -- have him describe to the egyptian people describe what he will do. we sat there for two and a half hours. and he said what about the security service? i said there will be demonstrations. don't crack down on them. we talk with him on how you have to work with your security forces to maintain law and order but in a context of free and fair elections. he was taking notes. and they did a lot of that. and mubarak did go out and campaign. after that election, the egyptian press was saying egypt

will never be the same. so we said, great job. you were on the road. go to the parliamentary elections. and the first round of parliamentary elections occur and the brotherhood, not surprisingly because mubarak had destroyed the center, the moslem brotherhood started to do well and mubarak got scared. and in the second parliamentary election, they crushed them with a vengeance. at that point, our efforts to get mubarak to preside a great transition ended. -- to preside over a transition ended. you don't understand our people. we tried your experiment and it blew up in our face.

it is a hard business. one of the challenges for the obama administration is that, for those regimes that dhave not had a liberation, help those routines do a democratic transition before there is a revolution, not after. but i offer the been yeah m aboutub -- i offer the been yevignette mubarak. it is very hard. on the way out, he said, mr. president, i interest and what you're saying, but i am afraid. a man in his a pause, maybe

90's, trying to reform such a long way to go. but one of the things that the obama administration had the opportunity to do is to get these regimes to have some legitimacy to lead their people to a democratic process without having the destruction of revolutionary change. >> i want to make a couple of comments. one is to offer further explanation on why there is not a center. and the second point i want to make relates to the lesson that steve was saying. there has been a lot of focus within the obama administration about precisely what you're describing. having those kinds of conversations, you can see what is coming, get out in front of it and offering certain suggestions.

but let me offer the first observation. mubarak very much did what elliott was describing. he was not alone in this. basically, all the so-called republics, they had no justification for why they were in power. they had no idea that explained what was their reason for ruling. unlike the monarchies, they had dynastic legitimacy. you can say that they have limits, but they have some legitimacy. they had none. because they had none, they feared those who create in narrative who would justify an alternative. mubarak focused on making sure there could not be an alternative narrative and it had to be a by near a situation. in part, n.j. it had to be a by mary -- it had to be a binary

situation. he did something along lines of what will it was describing because he did play footsie with the muslim brotherhood. they were extremely brutal. and the allied the muslim brotherhood as a party. outlawed the muslim brotherhood as a party. they allowed the isthmus to come in a takeover. whether it is the lawyers are the doctors -- it was a mother who came to dominate. this was ok from the mubarak

standpoint. he give them an outlet. by the same token, and anybody who is under the roof of a secular or liberal, no possibility of emerging, no tolerance for them. so you look at what happened. basically, we're in a situation where you have one place that we have seen as being off-limits because the regime did not have legitimacy. in the mosque, you have freedom of speech. people in the mosque would stand up and say things. you come into the mosque in uc people who stand up and they are not giving in. they knew had to play on the into the people felt and the fact that they did not have an alternative outlet. here was a mosque where you had a summons of freedom of speech were your allowed to organize -- you had a semblance of freedom of speech where you were allowed to organize.

and the embodiment of social justice was seen because they were engaged in providing clinics to distribute food when there was an earthquake in cairo. who is out there distributing food and blankets? it was the brotherhood. it was not the regime. you would see no sign of the government, but you would see the brotherhood. they could do it in a limited way, but it could be seen. there is a bill 10 advantage that the eighth myth -- that the isthmus had. they are seen as being effective because they deliver some social welfare. they are seen as non-corrupt and and bodying social justice, the antithesis of the regime. and they are allowed to organize.

the secular liberal alternative is not there. they're not allowed to organize and their secular. and the regime as secular. the number generation is able to use the internet. they are able to present an opposition. but they have not had the time to create an identity, an agenda, a platform where they can think about had we now present ourselves and our identity to the public? they had all of the disadvantages in the early going and the isthmus had all these advantages. this was a region that was characterized -- this is a subject political culture, not a participatory political culture. what has happened in the last year, one of the reasons i do not despair, although i am not

feel uneasy about the way things are, the fact is that people in this part of the world today and increasingly see themselves as citizens, not as subject. and as citizens, they should have rights. as citizens, they can make demands. as citizens, they can have expectations. as citizens, the should be able to hold their government accountable. ist they don't have institutions that are there that allow them to express what citizens would express and it will take time to build those institutions. one of the things that has to happen, now, calling upon being citizens and they clearly have a voice and they will not give up that voice, it is important to create standards of accountability. on our own, we cannot do this because we do not have the credibility to be able to -- it is able to blame things on us. -- it is easy to blame things on

us. you'll not see one house built, one job created, and it will not address their demands and expectations. but there are things that can be done, but you have to build centers of accountability or the business will have all the advantages. will have allnesisthmus the advantages. one thing you can save is a sense of citizen -- you can see is a sense of citizenship emerging. you have to create a sense of inclusion. you have to create a sense that people have the means to participate and somehow shaping their own future and their own destiny. it is an easy thing to say. it is a hard thing to do because you get back to what king abdullah said to president bush.

many of them will say we understand. i will not identify these individuals now because they are in power. many of them say we understand. they don't quite know how to take the steps that will be responsive without unleashing a set of forces they feel will undo them. and there are not too many people in power who will take steps that will undo their hold on power. >> especially since you brought up the question of the islamists and the mosque and this shift in identity from subject to citizen, that brings us to the main topic today, which is the subject of religious freedom. what is the role of religious freedom in the is ongoing transformations? when we hear religious freedom,

his nut a -- is that a talking horse or is religious freedom a key solution to pluralism and to creating these institutions and having citizenship that dennis was talking about, especially for non-islamist muslims and minorities such as christians and jews? >> it seems to me a very difficult question. these are countries in which, for the most part, there was a fair amount of religious freedom -- for the most part. the restrictions on religious freedom are two kinds. one, minorities, for example, in many of these countries, there are laws against changing your religion from islam to another

religion. and then there were the restrictions that the state put on the muslim brotherhood and other expressions of islamist belief. now the systems are open and you can have something closer to popular sovereignty. it raises the question of religious freedom again. it is interesting. i rode a column in the monday " washington post" not as the worst example of difficulties, but it is a important. it is a place where every says, look, to news and has a really good chance of making it. as a tunisian -- tunisia has a really good chance of making it.

a film had a scene in which people in the movie had a visualization in her mind of god, an image of god. and i said that is a violation of the freedom of expression to go after -- for the state to prosecute. and it is wrong. and i had a level tunisian friend sending me any missing, no, no, you are wrong. -- sending me an e-mail message saying, no, no, you are wrong. there are a million issues. one is precisely the kind of thing you're talking about. if you push those issues, you americans, complete freedom of expression in the religious realm, then tunisians, none of whom want to see that kind of

movie and who are conservative, they will say that this democracy stuff brings with it chaos and sacrilege and down the road prostitution, homosexuality. that is the line is given. he is not wrong, but he is not right either. what i wrote back to him was that the problem that you are seeing is that there is no limited principle. first of all, there are no two nations who want to see this movie? zero? and if there is only 20% of the country, they do not count? and if the argument is that you cannot show a movie like that because the vast majority of tunisians but don't want to see

it, don't the vast majority of them think that a woman should not be let out of the house without a burqa? is that not also true? i think that what you have, to some extent, is a competition among the freedoms that we want to see these countries adopt. you will see this happen where islamists will argue against secular parties. they will take you down the road and this will end in a place where there's no place for religion in the public square and it will take you down to sodom and gomorrah. which will sell to millions of people in the region. but the answer to that, which

you'll also find, we will not have freedom of religion for 25 years until things settle down cannot be right either. it is not a simple question. it is not like saying that every single freedom can now advance at the same pace and realize at the same pace because they're all interrelated. i think we do have a role here. the american-style of secularism is not their style. and i think we need to explain and defend the american model. a lot of people in the middle east and beginning to become, in tunisia also, to realize that it may be a better model for them. we do not believe in majority rule, and a sentence, and a paragraph. we believe "under law."

we have a constitution. we have a preamble about how the state is constructed and then we have amendments. we do not view democracy as the ability of those 51% to employ is -- to impose everything they like what everybody else. that is not what we're like. >> to pick up on that, the religious freedom is very important to us. it is important as a value. i looked at the 10 amendments and the first one, thought, a better check that. i thought it started with freedom of speech. actually, it shows that congress shall make no law making

establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. and then at the end you have free speech and assembly and all of that. in some sense, it you have freedom of religion, the other parts of that amendment follow on it as corollaries. so freedom of religion is very important. lawyers say that hard cases make bad law. if we force these regimes coming out of their history as a first issue to deal with that question of how far does freedom of religion reach, i need to -- an issue that has bedeviled our country for two vendors, you do not have democracy. -- for two hundred years, you cannot have democracy. if we put that on these governments as a first order of business, they will not make it. so what should we be doing? i think something short of that,

something that will enable the resolution of those questions, but does not force them prematurely. and that is religious tolerance. that is where i would make the focus. one colleague said something very profound. he said, in the middle east, and neither arab nationalism nor political islam had a tradition of tolerance and pluralism. and that is what the middle east needs. why does he say that? because, if divinities cannot solve the issue of power, then you have a situation where the political authoritarianism of themubaraks will be replaced with religious the foreignism -- religious authoritarianism which is what you have now. shia beating on kurds and s

kurds beating on shia. and everything else. religious tolerance means you cannot impose your beliefs on everybody else and the needs to be space between the state and religion. a speech in cairo anchored a lot of islamists. he said, look, the state should be equidistant from all religions and no religions. and the state ought to run a system for all religions have a place. but the premise of that will be tolerance. and i think that is what we need. because if there will be stability over the long term, there has to be tolerance in the

element of democracy. so i would say tolerance. >> i do not have really add to what they have said. i think they both captured it effectively and eloquently. the only thing -- it is may be a semantic way of saying what you just said. i think the critical point is respect for minority rights. again, when i was talking about standards of accountability, are was tying -- i was trying to get to there being political standards of accountability.

when you reserve space for competition, that means you also have to respect the views and rights of others. there has to be the right of those who get -- those who get elected have the right to make laws, but they have to respect minorities. if they have respect for minority rights, then there will be tolerance. in the egyptian brotherhood read now, you see a kind of pulling attraction over exactly trying to define what the role religion will be in the state. article 2 is the role of sharia, but there is a difference among those who feel that it should be much more omnipresent role and

those who think there should be a separation. the extent to which i agree with both my colleagues appear on the idea that we have a role to play, i think i would add we would be more effective if we can build one amounts to a large number of partners saying this internationally and repeating it over and over again so it becomes a mantra. when it becomes a mantra, it then becomes something that the brotherhood will realize that the world is watching at a time when they want help. and if they want help, they need to treat certain standards. and it seeps into the public street anyway. they have the psychology of being citizens, but did not have the existing mechanisms on how to act on that. >> one more question to our panelists before we turn it over to the audience.

this is on a country that is not necessarily associated with arab spring, but some may say that the release seeds or not just in tunisia, but in iran with the green movement protest. i would like to ask the panelists -- helmet, we will begin with you. -- elliott, we will begin with you. given that the regime is defined by a kind of religious intolerance, do you think that religious freedom advocacy, whatever that might look like, maybe a way into the side door of promoting reform moderation iran, especially for the iranian muslims who do not accept the regime interpretation? >> i do. many people of iran have been

inoculated against this form of political and religious organizations by having the horrible experience of living under it. i believe they would vote against this in a free election. that is why there will not be a constitutional referendum in iran asking people whether they want it anymore. it is something that will change when this regime someday foal's. i think many iranians will never know the exact numbers and tell iran is free. but there are many who believe this is a corruption of she of islam -- of shia is long. -- of shia islam.

they have essentially destroyed it by bringing it under control of the state and it ruins the entire system. it is not, therefore, surprising. the most important resistance from regime -- resistance to the regime comes from the clerical system. there are so many prominent shia leaders who refused to vote in the recent elections on the grounds that it was all such a corrupt political system. alton l.a. -- they -- they looked around and they realized that, in some of the era of countries -- we have seen free elections in tunisia, egypt and had big victories.

but the iran population is nearly disgusted with the kind of islam that the state is forcing on them. they realize that means the future of shia islam in iran. in the case of iran, generally speaking, the push for religious freedom is very helpful overall in arguing for a better future for iran. i am troubled by one part of this picture. that is the high. this regime has been a vicious and bloody and murderers when it comes to the high. i do know whether the post-

islamic republic of iran will understand that this is all part of the same disease $7 and -- disease of intolerance. one has to hope that this experience teaches tolerance not only for your own group, obviously, but by definition the real meaning of it, the they would go beyond that. and at least tolerance for those were not in your group. >> i would have given a different answer. i think is actually right. having been informed by my

colleague, my answer would be yes but in a sort of indirect way. i go back to the first amendment. congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. for 200 years, there has been tension between those. i think helps iran in the following way. the watchword is "free exercise of religion" and "free exercise of all religions." that requires a tolerance of all religions. if you have a tolerance of all religions, you cannot have a state founded on a religion because it is inconsistent with freedom of religion and the free exercise of religion by all groups. that is really the issue in iran. we have a theocratic based regime. the region will have to

conclude that that has not worked for the benefit of the people. and that you cannot establish a government on the basing of the slogan "islam is the answer." if your question is "what is the answer to all political problems and the question to how to found a political system," islam is the answer -- the region will have to respond no, it is not. in that sense, iraq is ahead of iran. and because of the remarkable character of ayatollah steestani because, when all of the political parties came, they said, tells what to do, he was the limiting power. he said no.

that is a political question. you need to work it out. i think that is the right answer. as part of this tolerance dimension, the second piece of that is the region will have to understand that a political system based on religion is not the answer. >> i do not have a lot to had. one of the points that eliot made is exactly right. what this regime has done is given religion a bad name. in many respects, it is probably discrediting it for the future. it is one of the ironies. we have seen a militarization of the regime and powers being taken away from the clerics. it is also the quietest school of shia islam, which is the

dominant one and is the polar opposite of what has emerged in iran. at some point, in iran, we will see a change. it is true that the focus is on the nuclear issue right now, for reasons that are understandable. i have not been trained initially as a specialist on the soviet union. you can always tell someone's age when they are a specialist of a country that no longer exists. [laughter] i see with in iran what looks to be of an analogous situation to the soviet union in the early- 1980's where ideology, in this case, religion as they describe it, has lost its relevance as being an idea buyer rule, but

there to cloak. and underneath the cloak, you have a corrosive reality that is eating away at this regime overtime. you can never know or predict how long it will take to emerge. its impact on iran on religion will be increasingly negative overtime. we will know -- maybe there will be an evolution from this regime. maybe that will happen first. but if there isn't, there could be a reaction against religion. >> we will open it up to the floor for questions. the three stipulations for any questions is that you first identify yourself, second, keep it brief, and third, keep it .implcivil

>> i really appreciated hearing the inside stories of talking m toubarak. -- talking to mubarak. nore's this perception that one in the u.s. government is trying to push these issues and i think this is important. i am a specialist on yemen and jordan. in 2006, yemen had its first real alternative candidate in its general election. and king jordan, i wonder if there are conversations there. king abdallah, he is our best friend there, but the regime is not legitimate. he does not have to perform pretend elections every four years and pretend that is the basis of legitimacy. i wonder if their conversations there and if there are in saudi arabia, the other give religion a bad name country in the

region. i would love to hear more stories on that. >> one of the problems you run into is that, while it is true that there are sometimes rulers who respond to these questions, which it probably see as lectures by the stupid americans, they respond by saying you do not know anything. you do not understand my people. that happens. but what happens with equal frequency is the people say, absolutely, you are right. i am ahead of you. that is just for us. there was at a time when it looked like president solemn was moving ahead with democracy. he had an opponent in the

elections and he had a couple of good years. but looking back, one could say read thead knockenot constitution that said, this is it, i am there. he did it. we and others in a position to give him money, the eu, the world bank, imf, etc. in the case of jordan, i am not sure. the most effective lobbyists for jordan is the king, as his father was. you can tell the king that he has not thought of and said in his most recent speech about the liberalization in jordan. he has a gigantic problem with

the division between east pakistan and the palestinians. he has a system where, quite intelligently, the prime minister does not come from the royal family. he comes from politics. when people get annoyed after eight months, he is gone. the problem is that, if you do that every six months to eight months, year after year, people will begin to doubt whether the changes or the reform is a disservice. in the aftermath of the arab spring, i do not think there have been real reforms. he is worried about something that we're not worried about. this can be positive or negative. i do not think he is so much worry about what will happen between now and december. he is wondering whether his son will be king of jordan. and he has to figure that out

and it is hard. what would you tell him if your his brother or a close adviser in the royal court? i would argue that the game he has been playing for 10 years of a whisker to call fake reform will ultimately have to be -- of what can be called a fake reform will ultimately have to be jettisoned. >> i think eliot description and analysis is quite apt. , there wereof solemsala

conversations with the obama administration to get him to accept transition. in this particular case, it was coordinated very close they -- very closely with the grc states because they were providing him with the means to stay in power. he would make certain commitments and even everything was done at one point and then he would back away. this is a guy who stayed in power for 30 years and was pretty good at maneuvering. that meant not only internally among the tribes, but also externally with choosing to have certain allies at certain points and choosing to have different allies at different points. in the end, he did do with the transition. there are some positive signs

with this transition. there are still some open questions in terms of the way that his own family within the military. but it is pretty remarkable to look at what the reaction to his elections were, including among those who had been fighting each other. there was a genuine sense that something profound had no happened. the problems are enormous. they had few resources. they are running out of water. and they still have separatist impulses in the south. they face real challenges. but the transition is underway now and it shows some promise. clearly, it needs support. the fact is that sala, in the end, did leave. it came at the enormous efforts

by people in the administration. the conversations with him were of high frequency and at high levels, including the president. your also striking a balance in these cases between what is the right balance between what you say in private and what you do in public. someone who has worked in the middle east for a long time, i can tell you with a high degree of confidence -- i say this at a time when humility should be the order of the day. we're not the authors of what is unfolding over there. we should first have a lot of humility. so when i said the falling, i am saying this not only with humility, but also with some sense of experience. you cannot limit what to do in private. in this part of the world, if it is only going to remain private, they will never take it seriously. how you balance would you say in

private is part of the art. this is not a science. this is an art. you have to figure out what the right balance and the right moment -- when you say it, you have more than one audience. others will hear it. so you have to calibrate this. but if you can operate only in private, you will be effective. ultimately, what worked in getting him out was that, at different times, we've ratcheted up what we're saying in public. but we coordinated that with the others will have greater leverage in terms of moving him. having written a book on statecraft, i can say that an element of statecraft here, also realizing what you say in public, if you have other actors were key or pivotal in terms of helping you succeed in producing the outcome that you seek, you also have to orchestrate what you're saying in public and not surprise them.

this is not the individual leader your working out. it is also whoever is part of the efforts in managing the transition. i do not have much to ride on what elliott said about jordan. i think the king now is more conscious of the need to try to carry out reforms that will be seen and not just from an outsider standpoint, but it has to be real. it is a tough nut to crack. the backbone of his regime also, as a recipient of about 80% of the revenues of the government. if your to open up the system and if you really create the kind of reforms that will allow

jordan to force overtime, you have to manage the fact that they get 80% of the revenue now. you cannot have them go cold turkey without unleashing forces that you do not want to see happen. this is one of these cases where you can do a lot in a laboratory that seems to make sense. but in the real world, where you have to carry it out, it is a very hard process to orchestrate. i do think that the king has got allot in the last year about ways to create not only reforms, but also to demonstrate the reforms are real. he is looking at models much more than was the case before. and the moroccan model, in some respects, because both of these -- because they trace their lineage back to their profit,

they have a lot in common. he goes to morocco with one potential model. the king of morocco is an interesting example of someone who did look at what was happening and decided that he had to get out in front of it. what has emerged there -- again, there will never be anything that works perfectly. but what has emerged there has some potential. at least i think the king of jordan is still trying to think that through. my sense is that he is genuinely wrestling with this and trying to proceed. but the context is a very difficult context. there are no simple answers for it. >> we may want to go to another question. >> ok.

>> thank you for an excellent panel appeared one of the things i appreciated was how much each analyst takes a sincere anrole n religion. in recounting the story of the cia analyst ernie all may who, in the 1970's, religion oas beig very important in iran and said we had to look of this. but also he was ridiculed. how much in u.s. foreign policy shaped by a kind of widely shared secularism and they

establishment. neither religion is irrational or irrelevant. is that still true today? >> we will try to make our answers more brief. [laughter] there is an issue of what is secularism. i had a conversation with condoleezza rice. i asked her, do you consider yourself a secularist? she said, no, i am a religious person. the french have a view that the state has to sit on religion to make sure that religion does not intrude on public life. that is a model that i do not buy. that is a model that i deny it -- that i do not think our country buys.

and equidistance of all religions, but it tolerance of all religions. -- but a tolerance of all religions. i think the political establishment is somewhere between the american model and the french model. i think the american people are between the american model and perhaps something with a more active place for religion. i think the government has been conscious of that. from 1989-1983, i was at the pentagon. i used to talk with what the turkish establishment needed to provide a space for religious expression by the population. i think that is something americans broadly agree on and

the diplomatic community agrees on. at various times, i think that is the model we have urged on countries. you have to provide a space for your citizens. president bush used to say it to the chinese your people, at the end of the day, will never feel thoughtfully satisfied and you'll never get the best out of your people if you do not allow some space for the exercise of religion and the exercise of the spirit. i think that is roughly where the united states government has been. >> i agree with what steve said. i do not think there is an impulse of people on the inside that has generalized you. -- generalized view. it is country by country. you have to look at the circumstances. i think the most analysts within the government do. i do not think they have a

priori view.n a having been someone who negotiated for a long time on is really issues, often times, i actually wanted to have religious/spiritual leaders to support the premise of tolerance and coexistence and speaking against violence. and i could not produce it ever. i recently met with an interfaith group from the area and it included israelis and palestinians. and for the first time, they said they would like to see if they can play a role. i said, you know, it is interesting. historically, that has not been the case. indeed, i recall that, in the year 2000, the pope made a tour throughout the middle east.

his representative came and asked us and wanted to create an ecumenical meeting where they could reinforce the importance of tolerance and they put together a meeting in jerusalem and it was a complete disaster. so it was refreshing to see an interfaith group come in the area and want to promote something. in answer to your question, in my own experience, i did not view it as something that was at odds in peacemaking. although i did not want this, the to become a religious, but because and you could not settle it. i wanted religious spiritual leaders to see if they could enforce the values of tolerance, not violence, and coexistence. >> the gentleman in the back. >> two quick questions.

what is the obama administration's view our assessment of libya moving forward? will democracy take hold in libya? if not, what are the challenges that prevent that? some have made the claim that the current administration is cooking the events in syria. what is your assessment there? >> dennis, i think that is to you. [laughter] >> first, i am not in the obama administration. i do not speak to the administration. they have plenty of spokespeople and i am not one of them. obviously, i was in the administration for most of what went on on libya, including the intervention and its aftermath. i think there is a continuing hope that what will emerge in

libya is a government that is largely rep. it will be a government -- representative. it will be a government that is representative and inclusive. when you speak to the people who are in the administration in libya right now, they're very much committed to trying to produce what would be a representative democracy. coming after gaddafi, in the absence of any institutions, is, in some ways, easier and harder. in other places, there are white i would describe as -- what i would describe as their sauce institutions.

they're not real. and then you take them and try to reform them. and libya, you're trying to build something largely out of nothing. there is potential because of that. but there are all sorts of splits within the country. there is no doubt that the isthmus is trying to gain the upper hand. but when you talk to the people who are trying to manage the chains themselves, many of whom were educated here, they are incredibly impressive. sayinge certainly the right things. but the administration is looking forward to helping bolster them in a specific direction. i do not believe that would just came out or by design from the administration. they may reflect certain views within the intelligence community. it is not my belief that it represents the views of the administration.

>> in october 17, 1989, george washington wrote a letter to morris in paris about the french revolution. the revolution is wonderful, but he also warned that is of too great a magnitude to be effective in short -- in so short of space and with the loss of so little blood. to run from one extreme to another is no easy matter. should this be the case, rocks and shells not currently president will rock muscles. -- rock vessels. i think back to washington -- going from one extreme back to another. his words on the french were

right. today apply today? >> i can give you a firm may be. [laughter] we do not know yet. the changes in government began roughly a year ago. there are significant changes in many years with the regimes that were there, 20, 30, 40 years. we know from the experience that, for example, to uneasy and malaysia and others, islamists tend to do best in the first election. they have the opportunity to organize. in the eyes of many people in the country, they stand for integrity. they were not part of the old corrupt system. but then they get elected and they can produce in many cases. islam is not the answer. it does not create economic growth, jobs.

then in the second and third elections, if there is one, then the tide tends to receive. when that happens, -- if it happens in tunisia, that means nothing over whether it'll happen in egypt or libya. >> in the egyptian revolution, almost all of the casualties were in the first 18 days of the revolt. and it was the government shooting at demonstrators. since that time, it has been a remarkably peaceful revolution. and they did have and conduct the freest and fairest election probably in the history of egypt. i think there are all the risks and it could all go south. but i think you have to give the egyptian people some credit for what they have done so far.

and we ought to give them such help as we can and that they are willing to except. because it matters how this comes out. remember, there is another revolution that was made in the name of freedom and democracy in 1979 and that is the iranian revolution and it got hijacked. and it has been the principal problem in the middle east for the next 30 years. so how these revolutions come out matter to the people there and to us. that is why we need to provide such help as we can. >> i think is the beginning of the story. we are seeing chapter 1 of what will be at least a 10-chapter book that will emerge. we are not the authors of it. they are. and we have a huge stake in what happens there. i do not know what will happen. but i do not think that people suddenly found their voice will lose it. i dthink we have a huge stake

in figuring out having standards of accountability. they do have to deliver. at this point, they are showing signs in egypt that they understand they have to deliver. i understand in tunisia. there was an interview that i read of a woman in cairo from one of the poorest districts. she said she voted for the muslim brotherhood because they were not corrupt and they built houses. if they get in there and they do not build any housing and tonight create jobs, i suspect there will have a problem. they have to have repeatable elections. and they have to have standards of accountability and we will see. >> the tolling of the bill tells me that we have another panel --

of the bell tells me that we have another panel. [applause] >> next, the latest on the middle east with david ignatius. after that, postwar relations between the u.s. and iraq. then the department on a possible satellite launched by north korea. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> i was quite radical as a young person. i thought that singing "we shall overcome" was not a very effective way of getting civil rights. i thought that more confrontation was needed. >> walter williams on being a radical. >> i believe that a radical is

any person who believes in their personal liberty and individual freedom and limited government. that makes you a radical. i have always been a person who believes that people should not interfere with me. i should be able to do my own thing without -- so long as i do not violate the rights of other people. >> q&a sunday night at 8:00 p.m. >> now a discussion on the latest in the middle east with washington post columnist and author david nation. from "washington journal, this is about 40 minutes. host: our first guest of the morning at the table here, david ignatius who writes and thinks about american foreign policy from his perch at the "washington post." he's also written a couple of interesting novels about similar issues. thank you for being here. we've been talking about all the developments in u.s. and afghanistan.

you've been a spotter of the nato -- you've been a supporter of the nato strategy. does this week's events change your thinking thabeet at all? guest: well, we'll have to see. for the moment i think that we have a time table that we worked on, debated with our nato allies going back to a summit meeting in portugal a year or so ago. and that calls for a fazed withdrawal, calls for all the nato troops essentially to be gone by the end of 2014. and for u.s. and nato troops to end their lead combat role, turn over the basic security in the country by the middle of next year. it may be that the announcements this week, especially by president karzai urging that sometime next year, it wasn't clear when, u.s. forces and all nato forces should stay on bases, pull out of the country side.

the question obviously is whether afghan forces are ready to take over full responsibility, i think. if they are, they really can keep the country side stable. nobody would be happier to see that happen. our commander in kabul, general john allen, if they're not ready, i have a feeling that president karzai, whose continued term as president depends on the stability of the country. he would probably defer it to the end of the year. i think that would work for the united states for sure. host: when you read through all of the secondary reporting on this, people who are quoted even in countries saying that once he faces the reality of what

this means, he'll be pulling back from his demands, others saying he has a history of making very inflammatory demands and pulling away from them. what have we learned about his possibility as a leader? >> we've learned that president karzai is a very erratic, emotional leader that you have to be patient. you have to understand that what he says a week from now, a month from now, may not be exactly the same as he's saying today. we find that from political leaders where. he's not unique in that regard. i think the core issue that the u.s. should be focusing on, i hope karzai is focusing on, is how is this country going to remain stable enough after with withdrawal of most american forces which is coming. there's no question about that. we're on our way out. how is the country going to remain stable enough to avoid a civil war? afghanistan has known just a hideous 30 years of war.

it's a country that's been pounded in every corner. when i travel to afghanistan i have a lot, what you see is a terribly poor country that is visibly suffering these wounds of war. so, the last thing that anybody, especially president karzai should want is to set up conditions, kind of power vacuum out of the country side. that's been the worry at the core of the u.s. strategy there, how do we build up the afghan forces enough, just good enough that they can handle. that's what people are struggling to explore, trying to keep talking u.s. to afghan's, even with these terrible instances like the burning of the koran and the massacre last weekend. host: there are so many countries that we could talk about here, much going on in the

region, egypt, obviously, syria, iran and iraq. we're going to focus our initial conversation on syria and iran and afghanistan. you have questions for other countries in the region, david ignatius can take a stab at those. we welcome your participation. put the numbers on the screen. or you can comment on twitter or email us. all the addresses will be demonstrated on the screen as our conversation continues. how many times have you been to afghanistan? guest: i haven't made an exact count. at least a dozen. host: if people at home are asking just the seminal question what does the u.s. and nato get for 10 years of investment of blood and treasure in that country, what would you say? guest: i would say in terms of the core goal that we set when u.s. forces first entered in 2001, after the attack on our u.s. world trade center and pentagon, what we got was a

basic destruction of al qaeda's base in afghanistan. they flood across the borders. they have been attacking them there with mostly drone aircraft. slowly tracking those al qaeda fugitives down, killing bin laden, as we remember from may 2. you could argue that that's been pretty successful. it was a broader goal of reversing the momentum of the taliban, which would seem to be sole problem of the country, even after they were powered by u.s. forces and their afghan allies in that 2001 campaign. that's gone less well.

we still have to see precisely what the situation is and the key battle provinces in the south. and in the east, near the area where is so-called hakani network is based. the strategy the u.s. had we called counter insurgency. bring in good governments, was a basic building strategy. that's had mixed results, i think we have to be honest. the afghan officials have not provided the kind of good government that keeps people comfortable with where they are and that enhances security. in many areas, the taliban forces have been driven out. afghans will tell people like me when we come visit that the taliban are not popular, there

are some polling of afghans that says that that's true. they're viewed in many areas as just tough, tough people who make life more difficult. so the question, as u.s. forces begin to pull out of these areas where they surged last year, what will security be like? will taliban spring back in. will they gain control of this district to the west of can door har, where the terrible mass car took place. now that's what all our commanders are watching, watching it week bye week and we'll have to see. host: well our phones are all lit up just with this topic. connecticut is on the air, a republican there, good morning jean. caller: good morning. i just mostly have a comment. i wonder how mr. ignatius would feel if he were one of the last

people in afghanistan because what's going to happen there, the taliban is doing to take the country over. everybody knows it. all the people, because of the timed withdrawal, all the people there are taking their sides now. and you know most of the people are going to be atrade of the taliban, afraid of losing their heads. so they're going to go with the taliban. they're scrambling for that right now. how would you like to be the last one there? you would lose your head. but we don't think anything of sending over people and leaving them knowing that we're going to pull out in 2014. that's all i have to say. host: thank you. guest: well, the caller raises a couple of good questions. the first that i would focus on is this question of whether the taliban will take over.

my own guess is if you're looking for a bad outcome, to be a pessimist, which sure is easy gwynn that country's history. what you expect is not a takeover by the taliban but a civil war and a partition. and there are many ethnic groups that makeup afghanistan, who will already beginning to stockpile the weapons, prepare to defend their regions to make sure that the taliban don't take control. so i think that's the thing to worry about more, is a splintering, a civil war in a country that results in partition. on the question of being the last person there, one thing the u.s. is pretty good at is forced protection. i don't know anybody who cares more about the security of

soldiers than their senior officers. an idea we would leave the last man standing undefended, unable seerotect himself, i don't that happening. host: the topic, titled how to end the afghan mission, and we welcome you to find him on the "pennsylvania post" website. next call, david is a democrat there. good morning, david, you're on. caller: good morning. just a question for mr. ignatius who appears to be very thoughtful and reflective man. just was wondering if to consider the counters factal so to speak, if after 9/11 we had characterized it as a criminal act, and involved the f.b.i., and in terms of securing the country from terrorism, and also engage the c.i.a. in terms of counter, you know gathering intelligence

for terrorism that may be brewing abroad and never gone to war, just never gone to war in afghanistan, or iraq and taken a completely different route, would we be in a better position now? guest: i think it is entirely possible that we would be in a better position. you have raised one of the most important lessons in this 10 years of war, which is american power, in a funny way, is more powerful when it is at our side. when the gun is in the holster -- when we begin shooting, begin these wars with hundreds of thousands of u.s. troops, what has struck people overseas is how difficult it is to achieve our aims. i come to think, as i think the caller has, that a smaller,

lighter footprint of forces, paramilitary forces operated by special forces command, perhaps the cia, would be a better answer with dealing with insurgencies and supporting friends of the united states. that view is widely shared in our government. you would be surprised at how the generals who have done the heaviest work in this fighting, they are not enthusiastic about more wars in the model of the iraq and death in a stand. they understand the cost -- and afghanistan. they understand the cost. host: i will move on to iran, and a recent column. since you are arguing for sanctions, a global network

expels as much as 30 banks. a global network called swift, which announced thursday it is crippling institutions ability. it is the first time the consortium based in belgium has taken such a step. how important was this? guest: this was a big story because swift, which is like the world's financial central nervous system, if they cut you off, your ability to transact basic business becomes much, much harder. you have to plug into other remote outlets, if you can. you can see if you can finance

transactions through turkey, other neighbors, and that is when the u.s. will be exerting influence on those countries not to help. this is one more step to say to iran their current course is not supported by the world community. what i argued in the article you mention is that i think a military attack on iran by israel or the united states would be a mistake and produced the opposite result that we desired. it would probably rally the iranian people behind a regime that is not popular. i worry that it also might deflect the course of what we call the arabs spring, so it becomes more militant, more

anti-western than it is. i think sanctions, which we often laughed at present ineffective policy, in this case seem to be working in the currency has lost more than half of its value in the last few months. these sanctions will increase that value, and i would be amazed if they did not have some effect on iranian policy. host: we keep hearing more threatening statements from western leaders and israel about military action. with the prime minister visit wednesday, the president describes a window of diplomatic approaches closing. let's listen to him, and then talk about whether this is strategy or it is becoming an inevitability.

[video clip] >> i have sent a message directly to them publicly that they need to see this opportunity of negotiations to avert even worse consequences for iran in the future. do i have a guarantee that iran will walk through this door? no. in the past, there has been a tendency for iran in these negotiations to late, -- de lait, stock, do a lot of talking, but not move the ball forward. i think they should understand that the cuts that the sanctions, they are because we have deployed so many options available to us.

the window for solving this issue diplomatically is shrinking. >> what do you think is -- host: what you think is going on? are we waiting a big stick, or are we on the verge of military action? guest: you do not know until the state comes down, but i do not think that president obama wants to go to war with iran, and he hopes this increasing pressure of sanctions and other unstated sanctions that might be at work will convince the iranians to alter their course and allows some negotiated settlement. he feels that our country is fed up with war after 10 years and does not want to jump into

another one. it has been very interesting to watch president obama tried to make a convincing enough threats that he is prepared to use military action to get the israelis to back off of their view that action may be necessary, and also to convince iran to come into negotiations. it is a three-way the game of chicken. i have been to tehran. almost on every street corner, you have almost have an accident. usually these cars come rushing at each other, and then one has to negotiate the passing. we are all involved in a game of chicken at this intersection. i think people in washington do

worry that over the next few months war is a possibility. host: matt is in annapolis watching us. an independent. on the air. caller: my concern is the future in afghanistan. i have a brother in the army that is deploying in the next couple of months, and he has stressed that some of the under officers -- younger officers are not ready, but seniors are pushing deployment. what is to prevent things that happen in afghanistan from happening in the future? guest: ben -- that is a great question. everyone listening feels for your brother going out and

another deployment. we have retired army. -- we have a tired army. that is not to say that it is not still fighting at a high level in maintaining good discipline, but we see incidents in afghanistan that show that people are doing things that well-disciplined soldiers should not be. urinating of the dead, the 30- year-old staff sgt that left his base and started shooting civilians -- and no the army has in place a system to encourage people to talk about the stresses. your brother, and all of the brave soldiers heading off on new deployments, can count, i think, and better help from the

military from their officers in dealing with the kinds of problems that arise in these stressful combat situations. what all of this reinforces for all of us, especially those serving, it is it would be great to get forces back home now. host: albany, kansas. thomas is a republican. caller: i am from albany, ky. my name is thomas. we're talking about afghanistan. i see them committing crimes of passion instead of power and greed. sanctions really to work, but also reward of democracy does

work. i would like to see as -- see us come together with some kind of outline to the standards of the democracy of the world. if we had some kind of outline for people to read and to understand and to live by, not to kill, not to create crime -- we are up against people better committing crimes of passion, not crimes of greed. we need to grow from there. host: thank you. guest: well, you do see a lot of greed in afghanistan as well, but what i found is there is a yearning among the afghan people after these three decades of war for the rule of law, a sense of justice in their villages.

when i was left in afghanistan, in june of last year, i traveled to a city in the far eastern edge of the country, almost to pakistan, and i went with a general who was running something he called the rule of law field force. general martin showed me a map of the districts in afghanistan that do not have judges or prosecutors, and then he showed me a map of the districts where the taliban was strong, and guess what? it was the same map. where there is no justice, the taliban comes in and provides it. there is a demand by the people to arbitrate all the disputes that come up. so, general martin has been trying to recruit good judges

and prosecutors to go into these areas. that is the kind of program i wish we had been doing all long time ago, and i hope we keep doing it even as combat troops are reduced because it gets to the problem the caller is talking about. what does afghanistan need? it is not going to be switzerland, but if you could get basic judges to solve caller: we should have never been in afghanistan, iraq, and we need to tell israel to live iran alone because they are the ones causing all of the problems for us.

guest: well, first, i guess i have come to agree that the invasion of iraq was a mistake. at the time, i thought it was justified, as a lot of people did, but it's in the costs and benefits it is hard to come -- but seeing the costs and benefits, it is hard to come to that conclusion. if you go back to 2001, most americans had the feeling that we had to take the fight to the people that had done this. it is hard to think that we would not have gone into afghanistan. the question is how hard, how long, and i have been -- as i said earlier, i have learned that smaller footprint makes sense. in terms of israel and iran, it

is clear president obama and most officials and commanders think it would be a mistake for israel to attack iran and trigger another war that is not as useful as it should be in dealing with the iranian nuclear problem and has enormous consequences that could catch us up in a big, complicated war all over again. host: help us understand what the significance of and done it -- ahmadinejad being made to answer questions from religious leaders. guest: one reason i think military action is a mistake now is the military -- the political system is a train

wreck. difference dubliners -- different governors are accusing each other of witchcraft, believe it or not. ahmadinejad is a willful, strong headed person that wants to run the government. it is a system divided among itself. as the problem of sanctions deepens, iranians, who are sophisticated people, a rich culture that could be a very modern country, and as some point i think iranians will say enough. this divided government is not serving our interests, and a worsened economic situation is not acceptable. when that will be and how this will play out, and nobody knows. i am struck by this board -- disorder in iran.

host: ahmadinejad is the face of around for most of us. how long will he be in power? guest: there will be a presidential election in 2013. one question is to the spiritual leader will back because he is a powerful figure, and how open those elections will be. said lee, what we have some -- said lee, what we have seen in iran, it is more of the ayatollah's have turned the screws. they will not allow many candidates to run. if a candidate they fear is doing well, they will take away

his votes it seems. so, the democratic opportunities iranians had are less, but they are still there, they will have the elections, will elect a new president, and there will be a lot of jockeying to see who is the candidate. host: the strategy behind sanctions -- they heard their rank-and-file populace. is the idea to have them become so frustrated that they will rise up? guest: it is not described as a policy for reaching change, but the more i have thought about

it, you have to be honest. if you cut the country off from the central nervous system, swift, essentially an act an embargo so the country can not sell its most important product, oil, and that will happen in the middle of this year, you are creating a situation that almost inevitably will have political repercussions. is this just and up hurting ordinary iranians and leaves the leadership intact, the opposite will happen. host: steve. caller: your object to the is legendary. my question deals with afghanistan. i feel it is almost a taboo subject. opium. it is reported that the leader is an opium addict, and it is a fact that his brother is a

super-rich heroin dealer, and afghanistan it is living in many regards in the 15th century. i want to know if you agree with that and any solution must deal with the opium trade or i am all wrong of of the. i am "trichet i'm also worried about women being brutalized -- i am also worried about women being brutalized after we go. i'm a great admirer. i will take your response offline. guest: those are powerful questions. i have flown over opium and poppy fields mile after mile and just watched as people harvested those copies. sometimes there are a few hundred yards from nato forces. there is no question the opium trade has been an important source of revenue for the taliban and corrupt warlords who are almost as bad as the taliban.

this base of narcotics trafficking in afghanistan is part of why some people fear we have been dealing with a criminal state, a criminal enterprise that is so rotten with corruption that it will not provide good governance for the people. is afghanistan the 15th century country? i do not think so. one of the things that struck me was that as a court edit -- as it is, it is being transformed by modern communications. everyone has a cell phone. there are wonderful afghan television stations. i have a friend runs one of them, and he was dubbing sesame street. they have police shows chasing drug dealers and the taliban. when you think about afghanistan, think about a country that in large parts wants to become modern.

they have their own version of "american idol" in a country where the taliban bled at -- band singing. the rights of women, the ability for girls to go to school, it changes the have happened are wonderful. anyone who goes there is sick at the thought that you turned back towards a world where women's rights were deprived. i just read and wrote about an interview with a top taliban leader, who responding to public pressure said if we come back to more powerful positions we will not close women's schools. we understand girls should have education, etc.

host: chris in new haven, connecticut. caller: my interest in iran goes back a long way. i saw pictures of my mother's system -- sister at their royal table of the shaw when my cousin worked for him, and we promised the shop five nuclear power plants. -- the shaw five nuclear power plants. if we gave the nuclear power plants to the iranians it would take nuclear weapons off the table, and why i oppose nuclear proliferation, i think it would be better for them to have a fukushima over there than for us to store nuclear waste over here.

i just wonder why you think about all of that. host: thank you. guest: you raced two good points. first, it was the u.s. that got the ball rolling on nuclear iran by fostering a nuclear program. the shaw had hoped the s he moved down that road he would at some point -- that as he moved down that road he would be able to build nuclear weapons at some point. iran, like many countries does want to have nuclear power as a symbol of being a modern state. the program is popular in iran. the question for me is is there a formula that allows iran to be a nuclear power state with its own nuclear industry, as most countries do, without being a nuclear weapons state?

it is still signed on for that kind of deal, and allows inspection of facilities to verify that it is playing by the rules. we think that there have been some real bricks from those rules. that is one of the reasons the u.n. has sanctioned them repeatedly, but if you could come up with a deal where the world would be comfortable it was a power program, not a weapons program, that may satisfy iran's your name to be modern without scaring everybody else. host: we will put some video on the screen of a government- supported rally in syria there for the regime. people are on the streets, apparently encouraged by damascus to do that, and "the washington post" argues this

morning there are a range of options including enforcing no- flight zones, setting up corridors, etc., and says if we stand on the sidelines, worst case scenarios are more likely to result. do you agree with him? guest: i do not agree with the west part. -- the last part. syria is a tough problem for this administration, and for anyone like you or me who wants to figure out what the right policy is. the syrian loss of life is really grim. we now have well over 6000 people that have been killed. we have the insurgent stronghold in homs that has been overrun. we have had a terrible

humanitarian situation. the regime of massad -- of president assad has been very unpopular around the world. the problem is the opposition still has a red tag force. it calls itself a free syrian army, but as a friend told me the only thing in that statement that is true is syrian. it is not an army, and it will not free the country. to save the country, you're talking about foreign military forces ceiling that army off. i do not think the u.s. should do that. u.s. expeditionary forces in the moslem countries -- we have

had enough of that. it is conceivable we could assist regional powers like turkey, the northern neighbor of syria or saudi arabia on the soft, it is the -- on the south, if they feel strongly and they make that decision and ask for help, we should rethink it.

this is one of those situations where you may desire to help civilians and reduce civilian loss of life, the united states with a hasty decision that is not brought -- thought through -- where will you train these civilians? if you do it wrong, you will get a lot more civilians killed, so the death toll rises from under 10,000, to some multiple. wars in this world can spread like wildfire. hi, the lebanese civil war. by some counts 100,000 people were killed by did not want to see that happen in -- and i do not want to see that happen in syria. host: ginger, what is your question? caller: i want to take care of the usa. the border is a mess. our people are crying out? -- our people are crying out. what can we do? what can be done? guest: president obama often says we need nation-building at home, and the best thing i see is the u.s. economy starting beginning -- finally beginning to get muscle tone, and investors finally adding extra cash to build a new plant.

so, as economic activity in the u.s. begins to pick up, i think we will feel better about things as we begin to go back to work, and this terrible feeling that we are fighting wars overseas while we are struggling at home, if the economy keeps improving, we will not feel that as much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> following the interview this morning,. post" ngton pores published a story about

president obama's decision on osama bin laden. abouttomorrotomorrow, we will k the prevailing wages for public construction projects. >> next, a form looks set postwar relations between the u.s. and iraq. then, the state department on a possible missile launch by north korea. >> the attorney general discussing the loss it going before the u.s. supreme court challenging the affordable health care act. >> justice roberts, some people look at this, the week before the federal government filed their motion to dismiss, as a

harbinger of doom for our side. i don't see it that way despite the very broad language of the case which is a necessary and proper case. this brings very broad language it down through a very thin funnel. the federal government cannot get this bill through that final. if that is a requirement for justice roberts, i am confident. there has not been time for us to assess how he will -- >> it would be necessary and proper as part of the commerce clause. >> you can see the entire interview with the virginia attorney general on "n ewsmakers." >> it vice president biden's national security adviser said that the obama administration is

committed to helping a postwar iraq. the conflict is over but the work in the country continues. his remarks came during a discussion on u.s.-iraq relations at the center for american progress. this is about 45 minutes. >> good morning, and welcome to the center for american progress. i'm the senior vice president for american security. on behalf of all my colleagues, i want to welcome you. for the first time in nine years, the u.s. does not have troops fighting in iraq. president barack obama fulfilled his promise to end the war in iraq as part of an overall strategy to rebalance american national security priorities. today, we will discuss this and have this presentation on to the end of the iraq war and the

american engagement in iraq with the deputy assistant to president obama's and the national security adviser to vice president joe biden. our colleague has done a brief paper and it is on the back table for all of you who want to make sure that you grab a copy. he is looking at how the end of the iraq war had strengthened overall u.s. national security. by dedicating more resources to the fight against al qaeda, to restore u.s. military readiness, options to face other middle eastern threats, and to reduce the financial burden on defense spending, and to rebalance u.s. national security overall. that is on the back table and also on line.

it was last december that president obama said "it is harder to end a war than to -- begin one." iraq is not a perfect place, but we are leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self- reliant iraq with a government that was elected by its people. we are building a new partnership between our nations and we are ending a war not with a final battle but with a final march toward home. the president continued -- "this is an extraordinary achievement, nearly nine years in the making and today the american people remember everything that the men and women in uniform did it to make that moment possible." i think we will have a very interesting program here.

after we have comments, we will have questions from the audience. it is my great pleasure to welcome tony blinken. [applause] [no audio] >> thank you very much. good morning. it is great to be here at the center for american progress, particularly good to be here with you, rudy. also, with john podesta. a great leader in the clinton white house and a great leader in this institution. like many in the administration including i suspect the dozens of alumni currently serving, we look to cap for sound analysis. it is good to release try to return the favor by showing you

some of our thinking about iraq. sunday, this marked nine years since the start of the iraq war and three months since the last american troops crossed the border into kuwait and in one of our nation's longest conflict. the wisdom of going to war in iraq is something that is going to be debated for years and i believe that debate to the historians. what is beyond the debate and what news coverage too often fails to acknowledge is that iraq today is less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous , and the united states is more deeply engaged, that at any time in recent history. those of us who have been working on iraq for a long time. we know that this progress, while far from complete, is also far from inevitable. it was the result of the

extraordinary sacrifice of our troops, the resolve and resilience of the iraqi government and its people, and the study and intense engagement of our defense and civilians that remains to this day. i appreciate the opportunity to take stock of how far that we have come, the challenges that remain, and where we have to go in building a new and more normal relationship between iraq and the united states. rudy, you quoted president obama and >> ago. when the president and the vice president came to office, they came with a commitment to end the war in iraq responsibly. both parts of that are critical. end the war responsibly. it meant bringing our troops home after nearly a decade of war and as important, it meant helping the iraqis build a sovereign, stable, self-reliant

country, with a representative government that could become a partner in the region and not a safe haven for terrorists. on our first full day of work after the inauguration, president obama posted a cabinet level meeting to begin charting a course towards that goal. the president determined to withdraw u.s. forces from iraq cities by the summer of 2009, to end our combat mission and get down to 50,000 troops, and to withdraw all of our forces by december 31st, 2011. under the president's leadership, under the leadership of vice president biden, we have followed that to the letter. at every significant step, everyone predicted that violence would return and iraq would slide back into sectarian chaos.

at least so far, those predictions have proved wrong. of the last five years, violence has declined and remained at historic lows even after we completed the withdrawal of u.s. forces late last year. security incidences fell from an average of 1600 to less than 100. that has been a consistent trend over the last couple of years. of course, that is a credit to our troops first and foremost to incceeded at great cost is t restoring a measure of stability. they are the moisture in the ability to provide basic security for their citizens. this created the time and space for what vice president biden has called the most important element in iraq which is the emergence of politics as opposed

to violence as the basic means of settling disputes advancing interests. we all know and we have seen and read about a series of political crises over the election law, the election process, government formation, that have plagued iraq in recent years but at an earlier phase would have erupted into all-out violence. each and every time the iraqi leaders resolved their differences at the negotiating table, with a steady support of our industry, led by our tough diplomats, and in december, after more than 8 years, president obama kept his promise to end the war in iraq responsibly. let me briefly describe a scenario that recently played out in iraq. i think it will sound familiar to you. a leading sunni arab political figure is charged with terrorism-related offensive by a

shi'a government. rhetoric escalated on all sides. a group of lawmakers walked out of parliament grinding the political process to a halt and sparking fears of a return to sectarian war. this happened in the summer of 2007 when a culture minister was accused of ordering the assassination of a fellow politician. as you know, a rather similar series of events took place recently. the current vice president and members of his security detail were charged with terrorism- related offenses. the iraqi government enflamed an already intense situation by televising confessions of some of his guards. his bloc walked out of the parliament and the council of ministers. once again, we heard predictions of an emen