it is increasingly clear that canada's energy and natural resources are massive assets to our country in the global economy. the oil and gas, mining, and forestry sectors directly employ more than three-quarters of a million canadians. they are driving economic growth across the country. they are creating good jobs not only directly but also indirectly, in manufacturing, clerical work, skilled trades, and financial services. canada's resource industries offer huge potential to create even more jobs and growth, now and over the next generation. this potential exists in every region of the countrynatural gas in british columbia, oil and minerals on the prairies, the ring of fire in ontario, plan nord in quebec, hydro power in atlantic canada, and mining in canada's north. recently it has become clear that we must develop new export markets for canada's energy and

natural resources, to reduce our dependence on markets in the united states. the booming economies of the asia- pacific region are a huge and increasing source of demand, but canada is not the only country to which they can turn. if we fail to act now, this historic window of opportunity will close. we will implement responsible resource development and smart regulation for major economic projects, respecting provincial jurisdiction and maintaining the highest standards of environmental protection.

we will streamline the review process for such projects, according to the following principle, one project, one review, completed in a clearly defined time period. we will ensure that canada has the infrastructure we need to move our exports to new markets. beyond this, we will build on our very effective partnership with the canadian federation of independent business, to continue reducing red tape across government. our goal is to allow businesses to focus on what they do bestcreating jobs and opportunity, from coast to coast to coast. finally, as a key part of our plan for long-term prosperity,

our government is undertaking the most ambitious trade expansion plan in canadian history. experience has shown that opening new export markets provides an enormous long-term benefit to canada. it creates new opportunities for canadian businesses and good new jobs for canadian workers. on a level playing field, canadians have shown we can compete successfully with the best in the world. for this reason our government has worked hard to open new markets for canadian exports. before 2006, canada signed only three new trade agreements in 13 years. since then our government has signed new trade agreements with nine countries, and we are in negotiations with many more. just yesterday the prime

minister returned from another trip to asia, launching negotiations on new trade agreements with thailand and japan. the united states will remain our largest and most important trading partner. still, recent events and long- term trends indicate clearly that we need to diversify canada's export markets. we need to open new export markets in the world's emerging major economies, while strengthening and expanding our existing trade relationships. we will continue working with the united states to implement our joint beyond the border plan, to strengthen and deepen the economic and security links

between our two countries. at the same time, we will harmonize our duty and tax exemptions for 24- and 48-hour trips to match levels for u.s.citizens. this measure will ease congestion at our borders. we will conclude negotiations on new trade agreements with the european union and with india. we will also begin entry talks with the trans-pacific partnership, and continue building our growing trade relationship with china. by gaining greater access to these vast and growing markets, we will strengthen the financial security of all canadians. we will create good jobs and long-term growth in every region of the country. since we were first elected in 2006, our government has been focused on creating jobs and economic growth.

ultimately our goal is to ensure long-term prosperity for all canadians. ahead,"looking a little as sir john a. macdonald advised. we can see in the distance every reason to hope. we see young canadians, confident in their future, retired canadians, secure in their senior years, aboriginal canadians, realizing their vast potential, new canadians, strengthening our country as they have done in every generation. we see every region of the country, more prosperous than ever in our history. we see canadian businesses and universities coming up with things no one has thought of before, leading to new opportunities and a better life for canadians and for people around the world.

we see canada, going from strength to strength in the 21st century. we see canada, at the centre of the worldwith a great and friendly market to the south, a continent of opportunity across the atlantic, and a world of growth across the pacific. we see canada, whose wealth, while immense, will be measured ultimately in the greater happiness and security of its people. we see canada for what it is and what it can bea great, good nation, on top of the world, the true north strong and free. our government has been inspired by this vision from the beginning. today we step forward boldly, to realize it fullyhope for our children and grandchildren,

opportunity for all canadians, a prosperous future for our beloved country. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> steven harper visits washington tomorrow for a summit meeting with president obama and philippe de colder around. yes this is down for an interview about relation -- he also sits down for an interview about the environment and national security. live coverage at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> not an oversight hearing of security measures by the security administration.

after that, and house hearing on security on the korean peninsula. now a house oversight hearing on security methods used by the transportation security administration anthony the use of body scanners. officials testified at this joint hearing held by the house oversight and transportation committee. quite the committee will come to order. the oversight committee exists for fundamental principles. first, americans have a right to know that money washington takes from them as well spent. americans deserve an efficient and effective government that works for them. our duty is to protect these

rights. our solemn responsibility is to hold the government accountability. we have work tirelessly with watchdogs to travel the -- bring this to the federal bureaucracy. today we are calling the third hearinhearing. we plan to hold to additional csa oversight hearings parent they serve a vital role. in a post 9/11 time, are we getting value for our money? do you have a system that is thorough and complete that takes care of all of us?

must deliver value to the american people. it is not a small agency. this is more men and women working with aviation based organization. only one-quarter of the funds used by a tsa come from aviation fees. 3/4 comes from the american people. those of us to do not fly are paying a heavy price for those to do. even the dollars paid for by landing fees run at our

airports as a high price to pay. it is a burden on our efficiency. whether the dollars come from ticket fees are the taxpayer directly, it is essential we reviewed the effectiveness. by 2013, tsa will have wasted more than $500 million of taxpayer money developing advanced imaging technology machines. in addition over public outrage, it paints a dire picture of ineffectiveness. they believe the screening of passengers by observation techniques for the programs has already cost taxpayers $800 million and is ineffective. congress should consider limiting funds for this program. gao claims that tsa deploys it

before having solid scientific basis. when its work, it was only an accident. despite $3.2 billion cross, they continue to find that they are failing to properly administer the transportation marker identification credential. i have seen this failure myself. i have seen a mandated identification waved. showing a picture idea is not congress mandated. let's remember it costs a lot of money to produce the card using it as a high-priced id card. without creating a plan to upgrade the explosives detection system, which cost minders $64

million more, tsa cannot ensure updating it will be cost- effective. eds is an important system. whether it is the inadvertent touching of fertilizer or the real explosive. we mean to screen. it is an effective tool if it works. if it does not work, we have the biggest problem with a possibly have. the viper program faces serious questions from security experts in legal scholars about the constitutionality of this initiative. tsa is not taking into consideration the cost benefits.

that is a big part of what this committee is here to ask questions on. not might it work, not if we must do something, but have we done a cost-benefit analysis? have we screened through many choices and only deployed those which were? of what we do know is that we have fielded products that do not work in the past. when it becomes known that a product has a gaping flaw, it becomes essentially useless. even when it becomes public, there is no other tool so we continue screen people knowing ifthat is not enough. i now recognize the chairman of the subcommittee on aviation

infrastructure. >> thank you for organizing this important hearing. thank you for doing so with the transportation committee. after 9/11, they held a number of hearings to attempt to determine what happened and what's needed to be done. it became very clear that requiring easy access to the cockpit in case there was a medical emergency was not the most secure way to go. that policy was changed. now our cockpits are hardened. it is difficult for a passenger to take over an airplane and turn it into a weapon. that is the most significant

security change since that time. beyond that, people can go on airplanes and possibly take a plane down to treat this as they could if they were to go to a football stadium or a cruise liner or any sort of a train. we do have a security problem. it is not restricted to airlines. the part of the danger i think was dealt with when it became impossible for people to take over the airplane and turn it into a weapon. that says, we have this regime that all of us experience in congress. we are expecting millions of travelers every month, the same

people over and over. that has to be wasteful and intrusive. this has been going on now for 10 years. if it is going to go on for another 10 years, it behooves us to come up with a less intrusive and more sensible program so that we concentrate on where there might be a risk rather than inspecting the same people over and over. when we had hearings, and experts came in and testified before the transportation committee. they have faced heightened security threats. hardening the cockpit was one thing they advise.

trying to attack people reject track people when they buy tickets. working on the intelligence side of things to see if there is some sort of a likelihood that that person might be a risk. ways of inspecting people and how they behave, not just at the airports. looking at how they interact with ticket agents. there are a lot more strategic and intelligent ways to go about this. then spending hundreds of millions of dollars. changing the psychology of americans to have been starting to feel that they have done something wrong and there been subject to shakedowns.

as we do when you're worried about someone who has committed a crime. we are assuming everybody is guilty and treating them like prisoners. they are american taxpaying citizens. i feel that we have a lot to do to straighten this mess out. it is not a cost-effective approach. after 10 years, we owe more to the american people. >> thank you for having this hearing. >> i ask unanimous consent that our colleague from tennessee be allowed to participate in today's hearing. i will note that the ranking members of each of the committee's are driving and and have been delayed. it is not a flight as far as i know. they will make their opening

statement after our witnesses. i am sure they will be your guide then. with that, i would like to introduce our first panel. mr. steven sadler, the transportation security administration. mr. steven lord is the director for homeland security of the u.s. government accountability office. rear admiral is the u.s. coast guard and the assistant commandant a former marine safety security and stewardship. pursuant to the rules of this committee, would you all please rise to take the oath? raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give is the truth and nothing but the truth?

let the record indicate that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. my predecessor's face is up there. he began a tradition of explaining the obvious. he did it every time and i appreciated it. your entire opening statements will be placed in the record. in front of you, you have the countdown clock. like so many things that you looked at, doesn't really matter? the answer is please summarize if you run out of time. we would like to get through all of you out of here in a timely fashion. you have five minutes.

>> good afternoon. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. tsa has made significant strides in our utilization over the past year. automatic target recognition software, and passenger privacy while streamlining the checkpoint screening process. in the fall of 2011, my office began to develop performance targets. tied to this, we implemented a plan to increase utilization across the nation. as a result of these efforts, at our performance between february 2011 and february 2012 improved by 200%. in addition, we are employing technology to automatically verify passenger documents. it will eventually replace the current procedures used to detect altered documents.

we will deploy this technology for operational testing beginning next month. technology is only one mechanism to identify potential threats. the spot program uses behavior observation and analysis to identify high-risk individuals who may pose a threat to transportation security. spot was scientifically validated in 2011 by the science and technology division. represent the most thorough analysis of any screening program to date. no other counter-terrorism program is not to have been subjected to such a rigorous evaluation. the study revealed that spot was significantly more effective at identifying high-risk passengers than random screening protocols. subsequent to the validation study, we took steps last fall to enhance the program.

under a new pilot, the behavior detection officers employed a special interview technique. this interaction enables officers to better verify or dispel concerns about suspicious behavior and anomalies. preliminary analysis shows an increase in the rate of detection of high risk passengerst. sa is conducting an analysis with the directorate to inform the validation process. completing this program deployment, we have begun teaching a tactical communications course for our front line workforce. this training focuses on active listening, empathy, and will be complete by the end of 2012. these initiatives are some of the key aspects that provide the

backbone for our overall risk based strategy. this strategy demonstrates our commitment to move away from the one size fits all security model. this approach was necessary after 9/11 and has been effective over the past decade, we will move towards a more intuitive solution. the widely known is the pre- check. 600,000 passengers have experienced an expedited screening. by the end of 2012, we expect to offer passengers the benefits. we just expanded to include active duty u.s. military traveling out of reagan national airport. in addition, last fall we implemented this screening procedures for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave

their shoes on and go through a less intrusive screening process. this last monday, we began testing simply modified procedures for passengers 75 and older. we're supporting efforts to test identity based screening for airline pilots. over 470,000 uniformed pilots have cleared security through the non crewmember program. these initiatives have allowed us to expedite the screening process for children, military, frequent fliers, and the elderly. they resulted in fewer requirements and a significant reduction in patdowns. by enhancing the effectiveness of our current programs, tsa continues to work toward our goal of providing the most effective security and the most efficient ways.

thank you for the opportunity to testify. i would like to introduce my colleague. >> the gentleman is recognized. >> good afternoon. i appreciate the opportunity to testify on some of the work we are doing in coordination with the united states coast guard to strengthen security. the transportation credential program is an important security measure designed to ensure that individuals who pose a threat to security do not gain on escorted access. prior to this program, there was no standard verification or background check for entrance to a port. the identity verification requirements of the program supports the multi layer approach to protecting the nation's transportation systems and enhance security at airports. several key objectives were met during the initial rollout of

the program in october of 2007. these include milestones for implementing enrollment sides, conducting assessments. on april 15, 2009, u.s. coast guard regulation implemented the requirement for all unescorted workers in secure areas and all mariners to possess a valid. almost 2 million transportation workers have received them when applying for a hazardous material endorsement on a state issued commercial driver's license. hazmat applicants do not need to go to an enormous center predicting go directly to the state licensing agency to apply

for this endorsement. 11 states have availed themselves of this capability. we also recently awarded the universal enrollment services contract. this new capability will allow individuals to apply for multiple programs at the same location. allow enrollment for new and future programs. on may 31, 2011, we completed the required data collection phase. tsa gathered information from seven ports, 13 facilities. these sites provide data. the final report was submitted to congress february 27, 2012. this data provides a clear

picture of the likely impact of using readers at maritime facilities. this pilot conclude that system's function properly when they are designed, installed, and operated in a manner consistent with the characteristic and business state of the vessel operation. thank you for the opportunity to testify. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the progress and related challenges and deploying three t security programs. my observations are based on a large body of work. i would first like to note that tsa have made some notable achievements since the 9/11 attacks. as the witnesses noted today, some remaining challenges still exist. the first program of like to discuss is the behavior

detection program. also called spot. this program consists of over 3000 behavior detection officers that are deployed to over 160 u.s. airports. this program is a key part of tsa's efforts to focus more attention on dangerous behavior. much more work remains to fully validate, establish sound performance metrics, and assess costs and benefits. as we noted in our prior work, all these additional steps could take several more years. as we noted in our report on the program, we deployed spot nationwide before determining whether it had a valid scientific basis. the good news is that they did complete an initial validation study in april of 2011. it concluded that the program was more effective than random

screenings. however, it was not designed to fully answer the very important question of whether you can use behavior detection principles for counterterrorism purposes in the airport and are met. a scientific consensus does not exist. another key report recommendation was to develop better performance measures. the importance of this is underscored by looking at the arrests made under the program. 27% of the 300 spots arrests made in 2010 were illegal aliens raising questions about mission focus. the second program i would like to discuss today is the body scanner program. advanced imaging technology. as you know, these scanners were deployed in response to the attempted christmas day attack. 640 of these units are now in place at over 160 airports.

these machines provide superior benefits over metal detectors. earlier this year, we issued a classified report. most of the details are still classified, we agree to allow to note some of the details regarding the utilization for today's hearing. we found that some of these units had been used less than 30% of the days since their inflation. in response to our report, we agreed to take steps to address these low utilization rates. the last program i would like to discuss today is the maritime biometric provincial program. in terms of progress, tsa has and rolled over 2 million maritime workers in the program. 2011 report identified a number of significant internal control

weaknesses in background checking and used that we believe has limited the security benefits of the program. these weaknesses may have contributed to the breach of selected u.s. facilities during a covert test we conducted as part of this review. we recommended the strength in program controls as well as complete and effectiveness study to clarify the current programs contributions to enhancing maritime security. dhs has established a working group to address are important report recommendations. we look forward to seeing the results of the committee's work. in closing ,tsa has established a number of security layers to thwart potential terrorist attacks. our past work has a defined in number of ways this could be strengthened. i am hoping that today's

hearing can provide some additional insight on how these programs can be strengthened and made more cost-effective. mr. chairman, this concludes my statement. >> thank you. >> i am honored to appear before you today to speak about the coast guard's role in enforcing compliance of the transportation worker identification credential. the twic program requires such all merchant mariners and transportation workers seeking unescorted access undergo a security check undersea at twic. it is required to 2700 regulatory facilities and 50

unregulated facilities. the transportation security administration has primary responsibility for the issue when it's oftwics, the coast guard has responsibility for ensuring compliance. the coast guard continues to conduct unannounced and announced inspections to ensure compliance. the coast guard has verified more than 213,000 twics. in accordance with a safe port act, the pilot program was conducted to evaluate the feasibility and technical and

operational impacts of implementing a system. electronic readers add another layer of security associated with the twic. tsa's report on the pilot program was delivered to congress on february 27. the coast guard is incorporating the results of the pilot. this will apply requires to leverage security benefits and abilities. section 809 of the coast guard authorization act of 2010 and amended the original requirements. as elements of the coast guard issuance process relies upon data out receipts, the provision was neither self executing or easily implemented. the coast guard issued a policy letter in december of 2011 to remove the requirement to hold a twic for mariners inactive.

the coast guard continues to work towards codification of this change to a rule making process. a gao report in may 2011 identified a weakness in identification. in response, we issued policy towards the field finance directing for wrote investigation. a quick flash a of thetwic is not acceptable. electronic readers insure each person attempting to enter a facility is carrying a twic. we continue to work with our partners and state and local agencies to improve the program. by balancing a steadfast commitment to security, while facilitating commerce. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. i will be pleased to answer your questions.

>> thank you. we will not recognize the gentleman from maryland for his opening statements. >> today, the oversight committee convened to examine measures to secure our nation's transportation networks. they must achieve a delicate balance. they must be effective in meeting the evolving threats posed by terrorists. we also expect it to be responsive. since the terrible events of september 11, 2001, several attacks have been attempted against commercial planes. including the attempted bombing of christmas day 2009. northwest airlines flight 253 and the attempted bombing in 2010 of a cargo jet using a bomb disguised as an inkjet cartridge. these instances demonstrate the

of all been threatstsa must counter. the 43,000 security officers must screen more than 2 million passengers every day in our nation's 450 airports. the vast majority of passengers pose no risk, these officers must find the equivalent of a needle in a haystack. tsa increase the deployment of advanced imaging and technology systems to screen passengers for both metallic and nonmetallic press. they have developed the pre- check program to expedite screenings to low risk to travelers. i welcome the efforts to develop a more intelligent risk based approach. recognizing the enormity of the challenge they face, the agency develops new screening

techniques, we must ensure that its tracks the appropriate balance between moving too quickly or moving too slowly to address new threats. today's hearing will review at the transportation work identification credentialed. when i served as chairman of the subcommittee on coast guard and maritime transportation, i convened hearings in 2007 and 2008 to review the rollout of twic. unlike many screening techniques, congress mandated what became the twic program. there are now more than 2.1 million enrollees. they have paid approximately $280 million to implement this program. to close the security perimeter, we must implement the use of leaders so that these cards are not just expensive flash passes.

twics are not issued to in eligible applicants. we must also view it in a broader maritime security context. it is meant to control land side access to secure areas of u.s. ports. there are many risks that approach our ports, particularly from the water side. none of the individuals on the estimated 17 million small boats operating in our waters are required to carry a twic. none of foreign mariners carry twics. the coast guard must defend our coast, rusty thousand but see, respond to marine casualties rescue thousands at sea. this service of 42,000 active-

duty officers do all this on a budget of less than $10 billion a year. less than 2% of the budget. they now face additional cuts. the coast guard does all we ask them to do. we cannot continue to stretch the service and assume they will never break. i yelled back. thank you for your courtesy. >> first of all, thank you so much. i am honored to co-chair this hearing with you.

sorry there was a little bit of a delay. i am pleased to be with you. thank you for your leadership. this is a very important agency that we have joint responsibility over. our committee has some limited oversight responsibility under transportation, as you may recall. tsa was created -- i happen to chair the subcommittee on aviation in 2001 after the terrorist attacks. since that time, tsa has grown from 16,500 screeners and a small cadre of different transportation security activities, which would join together.

it was a much smaller beginning. unfortunately, tsa has mushroomed to 65,000 employees, of which there are 14,000 administrative personnel. 4000 in washington and 10,000 out and the fields. we never intended it to mushroom to this size. i have been critical of the administrative cost, we might be able to endure that kind of expenditure, which has now grown to $8 billion. if that meant we were secure. instead, as this committee reports today, we have a number of programs that are so far behind, i would like to talk about the transportation worker identification card.

hundreds of millions of dollars in limbo. some of the equipment that has been purchased does not do the job. i know we cannot talk about all of it in this open setting. the deployment of an ax -- acquisition of expensive and equipment that is supposed to protect us the deployment could have better by a high-school class project. tsa has had five administrators in nine years. we had a period it when we had no administrator. it is difficult enough with an agency to operate with an administrator in washington. let alone not having an administrator for that period of time.

i have other concerns, have been monitored this as closely as anyone in congress. we are still at risk. the nation is still address. unfortunately, even the layered system -- almost every layer is flawed. the behavior detection, which i have worked with previous administrators to put in, we have equipment that did not work. tsa again bought equipment that did not work. i have had might investigative staff follow that. they have sat and a sad and we were paying rent on them. they were sitting in a warehouse, they spent $600 per

piece of equipment. only after we prompted the actions. some investigators looked at another warehouse. we got information that it was full of equipment. the nerve to cause us to delay. i might even ask if we can not get the information to subpoena. when you were informing tsa that we were sending our investigative staff -- as our investigators were appearing on the scene. it is a very expensive and disappointing operation. i had faith in administrator crystal. he promised reform. i do not see that happening, unfortunately.

that is the highlight, mr. chairman. tos important that we get the bottom of this. there is a lot of hard-earned tax money going to theaters security, and not real security. we have to stop paying that price before we pay a huge price of a successful attack. >> i will not recognize myself for five minutes. i have the advantage of knowing your bio. i spent nearly three decades in security. the one thing i know about security is there are two types. there is the type that convinces people that your

target is harder than somebody's else's. i cannot protect all cars. that is what i would say you have is a system your today. you have a series of hardening spread the word sometimes, and i am speaking about the aviation. these programs certainly seem to be good programs. in every case, as the wind blows, those spots will stop targets. targets are exactly like you would expect. they are mobile, responsive. if we do not have a layer of security system that has a sufficient force to rallies to be like a ship, one in which we know there will be a few leaks,

but for the most part, it is watertight. our security system today is not watertight. the accidental catching of the bad guys belabors two points. the many people who find themselves going through security and sometimes they have us pull something out, and sometimes they do not. sometimes they do is secondary, sometimes they do not. we opened up this hearing to facebook. i am giving you anecdotal once. i will supply all of them and i will place them in the record. so you can respond to the individuals. for example, joe is a u.s. marine. he was flying in his dress blues uniform. he was forced to remove his trousers in full view of passengers. it did not matter that he explained what it was. it did not matter that it was something that he had seen many times before. you and i know the turnover is high and the training is perpetual.

the next one says, i am a disabled person and have been targeted for groping. my wife travels with a portable oxygen concentrator and to reduce of the machine means she gets pawed by hand every time we travel. julia -- the tsa has taken away my freedom to travel because i wear a medical device and i cannot go the the amount of radiation i would be subjected to. there are plenty more. over 350. i am wendy. i have worn an artificial leg since i was four.

i am now 61. i used to travel a lot for work, gave up traveling after being assaulted by tsa constant. the first question i have, 65,000 tsa workers. a quarter of them are employed in administration. do you think that is a fair ratio or are you a bloated, bureaucratic organization that has a lot of people working and a lot of systems that do not work? >> thank you for recognizing the hard-working men and women of tsa.

i will have to take a ratio for administrative to front-line personnel. i think it might be different from that. >> when i travel, obviously, to a number of places. houston, sacramento, san diego. i can tell you that i periodically count. for four active checkpoint in san diego, there will be 35 people standing there. wouldn't you agree, based on your own observations, the amount of people directly at a checkpoint versus the total number is extremely high? you have not created any efficiency in the 10 years of your existence. >> i do not agree with that. tsa is working hard --

>> let's go through the numbers. there are four times as many employees as there was seven or eight years ago. correct? >> i do not believe -- >> 16,000 in your initial authorization. 2005, still below 35,000. you are now over 65,000. in the last five years, have the american people seem shorter lines? yes or no? >> i do believe they have seen shorter lines in the last four or five years. >> i would like you to check your figures. they have not seen a shorter lines. you are not given shorter lines. you are taking longer for each one and using more people. with that, i recognize the ranking member for his question. >> thank you very much. tsa the recently completed a test required by the safe port

act. to maximize the security, and we must move to implement the use of the readers. tsa was responsible for the recent pilot test. the coast guard is responsible for the final reader role. will it be feasible for facilities to install readers that can quickly read twic cards? i think it seems like we ought to get this done, gentlemen, in some type of way. we have been messing round with this for a while. >> i would be pleased to answer

that. we have embarked upon a rule making process. getting to a final rule. before we did that, we need to adjudicate the comments. that will be very informative. with the objective of not seeing commerce. there are over 32 recognized commercial twic readers. one of the concerns will be whether you use a mobile system or a fixed system. we would envision approximately two-year period of time from the time a final rule was on the street to full implementation across industry. >> do you have a response? >> we did showed that when the readers were installed

properly, the people were trained properly, and the workers were assimilated to the use of the cards, they did work properly. they did not impede the flow of commerce in those particular parts. it does depend on the installation, on the training, it does depend on whether the facility has picked the right reader. >> the employees were successful and accessing -- let me ask you this. i want you to clarify. in individual ports, to the have the responsibility to deny admission to those who have valid and authentic twics if they have no business on the property? >> that is correct. >> what steps has the coast guard taken to address the gao's findings?

do you think it will help to close the security gaps? >> i do. they have been out in the field during spot checks. we have done over 200,000 of the spot checks. last week, we ran over 450 spot checks. out of those 450, we found 58 members who had no business being at those particular facilities. we engage extensively with our stakeholders. the facility owners. we are interested in those who may have criminal intent, which is one of the information's that twic provides. the card holders are being screened against the terror screening data base. there is real time information and a benefit to the facility owners.

>> it is the only part of our maritime security -- and that is very significant. the coast guard will be the most important element of that regime. the strain of budget cuts on the service are obvious. in 2010, at 10 of the 12th suffered significant problems and had to be taken out of service. is that right? >> i was involved with that response. >> these are required by the safe port at to be established by october. the inspector general and others have noted the coast guard's inability to meet safety and security emission requirements in the arctic as the ice cover opens to allow

more shipping operations in those latitudes. nonetheless, the president's budget -- this budget will conclude the acquisitions of the fast response and a number below the approved program record. this is my last question. i know the coast guard strive to meet every mission requirements. can you comment on the challenges the service is facing and balancing its competing commission and means and the maritime security arena at in light of the significant budget constraints? i have always complained about the coast guard having not enough money. >> i would be pleased. i was involved in the deepwater horizon oil spill. the president directed that we tripled our response efforts. we are constantly doing front-

line operations. we had the good fortune, if you want to call it that, where we did not have another contingency occurring at the same time. i was able to redeploy and marshal all those resources into the gulf of mexico. we were able to do the same during the earthquake in haiti and hurricane katrina. the challenges we face is what if we have multiple threats? what if we had a hurricane and then we have a threat to national security? taking place concurrently. that is where we run into resource challenges. we have to reallocate resources from one mission to another. we do not have the resources to

do both. >> we now recognize the chairman of the committee for five minutes. >> my friends at tsa, since my last hearing, the appropriations subcommittee, i was not a member of that subcommittee, but was allowed to ask questions. >> we recommend that system to all committees. >> the funny thing about that, mr. chairman, tsa found out i would be a witness. they send an e-mail. the e-mail said, when he asks a

question, take a long time answering act. so you eat up his time. the problem is that sometimes you think it is the gang that can shoot straight. they shot the e-mail to cq. reserving my time, if you would answer fairly briefly, one of my concerns, of course, is that transportation worker identification card. we spent over half a billion dollars, is that correct? $511 million. >> we have spent approximately hundred $74 million. >> i have $500 million. >> you may be including grants. >> in the neighborhood of half

a billion. the card is supposed to allow us to identify who goes into our ports. we passed the law, setting that requirement up, after 2001, right? >> i believe that was required. >> thank you. they have produced 9.1 million of the cards are active. they printed 3.1 million of them. we still do not have all the components that were required under the law, including iris and thumbprint as far as biometric capability, do we?

>> we have capability as far as the card -- >> you do not have a standard for iras -- iris, is that right? this is not going to be "groundhog day," but i had a hearing april 14, almost a year ago. we had the director of the information technology lab testify, and my question was when would you finish the iris capability? hopefully by the end of the week. and when will you finish the standard? >> by the end of the year. >> i do not have a time.

>> they told us the summer. so, we're now going into our ninth year. reproduced the card, -- we produced the card, but then i read you are still in a pilot reader program, so, basically we have 1.1 million of these cards and we do not have readers. is that correct? we do not have readers? >> just to go back a second -- >> do they have readers? >> certain parts to have readers. >> how many of these cards are able to be read? >> we know the pilot ports have readers. i do not know outside of the pilot course -- >> at this time, a very small

number of courts in fact have readers. >> without objection, so ordered. >> thank you. behavior detection. let me go into this. i will just take one more minute. behavior technician program. we spent $1 billion in. can someone say that that is correct? >> i believe that number is slightly below, but we will get back to you. >> alright. alright, i will ask you. when i knew that the puffers would not work, and it did not detect trace elements that were

put on me, they told me it was just a technical problem. we just destroyed those, is that correct? we paid the police $600 -- $600,000 to destroy these? >> that is correct. >> they had dod destroy them. getting something else in place because the technology did not work, and you all have seen the classified reports and the reports on the advanced imaging technology. is that correct? >> yes. >> perino by that performance, that lack -- we know by that performance, that lack of performance, will we have seen with the puffers, that is very successful, but the problem is gao viewed the performance and saw 24 times 17 known terrorists went through airports

and yet they have yet to detect one terrorist. and that was a question submitted by one of the floridians. we had an open question online. "can you name any terrorist that you actually -- can you name any terrorist that you actually stopped in the program? >> while we accept gao's assertion, we do not know that those individuals went through a the time, and they were not operational, said they were not manifesting signs of distraction. >> can i comment on that? in the gao representative, and i think our point was to study the travel patterns people associate with terrorists to see if they were exhibiting behavior

is. at this time, i do not think it is known whether they were exhibiting behaviors or not. we suggested that reviewing the video tapes, we thought that would be a rich source of information to help define the program. at this point, mr. chairman, i will also ask unanimous consent to put in the record, we went up and looked in boston where they had a demonstration project. i think there's the one in detroit. there was unbelievable -- >> without objection. >> also passed -- >> without objection, that will be placed into the record. >> i would like to go to my colleague from the select intelligence committee who knows

probably more than anyone on the dais what the skills are to read someone who may be a terrorist. and the gentleman is recognized. >> thank you. you may have overstated that a bit. >> no, i remember our time behind closed doors. you were the senior statesman their. >> i appreciate that. what we do, mr. chairman, it is going to be a pretty mundus agency. -- 2 mundus -- huge agency. i would like to -- the one thing that amazes me. is not rocket science. i have been waiting and waiting and waiting. i was really pleased to see we have pushed to the air crews

threw out a little quicker and not delayed things. there is a member here in to help probably as high clearances' one can get for years. a suspect coming to the same airport time and time and time again. another one where things happened on the server's. there seems to be no effort to recognize, gosh, they have top- secret crypto and so on and so on. is there ever a thought to take advantage of that, or are you going to keep on doing it the way you're doing it? >> certification, the answer to that is we are actively trying to -- sir, the answer does we're actively trying to expand the been there were part of the

flyer program or they have opted into the global entry. we extended the program to active duty military at reagan national airport. that started last week. >> i understand, the ex- military and myself and others. i took off my uniform monday and did not work the next. but the history is still there. >> we are actively -- >> what is your time line for "actively"? it seems simple,

straightforward. record is the repair or is not. >> -- the record is either there or is not. >> there are two aspect. there is a technology piece that allows us to verify that someone that we believe they are -- there are over 6000 resistance in the program. we are doing it cautiously to make sure we are maintaining security. >> i understand that. i do not understand -- it is like discovering the we'll all over or passing of the fact that we have spent a lot of money doing background checks on a number of people, and how many years halves -- and many years has that been going on? but i want to stop on an apologetic note. i think the personnel are

working hard and are sincere and following the will see a minister raiders -- following the rules the administrators are asking them to operate by. i thought that would probably get salt. it takes the time, clogs up the process. it is pretty simple. there is an it card -- id card. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i yield myself 5 minutes. first, i would like to thank you for taking the time to be here. i am in the position of being

the one member of congress to serve on all three committees to have jurisdiction over the csa -- tsa. i spend a lot of time with this issue, as well as charting the services of the tsa. i'd like to say almost without exception, but there are exceptions, the employees i've met in my travels have been courteous and professional in nature. however, as part of preparing for this, just like chairman issa, i went to my social media sites for comments, and i received quite a few negative comments, and without objection, i would like to get those injured in to the record as well. >> so ordered. >> i wanted to talk about some problems that people have reported with the tsa.

the tsa is squeezed into spaces and airports not designed for that level of screening. we had one in the news at this last week. the gentleman in the wheelchair. it seems like at some point, if we could just use some common sense and slow down a little bit and offer to do some of the screenings, you know, in a private area. it is worth spending a little effort bond creating spaces that are more friendly, that we might be able to do better there. i just wish we could code should be -- coach the tsa and the traveling public not to get worked up, because there may be better ways to do this. about six months ago, i think i commented in one of these hearings, check in at a kiosk, and my staff to the tsa.

now the tsa is at least asking me for my full name. it seems like it would be better if there was a little more engagement. would you like to comment on that? >> first, if i could -- every passenger who travels through checkpoint is entitled to private screener on request. >> it might be something you can apply for, and especially for the elderly and disabled and children. >> and the video from last week was over two years old, and with the policy changes last month -- last fall, we've seen a dramatic decline in the number of times we have had to bat down children and the elderly with our new program. -- pat down children and the

elderly with our new program. our officers are trained to observe signs of deception, fear, and they are different than the other traffic. >> there is no way to test that. you cannot imitate those behaviors, correct? deterrentsny program, it is very difficult. >> -- as an air -- as in any deterrents program, it is very difficult. >> i am dusting off my global entry card, because i am looking forward to being able to use that. >> we intend to roll it out to be 35 biggest airports by the end of this calendar year. so far, we are on target for

that. we continue to roll out a couple of weeks -- a couple a week. >> e s&p 500 fairmount of time studying what the -- you spend a fair amount of time studying what the tsa has done. do you see some things you should be doing that you are not doing? >> i cannot think of anything off the top of my head. we can pleaded -- we completed a large body of work. we think we're having a positive effect on the program. tsa has been very receptive to most of our recommendations. >> i see in that time.

hopefully we will get to a second round of questions. i will recognize the gentleman from virginia for 5 minutes. >> i think we need to start, positively recognizing the mission here. how do we craft -- graft protective measures to protect the public? in that a democracy, it seems to me we ought to be arguing about this all the time. it is my right to be protected. it is a natural tension and not necessarily a reflection on the men and women trying to fulfill this mission. the men and women who have been recruited are doing, on

balance, a very good job. as the chairman indicated, there are occasions when that has been the case. one thing i would just say -- simple training and please and thank you would really belong way the bank -- go along way. i wish people could remember that. parking orders is not -- barking orders is not appropriate. i would urge you strongly to make sure, i know it seems simple, but it's on at the traveling public's and nurse. -- traveling public's nerves. what we are trying to do is get

compliance. most of the public is able to tolerate intrusiveness. i think we would also go along way to understanding the compliance, knowing we are all in this together. >> 200 entities were ranked as the best place to work.

it was in the bottom 5%. of federal agencies. as "yeah, i would like to work their." it was second to last in pay and family friendly policies. >> i am aware of that survey. i would like to comment. gao is consistently ranked near the top. i saw the scores for tsa. i think that reflects a large screening work force that has somewhat stressful job. they are interacting with the public day-to-day. it is not clear to me what the department was doing on that. we have work underway. >> i am going to give you an opportunity to tell me that. would it surprise you to learn it was 13%? >> if that is accurate, it would not surprise me, no. >> and 10% for the last five

years? higher than the average federal agency. >> anytime an agency experiences that kind of turnover, there is that kind of challenge. >> given the nature of the mission, should it not concern us we have low morale and high turnover and that could affect the performance? >> i am not sure what the causes are. >> putting aside causes. with that not suggest we're putting in danger the mission? but i am not that enthusiastic about the mission or i do that even care about the mission and i do not like my boss or the agency. what is the impact on the traveling public if they are not carrying out their mission? >> i will not ask any more, but

if he would not -- if you would not mind asking mr. mclaughlin to respond to that? >> thank you. to your comment on training, i am pleased to let you know that earlier this year, we began an initiative which is training that all tsa employees and their managers will focus on, which focuses on empathy, and communication techniques that hopefully will improve that experience. the caveat being airports are the most busy and allowed places and sometimes it is hard to balance the need to communicate and be heard without being over, so to speak. there's a difference between -- please put your hands up and "please put your hands up!" we're working to get that training is complete by december of this year.

my goals for -- my goals were 6% attrition for full-time, but the overall number might be excused somewhat by bad data. with regard to what we're doing to improve their standing in the best places to work, i can tell you that being an employer in the private sector and now in federal service, having worked with thousands of employees, i will tell you i am very proud of the dedication of my work force and their commitment to the mission. overall, their focus on the mission is not consistent with the rating we receive. the rating we receive. that being said, we have a