they have a national advisor recounts all. they have training like the one i described with feedback from officers. one officer described it as a like changing effect. and i would also say it comes with the newness of our agency. is keen to have a different growth curb then an agency -- it is going to have a different growth curve. >> now let's go to the gentleman from minnesota, a former airline pilot himself. >> thank you, mr. chairman. expert, i do not know about that. and user, definitely. hat everyone was to be safe. -- everyone wants to be safe. thank you for the coast guard. just a couple things.

i see spot developing into something more like we see in israel, going through more proactive challenge reply. let's just deal with the now. so, we hit spot, go to the screen areas, and 30% are seen by ait machines. >> according mclaughlin to mr. -- according to mr. mclaughlin, that is correct. >> are it's 100% -- are ait's 100%? >> any technology will allow limitations. >> the metal detectors are a little bit less. only 30% of the people have gone through the first phase and are going through 30%.

then they go through the ait machine, whereas the other 70% have gone through metal detectors that are less safe, but not as good. ok, we go to the gate. you have the gate agent, make sure you get on the right aircraft. we have some security here, but there is the possibility something could slip through. this talk about the aircraft. -- let's talk about the aircraft. we have nearly 1 million airport workers that are credentialed. they have direct access to non- public areas, and they are working in the shadow of the airplane.

could you tell me how these 1 million workers are credentialed? >> there is a secure identification display, and they are essentially vetted from databases and criminal records. >> we have seen recently drugs being smuggled on aircraft, drugs in and around the aircraft. is it fair to say there are holes in this program as well.

>> so we have a potential going to the aircraft, passengers being screened, having a very good potential and just and equal opportunity of a potential -- of items being put on board the aircraft, perhaps in the shadow of the credentialed workers. my question to you, and i am going to give you a very good one, if you do not mind, sir. and i say this with all due respect. the potential of having someone with bad intent coming on the aircraft, with a device on board the aircraft in the shadow of that aircraft, if that aircraft gets underway and is in the

year, what are the line of defenses capable in the air at that time? who is the last line of defense, mr. mclaughlin. and do not say the cockpit door. >> there are multiple layers in place. we do have air marshal's. the ultimate layer that is an important player today and we talk about it from time to time is the actual passenger. that individual who learns as many lessons on 9/11 as the rest of us have learned. >> true. but a professional terrorist has done this routine 100 times.

they know when that cockpit door is going to be open. may know when it is going to be closed. they know lot of things about the aircraft that your average member of the public does not know. my question -- there are certainly not any fams available per flight. y on god's green earth would be cut in half a volunteer program that protects the aircraft for $15 per flight? why would we do that? topicannot discuss that's because is not my area of expertise >> i can reinforce of the layers that are on the ground, including the work we do in and around the airport. we can take that question for the record. >> i would appreciate that. the program is being cut in half. it was the last line of defense for many terrorist wishing to take that aircraft and using it as a weapon of mass destruction.

i would appreciate your information on that. >> thank you very much. we will recognize the gentleman from tennessee. >> the tsa personnel have all been courteous. they have a tough job having to do a monotonous gig. they are not the most popular people to to see. the other is about the twic cards. they are important, but it seems like there could be a better way to allow the people who receive them to pick them up. improvement in that system would be helpful to my community. who is the expert on the process at the airport? >> the airport would be myself.

>> today, i was asked to take off my watch. why? >> i was not there with you. it is possible that the officer working to facilitate the travel of customers might have felt that it would alarm and you would have had an easier experience by removing it. you are not required to remove your watch. >> everybody was. she was announcing, take off your watch. if the light is on, they will not pass you. they say, it will save you cost in the future. that is not epa's job. nor is it your job to make it less likely. i do not get it. it makes no sense to me at all. she said, you've got to take it off.

the rules need to be consistent. for a while, we did do shoes. shoes must be looked laid flat on the conveyor belt. is that a uniform rule? >> at one point, we change our procedure. we have subsequently change that back to allow them to be placed in a bin. >> it is not a big deal, but sometimes your shoes get crushed. i am comfortable in my manhood, the guy was fine. i did not have a problem. when i got out, he wanted to pat me down. the machines must have messed up is all i can figure.

>> i cannot speak to your specific situation. i can look into it for you. >> it's just seems like there should be some consistency. the machine might be set at different levels or something? sometimes you go through and they want to look at your arm or this or that? whatever. i am not the bionic man. it makes no sense. >> the role is to be uniform and consistent. we want to be random and unpredictable at times because we find that is helpful in terms of our work and security.

we are looking for a uniform and consistent experience for travelers. i am happy to follow up. >> there probably should be some type of a system where you have your most frequent fliers, up one day, there was this lady, she has the richest woman -- she has the richest husband in town. they were going through all of her stuff. sometimes, it just takes a little common sense. how much did the process cost us? >> i can take that question for the record and get back to you. >> that was a loser from jump street, too. if you are a terrorist you would go to the line that did not have it.

it did not work, so the terrorist could have chosen either line. if they looked at you closer in the other line, why did they look at you closer? it was really bad. otherwise, all of the tsa people are great. it is a tough job and i know you will make it better. >> the staff informs me they were around $30 million. the same situation exists today. i fly home on american, sometimes on united. if you are going to united at dca, you go through a full body scanner. if you are going through american, you go through eight metal detector. it does not take a rocket scientist to recognize a potential issue there.

>> i had a conflicting schedule. i apologize. these questions may have already been pursued. what has been the total cost of the program to the federal government and the private sector? >> to date, the program cost approximately $374 million. that would include $100 million in appropriations. $274 million in user fees for individuals. >> that is the federal government and the private sector? >> yes, sir. that is the appropriated money to start the program. $274 million in user fees when you enroll. >> thank you, sir. what is the amount of money that you allocate for twic administration each year?

>> about $2 million, looking at commercial technology. >> that is $2 million annually? >> that is to date. i do a number of missions, one of them is validating twics. >>, and the coast guard personnel are dedicated to oversight of the program? >> they are not dedicated solely to twic. it is just one element of that, so they are looking at everything. those exist at all of our sectors, all of our ports throughout the united states. one example is we recently shut down a facility in miami because it did not have the appropriate safeguards. there were literally holes in the fence line that would allow people with no business to enter into those facilities. >> how long has twic been online?

>> it was implemented on april 15, 2009. on that milestone date, all facilities were in compliance. the reader will be critical as we go forward. that will be the next enabling mechanism. the biometric chip is what provides the next level of security. >> thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you very much. >> i think the committee for allowing me to participate today. this is an issue that is important to my constituents. mr. lord has mentioned constituent satisfaction, customer satisfaction as a goal. i would just commend to you, looking at the economist

magazine, pole. they have up right now. they're asking whether the changes to airport security have done more harm than good. at last check, it was 87% agreed that changes have done more harm than good. gentlemen, i would contend that we are not doing our best i customer service. i think my colleague from the other side of the aisle spoke well to that. i want to talk to you about the vipr team. my home state of tennessee became the first state and the country to deploy vipr teams simultaneously. the teams included explosive detection, a k-9 teams. my office was informed that the point of operation was for tsa agents to recruit truck drivers.

those involved in the operation were only supposed to be handing out recruitment brochures. since neither position has actual federal law enforcement training. however, i have a couple of posters. if you look at these posters, i will call that exhibit a. if you were watching the video of this transaction, you would see that this individual, who is designated as an employee, is walking around and inspecting the trucks. if they were supposed to be handing out brochures, what are they doing inspecting the tracks? what type training do they received to detect abnormalities or potential threats in semi trucks?

>> the vipr you referenced was a joint training exercise. 23 different agencies, both federal, state, and local. tsa was invited to participate. the exercise went off very well. it was an important opportunity for us to build relationships to ensure that in the event of a real national security emergency, we have the types of relationships -- >> you are using my time. what type training do they have? to detect the abnormalities that would be on our nation's highways? they have no federal law enforcement training, correct? >> during the exercise, the

officers did not conduct any screening of the vehicles. >> let me put up poster number two. why did they ask to open the top of this truck and look -- was there a specific threat to to tennessee highways on october 20, 2011? was there any intelligence suggesting that a suspected terrorist may be driving a semi truck across tennessee? were there specific threats that were deterred by conducting this operation? >> i cannot talk about threats that might have been deterred. this was a training exercise, not an exercise based on active intelligence. >> ok. do you have anything to add to that? >> no. >> you don't? i want to go back to this question. what type of specific training

do they have to be on the nation's highways conducting this type of searches? >> they do not receive specific training with regard to screening vehicles. >> ok. >> a the k9 team appears to be a multi modal dog that is trained in that mode of transportation. >> even though they have no federal law enforcement training, you are pleased that are participating in these exercises? >> again, the program is set up to provide a visual deterrent and to work in conjunction with their state and local partners in all modes of transportation. part of that, again, is to build a relationship in times of an exercise. >> they have been administratively it reclassified probing screeners and given no federal law enforcement training are going to be out on our

nation's highways and seaports participating in this type of activity? >> i am not sure i understood that as a custom. >> based on the performance that you have seen with the teams, and their ability to prevent specific terrorist threats, what kind of grade would you give them? >> i think they do a very good job in a mode of transportation where we have very limited resources. i think they do a very good job of providing visible deterrence to people who might be attempting to do something bad. >> a to f? >> i would not be experienced to say specifically. b+ to an a-. it is a program that is only

five years old. >> i would remind you that your agency has agreed that performance measures need to be developed for the vipr team so there can be some quantifiable data. we will follow that as we move forward. one last question, have they ever pulled over cars or vans? >> i am not aware of a tsa assets on a team pulling over a car or a van. >> i would love to have that answer. there is no terrorist that has ever driven a semi truck. we find it very curious the method that was being employed with the team's.

you can go look at the example. >> thank you very much. we will now start our second round of questioning. i will give it a go for five minutes. and then we will go to mr. cummings. >> as we talk about the spot program, if an agent were able to see something they considered to be a suspicious behavior, what is the follow-up? what can they do? did they engage the person in conversation? what is the procedure? is there something they can do? can you tell me what that is? >> in our spot program, our officers are trained to observe

the behavior and engaged in casual conversations with individuals. if the circumstances warrant, they can engage local law enforcement for further follow- up. >> if they detected something suspicious, i can stop them from boarding the plane? >> if they can physical detain an individual, spot officers are not trained, nor do we want them to physically detain an individual. >> i just walked on and get on my plane? they cannot stop me. >> i misunderstood your question. a spot officer, if they have reason to believe that you are suspicious, can engage in local law enforcement officer, who will interview you and either send you on your way it or asking additional questions. >> has a spot officer ever stop somebody from boarding a plane? >> not to my knowledge. there are times when a spot

officer will engage in conversation, but i do not know all the time when an officer has stop someone from getting on a plane. >> how much are we paying these guys? >> are spot officers are paid in the same range as our federal officers. somewhere between $37,000 and $50,000. >> whether or not they could detect surgically implanted explosive devices. the unanimous answer was no. on july 6 of 2011, the tsa released a notice to airlines. earlier this month, someone posted a video on the internet demonstrated how to defeat these machines. why do we continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on technology with such obvious and vulnerabilities?

>> i would point out that recently, our our administrator testified with regard to effectiveness. he will be able to get into more detail in a classified setting. on a daily basis, we review of vulnerability is in our system. ait is our best deterrent and detection against metallics threats. >> that is not our current plan. based on our evolution would

risk based security, we're looking at the best way to deploy the best assets we have and configurations that makes sense across the system. >> are they getting deployed in a timely manner? i know there are some warehouses that a lot of this equipment sits in. we were not using modern deployment techniques. >> to my knowledge, there are no ait's in the warehouse that you referred to. art utilization numbers are improving dramatically on a daily basis. >> where are you getting a safety evaluation on these machines? for tsa agents operating them? the airline staff are diverted through.

i saw a pregnant officer, right by one of those machines. i was concerned because i understand there are no safety checks there. >> this is the one that uses radiation. there have been three independent studies, one from the fda and the u.s. army. the machines are subjected to regular testing to ensure that they fall within safe limits. with every test that has been conducted, the units are well below established limits. all the tests are available john tsa's public website, tsa.gov. >> i am comfortable with what i heard. if you are interested in having as conduct follow-up, i can talk to your staff.

>> we will be in touch. i now recognize the ranking member for five minutes. >> the audit found that tsa had inadequate screening systems in place. to deny the issuance of twic to them. what steps have you taken to address these findings? >> the first thing we did was we created an executive level of oversight board coordination with dhs to map our strategy to address these recommendations. after receiving the report and recommendations, we retained the trusted agents, the individuals that collect the information at the enrollment sites. we also made system modifications that allows us to

collect more information on the documents that are collected. they could be reviewed more thoroughly. on the longer-term plan, but we are making arrangements with the u.s. system so we could send our fingerprints into that repository and check our fingerprints that we had against the fingerprints in their repository to see if anybody is applying under multiple names or identities. the other long-term project we're working on this capability with fbi. currently, we are required to submit fingerprints each time we want a criminal history records check. the want to see if we can submit to the fingerprints we have on file to the fbi to get a

criminal history records check without calling somebody in to submit a new set of prints. it will tell us if the individual has committed some type of criminal offense and between the applications to make every five years. there is a number of things we are doing. we took the recommendations very seriously. >> during a hearing on twic in may of 2011, mr. lord indicated provide a normal driver's license is as least as secure than a twic. is a twic more or less secure than in normal driver's license? >> for the twic, we think it is a secure a credential. prior to, you could go to a port and gain access with multiple credentials.

a credit card, a union card, any number of credentials. the first thing i would say is that it is the first time in a common credential has been issued in the maritime environment. we developed many security features to put on that card. we did that in coordination with other agencies, including the forensic document last at ice. we did the best we could to make that cards secure. it has a biometric on it. the readers are not in place yet, but the coast guard has portable readers to do the checks. >> section 809 of the coast guard authorization act of 2010 and since mariners cannot need access to secure area of a vessel from the requirement that they obtain a twic.

it still requires those seeking their first mariner credential to visit a twic enrollment center. to complete the enrollment process and pay the enrollment fees. i understand that the exemption has been estimated by the coast guard to apply 60,000 of the 210,000 licensed mariners in the united states. is that correct? >> that is correct. we've only had 68 take advantage of that 809 provision. >> why do you think that is? >> they see it as an employment opportunity.

for an employer, in this competitive environment, they see it as advantageous to have that credential. >> i see my time has expired. >> thank you very much. there are quite a few other questions. some of the other members have had to leave. i did want to ask some additional questions. with that in mind, we will be submitting additional questions in writing to complete the record. without objection, i would like to leave seven days open for members to submit those questions and opening statements. i would like to thank each and every member of the panel for being with us. i commend you for your service to the country. i encourage you to look for ways to improve with you and your

agencies are able to do to better served and better spent more efficiently the taxpayers' money to provide a safe transportation environment for all of us. thank you for being here. we're done. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> a house hearing on security

on the korean peninsula. then "q & a" ." >> experts on iran, and declare weapons, and national-security debate the pros and cons of a country.ke oon that the cato institute hosted this on friday. it is one hour and 25 minutes. >> if you could feel free to

take a set. seat. the free to come in and take the seats. is better to watch it live than on television. for those of you who are getting here, and perish the thought he would have missed the first panel. -- i perish the thought you would have missed the first panel. i am pleased you're here for the second panel. should diplomacy fail or otherwise, to prevent a nuclear rising iran, how? we have diverse panel. we tried to get people " vigorously disagreed together. i think we'll fulfill that mandate today. i am going to introduce the speakers in order in which they will speak and then sit back and

watch the fireworks. to begin with, our first speaker is an assistant professor at georgetown university. he has worked as a strategist at the office as secretary of defense where he was a warded outstanding achievements. his articles have been published in the political science preview. you may have heard there is a piece on foreign affairs.

his commentary has been featured on many broadcasts. our second speaker is nuno mo nteiro who is a member of the scientific council of the portuguese international institute. his interests are security steady including the power of politics and nuclear proliferation. his working on a but going out a theory -- on a book of playing out the theory of determinants of military competition. his research has appeared in international security earlier this year. commentaries have been featured in the foreign affairs national

interest. the third speaker today will be on this panel, jamie fly. he starts under the bush administration from 2005-2008. his work addressed issues like the iranian nuclear issues, a proliferation finance, and other issues. he received the medal for exceptional public service in addition to his position at the fpi. the council onf foreign relations. last and not least is the josh

rovner who has spoken at cato before. he previously taught at clark university. he's the author of an excellent new book, of fixing the fact. contributed to an effort to turn this to a book called nuclear strategy in the age. he has written articles on intelligence reform. everyone on the panel will discuss military options, a containment options, squared off against a nuclearized iran.

>> thank you very much. it is a pleasure to be here. i was here talking about my last book. it is not in the old auditorium. as justin said, we are here to talk about iran pose a nuclear program. there's agreement that their program poses the greatest emerging national security challenge to the united states. we could get some kind of diplomatic settlement. second, we could acquiesce to a nuclear arms iran or wheat or israel could take military action to prevent them from acquiring military weapons.

the diplomatic settlement would be ideal if we could get it. there is good reason to believe that we cannot. it is hard to imagine any overlap between what they would be willing to agree to. what would reassure washington in the community that their program is no longer a threat. they are returning to in negotiating table on april 13. iran has stated that they will be unwilling to discuss the in richmond programs. a european diplomat said the only hope we could provide was that maybe merkel sap them. if diplomacy fails, that means that sometimes the united states will face this typical decision but would aacquiescing.

we tried to put in place a contaminant regime. there was still be many threats that of the difficult to address. they saw to acquire nuclear weapons. iran will become a nuclear supplier transferring the issue. it will become more aggressive. right now they restrain the form policy. it fears major military action. it would know it would have a nuclear counter deterrent. this provides a cover. this means the middle east could be more crisis granted. if the have a new ground in iran, any one of these crises could spiral out of control. i do not think they would launch

a suicidal war, but given the environment, i think there are a lot of possibilities for inadvertently exchange. in nuclear exchange involving israel could very well. once they have ballistic missiles, which experts estimate could be be as little as five years, it could be within the united states. this could be years or decades are even longer. in nuclear arms iran is unacceptable. that leaves us with one option. the military option is not an attractive one. there are many downside risks. it is better than the alternative. a military strike and almost

certainly distraite iran's nuclear facilities. this is that it back. i estimated said this back >> you are an appointee by the between three and 10 years. president. i would appreciate it if you asked the president what are the there is a significant upside. details of the missile defense there are also down sides. that cannot be disclosed until the election back to this committee. i have grave concerns about the these are not quite as severe. president having the cost would be iranian military retaliation. iran does not have a strong conventional military. president developing be options, the strike options would be to support the attacks pa.

we have to think what they would do. it would want to strike that. the primary goal is to continue to exist. it will not want to pick a fight. the one country that could start a conflict that would lead to the end of the iranian military for the current regime. it will aim for some sort response. if they do not strike hard enough, they will lose faith. the united states and play on those fares. it places a clear deterrent strategy. we're not interested and

overthrow the regime. i think that we can prevent iran from crossing certain red lines. they make it clear that if they crossed the red lines that we would be willing to engage in a bigger fight. it the sanctions fail and if the united states finds itself choosing between a nuclear arms iran and the strike, the point will have to make that decision is it they kicked out international inspectors, if they find itself in that position, we should work to build an international coalition. they should pull back and

observe a rounds of the iranian retaliation. it is not an attractive option. it is better than the option of living with the dangers of a nuclear-armed iran. >> thank you. i will take the opposite imagine.as you may i want to talk about three things. what are the possible and games? will be the result of not attacking gamiran? there is a difference of what is maybe. i agree settlements is unlikely.

and do not think the other two options are on strike are acquiesce. a late sen capability in which they contained in not control the cycle. one of the consequences of an attack is that it makes this end game less likely. the more we antagonize them, the less likely they will be persuaded that lay in capability is sufficient. it will be more likely that they will weapon is india. on the consequences of not attacking, there are three consequences that were not mentioned. one is nuclear involvement. the second one is the middle east, at the possibility that other states would follow suit. the final one is the likelihood

of escalation to the crisis in the middle east. the first one depends on the weapon is asian, if they were what a nice. it is hard to figure out by the regime feel emboldened internationally. the key question to ask is what are the actions? the actions they would like to take that are currently deterring that we would no longer be able to deter it be required in nuclear-weapons i have not seen a good answer to this question.

are they going to supply more advanced weapons facts do they want to encourage terrorist attacks facts all of these actions would threaten the states. we are not in the habit of attacking on nonnuclear states. if they insist on ebonizing and provokes a crisis, it is possible that they would suffer the devastating nuclear strike decks i do not think that nuclear weapons changed the determination to survive. i do not been a change the fact that iran cannot prevail against an israeli coalition. i do not know which of the actions that they would like to

take. it should create a serious struggle for israel and the u.s. while not risking the survival of the regime. still on this question of emboldening, i would like to note what i think is an internal contradiction. if we strike them provincially, we can expect theories seem to be part of the early rational. we can tell them we're only going after the nuclear program so do not go overboard with your reaction. you might expect them to act with great restraint. they become understandable. it changes the preferences in a way they become a grave threat to national security. if we attack them now, they will be ok with it.

you have to have a one way or the other. you cannot have it both ways. it means that an attack cannot be limited because the iranians would retaliate. if the iranians are so restrained that they would not retaliate, they're likely to be restraints once they possess nuclear weapons. it is unlikely it is possible to have a limited and necessary strike. the second point is the consequences of a potentia potentially nuclear iran. this is an effect and not striking them.

i'm extrapolating. even if they only have a lifting capability, it would be likely that other states would follow suit. i would like to note a couple things. the u.s. has existing security assurances based on current capabilities about the need to spend more money than we are already spending. i would argue that looking at the history of the nuclear era, there is no example of a u.s. ally on which the u.s. exerted specific pressure. the u.s. has been consistently successful in preventing the allies from proliferating.

egypt and saudi arabia are among the greatest supporters. turkey is the sonja soh[inaudib] iraq is a bit more complicated. it may turn against iran. in which case, they would need u.s. support. it is unlikely that even iran in a position would result in a clear cascades. the broad record is that the u.s. is successful at preventing u.s. allies. the their plan that would results in the acquisition will be the possibility of the escalation. this would require actual weapon is asian. if they would settle for the

laying capabilities, is hard to figure out how it will lead it in the context of a crisis. even if you have one, the argument is that iran and the u.s. and iran and israel lack communication channels. i would like to note that this is before we have robust communication channels. it is before the soviets have a long experience of managing a large arsenal. they had an arsenal for five years at most. it is unclear whether they have retaliation capabilities. and still they back down. we can use history to make the opposite point. there is no historical evidence that would be due to be leaves

-- would lead you to believe that it is a likely event. we never seen this crisis. we have never seen them escalate to the nuclear level. let me talk a little more briefly about what would happen if we attacked iran. at four points to make. it is different from what proponents will attack. an attack would be far more costly than you expect. an attack would not be comparable to an attack on syria. this is an analogy that makes no sense. this is limited to one facility. if you look at the press, you will see it is an attack that is likely to stretch israel capabilities. it is not particularly a weak country. we're not talking about one strike, one day.

this is far more costly unlikely to generate their reaction from iran then i think. the second point is that the results of attacking iran would not end a program. it would delay a program. we disagree with the assessments for how many years.

hollingewhere general or secreta ha. >> congresswomen, it regard to where protection of our men and women who were serving on the peninsula, i've placed a lot of

influence on the biological defense training. on a frequent basis. we have the right capabilities. that is the first thing. secondly, in terms of fire protection. it is an important that we keep that current. we train in those types of i'm talking with regards to that. i do not see the north koreans giving of this capability. this is something we will continue to have to deal with given this set of conditions.

>> thank you very much. i think what the department brings to bear are three very important things. one is a strong to deter them a reader from these massive distractions. the indicated a robust defense capability. this is what the department of defense brings to bear. north korea is an outline there. the president was just in seoul over the last couple of days. over 50 of the world leaders were there. barry getting there to increase that danger. we're supporting broader international diplomacy. i want to extend the discussion her och ought and what you are finding in terms of the morale of these unaccompanied tors.

the turnover is about 600 or 700 service members every month. is that normal? >> first off, most of the turnover we see that is occurring out of that 600-700 are the lower in listed great. as you imagine, that constant turnover affects the crew stability inside the second division.

that is something that the commander has to deal with. in regard to the normalization, we have roughly around 3800 families that are command's sponsored. there are another 1700 s soldiers that are non command's sponsored. that is really what we have. we have not achieve that as of yet. i looked at could we afford more families over there be on the 4645? i determined that is not

feasible at this time. >> do you have other concerns that are affecting the quality of life for service members that are there? e do not necessarily see those numbers getting to that level. do you see major differences? >> we have a threat to the north. we have a well stated mission. i have not seen a decline in any morale issues. this requires active leaders,

leaders that are sensitive to the needs of their service members. that is where i put my effort. i am making sure that if there are any quality of life issues, that we try to resolve its. >> the people that have been deployed, are there numbers at the height of some of the deployments that are going into iraq or afghanistan? >> we see a lot of returnees.

>> are they fighters able to accommodate some of the needs are returning soldiers? >> i have placed a lot of emphasis on back, a particular lay in regard to any type of ptsd. we are active with the programs to make sure we are quickly dealing with any service member

that may have a problem. >> they're not able to go out into the economy when it comes to service providers. is that correct? >> the medical community does right ones that go out if there is some specific needs. so far they have been very good on the peninsula. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. >> thank you. thank you so much for joining us today and for your service. i enjoyed our visit out there. south korea was a great opportunity to go there and understand the challenges. you spoke about the north korean army having about 800 service combatants. can you tell us what other capabilities in relation to our service combatant and the japanese maritime self-defense ship's center also there in the region -- that are also there in the region? >> the theme that concerns me most are there submarine forces. by to give early the ones on the west see. -- west sea because that are shallow waters.

i can go in more details. some of this is atrophied from what i can tell. the navy maintains a robust patrol capability every day. some of the things we of but that are in affability with the u.s. fleet. i know he has a very good relationship with the japanese.

>> what means do u.s. and iraq forces have in the area of ground attack to support our men and women that served their? -- there? where are we in relation to manning requirements there in the region? there is a cap of 28,500 u.s. forces. where is this in relation to our needs? especially in the area of aviation? >> perce stuff, we do not have a full brigade. i asked the department's to the joint staff to adding that the

italian bac that was -- adding thtat battalion back that was repositioned to meet requirements for the war in iraq. i welcome that. that would help with our helicopter fleet there. in regard to our overall posture, i feel we are " very well. we're getting many of the new pieces of a quick marriages modernize. we got the best team this nation can provide as well as the bradley fighting vehicles. the stocks are in good shape. we just issued some of that out.

i am confident in regard to the ground capabilities. we're in pretty good shape. i can talk in closed sessions. i will be more than happy to talk about that. >> we talked about conventional capabilities. we made a significant investment and operations forces. are we properly positioned from a report standpoint with our special operation forces? >> we have the korea which would work side by side with the special operating forces. it is a very good for us to continue to improve that.

if we go to war tonight,, that is what i have. in addition to what would be flown in from u.s. so-callecom. we are working on those capabilities for soft platforms, for example. that is one of the things come as a did my assessment, that i looked at that i think we need to improve on. secondly, with regard to the north korean metric problems, they have the capabilities to infiltrate. that is probably one of the biggest worries that i see.

i can go into more detail in a closed forum. >> thank you >> if north korea were able to create a nuclear weapon capable of reaching our shores and they lost it toward our nation, what with our response be? >> i cannot speculate on that hypothetical situation. we do not assess that north korea has that ability today. but we are aware that north korea is developing both its long-range missile capabilities and is continuing to work on its nuclear weapons capabilities. the department is considering the best responses to this. >> what do you think north

korea would think a response to that would be? >> congressman, the way i look at this, north korea uses a core strategy. and they use that strategy to get concessions. first off, they will not give up their capabilities in regard to ballistic missiles. they will see that as a means to protect the regime. in regards to the coercing strategy, we have seen this where they demand concessions. they deny get what they want or they get what they want. they antagonize, provo, and go back into an appease mode -- they antagonize, provoke, and go back into appease mood. my guess is they will continue to use that as long as they continue their military force

policy, which have believe goes to protect the kim family and the whole communist party. >> is there not the general perception in this country and their country and any other country watching our two nations that, if they lost a ballistic missile and nuclear arms toward our shores and that we would respond in kind? is that not a general perception? >> i do not know what our responses would be right now that. >> i am not asking you that. i am asking you what you think the general perception was of general observers of this process between our two countries. is it not the general perception that, if they launched a nuclear weapon toward our shores, that we must likely respond in kind? my sense is that that is what

fuels the in society and the concern over the north koreans have been the capability. it has to be dealt with in some manner. >> i think we have a robust return capability and we have national capabilities and capabilities in the theater. again, it is our policy to deter that kind of behavior that you are talking about. well we do not assess the they have that capability that you outlined today, the development in this regard is something we're very concerned about. we became a robusta deterrent capability to address that action. >> i think it is very unlikely, that even if they had a nuclear capability, they would launch it toward us. why would they need to do that if they could simply put a

medium-range missile on our ship. >> we have to be aware of a whole range of possible attacks they have pursued many means to provoke us we have to watch the foray of threats, including the ones you have outlined. >> i do not think there collectively suicidal. i think that is the possibility.

>> thank you, gentlemen. the committee will now stand in recess as we moved to closed session. thank you. >> next, the q&a. live at 7:00 a.m., your calls and comments on "washington

journal." today to my discussion with correspondence from the associated press, cbs, and "the new york times," talking about what it is like to cover war and conflict. >> america will suffer a catastrophic cyber attacks. they deny use those words indiscriminately. we have to move rapidly, but not in a way that violates privacy or the basic tenets of privacy. and it encourages quick reaction, not a regulatory environment. >> congressman greg walden on cyber security and privacy.

>> this week on "q&a," jerry ensminger and rachel libert talk about the documentary "semper fi: always faithful." >> rachel libert, why did you get involved with a film called "semper fi"? >> i was researching a completely different topic, and i met a woman. before she left the project, she let us know that her brother was

involved in a fight exposing water contamination in the marine corps, and my co-director and i were a bit skeptical, but we agreed to meet her brother, which turned out to be jerry ensminger, and we were immediately taken with the subject, and i would say for two reasons. we had seen the evidence that jerry had amassed, so there really was substance to the story, and secondly, we were taken with him. we thought there was a powerful and charismatic story, in part mental story. >> where were you located when you started this? >> in new york. >> and what year did you start? >> 2007. >> how long did it take you to do it? >> a little over four years, and i do not know that we knew that going in. you start the process, and you do not know where they are going, and there is a faith in a documentary that you believe in the essence of something, so you have to go where life takes the story, and it could take two years. it could take 10 years. we do not know.

>> let's watch a clip beginning and then come back with jerry. [video clip] >> i was making a plate of food in the kitchen, getting ready for the evening. >> at camp lejeune, the water has been linked to these cancers. >> my first thought was, is this what happened to janey? i dropped my plate right there. it was like god was saying to me, here is a glimmer of hope that you will find your answer. >> jerry ensminger, what are you talking about there? >> when any family has parents

that have a child, especially a child that is diagnosed with a long term, catastrophic illness, without exception, because i have talked to so many other families when janey was sick, when you have a chance to sit down after the shock of the diagnosis wears off, there is that nagging question, why? no exception. and i looked into her mother's family history, my family history, and no other child ever been diagnosed with cancer. >> and what year was it that she got the cancer, and when did she die? >> she was diagnosed in 1983 and died in 1985, and that revelation on the news did not happen until 1997, three years after i had retired out of the marine corps, and all of those years, i had had that nagging

question, and when i heard that, i was going into the living room with a plate of spaghetti, and the reporter on the television set what they said right there in that clip, and i dropped my plate of spaghetti right there. >> go back to when she got the cancer. what kind was it? >> acute leukemia. >> where did you live at the time? >> jacksonville, north carolina. we were living off base. there was the home of camp lejeune. >> how many years did you spend in the military? >> 24.5. >> what would your rank at the end? >> master sergeant. >> specialty? >> transport, and i was also a drill instructor. >> where did you meet your wife? >> okinawa. >> and how many kids did you have? >> three girls, all girls. >> how old are they today?

>> one is 37, jessica will be 31. >> you have one other? >> janey is dead? >> you had four? >> yes, veronica. she is 23. >> you met his sister, and then you met him. what were your hurdles to get this done? >> financing in raising money was a large hurdle, cobbling together the financing, especially when these things are unpredictable, and they drag out for so long. that is a given. beyond that, i would say specific to the film, when we first started, we were not sure how much jerry could achieve. we believed in him and his story, someone who was so loyal

to the marine corps and became disillusioned and had to fight against them. that inherent story and the personal struggle, but we also had a nagging fear about, you know, so many cases of water contamination or environmental incidence are unresolved, and how much traction can one guy get when you are facing such a huge opponent such as the department of defense, my co- director, two years in the middle of it, we started to see jerry make traction. there were people on capitol hill. we thought, yes, there will be a story of one man persevering and one man actually achieving something in his determination, something we could structure a

film around. >> after you heard that report in 1997, what were you specifically looking for? what was done to the water in jacksonville or camp lejeune that you feel led to the death of your daughter? >> initially, i started making contact with representatives at camp lejeune and the navy environmental health center, which is out of norfolk, and then i started looking into other issues where contamination had taken place, other studies that had been done, that led me to this guy, kevin costas, who did the final investigation in massachusetts, which was made famous by the movie "a civil action." the representatives of the military that i contacted played this down extremely, told

me they do not know what they are talking about, these are very minute trace amounts of these chemicals, you do not have any fear that you -- you should not have any fear or reason to believe that this is what caused your daughter's illness, and i said if that is the case, why are they talking about the childhood leukemia study? that is what they called it initially, and as time went on it, and as years went by, i said in the film that i have all of the faith and confidence in the world that the marine corps that i had served for nearly one-quarter of a century of my life would do what is right by its people. as time went on, i started to realize that not only were they not going to do what was right by the people, they were doing

everything they could possibly to do what was wrong. they were obfuscating facts. they told many, many half- truths' and total lies. >> here is more of the documentary of which you are speaking. [video clip] >> we went for years without knowing what the truth was until the marine corps posted a bunch of documents by mistake. tom called me and told me that they had posted this website on the internet, and i said, "no kidding." i was on a dial-up comr,