his planning on our withdrawal from this bloody afghanistan? >> first of all, let me congratulate the honorable member on his stunning victory in his return to this house of commons, and i know he always speaks with great power and great force, but on this issue, i have to say that we profoundly disagree with him. the troops are in afghanistan at the invitation of an islamic government and under a u.n. resolution to try to help the country to have a peaceful, prosperous, and peaceful future, and he knows the dangers in the past are walking away from afghanistan and leaving that country to become the terrorist supporting country under the taliban. we must not make that mistake again, and i would urge him not to play to the gallery on this one but to speak up to make afghanistan a safer country. >> order.

mr. ed balls, before the prime minister leaves. >> he said it does not raise any money, a claim which is contradicted by a report and the treasury's own figures. could the prime minister do that before he leaves the house, mr. speaker? >> order. order. order. these matters will be the subject of debate later today, and if i did not know the right honorable gentleman, the member, as well as i do, i would think that he was trying to use the device of a contrived point of order to continue the debate, but because i know him as well as i do, he can take it from me that i know he would not be

guilty of such on were the conduct. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> this week, three days of testimony from james murdoch with the inquiry, an investigation into the practices of british newspapers in light of the phone hacking scandal which resulted in the closure of their "news of the world typical average. there is rupert murdoch on wednesday and thursday mornings. live at london at 5:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2 and c-span radio. >> chuck colson died at the age of 80. there was the first report of the watergate story in the media, the so-called dirty tricks in the nixon

administration and his process while working in the white house. this is one hour 20 minutes. >> people in the high-tech, media-saturated world get stereotyped pictures of the people, and they then conclude that is all there is to that person. nixon was a very complicated personality. he characterized the history as the evil emperor who punished his enemies and was a vindictive and mean and vicious. he was actually a very kind, decent man. there were many, many times when we would have discussions, even though i was a guy with a political portfolio, i was a guy with the task of mobilizing outside groups, he would just talk about, "we have to do this because this is the right thing." in 1964, in the back of his limousine, up to his apartment

on the upper east side, he had said, "you know, we have to do this, because the kind of world our children and grandchildren live in depends on it." he could be an incredible idealist, and people do not see him that way. unfortunately, they will not, because there is a cartoon with the 5:00 shadow, evil incarnate, and he was anything but. he was a very decent human being, and brilliant human being. morally flawed, like all human beings are, maybe to excess because of all of the experiences in his life that left him suspicious of things and people, but a fairly complicated man with a very good street in many respects. >> we have these tapes. how should students of the tapes

of unix and on the tapes >> the tapes are one-dimensional, as well. public speaking. often what you do is body language. often what you do is the way you move your facial expressions. it is the emphasis you put on things. it is more than just the words you hear. you also cannot listen to a composition of context and still understand what the real intent was out of that conversation, so i remember when i was preparing my own defense in the watergate trials, listening to some of the tapes, and i could not make them out, and i did not remember them, and they were so garbled, one of the prosecutors felt we were talking about doing something devious to senator kennedy. it was something else we were talking about, coming out of the office talking about the situation in vietnam, so i've

listened to some tapes, and they have refined some, and they are one-dimensional. there will not tell you everything. you will not know when nixon was kidding, which she did a lot. you walked over when he was cementing the kind of disagreement and his staff that got in the kind of opinion that he wanted to hear. there are a lot of things that you cannot take off of the tapes. >> i would like you to preserve an anecdote you told john whitaker about a jokey played on henry kissinger. >> kissinger had the right, although he abused it, to come into the office, the oval office without having someone announce him or take him. he could just walk in when he wanted to. nixon told him that because of the severity of the foreign- policy issues to feel free to just come in and interrupt anything. well, henry would do it for trivial things, and one day,

nixon was really kind of ticked off at henry for a variety of things, and we were in the executive office building. the far door swung open, and i looked over, and it was henry. nixon did not appear to look, but i knew that he knew it was henry. "i think it is time that we use nuclear weapons. everything else has failed." and kissinger stood in the doorway absolutely paralyzed. that is on the tapes somewhere. people are going to look and that and say that colson brought up the dark side. that was pure humor. he did that a lot. >> the pentagon papers. >> mm-hmm. >> you witnessed the president's reaction. tell us about that.

>> the pentagon papers came out, and i was at the senior staff meeting in the roosevelt room, and there was a mood of panic and despair, kissinger throwing papers on the table, saying we cannot run government this way. i was with nixon that morning, and he was genuinely alarmed, and i could tell when he was manipulating people. i was enough like him, actually, interestingly enough, when i knew he was doing things for effect, and he was not. he was genuinely concerned that there could be a wholesale breakdown in our security system and we would get cia assets exposed, we would get secret opposition -- operations, like the national security steady number one, which was a contingency plan for vietnam out in the public domain, and this could be catastrophic with us, particularly in our relationships and then which she

knew about, but most of the people did not know. what was going on with russia and the soviet union. and china. he was aware of the consequences more than anybody else, more than kissinger, and he was genuinely alarmed and told me we had to do something to stop -- we had to do something. to get mitchell to try to see the papers and get a restraining order in court, which failed, and told me to do whatever it took to stop it, and that really led to the creation -- it was really the trigger for what later became the undoing of the nixon presidency, the guys running off with reckless abandon. but i never had a moment's doubt that nixon was genuinely

concerned and that there were two areas and we would have to fight this on. one was legally and one was public opinion, and that would be my side of it, which is why i was looking for anything i could find that was derogatory about ellsbury. >> you bring hunt into this cast of characters. >> yes. at the time nixon wanted to bring in a group of people who would do security. i never knew about the houston plant. the houston plant was before i was sitting in the inner area. if it was discussed, it was never discussed in my presence, so i never heard about it until water it exploded. the summer of 1971, when nixon was exploding over the papers being circulated through washington, not only the pentagon papers that got to the press but some that got to the

brookings institution and other places. in senators' offices, we would get calls the senator's offices had them, so i heard him in one meeting say, and i was in the room with another, and he turned about and said, "bob, i have to tell you. we need a team here. people need to break and and get it done. the fbi was to do this. they are not doing a good job? all of this was on the tapes, and you have probably heard the tapes. this was maybe where use becomes a disadvantage, because i took him very literally. i thought this is what he means, and he is the president, and troops are in battle, including friends of mine, flying helicopters in vietnam, and this is a serious business.

when we left the oval office that day, i turn to hall and said, "what are we supposed to do about this?" and he said, "we have to do something with those brookings papers," and we had to have john do something about it. the president was blowing off steam. i called jon erlichman, and he said to go talk to jack and say that i told him to talk to you and tell him that his job is to have a plan to get those papers back. this may seem naïve to you, but it is true, but my thirst -- first thought was best we would call someone an suspend a security clearance at brookings and get the papers returned. i had not dealt with jack. i knew who he was. an x copper with security. i did not know what he did acceptee reported to john.

he said he would meet in the men's room. i went to the men's room, and he said, "tell me what it is." and i said that he wants to get the president's documents back. i thought probably the best thing to do would be to call someone. he said we would not get anything -- anywhere that way. he said as a member of the police, they would create a diversion, a fire, and i said i do not know how you do your business, but the president wanted the papers back. that is the last i heard of it until watergate. and nothing did happen. but much was made about one of the explosive things was that i proposed the bombing of the brookings institution.

and i said they got it wrong, it was "the washington post" that i wanted to blalock, not the brookings institution. and john dean has made it a crusade over the years to talk about what a madman colson was. i got a call three years ago to ask my forgiveness because he said it was a lie, and he said there is perjury. he did not say who committed it. and i had written john dean and told him, and i told prosecutors after i had total immunity, and they said, "did you order brookings?" and i said i did not. they told me i had immunity. i said i did not. in taking full responsibility, i did not pull the whistle on the

president, and i did not say that is not a good thing for you to do or that is not something you should be doing. i also did, as a result of those meetings, send a letter to john ehrlichman, in which i said there were people to be brought into one things, and there were six names and the files, and the bottom name was actually howard hunt. i think he was my last choice. in any event, it came down to hunt. interviews with howard. he came by my office a number of times, but i did not talk to him about this. i arranged for him to go interview ehrlichman, and he hired him, and he was put in my area staff wise. he must have had, he did get a

consulting agreement. i did not arrange that. that was done by the staff secretary's office, but he saw himself as my friend and would come by the office a lot and tell me what was going on, so i was responsible for that. he teamed up with a warmly. -- teamed up with boardroom liddy. -- gordon liddy.' they insisted that i need him because they were having trouble getting approval of the counterintelligence plan. i spent maybe two or three minutes. i picked up the phone and called magruder, and i said these guys were complaining. do whatever you have to do. and i hung up the phone. that was really the extent of my involvement with liddy completely. hunt, i had more involvement

with. i used him in one case, and he would come down to my office. i felt like talking. he was an engaging guy, an interesting story teller, a great novelist, wrote great books, and a cia operator. i enjoyed it. i would listen to his tails and think they were fascinating. >> you both went to brown. >> yes. i was the president in washington, and he would come to meetings, and i knew he was in the cia, so i knew him slightly. when he left the cia, he came to work for robert bennett, bennett and associates, and made an appointment to come and see me, and this was before the pentagon papers stuff, and he said to me that he was out of the cia but have a lot of experience. "if i can help in any way,

anything you want done, you just call," the so the decision was made to hire, and i put him on the list and remembered that he had volunteered and had this kind of background and that he was politically -- it was significant that the offered before. >> the president would refer to him as "colson's cia guy." >> yes, i was the one who recommended him. >> but this would be a tag for you. the discussion with liddy and hunt was in 1972. this was when they were trying to get the intelligence planet, which i'm sure they did not go into any detail. >> well, they were talking about preparations at the committee. first at the convention, we will prevent disruptions.

>> the democratic national convention. >> i never heard that. >> the itt case was a precursor. >> it sure was. >> what was your role? >> without any question, i was the guy in charge. for better or worse, i will take responsibility. the president put me in charge of it. i reported mostly to him, and it was to try to work but. this was the republican national committee for the convention. all of the things. >> the antitrust case. >> the antitrust case, of

course. and i of this was preposterous. there was a task force. mitchell put someone from the justice department on it. i had been with harold from itt when he met with ehrlichman in hrlichman's office, discussions with itt about overturning the communist government, and so i had heard them talking about these things. there was no discussion about contributions or the republican committee or the antitrust case. clearly, they were trying to curry favor with the administration because they had issues, the antitrust case been prime among them, but it never came up in a conversation i was

in. but i thought bowl for and was a bogus charge. i really did not believe it. and we talked to enough people in the government, if there had been trucked to it, i think i would have picked up, the case in the supreme court. i did everything i could to send howard hunt out and interview one man lying in the bed in the hospital. the ill fitting disguise, the ill fitting way. i do not know where he got that. but if i had thought about it, probably would have realized he got it from the cia. he brought back information. she stuck to her story that it was true, and i could find no evidence that it was true on our side, but it was putting us in real jeopardy on capitol hill, and it was a serious issue, and i fought it as hard as i could.

one afternoon, alderman called me in and said the president said i had been working too hard on this thing -- halderman called me in. i wondered why that had suddenly ended. >> and maybe there was a little more to it. >> well, possibly, you could draw that conclusion, or possibly we had fought it too hard and were making more of an issue. i do not know. i have no idea. >> yes. >> i will tell you, to the best of my ability, we would try to figure it out. i recognized full well that i needed to know the facts. i would still defend what we did the best way i possibly could,

but i did not want to be surprised, so i really tried to find out if there was anything to it and could not get anyone to give me any glimmer of evidence. >> there is a budget for a committee to reelect which was given to halderman, which was approved, in 1972, and they mentioned money to you for what is described as black operations, operations that were not to be associated with the rnc. >> i knew what black operations were, but nobody ever gave me $90,000. there were things we did. with a bogus committees, but i got most of the money for that from outside groups. i never got the money from the

rnc or the committee to reelect the president. >> you were on it. how did these bogus committee's work? >> there was a former national committee member from the district of columbia. another guy named joe, used to raise money from some of his clients, for various front committees, and we would do some mailings for these committees. one campaign was all funded by joe in some of the people that worked with him, so if there was money coming out, a couple of times, i was told i had money for some event, maintaining my staff. i was surprised at that.

but nobody ever told that -- told me that it was a line item in anybody's budget for cash. >> he mentioned in 73 he was head of the rnc and you wanted him to do some mailings. he refused to do is. do remember having a clash with ?resident bush ta >> he was not there very long. >> he did not overlap very long. he replaced dole appeared >> he was not head of the rnc. i do not think i had any role after i left the white house. i would be surprised.

>> it would not have been. >> i think he overlapped a month or two. let me ask you about where you were on june 17, 1972. where were you? >> i was at home in virginia. i was sitting at my swimming pool. this was saturday afternoon. i had noticed a break-in at the democratic national committee. i think i had seen that in the morning. i am not sure right now. what i remember vividly is a telephone call in the morning. i was sitting outside with friends.

he said where is your pal these days? i said i do not know. and not seen him in several months. he said does he work for us? i said no. he left months ago. as if he is off the payroll. why are you asking? they must have known about it. they had the name in the white house phone number. we're just trying to track it down. it hit me. i turn to my wife. i said this could be the end of this presidency. i was sick when i thought it that had anything to do with it and if we had anything to do with it, i realize it would be a

huge problem. ÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷÷ my reaction was not on moral grounds. someone said we're getting away with inflation about what was going on, i would have said great. the national committee made no sense. he had no power. they were broke. i cannot imagine why they did it. it is one of the mysteries to me why anyone went to the democratic national committee. >> say you did not see any of the intelligence that came from that operation? >> i never heard anyone talk

about it. >> did you interact with gordon strong? >> i do not think so. not much. you are talking in 72. >> he was the liaison officer. >> he is never in any of the meetings that i had. bruce was the staff secretary. he will get the papers i needed to see. i could always trust him. i had my own strategy meetings going on. >> how uncertain about reelection were you in early 1970. >> i thought muskiee would beat

us. i knew him well. he came at the end. i stayed on at the new england senators conference. i really liked them. i have a lot of respect for them. i believe to be a very formidable opponent. i'm sure he could beat us. i looked at the demographics and the breakdown and looked at the issues we were dealing with. his being the candidates was my worst nightmare. i never thought is possible. >> will this explain why the committee reelect sponsors the dirty tricks in the other

activities which many members later dispel? >> i think so. it was not until after the democratic convention that any of us thought we could relax. that memo i sent to my staff, i was dead serious. we crept about this. it is not exaggerated. it is a color from memo. i was dead serious. i thought we had to fight every inch of the way to get nixon reelected. as we were riding high in the polls, i still figured there'd be a surge. there'll be a closing of the gap. it stayed constant all the way from the nomination through the election. >> what was the line you did not want to cross? >> what was the line?

>> were you drawing any lines? >> the only line i would have drawn is to not do something that is going to be counter productive or stupid. if you are going to get caught, and do not do anything. i am used to politics. i had known about kennedy and johnson bugging the planes. i knew the history of this. i played rough hardball politics. i would not have been morally offended by many of the things that went autumn. i think it -- that went on. i think it is comical. when i read about them later, i thought it was childish. i did not feel like i was crossing the line. in terms of questions like

this, i would be a pragmatist. if this is something we could get away with it, i could do it. >> you worked on the nixon administration's reaction to the vietnam veterans against the war. tell us a little bit about recruiting john o'neil. >> i searched my memory for that. it became the current issue in 2004. i am not sure that i recruited them. somebody in the white house told the about them. i cannot tell you how i heard about them. i invited them to my office. i was hugely impressed. i was a navy academy graduates. we spoke articulately. he was a democrat that voted against nixon. we believed nixon was absolutely right and the war was being

politicized. as a patriot, you want to come forward that contradict what vietnam veterans against the war stood for. organization had a name. we help them get television appearances. i had a staff that watch out for these things. he was the one he told me about this. i remember being very impressed with him. the only thing that struck me was that he had on a court suit. he looked preppy. he had on black shoes and white socks. he looks like a country bumpkin.

he was so articulate in defense of the nixon policies and such encouragement to nixon. nixon brought kissinger in. he made a big thing of it. he went in there and did a lot of his things. he got interviews and that sort of things to promote him as an offset to john kerry and who i had never met. i picked up a lot about him from people who knew him. i had a pretty balanced picture of the guy. nothing that has change that picture. he is a very interesting character. i did my best to undermine him. >> what did you do other than finding john o'neill?

>> we probably cut veterans' organizations. there is no black operation. there is no attempt to smear him of them in some of the information i picked up about him that was not very complimentary. he is paranoid. he has this idea that i ran a big campaign. he said this in the 2004 election. he said that the nixon people are pulling all the stops. and do not believe that should be involved in a campaign. i tell you what kind of a guy carry is. this is interesting.

i went to the national bar breakfast in the early '90s. one of the speakers was announced with john kerry. came in the mid-90s. kerry gave the most evangelistic message i think i have ever heard. it was magnificent. house complected because he was a guy read i was really conflicted because he was a guy -- it is complicated because

here is a guy that is now a christian. i wrote him a letter. i said we were once at odds with whenever but i'm for of the have become a christian. out that to come by and visit with you have a prayer. i like to apologize for anything i might have done to her you in the past. if you understood the perspective, this is the first thing he would do. this is a matter of natural instinct. i really was rejoicing. and never got an answer back. but i got a call from a reporter saying that you apologized to john kerry. all he said was that i apologize for the terrible things i had done. i explained the circumstances. he came up again in the 2004 election. john kerry has never acknowledged that letter or mea or anything except a

constantly tell people that i apologize. well i did, but is the context of prayer. that does that leave me with a good taste in my mouth about john kerry, no. >> when you read the recollections of this era, there is a tension. he says you brought up the darker side of the president. you recall are holderman bringing out the dark side. what does this mean and what roles did each of you play? >> we have a lot of competition between us. there were moments when i really liked holderman.

there times when he could be utterly obnoxious. he would bar to these commands -- bark these commands are be cutting in his response. i'd only been there six or eight months. the executive us for dinner, i said don't wear that titanite is a live television -- del where that type tonight because it will look terrible on television. he will put you down. he cut people down. most people had their run in. they were not treated kindly. bob could be rough.

there were many times that i saw him take notes when i would have disagreed. and maybe i did later. there were times and i thought he was simply being mechanical in reacting to the president. there were times when he did things i would not have done. there other things when i brought up the dark side of dixon. it was always close to the surface. nixon was a street fighter. his first reaction was to fight and get even with people. what he needed to for people who give him a more measured reaction, -- what he needed was more people who would give him a more measured reaction. what i regret a lot is that i

did not take those occasions to help nixon moderate some of those views. aldermen and erlichman say they were given orders like i was given but they did not carry them out. they did exactly what i did. there times will we will ambience. -- we went beyond. holderman, erlichman, and nixon and i were talking about something that arthur burns had said. he was not supporting the president of one of his issues.

at the end of that night, nixon turned to me and said "he is lobbying for a raise, isn't he?" he wants to get the same as the cabinet. he wanted to be bumped up. nixon said put that out to the press. i did not. >> you knew that he wanted it to be after there. >> the next morning was a saturday. i said that is not a good idea. and so we should not do that. he said you had your orders. go do it. there is a case where i was being wise for once. bob was saying go for it.

this happened frequently. this turned out to be a bad thing. it was bad for nixon and the country. >> what happened in? >> a story was put out that was false and discredited. he came up that i was the one i planted the story. >> how did you -- you were one of the ones allowed to plant stories. >> not very often. very seldom. i have people who did that. it in my officen twice appeared to be the most friendly of the reporters. he was the one i gave the information to.

there were reporters that desperately wanted to see me. this is a very good reason for do that. i try not to do that. i thought it could not tell me. the cannot think of his fame. it is the only in the day. -- it is getting late in the day picke. most of the stuff i planted i will plants through klauson.

he was constantly after me. he wanted to see me. i refuse to see him because i was a nixon loyalist and i knew it too is trying to do. my law partner was represented me and said this could be a good thing. i have them in my office one night. he began the conversation by saying that in the past several months that the people who won't talk to me have something to hide.

i said and made a mistake inviting you in. it did not want to talk about you. that was our one meeting. i did have some on the phone a few times. my better judgment was to not to talk to come. -- talk to him. >> about the desire for revenge. on the tapes, after the break- in, and the president would meet with you. holderman said when the present vintage with you it was a sign of trust. he chose to do it with you.

why? >> there was stress. he said he never had a son but if he did, he would like a son like me. he had that feeling toward me. i did to him. i felt very loyal to him and very close to him. i admire him greatly. it was an emotional thing. we were approaching draft age. we're getting the war over. i think he could let his hair down with me. he did plenty of times. >> it is a very deep anger. >> he told me he had someone

during an asteroid across the room someone later said he didn't say that. >> he wanted you to go. he talked to you about using the irs about his enemies. >> i talked to dean about that. there a fight about licenses in the past. that to keep getting them renewed.

he even took over the washington star which later became the times. there were a few things i did when i left the white house that is after left the white house. there's not anything we did during the campaign. he would be too vulnerable. >> when do you get the sense that you are going to be the fall guy for the watergate? >> i worried about that right after the election. there were 45 evans says that

may me suspicious. -- four or five episodes that made me suspicious. i was coming into aldermen's office. there is a meeting going on. i opened the door. nobody told me not to. john mitchell was right there. so what do you want? i said we are in a meeting. please see me not the manner now -- he said we would rather not see right now. this was in the first week of watergate. i shook my head. i was not welcome in that meeting. we came back from california on air force one. this was in august.

i left air force one to go to my car to drive home. i realized that of something on the plane. i went back. the staff conference room where i had to walk again haldeman and ehrlichman were talking. it was just shut off the moment i walked in the door. it is very awkward. i got out of there as quickly as i could. it could've been anything but i felt it was about me. i does have that 6 cents. it became very clear to me after the election nixon and wisely called his staff in to let them know what they wanted to do. i wrote him a memorandum. i told him i was going back to

practice law. i think these are the things. i was the first one and the senior staff to be invited to camp david. i come in. it is just very trivial of an evening. the wine is flowing. nixon is talking about the great future. he says if you want to stay, there will be the right position for you but i think you'd be right in the cabinet. you could be my outside advisor. i was beginning to get a sense

of thing that was not characteristic of him. haldeman and ehrlichman were nodding. as you back to lunch, as of what does this mean? this you want me to stay or not? he said i think you should go. >> they poisoned him against you. >> i have always thought so. you have heard more of the tapes and i have. >> but everything is on the -- not everything is on the tapes. what have we missed? what discussions has the president have about watergate with you that are not on the tapes? what i do not know the step that can david was on tapes. some of it was. one night he was talking about -- this is in december of 72.

he was talking about kissinger giving his interview. we are talking just the two of us off the living room. he waves to me. we go into the hall. he said, "the next administration, kissinger is gone." then we resumed the conversations. . if i had any sense i would note the room is but. >> ec summit to paris 0-- you sent someone to paris to take a picture? >> ted kennedy. someone sent us a clipping from

europe. nixon said "of what that picture." picture."that with what is going to be our next opponent. we tried to the normal ways to do it. we cannot. it did not turn up in any of the news services. guy in new york.i i asked him to get me the picture. which he did. i walked in the oval office and i said i have something i think

you would like to see. i dropped the picture on his desk. he picks it up and swings around with this speech under the table behind his desk and laughs uproariously. that should have been a good clue to me they did not want to laugh into the microphone. i was naive. but we got the picture. we never used it but it was good insurance. >> that would have appeared in the newspapers at some point. >> yes. >> nixon called into center in the same meeting in said "come look at this." henry looked at it and laughed. henry loved that stuff. >> no. nixon was probably a little jealous that henry could be photographed. >> we have this conversation, too.

that some of these desires for revenge can out in the press and was drinking. -- came out when the president was drinking. could he not hold his liquor? >> he is a complicated personality. i do not want to say he could not hold his liquor. there were times when i thought nixon came close to going to far with his wine at a dinner or scotch. he can pretty well control its purity could have a drink or two before dinner and always a bottle of vintage wine he would save for himself and other people would be left with the drinks. there were never a time when i was with him was he not in

of histe calontrol faculties are dangerous. there are two or three phone calls which i suspect have been listened to when i thought he was over the edge. one night he called him. he just came back from russia. my dad had a heart attack. i got a call from the president. he is incoherent. i could make head nor tail of what he was saying. he would slur off. with conneceted ot him

one telephone. i said i need to get a telephone. the went to a neighbor's house. i called the white house switchboard. valet.the b i said i'm connected to him on the phone but i think he's passed out. he was at camp david. he said he is fine. he is asleep. the next day the president called me and said he was on heavy doses of sleeping pills, the jet lag have gotten to him. it could well be. there were times when he would call me in the middle the night, took what in the morning -- took a lot in the morning. this was often. he would call me. it did not sound like he

had been drinking. he was not clear with that as a normally was. there are times it could not sleep. i recognize the phone call was just hand holding. >> these were the times you not do what he ask you to do. >> absolutely. >> you said there were hundreds of things he as you to do. >> yes. there were times and i knew i couldn't and shouldn't. >> you are a complicated person. how did you know or not know? >> if i sense it was a deal where he was just ranting i would let him rant. he wanted me to fire all the people at the bureau of labor statistics 61 i. i called george shultz.

i said he wants to fire the head of the bureau of labor statistics and all those people. he said do not do that until i come by. he got on the plane. he flew back and get with him directly. there were many times when i did not do what he said in got the person involved to should stop them. sometimes i did not wish i had. there were an awful lot of things to ask you to do that you cannot do. but you should not do. to unwind. know how after the teamsters endorsed nixon, which i range in 1972, i went out there to be with the teamster meeting. i was there when they decided to endorse him.

the next morning he was exuberant. he said let's go for a ride. we went outside in the golf cart which he drives. i was never one to risk my life. he is driving up and down the roads. he's showing me this stuff. he is as a good driver. is not paying any attention. we're in the golf cart. it was his way of celebrating. that is about as far i saw him celebrating something. if he did not have the capacity to relax. another time out there for dinner. it was just the two of us. we were in the upstairs library that looks over the pacific. this is where we talked about this. we went through the entire conversation. that is relaxation. i found a kind of interesting as opposed. i could have engaged in more

stimulating conversation and to them to relive negotiations appeared to so totally bogus i don't thinking about to let down. which is why you get those overnight calls that were so intense about everything he did. he did not know how to cool its. >> recount for us the episode after he learned that george wallace had been shot. he was concerned about bremer. >> we are absolutely panicked that bremer will turn not to have been an ally of some right- wing group or some crazy involvement with us. any connection to us in the present would be in peach. he called me in his office. this will be in the tapes. he jokingly said it should have

finished the job. he was kidding. he said this is that if any of our people have anything to do with us. it would be great if he came from the left. he said what can we find out about it? he said tell me what you can tell me. they have the place off. he was telling me what to do. he was whispering loudly. i'm sure mark must've heard it. who is relaying all these instructions. is it is there any political

insurance inside? and he said, fine buy anything. the president said -- call me if you find out anything. the president said could we get the cia guy to go out? i say go call him. i said could to do anything? i said it is probably too late. his response was surely he has the thing sealed off. i told the president that. we can waiting all night are waiting for the next three hours for reports. it came either directly to me or to me in my office. as it turned out, he had been

stalking nixon as well. there was no political gain or loss. . his office and he was sitting there making gestures. as trying to read his lips. in the 75 or six conversations. >> this is what i cannot understand about the watergate theory. i see no evidence that he sat with the and said "what was hunt doing?" >> go back to the illfated conversation about brookings. he says i want somebody in y here w ho can do what the fb u i used to do. i thought "you cannot do that."

i regret i didn't. i always thought he knew what was going on. i was sure he had approved it. >> after the election, i am surprise nixon did not have a conversation with you about hunt. >> we did have one in january. he knew i was involved. the question was amnesty. this is an interesting story. i really felt badly that i had gotten hunt into that.

he lost his wife. i felt responsible. i did not know we were paying the money and tell the called and told me so. i recorded it. i was being set up. i agree to see him. he asked me to. i cut him off appeared as if you talk to me this way, i cannot help you. if you'll just be quiet i will tell you what i want to do. as a friend, he should not go to prison. he was doing what he thought he

was told to do. if he did go to prison, i would go to the president and ask for amnesty or pardon. you have my political assurance on that. it is only because he is a friend. i brought him in here. at the irresponsible. -- i felt responsible. i knew he was not testifying. he said plenty on this tape that signal to me that he was blackmailing us. that was not the reason i would talk to the president. walking to the west wing with erlichman one night and one other person, there were three of us, i don't know.

i said he is going ot be leaving, but if you allow hunt to get convivted and take the rap, i will come back and talk to the president. i would telleave, the president to make sure he pardons him. erlichman did not say a word to me. i never did it. i never raised it with the president. later erlichman said i had done it. the president went into a frenzy. who is sitting there with all

the tapes. promised a seatrominenc for him? i said no. this is one of the charges and watergate but it did not happen. i did not ask him. i tell our limit house going to the gazette wanted to be able to come back to erlichman -- i told ehrlichman i was going to because i wanted to be able to come back. i wanted to keep my leverage. i said some in the was untrue. the president and i did talk about these things. one conversation which i am sure is on the tapes the president said that they get into the

white house backs the think it was in january. i figured it out pretty well. i said to the president, get him out of here. i said he should get a special counsel. a robust two is in danger. danger.as in >> did you think it was possible that $300,000 could go to someone to undertake an intelligent operation without haldeman knowing? >> i did not have any question

that he approved what was going on. and did not think anyone was a good enough to break into the international committee. >> you think he approves general political intelligence? >> yes. eustace market that. -- he was too smart for that. what i'm trying to understand why. but the lot was the rivalry with mitchell. it would have been perfectly logical. there is a meeting every week of the brain trust of the campaign. mitchell and the fellow who cam e int to replace mitchell. me, haldeman, sometimes ehrlichman, but not always.

the intelligence issue never came up once. i was not part of the discussion. the only time i heard about it is a live brought him into the office. >> see you think the president knew that you were being set up to take the fall? >> yes. i do. i hate to say that. i would like to think he had as much affection for me as i had for him. i think he knew it. i think he had to know it. what have you explain that? >> i do not agree with the jar when the that the survival of

the fittest. i was below him -- darwin, but that the survival of the fittest. i was below him on the to change. -- food chain. >> last question and i will let you go. you said tell a story about asking, you are with a group of your former colleagues. you asked him what happened. tell us how that happens. >> we were conversing in my room. the testimony was going on. macgregor had been brought there. we were talking. i said we're in prison because

of watergate. what you think we broke in their tax i said i'd never heard of him. to bring him up to my room. i was suspicious. i said we were just having a conversation. why do we ever approve watergate in the first place that's why do we decide to go in there? what we tried to find? he got a red in the face and nervous and agitated. he never answered. we just shook our heads. he was the guy who gave it the green light. later he said the president told him to appear that is ridiculous. >-- told him to.

that is ridiculous. the president was always protecting mitchell. he had to. >> why? >> he felt about mitchell the way i did about hunt only more so. he told me once that john mitchell did not want to come here. he did not want this job. i could not turn on him. i forced him to give up this law practice and come here. i think you really felt a special loyalty. i was a young guy. he was an older man with a half million dollar year law practice. >> where you the day nixon resigned? >> in prison. what have you feel?

-- >> how did you feel? >> i was relieved. that it was over. disappointed because i would have thought he would have taken his own troops with timothy was going to resign. -- with him if we was going to resign. hopeful that jerry ford would do that. sad for nixon personally. i really felt it. i knew what a incredibly difficult thing that was for him to do, just to stand there and look at people in shame. how hard that would be for a man that proud. >> did he ever talk about it with you? >> no. what did you see him afterward? >> yes. the first week i was home from

prison i got a call from him. i said something negative about kissinger. nixon calls me. it was like old times. we were just chatting away. he was ambulant. he got one secretary of state. we have to support him. i think we should let henry. he was nicely telling me to lay off of henry. i am sure henry called him. not is when he said you're going to go into this religious business. people in business with love to hire a guy like you. i said let me [unintelligible] i will talk to you about it. i did go out and spend three

hours with him on a sunday morning. he said i was coming out because i knew he liked sunday morning worship services at the white house. he would not go to church now. i would conduct this in his office. i got there. he had his phlebitis. my wife was in the waiting room. i figured i would be half an hour. i was there three hours. i never got to talk what i wanted to talk about. all we talked about was watergate. jaila what did you go to for? i said director information. he said i told you to do it. my wife was laughing because here i go to prison doing what

he said and he did not even know i was there. he was really shocked after he left office. i saw him a few more times when he came to new york. i saw him getting back on his feet. i always had a good relationship who is always very friendly to me. i never really spend much time with him after may be the first three or four years. i was in new york for something. he said come on over. we started meeting together. that was in the early 1980's. i do not see him much until the end. >> did you feel -- when but thgt

back to the present, he felt he should apologize. he felt he had done something that has hurt nixon. my sense is that you felt the blame could be shared. >> i did not apologize to him because i was doing exactly what he told me to do. i did not think i was involved in watergate. i had given him /spirit get rid of the people who did this and hire a special investigator. i left the conspiracy when i did that. i realize it yet again my vice he might still be president. >> did you disappoint me? >> sure. of course. i also understood the man.

families disappoint one another sometimes the yourself family. >> thank you for spending time with us. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> next "q & a." then david cameron takes questions at the british house of commons spirited than a conversation with erick kantcan. >> in his room from positive government policy is a private sector that drives it developments. it feels it. we have some vision where we are going. if ever we needed that it is right now where we have this opportunity creating infrastructure. >>