evidence in the most rigorous procedure known to our law. that is what this is intended to do. you have confidence. i trust this. there is a printer challenge of the jury. should have mentioned that there is a preemptory challenge. someone who knew the accused, there is a preemptory challenge where you do not have to give your reasons, although they do use doctrines in civilian jurisprudence. this is the doctrine where someone is challenging a member

for discriminatory reasons, the party challenges a black member of the jury. because the individual is black, that is against the doctrine and is observed. that is also a surge in military courts as well. printers challenges are part of assembling this. the jury deliberates in the wind of getting a verdict and then sentencing happens if there is a finding of guilt on the accounts. that is a process whereby a sides are presenting witnesses as to aggravation or extenuation in mitigation. and wanted to spend a little bit of time on that. let me trigger some questions by raising criticisms and the counters are persuasive.

i call them the five "uns." they are unsettled, unfair, unnecessary, unknown, and/or unbounded. let me go through the five of them. i believe that although some of them had aspects that were sounds criticisms, and now they are either untrue or misleading. to continue to oppose a military commission that i have

summarized, after two different ministrations in the executive branch, the supreme court that invalidated the 2001 commissions make clear that congress had the ability to make commissions. no less than five acts of congress have established a strong basis for these. to continue to oppose the framework of the rule of law, this might final "un" which is unwise. let me go back. the argument that military commissions are unsettled is

that you happen to make the step up as you go along. there is so much litigation risk. people will be challenging it forever. you'll never get to where you are going. there have been seven convictions the military. there have been here in why use these unsettled? there are well established laws that are providing. i would ask you to try to view these. . they are a judge operating in the system. they have sources of law. he is to look here with minor

differences. i spoke about this here say thing. there is no requirement for warnings to be read. with some very isolated differences the code of justice and all of the judicial decisions are applicable. the judge will also look to federal law. there is classified procedures. there are others. this area of what have they been given the opportunity tax there is a place to go. i submit to you a court is about applying law to individual case. there are issues that arise. judges are having to have

individual cases. this is no different than the have and any other system picture this idea that there is enormous litigation rest is anticipating -- is dissipating. there are issues in every system, issues and conspiracy pay they are going to be heard by the d.c. court of appeals here very soon. there's going to be an oral arguments. it is unsettled. it is a settled body of law. they are unfair. this is a body of procedure and law that will produce fair trials. those latest reforms is an

important one. these are fair trials. they are administered by independent people. they're not waking up in the morning. they are not tenured positions. they're sworn to uphold the constitution. we have a system. i have trials for international terrorism systems.

this is in a number of districts. they have done a great job. most cases where you have an overlap in jurisdiction, this is the key of this unnecessary arguments. alleged violators must have

jurisdiction three different ways. there has to be a lot of work. the cannot try someone in the military commission for violating this.

some of these are similar us hostility. some of them look like crimes in the criminal code. some of them duct. hiding behind the protection, they get on the battlefield. that is an act of treachery. using your enemies reverence. this is a perfidious crime under the law of armed conflict. you have this body of 32. you have to have jurisdiction. you can only charge of those.

he had to do that over someone who's the right person. someone who's not comply with the laws of war. you cannot try an enemy prisoner of war in a military commission. congress as said there limited to an underprivileged belligerence. it has to be in the context of an associated with hostilities. this is a narrowed jurisdiction. there is protracted armed violence of its scope and intensity that justified the use of armed forces. this is a narrow jurisdiction. if a look at some of these, these other things that happen in the context, if you look at that and say that looks like a civilian crime, you have

hijacking in terrorism. it can be characterized as a violation of civil law. and a violation of armed conflict. 1 and the key indicators is congress 2001. it passed an authorization for the use of military force which made it very clear that associated forces our enemies. you have this overlapping jurisdiction. why did you just try all those people by civilian courts? the response is that although i believe that is in our interest most of the time to do it, there is a narrow category of cases where the best choice is a military commission. there is a variety of different argument i will give you on that basis. some of them boil down to have the crime ought to be characterized, what is the best way to characterize that criminal conduct.

sometimes it is better to characterize it as a violation of law. sometimes it is an offense that on the books, because there has been a war crimes act that allows courts to punish it, it has never been tried. the have not tried these kinds of cases. others might emphasize the jury. we want our juries to handle international terrorism cases. the jury is one of the ways our society gets in the game. it causes the people to have to consider a crime. sometimes a military commission is the better choice. they are using the jury that i described in an area that maybe is in a downtown area.

i believe our cities can handle this. there are situations in which to put these factors together. another happens to be whether or not miranda warnings were given. is that the right role? miranda makes a lot of sense. it makes sense to give the miranda warnings. that complaint in state in question of whether or not be good to the military issue. i mention this before.

sometimes the islamic military commissions the wiser choice. that is the counter to the unnecessary arguments. there is a different order of magnitude. when are faced with a serious threat that defines us they will be coming at us. they cynically invoke the law. when you're telling with threats like that, why would any government take an institution or a tool off the table ducts this is the counter to the unnecessary arguments. why we take that off the table.

this has been around since before the constitution. they have said it ought to be part of our national security apparatus. it is a start of the counter. it made me want to follow up on it. anon. i'm persuading that there these can be fair. and and i know anything about them. have not seen anything about it. they are unknown. isn't that is part of being perceived to be fair and been known to be fair deaths we made important strides. because these are taking place right now, if they do not have to be. they are not specific to any particular site.

they could be convened elsewhere. in order to sure people understand, they have this to the television for observation. the same role applies to the military commission as a does the court martial of a service member. the media can go in and watch the proceedings. the cannot record them. you can have a sketch artist. this is a row we are familiar with. it is our way of balancing fair trial. this is how we balance that in our criminal-justice system. you can observe this. because it is hard to get to guantanamo, they can have this transmitted to a certainty. this has been happening since last fall. there is also a web site where you can see all of the motions that have been filed in the court rulings. they counter the motion that a party has made.

then there is a transcript. a very quick transcript is produced. it is put up on the web verbatim so you can follow. eking go on the web and see what happens. these are important. this is the criticism of being concerned about expanded military jurisdiction. we embraced this military chivvying and is to undercut that. we need to have our civilian juries to get this in the game. we're linking the government to the people. there is a long line of distinguished places and are supreme court opinions going

back. there is a distinguished line of thinking against military jurisdiction. irresponsive that is we have not saw this out. -- the response to that is we have not sought this out. he said you are on order. you go do your job. we did not lobby for permission. if we are given a, we are going to do it with integrity. we're going to do it with skill. we're going to use across the government every bit of

expertise we can get. the investigation has mobilized. we are using the whole of government. we will use this authority and military courts. it fit certain kinds of cases. our jurisdiction is this unbounded thing. look at our jurisdiction. congress has circumscribe did to the hostility. that is an element of every offense that i have to prove. it's a place in the context of

an associated with hostilities. it is not an area of peace that you use this. it is circumscribed to this. it does not apply to other types of individuals and two uniformed soldiers. it does not apply to u.s. citizens. it has to be one of those 32 offenses picture can find it involving officers and personnel.

they are trying to do a job that may have become too political for whatever reason and it is not able to be done in civilian courts. it cannot be done because congress has blocked it. congress has set no detainee from guantanamo can be transported to the united states with any federal appropriations. i would say in that context this is not an unbounded project at all. it is intended to implement the

rule of law. to not see that cannot support it, i am actually asking you. i am because unlikely spokesman. here i am trying to explain to folks that we're going to do this. we are committing to doing it fair. there has been this resounding branch of our government having weighed in. given the threat that we face. this is to stimulate a little discussion. i think we have half an hour for questions. [applause] >> i will start here and go

clockwise. when did the big criticisms is that although it is wonderful that we would give protection of detainees, this only applies to those who are live. you're asking military to reach 10 to an impossible standard and the response has been to kill, not capture. i just wondered what that kids do. >> i think you raise an important point. i with fischbach understatement of what our policy is.

-- i think that is an understatement of what our policy is. the call this an incident of war. you can use different tools. this makes sense from a military theory. you can target your enemy. you can target them. he can survey them and listen in to what they are doing. you can detain them. and a porn incident of war is the current complex. they said even though you do not see the word detain detention is an important incident of war. an incident of war is to hold someone accountable under the law of war. to agree with the thrust of your statement, and thank you for asking a question, if you take away one of these methods of trying to subdue an enemy, you can only be righteously add more if you're doing it under a rubric of self-defense. we're defending ourselves

against a threat. if you take away one of these ways of prosecuting the conflict to bring it to a swift and and as possible, you create distortions. if you deprive a soldier of the option of detention, think about it. yet a soldier or a marine. he does not have a system of humane detention. we are encouraging people not to have our doubts. i am not here to talk about

other policies. i am high on trials. i believe trowels are important to vindicate our daddy. it is most sensible and lawfully sustainable that we know. although you can defend it, the most sustainable legal form of detention is incarceration after you have defended someone of -- convicted somewhat of a

crime. they are punished. this is a form of detention. it will withstand the test of time. once the complex are is going away, the authority to call them will unravel. does that make sense of? it will not happen if the convicted under a crime. i believe that trials are important. they insure this balance that have to be relentlessly pragmatic about using. with in that space, we ought to be using all the tools available to us.

we are dealing with an enemy that is fighting in on covered terrain. it is a strike by drone into an area where the local government may be unwilling or unable to do so. we are dealing with an asymmetric threats. i would propose that holding somebody accountable under law is maybe they must effectively

symmetric counterthrust. you are using all affected methods. there asymmetric. engagement is happening in a way that the other side does not see. the air asymmetric even if you are surrounding with a bunch of different ways. the law overmatches. if provide a legitimacy that they cannot match. that is why we cannot ever depart on values. we have got to use this. that is a great question. >> i am a student here. i'm wondering if the pataki but a bit more about the defense teams for the detainees. i know a lot of them have civilian lawyers as well. i was wondering in the trials

are both the lawyers in the military interacting together? is there one who is in charge? >> since the boom at the end of 2008, detainees have had habeus corpus. they have been able to challenge this and civilian court. it is the one provision they have clearly help. this is not a criminal procedure. they are determining whether or not there is authority to hold this. these are civil proceedings. it is for the writ of habeas corpus from the court. the court is supposed to determine your authority for

holding these people. the standard is a standard that has been in place since march of 2009. it restates this law of armed conflict principle. is this individual part of or did he substantially support al qaeda?

they are often doing it out of their interest in civil liberties. on the criminal defense side, i mentioned before the right to counsel. it is qualified by one of the advocates. if you're facing a death penalty one, it is qualified. different ones had different lawyers. captures this. some defendants get three or more. it could be a complex case. they are picking this team. they will detail one of the

councils to be the the the military council. internally this team may make them bleed for a number of pieces other and then had the civilian be the one. this is up to the team. the client can designate who they want to represent. that is kind of how it works. they are entitled to investigative resources. i will be the last to say that a defense counsel would say he is happy.

that is healthy. you'll see that in every system. i believe if you look at the resources and in the litigation, and this has happened in some of the cases were the judge has some of the requests for additional translators.

you would see there is april best resurfacing of the defense function. all those choices are reviewable by the supreme court. they're preserved on a peel -- on appeal. great questions. >> do you think this could be a successful strategy? >> what specific strategy of the command? have day protected him from this tax i was wondering if you think this will be emulated? maybe this could be a strategy. he had his father by the addition -- a petition. another aspect of this litigation. there are events that are happening. i would say this does raise

issues in difficulties. it is an interesting strategy of individuals who are harvard in different areas. it will present a challenge but not in a totally different way than something we have already encountered. that is the nature of this

conflict. >> any others? >> there is a debate over whether to utilize this. who is the decision maker? >> very the question. there is a 2009 protocol between the department of defense and the department of justice. the ultimate decision maker is the attorney general.

these are some i receive from the attorney general. it looks very much like the decisions that are made davey between two different jurisdictions that may have concurrent authority to try somebody in our courts. very familiar this is a judge advocate. we have a case that has been tried by the civilian courts. we have to decide who would pick it. we have a memorandum of understanding. there is this protocol that covers it. it uses the strength of interest factors.

who investigated the case tax what are the punishment's? -- who investigated the case? what are the punishments? are there laws that bar you from doing it? that is very important now. there is this protocol that decides which of two jurisdictions. you may have a drag case across state boundaries between oklahoma and kansas. you have to u.s. attorneys. it is importantly case specific. it is very lacked. the intent is to do justice. that is a great question. >> i in the justice reporter -- in the justice report.

there are challenges about the classification of the accused declarations. this is what the lawyers obtain an outcome. >> i think he may be talking about specific motions that i will not address. i will not address any specific case. i will talk about rules. this is all from the methodical resolution that will be preserved on the record. it can be appealed on a federal court. this is the context of

transparency and any other issue. let's talk a bit about this. this is the unknown. they are not transparent. we're using the same practices we use in our federal courts. i am not going to promise that everything will be publicly available. there are sources and methods that to be protected. it is not just national security. the government has a lot of information about individual citizens.

we are not the liberty to open our books. we have to have enumerated authorities to do anything with information of government. that is what people expect. they have a sensitive medical file. we can open that up and show it. our values require this as to our eyeballs. we do a carefully. transparency as a general world? ps. an open society does not demand infallibility. it is difficult for them to understand what they're prevented from observing. we do have a desire to see the decisions are from is making. if we are going to not have something be visible, you're speaking of an example of a pre- trial conference between two

parties and a judge. you're trying to set up the trial in both your areas. you're not making any decisions a matter of law. any decisions need to be recorded. there is some level that the public is not seen. this is something that has to be on the record. i will see how these types come up. i am not sure i see the tension with sure transparency and understanding. anything the portman has to be on the record. they are not being done. they're being dealt with both parties there. there's someone watching. if there's going to be non

disclosure, the commitments are government makes are that there has to be an overriding interest for not having it be visible. the protection of sources estimate to you is an overriding reason of individual privacy. it has to be done in a tailored way. it passed the surgical. you have to have looked for alternatives to the closure. sometimes you can protect the information in a tailored way. you have to put it on the record. any of the non disclosures that

they may say. they have access to information. before they can blurted out the hat and a they want to raise it. the we have to figure out how we will protect the information. yet to lay that out in a way that will be reviewed. even in the case of pre-trial conferences, that is being preserved as an issue. it can raise the issue if they want. those are the commitments on the use of information. we have to reconcile this notion of a free press. people understand how their governments are making decisions with these other interests.

>> i'll come back to you. let's go here. it will go to you. >> you talked about the idea becker this is one of the tools on fighting in asymmetrical war. we have been noted for your ability to try to break the backlog at guantanamo. do you ever anticipate that there will become a time for this form of a military commission would no lagered need to exist? >> i'll go back to this idea that what most cases should be tried in a federal civilian court, but there is a category

where this instrument is going to be the best available option. i do not see any major ending of this a semester type of threat. a tend to think that is the way people will strike out again. he will have stateless a coordinated efforts. i do not have a crystal ball. it seems that we will have those kinds of threats for a long time. not existential and that it is threatened the very serious in a way the sometimes ex essential threads are through. you get defined in how you respond. you get tempted.

they encourage even peaceful people to respond outside the ball. having unlawful instruments, and this is an institution that for over 200 years has been at the intersection of law and war, having institutions like them. this is a notion in inherent tension. have you apply of la? it is a valuable instrument. you did not want to turn soldiers into our civilian court system.

if given that mission, we ought to be able to do it. it is a law on the book. we are developing a specialized practice. we are able to handle large amounts of classified information safely. we have the compartments of facilities. the defense counsel has them. we have the ability to do justice and protect information. we have relationships with agencies all over the government. this is a valuable thing to keep going. even though the number of cases may be small, they indicated and it can be important. congress has invested a lot of legislative effort. my sense is that it'll be here. two different presidents has said that this is a part of our national security and justice

institution. amigo over here. -- let me go over here. >> i know today's focus is detainees and serious. it seems to be an average soldier crime would be local. why aren't they judged by a jury of their peers? why is it always officers? >> this is the fact finder that congress has decided upon in these courts. you are pointing out the military justice system since 1950 has included 1/3 of the jury trial. he may elect to have jurors of to include 1/3 of the enlisted soldiers. this is the composition of the jury is that congress has specified. that is what we're seeking simplify. it is a diverse group with gender diversity. all these different things that are policed by our congress. it does not include enlisted

personnel. that is what puts officers in the pool. perhaps policy reasons why that may make sense, officers will be in there for a while. some of this and take a long time. it is a very good question. the systems are not identical. they may make it better. of anything come to a sense of the system. is this a fair process? doing so in trying to find out what happens in an event that we think we know a lot about, looking at it from the point of view of accountability under law, and saying specified charges it was recorded.

it is an important justification. thank you. >> i just wanted to add one little note.

. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> he did not seek this, take a position. but, in order to make sure the this job be done with a certain level of continuity and optimal professionalism, he requested that his tour be extended through november of 2014.

in doing so, he voluntarily gave up the possibility of having another appointment and promotion to a higher rank, to major general. this is an extraordinary personal sacrifice, done in the interest of making sure that this job be well done. i just wanted to make a comment here about this. this is a model of the type of service to a cause higher than one's self, which is one of the central lessons of moral leadership that we hear try to inculcate and encourage in our students. so many people are worried about their careers, their positions in their corner offices, their personal power, to have officers like the general do this kind of service really is the height of

civic nobility. i really just want to thank you for an bodying this and honoring us with your outstanding presentation. thank you, sir. [applause] >> this is that -- i mentioned that term for the coin? >> thank you, sir. >> i have something here for you. i brought these back from afghanistan. we used these in 14 consecutive provinces in afghanistan. we tried to help build the capacity for the rule of law. we have these cups and i wanted to give you one. it is a field cup. you never have to wash it. [laughter] rub it on your leg. my favorite afghan proverb that

this institute in bodies, a country without what is a jungle. a wanted to have one of these. >> thank you, sir. you on monday. [applause] -- hugh honor me. [applause] thank you for coming, ladies and gentleman. have a great afternoon.

>> the aclu has believed for some time that police departments around the country are tracking people's cellular

phones on a routine basis. >> should tracking a cell phone require a warrant? tonight, catherine crump, talking about whether current laws adequately protect individual rights to privacy. 8:00 eastern, c-span 2. >> with congress on break this week, we are featuring some of american history television's programs. tonight, a look at the role and influence of the first lady's. tonight, a chronicle of betty ford, barbara bush, and laura bush. they talked about this story with doris kerns goodwin. after 10:00 p.m., we will hear from several women who served with the first ladies. american history tv, in prime

time, all week on c-span 3. the present -- president obama and the japanese prime minister held a joint press conference today at the white house. the talk about of the breeding. >> our joint vision commits us to investment. we are among each other's top trading partners. exports support more than 1 million american jobs. there is more we can do as we were to double u.s. exports. i appreciate the prime minister updating me with his efforts, including liberalized trade and playing a leading role in the economy. we instructed our teams to continue consultations regarding japan's interest in joining the trans pacific partnership. we agree to deepen our

cooperation on nuclear safety and cybersecurity third the joint mission lays out the future. this is a region where international norms are up held. we continue our close consultations on actions of north korea, which are a sign of weakness. we want to encourage more reforms that improve the lives of the burmese people. our joint vision reaffirms our role as global partners down by shared values and committed to international peace, security, and human rights. our nations are the largest

donors in afghanistan. we are planning for the nato summit in chicago and plan for the transition in afghanistan and japan will plant for a donor conference to sustain development. i want to think this time to commend the prime minister and japan for showing leadership with regards to the iranian nuclear program. they are now appealing the crunch and one reason is that countries like japan made the decision to reduce imports. this is one more example about japan continuing to serve as a model and a true global leader. finally, this commits us to new collaboration between our scientists, researchers and includes new exchanges that will bring thousands of our young people together including high school students to help japanese communities rebuild after last year's disaster.

mr. prime minister, thank you for helping to revitalize our extraordinary alliance so we enjoy even greater security and prosperity for both our countries. once again, i salute the people of japan for the resilience and courage that they have shown during this past year. >> you can see all the press conference on c-span tonight at 8:00 eastern. >> four years ago i was a washington outsider. four years later, i am at this dinner. four years ago i looked like this. today i look like this. for years from now, i will look like this. [laughter]

[applause] that is not even funny. [laughter] >> mr. president, you remember when the country rallied around you in hopes of a better tomorrow? that was hilarious. [laughter] that was your best one yet. honestly, it is a thrill to be here with the president, a man who has done his best. there's a term for guys like president obama, probably not two terms, but -- >> you can watch any time online at the c-span video library, behind the scenes, the red carpet, and all the entertainment, at c-span.org /videolibrary. >> all this week it is booked

tv in prime time. a look at that lives and careers of senators. arlen specter, then a book that examines career of richard lugar. after that a book party with former wyoming senator alan simpson. thistv in primetime week on c-span2. >> this week marks the first anniversary of the death of osama bin laden. we will hear from a panel that talks about the state of al qaeda. hosted by the potomac institute,

this is close to two hours. >> ladies and gentlemen, it is my privilege to welcome you to the potomac institute for policy studies today. we have for long to time the privilege to be the host for a series of seminars, studies, and publications on a variety of issues surrounding terrorism. the potomac institute is not for profit that focuses on the issues of science and technology and how science and technology affect our governments and our society, our health, if you will, and in the world we live in. we began focusing on terrorism in the mid to late 1990's because it became apparent that this old form of aware of -- of

warfare was being reborn in the modern age due to the use of technology. since we began studying terrorism, it became evident terrorists of today found novel ways of using technology, 1st airliners, as weapons against us. now the issue is how can we use the protective technologies to counter this spurge we're still dealing with. today as we celebrate the first anniversary of the death of osama bin laden, the potomac institute was fortunate to attract and keep at the institute professor who heads center for international studies. he is also affiliated with the yale university for -- center

for legal studies. i am happy to have as a co- sponsor don wallace, who will make sure we address not just the technical aspects, but legal aspects as well. professor alexander put together a book in 2000more than ever, the american -- in 20001 that was published nine months before the events of 9/11, and i am proud to say before 9/11 we sold 340 copies. after 9/11 we sold about 150,000 copies. today is available in two dozen languages and around the world as one of the first volumes that articulated what this network was.

one of the things that book featured most was a set of pictures that were obtained publicly on the members of al qaeda at the time, the famous original 53 which became the targets of the last couple administrations. it has been the policy of the last couple administrations to target al qaeda as a set of individuals we need to take out. today i think many people you have heard in the last day or so are claiming great success in that mission to target outcry that, there are very few members of the original court position left. only one or two. only a few who have joined since 9/11, and those who have left have been driven into hiding. the question on whether al qaeda is defeated whether targeting the individuals of the

organization and succeeding in taking them out is in fact winning the war. frederick kagen wrote in a policy review and article that it is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. the enemy at war is a group of people. some of them need to be killed. some of them captured. some of them driven into hiding. the overwhelming majority will have to be persuaded. the question i would throw on the floor is not whether we have successfully targeted and killed those who associated themselves with al qaeda, but whether we have successfully addressed and countered the message that caused those to join the organization in the first place. it is an open question, one that each of our speakers will address in their own way. i would like to start the discussion off with a gift to

them of the 10th anniversary book that jona has produced along with me to articulate all of the activities of the last 10 years against al qaeda. with that, if you will help me, i would like to give to each of our speakers a copy of our book. if nothing else, it is a good paperweight. and a good symbol of the tremendous work that professor alexander and the center for international terrorism studies is responsible for here at the institute. i would like to thank him for his dedication to all issues of studying all issues of terrorism and doing it in the most professional academic way that most of you will agree that professor alexander is absolutely a world treasure when

it comes to these types of issues, and we would not be anywhere near as deep in understanding without him. please join me in welcoming professor alexander. [applause] >> thank you very much, mike, for your generous introduction. i would like to remind the audience, since it has been generous to broadcast this event, if you could turn off your cell phones, if possible. we would like music, but nothing else. now, we want to thank the institute and others here for

recurring this and making this seminar available almost immediately. i would like to make a few footnotes like an academic because we have a very rich panel, and we would like to develop some discussion. now, mike mentioned the work and studies. provide context, nothing is new under the sun as we know, and for decades we tried to academically a chief two aims. one is to learn the best lessons to try to anticipate the

future. in the last months in the same rule, we had a seminar on nigeria. in fact, it is interesting that , that wek to 1980 developed a research project on international violence. we did not even want to use the term "terrorism." now we are discussing the affiliate's of al qaeda. at the same time, we also tried to develop some capability to learn about state-sponsored terrorism, and going back to 1980, we published the first

study on iran together with a congressional research service in the library of congress at the time, because of their request of some members of congress, and we continue over the years. i would like to mention most recently because it is connected with al qaeda, in case you missed that, we just published a report related to the node- traffic zone, west africa and central africa, from 9/11, to the arab spring, and i would like to commend our team of researchers sitting in the back, the next generation, we're very proud of them, who contributed research to this study. finally, i would like to mention that we are trying to cooperate with international organizations such as the united

nations and nato, and one of our recent activities in publication is a journal called "partnership for peace," that is being published in and correct, turkey, working with nato. i recall very vividly that james woosel, after the cold war, he made a statement before congress related actually to the nature of that threat, the instability, and she indicated -- he indicated during the cold war it was very simple in a way to deal with a big dragon, but in the post cold war, we have to

deal with a situation of many snakes in the garden that we cannot identify. this obviously brings me to the question of al qaeda and the challenge of al qaeda basically in terms of the short-term and long-term aims and goals and what direction outcry that is taking. i would like to mention now that we do have a very distinguished panel. basically, i am not going to read this at this time except to indicate that each and every one specialized in this particular

area, and because of that time factor, and some of you have to leave earlier, i would like to and vice -- invite the director of the terrorism program at the institute for middle eastern policy. >> good afternoon. thank you for accommodating my teaching schedule. the students are very understanding. it is a pleasure to be here. thank you very much. if you read the papers this

weekend you might come to the conclusion that we are done, that outcry that is all but over, and we are on the right trajectory. i might agree with the second half, but we are not yet where we need to be. we will be i believe at some point in the not too distant future we will not be talking about al qaeda as such, but the global insurgency that bin laden created where he was far more successful than he ever dreamed he would be in creating a movement that has become an idea is something we will deal with for some time. i do not lose sleep worrying is it al qaeda, is it al qaeda- affiliated, is a they wanna be, as much as i worry about what are the capabilities of those intent on doing us harm? the fact of the matter is it has been a fantastic years for those

involved in counter terrorism. we're about to celebrate the one-year anniversary of the take-down of bin laden. that cannot be stressed enough, how important that was. many of us were mistaken when he believed -- when we believed he was not involved. i stand corrected. the fact is we know from the intelligence that came out and out of a bought the man was very involved, not in the day to day operations, but he was reaching out to people and coming up with ideas and getting the ok for ideas, thinking about plots targeting the president of the united states, etc. taking him out was important because it removed the face, the

name behind the movement. that was a tremendous blow to their soldiers and to those who seek to radicalized others who follow in his image. it also left as a leader al zawahir, not a pleasant individual, he did not have the madness is some, there was good reason to hope he would push some people away, might create some fissures in al qaeda, and that might be successful. perhaps the greatest achievement was catching that treasure trove of intelligence. a couple weeks after the raid, there was a conference with the national security adviser who said the amount of information collected was the equivalent of

a small and liberal arts college library, and we're talking about 100,000 pieces of information. going through it again, and the tree osh now seems to be complete. this will be something that people will continue to go through. this gets us to this weekend's press. what you will hear a lot of an hearing more of is a lot of politicking. neither party has a monopoly on that, so we will hear from both sides. we will hear about how much more to do, how far we have done. that all needs to be taken with a grain of salt. what i am interested in what the career people says and what the defense secretary says. we have some ways to go.

beyond the takedown of bin laden the much larger story from this past two years is the arabs spring, which some call the islamist winter. they are cataclysmic. it is a huge shot to al qaeda's ideology, the fact that al qaeda three years of bloody violence, maintaining the only way to take that a regime was through violence and you cannot only engage in that near jihad, you had to engage in the far jihad against the united states -- all that turned out to be bogus. in the and a small group of liberal-minded, moderate- minded, arab and muslim took it down the mubarak regime.

i wished us in the west would do better in promoting those alternative messages. that is where counter terrorism is going to go in the future. i worked at the fbi. i was the deputy chief of one of the intelligence agencies, one of the smallest ones at the treasury. i am convinced that we do tactical terrorism, counter terrorism really well. there is no such thing as 100% counter-terrorism. the right only may be most

effective way to further your political agenda is. we're not where we need to be there yet. that is where i believe bin laden has been more successful than he could ever dream to be. i do not only think about the al qaeda corps and his impatience -- and lose patience with those who do. we are in need of instant gratification. the fact of the matter is our average serious work in a much longer time frame. right now it is one thing, but tomorrow, next week, next month, it could be something different. i am tired with those who are interested in assessing where is the al qaeda core. today could be out cut it in the arabian peninsula. it is al qaeda that has found a

new and creative way, not so new. a group that had been floundering because it was working on a few thousand dollars and a kidnapping for ransom. whether it is other affiliate's which is going to be a growth industry for terrorism. my biggest fear is the home grown extremism, which is not limited to radical islamist extremism. the reason that keeps me up at night is because my time in the intelligence committee -- committed the is not capable. people may set off one of the trip wires we put in place. if we are -- sitting in their

mother's basement, had never crossed law-enforcement, we have no way of knowing about these people until one hour late. that is what keeps me late at night. i will end by saying this -- with all the things did are discussing today, recent indicates -- events indicate we do not only suggest a threat from radical islamist extremism. you can look no farther than attacks in india. this is something we will deal with at least over the next year, probably lunker. i want to thank the potomac institute for inviting me. i think you all for coming here this afternoon. [applause] >> i will stay right here.

>> a footnote. you mentioned we do not have to worry about al qaeda. in fact this month of april i think the attack on oklahoma city that we have to keep in mind, as you indicated, and also is fairly two years after the failed rescue mission in iran. the past 30 years we have to deal with restoring the american credibility and confidence. this particular event, the mission to kill bin laden, is a significant development. >> daughter's offer the same

instant gratification as suns do. -- as sons. where are you going? where does al qaeda want to go? where can they go? where do we want al qaeda to go? the death of what bin laden meant to. i am not sure. the pressure of the military, economic, has caused al qaeda to adapt and to mutate. most view his death as a good thing. what does that strained look like? when you have a game plan set and the other team changes, you need to adjust. it is about adaptation, and especially in war, he who adapts quickest will have the advantage.

notock hata -- there's adaptation required. i am attempting to extrapolate what out cut will look like, become. as yogi berra stated, prediction is hard especially about the future. where does al qaeda want to go and where can they go? assuming they have not shifted from there and original views, we are dealing with people on the fringe. they livebelief in their cause. trees can be relative. almost digressing to myth, and it is powerful. degrees of the french gerrie, and we have some french -- french people --gfringe. when things cannot be agreed on, of violence results.

where do we want al qaeda to go? we want them eliminated. is there a way we could shape their future? unfortunately the nature of the world right now does not offer alternatives. with global economic woes, expanding global growth, poverty that results in ignorance and want, reliance on oil, and an emerging culture police you can reason with anyone and everyone. two examples come to mind. in the book that deals with the japanese surrender, members of the oss met with coach semin and received assurances that they were ready to cooperate with americans. a major parachuted into hanoi,

selecting forces for operations against the japanese. in a province in 2004, sunni looked at alternatives to war. these meetings sought an alternative to al qaeda @ in iraq. the marines who made this out reach where civil of fair group marines. names no one here would ever know. they were exceptionally creative. they believed people wanted a lifestyle better for themselves and a better future for their children and fundamentally that poor men want to get rich and richmond want to get richer and richer in and war in their back yard does not bring that to an end. ask yourself who was awakened,

us or them? in closing, let's discuss some fundamentals in dealing with al qaeda. the blunt, decisive, brutal, separate religion from their cause, and take advantage of opportunities. leave no doubt what you say and what you will do, and then do it. when you do it, be decisive and brutal is the only way. some have lost the sight that war is cruelty, there's no use trying to reform it, and the crueler is, the sooner it will be over. this remains true today. when the dogs of war are released, cannot be surprised the result is carnage. in some ways we are pollyannas in our country. we have muddied this water. when a person is bad, they're bad regardless of skin color or religious affiliation.

be decisive and brittle at that point. , opportunities will exist, but must be realized, and this is difficult. imagine the difference if pucci men had been given an opponent of path. i do not want to trivialize the complexity of these matters. we will have opportunities. thank you. the next speaker is a professor at georgetown university. he is a distinguished scholar. >> thank you. first of all i would like to

thank my old but young friends. we have known each other for a long time. i have to say i feel a little bit like a fish out of water because i have not focused on terrorism as such. i used to be doing it a lot in the 1980's, and we are surrounded by people, this is their specialty, so i feel a little bit apprehensive. i will try to see what i can contribute to the debate that hopefully will be of use. i've looked like to say i am

extremely happy that bin laden has been dispatched to some warm place, a hot place, so that is quite good, and definitely we can say that out cut it today -- al qaeda today, when the successor was chosen, that it was -- you could see beneath the bluster that there was concern, including him saying we have trouble getting money and people have to come, and our friends should help us more in pakistan. this has [unintelligible] and every organization, like al

qaeda, when you suffered such a blow, it is a long while before you can recoup. what i will focus on is what matt was saying, what is the spectacle and strategic and looking at forces that give us, people like bin laden, a little bit to talk about context, and to see that when one tries to develop a broader counter terrorism strategy, what are some of the issues one has to do? the united states does not have control over it. this helps in the development of movements such as al qaeda.

the united states did not instigate the soviet invasion of afghanistan. once they invaded, we have to do our job. we have to understand the soviet-afghan war was the principle in which this whole jihad emerged and blossoms. i do not suggest -- this had not been completely operational lives. this whole soviet-afghan war became a crucible of jihad, and became legitimize. this is something we have to understand. there is a direct link. also, the other thing that happened was that pakistan

underwent a tremendous change. here are the actions of our allies. i do not mince words. if i had i would be in better shot shape now. there was a fundamental change that occurred in pakistan's islamic culture. they got a new lease of life proselytizing. this new -- happen, but these did not exist in pakistan. i know what i am talking about. it is almost unrecognizable. this is something we have to keep in mind. everyone else you see that have this jihadis migrated, whether

in bosnia or in in chechnya. it migrated from afghanistan. we have to keep in mind that the people that helped develop, either financially or ideologically, and here i come to this whole idea which is a euphemism for something you all know, so i do not need to say it on television. this is a dilemma we have that we have to come to terms with. if we do not, i do not know how we are going to deal with it. why is it the whole question of terrorism is difficult to resolve? one of the things we're seeing happening, and i hope it will stay that way, although europe is different, if we judge by the horrendous killing happened in toulouse, which was part wrenching, and the person involved in that claimed he had

connections this newfangled krupa in kazakhstan, who they say there is another one of those which is called franchise, like mcdonald's or kentucky fried chicken of terrorism. whether they are connected with al qaeda or not -- is another thing. a lot of these issues also have local boards that corker -- have local routes that al qaeda is trying to exploit. kazakhstan until recently did not have an islamic problem like they do right now. these are some of the pieces that are going to happen.

in terms of the future doing what we have to do, have two problems, and one of them is the ambiguity of the local states as far as the uses of [unintelligible] terrorism also has to be bad against whomever it is perpetrate. [unintelligible] if some group sets against a country that a local power or others do not like, then they call them liberation movements or whenever, and i can name names, but i prefer not to. the ambiguous role of state these out the terrorism. the most since factor -- idea

that bin laden was roaming around in pakistan and pakistan is not know that -- i am sorry, that strains credibility to the point of impossibility. this is one thing we have to do. if pakistan cannot protect its own shia population , and we have to separate the shia from iran. the other 100 million, the way our treated, is a completely different thing. the idea -- it seems to me that all that we know that the pakistan government helped to carry out the attacks in mumbai.

these are some of the things we have to keep in mind. where al qaeda is going? i think it is developing a more sectarian force. the sectarian focus was clear in speech.iri's said the persians are doing this. now that he is trying to piggyback on what is going on in syria, which is also sectarian directed, linked with regional rivalries. what does the arab spring mean for al qaeda? anytime there is a political process, where people can,

including the salafis, which i hope will remain in the minority, any time there is a route you to go through politically, the likelihood that this local group will disconnect themselves from this headquarters of al qaeda -- we have to wait and see. to me, it seems to me that the arabs spring is the worst thing that could have happened for al qaeda, and they have to play catch up with that. i agree it shows if you want to get a grant of a collapsed government, whether egypt, syria, iran, what ever, there are many of them are around,

nobody has a monopoly, unfortunately in repression. there are local factors. in south america they did this all the time. if somebody wants to be corrupted, americans do not say, why don't you speak to your people? you can take action within your own country, and there is a political truth to that. the experience of, if one can call them, events that have happened that cannot work out, then i do not think of cut that in the sense of the kind of terrorism -- never really had existed as such. it plays where everybody can look to, like some kind a

spiritual headquarters that everybody tries to get legitimacy by phillie lady itself with bin laden. -- by affiliating itself with been light in. the other thing is targets of terrorism changed, depending where grievances can exist and where the opportunities exist. this is one of the problems. the russians, because i know i did a bit more about terrorism in the caucus and other places. the chechen issue has not finished yet. when the russians felt that chechnya had been sacrificed, were having problems in various cities, as long as those problems are big -- guest i have talked more than i should have, and i apologize. i hope there was something

useful. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. of course there are questions very shortly. i would like to call on and associate professor of strategic subject -- studies at johns hopkins university. >> i would like to begin by apologizing for my early departure. i would like to apologize because i feel i am going to throw rhetorical bombs here and run out the door because -- before everybody can get back at me. i am not leaving because i am of for the discussion. this is an important discussion. i will have strong views, and i think the person to my left is

going to disagree profoundly with me, and if i am not able to stay here, please forgive me. i am happy to engage some other time. let me begin by saying i agree with others who have said the death of bin laden is extremely important. this is the founder, the guy who had so much charisma that he was able to convince a whole lot people to kill themselves for a cause. i do not want to minimize what the death of bin laden has meant. as with others i do not believe that if has killed off out qaeda or it has led to a defeat of the group, nor to think the arabs spring as it has developed has led to the death of al qaeda. there was a point last year when there were a lot of hopes,

including some that i had come out that this might point out a different path, especially in places like egypt. as it developed i do not think it has led to the strategic defeat of al qaeda. this is because i disagree profoundly with the old view of what al qaeda is. my definition of the group, a tiny group of extremists, and that is i do not think it is a terrorist group at all. it was in the 1990's. i agree in the 1990's it was all it was able to be. it had a few hundred followers. it had whacky dreams and fantasies about what it could accomplish. it was confined to sedan and off to the wilds of afghanistan, where it could do nothing, right? in the 1990's, i agree, it was a

terrorist group. then it only at the aspirations for bigger things. if you look at captured documents that we have from our war in afghanistan, what you see is they were spending 90% of their money in training which he dean and regular combat troops, and only 10% of their money, what they call a special operations, that is, the attacks in the united states. had in the 1990's, they aspirations, unfulfilled, for bigger and better things, and they were spending time and most of the effort on developing those rather than on attack the united states. i would like to say at the beginning that one of the things that as profoundly it our views is our views of 9/11. it is not about us. 9/11 make us think everything

going on in the world that has the name al qaeda -- it was not. the fact that eight times as many muslims have been killed in the world since 9/1 firs1 ver sus american -- we have misunderstood what al qaeda's objectes are. we believe their main objective is to attack the united states. in fact that as a means toward an end. we have confused means with the objectives, which is a basic mistake you could make and leads to all sorts of confusion about what needs to be done. the means were attacked the united states cannot get the

united states and out of muscle countries entirely. bin laden had this fantasy that was in fact disputed by a lot of the members of our credit in the 1990's that the u.s. was this cowardly country that could carry out a few attacks and u.s. would run for it. what was he planning on doing after? that was the real strategic plan, which was four fold, where the expressed multiple times not just an open statements and articles written by out kind analysts, but in the few captured documents we have from iraq that our public. these things are expressed multiple times. here are these objectives of al qaeda. if you go back and read every single statement made by al qaeda's leaders for the past 10 years, these are repeated ad nauseam. first and foremost, to overthrow

all the rulers of muslim majority countries. secondly, to impose their version of sharia on all muslims. thirdly, to create what they call emirates, which have specific source of characteristics and set up a caliphaate. beyond that, there is a fifth objective which was world conquest. those were the five, but they four focused on, they called it making the word of god the highest, and to me that means world conquest. those were the fundamental grain, , strategic objectives of al qaeda from the start, and does have nothing to do with terrorist attacks on united states. repeatedly when they talk about objectives, they did not say,

when of our main objectives is to attack the united states. attacking the united states before 9/11 was the fantasy about what this would do, and after 9/11 was about recruiting and show people they were still relevant, but not about the main objectives any longer. that is why i call al qaeda not a terrorist group, because the terrorist group is a small group, a few hundred people, don't have the capabilities or the desire to expand further, and able to recruit people into their organizations fast enough to replace them, and are incapable holding territory and governing its. when you look at the al qaeda corp., that is certainly what is going on. the term al qaeda means headquarters. their first term for themselves was the high command, something repeated in these captured documents.

the high command of something they hoped would be andbigger, and since 2005 has begun to live up to these aspirations of the 1990's. they have set out to creek franchises, branches, of their organization. they believe those bridges are an integral part of their organization, carrying out their orders. conquering territory and do all kinds of things they should not do. at least that is what they thought until zarkawi came along. zaqawi was a huge lesson to them. before 2005, 2006, they were creating something, and then

zakawi showed them what would happen. since that time they have a much tighter command and control. it is no coincidence that bin laden moved into that house in abbottabad, because the way we knew about communications before last year suggested they used couriers only in order to carry their orders around, and that turned out not to be very helpful at all. in 2005 they moved to abbottabad, and the early news reports said there were fiber optic connections in the house. to me, that answer and a huge

question that had been raised about my assertions that were backed up by very little evidence about command and control. i could see people doing what they ordered, putting out orders and people fulfilling them, but how precisely are you going to organize something like this on a global scale? command and control in and a regular war is a different thing from command and control in the regular war. there's always a chance for splintering. even before i heard about abbottabad, there was this recognition that we were not talking about command and control that the pentagon exercises on combat commanders around the world.

in two dozen 9, i had some rough conversations with people who attacked this notion, and i began to change my mind. the one thing i could not answer, how is he going to do this from a cave in northern waziristan? i cannot imagine, and as soon as i heard he was in abbottabad, i think i am getting it. there were these fiber optic connections, that answers an awful lot, too, because he does not have to depend on some courier system. there might be other methods. i would like to finish by saying i understand that making this assertion, that is, that this is not a terrorist group, but the headquarters where high command that something that is attempting to become, or is in the process of becoming a global insurgency has an awful lot of policy implications, some

of which are tremendously unpalatable. but i do not believe you should ignore what reality is telling you because you cannot afford it or you to not like what reality is telling you, right? the fact we cannot afford to carry out a global counter insurgency the way we did insurgencyanbar not make us flinch from recognizing the scope of the problem we are dealing with. i the first and foremost it argues that attrition is the wrong way to go. it will encourage radicalization and recruitment. and our main method for combating these guys is probably adding to the problem rather than helping to solve it. there is an awful lot of places where is the only thing we can be doing. we do not have partners.

we do not have capabilities. we believe that is it. maybe that is true and maybe that is not. to engage in a practice that is worsening the problem for us in a -- on a daily basis is not the way to go. if we are not dealing with a terrorist problem but dealing with an insurgency problem. i would like to stop there. please forgive me again for leaving early after this. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. a few minutes before we come back. we will ask our final speaker, the distinguished research fellow at the institute for national strategic studies.

and retired from the military after 26 years >> thank yoyears. >> thank you. i will offer these opening comments. the comments made there represent the position of my host institution or the department of defense. the product of my own research and individual conclusions. delighted to be here again today. as we near the one-year anniversary of the operation that eliminated bin laden, i am here to contend about diverging with her position but rather than overestimating the death of bin laden, we underestimated and under appreciate the degree to which his death has clarified and made more understanding -- understandable what is not a

global insurgency but it is a radical ideology that has prospered under the leadership of a core and unique organization which tried to bring life to five separate dimensions of that divorce ideology. to try to channel it in a direction that aims -- bin laden is a personality. no less relevant than lenin was, to bring together and fuse that. if we -- much like lenin, there was no other organizer that brought together the fund- raising ability and as we know, i was convinced that he was a strategically irrelevant communicator with various and disparate outfits and i have to confess i had insider knowledge,

i worked in afghanistan. i worked on the problem of iraq and we nail bin laden personally was involved in communications to corral and bring under control is our here -- zawahiri. he was involved and he was there during that period as a consequence and no surprise when you're talking about a global ideology bin laden was relevant. consequently, his death changes or evolves or more to al qaeda in what is. it also leaves extent what i've think mary has referred to and matthew has referred to which is this high desert -- wider issue ideology. which i will contend remains accent and is the issue but like a boulder being rubbled into smaller pebbles, -- when you

take away bin laden, you are left with a different managerial problem and one that needs an altered vocabulary to understand. not that it is any less relevant. rather being -- then being pursued and taken on in the language of a global conflagration or request against the movement, you focus more on bringing down your overseas footprint so you are not metastasizing elements in different places where you do not have to be. you focus more on special forces, in direct operations and working with partner nations, some of whom may not share your proclivities' about democracy but in the long term wants to see banish the same metastasized threat. and that you spend more time on your police cooperation. the elements are less of a threat to do with what mary has referred to correctly as the outside in the approach that

they brought to al qaeda which is this notion we're feeling in trying to overthrow corrupt governments in the 1990's, algeria, and other places. we have come together to throughout this buttressing influence of western nations. this was the spark al qaeda -- of al qaeda that was significant from -- in altering the movement that metastasized in the 1990's. our interest right now is in recognizing this change. backing of the rhetoric of trying to take on every one of these affiliate groups as though they are some kind of inherent threat to put on the mantle of what bin laden or zawahiri represented. or that he has a steering wheel disembodied from this bus

ideology. it is the voices of the islamic world. i have had the privilege of living in saudi arabia and kotter -- qatar. they will find a path for that moves in a more modern without the resort to violence as the only way toward political change which is the underpinning of june autism and which al qaeda moved and bonded together. therefore a very dangerous set of activities that did galvanize our intention -- attention on 9/11. what is it about al qaeda eisa has changed and i have written on this and argued that his death is the 80% solution to the unique and acute problem that al qaeda tried to craft itself on top of this movement brought to the fore. the five elements of al qaeda which, by the way as mary notes,

has been oriented to co-op and bring together these elements that are revolutionary in our and surgeon base inside the muslim world. aspired to be a core organization dedicated to planning, recruiting command training -- recruiting, and training. as mary has said and matthew alluded to as well, for the purpose of getting us out of muslim lands of the can have free rein to topple les corrupt -- toppled the corrupt and autocratic regimes. to serve as a vanguard for organizing and coordinating existent and regionally focused groups. their presence was believed to defile islam and bring it to a level that was unacceptable. this is important. an inspiration to the

disaffected and lone wolf muslims to act out on their frustrations through violence against symbols of perceived oppression against islam. fourth and very important, to serve as a brand name representing the kind of highest level of this ideology in bringing successful violence against the so-called crusader government and officials in which most senior lead -- leaders remained free from serious punishment, penalty, or harm. there was this mystical notion of al qaeda prior to the raid against bin laden, this notion of impunity. that they were immune. they could go and find succor and hide out and the long arm of westernism could not get to them. al qaeda would serve as a base certain for the conquest of us can stand -- of afghanistan and pakistan. this is important because the

mists -- because of the mystical origins of where al qaeda came from and where it built up at the end of the soviet jihad period and where it turned toward these local jihadi activities and the galvanized the framing and bringing together of al-zawahiri with al qaeda and focused on the far end of may 1 to defeat the near and may 2. three of these five elements have been castigated. this notion of a brand name that was free from retribution or had impunity against being captured or attacked, that was brought to its knees. most of us who followed j. hadi website saw that clearly over two or three months. this notion of how could this have happened, followed by this claim and his desire to revenge

and rage. al-zawahiri and others of the core group alamance still feel the wrath of that. there are no longer seen as -- they are no longer seen as immune. any [unintelligible] would be -- produce the same response. he controls a cohort of well- trained and well capable egyptians and to a lesser extent, algerians who are capable of attacks and the should not be taken lightly. this notion of ducouer organization able to plan, recruit, and -- this organization able to plan, and recruit. we can all point to things that have been plotted or planned in

western pakistan and our intelligence has identified that since 2006. we have shown an ability to intercept and work with partners to include the much-maligned and deservedly so but the very janus-faced isi who were plotting mass of attacks in western europe and against us board find -- or to find bits of information. al qaeda as a core organization has no longer the kind of capability nor do i think they can regain it based on who is left alive. a monograph by published lists those who are left out there who have limited capability to reorganize. this notion of base for certain conquests. the relationship between bin laden and mullah omar and the

haqqani group is showing that organization. not that al-zawahiri was in play but they never swore an oath. my read of the situation, having lived in that part of the world and having done work with the assistance of others suggests to me strongly that it is not the ideological linkage to al qaeda that matters most to zero more. but rather than strategic linkage to pakistan and -- notions that the jihad from western pakistan is fermented into an international problem for americans or chinese source -- or others. that is the break right now. it leaves us with half the other two of the five things that are out there. which we do have to worry about a week have to take a different tack and approach and one what i -- i would argue that we're seeing and taking already. reduce the footprint of american

military and western military, or enter around special forces, and direct strike technology and better coordination. that is where i think we're headed in yemen and somalia. it may be slow but where we need to get to. we should expect that al qaeda is trying to coopt. let's be careful about making sure the wheel is connected to the bus. cannot claiming ownership. vague notion of the lone wolf terrace attacker. the u.s. came to grips and i refer you to the most recent counter-terrorism strategy. the phrase resilience comes up a lot. that has to do with the fact that no matter how good we are at counter-terrorism activities, we're never going to do away with the loan will for the inspired individual that shows

up at the recruiting station or with a claim of self professed internet activity, reading a website and going off and doing something negative. they are less catastrophic. it is time that we followed the mantra of resilience and looked at our capabilities and say, we have more than enough ability to hook -- handle these as long as we keep connected with these parts of the world where these folks are likely to be. the prescription is not to over emphasize or hyper-inflated the degree to which al qaeda brings together a dangerous but not globally catastrophically dangerous journey movement and recognize that al qaeda's uniqueness is the attempt to make -- put that together. that made it dangerous. bin laden's death has reduced the danger and our policy needs to reflect that going forward. [applause]

>> thank you very much. in honor of our speakers, i would like to develop some sort of discussion. matt has to leave. are there any questions at this point? would you kindly come to the microphone over there? >> we have scared them spaceless. >> -- speechless. >> if you want to make a statement or ask a question or comment? >> nelson hoenig. what you have said has to do

with the concern over a rise in domestic terrorism and terrorism is perhaps inspired by the of that -- a by the ideas -- inspired by the ideas of al qaeda. what is your feeling about the importance of domestic terrorism? what is the panel's concern? >> on the one hand what i have said might seem to minimize the danger of terrorist attacks but terrorist attacks are one of the major means that al qaeda has used in this war as a whole. it is one of their major tactics they have used. i personally do not believe that anything i said should minimize the threat that we face for potential terrorist attacks.

i would like to say, if zawahiri were smart, he would never carry out another attack on the u.s. again. unless americans are dying, apparently, we do not care. if he were smart, he would never ever attack us again and keep doing what has been going on in the rest of the world as one -- the rest of the world. the garden spots of the world, as one person put it, dismissively. if he made a public declaration, we have given up. that would be one of the smartest thing he -- things he could do strategically. given his aims. i do not believe he will do it. i have a slightly different read on him. 15 years ago, i think that was

right on. i think he had ticked off everybody in his entire organization that he'd started. he had such an abrasive personality, caused by certain events in his life, the fact that he was tortured so horribly and betrayed his best friend to death. i think there is a lot of pent- up anger that kept him from working well, playing well with the other children. on the other hand, he has 15 or 20, nearly 20 to watch bin laden and to learn things and see how the organization works and i am sure he has a deputy who will take over for him. the organization is this tightly knit, hierarchical organization with lots of room for guys getting killed off and replacing them. now that that does not cause problems. a lot of people expected the court to collapse and the world wide thing to collapse after the

death of bin laden and that did not happen. there were 40 days of silence and he was announced as the next head and things went on. on the other hand, i said that i do not think he will be able to give up attacking the u.s. his strategic focus seems to be egypt and exploiting the arab spring. he is also extremely angry at the united states. i think his attack on the u.s. will not be about chasing the u.s. out of our lands or will not be about fund-raising as such. i do not think it has a rational basis at all. it will be pure revenge. it was the u.s. that killed his wife and his kids and i do not think he has ever forgotten that any more than i think he has forgotten he was tortured by the egyptian government and betrayed his best friend.

i do worry about attacks on the u.s. but i do not see them as having the kind of tight strategic games that bin attack -- bin laden's had. i believe it will be, i want revenge and he will do it regardless of is to the benefit of the group or not. >> part of that is irrelevant in that the attacks on the u.s. could come from al qaeda core, it could be driven by al qaeda corp. the courts today has less of a capability to do the spectacular than it once did. they are very capable. people who know the united states who are trying to carry out attacks but the larger thing about the home grown

extremist threat, they will not come from the al qaeda core. operationally what that means is if it's not that we will not have attempts and spent -- on spectacular attacks, what is much more likely and likely to be more frequent is smaller scale attacks by homegrown and extremists or wannabes. some might have ties back as the times or bomber did back to pakistan and others may not. hopefully, most of those will fail. hopefully they will be thwarted. if they are not deported, we did not toward the times square bombing. there were not capable. they could not remember how to make the bomb. it could not go off. even this subway bomb that they had to communicate back one more

time. they could not figure out how to wire it just right. it may not be another tactic to kill thousands but it could kill hundreds or several dozen. if you had a bunch of the succeeding it could be devastating and some -- it could have some devastating economic effects. the shifts of how we understand al qaeda beyond the court. -- the core. your paper was good, thomas. it is the affiliate's and it is very much the fact that this idea has metastasized. -- the affiliates and it is very much the fact that this idea has metastasized. i believe -- with makes it

amenable and open are things that have to do with social cohesion. whether it is being underemployed or unemployed or not knowing if they fit, you have seen examples in the somali-american community. >> there is an implication that mary and matthew have touched on. the feature of the corps in terms of providing this cadre of capable bomb makers and trainers and reversers. matthew's point about the failure to have the bomb go off is indicative of the fact he was a boy scout camp are in -- camper in fatah. these guys were refered to as

nitwits. 77 northrence between and south. there is something to a core, taking something that could be, cool, mild lead tragic into huge lead tragic that we have to be -- mildly tragic into hugely tragic. and how you find someone who is disgruntled. this seems to me where most groups want to go, a mumbai-

style attack. that does not mean complacency but those kinds of attacks, those are the ones we should fear because they require less of a high-tech, high-ability mindset. >> not xm free only to that, more in terms of the long term. if i may say about bin laden, every single person has wanted since the death of has wanted [unintelligible] that this is a

global insurgency. because that is a list of desideratum. you have to realize history is important. we ignore history and our own peril including recent history. the other thing that is important, we do not want to see some contradictions. these have relationships with a country that has played us like a fiddle for 35 years. that is pakistan. we do not want to see the facts for our variety of reasons. we basically made ourselves [unintelligible] because of our afghan policy. you -- pakistan will do anything

you want it to do. the other thing of achilles heel we do not want to understand in saudi arabia. this is another word for wahabism. it has started since the 1960's. i just give you this thing that is published that the lawyers find -- and this has been [unintelligible] and they look for terrorist groups in latin america that does not exist. this is something we have to say, we're failing the american people if we do not realize some of this. it is a pipe dream. the muslim community -- it is

dangerous right now and i would go to that and it is getting more and more dangerous is the intensification of sectarian and regional countries. we're making even a country -- who will pay a heavy price for its ambition. instead of zero problems, and has more problems than just about anybody. all those things i agree 100% and i am no expert. we have to follow the somali disenchanted, the pakistani. we have to be a little bit honest with ourselves. how we have been shooting ourselves in the foot. we keep saying [unintelligible] do not has -- do not have a relationship. whoever believes that believes in the tooth fairy, i am sorry. i was invited for that.

that is the only thing i can contribute. >> just one point of clarification. you're right. everyone wants to create the [unintelligible] >> except me. >> they want to create the [unintelligible] here is a great example. the attempted to carry out military coups. they failed miserably and were not able to do anything. when i look at al qaeda, they have not just an aspiration. they're talking about world conquest. the issue for me, where are they at in a -- achieving their objectives? what i see is the first objective of overthrowing these

rulers seems to have happened through other means but there is places like egypt where mubarak is no longer in charge. they wanted to set up sharia they failed. they succeeded in northern pakistan or other places in imposing sharia. they declared multiple emirates. i believe the correct manna patrick forrester measuring whether they are correct metric in measuring whether they are successful -- are they controlling people's leader? are people in this country is forced to wear the clothing,

forced to wear the beard, forced to give up kiteflying and all the other things? the kind of state is similar to what date -- the al qaeda created in afghanistan. intimidation, and murder. in anbar province we saw that on the ground and we got to see that for ourselves. nobody wanted these guys except for some people who had some revenge fantasies. the important thing is that there is what people want and what is imposed on them. everywhere these guys have this where they have managed to impose their vision and where al qaeda claims to control these people, only with the help of outside actors have we been able to get rid of them once they set up their so-called and rep. the people of chechnya were

incapable of kicking of these guys. you have to have -- had to have an outside after. the people of afghanistan were incapable of getting rid of the al qaeda even though they hated their beds. you had to have outside actors. al qaeda actors were the only ones who could do something. does that mean that the u.s. has to be involved? that is not the obvious policy implication of what i am saying. iraq should have told us that our presence there created more problems than it helped. our presence may have created more problems than a help to solve. i am not making an argument for some sort of loose on the ground, u.s. must be physically involved in these places. >> there is another thing that we will forget at our peril. that is throughout the 1980's

and 1990's, we saw salafi islam as an antidote. bey're not going to revolutionary. we thought there were praying and wearing beards and so on. they have metastasized into this thing. this was linked to regional rivalries. we have to look at the country. it cannot start -- [unintelligible] you have to have a dialectic approach. in afghanistan, people turn to al qaeda as a result of a long civil war. the countries do not return to normal after 30 years of war immediately and become nice democrats answered during this

period the same thing in the way that the [unintelligible] has gained influence in the agent. these other ones that people went to [unintelligible] we have to look at the root of it, at the source. this is the source, unfortunately. anywhere that state power disintegrates, you're going to have all kinds of military ism militarism. -- militarism. now there is a major concern, the [unintelligible] >> one thing to the point of your question. when a tactic is successful, it will be emulated. we have a lot of crazies in our country to know how to make a bomb. it will happen more and more.

with no influence from anybody but the outside but it works, unfortunately. ok, next question. identify yourself. >> i take a cue from my question for the good general. and it has expanded by a good deal that was set by the other people. i am wondering what evidence, what primary source material exists for any change in a game plan, as you pointed out, may well be the case. it is in war. any change in game plan by al qaeda, whether it is a game plan -- its game plan as a terrorist group or whether it is -- it might be a game plan for something beyond just being a terrorist group. do we have any evidence, other than conjecture, for any kind of change in game plan?

>> let me offer -- i am sorry that mary left and matthew will be able to add to this as well. we do. we have evidence that al qaeda is a thinking and promulgating organization. it thinks and promulgates through a couple of primary media. one is its base website. it also has a newspaper that promulgates messages and information. we get the tone and the tenor from al-zawahiri or those were listed as the -- these are the heads of internal or external operations for the different functionaries. for many years you had one or more of the libyans promulgating

basic doctrine. two are both deceased. someone else steps in. we have seen the change. we have seen the want to reach out and aspire to what i call coopt, others call franchise. i would argue to you that is important both ways. for the local level groups, it is important for the same way the comintern was important for people like the revolutionaries in vietnam or other parts of the world because it was a signal for fund-raising. a signal to these places that tends to give the charities and the charities are unregulated or

over focused on liberating or -- and those charities tend to find their way to these groups. that is an important part of signaling and affiliation. the group announces and speculates. al-masri or azar urey, how they want to manage the message about a gender palestine or now, about syria. al-zawahiri said syria is the place for the move to gain -- ujadeen to collect. they -- now, zawahiri is asking for more to exploit the sectarian violence in syria.

that is important. that does play into another broadening fame in the wider middle east which is this shia- sunni split. the belief that this decade has advantaged tehran. this is the interesting tactical shift. tactics do not vocalise strategy. to the extent al qaeda manages if it is not an aspiration, only violence can bring change, you have not got al qaeda. it is something analogous to trade unionists or social democrats. that takes time. 100 or 150 years.

if we get to the point where all the heads of the residual core want to talk about how they have influenced the parliament in agent or syria, that battle is just about one. -- won. the voices of the people, [unintelligible] they can't do without the oxygen of violence. that is where they lost footing as people have had alternatives in the greater the middle east. >> i think you touched on it a couple of times. for a game changing watch, watch the money. it is about money. it was -- it is what will drive them and give them capability. recently, i can say this in a

general sense. we have realized that and matt with his background in the treasury could speak to this better. we have started to employ those tools to go after some things, and when you take their legs out and add accord, at religious beliefs are important but if you do not have the capability to do it, you will fall flat on your face. the sooner we can go down that line and employ inkster's of capitalism in this fight, of the better off we will be. >> if i may respond, i offer you the opportunity to look at this book just published and precisely because of your question, we provide electronic communication persuasion. as you know, the general can defeat an army but the general

cannot deceive the minds of the peasants and this is what we have to deal with, continuity and change. general, would you like to ask a question or make a comment? >> this has all been very interesting and most and lightning -- enlightening. it is always good to hear what academia and other experts from several disciplines have to say about this topic. i was wondering, though, as i listened to all this, what we do now? it seems to me that one thing that was not discussed at all is, how do we get the media on

board with our intent? one way would be to come up with an intent. what do we intend to do in the next five, 10, 15, 20 years. the long view with respect to how to wait and of with a better world for everybody and not just focused on the united states or on western ideas and all that kind of thing. how do we set out to try to improve the world as we know it for everybody? that ought to be the kind of goal that our country could help take the lead in in the future. 20 or 30 years from now, as i say. it is interesting, for example, that we do not learn a lot from history. one of the things that history teaches us is that freedom is

not necessarily a universal value and all that kind of thing. many people in the world are more interested in security than they are freedom. that is why in some cases, many cases, they gravitate toward the totalitarian type of government. they can provide in some ways better security. we need to look at that and look at our history and see what can be done to make the world better. i think in terms of terrorism, terms like a global war on terrorism and all that, that is not correct. terrorism is a tactic. it is a tactic tactically and strategically. it always has been and there are examples, as you know. not just in the last century. terrorism and tactics and that kind of thing go back. you can find them in the koran,

and the torah, and it can certainly find them in the bible. it is -- that is what we are dealing with our tactics. the idea that we need to prevent catastrophic types of tactics from hurting any nation, whether it is our nation or any other free world as we know it today. that ought to be one of our prairie goals and one of our prairie objectives here. -- primary objectives here. we forget the asymmetrical value of terrorist tactics. those are the kinds of things that present real danger to us. i also hope that we do not get overconfident here based on what we have heard here today. that we should never underestimate the enemy or the other people or anything like

that that bridge disaster in the long haul. we want to be very careful. the terrace attack that date tactics and the attack that occurred on the 23rd of october in 1983 against the marine headquarters in beirut and the french headquarters and the israeli headquarters. not many people really realize that within a few minutes, the terrorists took out three major headquarters of three different countries who were there trying to bring peace and stability in lebanon and the like. that attack was conceived in iran and it was funded with money and material through damascus and through the western front in beirut. and carried out by the hezbollah.

nobody has mentioned has bullet today. they were a very violent group and still are. we should have probably gone in to them in 1983 and gone to the valley and deposit it there. that is a different topic. it was a carefully coordinated attack. one of the things i think we over-dramatize is we made a hero out of bin laden. we aided and abetted everything he was trying to do by making him a hero. and by giving him broad play in the media and elsewhere and the like and also setting him up as someone who could not be taken down and all that kind of thing. why do we step back and think about these things a little bit. i agree that we could do a lot

more are operating out of this country and other countries around the world. we do not have to be in these particular countries and regions to be very effective and not just with special operations type of capability but there are whole host of types of capability, not political, economic, and technology that we could bring to bear when we want to do it on our time schedule. we should drive the whole thing. the free world. not bin laden or some other terrorist core activity. i have already said to my chair. but i think i agree. we ought to come out with a different kind of strategy for the long haul, look ahead, and then work backward like you would in the campaign command. you work backwards by phases in terms of what money you can afford to put to this strategy

and all the kind of thing. we have got to and somehow we have got to harmonize not just the academic and research and thought -- research thought and military thought. i do not know how you pull in that crowd across the river. i will leave it up to you academic types. we need to pull together and this is above politics and all that kind of thing and do what is best for the free world as we know it today. thank you. [applause] >> i would have let you go first. >> i think he did. >> for those who do not know me, i am don kerr, i have been associated with a number of organizations over the years. one of the things that came up here is the most important, the need to pay greater attention to

pakistan and be realistic about what it is. some of you will recall that when we got to exploit some of the sides in afghanistan, what we found is the evidence at tarnac farms and long term interests al qaeda have. other kinds of weapons and other kinds of technology. not only that, people that supported that effort were mostly retirees from the pakistani nuclear program. if the retirees felt it was important to support al qaeda, one might ask whether people currently in the program share those views in some manner. it is something that we need to prove out. we also need to understand that when we leave afghanistan, it once again becomes part of pakistan's defense in depth against what they consider their

real enemy, india. it has killed a bit as a consequence of the mumbai attack. they talk once in awhile now. in fact, we are a pawn in the game they have been playing in terms of two nuclear-armed neighbors and what each might be able to get from the united states, depending on what our interests are in the region. i think pakistan is the lurking double in the background here. it is the place where more technology would be available to al qaeda and those who would emulate them. it is very poorly controlled. it is as close to being a failed state while still remaining estate -- eigha state we must dl with. i will leave you with that. [applause] >> here is the mic.

>> can you hear me? i am sort of overwhelmed by how much i have heard. i am a civilian, and i respect generals. al title of this is "a qaeda, quo vadis," and this is a challenge to us. he used the term grand strategy as did shareen hunter. this is not the cold war. the desire for the caliphate -- they had one in the 20's. we have to get away from cold

war thinking. there is so much knowledge, i was overwhelmed by my neighbors, how much they know and shareen hunter said we do not know enough. the brits talk about a great game. is it a great game or is it a lot of little games? we did a great program on nigeria. it was interesting to listen. you have the local terrorists and there is some of al qaeda. there will be blown actors there as well. how can we aggregate all these phenomena, and relate it to a national brand strategy? as much as we heard today, god knows we heard a lot. most of us learned about the subject we have learned before. we do not know how to get our calpers around this subject and

it is a real challenge. -- our calipers around the subject and it is a real challenge. >> [unintelligible] regionalist but i have been doing this a lot and i have the advantage of being from the region myself. i can kind of understand some of the things. one of the things we have not come to terms with is the collapse of the soviet union has changed the world. in the old days, when you had an absolutely dominant paradigm, you could have even during the cold war, i remember one of the books i read as a graduate student in england. it was called "nations in alliance." the great powers generally what

alliances to achieve their broad game -- gain. the local states what alliances to help them in their local little games. this is a symmetry that exists between that great power and the local powers, has become much more pronounced and strengthened. [unintelligible] the soviet union. i am sorry to say that the policy community, i am sure they know it in their private deliberations but we do not seem to understand quite well that our interests and pakistan's interest in afghanistan are not the same. i wrote an article in 1989 saying that. the title in lexus-nexus -- [unintelligible] the same thing is the interests

in afghanistan is not the same as saudi arabia. even in iran. and yet we pursuit in afghanistan after our victory. in iraq, the strategy is -- it is with pashtun. pashtun equals [unintelligible] i am sorry to say. we basically helped the insurgency and this is a history of that. this is one of the major things we have to keep in mind. the system of international relations has grown asymmetrically. the other thing is i am going to say this is the last time i will say, i have an opportunity -- on policy towards iran has distorted our entire policy in the middle east. you cannot go around --

[unintelligible] a major rationale was to contain iran. it is a crummy little country with rickety stuff that has been your mouth. if we want to mention -- manage this region, we have to have a holistic approach [applause] -- approach. [applause] >> i might say the legacy -- if al qaeda is dead or dying, hopefully it will fade away. in the light of who we are and what we do, we are a science and technology think tank where we look at the impact or science

and technology on our society. the impact in regard to terrorism, i would like to sum up as a final word at today's conference. terrorism as many have said here, terrorism has been around since the beginning of mankind. the ability of a few to terror as many by killing them publicly has been a tactic used by many people. the difference today, and if i might comment that this is, to me, the legacy of al qaeda, is the demonstration that a small group cannot just terrorized by killing a few but by using technology, killed thousands. that was the difference of 9/11. it was not a terror acts when people set off an ied and three people were killed or 330 were killed. a small group used modern a small group used modern technology to kill 3000