and prevent fraud. that is later today at 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. eastern here on speech then -- here on c- span. this weekend, the united kingdom and celebrates the anniversary of queen elizabeth. tonight, to conceal her address to parliament as part of her a diamond jubilee commencement. it included speeches by the house of lords and house of commons. join us this evening at 9:00 eastern here on c-span. >> sunday, -- >> i think the problem is people see him as the friendly man, which she was, but there is another side of him that wanted to be the best. he was obsessed with ratings. he was probably the fiercest competitor i have ever written

about. i have written about generals and presidents and his desire to be the best was very pronounced. >> the new biography of longtime cbs news anchor walter cronkite tonight at 8:00 eastern. >> osama bin laden was no longer in control of cockeyed in 2010. -- al qaeda in 2010. the author of the report analyzed the past and future of al qaeda at the new american foundation. this is about an hour-and-a- half.

when you get a chance to talk to her about al qaeda or politics and the middle east, you never walk away with the feeling you have not learned something. i hope we have that experience today. it is a pleasure for me to host somebody from the terrorism center at west point, i still have an affiliation as a fellow there. it is a unique institution. their mission is educating cadets and they have taken on in this role doing cutting edge research on terrorism in general. i think that there is misconceptions about what the center is. i remember when i was up there, people would be looking for a

tour of something thinking there would be a command center with flat screen tvs and flashing information, and what you find are a group of smart dedicated researchers that to spend their days trying to understand problems through hard work. i think she is a great representative of that organization and what it tries to achieve. it is nice to have her here today. she also teaches in the department of social sciences and she is also, i will point this out, the author of a book which i liked so much that i assigned it to my class i taught at columbia and i were to encourage you to take a look at it. i'm going to turn this over to

nelly and then we will have a q&a. i hope you will engage in that. the one rule is please stand up, state your name, explain your affiliation, and then ask a great question. nelly, please. >> many thanks for all of you who are interested and came here today, and to the new american foundation on behalf of the authors of this report. i would like to note that the findings represent the analysis of its authors. they do not represent west point or the department of defense. responses during the q&a are my own views. i'm going to start my

presentation with an important qualification followed by a sound bite about the most compelling story and give an overview of some of the main findings of the report. in the overview, i will focus on al qaeda under the leadership of a bin laden and on his relationship with iran and pakistan. i would be happy to go into more details about other aspects. the important qualification has to do with the fact the report is a study of all the 17 documents captured from his compound. they consist of electronic letters totaling 175 pages. in view of the same volume, it would be irresponsible to claim they reveal conclusive information about al qaeda.

the documents are highly valuable and at the very least to the demand a reassessment of what has been dubbed as al qaeda central. this brings me to the sound bite, witches, bin laden's frustration with regional groups and his inability to exercise control over their actions is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 documents. why is this compelling? because it has been assumed al qaeda was able to rebuild following the losses it suffered in the aftermath of the military campaign in afghanistan in 2001 and it has also been able to access the organization. the intelligence community labeled this as a al qaeda central based on the leaders who

were set to report to bin laden and indicate there was a sin biotic relationship between this central and regional groups. they have been dubbed as the phillies. according to this argument, al qaeda central gives guidance and it is assumed that the affiliate's are in compliance with al qaeda central. all of the documents show that the framing of the organization reflects a conceptual construction by outsiders rather than the reality of insiders. some of the affiliate's fought -- sought his blessing when it came to declaring an islamic state and wanted a formal union to acquire the al qaeda brand. the tone that makes it clear that he was struggling to

exercise even a minimal influence over them. he is burdened by their mistakes and he disapproves of their operations, especially those that resulted in the unnecessary deaths of muslim civilians. their mistakes distorted the image, separating them from their popular basis. the documents do not show bin laden to be in charge of the landscape but in 2010, he is seeking to find ways to centralize and oversees the affairs of regional groups so there was something called al qaeda central which was as news to bin laden. i am not joking. in his blueprint for centralization, it is inspired by what you read about cockeyed a central. "the expression is a technical term used in the media to

distinguish between al qaeda in afghanistan and al qaeda in the rest of the region. i do not object to using it to clarify the objective of the endeavor." as to those that have been called the affiliate's, they have not just been a problem in terms of harming its image, but they have also caused debate among the internal leadership. three positions can be determined. those who represent senior leaders to declare and disassociate themselves from those who do not consult with al qaeda. >> there are others represented by an anonymous author believing that the inclusion of regional groups contributes to its expansion bin laden seems to ever presented a third position.

he wanted restraint and provide advice even as it fell on deaf ears. the groups for which there is enough content to gain some kind of understanding of al qaeda's relationship are iraq, the arabian peninsula, and the taliban, and how should bob -- al shibab. it's an admission by bin laden proves to be a liability, not an asset. an anonymous author describes the leaders to be extremists and their speeches to be repulsive. some what revealing is his concern with aqap and yet he

comes across as critical in particular, its attacks in yemen, its lack of action to win support, and the ill advised public statements of its leaders. he was anxious that it was attempting to accomplish more action than it was capable of sustaining. it appears its leader had sent a letter in which he wrote if he ever wanted, it today is the day. they were ready to declare an islamic state and was possibly seeking the blessing from bin laden for his takeover plan. it also seems that he had requested a senior leader be dispatched to help in the operational work. that is not what he had in mind. before responding, bin laden had written about yemen and told him that such an islamic state is it

prematurely declared. and that it is likely to lead to avoiding the work of jihad. in countries where, that are occupied like iraq and afghanistan. the letter is unambiguous and condescending in its tone. on the question of declaring its stage, "of course we want an islamic state in which we would establish scots law but only if we are capable of holding onto it. " the author reminded him that if they were unable to hold onto afghanistan, the chances of jihadis holding onto yemen are

even slimmer. as for a senior leader to assist in the operation, this was denied citing security reasons, even though bin laden was planning to dispatch somebody to the region. the fact thataqap continues to amount attacks suggest that the leader either did now receive the letter or if he did it displeased him and he decided to ignore it. my personal favorite is the pakistan taliban. in which they mentioned the group was not a flattering. he was appalled by his conduct in his trial which bin laden was following in the news. i beg your indulgence because this is a quotation i'm going to relate to you. this is a letter from bin laden.

"you have followed his media trial, may god release him. in view of having taken an oath not to harm the united states when he was awarded american citizenship, he responded he lied when he took the oath. it amounts to the trial and does not fall under permissible line in times of war. please request that our brothers redress this matter." and he appeared in a photograph alongside the commander. i would like to verify that when he knew the personal card reader -- acquires american citizenship this requires an oath sorry not to harm america. he should be informed of it. we must act to remove the suspicion that we engage in the trial." the times square had no hand in

pakistan. it is clear that the indiscriminate attacks against muslims were of major concern to al qaeda. this led them to write a letter addressed to their respective brothers, the leader. they stated that the satisfaction with the ideology, methods, and behavior that unless we see clear steps toward reforming and associating yourself from these mistakes, we shall be forced to take steps. somebody did not do that well, either. bin laden was concerned about their neglect to build a viable economy and its approach to islamic law. it seems that the leader had

sent a letter to bin laden in which requested on the question of declaring an islamic state or informed him he was about to declare one. his letter has echoes of it is not you, it is me, sort of excuse. on the question of formal unity, they declined. first, he indicated it would give the enemy the excuse to mobilize its forces against somalia. the second reason is the extreme poverty in somalia and he wanted to promote economic development there. he told him, i am determined to urge merchants in one of my public statements to invest in an important development. the absence of public

affiliation would strengthen the position of merchants who desire to help their muslim brothers. on the question of declaring a state, bin laden advised against it but it said if you believe it is necessary, you can declare it. what is intriguing about them is that though bin laden denied them public union, he granted their wishes after his death in february this year. this says something about tension among senior al qaeda leaders. in light of the documents, one has to reassess what it is today and his relationship with regional jihadi groups. next i'm going to talk about iran and pakistan. relations to have -- seems to have been antagonistic.

there is evidence of a covert campaign against iran. this battle appears to have been an attempt to influence the indirect negotiations over the release of their families, including members of his family. the documents provide insight on al qaeda in iran and also not from iran's side. this is after they released a group of brothers in several batches, including legacy al qaeda members who go back to the 1990's. based on a letter, the iranians were not releasing prisoners to forge a bond with al qaeda. the iranians did not appear to have made direct contact with al qaeda, at least not in the initial stage.

"the criminalist did not send us any letter. they do not wish to appear to be negotiating with us as if to suggest that their actions are pure be one-sided and based on their own initiative." the documents are clear about where it stands with its relationship with iran but we do not know, we do not have anything on iran's perspective on the matter and why they detained their families without due process. unlike the explicit references to the iranian regime, the documents do not have that many references about pakistan. although there are a notes about trusted brothers, there are no explicit references to any institutional support. another reference was highlighted that bin laden did not appear to enjoy freedom of

movement with his family. in his long list of security measures, he wrote that it is most important not to allow children to leave the house except in emergency situations. nine years, he proudly told people that he and his family, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who keep their voices down. bin laden could run but he could not hide. he seems to have done very little running and quite a lot of hiding. to conclude, in comparison to regional groups, he comes across as an outmoded jihadi. in contrast to their attacks, he was more interested in carefully planned methods. the eagerness to declare islamic

states in the region was moderated by bin laden's patients to secure public support and while they aim to win the short-term battles, and his eyes were on the larger prize. he wanted to defeat the united states and i do what -- its support for the corrupt muslim regimes and liberate his fellow muslims. bin laden knew how to articulate the grievances he believed moslems suffered at the hands of their regimes in western countries but his private letters show that saving his fellow muslims from the attacks of his brothers were on his mind. thank you. [applause] >> can you hear me? i am going to ask a couple of

questions. i had some written down and i kept writing more down as you were talking. let me ask you about this notion that bin laden was not in control. some of the conversations in washington after the letters were released emphasize something different, that he was, in fact, in communication with elements of the al qaeda empire around the world. there was the assumption that that kind of a communication did not occur. how do we understand his ability to communicate and place it in the appropriate context in reference to his ability to control events in the first place? he was in contact. >> there was a difference

between communicating and being in control. the documents are clearly showing that he is in control. it is important to note that bin laden appears to have documents in late 2010. we do not see him before then. in 2010, we do not see him to be in control. the documents showed that he is communicating with them but in many instances, he is very concerned about their own ideology and their own public statements. being in communications is completely different from being in control. he was in charge of the jihadi world, we would have seen

different kinds of operations. that is not the world he was in charge of. >> what would we have seen? larger attacks that united states? >> select maybe -- let me be, on one level, he leaves letters, calling on the regional groups to focus their attacks on the united states. at the same time, he does not trust them. there is something intriguing about one of his letters that he wrote, which is the most reflective one. he proposes to centralize jihadi activity. this is when he discovers al qaeda central in the media good idea.t is a

he wants to centralizes the first. -- centralized at first. -- efforts. he would like to create a special force based on the letter, a carefully written and strategically written letter about how we need to believe the regional groups so that we would ask ourselves. my own interpretation is that i do not think bin laden would have wanted to trust them but he wanted to them to be there for the show. whether he had the capability to create this force or not it is difficult to say. having said that, this is where, if i were in yemen, it would

have surprised me receiving this letter from bin laden because some of his statements prior to that, he would call on muslims to rebel against their leaders. all a sudden, he is saying do not act. there is a change in his mode of thinking between his public statements and starting from 2010. it is possible he thought they cannot be trusted and they're not going to be able to mount the quality of operations he would like. in his letter in somalia, he is very clear. mount you couldn't really a quality attack, do not attend something. he is more interested in quality than quantity.

he seems to be somebody who is very patient and prepared to wait until the right moment. about laden's concern killing muslims was not that much of a surprise. we have seen concern from senior leaders in al qaeda going back to 2005 with letters to folks in iraq. another declassified documents, also in reference to iraq. this is a major theme of your book. this notion that built into the ideology is this spinning out of control where individuals will take up their own initiatives and do things that are not in the strategic interest of the

enterprise. that has to feel good. you got one right. when you look at these documents, 17 documents out of more than 6000 that were captured, what did you expect? what was confirmed in these documents and what surprised you, where you did not think they would be thinking about x, y, or z? >> i had been working on an autobiography about a leading operative. it has been my education and when we received the documents, my report on it had been completed and it was reviewed

by external leaders. i had to put it aside and i think it is more insightful than the 17 documents. they did not surprise me because i had heard them before. the report will be published hopefully next week. i was familiar with these dynamics from an insider's perspective about the fact that these indiscriminate attacks are not really their mode of thinking. there is also concerned about other civilians, al qaeda sees itself as targeting military, economic, and political targets. it does not see itself targeting civilians. that is why i think we need to

be looking, especially after these documents have been released, where al qaeda stands. what does it mean in terms of groups? that did not surprise me but i am somebody who had the privilege to be reading another person's work. i will tell you what surprised me. i had thought that bin laden, through a number of sources, he was actually a decent cockeyed a leader. i can see why. i thought it was exaggerated in terms of the people who followed him. i was expecting to see somebody with an eog. -- ego. >> that stands in contrast with the video of him.

>> this was selective. of course he is on the news. and watching himself, it is selective. who does not say here is what you need to do. he offers a suggestion. he asks for people's consideration and to get back to him, in fact, one of the three items he wants to be part of the oath is for people to believe in

his persona. i have read other primary sources and the oath does not require an oath to bin laden. it requires a commitment to carry aout their work. there is the oath for it to carry out the work and the third one, the duty to give advice to other senior leaders. there is no arrogance. i did not see it in those letters. in addition to that, he is highly concerned about the safety of his men. those who die, he inquires about their families.

that is why people respected him. >> that is an obvious question, which is now that he is gone we have a person with many of these qualities that are not usually ascribed to him. he is somebody who had throughout his career got in fights with allies and as somebody that is not considered as charismatic and yet he is somebody that the affiliate organization have recognized as the new leader. rather than think about -- what

are the strategic differences? particularly with affiliate groups and being welcomed when bin laden did not want to bring them into the fold? >> just as a qualifier, i do not know enough from primary sources as to how members of the jihad group look at him. he does not seem to be popular. i cannot say whether he is arrogant or not. to his credit, bin laden sacrificed his fortunes. he w