of different cooperation agreements the one we negotiated with the united arab emirates as the gold standard. we in the united states obviously prefer a model that does not involve the whole fuel cycle, does not stress the number of countries that have the full infrastructure for uranium enrichment. i gather from what you have said you would be in favor of encouraging countries like jordan, like turkey to use iran as a model for nuclear development? >> no. >> no? >> should i explain? >> yes. >> i think the enrichment today's just because of the u.s.. but after the revolution with iran decided engage in nuclear activities, the u.s. position was no nuclear power plant for iran.

the u.s. was not ready to recognize the rights of iran for power plants. this was the reason they could not do anything in order to complete the unfinished projects. the western countries left iran with billions of dollars of unfinished projects, and they were not ready -- iran had no plan, no program for in richmond, and the revolutionaries decided even to decrease to a minimum the ambitious projects. they canceled many projects. but when the rest challenge iran with the rights, even for nuclear power plants, you left no other option for iranians. then, after iran mastered the in richmond, then the u.s. said,

"ok, now, we recognize the rights of iran four nuclear power plants. after iran mastered nuclear enrichment. this was the best way in order to convince the u.s. that you should respect the rights of members for at least civilian power plants. then, again, the u.s. position was 0 in richmond. when iran mastered 10,000 -- rested fusion, the u.s. and europeans are thinking, not 20%. maybe 3.5%. the mistake is from the beginning, that iran was never going to have in richmond from the beginning. you just push iran to this situation. if at the beginning of revolution -- if you had determined they had completed the power plant, iran had even know program to have the second power plant.

it was the u.s. proposed to read to have 23 power plants before revolution. after after 30 years where iran has paid hundreds of millions of cost because of your pressures, now you are expecting iran to give up everything. it does not work. it is very different with the united emirates. you cannot compare iran with the united emirates. >> thank you. we both take questions from the floor. week for the microphone. give your name, be brief. >> i have a question about the european union and 2005. i am also an adviser to others.

we've talked a lot about the issue of the security council resolution. with the presentation make, there are two different interpretations. there is a central interpretation shared by almost everybody. when you have a right to a rich, every country has a right to enrich. but at the same time, you have to have the dues for that. it can be used for military use or building a nuclear submarine. at least it is not building a nuclear weapon. the question is very simple.

we have to know it is expected to be used for one very small thing. if there is a solution, we have to have civilian use of the program known. do you see the possibility of having the views on the program. if not, can you reduce the size of the program? this is an absolute presumption before it is used for. thank you. >> ambassador, do you want to feel that? >> is an interesting and important question. it lies at the heart of the disagreements. there are disagreements about the interpretations.

anything that looks military goes beyond the civilian looks suspect. my own feeling is in the course of the negotiation, at some point we're going to have to define the question. otherwise, we continue to propagate misunderstanding or differences and difficulties. that is very important. doing that early rather than later is significant. one reason i proposed u.s.- iranian bilaterals is that question and others would be explored properly. it would begin to give a sense of confidence for people who have had less contact with iran. i think that along with the questions of different interpretation make a lot of sense. it is very important for us to continue to think about how to plug the loopholes.

one is interpretation. one is the definition of what is civilian. is everything not civilian excluded? is everything allowed unless it is a diversion? these are broad questions. they have to be put into shape. we need to think about the in state -- end state. i would say there is no probable reason -- palpable reason for the use of plutonium in any fuel proposition unless it can be conclusively demonstrated their is an economic imperative. if there is, i would then ask for enrichment to be totally multilateralized and be done on the basis where there is competition and absolute transparency. there would be the greatest safeguards against decision rather than forcing people to go

independently on the one hand or alternatively failing to persuade people there is a reliable international system with competition that cannot be used as a way to bring political pressure on countries for questions that go beyond proliferation. my hope is it would support non- proliferation in an important way. that is my hobby horse and i am sticking to it. >> i agree with the ambassador. we have to define the question and reach a situation where the civilian and military uses are defined as clearly as possible. i want to make the point that there is a third dimension between civilian and military. that is the prestige dynamic. we are seeing all over the world that nuclear technology carries prestige which has nothing to do

with military uses or civilian uses. it provides the country with self-esteem about being on the level of other countries. this was the case in china when it acquired nuclear weapons. it is to some extent the case in iran today. the question is recognizing this gusty -- this prestige question is very important. otherwise we will see the proliferation of nuclear technology. we will see technology is the same. countries want to acquire the stolid. iranians need at least one thing to remain on the nuclear technology program. >> i think after revolution,

france declined contract. -- decline the contract iran had already with france on enrichment. if you have not declined, the enrichment was to be done in your land and not iran. the second issue is that the problem is the nuclear bomb. the iranian side would except all measures and commitments to venture the international community that iran would forever remain in non-nuclear weapons state. this is not an issue for iran. on transparency measures, openness, up to the end, they would be 100% on them if the rights are respected. ultimately, the sanctions should

be lifted. you remember in 2003 and 2004, the european e.u. 3 or asking for objections to non-diversion. we asked them to define the objective guarantees. we wanted to know what they want ted. then you have the meeting with president in 2005. the agreement was they would leave it to the iada to define it. when we arrived in germany, we were told it was discussed with washington and washington had rejected it. either they're not ready to leave it to the iaea to define the objectives for non- diversion.

in spring of 2005, i have detailed in my book, when i met with the e.u. it was before a presidential election. i told them i would agree for iran to have a pilot and export production. then we would negotiate for a longer period in order to reach some kind of compromise and leave it to the europeans to define the objective guarantees. this proposal, when we ready to have one private, this was rejected again by the e.u. iran was not very much eager to accelerate the program. at that time, the proposal was

confirmed by the leaders. the europeans were not ready to cooperate with iran. >> the next brief question. >> thank you. i have a question for ambassador mousavian. new reports out this morning say there will be another round of discussions between iaea and iran regarding the framework concept for dealing with the possible military activities iran is suspected of being involved in in the past. my question is, what do you see as being possible in these discussions which come a week before the board of governors meeting? what needs to be done to move forward to resolve these questions?

if that could be achieved, how would that affect the dynamics of the p5 +1 discussions in moscow. >> maybe i could take a shot. it is an important issue. before 2003, there are continuing disputes. the intelligence community is basically continuing to reassure us the judgments in 2007 remain, the intelligence community. the pmd question is of most salient importance to provide the iaea with the fullest possible information to guard against problems in the future. i would be willing to adopt what i would call the south african model, a no-fault process. tell the whole truth and there

are no consequences. if you do not tell the truth, there are all conceivable consequences. in part, it is a test of good faith. in part, it is a way to determine the answer. in part, is to take the burden off of the guilt trip off of the back of iran, which in my view is not necessary if we are proceeding in a regional basis for the future. this may be naive, but i sense the notion we're going to spend all our time worrying about the past when the big problem is in the future. that is not a useful enterprise. what the south africans did with respect to their own terrible record on apartheid and how they handled the difficult problems of the future was not perfect, but those who did not tell the truth suffer the consequences. those who did tell the truth emerged and had a record. there was closure.

we need closure. we need to have the iaea as widely informed as it can be to design for the future. i just heard you say hossein and i do not represent governments. if we did, this could be sold tomorrow. -- this could be solved tomorrow. i think clearing up possible military developments is important. do i think it's it's standaway future progress crocks to mark -- do i think it should stand in the way of future progress? probably not. what is skewed in this is iran in good faith. iran needs an opportunity under conditions that are not punitive to demonstrate it is prepared to appreciate -- to

approach the negotiations in good faith. now is not the time to explore other things. >> iaea have two technical questions. one relates to after 2003. 90% of technical ambiguities are removed. 2% are left. these have been already discussed in the previous visit to tehran. tehran agreed to give the required access to cooperate to remove the remaining issues. a possible military dimension relates to the 1980's and 1990's, not to the current program.

it needs iran to implement additional protocols and give access to the iaea beyond the additional protocol. this has been agreed upon in tehran. in a previous visit, 95% of the issues on how to cooperate by giving access and inspections was resolved and agree. 5% or 10% are left. i am sure iran will agree this is not an issue. let's say if iran agrees to give all access, inspections, corporations with iaea would moscow be ready to respect the rights of iran or not? >> we have a few minutes. let's take a few questions and give the speaker is a chance to

respond. -- give the speaker's a chance to respond. " from the atlantic council. >> i am from the atlantic council. >> we understand iran has been working to clean the site. when we talk about establishing trust, this is not something that engenders trust among the p5 +1. it seems you are saying iran will trade for something with moscow. we have a disconnect. p5 is saying they want action on 20% in return for some action by moscow. do you see there is any possibility perhaps your proposal or something like it could be agreed to on the 20%? are they just going to go around in circles on the right to an rich? -- on the right to enrich?

>> i want to follow-up and ask if a slightly different way. the meeting in tehran before baghdad raised great expectations that did not materialize. the upcoming meeting will raise great expectations that did not materialize. is it possible these two streams with iaea wanting answers and the diplomatic stream are interfering with each other? should we concentrate on one or the other or another? should we put aside the other stream for the time being? >> the relationship between the two? >> it has already been visited

two times. it has already been visited two times. the iaea have enough technology instruments that even if some buildings are destroyed, in case there has been some enrichment activity, they can find it 10 or 15 years after. it was not. there was nothing there. it does not mean the iaea could not find it because there was nothing. remember the summer of 2011 when even the iaea did not raise such an issue, remember? the russians accepted the proposal on the table.

it included the implementation of additional protocols, arrangements, giving access to iaea, limiting the new installment of centrifuges, stopping at 5%. everything was there. iran responded positively. the foreign minister said we are ready. the p5 rejected it. the russian proposal that had measures for 100% transparency, iran threw that in even before the issue was raised. >> i will not discuss it further other than that the idea that it has to involve nuclear material

and is a violation loses sight that the one side has no nuclear material. there is the persistence of nuclear explosive material. my view is that is less important than the other aspect of this. that is inspecting the design system of the -- that is designing the inspection system of the future. as long as we confuse the two and one hold up the other, we have a problem. you want all the transparency but you do not want to give on the other thing the iranians want to give on. that is a difficult problem for us. do we address the question of how much enrichment will be permitted temporarily or permanently in some arrangement with iran? if i say i am willing to except a level of civil enrichment and iaea is satisfied and improved

as technology improves, it could go ahead. it appears that is on the table. my feeling is that is too big for the present time for the u.s. to except in the context of an election. i am sorry to see that -- say that. maybe it will be reversed. maybe it will be seen as a victory. i would hope so. at the moment we seem to run scared on the issue. there is an iranian position of deep distrust that says for them the only acceptable think is a zero enrichment. nobody has sat down and explained why a zero enrichment would weaken inspection more than some enrichment. then the president would have to face up to the question in the middle of the election campaign on whether he wants to present another issue where he could be

attacked even if unfairly. that is a difficult question. i do not have the answer to if. -- i do not have the answer to its. >> i think it is interesting that proposals put forth on the processes are put forth by former directors of the agencies. there have been recent proposals. it is significant on how you can verify the question of military and civilian uses. i think this is a political problem. >> thank you very much. please join me in thanking the speakers. [applause] >> on friday, the iaea and iran

bill to reach a deal allowing greater access. officials and the acting envoy expressed disappointment there was no agreement. tomorrow, the discussions on the farm bill being debated in the senate. the bill would replace the long time program of subsidies to farmers with crop insurance. that is on "newsmakers" on sunday. next week, monday through thursday we will bring you live coverage of the inquiry on british phone hacking. starting monday, former prime minister gordon brown and george osborne.

the hearings investigate the relationship between british leaders and the press. testimony begins at 5:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. >> talking about reform does not solve anything. you have got to get specific about it. i would bet if everyone in the room designed a plan, i could sign on to 90% of them. >> warren buffett, tonight at 8:00 on c-span. >> today on "washington journal" the political commentator discussed his new book on the obama administration. he talked about the economy and administration policies. this is just under 45 minutes. this is just under 45 minutes.