a humanitarian crisis because there is a nexus with our strategic interests in the u.s. we have seen terrible slaughter in somalia, in sudan. we are not having the first conversation about that situation. and those people's lives are worth just as much as the syrians. we are having this conversation because of the strategic dynamic. the issue is not that i think we should not do things about slaughter. the issue is that i think the military action in this contest is likely to be very violent. there is likely to be a lot of collatal damage. it is a much denser society than in libya. most of the killing is being done with -- by men with ak- 47's. those are hard people to bomb. it is hard to stop the slaughter in a small division -- a small village when the killing is being done with knives and power tools. >> i think we should stop it

more for interest to region -- interest reasons. the fact that we did not have this discussion with sudan or somalia reflects negatively on us, not necessarily on whether we should not be having this conversation. i think we should have been having this conversation. there are a lot of legitimate reasons why there should be something serious doubt about the slaughter that is being -- taking place in sudan and somalia. the issues of intervention for me, those are complex for me. we have reached a stage of consciousness in this world where we begin to say that some things should not ever happen. slaughtering children, that should not happen.

on the other hand, when you are talking about the dynamism and intervention and the military aspect and collateral damage, we are all aware of that. for months in syria, we have not even ask for intervention until the slaughter became too much. until we realized it is not going to go away. through peaceful means. enough of people got fed up and began picking up guns and firing back. now, no one is asking people to into the7's

neighborhoods, but a few days ago on my blog, i put to the youtube video of homs. they were pounding it. you could see the area was empty. it was intentionally away from residential neighborhoods. it is this kind of area that should be targeted by a airplanes. there are areas on the highways between different cities that can be targeted. we are aware, of course, of collateral damage, and there are places where there can be minimal collateral damage. armed rebels can fight and defend their own communities. it is a combination of things that need to be tried. i really believe that the discussion is not about

intervention or non intervention. it is more about intervention or intervention light. this is what i think senator mccain pointed out when he said we are moving beyond the decision, moving forward. we need to realize that time is not on our side. for this reason, we should be speeding up. i want to briefly acknowledge the fact that we do have a couple of people that actually could help shed light on this. they do not come here often and i think their presence is very important. for all the problems about the division, actually, there is a lot of coordination also quietly that happens between all the different political factions.

today we have in our midst a group of syrian opposition members. there is a group representing liberal independents. my colleague is from the national assembly, and we also have my colleague who is right there, who is from the first opposition conference that was formed. he is a well-known academic as well. all of these people from different backgrounds. all of these people really have been working together for months trying to create coordination between the different opposition

groups and trying to create a unity around division. it is important to realize that opposition is not only division. there is coordination taking place, and that can be leveraged as well. >> we do have other questions. i had offered this gentleman the opportunity to be next. then we are moving to the back. i saw a question over to the right. >> i work in special operations command. my question for you is, does u.s. involvement, even in a limited scope, have the potential to galvanize the situation, thereby increasing the likelihood that foreign fighters and other international organizations would want to go

into syria, and is that an acceptable risk to take? >> i do not think we have to encourage -- that we have to look at what we do as encouraging foreign fighters. i think we have an interest in ending it or helping it to and as quickly as possible in favor of the opposition. with the no-fly zone, i do not think that would jeopardize the jihad these. would boots on the ground in syria? yes, but what we're talking about here is getting syrians to fight the regime. you will get some foreign fighters as well, but i do not think this is going to be -- i do not think it is going to change the dynamic entirely by having u.s. involvement.

>> thank you. i saw a question all the way in the back corner. >> the u.s. will have to intervene at one point. is it cheaper or may be better to interfere now for the same price and save people at the same time? >> this is the sort of thing our friend just mentioned. there would probably be a lot of collateral damage and suffer a lot of u.s. casualties. this is going to be a big risk. it will create a whole host of operational challenges for us.

these are going to have to be secured better than they are secured by syrians. once you go in there, by the way, you are in the wormhole. you cannot just go in and. you have to figure out a way to destroy it as well. this is the kind of thing that will be the least popular operation for americans to try to sell. it will have high casualties. nonetheless, wmd is will be a driving factor. we have been raising this as an issue to pique the attention of u.s. policy makers and it is working. all the more reason to try to create areas that are not flawless but are under control of the well-disciplined syrian opposition and syrian fighting force that can guard these facilities. >> please wait for the microphone.

>> i am from united against genocide. my question is, obviously, looking back at history, i see kosovo as being an example where by the u.s. intervened after it was clear that mass atrocities were happening. but i looked at the experience of rwanda where the international community did not intervene when mass atrocities were happening. as a matter of fact, the genocide happened. .'m just skeptical what would it take for the international community to do something about what is happening in syria?

does it have to reach the scale of rwanda? thank you. >> i think as most people know, the numbers are not the same. as brutal and vicious as it is, the numbers are not the same period i came back from 11 on a month ago. most people assume that what is holding in the u.s. back is the presidential campaign. i'm not convinced of that. i tend to think that the administration is willing to avoid doing anything about it for as long as possible. i also believe there are republicans who look at this very differently. there are republicans who do not want to act on this either. what will change it? will it just the wrong numbers? it might be. it might just be raw numbers.

if 10,000 people are killed and one afternoon, that might do it, but obviously the regime is avoiding a stunt like that. i do not know what will change the equation. >> i retired from the office of the secretary of defense. the point you made when you talked about the partition that is happening, looking into the future, any of you, would partition be so bad? i am not arguing for it, but think it through. what is wrong with it? >> if it is cordial [laughter] if it does not involve ethnic cleansing of so many hundreds of thousands of people, and if it is a partition into two states instead of god knows how many systems, perhaps the syrian people can come together and agree to do it.

but the problem is, it is not just coming together and discussing in a peaceful, a civilized manner whether we want to be together tamaany more or . what is happening is that one regime, for its own purposes, for the sake of remaining in power, not for the sake of community, but for having the privileges that come with rule, wanting to do this. we are talking about the desire to help to stabilize the rest of the country in order for them to feel secure -- destabilize the rest of the country in order to feel secure in the system they have created. if we allow to continue to unfold in this way, thousands

and thousands of lives -- more, will have to die and hundreds of thousands more will be displaced. so, the crux of it all is so draconian. i would not even care to speculate about this. at this stage, i would prefer to see -- even the best scenario now that i see calls for reintegration as much as possible of the rest of syria. if they do not want to, they do not want to. i think at this stage, the entire strategy is about the borders of the entities that are emerging and trying to make them two viable entities that still down the road could integrate once they realize how much of a problem assad is.

so, the partition is happening. so i do not want to see it into 100 sort of fiefdoms. unfortunately, the dithering of the international community has got into a point where i see no solution that can keep syria hole anymore -- whole anymore. because assad has been given enough time. russian backing is very important. russia wants to have the arm of lithuania, it is as simple as that. and they've been given the opportunity to do it. >> of like to give the last question to the syrian national council. could you reintroduce yourself, and then i will bank the panelists. >> thank you very much. -- thank the panelists.

>> thank you very much. would i have heard are many reasons for not intervening. i would like to hear also if you have enough analysis of not taking action, not intervening, what will be the results from the american point of view and from the interest of the freedom fighters? thank you very much. >> to paraphrase, what would be the cost of inaction if the americans continue to sit on the sidelines, and the international community, more broadly? >> well, we can start -- if you have a quick answer and then we can move across the panel. >> again, my