>> david cameron takes questions at the house of commons. after that, rob portman in new hampshire. >> this week, on "q&a", kirk lippold discusses his book, titled "front burner: al qaeda's attack on the uss cole." >> kirk lippold, why did you take the blame for 9/11? >> i do not think i took the blame, but i felt that i bore some response ability. it was my job years ago when i raised my right hand to defend

the constitution. that meant defendant my nation. when our country was attacked, i was on active duty at the time. i was familiar with al qaeda. i felt the degree of burden that i should have been saying or doing something, having been at the focal point of that firestorm, i should have been saying something to our leadership, it to anybody that might have listened. >> right away, you say, the war on terror started with us. explain. >> the way i look at it, when you attack buildings or embassies, whether it is the world trade center, the embassies in africa, those are things that represent u.s. interests. when you attack a warship, that is different. that is something that defense u.s. citizens and our interest around the world. when you try to take away and

nation's ability to protect itself, it is an act of war. >> let's go back to the beginning. what date was at the ship you were commanding bombed? >> october 12, 2000. >> what were the circumstances? >> we had been operating in the mediterranean for about 6.5 weeks. we had been held back until the last possible minute. consequently, we had to go at a high-speed transit, 30 miles per hour, at double the normal speed. it was because of that transit that as we went through and around the southwest corner of the arabian peninsula, we below 50%. it carries over half a million gallons. we had to find someplace to stop. because of the drawdown in naval

forces, we had gone from a navy of 4000 ships to 600 ships at the height of the reagan buildup. they looked at two ports for us to refuel. it is a safer port. that is where we will pull you into to refuel. expected to be there for about six-eight hours. >> yemen today it sounds like the headquarters of al qaeda. what was it known then and why were you -- i know that you did ask this question. what were you doing in yemen? >> our nation had made a decision a couple years before the uss cole ever pulled into that port, to do engagement. we had decided that yemen was a

good port for navy ships to pull into. it was a way that we could introduce money into their economy and help them out in a very bilateral type of engagement. we put the mining teams in there to help the country demine. there were a number of activities going on. what we were not doing was investing in our intelligence. i think every ship that operated in that region knew that there was a general threat from al qaeda, obviously, we had that the bombings two years before. there was nothing untoward to indicate there was a threat to navy ships. >> first of all, does the name come from? >> it was named after daryl cold. he was a marine sergeant who was awarded the medal of honor for his actions on iwo jima in

world war ii. >> how old was the ship? >> she had been commissioned in the navy, in june 1996. a fairly new destroyer, modern equipment. she had already made one deployment and had come back to the united states. a training cycle of about 16 months. >> how long had you been on her and what was your rank? >> on october 12, 2000, i had been in command of the ship for about 15 months. i was commander in the united states navy. >> explain how a man or a woman can be a commander, but still be the captain. >> it does not matter whether you wore a lieutenant or whether you are in 80 capt. -- a navy captain, you earned that honor read title of capt.. >> how big is this -- the

honorary title of capt.. >> how big is this ship? >> 8,400 tons. >> how many sailors? >> it is about 25 officers and about 275 enlisted. we were able but shy of 300. >> how many were killed? >> there were 17 killed and 37 wounded. >> exactly what happened? >> we had pulled into the refueling that morning around 9:30. we were right side to that pier. i turned the ship around in case we had to get under way in a hurry. at about 10:30, we started refueling the ship. during the course of operations that morning, my supply officer made arrangements for three garbage barges to come to the ship. in addition to the normal arrangements, we also knew that

we want to get rid of our trash, hazardous materials. we had arranged for three garbage barges to come out. by around 11:00, two boats had come out. i was turned back to my desk and giving routine paperwork when at 11:18, there was a thunderous explosion. you could feel all 505 feet and 8,400 tons of destroyer. it is almost like we seem to hang for a second in the air. we came back down in the water, lights went out, ceiling tiles popped out, everything on my desk lifted up about a flood. i grabbed the underside of my desk until the ship stopped moving. i went to the door of my cabin. as i look down the passageway, this gray cloud came towards me. there was not a sound on the

ship and i did not know why. it washed over me. i could smell the dust, i could smell the fuel. i can also smell this acrid metallic tank. within a matter of seconds, i knew we had been attacked. when i turned the ship around in the harbor, and if it had been an explosion on the ship, i would have been shoved left. i knew something had come alongside and detonated. >> house and did you know that people were injured and killed? >> -- house and did you know that people were injured and killed? >> intuitively, i knew we would have injuries. the first thing i did -- i didn't know if we were going to be boarded. i went back into my cabin, all locked the safe for i kept the keys to the weapons. i pulled out a 9 millimeter, loaded it, grabbed two clips of

ammunition. i went outside and stood there for just a second. i looked around, the watch team was gone. it had been blown into pieces and scatter across the deck. the wires were snapped off. there is this dirty black water dripping off of everything. i had sworn that both to support and defend the constitution. i took a the breath and headed towards the port side. >> what is your reaction? >> when i first got there, i think police saw was reestablishing the defensive perimeter -- i saw that he was reestablishing the defensive perimeter are ron shipp. you could tell there was an attack. the explosion had blown metal into the ship, nothing was pointed out word. there were four or drafts.

it turns out, the to garbage barges had left at about 11:15. what we did not know was that al qaeda had been in that port for a number of months observing navy ships. the third barge masqueraded as the garbage barge. we were operating under peacetime rules of engagement. it did not exhibit a hostile intent. people thought it was the third garbage barge. it came down the side of the ship. it came to the exact same spot in the middle of the ship where the previous board had been. >> you say in your book that the guys smiled and then blew themselves up. what kind of people are they? >> you are seeing a very

dedicated and focused enemy. they will stop at nothing to further their ideology, to try to get -- you have to remember what osama bin laden's entire declaration of war sad. he wanted all u.s. forces out of the middle east. >> i want to jump to 9/11. i want to jump to september 9, 2001. where were you? >> i had been briefed up at the cia. i received a call from a former commanding officer. i had driven up the george washington parkway, arrived at the old headquarters building. it was like a movie set. 16-inch grant and the floor, to the left is the single star for all of those who had died.

on the right rear row after row of gold stars. we started a briefing at 7:00 that morning. at the end, i was talking with mr. charlie allen. i said, thank you for taking the time. america does not understand. i believe it is going to take a seminal event were hundreds die before americans realize we are at war. he said, we are doing our best to make sure that does not happen. 20 minutes later, we watched as the first plane hit. i looked at the television with the smoke coming out of the world trade center. what sightseeing plane on a beautiful clear day could fly into the side of the building? you could also tell from the size of the whole that something was not right. a few minutes later, i was standing in the counter- terrorism center. we watched as that second plane

banked into the second tower. the director for the counterterrorism center at the cia. >> under what auspices were you at the cia? >> i was there at a military officer of receiving and off the record briefing. >> what were the circumstances for you in the navy? >> i had a change of command on the uss cole. i had attended the joint forces staff college in norfolk, virginia. the office was called the united nations and multilateral affairs. we were dealing with a lot of international treaties. we were the only global strategy office. most of them are broken down by regions. we were the only one that spanned the entire world as far as treaties, united nations. >> what was then maybe saying to

you about your future? >> at that point, my career look to be on track. >> you were still a commander? >> i was still a commander. >> you have been in the navy for how long? but a little over 20 years. -- >> a little over 20 years. you have a career, you have potential. i felt very privileged to be working for the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. that whole issue would suddenly changed on the morning of september 11. >> why? >> being the only office that was a global, dated to develop a strategy and policy. -- they needed to develop a strategy and policy. we know we will insert forces into afghanistan.

we knew we were going to capture people. it first became ok, when we go to capture people, who do we got to capture? that was winnowed down to a high-level taliban and al qaeda. from that group, where do we put them? it would eventually turned -- they needed a more long-term facility away and added that country. we did not know how pervasive al qaeda was. we looked around the world at a number of places and settled on this unique piece of territory called guantanamo bay. secretary rumsfeld was somewhat reluctant to be building up a facility there. everyone remembers those horrible pictures of camp x-ray. those facilities had existed for years. that was the temporary holding facility for haitian migrants.

they were being treated humanely, they were treated consistent with, but not in accordance with the geneva convention. it was a unique legal distinction. i would also have a unique opportunity of being the joint staff representative on what was called the interrogation working group to determine what techniques the military would use in handling these detainees. we decided to only use those methods that were in the army field manual at the time. it has since been expanded. we were not going to get into any of the areas where other agencies had gone. i think it was the right decision. and then how do we repatriate them? how do we repatriate them if they no longer represent a threat? >> why do you call your book

frontburner. >> when i made the initial boys report, it is called for attacks on u.s. forces. -- voice report, it is code for attack on u.s. forces. >> you are still a commander, you graduated from the naval academy in what year? >> 1981. >> when does someone you has been in the navy for 20 years expect to get promoted? >> normally, i was a due course officer. i was never selected early for promotion. i expected to be looked at some time around the 22 or 23-year point. everything looked to be on track for that. >> let me run a piece of recorded video with senator john warner. >> in the case, the report of

the investigation, the officer was clear, precise and the professional. well done. the report found that instructions, the directives, and orders had been violated. the report stated that failure of the commanding officer to implement half of the required 62 forest protection measures. further, according to the investigating officer, there were 19 forest protection measures that could possibly have prevented or mitigated the effect of the attack on the u.s. s.cole. of these 19 measures, only seven were implemented by the commanding officer. >> know time is your name

mentioned. he is obviously talking about -- at no time is your name mentioned. he is obviously talking about you. i do not want to get too far in the weeds. it is hard to understand all the language, but what is going on? >> what you are seeing is a senior senator who clearly did not delve into the investigation the way he should have. he is manipulating facts for the purpose of a political agenda. the area unfortunate. when he fails to mention, when you look at the 63 measures, half of them did not even apply to the physical circumstances that we faced that morning. right off the bat, half of those measures, we were at a key error in the middle of the harbor. -- pier in the middle of the harbor. what he fails to mention, he only speaks about the investigating officer. that officer had a very narrow

scope given to him for the investigation to only look on the ship. he could not take the context of how we came to be in that port, what the intelligence was, what measures other ships may have followed. as the investigation went further up the chain of command, and was reviewed by much more experienced officers, they would ultimately determine that there was nothing that the crew or i could've done that morning that would have mitigated or prevented that attack. that was up held all the way to the secretary of defense. he either did not read the investigation the way he should have, or he is picking facts selectively in order to paint a picture so that he can achieve an agenda that he wants. >> where is it had quarter? >> norfolk, virginia. >> senator warner is from virginia. what role did he play in your

future? >> he would play a role two years later are to the attack. in january of 2002, i would be selected for a promotion. my name would be supported the my entire chain of command. even the commander in chief and president bush. what a lot of americans do not know, every officer promotion has to go to the senate. they give their advice and consent on every officer. just like they do for every political appointee and federal judge. when the list went over there, senator warner told the navy, i do not agree with your decision to permit -- promote. if you keep him on the list, i will hold this list up and never allow any officer to go forward. >> here is the former chief of naval operations. >> this particular case was about an attack being conducted

on the ship. in my judgment, this commanding officer was held accountable. i judged him. as you said in your statement, i found some things i think he could have done better. i do not believe that those things rise to the level of punishment to court martial him. i did not believe that was the case. that is the way i made my judgment. >> what are we watching? >> that morning, there was one accountable officer on board. that was made. all i ever asked for in that investigation is that you view that accountability determination and how my ship performed before, during, and after the attack. i think the admiral is absolutely right. he said yes, there are things that could have done differently. i made a decision based on the

physical circumstances that they faced to make a judgment decision on which protection measures to follow and not to follow. i made that determination. there were some measures i did not. i did not immediately inform the chain of command that i had suggested my force protection posture based on the physical circumstances that morning. there was nothing that could have been down that would have mitigated or prevented the attack. but i was held accountable by the chain of command. senator warner does not clearly understand the difference between accountability and blame. >> why does he want to get in the middle of this? any idea? >> the only thing i could ever surmise is that he had been in discussions with some of the families that were concerned about the fact that i was being promoted. it was clearly a political

decision. he was up for election that fall and did not want to move it forward. >> he is no longer in the senate. in your book, you talk about seeking a meeting with them. >> i did. >> what year was that? >> 2006. >> why did you want to meet with them? >> i burk to the chain of command and given the navy and the department of defense every opportunity to try to push my name forward so that it could receive the consent of the senate. i finally reached a point where it was clear that they were unwilling to put the political stake in the ground. you have to go to the source. >> the chief of naval operations was on your side and not hearing. later on, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff did not approve of your promotion going forward. >> you will have to ask admiral mollen. i do not understand.

he did a complete reversal to what the entire chain of command had supported, including the president. he felt he knew better, but the reasons are still a mystery. >> who is responsible? >> it belongs to the secretary of the navy. that is why we have civilian oversight and civilian control of the military. it is not the chief of naval operations and it is not the chairman. they can provide advice, but it is not there board. >> you say that you want to talk to senator warner. have you spoken to him? >> absolutely not. i wanted to allow my chain of command as much latitude this issue. >> what happened? >> i would sit down with the center at one of the meeting

rooms. we would spend about 24 minutes together. ultimately, he would be unmoved and refused to do it unless the navy was willing to put up with a full senate armed services committee hearing, we opening the investigation. -- reopening the investigation. >> you say that when you showed up for the meeting, there were microphones and several people there. >> politicians in this town of love the theatrics that go along with something like this. when i walked in, it was a table set up with microphones. we are going to record this. where are your people? where is your public affairs person? where is your attorney? i looked at the staff and said, if i can not clearly articulate

to the senator why i should be promoted, i should not be a captain. i will speak for myself. >> obviously, this book has something to do with where you want to set the record straight. >> i know we have had a long discussion about senator warner. i wanted that but to honor my crew. it is my group that are the true heroes. they are the ones that sprang into action that morning. they are the ones that saved the ship from sinking. they kept their crewmembers alive. 32 of those people would survive. that does not happen by magic. >> how many of these people are you still in touch with? >> the vast majority of the group. we are a tight group. almost on a daily basis. >> you also report that he met with each of the people that it

lost their lives or were injured. you went to their families. one family would not see you. >> that is true. there were still angry. they still looked at me as being the commanding officer and being responsible for having the attack occurred. i reached out to that family. over time, that offer stands for my lifetime, i have talked with the parents, i have talked with the brothers of the person who was killed. we have discussed a number of issues that surround the event itself. >> when did you have those meetings? >> right after the investigation was released on january 19. it was that afternoon and evening that i sat down, picked up the phone bank, and began to call all of the families. make sure they receive the investigation. answer any questions. many of them were curious as to why i waited until that point to

reach out. i told them, it it would be unfair for me to have established any kind of relationship with you as a family for good or for bad. what investigation had found me totally accountable and responsible for this attack? you would have felt that i had manipulated new or used to somehow. i had to wait for that investigation to run its complete course and be released before ever reaching out to any of those families. over the next couple of weeks, we would establish a time. to go out and meet with them. when i initially proposed to the navy, they were very reluctant. the answer initially was absolutely not, but i knew it was the right thing to do. they would eventually give me a blank check. i would spend 3.5 weeks visiting with each of those families. >> when did you leave the navy? >> are retired in 2007. >> why did you leave?

>> it is never a job for life. evidently, you retire. and then you go find real work. >> why did you run for congress? >> i ran for congress last year in 2011. iran because -- i ran because -- i looked at the way our political situation is going in our country and i said, i can sit on the fringes, i can talk about it, i can complain about it. if you really want to affect the direction and course of the nation, you have to roll up your sleeves and get ready to go swim and not dirty end of the pool called politics. i took a good hard look and i asked a lot of questions. i said, you know, this is going to be the time and place. >> what happened?

>> i had 14 months until the primary. the week after i entered to run for congress in northern nevada, or ethics challenged senator would resign. that would cause the governor to appoint the current congress and in the district. that triggered a special election. it went from 14 months to four months. ed.n the gop suit eight weeks later, that pick was made. it would be the gop chairman. that was upheld and the supreme court in nevada. realistically, that is how it works. i am hoping that when the next legislative session and of automates, -- legislative session in nevada at meets, we will see what the future brings.

>> are you going to run again? >> ample opportunity for both the political future. >> i have something called a challenge going. -- coin. i do not remember when this started. military people and give these out and secretaries of the navy and army, what is this thing? >> they are a way that a commander can give eight small token to the people working for them for an exceptional job or may be a medal is not merited. it gives them an opportunity to get these coins and the commander recognizes their superior performance. >> who pays for these? >> if you are in the military, a lot of times they are paid for through official representation of finance.

in some commands, they are not allowed to use any government funds. they come right out of the commanders pocket. >> the reason i held it up, there was a point in your book were you are quite irritated by general tommy francs. >> i would not say i was irritated. i was just astounded at the fact that he came aboard the ship and was totally disconnected from the reality of what we had been through. he was walking run the ship like it was a garrison to ouur. he kept walking around saying, you are doing a great job, have one of my coins. it was not that i thought the crew did not appreciate what he was doing, but he was the central command in commander. he was the guy responsible for putting my ship into that port and having the access to the broadest level of national

intelligence, should have been able to make a determination as to whether we belonged there or not. we were completely blind sided. >> we have some video, though. i do not know if you have ever seen this. >> i am interested in knowing because that is a readiness issue right now. if we do not have the ability to support them and oppressed people on scene was a french medical team -- support them and the first people on scene was a french medical team. >> that skipper had his hands full. if i could day before this body, did an absolutely miraculous job. >> i would have concurred because his ship is still afloat. >> surprise today be that kind of support? >> i am not. he did a very a generous -- he is a generous and kind man.

he is good at recognizing superior performance. the only thing -- when he was aboard that morning, he appeared to not really -- to really understand the impact that this attack had on mass. the fact that we had already gone through. we were hit on thursday and he did not come aboard until the following monday. the ship and the initial attack was fairly stable ride off the bat. on saturday night, we lose my only operating generator, i cannot restart it. the emergency generator does not work. i cannot initiate the start to get the torch to work. we are at a point where come early sunday morning, we are using a bucket brigade for 15 minutes.

finally, we were able to do that. the jury read some high-pressure air compressors that reportable as. -- that were portable. it is an amazing testament to the group, how well they were trained and what they did. >> you show an irritation about the support you got from the navy. the intelligence -- for instance, you say the intelligence chief in yemen it did not even bother to communicate with you at all about the possibility of al qaeda. >> he would not communicate directly with me. it is his job as the senior u.s. intelligence official in the country of yemen to be able to develop -- especially in a

port to be able to allow the u.s. military and the department of state and defense to make a determination on whether it is safe for us to be there. i met in the 27-ship to pull and after a couple of years, clearly, there was something going on. you have to wonder. i want to go back and touch on the issue with the navy. the phenomenal support that i was absolutely phenomenal. they really took care of my crew. >> you were irritated by the lack of support from washington? >> it seemed like washington was keeping their distance because everybody knew that this was going to turn into a blame game. what did you give that ship for intelligence?

everyone was going to be ducking and dodging on this one. it even took the general a couple of days to stand up, i am the one who started the program of putting that -- putting ships into that port. there comes a point in time where i am lonely guy out there at the point of the spear. where were all these other people back in washington? what were they doing other than try to avoid responsibility? i was seeing a ton of support from my way. washington was very tied up with a huge influx of force is coming out to support us. >> when did your president call you? >> friday night. we got hit on thursday it and he called friday night.

nothing in your training ever prepares you for sitting in the back end of the ship on a cell phone talking to the president of the united states about what has just happened. >> how long did he spend with you? >> less than a minute. it was a very short conversation. he said, you are doing a great job keeping the ship afloat. the middle east was starting to unravel a little bit. we had the attack at the embassy. you had be -- there were a number of issues starting to pop up about the middle east. he had his hands full more on a strategic and broader scale than just one navy ship. it was important to me. on a larger strategic perspective, he is looking at the entire pattern of attacks better starting to occur and is wondering if this is the signal for a larger war.

>> you said earlier, on january 19, the report came out -- what year? >> 2001. >> how about president bush gas \ h? >> when president bush came into port, the administration basically looked at it, deputy secretary of defense said, the information is stale. they had an attitude of, we are forward looking not backward acting. consequently, the uss cole became a -- we watched the clinton administration and do nothing. the new administration took over. could have made a decision to

take a new direction. they did nothing. 11 months after the attack, the nation would pay a tragic price. i will tell you, we will never answer the question on whether tipped our would have hand and the intelligence world so that we might know whether or not 9/11 was in progress. i guarantee you, doing nothing in response to the attack sealed our fate. >> on october the 18th, 2000, there was an event at pier 12. we have some video of that. there were ships there, the president of the united states shows up. whether for that event? >> that was a memorial ceremony that was put together by the navy. and number of the when did you had been brought back -- woun

ded were able to attend that. >> you are frustrated when you talk about -- you wanted more than that. there was a meeting that was held with members of the families. what year was that? >> that happened in january, 2001, before the investigation. there was a meeting held were all the families were assembled. they had the commander-in-chief of the atlantic fleet as well as the federal bureau of investigation director. they basically gave a briefing on where they stood with the investigation, what was going on. the families on loaded on them. they did not deliver getting the attention. they did not feel the questions were being answered properly. they were not paying attention to it and wanted some real answers. >> what about the meeting with

president obama? >> that happened on february 6, 2009, right after he took office. that meeting was triggered by his executive order decisions to close guantanamo bay, suspend military commissions. >> usa in order to get the met -- you say in order to get the family members there, they ended up going to the obama contributor list. >> when president obama wanted to meet, he initially wanted to meet with his 9/11 family members. you have to remember, when he signed those executive orders, not once before he did those did he ever consult with the department of state, justice, or defense. he did not know the real impact is going to be on making the decision to say i am closing guantanamo bay.

all you have to do is look at one year later. it was very clear of the american people had spoken out crystal clear, despite with the attorney general wants to do, and said, at guantanamo should remain open. it was never intended to be the detention facility it became. we always wanted to be an intelligence facility. in talking to the families, it was one of the families from 9/11 that said, the uss cole has been ignored in this all along. you need to invite them. he notified the families of cole. the only ones to could attend or the ones close to washington, d.c. >> where is cole today? >> she deployed for the sixth time. she left about 66 ago. >> after the it -- she left

about six weeks ago. >> after the explosion, how long did it take to get cole back in active duty? >> of 15 months -- about 15 months. until she sailed away from the yard at the huntington eagle shipyard in mississippi in april of 2002. it was about a 15-month rebuild. $250 million. >> go back to this book. what scores did you settle in this book? >> i did not want to settle any score. bad book is truly about the heroic efforts -- a bad book is truly about the heroic efforts they made.

the fact that we lost a ship that first day once, almost lost it saturday, and they were able to save it. all the things we endured after words, whether it was the investigation, to feeling ignored in the long view of history. we fell under the footprint of 9/11. we have been relegated to that dustpan and left to drift into obscurity. that is why i finally said, this has to be captured. the american people need and deserve to know the heroes i was privileged to command that day. >> you did not say much about this, but i want to read it. kevin sweeney walked into the ship's detachment office and announced the pity party was over. everything was ordered disposed of by the end of the day.

>> i was shocked when i heard that. i heard it several days later. kevin sweeney was my relief as the commanding officer. when i heard that had happened, what bothered me most is that he was clearly receiving guidance pressure from the leadership of the navy to put it this attack behind you, look forward, and turn that ship around. the crew never felt like there was a pity party. they never ask for anyone to feel sorry for them. they wanted help in dealing with some of the issues. everybody had post traumatic stress. there were still working through that process. having a harsh -- he would pull the crew together on several occasions that chose to remain behind and encouraged everyone that had been there to leave at some point. >> did you know him?

>> i did not know him. one of the unique things about the navy, once he was in command, it is your ship. once you relinquish command, it is no longer your ship. those are his decisions to make. he did what he thought was best as the commanding officer. every commanding officer had that opportunity. you make decisions that might be right or may be wrong. that is one of the great things about it. >> back to the actual event. how were the 17 killed? >> it was a combination of people that were working in the galley area, down in the general workshop where we do a lot of repair work. the force of the explosion, when it came into the ship, literally took the deck of the galley area

itself and blew it into pieces. one cut off the left side of the ship. one slammed into the mess line. >> among the injured, how many of them more severely injured to this day have a problem? >> i have not kept track on what their medical conditions are. i do not really know. a number of them are still getting treatment through the v. a number of them retired with disabilities. that is part of the consequences of raising your right hand. when these things happen, the nation as sam's an obligation to those sailors -- assumes an obligation to take care of those sailors. >> i read about debbie

courtney, ann chamberlain, i can go on. a lot of women on this ship. >> absolutely. that morning, i did not have men and women. i am sailors. each of them performed at the ally.ly -- phenomena i have sailors and officers and they will all get treated fair and square. we had a mission to do. that is exactly what we did. when the blast hit, it did not matter whether you're a man, a woman. they all performed. they came together as a team. >> do what the process, the navy remained publicly silent on the issue of the additional crew's remains. the longer the wait, the more difficult it was going to be for the families to deal with the

tragedy. months had gone by with no word as families waited in silence. >> they were still working on identifying some of the remains that had been found. when 9/11 occurred, we got put on the back burner. 9/11 became the priority. the identification of those remains became the priority. cole was relegated off to the side, and we would be told to wait. i knew there were families out there that deserved better. those people in the pentagon were in no higher priority than we were. we had been waiting for months. now what was going to turn into more than a year before we get those remains identified. they needed to be handled in a dignified manner. >> there is a person that you felt was responsible for this.

as the top, he is due for a tribunal -- as we talk, he is due for a tribunal. can you explain that? >> as part of the process with the obama administration, while they wanted to shut down and bring everybody here, during the end of the bush administration, the guy you were speaking of, and he has been brought to guantanamo bay. he is waiting for a military commission to be conducted. we have seen that the attorney general is moving forward with that process. we're beginning to see the charges have once again been reinstated. they are now going to the numbers of motions. you are seeing his attorneys tried every legal shenanigans in the book trying to delay the trial. this is classic lawyering.

in two years, they will claim the united states government is delaying a fair trial. he was the principal explosive sky that was brought into the country to credited pulling together all of the assets to conduct the attack. they had already put together a boat with explosives and attempted to send it out to the ship. the people they're scattered, it came back, recovered the equipment. tested them in the desert. then they would bring -- he would reorganize the entire way they were planning to conduct the attack. no more than 9/11 was picked as the day -- they made the call, we pulled in, and that bodes

came out to was masquerading as the third garbage barge. >> how do we know? >> ipad been told there are -- there is a lot -- i have been told there are a lot of different evidence. >> what should happen to him? >> i think he should get the death penalty. >> what are the chances that he will? >> i think it is terribly good. if we have an administration that has the political willpower to do it. he should be sentenced to death. we are at war. this is not the federal court system. the american people and made it clear that they realize that what is going on in the time of day is the result of the war effort, not a large-scale criminal action. >> you spent 27 years in the navy. >> 26. >> 30 total years. what are you doing now to make a living? >> most of what i do now, i

talked to groups about uss cole. i serve on the board of military families united. i am on the board of advisers for a startup company. halo defense systems out of massachusetts. it looks like they have a superb product. trying to make sure the american people stay aware. i've engaged in the future of my state out in nevada, obviously. making sure we get the kind of representation we need to carry the country forward. >> you were for to your closest friend. you did not explain who she is. >> she and i have been together for well over 10 years. >> have you been married? do you have children? >> i have not been married and i do not have children. >> what are your thoughts?

he said the attack on cole fundamentally changed how the navy viewed forced protection. what has changed? >> what you are seeing now is the navy has done a very good job in doing a lot of exercises and giving his commanding officer's better out there -- that are out there. they have provided them with a lot more procedures and equipment and training. one of the forest protection measures is keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. it sounds pretty straightforward. at the time we deployed, we had never had any forest protection exercises. -- forced protection exercises. we never experienced anything

like the potential for an ied. nowadays, when i tell this commanding officers, when you go out there and you were told to do protection measures, ask yourself the question, what procedures do i use? what equipment to i have? what rules of engagement do i have available that will allow me to use those measures? what intelligence are driving me to do those measures? if i go into a host nation, are they trained at the same level? did they have the same capability to check out the small boats? did they have the ability to keep boats away from the ship? do they have the ability to check vehicles? if not, you have to expand her presence to do that. if local authorities will not let you do it, do not plan. -- pull in.

i believe he is from yemen. >> where were the two that were on the little boats -- where are they from? were they killed and deli? >> and stanley. they were vaporized -- were they killed instantly? >> instantly. they were vaporized. >> it was a combination of a plastic explosive. with tnt. >> the title of the book is " front burner." our guest has been kirk lippold. >> i want to give you one of my challenge coins. thank you for letting me share this story of some great heroes. [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> for a dvd copy of this program, call -- for a free transcript or to give us your comments, visit us at -- >> tonight, prime minister's questions with david cameron. followed by ohio republican senator robert portman in new hampshire. a look at the battle ground states in the 2012 elections. .