nomination of a judge to the u.s. district court. they will also look at small business taxes. the house is live at 2:00 eastern on c-span and the senate is live >> this week, kirk lippold discusses his book about the attack on the u.s.s. cole, "frontburner." >> why did you take the blame for 9/11 in your book? >> i do nothing to blame but i certainly felt that i bore some responsibility. it was my job years ago when i raised my right hand and swore

an oath and swore to defend the constitution. that meant defending my nation. when our country is attacked was on active duty. i had been through a major terrorist incident. i was familiar with al qaeda. i just felt the degree of burden of the i should have been saying or doing something, having been at the focal point of that firestorm on 10-12, october 2001 should have been saying something to our leadership, anybody who high -- might have listened. >> you see the war on terror started with us. when you attack a warship, that is different. that is something that defends u.s. citizens and our interest around the world. when you try to take away a nation's ability to protect itself, it is an act of war. >> let's go back to the

beginning. i am sure you have told the story many times. what date was the ship you were commanding bombed? >> october 12, 2000. >> we had been operating in the mediterranean for about 6.5 weeks. we had been held back until the last possible minute. we had come through the suez canal down the red sea. consequently, we had to go at a high-speed transit, 30 miles per hour, double the normal speed. double the normal speed that ships with transit to the middle east. it was because of that transit that as we went through and around the southwest corner of the arabian peninsula, we were below 50%. we needed fuel. a ship like u.s.s. cole, it carries over half a million gallons. we had to find someplace to stop. because of the drawdown in naval

forces, we had gone from a navy of 4000 ships to 600 ships at the height of the reagan buildup. they looked at two ports for us to refuel. it is a safer port. that is where we will pull you into to refuel. expected to be there for about six to eight hours. taking on a quarter million gallons. >> yemen today sounds like the headquarters of al qaeda. i know that you did ask this question. what was the now and then and what were you doing in yemen? >> our nation had made a decision a couple years before the uss cole ever pulled into that port, to do engagement. on a broader level with the yemenis government with the president and in the capital. we had decided that yemen was a

good port for navy ships to pull into. it was a way that we could introduce money into their economy and help them out in a very bilateral type of engagement. we put demining teams in there to help the country demine. following the civil war in the early 1990's. there were a number of activities going on. what we were not doing was investing in our intelligence. i think every ship that operated in that region knew that there was a general threat from al qaeda, obviously, we had the bombings two years before. there was nothing untoward to indicate there was a threat to navy ships. in the fifth fleet or the central command middle east area of responsibility. >> first of all, where does the name come from? >> it was named after darrell cole. he was a marine sergeant who was awarded the medal of honor for his actions on iwo jima in world war ii. >> how old was the ship?

when you were in yemen? >> she had been commissioned in the navy, in june 1996. a fairly new destroyer, modern equipment. she had already made one deployment and had come back to the united states. had gone through a small maintenance and retrofita training cycle of about 16 -- retrofit period. the training cycle of about 16 months. >> how long had you been on her and what was your rank? >> on october 12, 2000, i had been in command of the ship for about 15 months. i was commander in the united states navy. >> explain how a man or a woman can be a commander, but still be the captain. >> it does not matter whether you are a lieutenant or whether you are a navy captain, you earn that honorary title of captain. >> how big is this ship? >> 8,400 tons.

505 feet long. >> how many sailors? how many officers and enlisted? >> it is about 25 officers and about 275 enlisted. we were shy of 300. that morning. >> how many were killed? how many injured? >> there were 17 killed and 37 wounded. >> exactly what happened? and what time? >> we had pulled into the refueling that morning around 9:30. we were right side to that pier. our brow was pointed out of the harbor. i turned the ship around in case we had to get underway in a hurry. at about 10:30, we started refueling the ship. the clock was ticking at that point. during the course of operations that morning, my supply officer made arrangements for three garbage barges to come to the ship. in addition to the normal arrangements, we also knew that we wanted to get rid of our

trash, hazardous materials. we had arranged for three garbage barges to come out. by around 11:00, two boats had come out. the crew was unloading trash. i was turned back to my desk and doing routine paperwork when, at 11:18, there was a thunderous explosion. you could feel all 505 feet and 8,400 tons of destroyer. quickly and violently dressed up to the right. it is almost like we seem to hang for a second in the air. we came back down in the water, lights went out, ceiling tiles popped out, everything on my desk lifted up about a foot. and slammed back down. i grabbed the underside of my desk until the ship stopped moving. i could stand up. i went to the door of my cabin. as i looked down the passageway, this gray cloud came towards me. there was not a sound on the ship and i did not know why.

it washed over me. i could smell the dust, i could smell the fuel. i can also smell this acrid metallic tank. -- tang. within a matter of seconds, i knew we had been attacked. when i turned the ship around in the harbor, and if it had been an explosion on the ship, i would have been shoved left. i had been thrust up to the right. i knew something had come alongside and detonated. >> how soon did you know that people were injured and killed? >> intuitively, i knew we would have injuries. i would not know immediately. the first thing i did -- i didn't know if we were going to be boarded. i went back into my cabin, unlocked the safe where i kept the keys to the weapons. i pulled out a 9 millimeter, loaded it, grabbed two clips of ammunition.

i went outside and stood there for just a second. i looked around, the watch team was gone. it had been blown into pieces and scattered across the deck. the wires were snapped off. there is this dirty black water dripping off of everything. i had sworn that oath to support and defend the constitution. i would be willing to give my life if necessary to do thougso. i took a deep breath and headed towards the port side. >> what is your reaction? >> when i first got there, i saw that he was reestablishing the defensive perimeter around the ship. the rest of the security teams, i went over to portside and looked over. you could tell there was an attack. the explosion had blown metal into the ship, nothing was pointed outward.

there were four orange raft alongside the ship. one of them got along side and it was blown up, it turns out it had not. it turns out, the two garbage barges had left at about 11:15. transiting back across the harbor. what we did not know was that al qaeda had been in that port for a number of months observing navy ships. the third barge masqueraded as the garbage barge. we were operating under peacetime rules of engagement. it did not exhibit a hostile intent. like aiming guns at us or hostile acts like shooting guns. people thought it was the third garbage barge. it came down the side of the ship. it came to the exact same spot in the middle of the ship where the previous board had been. and then initiated the explosion. >> you say in your book that the guys smiled and then blew themselves up. whatwhat kind of people are they? >> you are seeing a very dedicated and focused enemy. they will stop at nothing to

further their ideology. to try and get -- you have to remember what osama bin laden's entire declaration of war said. he wanted all u.s. forces out of the middle east. and they want to expand, the radical islam caliphate beyond the middle east to take over the whole world. >> i want to jump to 9/11. i want to jump to september 9, 2001. where were you? >> i had been briefed at the cia. that morning. i received a call from a former commanding officer. who is now retired and working up there. i had driven up the george washington parkway, arrived at the old headquarters building. it was like a movie set. walked inside. 16-inch granite floor, to the left is the single star for all of those who had died. in the 0 ss, the precursor to

the organization of the cia. on the right, row after row of gold stars. we started a briefing at 7:00 that morning. it went for an hour and a half. at the end, i was talking with mr. charlie allen. who was one of the assistant deputy director's chair. i said, thank you for taking the time. america does not understand. i believe it is going to take a seminal event where hundreds die before americans realize we are at war. he said, we are doing our best to make sure that does not happen. 20 minutes later, we watched as the first plane hit. i looked at the television with the smoke coming out of the world trade center. what sightseeing plane on a beautiful clear day could fly into the side of the building? you could also tell from the size of the hole that something was not right. a few minutes later, i was standing in the counterterrorism center. we watched as that second plane banked into the second tower.

the director for the counterterrorism center at the cia. >> under what auspices were you at the cia? >> i was there as a military officer receiving an off the record briefing. on what the agency knew before and during the attack on the u.s.s. cole. >> what were the circumstances for you in the navy? >> i had a change of command on the uss cole. in march, i had attended the joint forces staff college in norfolk, virginia. the office was called the united nations and multilateral affairs. we were dealing with a lot of international treaties. the offices i was and was unique in that we were the only global strategy office. most of them are broken down by regions. we were the only one that spanned the entire world as far as treaties, united nations. multilateralve issues that affected our country.

-- other multilateral issues that affected our country. >> what was that saying to you about your future? >> at that point, my career looked to be on track. >> you were still a commander? >> i was still a commander. >> you have been in the navy for how long? >> a little over 20 years. it was the fall of 2001. i had been commissioned at of the naval academy in 1981 and i had been told following the investigation, you have a career, you have potential. it did not take folks and assigned them to the joint chiefs of staff. i felt very privileged to be working for the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. that whole issue would suddenly change on the morning of september 11. >> why? >> being the only office that was a global, they needed to develop a strategy and policy. the office i was and it would -- was given the unique message of crafting detainee policy. how do we put together -- we know we will insert forces into

afghanistan. we knew we were going to capture people. it first became ok, when we go to capture people, who do we want to capture? that was winnowed down to high- level taliban and al qaeda. from that group, where do we put them? they needed a more long-term facility away and out of that country. we did not know how pervasive al qaeda was. throughout the country of afghanistan. we looked around the world at a number of places and settled on this unique piece of territory called guantanamo bay. secretary rumsfeld was somewhat reluctant to be building up a facility there. everyone remembers those horrible pictures of camp x-ray. where they had the chain-link fences and the pens. those facilities had existed for years. that was the temporary holding facility. they were being treated humanely, they were treated

consistent with, but not in accordance with, the geneva convention. it was a unique legal distinction. they did not merit protection under the geneva convention. i would also have a unique opportunity of being the joint staff representative on what was called the interrogation working group to determine what techniques the military would use in handling these detainees. we decided to only use those methods that were in the army field manual at the time. it has since been expanded. by a couple of measures. for the most part, we were not going to get into any of the areas where other agencies had gone. i think it was the right decision. and then how do we repatriate them? if we captured someone we did not want to have, we had gotten by mistake, that had been swept up on the battlefield and did not belong in guantanamo, how do we repatriate them if they no longer represent a threat? >> why do you call your book

"front burner." >> when i made the initial voice report, it is code for attack on u.s. forces. >> you are still a commander, you graduated from the naval academy in what year? >> 1981. >> when does someone who has been in the navy for 20 years expect to get promoted? >> normally, i was a due course officer. i had promoted along with the majority of my classmates. i was never selected early for promotion. i expected to be looked at some time around the 22 or 23-year point. for promotion to captain. everything looked to be on track for that. >> let me run a piece of recorded video with senator john warner. we will ask you about this.

>> in the case, the report of the investigation, the officer was clear, precise and professional. well done. the report found that instructions, directives, and orders had been violated. the report stated that failure of the commanding officer to implement half of the required 62 force protection measures. further, according to the investigating officer, there were 19 force protection measures that could possibly have prevented or mitigated the effect of the attack on the uss cole. of these 19 measures, only seven were implemented by the commanding officer. >> at no time is your name mentioned. he is obviously talking about

you. i do not want to get too far in the weeds. that was in 2001. what are the circumstances? it is hard to understand all the language, but what is going on? >> what you are seeing is a senior senator who clearly did not delve into the investigation the way he should have. he is manipulating facts for the purpose of a political agenda. it is unfortunate. what he fails to mention, when you look at the 63 measures, half of them did not even apply to the physical circumstances that we faced that morning. right off the bat, half of those measures, we were at a pier in the middle of the harbor. i'm not worried about the regular access or checking vehicles coming out to the pier said they did not apply. when you look at the other measures, what he fails to mention, he only speaks about the investigating officer. that officer had a very narrow scope given to him for the

investigation to only look on the ship. and could take nothing else into context. he could not take the context of how we came to be in that port, what the intelligence was, what measures other ships may have followed. when they were there. as the investigation went further up the chain of command, and was reviewed by much more experienced officers, they would ultimately determine that there was nothing that the crew or i could've done that morning that would have mitigated or prevented that attack. that was up held all the way to the secretary of defense. when the senator says those things, clearly, either he either did not read the investigation the way he should have, or he is picking facts selectively in order to paint a picture so that he can achieve an agenda that he wants. >> where is it headquartered? >> norfolk, virginia. >> senator warner is from virginia. what role did he play in your future?

>> he would play a role two years later. after the attack. in january of 2002, i would be selected for a promotion. my name would be supported by my entire chain of command. from the chief of naval operations, secretary of the day become a secretary of defense. even the commander in chief and president bush. what a lot of americans do not know, every officer promotion has to go to the senate. they give their advice and consent on every officer. just like they do for every political appointee and federal judge. when the list went over there, senator warner told the navy, i do not agree with your decision to promote. i see he is on the list. if you keep him on the list, i will hold this list up and never allow any officer to go forward. >> here is the former chief of naval operations. >> this particular case was about an attack being conducted on the ship.

in my judgment, this commanding officer was held accountable. i judged him. as you said in your statement, i found some things i think he could have done better. i do not believe that those things rise to the level of punishment to court martial him. i did not believe that was the case. that is the way i made my judgment. >> what are we watching? >> that morning, there was one accountable officer on board. all i ever asked for in that investigation is that you view that accountability determination and how my ship performed before, during, and after the attack. i think the admiral is absolutely right. he said yes, there are things that could have done differently. when i pulled in that morning, i made a decision based on the physical circumstances that they

faced to make a judgment decision on which protection measures to follow and not to follow. so they are tailored to the situation they face and the intelligence they have available in that particular time. i made that determination. there were some measures i did not. what he faulted may 4 was -- me for was i did not immediately inform the chain of command that i had suggested my force protection posture based on the physical circumstances that morning. i was held accountable. senator warner does not tha understand the difference between accountability and blame. there was nothing that could have been down that would have mitigated or prevented the attack. but i was held accountable by the chain of command. senator warner does not clearly understand the difference between accountability and blame. >> why does he want to get in the middle of this? any idea? >> the only thing i could ever surmise is that he had been in discussions with some of the

families that were concerned about the fact that i was being promoted. it was clearly a political decision. he was up for election that fall and did not want to move it forward. >> he is no longer in the senate. in your book, you talk about seeking a meeting with them. >> i did. >> what year was that? >> 2006. >> why did you want to meet with them? >> i worked through the chain of command and had given the navy and the department of defense every opportunity to try to push my name forward so that it could receive the consent of the senate. as is allowed by our constitution. i finally reached a point where it was clear that they were unwilling to put the political stake in the ground. you have to go to the source. >> the chief of naval operations was on your side in that hearing. later on, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff did not approve of your promotion going forward. >> you will have to ask the admiral. i do not understand.

i had been supported throughout the chain of command. he did a complete reversal to what the entire chain of command had supported, including the president. he felt he knew better, but the reasons are still a mystery. >> who is responsible? the secretary of the navy or the chief of naval operations or the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff for promotions for officer? >> it belongs to the secretary of the navy. that is why we have civilian oversight and civilian control of the military. it is not the chief of naval operations and it is not the chairman. they can provide advice, but it is not there board. >> you say that you want to talk to senator warner. have you spoken to him? >> absolutely not. i wanted to allow my chain of command as much latitude on this issue. out of the limelight of dealing one-on-one with the senator. >> what happened? >> i would sit down with the senator at one of the meeting rooms.

that the senate armed services committee has. we would spend about 24 minutes together. chatting aboutultimately, he would be unmoved it. and refused to do it unless the navy was willing to put up with a full senate armed services committee hearing, reopening the investigation. and specifically looking into my suitability for promotion. >> you say that when you showed up for the meeting, there were microphones and several people there. and somebody they're asking you why you did not have a lawyer, where you did not have a pr person? >> politicians in this town of love the theatrics that go along with something like this. when i walked in, it was a table set up with microphones. going to a transcriptionist and they waved their hand and said, we are going to record this. where are your people? where is your public affairs person? where is your attorney? i looked at the staff and said, if i can not clearly articulate to the senator why i should be

promoted, i should not be a captain. i will speak for myself. >> obviously, this book has something to do with where you want to set the record straight. >> i know we have had a long discussion about senator warner. i wanted the book to honor my crew. it is my crew that are the true heroes. they are the ones that sprang into action that morning. they are the ones that saved the ship from sinking. they kept their crewmembers alive. and made sure that in the 99 minutes after the attack, 32 of those people would survive. that does not happen by magic. >> how many of these people are you still in touch with? >> the vast majority of the group. we are a tight group. we still stay in touch with each other,almost on a daily basis. >> you also report that you met with each of the people that were injured.

you went to their families. one family would not see you. >> that is true. there were still angry. they still looked at me as being the commanding officer and being responsible for having the attack occurred. i reached out to that family. over the years. over time, that offer stands for my lifetime, i have talked with the parents, i have talked with the brothers of the person who was killed. we have discussed a number of issues that surround the event itself. and what went on. >> when did you have those meetings? >> right after the investigation was released on january 19. it was that afternoon and evening that i sat down, picked up the phone bank, and began to call all of the families. make sure they received the investigation. answer any questions. many of them were curious as to why i waited until that point to reach out. i told them, it would be unfair

for me to have established any kind of relationship with you as a family for good or for bad. what if the investigation had found me totally accountable and responsible for this attack? and yet i had tried to do that. you would have felt that i had manipulated you or used you somehow. i had to wait for that investigation to run its complete course and be released before ever reaching out to any of those families. over the next couple of weeks, we would establish a time to go out and meet with them. when i initially proposed it to the navy, they were very reluctant. the answer initially was absolutely not, but i knew it was the right thing to do. they would eventually give me a blank check. to get on the road with my command master chief and i would spend 3.5 weeks visiting with each of those families. >> when did you leave the navy? >> i retired in 2007. >> why did you leave? >> it is never a job for life.

evidently, you retire. you get a check every month from the government, and then you go find real work. >> why did you run for congress? >> i ran for congress last year in 2011. i ran because i looked at the way our political situation is going in our country and i said, i can sit on the fringes, i can talk about it, i can complain about it. if you really want to affect the direction and course of the nation, you have to roll up your sleeves and get ready to go swim in that dirty end of the pool called politics. i took a good hard look and i asked a lot of questions. i said, you know, this is going to be the time and place. >> what happened? >> i had 14 months until the

primary. the week after i entered to run for congress in northern nevada, our ethics challenged senator would resign. that would cause the governor to appoint the current congressman in the district. that triggered a special election. it went from 14 months to four months. then the gop sued. so they could make the pick of the party choice rather than allowing it to be an open primary were the people could have a voice. eight weeks later, that pick was made. it would be the gop chairman. that was upheld in the supreme court in nevada. realistically, that is how it works. i am hoping that when the next legislative session meets they will reform the law. we do live in the 21st century. we should be able to have a primary process even for a special election.

we will see what the future brings. >> are you going to run again? >> ample opportunity for both the political future. also a future to contribute out there in nevada. >> i have something called a challenge coin. i do not remember when this started. has been a few years ago that military people give these out and secretaries of the navy and army, what is this thing? i am asking you for reason. >> they are a way that a commander can give a small token to the people working for them for an exceptional job where maybe a medal is not merited. it gives them an opportunity to get these coins and the commander recognizes their superior performance. >> who pays for these? >> if you are in the military, a lot of times they are paid for through official representation of finance.

-- funds. in some commands, they are not allowed to use any government funds. as far as representing the command. they come right out of the commander's pocket. >> the reason i held it up, there was a point in your book were you are quite irritated by general tommy franks. >> i would not say i was irritated. i was just astounded at the fact that he came aboard the ship and was totally disconnected from the reality of what we had been through. he was walking around the ship like it was a garrison tour. he kept walking around saying, you are doing a great job, have one of my coins. and backslapping with the sailors. it was not that i thought the crew did not appreciate what he was doing, but he was the central command commander. he was the guy responsible for putting my ship into that port and having the access to the broadest level of national intelligence, should have been

able to make a determination as to whether we belonged there or not. we were completely blindsided. and yet he made no mention of that fact any time during the thivisit. >> we have some video, though. i do not know if you have ever seen this. >> i am interested in knowing because that is a readiness issue right now. if we do not have the ability to support them and the first people on scene was a french medical team. and then a royal navy vessel and then we started getting people on by air shortly after that. >> that skipper had his hands full. before anyone could help him. >> that is different. if i could say before this body, he did an absolutely miraculous job. both on behalf of his crew and his ship. >> i would have concurred because his ship is still afloat. >> surprised he gave that kind of support? >> i am not. he is a generous and kind man. he is good at recognizing

superior performance. the only thing -- when he was aboard that morning, he appeared to not understand the impact that this attack had. on us and the fact that we had gone through -- we were hit on thursday and he did not come aboard until the following monday. on saturday night, we lose my only operating generator, i cannot restart it. despite three tries. the emergency generator does not work. i go to cut a hole in the side of the ship to get water out, and i cannot initiate the spark to get the torch to work. we are at a point where come early sunday morning, we are using a bucket brigade for 15 minutes.

with every bucket and 200 + sailors bailing out the u.s.s. cole to try to save it. finally, we were able to do that. we jerry rigged some high- pressure air compressors that were portable. to recharge the blast for the generators and five minutes after midnight on monday morning, we'd be restarted the generator and kept it afloat. it is an amazing testament to the group, how well they were trained and what they did. in responding to an emergency like that. >> you show an irritation about the support you got from the navy. the intelligence -- for instance, you say the intelligence chief in yemen did not even bother to communicate with you at all about the possibility of al qaeda. >> he would not communicate directly with me. it is his job as the senior u.s. intelligence official in the country of yemen to be able to develop -- especially in a port to be able to allow the

u.s. military and the department of state and defense to make a determination on whether it is safe for us to be there. i may have been the 27th ship to pull in after a couple of years of doing routine operations in that port. clearly, there was something going on. that he was blind to and did not know what was going on. you have to wonder. i want to go back and touch on the issue with the navy. the phenomenal support that i got was absolutely phenomenal. they really took care of my crew. >> you were irritated by the lack of support from washington? >> it seemed like washington was keeping their distance because everybody knew that this was going to turn into a blame game. what did you give that ship for intelligence?

why was that chip in there? what did you give it for training and protection? everyone was going to be ducking and dodging on this one. rather than being stand up individuals and saying i was accountable, i was responsible. it even took the general a couple of days to stand up, i am the one who started the program of putting ships into that port. and speak up about it. there comes a point in time where i am lonely guy out there at the point of the spear. having taken a major hit and never flinched wavered doing what was necessary. where were all these other people back in washington? what were they doing other than try to avoid responsibility? when in fact, i was seeing a ton of support from my way. washington was very tied up with a huge influx of forces coming out to support us. >> when did your president call you? >> friday night. we got hit on thursday and he called friday night.

nothing in your training ever prepares you for sitting in the back end of the ship on a cell phone talking to the president of the united states about what has just happened. to your ship and crew. >> how long did he spend with you? >> less than a minute. it was a very short conversation. he said, you are doing a great job keeping the ship afloat. the middle east was starting to unravel a little bit. we had the attack at the british embassy. you had had the intifada that had kicked off earlier that week. there were a number of issues starting to pop up about the middle east. he had his hands full more on a strategic and broader scale than just one navy ship. that had been bombed by al qaeda. it was important to me. on a larger strategic perspective, he is looking at the entire pattern of attacks better starting to occur and is wondering if this is the signal for a larger war. >> you said earlier, on january

that may be breaking out with nunnelee al qaeda but other areas throughout the middle east. 19, the report came out -- what year? >> 2001. >> how about president bush? did he give you any more attention? when he came into power? >> absolutely none. >> when president bush came into port, the administration basically looked at it, deputy secretary of defense said, the information is stale. they had an attitude of, we are forward looking not backward acting. u.s.s. cole became a footnote in history. they ignored it, they moved on as a new id ministration credit had been that act of war. we watched the clinton administration and do nothing. waiting until the day before the inauguration of the new administration to release the port into attack. the new administration took over. could have made a decision to

take a new direction. and do something about this act of war. they did nothing. 11 months after the attack, the nation would pay a tragic price. i will tell you, we will never answer the question on whether the attack would have tipped our hand in the intelligence world so that we might know whether or not 9/11 was in progress. and what was going on. i guarantee you, doing nothing in response to the attack sealed our fate. >> on october the 18th, 2000, there was an event at pier 12. we have some video of that. there were ships there, the president of the united states shows up. what was that and were you there for that event? >> that was a memorial ceremony that was put together by the navy. a number of the wounded were able to attend that.

and could be brought over by ambulance. that was to honor the 17 that had been killed. >> you wanted more than that. there was a meeting that was held with members of the families. what year was that? >> that happened in january, 2001, before the investigation. there was a meeting held where all the families were assembled. at the base theater in norfolk. they had the commander-in-chief of the atlantic fleet as well as the federal bureau of investigation director. they basically gave a briefing on where they stood with the investigation, what was going on. the families unloaded on them. they did not deliver getting the attention. they did not feel the questions were being answered properly. they were not paying attention to it and wanted some real answers. and they were not getting them.

>> what about the meeting with president obama? >> that happened on february 6, 2009, right after he took office. that meeting was triggered by his executive order decisions to close guantanamo bay, suspend military commissions. and conduct our review of every detail that was held in guantanamo bay. >> you say in order to get the family members there, they ended up going to the obama contributor list. >> when president obama wanted to meet, he initially wanted to meet with his 9/11 family members. you have to remember, when he signed those executive orders, not once before he did those did he ever consult with the department of state, justice, or defense. he did not know the real impact is going to be on making the decision to say, i am closing guantanamo bay. within a year and getting rid of

the detainees because there were in the wrong place at the wrong time and the others to be put in a federal court system. all you have to do is look at one year later. it was very clear of the american people had spoken out crystal clear, despite what the attorney general wants to do, and said, guantanamo should remain open. it was never intended to be the detention facility it became. we always wanted to be an intelligence facility. that is what i believe it still should become. in talking to the families, it was one of the families from 9/11 that said, the uss cole has been ignored in this all along. you need to invite them. he notified the families of cole. on less than 48 hours of notice. the only ones to could attend were the ones close to washington, d.c. who came at the last minute and were able to make it. >> where is cole today? >> she deployed for the sixth time. since she was repaired back there on the high seas and she left port -- she left about six

weeks ago. >> after the explosion, how long did it take to get cole back in active duty? >> 15 months. yard at the huntington eagle shipyard in mississippi in april of 2002. it was about a 15-month rebuild. $250 million. >> go back to this book. what scores did you settle in this book? besides sank the things you do about the family and the crew. >> i did not want to settle any score. i wanted to memorials -- memorialize the crew. that book is truly about the heroic efforts they made. the fact that we lost a ship that first day once, almost lost it saturday, and they were

able to save it. all the things we endured afterwards, whether it was the investigation, to feeling ignored in the long view of history. by a navy and nation who we fell under the footprint of 9/11. we have been relegated to that dustbin and left to drift into obscurity. that is why i finally said, this has to be captured. the american people need and deserve to know the heroes i was privileged to command that day. and what a phenomenal job they did. >> you did not say much about this, but i want to read it. kevin sweeney walked into the ship's detachment office and announced the pity party was over. and suddenly all the letters and gifts, everything was ordered

disposed of by the end of the day. >> i was shocked when i heard that. i heard it several days later. kevin sweeney was my relief as the commanding officer. when i heard that had happened, what bothered me most is that he was clearly receiving guidance pressure from the leadership of the navy to put this attack behind you, look forward, and turn that ship around. to get it moving forward. the crew never felt like there was a pity party. they never ask for anyone to feel sorry for them. they wanted help in dealing with some of the issues. everybody had post traumatic stress. it is how you deal with that as to whether it becomes a disorder. there were still working through that process. cutto have a harsh, let's it off and pull it forward, he would pull the crew together on several occasions that chose to remain behind and encouraged everyone that had been there to leave at some point. >> did you know him?

>> i did not know him. one of the unique things about the navy, once he was in command, it is your ship. once you relinquish command, it is no longer your ship. while i may have had feelings about decisions he made, those are his decisions to make. he did what he thought was best as the commanding officer. every commanding officer had that opportunity. you make decisions that might be right or may be wrong. that is one of the great things about it. -- about being in command. it is a privilege and a burden as well. >> back to the actual event. how were the 17 killed? >> it was a combination of people that were working in the galley area, down in the general workshop where we do a lot of repair work. the force of the explosion, when it came into the ship,

literally took the deck of the galley area itself and blew it into pieces. one cut off the left side of the ship. one slammed into the mess line. crushing entrapping sailors in the wreckage. the other acted as a scuba and took everyone in the galley along with equipment and those were standing in the mass line and began to shout and crush them toward the starboard or right side of the ship. >> among the injured, how many of them more severely injured to this day have a problem? >> i have not kept track on what their medical conditions are. i do not really know. a number of them are still getting treatment through the va. a number of them retired with disabilities. because of the injuries they did receive in the attack. that is part of the consequences of raising your right hand. and choosing a lack of consequence. when these things happen, the nation assumes an obligation to those sailors. to take care of them for the rest of their lives and to my knowledge, they're doing a good

job of it. >> i read about debbie courtney, ann chamberlain, i can go on. a lot of women on this ship. >> absolutely. that morning, i did not have men and women. i had sailors. each of them performed phenomenally. the fact i singled them out and the fact you pointed out there were men aboard, i have sailors and officers and they will all get treated fair and square. we had a mission to do. that is get ready to conduct sustained combat operations at sea. that is exactly what we did. when the blast hit, it did not matter whether you were a man, a woman. they all performed. they came together as a team. and did what was necessary to save the ship. >> throughout the process, the navy remained publicly silent on the issue of the crew's remains. despite repeated queries. the longer the wait, the more difficult it was going to be for

the families to deal with the tragedy. as many sought a degree of solace in time. months had gone by with no word as families waited in silence. >> they were still working on identifying some of the remains that had been found. as cole as disassembled for repair. when 9/11 occurred, we got put on the back burner. 9/11 became the priority. the identification of those remains became the priority. cole was relegated off to the side, and we would be told to wait. i knew there were families out there that deserved better. those people in the pentagon were in no higher priority than we were. we had been waiting for months. now what was going to turn into more than a year before we get those remains identified. they needed to be handled in a dignified manner. i was not seen that happen.

.- seeing that happene >> there is a person that you felt was responsible for this. as we talk, he is due for a tribunal. can you explain that? >> as part of the process with the obama administration, while they wanted to shut down and bring everybody here, during the end of the bush administration, the guy you were speaking of, he has been brought to guantanamo bay. he is waiting for a military commission to be conducted. we have seen that the attorney general is moving forward with that process. we're beginning to see the charges have once again been reinstated. they are now going to the numbers of motions. you are seeing his attorneys try every legal shenanigan in the book trying to delay the trial. this is classic lawyering.

we is as many motions as we can to delay the trial. in two years, they will claim the united states government is delaying a fair trial. >> who was he? >> he was the principal explosives guys that was brought into the country to credited pulling together all of the assets to conduct the attack. they had already put together a boat with explosives and attempted to send it out to the ship. that would swamp the boat and it would sink at the pier. the people there scattered, it came back, recovered the equipment. tested them in the desert. then they would bring -- he would reorganize the entire way they were planning to conduct the attack. move to a new safehouse, rebuild the boat, put it in their property, and wait for the right time. no more than 9/11 was picked as the day -- they made the call, we pulled in, and that boat came out to us masquerading as the third garbage barge.

>> how do we know? that he did that? >> i have been told there is a lot of different evidence. that definitely ties him to the attack on u.s.s. cole. >> what should happen to him? >> i think he should get the death penalty. >> what are the chances that he will? >> i think it is terribly good. if we have an administration that has the political willpower to do it. he should be sentenced to death. it should be expeditiously carried out. we are at war. this is not the federal court system. the american people made it clear that they realize that what is going on in the time of day is the result of the war effort, not a large-scale criminal action. backed with military force. >> you spent 27 years in the navy. >> 26. >> 30 total years. what are you doing now to make a living? >> most of what i do now, i talk

to groups about uss cole. i serve on the board of military families united. i am on the board of advisers for a startup company, halo defense systems out of massachusetts. they're starting in interested in doing it. it looks like they have a superb product. trying to make sure the american people stay aware. i've engaged in the future of my state out in nevada, obviously. making sure we get the kind of representation we need to carry the country forward. >> you refer to your closest friend. you do not explain who she is. we're relationship issue to you? -- what relationship is she to you? >> she and i have been together for well over 10 years. >> have you been married? do you have children? >> i have not been married and i

do not have children. >> what are your thoughts? he said the attack on cole fundamentally changed how the navy viewed force protection. what has changed? >> what you are seeing now is the navy has done a very good job in doing a lot of exercises. they have provided them with a lot more procedures and equipment and training. one of the force protection measures is to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. it sounds pretty straightforward. at the time we deployed, we had never had any force protection exercises. we had moderate intrusion exercises conducted. we never experienced anything

like the potential for an ied. a water borne ied like we would face. nowadays, when i tell commanding officers, when you go out there and you are told to do protection measures, ask yourself the question, what procedures do i use? what equipment to i have? what rules of engagement do i have available that will allow me to use those measures? what intelligence are driving me to do those measures? if i go into a host nation, are they trained at the same level? do they have the same capability to check out the small boats? do they have the ability to keep boats away from the ship? do they have the ability to check vehicles? if not, you have to expand your presence to do that. if local authorities will not let you do it, do not pull in. >> where were the two that were

on the little boats -- where are they from? were they killed instantly? >> instantly. they were vaporized. by the explosion. we found little pieces of boat and bomber. >> it was a combination of a plastic explosive. with tnt. >> the title of the book is "front burner." our guest has been kirk lippold. u.s. navy retired. >> i want to give you one of my challenge coins. thank you for letting me share this story of some great heroes. >> thank you.

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