>> when you attack buildings or embassies, those are things that are interests. when you attack a warship, that's different that defends u.s. citizens and our interests around the world. when you try to take away a nation's ability to protect itself, it's an act of war. go back to the beginning. i'm sure you've told this story many times, but what day was the ship you were commanding bombed? 2000.ober 12, >> what were the circumstances?

>> we had been operating in the mediterranean for about six and a half weeks had come through the suez canal on the 9th of october, down the red sea. we had been held back until the last possible minute in the european theater of operations. and consequently, we had to go at a high-speed transit, 25 knots, about 30 miles an hour, double the normal speed ships would transit to the middle east. it was because of that transit we went through the strait, rounded the arabian peninsula, we needed fuel. we were below 50%. a ship like uss cole carries over a half million gallons, so we had to find someplace to stop. because of the drawdown in the naval forces over a number of years, if not decades, we had gone from a navy of 4,000 ships following world war ii to a little shy of 600 at the height of reagan buildup, to 315 the morning of october 12. there wasn't one within about 1,000 miles. they looked at two ports to

refuel. aidan, jabutti, and said, adrian is the safer port, that's where we're going to pull you into to refuel, expected to be there about six to eight hours, taking on a little more than a quarter million gallons. today sounds like maybe even the headquarters of al qaeda. what was it known then and why -- i know you asked this question in the book. what were you doing in aidan, yemen? >> our nation had made a decision a couple of years before uss cole ever pulled into that port to do engagement on a broader level with the yemenees government with the capital. had decided that yemen -- or aidan was a good port for navy ships to pull into. it was a way to have is a refueling port of the it was also a way to introduce money into their economy and help them out in a very bilateral type of engagement. we had put demining teams to help the country demine in the

early 1990's. so there were a number of activities going on. what we weren't doing was investing in our intelligence and knowledge of what was going on in that country. i think every ship that operated in that region knew that there was a general threat from al qaeda. 06iously we had had -- obviously we had the bombings two years before. there was nothing to indicate that there was a threat to navy ships in the fifth fleet or the central command middle east area of responsibility. >> what is -- first of all, what's the name, cole, come from? >> uss cole is named after darryl s. cole, a marine sergeant who was posthumously award the medal of honor for his actions in iwo jima in world war ii. >> and how old was this ship when you were in yemen? >> 4 1/2 years old when we pulled in. she had been commissioned in the navy. the official ceremony was in june 1996. so a fairly new destroyer, modern equipment. she had already made one

deployment and had come back to the united states, gone through a small maintenance and retrofit period, and had done a training cycle of about 16 months before we deployed in august of 2000. >> how long had you been on her and what was your rank and position? >> on october 12, 2000, i had been in command of the ship for about 15 months, and i was a commander in the united states navy. >> explain how a man can be, or a woman, can be a commander on a ship but still be the captain. >> well, the way the navy works it doesn't matter whether you're a lieutenant in charge of a patrol craft or a navy captain in charge of a cruiser or aircraft carrier. you earn, during the time you're in command, that honorable ryan raburny title of captain -- that honorary title of captain. >> how big is the ship? >> 8400 tons approximately. >> how many sailors and how many officers, enlisted? >> normal complement is about 25 officers and about 275 enlisted. we were just a little bit shy of

300 that morning. >> how many were killed? how many injured? >> there were 17 killed and 37 that were wounded and awarded purple hearts. >> exactly of what happened and -- exactly what happened and at what time? >> we pulled in for refueling around 9:30, mowerred the ship in the middle of the harbor. we were stashor side. our bow was pointed out of the harbor. i turned the ship around as a force protection measure. about 10:30 we started refueling the ship. the clock was ticking at that point. during the course of operations that morning, my supply officer had come to me, made arrangements for three garbage barges to come out to the ship. in addition to the normal arrangements, the logistics agent reported to remove sewage and top off our fresh water tanks. we wanted to get rid of our trash, hazardous material and plastics, none of which we dump at sea. so we had arranged for three garbage bearnlings to come out. -- barges to come out.

the crew was unloading trash. i was doing routine paperwork when at 11:18 in the morning there was a thunderous explosion. you could feel all 505 feet, 8,400 tons of destroyer quickly thrust up into the right. it was like we hanged in the second for second in the air. we came back down in the water. lights went out. ceiling tiles popped out. everything on my desk lifted up about a foot and slammed back down. i literally grabbed the underside of my desk in a brace position until the ship stopped moving and i could stand up. i went to the door of my cabin. i looked down the passage way or hallway right there, this gray cloud came toward me. there wasn't a sound on the ship. i didn't know why. but that gray cloud silently washed over me. i could smell the dust. i could smell the fuel. but i could also smell this metallic tang and didn't know what it was. within seconds, though, i knew we had been attacked. i knew it wasn't a fuel explosion. when i turned the ship around in

the harbor, right side to the pier, if it had been an explosion on the pier, i should have been shoved left. i had been thrust up to the right. the only thing on the left side of that ship was open harbor. i knew something probably had come alongside and detonated. >> how soon did you know people were injured and killed? >> i wouldn't know immediately. intuitively i knew that we were gooding to have injuries -- going to have injuries beyond exiebility to treat. the -- at that moment in time, i didn't know if we were going to be boarded, if there was going to be a follow-on attack. i went back to my darkened cabin, unlocked the safe for the keys to the weapons. i pulled out a .9-millimeter, loaded, chambered, decocked it, grabbed ammunition, went outside the ship, stood there took a deep breath as i looked around. the watch team stationed in the middle of the ship was gone. their wooden podium had been blown into pieces and was scattered across the deck. the wires that used to form our

antennas were snapped off. there was this dirty black water dripping off everything. i remembered -- i had sworn that oath to support and defend the constitution. i'd be willing to give my life if necessary to do so. and i'm now faced with that moment. so i took a deep breath and headed toward the port side not knowing what i was going to find. >> what was your first reaction on what you found? >> when i first got there, my chief gunners mate, i thankfully saw, was re-establishing the perimeter around the ship. but the rest of the security team, i immediately went over to the port side, looked over, you could tell in that moment that there was an attack. the explosion had blown metal into the ship. nothing was pointed outward. were fourely there orange wraps alongside the ship. the first thing that went through my mind was one of those wraps got alongside and was blown up. turns out, it wasn't. the two garbage barges that had been alongside the ship had left about 11:15, transiting back across the hash rob ryan. what we didn't know is al qaeda

had been in that port for a number of months observing navy ships. the third barge that came out masqueraded as the garbage barge. undere operating peacetime rules of engagement. it didn't exhibit what we call hostile intend like aiming guns or shooting at us. so people thought naturally it was the third garbage barge. came down the side of the ship two guise were in it. stood up. waved to the crew. it came to the exact same spot in the middle of the ship where the previous barge had been and then initiated the explosion. >> you say in your book that the guys waved and smiled and then blew themselves up as well as the people on your ship. what kind of people are these? >> i think what you're seeing is a very dedicated and focused enemy. they will stop at nothing to further their ideology, to try to get -- you have to remember what bin laden's entire declaration of war says. he wanted all u.s. forces out of the middle east. and then they wanted to expand the radical islam to take east

whole world. >> i'm going to come back to some of this but i want to jump to 9/11 to september 9, 2001. where were you? >> that morning i had been briefed up at the c.i.a. had received a call, a former commanding officer of mine was now retired and working up there. i had driven up the george washington parkway, arrived up at the old headquarters building, walked inside. it was just -- in some ways it was like a movie set to me. the 16-inch granite seal in the floor in the main entryway. to the left is the single star for all of those that had died in the o.s.s., the precursor to the organization to the c.i.a. and on the right were row afro of gold stars of those -- row after owe of gold stars. we started a briefing at 7:00. it went for an hour and a half. at the end i was talking with mr. charlie allen, one of the assistant deputy directors there, and i said, thank you,

sir, for taking the time, but america doesn't understand. i believe it's going to take a seminole event, probably in this country, where hundreds if not thousands die before americans realize we're at war with this guy. he said, well, we're doing our best to make sure that doesn't happen. but 20 minutes later we watched as the first plane hit. i looked at the tv with the smoke coming out of the world trade center wondering, what sightseeing plane on a beautiful, clear day like this, could fly into the side of a building? you could also tell from the size of the hole something wasn't quite right. a few minutes later i was standing in the counterterrorism center, literally about to walk in and meet cofer black at the time when we watched in horror like the rest of the nation did as the second plane slammed in. >> who is cofer black? >> he was the director for the counterterrorism center at the c.i.a. >> under what auspices were you at the c.i.a.? >> i was purely there as a military officer, receiving an

off-the-record briefing on what the agency knew before, during, and after the attack on the uss cole. thend what were circumstances for you in the navy at that point? what was your job? >> at that time i had change of command on uss cole. in march i had attended the joint forces staff college in norfolk, virginia, then reported to the joint chiefs of staff. the office i was dealing with was called united nations and multilateral affairs so we were dealing with a lot of international treaties. the auspices i was in was unique in that we were the only global strategy office. most of them were broken down by regions. we were the only ones that kind of spanned the world as far as treaties, united nations, and other issues that effected our country. >> what was the navy saying to you about your future at that point? >> at that point my career looked to be on track. >> you were still a commander. >> i was still a commander. >> and in the navy for how long? >> i had been in the navy at that point a little over 20 years. it was the fall of 2001. i had been commissioned out of

the naval academy in 1981. and i had been told following the investigation on cole, you have a career, you have potential, you don't take normal folks and send them to the joint chiefs of staff for an assignment like this. so i felt very privileged to be working on the premiere staff in the united states military working for the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. that whole issue would suddenly change on the morning of september 11. >> why? >> being the only office that was global, they needed to develop a strategy and policy. and the office i was in was given the unique mission of crafting detainee policy. how do we put together? we know we're going to insert forces into afghanistan initially on a low footprint. we knew we were going to capture people. so so it first became, ok, when we go to capture people, who do we want to capture? that was ultimately widdled down to high-level taliban and al qaeda. that group, where do we put them? initially they were hooking at

kandahar it would turn into bagram. but they needed a more long-term facility out of that country because we didn't know how pervasive al qaeda was throughout afghanistan. we looked around the world at a number of places and eventually settled on this unique piece of territory called guantanamo bay. secretary rumsfeld, at the time, was somewhat reluctant to be building out a facility there. so we would piecemeal put together, and i think everyone remembers the horrible pictures of camp x-ray. the reality is those facilities had existed for years, and that was the temporary holding facility for haitian migrants. nobody complained then. but suddenly when you put terrorists in there the world went into a human rights uproar about it when, in fact, they were being treated humanely. they were treated consistent with but not in accordance with the geneva convection because they didn't merit protection under the geneva convection. i had a unique opportunity of being the joint staff

representative on what was called the interrogation techniques working group to determine what techniques the military would use in handling these detainees. and ultimately we decided very conservatively to only use those methods that were in the army field manual at the time which has since been expanded by a couple of measures. for the most part, we weren't going to get into any of the areas where obviously other government agencies had gone. i think it was the right decision. then it was, how do we repate rate them -- repatriot them? if we captured someone who didn't belong in guantanamo, how do we repatriot them if they no longer represent a threat or an intelligence issue. >> why do you call your book "front burner"? >> unique. the term, "front burner," when i made the initial report off the ship, is code for attack on u.s. forces. >> at the pentagon, you're working with the joint chiefs

and you're still a commander. you graduated from the naval academy what year? >> 1981. >> this is 2001, you've been in the navy for 20 years. when does someone who's been in the navy for 20 years and is a commander expect to get promoted? >> normally -- i was what they call a dual course officer, theote add long with majority of my classmates. i was never selected early for promotion, so i expected to be looked at sometime around the 22 to 23-year point for promotion to captain. and everything looked to be on track for that. >> let me run a piece of recorded video with senator john warner. we'll ask you about this. >> in the case of the cole, the report of the jagman's investigation officer was clear, it was precise. and in my personal judgment it was a professional job. well done. the report found that

instructions, directives and ordered issues by the chief of naval operation, the central command had been violated. in fact, the report stated that failure by the commanding officer to implement half of the required 62 force protection measures. further, according to the investigating officer, there were 19 force protection measures that could possibly have prevented or at a minimum mitigated the effect of the attack on the uss cole. of these 19 measures, only seven were implemented by commanding officer of the cole and his crew. >> by the way, no time is your name mentioned, but he's obviously talking about you. >> absolutely. >> that was in 2001. what are the circumstances? i don't want to get too far in the weeds because it's hard to understand all of the language. but what's going on here? >> what you're really seeing is a senior senator who clearly did

not delve into the investigation the way he should have and is manipulating facts for the purpose of a political agenda. it's very unfortunate. what the senator fails to mention when he talks about half the measures not implemented is when you looked at those 63 measures, half of them didn't even apply to the physical circumstances that we faced that morning we pulled in. so right off the bat half of those measures, we were at a pier in the middle of the harbor. i'm not worried about vehicle access or checking vehicles coming out to the pier. so they didn't apply. when you look at the other measures, what he doesn't -- fails to mention is he only speaks about the investigating officer. that investigating officer had a very narrow scope given to him for the investigation to only look on the ship and could take nothing else into context. he couldn't take the context of how we came to be in that port, what the intelligence was that we had onboard the ship, what force protection measures other ships may have followed when they were there. and as the investigation went further up the chain of command

and was reviewed by much more experienced officers than the investigating officer, who was just a navy captain, they would ultimately determine that there was nothing that the crew or i could have done that morning that would have mitigated or prevented that attack. was upheld all the way through the secretary of defense. so while the senator says those things, clearly he either didn't read the investigation the way he should have or he is picking facts selectively in order to paint a picture so that he can achieve an agenda that he wants. >> where is cole headquartered? >> cole is home quartered in norfolk, virginia. >> senator warner is from virginia. >> absolutely. >> what role did play in your future? >> well, he clearly would play a role two years later after the attack in january of 2002. i would be selected for promotion to captain. my name would be supported through my entire chain of command from the chief of naval operations, secretary of navy, secretary of defense, even the

commander in chief in president bush. what a lot of americans don't know is every officer for promotion has to go to the senate. and they give their advice and consent on every officer, just they do every political appointee or a federal judge in the united states. so when the list went over there, senator warner looked at it and basically told the navy, i'm not -- i don't agree with your decision to promote commander lippold. >> see he is on the list. if you keep him on the list, i will hold this list up and not allow any officer on this promotion list to go forward. >> here's former chief of naval operations vernon clark. >> and this particular case was about an attack being conducted on the ship. and in my judgment, this commanding officer was held accountable. and i judged him. and as you said in your statement, i found some things that i think he could have done better, but i don't believe that those things rise to the level

of punishment, to court martial him or something. i didn't believe that that was the case. and that's the way i made my judgment, mr. chairman. >> what are we watching there? >> well, one thing i'd like to make very clear is that that morning there was one accountable officer onboard uss cole, and that was me. and all i've ever asked for in that investigation and anything that you view that accountability determination in how my ship performed before, during, and after the attack. i think admiral clark is absolutely right, when he looks at it, he says, yes, there were probably things i could have done differently when i pulled in that morning. i made a decision as every commanding officer has the latitude to do based on the physical circumstances that they face when they pull in to make a judgment decision on which force protection measures to follow and not to follow so that they are specifically tailored to the situation they face and the intelligence that they have available in that particular time. i made that determination. there were some measures that i

didn't what the c & o faulted for me and rightly so was that i had not immediately informed the chain of command that i adjusted the posture based on the physical circumstances that morning. he clearly said there was nothing that could have been done that would have mitigated or prevented the attack. but i was held accountable by the chain of command. senator warner, however, does not clearly understand the difference between accountability and blame. >> why does want to get in the middle of this? >> senator warner? >> yeah. any idea? >> the only thing i could ever surmise is that he had gotten -- he had been in discussions with the families that were concerned about the fact that i was being promoted. it was clearly a political decision for him, 2002 he was up for election that fall. he did not want to move it forward. >> he's no longer in the senate. in your book you talk about seeking a meeting with him. >> i did. >> what year was that? >> that was in 2006. >> why did you want to meet with

him? worked through the chain of command and given the navy and the department of defense every opportunity to try and push my name forward so that it could set of advice and consent of the senate as is allowed by our constitution. but i finally reached a point where it was clear that they were unwilling to put that political stake in the ground against senator warner's wishes. so you have to go to the source. >> explain this. vernon clark, chief of naval was on your side in that hearing but later on the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who's also a navy man, mike mullen, did not approve of your promotion going forward. why? >> you'll have to ask admiral mullen. i really don't understand. i clearly had been supported throughout the chain of command. he walked in and did a complete reversal to what the command had previously supported, including the president. obviously he felt he knew better. but the reasons he list ready still a mystery to me. >> who's responsible, the secretary of the navy or the chief of naval operations or the

chairman of the joint chiefs of staff on promotions for officers? >> boards along to the secretary of the navy. that's why we had civilian oversight, civilian control of the military. it is the secretary of the navy's actual promotion board. it is not the chief of naval operations and it is not the chairman. they can provide advice on it, but it is not their board. >> so in 2006 you say i want to talk to senator warner. had you spoken with him up until that point? >> absolutely not. i wanted to allow my chain of command as much opportunity and latitude as possible to resolve this issue out of the limelight of having to deal one-on-one with the senator. >> what happened? >> i would sit down with the senator over at one of the meeting rooms that the senate armed services committee has. we would spend about -- excuse me, 24 minutes together chatting about it. and ultimately he would be unmoved and refused to do it unless the navy was willing to put up with a full senate armed services committee hearing, re-opening the cole

investigation, and specifically my suitability for promotion. >> but you say in your book when you showed up the morning to have the meeting there were microphones and several people there. somebody there asked you why you didn't have a lawyer, a p.r. person with you. >> i think you know as well as i do the politicians in this town love the thee yacht ricks that go along -- the theatrics that go with this. when i walked in, it was a table with full of microphones going to a transcriptionist. they said we are going to record it. where are all of your people? where's your public affairs person? your attorney to give you legal advice? and i just looked at the staff of the senate armed services committee and said if i can't clearly articulate to the senator why i should be promoted to captain, then i probably shouldn't be a captain. i'll speak for myself. >> obviously this book has something to do with the way you want to set record straight. >> well what that book really to do is not with me. i know we've had kind of a long discussion here about senator

warner, but the reality is, i wanted that book to honor my crew because it is my crew that are the true heroes of seoul seoul. they're the ones that sprang in action that morning. they're the ones that saved that ship from sinking. they're the ones that kept their crewmates alive, and made sure that in the 99 minutes after the attack of the initial 33 we'd evacuate off the ship that morning, 32 of those people would survive. that doesn't happen by magic. >> how many of these people are you still in touch with? >> the vast majority of the crew. we are a very tight group. we still stay in touch with each other. almost on a daily basis whether it's through facebook or e-mails. a number of ways. that you meteport with each of the people that either lost their lives or were injured. you went to their familyies' location. one family wouldn't see you. why? >> that's true i think they were still angry. they still looked at me as being the commanding officer and being responsible for having allowed attack to occur. i've reached out to that family

over the years. and over time, while we have never officially sat and met that offer stands for my lifetime. but i've talked with the parents. i've talked with the brothers of person that was killed. we have discussed in many way a number of issues that surround the event itself and what went on. >> when did you have those meetings? >> right after the investigation was released on january 19. it was that afternoon and evening. but i sat down, picked up the phone, and began to reach out and call families and say initially establish contact with them, make sure they receive the investigation, answer any questions. many of them were curious why i waited until that point to reach out to them. and i realistically told them, i said it would be unfair for me to have established any kind of relationship with you as a family for good or for bad because what if the investigation had come out and found me totally accountable and this attack and yet i had tried to do that? you would have felt that i had

you or used you somehow. i had to wait for that investigation to run its complete and thorough course and be released before i ever reached out to any of those families. and then ultimately over the couple of weeks we would establish a time period to go out and meet with them. when i had initially proposed to the navy, they were very reluctant. as a matter of fact, the answer initially was absolutely not. but i knew it was the right thing to do. and to the navy's credit, they would eventually give me a blank check to get on the road with my command master chief, who was the senior enlisted onboard, and i would spend three and a half weeks visiting with each of those families. >> when did you left navy? >> i retired in june 2007. >> why did you leave? >> well, when you join the military, there's a unique thing. it's never a job for life and eventually you retire. you get a check every month from the government. and then you go find real work. >> why did you run for congress and when? >> i ran for congress last year in 2011, aiming for 2012.

i ran because in the four years that i had been out, i just took a look and said you don't spend 26 years in a great organization like the united states navy and not miss that sense of service to your country. and i looked at the way our political situation was going in our country, and i said, you know, i can sit on the fringes, i can talk about it, i can i can makeout it, recommendations on how to improve it. but if you really want to affect the direction and course of the nation, you have to roll up your sleeves and get ready to go swim in that dirty end of the pool called politics. so i took a good hard look, laid out the plan, asked a lot of questions, and then finally said, you know, this is going to be the time and the place. >> what happened? >> when i entered the race, i had 14 months to a primary in june of this year. unfortunately the week after i entered to run for congress in northern nevada, our ethics challenge senator john he hason would resign -- john ensign would resign that would cause

the governor to fill out the remainder of his term which triggered a special election so it went from 14 months to a primary to four months to a special election. then the g.o.p. in the state sued so that they could make the pick of the party choice rather than allowing an open primary where the people could have a voice. eight weeks later that pick was made. it would be the g.o.p. chairman. that was upheld by the supreme court in nevada a couple of weeks later. next thing i know, i'm on the street corner going what just happened? realistically, that's how it works. i am hoping that when the next legislative session in nevada meets, that they will form a law. we do live in the 21st century. we should be able to have a primary process even for a special election. and we'll see what the future brings. >> are you going to run again? >> we will see what the future brings. i think that there is ample opportunity in the state for both a political future but also just a future to contributed in nevada. -- to considerable contribute in nevada. >> i have a challenge coin.

you can seat size of it. i don't remember when this started, but it's been a few years ago that military people give these out and secretaries of the navy and army. what is this? i'm asking you for a reason. >> well, what they are is they are a way that a commander can give a coin, a small token to the people working for them for an exceptional job where maybe a medal is not merited but it gives them an opportunity to get these coins and know that the commander truly cares and recognizes their superior performance. >> who pays for these? >> typically if you're in the military, a lot of times they are paid for through what they call official representation funds. the commander does. in some commands, they're not allowed to use any kind of government funds to buy those things as part of representing the command and they come right out of the commander's pocket. reason i held it up and asked about it is because there was a point in your book where you're quite irritated by general tommy franks.

>> i wouldn't say i was necessarily irritated as that i was just astounded at the fact that he came aboard the ship a few days after the blast and was totally disconnected from the reality of what we had been through. he was walking around the ship like it was a garrison tour onboard at peacetime base and kept walking around saying, you know, you're doing a great job here, have one of my coins. and backslapping with the sailors, and having it. it wasn't that i don't think the crew didn't appreciate what he was doing. but from my vantage point, he was the central command commander. he was the guy responsible for putting my ship into that port and having the access to the broadest level of national intelligence. should have been able to make a determination whether we even belong there had or not. we had been completely blindsided yet he made no mention of that fact. >> we have video -- i don't know if you've ever seen this from general tommy franks. >> i'm interested in knowing it because that's a readiness issue now. if we've got that many people

deployed into your part of the world and we don't have the ability to support them and the first people onscene were a french medical team and then a royal navy vessel of some kind, then we start getting people on by air shortly after that, that skip her his hands full for a long time before anybody could help them. skipper had his hands full, skipper lippold. and if i could say before this body, did an absolutely miraculous job both on behalf of his crew and his ship. >> without having had any other briefing, i would have concurred because his ship is still afloat. >> surprised that he gave you that support? >> actually, i'm not. general franks is a very, very generous and kind man. he also is very good at recognizing superior performance. the only thing -- when he was aboard that morning, he just appeared to not really -- just really understand the impact that this attack had had on us and the fact that we had already gone through -- we were hit on

thursday, and he didn't come aboard until the following monday. so we had had four days where we had almost lost the ship saturday night. the ship in the initial attack was fairly stable right off the bat and we were able to contain the damage. but on saturday night when we go through a cass cascading series of tragedy where's we lose my only operating generator, i cannot restart it decide three tries, the emergency generator on the mir doesn't work. i go to cut a hole on the side of the ship to get emergency pumps to get water out of the flooding engine rooms, and can't initiate the spark to get torch to work. literally we're at a point where come early sunday morning we are using a bucket brigade for 15 minutes with every bucket and 200-plus sailors bailing out uss cole for a period of time to try to save it. finally we were able to do that, sailor engine ute, we -- enginuity. about five minutes after midnight monday morning we would restart the generator and keep

it afloat. it's an amazing testament to the crew, how well they were trained and what they did in responding to an emergency like that. >> through your book, though, you show an irritation about the support you got from the navy. not only that but the intelligence. for instance, you say that the intelligence, c.i.a. station chief in yemen didn't even bother to communicate with you at all about the possibility of al qaeda being there. >> he wouldn't communicate directly with me, but he certainly -- it's his job as the senior u.s. intelligence the unitedive to states government in the country of yemen to be able to develop assets throughout that country. and especially in a port like aidan where we're pulling ships in, to be able to allow the u.s. military and the department of state and department of defense to make a determination on whether it is safe for us to be there. i may have been the 27th ship to pull in after a couple of years of doing routine refueling operations in that port.

was something going on there that he was blind to and didn't know what was going on. so you have to wonder. i want to go back a second and touch on the issue with the navy. the phenomenal support that i got from -- was absolutely phenomenal. they really, really took care of my crew. >> you had a sense -- he had a sense you were irritated by the lack of support from here in washington. >> well it seemed like washington was keeping their distance from this. because everybody knew this was going to turn into a blame game of, why was that ship in there? who order it had in there? what did you give that ship for intelligence? what did you give it for training and protection before they ever pulled in there? everyone was going to be ducking and dodging rather than being standup individuals and saying i was accountable and i was responsible. it even took general distincty a couple of days in saying i started the program in putting ships into that port and speak

up about it. so you have to wonder. there comes a point in time when i'm the lonely guy out there at the tip of the spear having taken a major hit and never flinched or waiverred out there, doing what was necessary to keep my ship afloat and my crew safe. where were all of these other people back in washington? and what were they doing other than trying to avoid responsibility when in fact, i a ton of support flow my way? washington, by the same token, was very tied up in that particular moment with the huge influx of forces that were coming out to support us. >> when did your president call you, president clinton? >> friday night. happened on what day? >> we got hit on thursday. he would call friday night. i will tell you right now, brian, nothing in your training ever prepares you for sitting at the back end of the ship on a cell phone talk together president of the united states about what has just happened to your ship and crew. >> how long did he spend with you? >> less than a minute. a very short conversation. he basically said the thoughts

and prayers of the american are with you, you're doing a great job keeping the ship afloat. at that point the middle east was starting to unravel a little bit. we had had the follow-on day's attack at the embassy, the british embassy. you had had the intifada that kicked off earlier that week. there were i a number of issues throughout the middle east that he had his hands full more on a strategic and broader scale than just one navy ship in a port of adrian that had been bombed by al qaeda. while important to me, on a larger strategic perspective, he's looking at the entire pattern of attacks that are to occur throughout the middle east and is wondering, is this the signal for a larger war be break out with not only al qaeda but other areas throughout the middle east? >> again, on the timing, you said earlier that on january 19, a report came out -- january 19 of what year? >> january 19, 2001. >> how about president bush? did he give you any more

attention? the uss cole. when he came into power. >> absolutely none. when president bush came into port, the administration basically looked at it. deputy secretary of defense wolfowitz basically said the information on cole is stale. and they had an attitude of we're forward looking not backward acting. and consequently, uss cole became a footnote in history. they ignored it. they moved on as a new administration. it had been an act of war. we had watched the clinton administration do nothing, literally waiting until the day before the inauguration of a new to release the port end of the attack. the new administration took over, could have made a decision to take a new direction and do something about this act of war and did nothing. 11 months after the attack on the uss cole, the nation would pay a tragic price. i will tell you, we will never answer, be able to answer, the question on whether the attack on uss cole in responding to it

would have tipped our hand in the intelligence world so that we might know whether or not 9/11 was in progress and what was going on. but i guarantee you, doing nothing in summons to the attack attack -- in response to attack sealed our fate. >> october 18, 2000. an event at pier 12 at the naval -- the norfolk naval station. we have video of that. there were ships there, men dressed, women, in their whites, president of the united states shows up. what was that? and were you there for that event? >> no. that was a memorial ceremony put together by the navy. a number of the wounded who had been brought back and were in andsmouth naval hospital could be brought over by ambulance were able to attend that. that was to honor the 17 that been killed. >> but you are frustrated throughout your book when you talk about through the years you wanted more than that. there was a meeting eventually that was held with members, the family members. what year was that?

>> that happened actually in january, early january, 2001 before the investigation was released. wherewas a meeting held all the families were assembled at the base theater in norfolk, that they had the commander in chief at the atlantic fleet at the time, as well as the federal bureau of investigation director, louis freeh, were there. they gave a briefing on where they stood with the investigation, what was going on, and the families basically on them. they didn't feel they were getting the attention. they didn't feel the questions were being answered properly. they felt like cole was being ignored in many ways by the navy leadership. were not pay attention to it. and they wanted some real answers. they weren't getting them. >> what about the meeting that was subsequently held with president obama? >> that happened on february 6, 2009, right after he took office. that meeting was actually triggered by his executive order decisions to close guantanamo bay, suspend military commissions, and conduct a review of every detainee that

was held in guantanamo bay. >> you say in order to get the members of the -- the family members there, that they ended up going to the obama contributor list? >> initially what happened is when president obama wanted to meet -- he initially wanted to meet with just 9/11 family members. it was going to be only the 9/11 family members that were known to be supporting him in his runup for office. you have to remember, when he signed out those three executive orders, not once before he did those did he ever consult with the departments of state, justice, or defense. he didn't know the real impact was going to be on making that decision to say i'm closing guantanamo bay within a year, getting rid of the detainees because they're clearly in the wrong place at the wrong time and the others were put into the federal court system, all you have to do is look at one year later and it was very clear the american people have spoken out crystal clear, despite what the attorney general wants to do, and said guantanamo should remain open. it was never intended to be the

detention facility of the detained. we always want it had to be an intelligence facility. that's what i believe it still should become. but in talk together families that were there it was one of families from 9/11 that said, you know, uss cole has been ignored in this all along, you need to invite them. on less than 48 hours notice he notified the families of cole. and unfortunately the only ones that could really attend were the ones close by to washington, d.c. who came at the last minute and were able to make it. >> where is cole today? >> great news. uss cole deployed for the sixth time since she was repaired back out there on the high seas. she left norfolk about six weeks ago. >> so after the explosion, when you lost 17 of your crew and 37 wounded, how long did it take to get cole back in active duty? >> it took a period of about 15 months. from the time uss cole was brought back on that heavy lift ship blue marlin and arrived in

mid december until she sailed away from the yard at the huntington eagles shipyard in mississippi in april of 2002, it was about a 15-month rebuild period. >> what did it cost us? >> $250 million. >> so go back to this book. what scores did you feel you settled in this book that you wanted to, besides saying the things do you about the families and the crew? >> i didn't want to settle any scores. what i wanted to do in that book was memorialize a great crew that did a phenomenal job saving that ship and saving their shipmates. that book is truly about the heroic effort that they made, the arduous and terrible circumstances that we had to live under for the 17 days we were in the port, the fact that we lost the ship, almost lost the ship that first day once, almost for sure lost it saturday and they were able to save it and bring it back, and then all of the things that we endured afterwards. whether it was from the investigation to feeling ignored in the long view of history by a

navy and a nation who we fell under the footprint of 9/11 and consequently had been kind of relegated to that dustbinn and left to drift into obscurity which is why i finally said, you know, this has to be captured for the american people. the american people need and deserve to know the hero that i was privileged to command that day and what phenomenal job they did. >> you don't really say much about this, but i want to read and get your further explanation. kevin sweeney walked into the ship's detachment offices and announced that the pity party was over and suddenly all letters, gifts, posters from the local school children and patriotic americans across the nation, everything was ordered disposed of by the end of the day. >> i was shocked when i heard that from the crew. i heard it several days later. >> who? cole.in sweeney was my relief when i had heard that that had happened what bothered me most that he was clearly receiving guidance pressure from the

leadership of the navy to put this attack behind you, look forward, and turn that ship around and get it moving forward. the crew never felt like there was a pity party. they never felt or asked for anyone to be sorry for them. all they wanted to was help in dealing with some of the issues that they were dealing with. everyone on that ship, including me, had posttraumatic stress. but it's how you deal with it to whether or not it becomes a disorder. they were still working through that process. but having a harsh, let's cut it off and just look forward and not do anything, he would, in fact, pull the crew together on several occasion that chose to remain behind and help rebuild the ship and encouragessed everyone that had been there during attack to leave at some point. >> did you know him? >> i didn't know kevin before he did that. the unique things about the navy is once you assume command, it's your ship. once you relinquish command, it's no longer your ship. while i may have had feelings myself for how he made decisions while he's in command, those are his decisions to make.

did what he thought was best as the commanding officer for right or for wrong. every commanding officer has that opportunity. you make decisions that in the long view of history might be right and may be wrong of the but that's one of the great things about being in command. it is a privilege and it's a burden as well. >> back to the actual event, how were those 17 killed? where were they when they lost their lives? >> it was a combination of people working in the galley area, the mess line itself, and main room number one and the general work shop where we do a lot of repair work for the ship right next to it. the force of the explosion, when it came into the ship, literally took the deck of the galley area itself, which was the ceiling, or overhead in main engine room one, and blew it into four piece. one cut off the left side of the ship. one slammed forward into my chief petty officer's mess, one slammed into the mess line crush and trapping sailors in the wreckage. the other acted as a scoop of e

in the galley along the those standing in the mess line and began to shove and crush them toward the right side of the ship. >> and among the injured, how many of them were severely injured to this day have a problem? >> i haven't kept track on their medical conditions so i don't really know. i know that i anumber of them are still getting treatment through the v.a. a number of them retired with disoibz because of the injuries they did receive in the attack. that's part of the consequences of raising your right hand and choosing a life of consequences when these things happen, the nation assumes an obligation to those sailors to take care of them for the rest of their lives to my knowledge, they're doing a good job of it. >> one of the surprises to me was i read about debbie courtney. >> yes. >> i read about denise woodson, about anne chamberlain. i can go on. a lot of women on this ship. >> absolutely. but i'll tell you something, that morning i didn't have men and women aboard uss cole. i had sailors. and each of them performed

phenomenally. the fact that i singled them out and the fact that you pointed out that there were women aboard the ship, i just looked at it and said, look, i don't have men and women aboard this ship, i've got sailor and officers. they're all going to get treated and square. and we have a mission to do. that's get uss cole ready to conduct sustained combat operations at sea, and that's exactly what we did. when that blast hit, it didn't matter whether you were a man, whether you were a woman. they all performed phenomenally. came together a team and did what was necessary to save the ship. >> let me read this from your book. the process, the navy remained publicly silent on the issue of additional crews' remains despite repeated queries. longer the wait, the more difficult it was going to be for families to deal with the continuing tragedy as many sought solis and closure in the healing nature of time. months had gone by with no word as the families waited in silence.

>> when 9/11 occurred, we got put on the backburner. the identification of the remains became the priority. cole, which was been one of my complaints all along, was relegated off to the side and we would be told to wait. i knew the families deserved better. we had been waiting for months. it would turn into more than a year before we would get those remains identified. they needed to be handled in a dignified manner. and i was not seeing that happen. >> there's a person that you felt was responsible for this, is in guantanamo, who is, as we talk, due for a tribunal. can you explain that? and why -- when you wrote this book, it hadn't been determined that he was going to be -- to get a tribunal. >> as part of the whole process with the obama administration,

while they wanted to shut down military commissions and bring everyone here, during the end of the bush administration, the guy you're speaking to is al nashiri. he is there waiting for a military commission to be conducted on him. he had eventually seen the attorney general is moving forward with that process. has allowed the department of defense to move forward. we are beginning to seat charges have once again been reinstated against him. they are now going through the numbers of motions. you're seeing his attorneys try every legal shenanigan in the book, trying to get -- to delay the trial. this is classic lawyer. ok? we'll use as many motions as we can to try to delay the trial. and in two years when we still haven't gone to a commission, they'll claim the united states government is delaying a fair trial. >> who is he? >> he was the principle explosives guy that was brought into the country to coordinate all of theether assets to conduct the attack after a failed attack in january

of 2000 against another navy ship. uss sullivans had pulled in. they had already put together a boat with explosives and attempted to set it out to the ship. unfortunately they would swamp the boat. it would sink at the pier. the people scattered, came back, recovered all the equipment, the bow, the truck, the explosives, tested them in the desert. then they would bring on in a sheery, he would re-- nashiri, he would reorganize, move to a new safe house, rebuild the boat, put it in there properly and waited for the right time. no more than 9/11 was picked as the day, uss cole wasn't picked as the ship when they were ready, they made the call, we pulled in, that boat came out masquerading as the third garbage barge and detonated. >> how do we know nashiri did that? >> can't go into specifics but i have been told there's a lot of good forensic evidence that definitely ties him to the attack on the uss cole. >> what should happen? >> i think he should get the death penalty. >> and what are the chances he

will under the way the legal of this is set up? >> i think it is fairly good if we have an administration that has the political will power to do it. if he is tried and convicted of that crime, he should be sentenced to death and it should be expeditiously carried out. we're at war. this isn't the federal court system. i think american people have made it very clear that they realize that what is going on in guantanamo bay is as a result of a war effort not a large-scale criminal action back with military force. >> you spent 27 years in the navy. >> 26. >> excuse me. did you have another four years at the academy? >> -- so that's 30 total years. what are you doing now to make a living? >> most of what i do is go out and talk to groups about the uss cole, i serve on a board of directors of military families united. i'm on the board of advisers for a start-up company working to build barriers for without deers side protection for -- waterside

protection for ships. it's called halo defense systems. they're out of massachusetts. they are very much starting and interested in doing it. looks like they've got a superb product. just trying to make sure that the american people stay aware. engaged in the future of my state in nevada obviously. working out there to make sure that we are getting the kind of representation we need to carry the nation forward. >> in the book you refer to your closest friend as nicole segura. you don't explain who she is. i must ask you. what relationship is she to you? >> she and i have been together for well over 10 years now and is probably my closest companion. >> have you been married and do you have children? >> have not been married and do not have children. >> so what are your thoughts? because in the next page in your book you said the attack on cole fundamentally changed how the navy viewed force protection and with the attacks on september 11, the nation felt vulnerable. what has changed now for someone to be a captain of a ship in the navy? >> what you're seeing now is the

navy has done a very good job in doing a lot of exercises and giving those commanding officers that are out there when it comes to protection for their ships, they have provided them with a lot more procedures and equipment and training to be able to do it. i'll give you an example. one of the force protection measures that i will always live with is keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. sounds pretty straight forward, captain. why didn't do you it? the reality. at the time uss cole deployed, we had never had any force protection exercises. we had had month moderate, litte exercises conductedded on us from the pier where people would try to get passed the quarter deck watch on the ship. but we never experienced anything like the potential for a car-borne i.e.d. coming down the pier, a water-borne i.e.d. like we faced. now i tell those going out to sea, ask yourself the questions.

what procedures do i use? what equipment do i have? what training have i given my crew? what rules engagement do i have that are going to allow me to use those measures? what intelligence are driving me to, in fact, do those measures themselves? and if i go into a host nation are they trained at the same level and do they have the same capability to check out those small boats that are coming out to your ship? do they have the ability to keep boats away from the ship? do they have the ability to check vehicles that might be come downing the pier? and if not, you have to expand your presence to do that. if local authorities won't let you do it or the navy sun comfortable with you doing it, don't pull in. >> where is nashiri from? >> i would need to go back and look. i believe he is from yemen. >> and where were the two that were on the little boat that pulled the plug -- i mean, pulled the trigger on the bomb, where are they from? >> one was saudi, was was

yenenise. >> were they killed instantly? >> sin instantly. they were vaporized. we found little pieces of boat and bomber atop the ship. >> what were the explosives? >> a combination of a plastic explosion, r.d.x., similar to c.4, interweaved with t.n.t. >> the title of the book is "front burner." our guest has been commander kirk s. lippold, united states navy retired. we thank you very much. >> one thing i'd like to do, if i could, is give you one of my challenge coins for having moan the show -- me on the show. thank you for letting me share the story of some great heros with people today. >> thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012]

>> both chambers of commerce are back in session today. the house returns in the afternoon at 2:00 eastern this week they'll look at bills on agriculture, defense, and financial services, and they'll also hold a vote on repealing president obama's health care law. the senate also returns at 2:00. and this week they'll consider the nomination of a judge to the u.s. district court for western tennessee. they'll also look at small business taxes. the house live at 2:00 eastern on c-span. the senate live at 2:00 eastern on c-span2. >> a number of live events today on the c-span networks.

on c-span at 10:00 a.m. eastern we'll bring you new jersey governor chris christie. he's followed by maryland congressman steny hoyer at noon eastern. over on c-span2, the woodrow wilson center discusses the 2012 mexican presidential election results. that's at 9:00 eastern. and on c-span 3, join us at 5:00 eastern for the house rules committee. legislation tor repeal president obama's health care law which is expected on the house floor on tuesday. on "washington journal," at 7:45 eastern, congressional quarterly looks at the week ahead for congress including a vote on repealing the health care law in the house and tax debate in the senate. both chambers are back in session later today followed by that is paul bishop. and in our final hour, energy