>> the political parties are holding their platform hearing in advance of the summer conventions. followed in mid august as republican star their platform process at their convention site. c-span coverage begins august 10 with the reform party in philadelphia followed by coverage of the republican national convention beginning monday, august 27 and the democratic convention from charlotte, n.c., monday, september 3. >> we have to be really clear about the very many ways that we own our self and we own our history and we make decisions that our history is phenomenal, vital, and special. >> if former college president

right and comment on politics, education, and african american history. this sunday, your questions and calls for the author of a new book. live at noon eastern on c-span2. the national security branch executive assistant director said he agrees with the independent report on the fort hood shootings that the agency could have better handled intelligence related to the accused army major, nidal hassan. the report accuses the fbi of poor information sharing and disagreements between field offices. major nidal malik hasan is awaiting a court martial set to begin august 20. the subcommittee hearing is over 2 hours. those that worked with judge webster on the commission. i also want to thank the men

and women of the fbi who over the years have done an outstanding job in so many areas and also the purpose of the hearing is to do what we can to make sure that we prevent this from ever taking again. i am disappointed the director could not be here. this would be an appropriate hearing for him to be here but today's hearing on the counter- terrorism intelligence and the events at fort hood, texas. thank you for your appearance today and thank you for the service to the country. on november 5, the united states army maj nidal hassan entered a deployment center carrying two pistols. he shouted "god is great" in arabic and started opening fire.

hassan has a weighted military trial for 13 counts of murder. the report was issued publicly on july 19. the report includes extensive factual findings on the fbi's counter-terrorism authority programs and assistance as well as specifics on the fbi investigation of [unintelligible] and the assessment of nidal hassan. the report analyzes the euro's actions as well as recommendations for other actions. i am concerned that there were warning signs and there were more aggressive investigations. there was a chance that this incident could have been proven -- prevented. the reason for less and less- aggressive investigation could have been political sensitivities, maybe in the fbi. an active duty member of the communicating -- should have

taken more seriously that was. at the time -- they believed at that time. the commission found that the decision not to interview hassan was flawed. i am concerned the culture and guidelines made this the path of least resistance. the webster commission makes no recommendations on changes to the fbi's domestic investigations and operations guide. of these -- if these guidelines were followed, and that failed to prevent these deaths and injuries, it may be worthwhile to question whether the guidelines themselves r problem. we want to understand what took place and ensure that agents are empowered to prevent similar attacks in the future. i will also have questions based on the report's findings and recommendations and what steps have been taken and will

be taken to improve counter- terrorism assessments and investigations. several of these recommendations have a resource implication but we want to consider in terms of the fy 13. i would urge that after this hearing, in the interim during august, the fbi come up and meet with the staff on both sides to see as we're putting together the so-called cr. what the ramifications are and what can and cannot. he should have the staff meet with both -- you should have the staff meet with both sides. the fbi -- i am concerned the fbi may have not provided the commission with a full accounting of its prior interactions. including the return to the u.s. in october 2002 when the fbi dropped an outstanding award -- worn for his arrest. what -- it would not have been

good if the fbi had not communicated to judge webster. i would like to recognize my colleague, for any comments he would like to make. >> we have had an opportunity in a classified session to take in this information and a chance to process it. i want to say that -- it is important that the congress to appropriate oversight in these issues but given the issues related to fast and furious and -- want to make it clear at least for in my view that none

of our work should be in terms of criticizing law enforcement. law enforcement officials are doing an extraordinary job under difficult circumstances and it is easy for us to go back and look at these things and we should create better policies going for a period -- for it. the chairman, whose father was himself a policeman, has a greater appreciation for law enforcement. i think the issues here in terms of what we ought to do going forward are well represented in the 18 recommendations the commission has laid out. as we did looking at the mcveigh case, when there are

these horrific incidents, we have to look and make sure that we are doing all we can do, but there is little ability to figure out exactly what an individual is actually a two in all circumstances. i think the commission under the webster commission for the work it has done. the chairman is correct to say that obviously we do need to look at how we prioritized leads and this question between discretionary lades and it will have some discussion about the fact -- the policy has been changed. i want to welcome you to the hearing and i will think the bureau for the work it does each and every day to protect the united states of america and it's the sense in -- and

the great work you have done since 9/11 to deal with this real focus of -- to -- changing this book is to terrorism. you're trying to prevent incidents versus catching the bad guy. i look forward to your testimony. >> you may proceed. >> thank you. good morning, chairman, members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. following the tragic events of fort hood, the fbi director ordered an immediate internal review of what the fbi knew about major the $ -- nidal hassan. the fbi identified several shortcomings in our training and we started to take corrective action almost

immediately. the director recognized the need for a broader, more independent review on how the fbi handled and acted on counter-terrorism intelligence before the fort hood shootings. the director for -- former director -- to conduct the review. as has been stated, judge webster completed the report and the report has been made available to congress and to the public. the webster commission have full access to fbi holdings. the conducted more than 100 formal and informal interviews and meetings and briefings and they reviewed more than 10,000 fbi documents. the commission also consulted outside experts on counter- terrorism and intelligence operations on information technology and on violent extremism.

the commission found a number of shortcomings in fbi policies in its technology and training and made 18 recommendations for corrective action. as you know, there are limits to what can be discussed today in an open hearing and hassan is the subject of an ongoing criminal prosecution. many aspects of the information related to this matter remain classified. as was noted, we did provide a full classified briefing and will answer as many questions as we can in this open setting. next, let me summarize the commission's findings and recommendations and review the corrective actions taken by the fbi already. the committee opposing recommendations fall generally into four distinct categories. one was information sharing. operational policies, as was noted. information technology, and trading. i will discuss shortly each one. starting with information sharing. the commission found that more formation could have and should have been shared -- information could have and should have been shared from the headquarters level. from the fbi to the pentagon. our -- review came to the same

conclusion. the fbi and department of defense created new information sharing agreements regarding counterterrorism investigations of military personnel. this agreement made sure that senior pentagon officials as well as the department of defense task force officers on jttf's the fbi continued to work closely with the military in these matters and have clear policies in place to make sure that information sharing continues. turning to operational policy. the commission recommended there be clear policies covering all counter-terrorism lead and for resolving disputes as they relate to those leads. we will get into that more as the questions come up. the internal review found similar issues with the policy. as a result the fbi has set new time limits and reinforced our existing policy and responsibility for every one of the leads and provided additional guidance to make clear that any disputes must be

pushed up to the supervisor level both in the field office and at headquarters. lastly, the fbi has provided enhanced analytical investigative resources for strategically significant investigations to make sure that all proper steps are taken and there is additional oversight. in the area of good rational technology, and include software and search capabilities in are classified data bases could have assisted the investigators in the one in san diego and the one in the washington field office. the fbi develop new software improvements to connect intelligence information more effectively and efficiently. new programs and now up and running and the fbi is providing greater search capabilities across all holdings. the commission made recommendations to improve training for all joint terrorism task force officers related to the intelligence bases. within months the fbi had

entreated -- completed training and we have since instituted a nine-day mandatory training course for all agency participants. there are additional detailed recommendations and we have publicly responded to each on our website. as we stayed on a daily basis, the fbi and its partners across the globe must identify and respond to palace terrorism threats. we do this in an ever-changing and complex environment. in recent years we have been able to disrupt dozens of terrorist plots. we know that the threat never wanes and we cannot overlook a single lead. at the fbi we accept this responsibility every day and we are committed to improving our capabilities to protect this great nation out and in the future. with that, a look forward to your questions.

>> i ask unanimous consent that he be able to sit, since board who was in his district. >> the first question, the reason that hus on first comes to anyone's attention is his initiation of contacted it becomes important to understand who the fbi thought him to be. and understand what the government knew about him at the time. according to the report, he was under full investigation by the washington field office starting in 2001. the report mentions he moved to england in spring of 2002 but does not mention his return to the u.s. in october 2002. the outstanding warrant for his arrest was inexplicably withdrawn by the washington field office. why was the return to the u.s. not referenced in the report and why was the warrant withdrawn that he was under

full investigation at the time? >> he did return in 2002. there was a diplomatic security service warrant out for him. we knew he was coming back and had information that he was coming back. the colorado u.s. attorney's office looked at the warrant and the factual basis for the warrant. it was not an fbi warrant and was dismissed simply because they did not feel they had the ability to prosecute him for the alleged passport fraud. it was not an fbi warrant and certainly if we felt that a warrant was good and there was a way we could have incarcerated him at the time, we would have done that. that was a state department warrant. the u.s. attorneys will look at

a warrant when somebody is coming back into the country to see a process can be served bid that determined there was not enough evidence to prosecute him on that passport fraud case there. >> it was very unusual and at the time it was early in the morning. there is more there than i think is obvious. why was the return to the u.s. not referenced in the report? did the judge know of his return? >> the commission had full access to all of his information. it was not an fbi warrant and we did not ask for it to be dismissed. >> of york confident that judge webster knew of his return and the fbi told him of that return? >> i am confident he had all the

documentation that would have referenced this. >> if he was under full investigation from 2001-2003, why was he approved by dod security to speak at the pentagon? >> i cannot speak for dod. i cannot answer your question. >> what was the fbi's understanding of the relationship between him and the 9/11 hijackers in january 2009? >> after 9/11, he came up in a commission report and there were allegations that he had supported some of the 9/11 hijackers. investigation was done to try to determine whether he had anything to do with 9/11. early on he was the imam of a mosque where some of the hijackers went and then transferred to a mosque in falls church, virginia.

we interviewed him after 9/11 on three separate occasions. he identified one of the hijackers as someone he knew as going to his mosque. we were never able to obtain any evidence that showed he knew beforehand about 9/11 or supported the 9/11 hijackers . >> based on history, do you think that is still accurate? >> i do, sir. >> did he ever meet with him? >> not that we know of. >> did he meet with the 9/11 hijackers? >> he was the imam of a mosque in san diego where we know to of the 9/11 hijackers went. he admitted that one of the hijackers went to his moscow. he knew him -- win to his mosque.

we were never able to substantiate any intimation that he supported the 9/11 hijackers. >> report comes in and the connection of any communication with him would have said that something is wrong here. report was issued on the fort hood incident. a statement praised the webster report. they also stated that we are concerned that the report fails to address the specific cause for the fourth attack, which is violent islamic extremists and. do you believe it was specific or was it because of the court had a tax? >> i cannot say specifically. >> do you believe it played any role at all? >> he is getting ready to go to

trial. i cannot comment on what was in his mind when he made that determination. clearly al-awlaki was well known within the community. he was a propagandist at that point. we know from some of the e- mails hasan saw him as a leader and an activist, but i cannot get into his head. >> have there been specific changes in the way the fbi approaches and responds to islam is extremists based on the lessons learned from fort hood? >> there been a number of changes made, starting with radicalization. this comes from the senate committee report. we have added classes on radicalization so at the earliest stages, our agents are looking for and no -- it is then all of our basic courses for a joint terrorism task forces. there is more training on

radicalization from the standpoint of understanding an individual like al-awlaki. when somebody is moving from a propagandist to being operational, where we saw him go later, there needs to be field office eyes on what we are recovering, like the e-mails. there needs to be additional from the community from some of the interagency so we make sure there is a fuller picture of someone like al-awlaki and those that have incoming contact with him.

>> there seems to be a significantly different view of his relationship with al-awlaki between san diego in the washington field office. what was the fbi assessment of al-awlaki until he contacted hasan through his website? >> that is an interesting question. we looked at al-awlaki for a number of years. in that timeframe, al-awlaki was incarcerated in yemen. we interviewed him while he was in jail. he gets out at the end of 2007 and comes on line very quickly with his website, and mocks the very careful line between what he puts on his website and his e-mails.

the interagency intelligence community begins to look at al- awlaki to determine whether he has become operational. we do not see that at that point. at that time we are just looking at him. he appears to be a propagandist. there is information and he is starting to get involved with individuals who are related to aq. our understanding is that time is he is an individual who was born in the u.s., spent time in yemen, was educated in the u.s.. for many people, he was considered an individual they went to advice for. we also know he was becoming more radical at that time. that is the look that we had in that snapshot of time. >> who were some of the people that we know of who worked radicalized by a lot dee perry

>> there are a number of other investigations -- who were radicalized by al-awlaki. >> there was a sermon is hot line. without a doubt he was part of the radicalization process. >> i know he looked at al- awlaki. >> there are a number of others. will you submit for the record who you believe for part who was radicalized? the prior investigations shake the fbi's understanding our misunderstanding of the reat he posed? >> i think if you look at the lead that came out of san diego, that felt that they had an accurate reflection of what

al-awlaki was at that time, at that snapshot of time. >> how many other u.s. government or military employees were found to have contacted all lockheed during this time? have these individuals been fully investigated and it in the hold security clearances liked hasan did? a story indicated that the fbi has conducted over 100 investigations within the u.s. military. is that accurate? >> the exact number is classified so i cannot talk about it in this setting. it is something that we looked at very carefully. there are many investigations we are running jointly with the

department of defense right now. to get your point, we believe we know who has been in contact with al-awlaki or at least potentially having listened to him, his sermons, etc. i believe we have them will cover. >> the e-mail shown in the report are troubling and the first e-mail raises the question of religious justification for muslims in the u.s. armed forces' killing other u.s. soldiers. he praises al-awlaki's religious understanding and ask for a reply. it is hard for me to understand the context of what such -- why such an exchange was found to be benign without any investigation. does that seem unusual to you? >> there are a couple of issues here.

the commission found that we certainly fell short. hasan is asking al-awlaki to make some general comments about muslims in the military from his e-mail number one. the second e-mail which is pushed forward and san diego pushes that lead to the washington field office and says all the e-mails may seem somewhat in eight, if he should be in the military it is something that should concern you. a couple of things occurred. there were additional e-mails that the field office agent was not privy to. when he looked at these two, he did a couple of things. he went to his dod counterpart. the task force agents from the department of defense. he does database searches on

hasan 2/6 -- to see if he is tied to any other terrorist group or anyone have under investigation. then he asked them to provide him their reports on him. he goes to his online files. he goes to the defense manpower data center and retrieves 30 files from dod. he retrieves his defense employee interactive data systems and retrieves about five or six of his recent performance appraisals. the agent does the checks and finds nothing else unusual about hasan. within that month he had been promoted from captain to major. the other thing and he found

unusual is that he held a secret security clearance and at the time was getting his master's degree, specifically talking about what it was like to be a muslim in the military and the conflict that occurred there. so when he looked at -- he was lauded for his research there, saying it was cutting edge and was looked at by his peers as cutting edge research. >> over his standpoint, he is looking at an individual who hold secret security clearance who has recently been promoted from captain to major, who is not trying to hide his invitation -- his identification in any form from pawloski. -- from al-awlaki.

he believes that it is in line with the research he is doing from where he sits. all his performance appraisals are positive. they state that he should be promoted, and he does not want to take a chance to move forward at that time and potentially risk the fact that al-awlaki is under investigation. again, a snapshot in time. we can go back and second-guess that task force officer, and again, i am not making excuses. i am trying to put it into context with what he had available to him at the time he made that decision. >> i have a few more questions. did the effort by -- did the fbi questioning follow the guidelines as delineated in the operation guidelines, and if so, does that indicate a

problem with the guidelines in that it discourages the greater pursuit of leads? when it was adopted, and how does it differ previous guidelines? were outside groups involved? >> i don't think so. >> when it was adopted, how does it differ from previous guidelines? the believe it should be changed to encourage more investigation of leaks, based on the circumstances? it is mentioned in the webster report. >> i will try to get all your points. the first question, did the agents follow the guidelines and the way it was written at the time. the answer is they did.

>> does that mean it should be changed to encourage more investigation of leaks? somehow as i did into this, here is an individual who follows the guidelines and the guidelines results in 13 people dead and numerous wounded. should the guidelines be changed? >> we have changed a number of things since this occurred. at the time, the lead was set as a discretionary lead. that has been changed. there are no longer discretionary leads. it asked the agents to use the least intrusive methods possible. gives an escalation of our

ability to utilize the tools congress has given us to investigate those potentially involved in terrorism. its state that we need to use the least intrusive means necessary as we escalate the tools available to us. in this case, acting under those rules, the least intrusive, the agent felt that with the database if he had checked and the information that came out of the dod files, with the fact that he used his own name and did not try to hide it his recent promotion, he had done everything it needed to do based on information he had. the way it is that right now, it gives us the tools to do what we need to do. >> so you do not think it needs to be changed? >> i believe we have the tools available to do what we need our investigators are among the most aggressive in the world.

when we armchair quarterback and second-guess, which we need to do to make sure we get better at what we do, i believe the tools of their period of a live the way it is written it gives us the ability to do it and i believe the fact that it requires us to use the least intrusive means to be able to escalate the tools you have given us, it make sure that we are walking that fine balance between protecting civil liberties in this country and making sure there is not another 9/11. >> the report faulted the decision not to interview hasan. the washington field office feared it could jeopardize the al-awlaki investigation. the washington field office believed that an interview did not satisfy the least intrusive means test.

a simple records check was clearly not sufficient to uncover the threat. what could have been done to determine whether hasan was involved in terrorist activities? are you confident that in a similar case today, two years from now or another year from now, we will wake up and a newspaper some morning, something like this has happened again. what further could have been done to determine whether he was involved in terrorist activity, and are you confident and is the fbi confident that in a similar case today, an agent would feel empowered to pursue with their instincts -- what their instincts tell them that there was something amiss.

would we take the current circumstances and are you confident that in a similar case we would not have another of fort hood? >> there are two prongs to the answer to that question. first of all, the way the information sharing set up is now with the department of defense, so at the ground level, the fbi shared with the individuals on the task force the information it had. where there was a clear lath is there was not headquarters to the pentagon sharing of information. had that happen, there is a possibility we would have seen the dod look at hasan differently and that could have changed the complexity of the investigation.

the second thing that has changed is when there is a difference of opinion between a san diego and a washington field office, it needs to be pushed up to management so they will help steer that direction. that potentially could have changed what happened. i don't think we will ever know whether an interview would have changed anything, but it would have allowed us to get a better handle on what the fbi had and what the department of defense on the ground had. >> why was it that it was not done? why did they not go to the higher authority directly? >> that is a great question and i do not have a good answer for that. it happens every single day where there are disagreements on the complexity or tone of how we conduct an investigation. they are pushed up to

management and headquarters. headquarters is involved. in this case, -- gillon >> is this the san diego office? >> that is correct, sir pitt >> was a a lack of aggressiveness on their part? >> -- that is correct, sir. >> i think san diego felt they should have been more aggressive. it did not get pushed up the san diego chain of command, which would have pushed it up to headquarters. we would most likely have said we wanted an interview to be conducted. >> a final phone call -- i commend the bureau. the public report almost has as much information as you need. the final phone call between san diego and the washington

field office included an exchange of interview and muslims who visit extremist website as a politically sensitive subject. the conversation was to have considered this. what does this mean to you? was political correctness why this was not a lead? what has been done to prevent the reoccurrence? i have a number of fbi come up to me. they believe there is a political correctness and cruelty into the department of justice and interior. it was said it was a bipartisan thing. they said the same thing with the final years of the bush administration. what does that mean to you?

>> i am aware of the comments you are making. the report did not define political credit mess that was responsible for his lack of going forward with the interview. that is a snapshot of the conversation that took place. the agent on the receiving end is not recall that. it is hardest for me to get into the minds. i do not believe plans cool christmas -- political correctness have a thing to do with this. it is easy to go back in second guess. i believe an interview would have proven but i do not believe political correctness was a reason. >> some time, all of that the opportunity to speak to the field office.

i want to ask them. bad i am making this official request to meet with them. i really want to know, i want to make sure this never, ever happens again, and no lead is not pursued because of fear that your career will be ruined because you do something that may save people's lives. >> thank you, and i want to thank the chairman. let me cover a number of pieces of this puzzle. right after 9/11, former speaker newt gingrich was testifying. i asked him a question, at that point, it was about how far we needed to go to prevent future 9/11's.

and i have reminded the speaker we have criticized countries like china for locking people up without charges, not having access to lawyers, so forth and so on, and what was going to be the rule of law relative to these new challenges, because our system of criminal justice in the country was basically on the notion that we would rather somebody guilty go free than someone innocent be convicted, right? so we kind of lean on protecting people's rights and due process. but terrorism is a different situation because you try to prevent the incident and the first place. i don't vary much by an to the notion of political correctness. i think we have an issue out around constitutional correctness, when you have an

american citizen that questions whether they can listen to or read something or associate themselves in some grouping. it is pretty clear in the constitution those things are protected. and then there is a set of actions that are of concern. now, this question of radicalization is not new in the military. there have been any number of groups the fbi has to be concerned about, attempting to either get members train to the military or to radicalized present members of the military. and this has nothing to do with any particular set of dynamics. this is a concern on going. i thought congressman dicks's

question was interesting, this issue of dod and coordination is something we may want to structurally look at better, because maybe we need to create a process in which the fbi could have greater access and maybe some joint alignment with some of the investigating units inside of dod. i was out at the terrorist screening center in virginia, and the agency seemed to be working well together. the agencies seem to be working well together, and obviously a lot of good work is taking place, but we need to be mindful as we go forward that we have constitutional prohibitions, a constitutional protections, depending on one might view it. i believe it is our right to uphold the constitution, and that each of our agencies of the government have that responsibility.

when we determined political correctness, i think that it cheapens the issue. we have a responsibility to follow these rules, and we also have a responsibility to create a safe environment as possible. i want to go to what the bureau's responses to these recommendations. they have been made in a number of different categories. if you could take the time in this hearing, which this hearing is about these recommendations and how we will go forward, and respond to the recommendations, i would appreciate it. >> thank you, sir. just a couple of comments, if it is. and, regarding our relationship with dod and how it is indicated. they have increased the number

of personnel throughout the country, and the kind of node that we coordinate all of these investigations now occurs at the national joint terrorism task force with the deputy is a member of the department of defense. so that deputy is a dod person. he sees every investigation that touches the military immediately, and is the belly button that pushes that over to the put pick on rigid over to the pentagon. so that formal process that you spoke about is in place, and that would be glad to talk with you about that more offline. and it's kind of go through the recommendations. one of the recommendations surrounded training, and one of the concerns was there was not enough training done through jttf personnel, especially relating to the number of databases the bureau has and where collection is stored. we recognize that immediately after 9/11 and brought some

3000-plus task force officers to be trained in our databases. the director asked us to look further into training and step back and assess whether the training we were giving to our jttf as a whole was enough. we went back and looked at that and change the way we do training as a whole for the personnel. there were a number of on-line courses they took before they came on and regional training, but now that has been moved to quantico and it has gone from a couple of days to a nine-day mandatory basic training for everybody. >> this new system, and the chairman has led the way, and we have invested tens of millions of dollars in this, this is the training through 3000 on this new system to access the databases? >> that is right, so that process will continue.

the training will continue, some of the new software that we have been able to purchase, again, at the behest of the committee to help us do a better job analyzing data is also being pushed out and trained. the other issues could your earlier comments, just about the lead being covered, how it was covered, and disagreements and how those are taking place. there are a number of policy issues that have been identified and changed. it took too long and both our opinion and in the opinion of the other committees to cover the lead it to begin with. we have changed policy there. it reiterates and requires leads to be covered in a shorter time and duration. >> in plain english, this came

as a discretionary lead. we have eliminated that. there is no discretionary lead and there is a timeline to follow-up on all leads? >> that is correct, discretionary leads wert discontinued immediately. the time line for routine leads was tightened up. we have also reiterated in a number of venues and change the policy -- we have written policy where there is disagreement in the leads and that needs to be pushed up to the supervisor and the officer and the appropriate oversight group at headquarters. i think the other point, going back to the comment, is that we have also looked at other cases and decide it that not only did the leads need to be covered more carefully and closely, but they need another group to oversee them. there is a robust analytical group back at headquarters that

looks at those individuals to make sure that there is nothing that is missed in those leads as they go out. the other thing that was highlighted, and i think rightfully so, in the commission report was the i.t. system being used to look at the email. it required the case agents to go back and the analyst to go back every time there was a new e-mail to search and see what other emails were in the queue. that was fine for the way we used to do business, but an individual like lackey, that system simply was not up to par for what it needed to be. now the system has been changed so if there is an email of interest, where a court authorizes us to look at or we are able to get those emails, the system automatically threads all of those email together and also tips the case agents or the analyst when a lead has been set as it relates to that specific e-mail address.

the point is that some of those other emails that were not pushed to the washington field office would have been queued up by the system automatically selected look at them as a whole and maybe make a more informed decision. >> let's drill down to this in english. go back to the first point. the point is there have been changes, and we went through some of this and a classified briefing, but there have been significant changes in the pruning of the information, the way that it is looked at and total, so you are putting the e-mail from a hasan together with others and with that sees the whole picture, not just one part. >> right, the system will allow all of those emails to be dropped and be looked at in total. >> the commission's recommendation on this working through challenges relative to but the control and determination of leads. you say that will be bumped up

stairs. so any time there is a dispute between two field agents, field locations, it will not be just settled through mulling through or doing nothing. somebody will have to make a decision. >> that is right, sir, and that occurs and has occurred every day. what we found when we went back, even though it was standard operating procedure, there was not clear cut policy that set that out. that is what has changed there. >> any of these recommendations that the bureau does not agree with? of 18? >> there are none that we did not agree with. the only one that we are continuing to wrestle with is their assessment that this lead should not have gone to somebody from the department of defense, rather it should have gone to

somebody from their home agency. our experience and my experience in running jttf is when you push a lead to somebody from that home agency, they are in the best position to understand the nuances of that agency, how to cut through red tape and get the information and cover the leads. in most cases, they are investigators from their agencies to have an expertise in investigation. that still trying to find sweet spot between that recommendation and how we make sure there is more oversight from the fbi. >> we have had this discussion before, and i will conclude on this point, which at some point this became a subjective matter. so you can look at the employee file. you can see top-secret clearance, the recent promotion.

and one could have saw that as a reason to be more concerned, and one could have saw that as some type of information that would say, well, there is no reason to be concerned. some of that has to do with one's view of the responsibility. so when we get to maybe ordinary what might be potentially criminal activity, that is one judgment call. when the judgment call is about saving lives, then that is where the fbi's post 9/11 role, if you would, this prevention in which pushing the envelope -- i know that you agree there should have been this face-to-face interview. not to say that hasan may not have been able to get through that interview in a way that would have alleviated concerns,

but there should have been at least eyes and a talk directly with him, in case you really were not trying to track down bank fraud or some other, you know, unrelated matter. the issue here was whether or not or something more nefarious afoot relative to a potentiality that was not necessarily based on a criminal enterprise. i think you for your service to the country and i would be glad to yield, yes. >> in december, 2008, a question, what would he think of muslims who have joined the military and have even killed or tried to kill other u.s. soldiers? that seems pretty stark to me. >> yes, sir. >> i don't know how you do that

he is doing a master's degree or something not to justify looking into that. >> sir, i don't disagree. as you go to the next line, it says can you make general comments about muslims and the u.s. military. we to consider somebody like soldiers who have committed such acts of jihad, and if you did, what would it mean to you? i agree, when you look in context, exactly how it is, it is startling. the problem is if you put yourself back into the agent's position at the time and you look at this e-mail with what he is looking at on the performance appraisal, where it states, and i quote, "he is going for his masters of public health. he has outstanding moral integrity. he took on a challenging topic for his mph, on views regarding

military service on the global war on terror." without question, sitting by itself, i concur 100%. when you look from this aspect, it changes the dynamics of that. again -- >> but sometimes in the history of this country, we had information and did not act on it. i mean, people going to flight school to learn to take off, how to take off an airplane but not landed, and that was sent to the fbi. and nobody acted on it. at some point, you have to have some instinct, some gut instinct that something is not right here and to follow through. pearl harbor could have been

avoided. i mean, all of these things -- what is always so frustrating is you look back, hindsight, what is so frustrating is we have the information. we knew that this guy had a relationship with a known terrorist and we did not act. that is what frustrates me. thank you. >> thank you. mr. culbertson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i cannot agree more with mr. dick's statement, and i really appreciate chairman wolf having this hearing today. i want to thank you, mr. giuliano, for your service. all of us admire the fbi and the work that you do. it is important, though, as mr. dix and the chairman has said, that we all learn from this. it is distressing to see, the one sentence, looking at the december 2008 email, but looking at that one sentence,

you don't really need the context. the statement itself is of real concern. i wanted if i could to zero in on the question that chairman wolf asked in a little more detail, if i could, sir, when the washington field office had assumed, because they were the recipient i understand -- i understand it is standard practice at the fbi that the washington field office in this case, looking at page 56 of the report, the washington field office owned the hasan lead and were responsible for its outcome because had been referred to the washington field office by the san diego office, and the san diego office was not satisfied with the washington field

office's response. the san diego agent, i believe the assessment was slim and was concerned enough that for the first time in his career, san diego officer followed up with the washington field office to pursue this because the san diego office could not understand why the washington field office would not pursue this lead and actually go out and interviewed this guy. i see from the report, mr. giuliano, that the fbi has had a policy, i cannot be stated or not, of pursuing an investigation using the least intrusive means necessary, is that correct? >> that is correct, sir. at that and it in this case, the washington field office decided that the least intrusive means necessary was to check the records and not conduct the

interview because the washington field office was concerned that might affect major hasan's military career? that was one of the factors? >> that is correct, as the webster commission went and talked to the agents, as he lay out all of the reasons why he felt an interview was not germane at the time, that was one of the comments. i do want to make a comment about least intrusive. at least intrusive has never meant not aggressive. i will tell you, and i cannot talk about it in this setting, but investigations we have across the nation and the world are extremely, extremely aggressive. this was a judgment call, and unfortunately we make these judgment calls every single day and we have to be right every single time. as you look through it, an interview would have been prudent at this time. but it is hard to tell whether it would have changed things, but the fact the least intrusive means, it is just a way to

ensure that we use the tools congress has given us in a way the are ratcheted up appropriately. that is the purpose of that. that should not have and does not mean that we cannot conduct an interview. >> sure. but in this case, an assessment was made by the washington field office that would perhaps endanger major hasan's career if they pursue this further? >> that was one of the statements. >> ok, and looking at the december 17, 2008 email, major hasan asked the question -- i am looking for it in here. some appeared to have internal conflicts or may have killed in the name of islam. clearly, he is asking a question whether or not if a muslim in the military tries to kill other u.s. soldiers, is that a problem, does that fit within -- is that something that muslims' faith -- what would the

muslim -- how would he look at that from the perspective of the muslim faith. if major hasan -- what if that email had come from a senior fbi officer? >> sir, i think it would have raised the same concern from san diego and as with the individual in the military. i think the difference here is when you have a guy like hasan who is doing research on that issue, and it goes on to say make some general comments about

muslims and the u.s. military, it puts it into a different context. again, i am not here to make any excuses as to whether the interview was conducted or not, but it puts it in a slightly different context. >> yes, sir. if the email had been sent by a senior officer in the dea or the department of homeland security or border patrol or some senior law enforcement officer, some senior officer in the law-enforcement community of the united states had sent an e- mail to a maniac a terrorist, what would have been the response of the fbi? a similar set of circumstances, but hasan is in the u.s. law enforcement community? >> two things, olague had thousands of people writing to his website asking for a legitimate islamic advice. that is a slightly different terrorist back them. that is number one.

no. 2, if the fbi agent had been writing a thesis that was similar to what hasan did, there may have been a different viewpoint. however, i think san diego would have looked at it with just as much alarm as they did when they sent this to lead to the washington field office. >> asking the same set of circumstances, but he is a senior officer in the u.s. intelligence service or a law enforcement officer. it seems to me that the statement itself, in fact an individual is working for the u.s., for the military or the intelligence services or u.s. law enforcement, that major hasan's position alone should have been enough to require further action on this. >> sir, again, i think that is the debate of the commission and i think they find that we should have done more, and i don't deny that.

>> have you changed a policy so if you find somebody in a high- level position in the u.s. law enforcement community or in the u.s. military making inquiries like this that it automatically kicks it up to a higher level of inquiry, including a personal interview, automatically? >> sir, there are no automatics and what we do. what we have changed is if somebody and law enforcement or the department of homeland security if we saw something like this, it would come up to headquarters the same way now that it is mandatory and the investigation of the eddy, and we go to the national joint terrorism task force with another set of eyes. that has not changed. >> i should have not used the word out automatic. i heard you now have a procedure in place when there is a conflict that is reviewed by a senior level official, and that is a change and improvement. >> yes, sir, that is correct.

>> what i am driving at is regardless of whether or not he was in the military, you have policies in place that would elevate the scrutiny of an e- mail exchange like this if the individual is an officer in the the the military or the u.s. law enforcement committee. >> that is correct. it is not just email. if we have an investigation that is predicated on what enforcement on somebody who hold secret security clearance, has access to military bases, we have broadened it wider. >> thank you, the chairman has been generous with the time. but just to follow, talk to us about what political sensitivity -- you have a reference in the

report on page 60 that the washington field office indicated the subject is "politically sensitive." what types of things are politically sensitive and inquiries of this type? >> i will go back to the comments made, that i don't believe political sensitivity had anything to do with the decisions that were made here. the commission found, i think, the same exact thing. there are sensitivities as it relates to the first amendment. there are sensitivities as it relates to civil liberties and civil rights. i think our job with the powers given to us by congress are to make sure that we keep this country safe while protecting civil liberties and civil rights. it is a fine balance every single day.

i don't believe political sensitivity played any part in this decision, sir. >> we know you do, sir, and god bless you for all that you do in the fbi does. the remember any discussions about political sensitivity, whether or not it is politically sensitive or could be offensive to the moslem committee or the islamic community, without reference to a particular lead, but to what extent have you seen or heard discussions from the fbi or doj about political sensitivity or insulting or offending the muslim community? >> sir, there is varied little talk about political sensitivity and side of the bureau. the bureau is in a political organization and we try to stay apolitical. there are sensitivities as relates to training. there are sensitivities as relates to the first amendment and civil liberties. those are things that we always look at, always strive to find the right balance between both.

and as you know, sometimes finding that balance is very difficult, because there are strong advocates on both sides of the table. but where i sit in my position as the executive assistant director for national security, i am not concerned about political sensitivity in what we do to protect this nation. >> we deeply appreciate what you do in our midst a supportive of the fbi. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, i think, mr. giuliano, you're misleading or overstating something. i read the report twice. on what page does is say there has been no political correctness, no political sensitivity? the commission is silent on it. you have led us to believe the commission has said that is not a problem. sir, would you tell me the page

that i missed where it says that is not a problem? >> i think my point is if you look at the reasons the committee set forth as to why the interview was not conducted, it does not say that their findings was because of -- >> but nowhere does this commission -- >> that is correct. >> ok, let the record to show that. i think you misled us another way, probably inadvertently. you indicated that the decision to drop the award was made by diplomatic security in the u.s. attorney's office, but it is my understanding that the washington field office agent made the call to release al- aulaqi. the washington field office was conducting a full investigation of it al-aulaqi at that time and was a pit bull case. you remember the paint ball case? >> sir, i do. >> and that person is in jail for life, correct?

>> i don't know that, sir. >> well, i think he is. you may want to check that out. and there is some concern that al-aulaqi was kicking it there. when you say that was not our gang, that was diplomat at security, this is a washington agent of the fbi called to say to drop the case. he was the very agent who apparentlys still with the fbi today and was the fbi agent on the paint all case. again, those two things were sort of misleading, like brushing and bump and move. they were involved. this was done at the request of an fbi agent. correct or not correct? >> that is not correct. an agent of the fbi cannot tell the prosecutor whether or not to drop the case. >> to drop a warrant? >> to drop a warrant. >> he never called? >> there was a dialogue. if a case agent has a case on somebody who is coming into the country, the system is set up so there will be a call to that case agent.

>> what time was that? >> i don't know. >> sunday, early morning. >> i don't know. am i want to get to the bottom. we're going to get a hearing, and we may even subpoena the thing, but think it is important. the inference was the bureau had nothing to do with it. where if there was a call from the fbi agent who worked the paintball case, that has bearing to the attorney. i could be corrected, but i think it was like, we will get this for the record. i think it was somewhere before 7:00 in the morning, perhaps on a day when the government was not operating. sir, i think it is a little misleading. >> can we give the witness a chance to explain?

>> sir, i disagree with that comment. no matter what time it was, the fbi does not have a power to tell the prosecutor whether to drop the case or not. the prosecutor makes that call based on the evidence at hand. if the prosecutor at the time, regardless of whether a call was made on not, looked at the evidence and decided there was not enough to be about to arrest that individual, as it would be in any case, the warrant would be dropped. but i assure you the bureau, if anything at that point, if we could have incarcerated al- aulaqi, we would have. >> we could go back and forth on this. it could have been the fbi said something else. >> i don't know. >> so with that, let me just go to mr. carter. >> first, i would like to thank the chairman for allowing me to participate in this hearing. i have a different line of

questioning. i have a constituency to answer to. i have a lot of questions that have been raised. i want you to tell me what i should tell these people who have raised this question. we're talking about people who were killed, many of whom had been deployed two, three, four times fighting in the war against terror, which until recently was the subject matter of why we went to war. it seems to have changed in this administration, but the previous administration, it was the war on terror. they went to fight the war on terror. they went to fight the war on terror that involved people of the islamic community. now they're coming my light and saying, my husband went in harm's way for this country three times, my son went in

harm's way for this country three times and he gets killed where he is stationed by a member of his own military, who begins a shooting career as a murderer by shouting. it gets investigated and a fine it is a work force of violence incident. and nobody seems to talk about, is the war against terror involved in this killing, but my husband is dead, my son is dead, after fighting for this country in numerous occasions in the war against terror in the islamic community. and what i got from the defense department was a whole series of places where excuses were made

for why did not catch this. and there you have a whole series of recommendations to change their procedures so they can hopefully catch it next time. and then the agency, the law enforcement agency, at least historically in america in my lifetime, americans have looked to you for the highest and best investigative procedures in the world -- not in america, in the whole wide world -- at least in my generation, anybody who said we need this investigated, who is the best, we would say, the fbi. and so the same person comes to me now and says now from the law enforcement community, what do i get? i get the same story.

yes, mistakes were made, it really is more excuses are being made as to why "procedures did not work." when did we stop having people use their brain to investigate and start having people who used procedures to investigate? have we discovered that procedures written by bureaucrats actually operates better than somebody's common sense that says it look at this, this guy is talking about shooting somebody, maybe we ought to look into this? what do i say to that woman who has lost her husband, or to that father who called me and lost his son? who can i look to in my government, my son or daughter has fought for, who will stand up and say it is our job, it is our responsibility, we failed. and instead of coming up with excuses, coming up with new procedures. can you tell me what i say to them?

>> sir, i don't think there's anything that you could say to them that will take away the pain they have suffered. as i stated in the beginning, i am not here to make excuses. we will not make excuses. they should and do turn to the fbi to do exactly what you said, and we have to be right all the time, 100% of the time. and when we are not, the consequences are dire. the goal is to figure out what we could have done better. we strive to be better every single day. this entire commission report was commissioned by the director after the senate already did their review, after we did our internal review to make sure it never happens again. he is committed to it, i am committed to it, our department is here committed to it, but i am not here to make excuses. >> you just made a statement, the consequences will be dire. what are the dire consequences as a result of the failure of

the fbi? who got fired? that changed, promoted, moved? i would like to know the situations. >> sir, any action taken by the bureau, the boss, the director had to be held until this report is done. this report has been pushed over to our inspection staff and our inspection division which handles all reviews of how our individuals conducted themselves during the investigation. was that is done, it will be pushed to the director for a determination of what action if any. >> what kind of time schedule are we looking at on that? >> i would say between 60 and 90 days, sir. >> so i think i can tell these

people at least as far as the fbi is concerned, there are dire consequences -- your statement -- that come to the people who failed this project. >> sir, i said when we fail, there are dire consequences to the public. i do not and cannot -- >> to the public. that is a different statement. of course we know there are dire consequences. there are a bunch of dead people stacked up at fort hood right now. those are dire consequences. >> sir, that is right. my statement was where i sit, we have to be right 100% of the time, and if we are not, there are dire consequences. as we see at fort hood. what occurs here internally will be determined by our internal inspection process, and it will go to the boss at once they conduct their review. i'm sorry i missed that.

>> ok, that is a good explanation. so maybe there will not be dire consequences. i just think at some point in time we have to decide, we all know our rights, it and we are all protecting our rights but we're also protecting the rights of a lot of other people, and i don't have a problem with that. i have done that most of my life. but more and more i have people asking me, who is going to take responsibility for this instead of just telling us, oh, it is not our responsibility, our procedures were bad. if you are the procedures, you are responsible, and so is the defense department, and both of you have gotten through this, both reports, and you say there is no political correctness, but how to why it explain to them that still would get no indication of a man with a heavily loaded automatic to walks down shooting uniform shoulders who have been to war or are on the way to war, it is

not a battlefield, it is not a war action, they are not entitled to the benefits of a soldier at war, and yet they are dead or wounded or they are shot in the brain and a half to rehabilitate themselves to just a alive. all of these things have happened to these people, and nobody is even defining the enemy. i just don't understand -- two of the most important agencies in government still have not defined what happened at fort hood. even mentioning that islamic terrorism had anything to do with anything. if he yelled out, "jesus christ is god," what they have said christians were involved? at what point does it become terrorism? that is the simple question.

>> airey is a difference between somebody who is tied to a terrorist group and islamic terrorist organization, which we could not tied hasan to during our investigation, and somebody who appears to be radicalized by them. again, i'm not here to make excuses, but where the difficulty lies is when you have somebody like hasan who are listening to somebody liked al- aulaqi and trying to determine the difference between what is in their head, there radicalization and mobilization, and that is something we did not foresee.

the question is whether we had moved forward and done an interview, would that have changed the facts. >> once again, getting back to this life or father who contacted me, that would say, wait a minute, all this stuff that he was talking to al-aulaqi about, isn't this the same guy the president said he authorized a hit on because he is a terrorist and he we killed him with a groan? >> it certainly is. >> it certainly is, and once again we see hindsight is. >> al-aulaqi who met his demise recently is different from who we knew. he had not been involved, that we could tell operationally, at this point. it does not change the facts, but he was and is a different person at the end of his life. >> well, finally, i guess i better quit, but i want to say one more thing. 9/11 took place, but the american people look at it, all they do is say, we screwed up. they were all kinds of indicators, not only from your agency but others that should have kept those people in new york alive and at the pentagon all live, but we failed.

we have spent trillions of dollars to fix that problem, and we failed. who does the individual american look to to protect us? the defense department? no. the fbi? no. it was responsible? i think i am. i think most of the people sitting up here think they are. and we depend on you and the other folks involved in this fight with us to be effective. and quite honestly, if the average american is on to be

frightened it as to who this government is going to protect them from who is going to kill us after 10 years, 12 years -- >> if i could just interrupt. it is a very unfortunate incident at fort hood, but i want the record to be clear there have been many, many, many other incidences where the fbi has prevented circumstances that would have harmed american since 9/11. i don't want to say this was the next incident. this was a circumstance in which the fbi did not hire hasan. they did not give him a gun. they did not let him on this base. they made a shot at looking at this e-mail and made a wrong call. but i think you are correct in that the dod, which had plenty of opportunities over a number of years to look at this person, right, and to make some

judgments is more comfortable than the circumstance in which somebody gets a discretionary lead. so i just want to be clear that at least my view of this situation is this was i think preventable. i'm not sure that it was profitable in terms of where we put the weight at, more on the dod side, then on anybody else. >> and i thank you for the comment. i realize my time has probably run out, but i want to point out that the frustration level, at some point in time, somebody has to be able who has some authority -- and this was the

commission that looked into this incident as it relates to our law enforcement authority -- if the dod should have declared it an islamic terrorist event and did not and that had some inputs on the law enforcement side, it ought to be part of the report. what shots from these two reports is there is nothing in it. as the chairman pointed out, there is nothing in it to indicate that this has anything to do with what we have spent 10 years fighting a war about. it dumbfounds me, and you cannot explain it to people who have lost their families and our being just treated as if they were casualties of the workforce. it is really hard to explain. that is why i wanted to protest. thank you. >> well, i think what judge

carter is saying, and i share his concerns, is there were 170 or more people from my congressional district who died in the attack on the pentagon, on the day of the pentagon. i rushed out and sat on the hill and watched what was taking place. we will not make this into a 9/11 hearing, and let me just back up withoutmr. giuliano, you are a good guy. everybody tells me your a good guy. i don't think that is the issue. but the washington office, somebody in washington miss the opportunity to open the laptop. had it been opened, we don't know, maybe -- and this is not a 9/11 commission hearing, but maybe ted olson's wife would still be alive. what dr. carter is saying is people don't understand.

the laptop was not opened, and or recommendations coming from your guy out of phoenix about the flight schools, and there were things that were missed. and we want to make sure that nothing is missed in the future. also, i have other questions that i want to go through, but we're going to do a letter to you on this. but i think people have to think about this. i think you were misleading on the cameramen case. the dates and times where al- aulaqi came in at 4:00 in the morning, washington time, that is 4:00 denver time. 4:00 a.m., where is he? probably at home. 5:40, the drop the case. al-aulaqi was arrested, they

dropped the case at 5:40 in the morning denver time. then he takes a flight to washington. u.s. attorney is in denver, so all of this decision was done by 5:40 denver time. wow, that is amazing. >> sir, can i make -- >> sure. >> he was coming in before that. >> i am sure he did. if you go back and check, in fairness, if you don't think you were a little bit misleading, then we went to different high school, you have different approaches. you act as though the fbi had no involvement. while the fbi cannot tell him to drop, they can give a

recommendation. we will give you a letter asking you to comment, but i think dr. carter, judge carter speaks for a lot of concerns people have had. i was the author of the master commission on terror in 1998. there were a lot of recommendations. guys appear on both sides of the aisle to not think there was terrorism involved, people said why are you doing this. you found the bush administration and then the clinton administration missed some things. what judge carter and his committee wants to make sure is it is not missed going into the future. were agents or supervisors rated on their relationships with an outside groups? >> can you repeat that?

>> were washington field office agents or supervisors rated on the development of relationships with an average two muslim groups? i have had some agents tell me that they were graded on their outreach. >> the community average personnel, maybe, sir, but as a regular part of their performance appraisal, i don't know how much that would way and to an investigator's day in and day out. >> so it could be in the rating? >> i don't know the answer to that question, sir. >> could you -- >> sure. >> was al-aulaqi or hasan advert a confidential informant for the fbi, as the san diego office appears to have suspected? >> no, sir. >> we understand that the fbi has a counter violence office with the national security branch. this was done without submitting the reprogramming administration preparation

required. what does this office do, and how will the work of this office do and handling leads like that of the hasan lead where political extremism could have played a role? >> sir, it is a very small office. about how many? >> one gs-15 and less than a handful of analysts. it came out of the requirement from the white house for all of us -- the department of homeland security, us, nctc -- to try to get back to the route, mr. carter's point, of homegrown violent extremism, but going back and trying to figure out whether we can get on the front and rather than being on the back end of it. in other words, can we learn

from what we and the fbi in particular, which is what this office is set up to do, can we learn from our investigations, can we learn from somebody you has become radicalized from somebody like al-aulaqi or somebody else and push that in some way back into the community to protect it from happening in the meantime. that is the purpose of this very small office that falls directly under the national security branch. >> on page 11 of the report, there is a list of 13 violt plots that were foiled. are any of these 13 incidents involving islamic extremism? >> i'm sorry, sir, what page are you want? >> page 11, a list of 13 violent plots foiled. >> many of them are homegrown violent extremism. not all of them. >> ok.

>> he did not answer. >> were any of them not islamic extremism? >> so all of them had some kind of ties to islamic extremism. i guess my point is, and maybe i misspoke, they were not all considered home run violent extremism. i stand corrected. >> ok. based on the report, it appears that the most urgent task would be timely and throw pursuit of leads and reassure employees that legitimate and aggressive pursuit of leads suggesting violent islamic extremism will not be perceived as politically incorrect and not be detrimental to their careers. is this what the office is doing? >> so it is an office that i think will help, and hopefully

the other offices help us, our investigators, better understand what is causing radicalization and what indicators there are of those being radicalized. again, i go back to the point that it is not good enough to just understand those who are radicalized. it takes more. there are many people who are radicalize to never do what hasan did. we need to understand those who were radicalized and we need to understand mobilization so we can prevent another fort hood. >> the commission report recommends a written policy on the division of the port among the fbi headquarters and field entities. it's just the fbi has already done that. is that accurate? >> yes, sir, it is. >> can you provide written

testimony to that. >> i will take that back. it is classified. >> one of the major findings is a lack of clarity over the ownership of the hasan lead, where the san diego and washington field office disagreed on the formality of the lead. as a bit formalize the process of resolving disagreements, were a process kicks in? >> we put out written guidance which will go into our policy the next time it comes around. it is on a cyclical basis. >> one of the most troubling revelations in the report is the lifetime that was taken to act on the lead. the san diego field office send the lead to the washington field office in january, and it was not looked at until february. a task force officer didn't read the lead until may 27. a cold, snowy day in january, and then may the azaleas are

out. a good deal of time has gone by. during that time there were numerous contacts between hasan and al-aulaqi. is the time taken to act on this lead standard for a lead of this type corporate? >> it would have been then, but not now under the new guidelines. >> was this lead given a priority that was not correct? >> not at the time. >> is the delay in acting on the lead, could that have been related to workload? >> it could have been. the squad was working on the inauguration and subsequently the shooting at the holocaust museum.

again, regardless of workload, it should have been covered. >> what does the fbi now believe is a reasonable deadline? >> immediately within 24 hours for priority one, seven days. and from the second that it is set, it does not matter, when it is assigned. 60 days from the time san diego would have sent it, it would been completed. >> i think you have answered this, but you may want to repeat it. the report recommends that the fbi has a policy whereby no task force officer shall be assigned a lead from the assessment of an employee within his or her own agency. the sec because judge webster believes it is so difficult -- was that because judge webster

believes it is so difficult to investigate your own people? you make a pretty good thing point, to be honest, but they make the same point that you have made. >> sir -- >> is there a blend? or is -- because it would be very difficult for somebody of a certain group to then investigate the people in the group. we all know each other and then have to have an objective person come from outside. could you elaborate a little more? >> i think you have hit the point very well. it is the one area where we are still wrestling with it. if you go back to the san diego lead, they consulted with their department of defense people for guidance on records checks, on how to get the records back in a timely fashion, and then

subsequently assigned to dod personnel in the washington field office. the webster commission felt there is a potential for bias from those investigating within their own organization. our argument is those people are by nature people who are investigators. if you look at the composition, whether it is defense, criminal, and cis, army, that is what they do and they are good at it. we think there is value added to the tax force. we think there needs to be a blend with me the -- added to the task force. ed we think there needs to be a blend with maybe some more oversight. >> mr. carter may remember this. i watched the chief of staff of the army out side.

do you recall what he said? i want to make sure i am accurate. >> i cannot quote him exactly, but it was something along the lines of i hope this does not disturb our islamic outreach program. >> if you are a major or a captain and chief of staff of the army says that, and he went to west point, you want a career, that can be tough. i think it is one you're going to have to kind of nail down, because when the top person in he organization says that' -- but i must say, i have talked to others and they have all said pretty much what you have said, but i think there has to be some mechanism to catch it in case you have a problem. the fiscal year 13 budget

request did not include any increases for the national security program. within the national security portfolio, what is the priority would give to increasing the number of intelligence analysts, and are you seeking such an increase in future budgets? >> there have been many machinations of the budget. i do not know where this last bill sets. our intelligence analysts are absolutely critical to what we do. there is probably not an sac in the field that would say an increase of intelligence analysts would not help them going forward. quest the commission seeks funding immediately for acquisition of new hardware and data. this hardware would enhance search analysis did it -- what is the cost associated to

acquire such hardware during this fiscal year? >> i would have to get back to you on that, where we are. we have made a lot of changes in our software and hardware since judge webster started his report. i just need to go back and see when this recommendation was and get a snapshot of our i.t. request and i will get back to on that. >> clearly, i think the committee would approve reprogramming, particularly of the high importance that judge webster gave this. if you could as soon as possible have them contact the committee, i would appreciate it. the report highlights the fact of staff members in the san diego field office were unaware of key data systems or were not trained on how to use them.

have steps been taken to correct this totally? >> yes, they were taken immediately afterwards. >> and it is mandatory as the commission recommends. thank you. >> and officers will complete the training with and how many days? >> right now is 90 days. >> was a recommendation 90 days or 60 days? >> i think it was 60, but with a number of people we're putting through quantico, we are at about 60. >> i want to ask this last question before i go back to the other members. the purpose of the hearing is to really find out what happened so that it never happens again. i would like to have the opportunity to talk to the person in the washington field office, but the commission did not find any misconduct to warrant is a planning --

disciplinary action but declined to express views on whether administrative action should be taken. has the fbi taken any of administrative action in relationship to this particular case? >> all of the findings were pushed to the inspection division as is normal course of action for us. the team is reviewing it for action and determine whether any action will be taken. >> what is the timetable for completion of this process? >> between 60-90 days. >> out side of the task force, was anyone else at w. f. poe or fbi headquarters aware of the length of time -- wfo or fbi headquarters aware of the length of time it was taking to act on this lead? >> it has changed under the new

system. >> are now the management would monitor this? >> is monitored. there are 90 day file reviews that would have caught that it had lagged. again though, the commission report stated -- and we concurred -- that the time. it's still too long. >> i am going to go on. >> let me try to cover some of the details but also get into some of the broader issues. so, it is how many months after he land at jfk? >> it was october of 2002 i believe. >> almost a year after 9/11. he comes back.

he is arrested but the warrant is withdrawn, right? >> he is held and the warrant is withdrawn. >> so, you know, i think that the chairman's interest in this has got a lot of merit, just to find out exactly what the circumstances -- because you would think there would be heightened attention. the bush administration is focused on the fact that we have just had this attack within the air. we have a full-court press going on, but for some reason, the rest is not pursued. -- the arrest is not pursued. you said at one point that this was a process al colloquy is going through. t timothyok aged a lot

mcveigh, and there is a radicalization going on but it has not taken hold. obviously, president obama, and he has been commended and criticized that his administration through a drawn attack killed -- drone attack kille al-alaqi. was he someone who had moved from having a set of beliefs that are protected in our constitution to being an active enemy of our country? >> it is a fair question and i will try to answer it as

specifically as i can. he changed and he changed a lot over the years. when he went to prison in yemen in 2006-2007, and he came out and came back on line in early 2008, he still had somewhat of a moderate tone but began to be more of a propagandist, began to show more radical tendencies. but we could not see him as operational or in an operational role at that time. >> this was four years after the jfk incident. >> that's right. crazy has been imprisoned. he seems to becoming -- he has been imprisoned. he seems to be becoming more radical. >> the intelligence community did not assess him to be operational at that point. it really comes down to where we

see him -- where really, obviously changes, and it changed over the years, was like to 53 -- flight 253 and the printer cartridge, clearly he was in an operational role at that time. if you go back to the 2000-2001 timeframe, he was still an imam at a mosque locally and was quite well respected. >> a year ago, when the president and his administration caused his demise, there were members of the house on the floor criticizing his demise. there was no question he was a radical. >> there was no question he was trying to kill americans.

>> and it was proper for us to protect ourselves, in my judgment. i do not want to put words in your mouth. i think it is important to put things in some context. this young man who walked in the movie theater and shot these people, you know, five years before that in high school was a different young man. something happened, right? so this is where we have to kind of get into the kind of context -- if you take something out of context, it is a pretext, right? it is not the truth at that time. so the truth at this time, a year after 9/11, when the bush administration was dealing with this question and he was released in 2002, he was not operational at that point. he became much more radicalized,

if we are using that term, in yemen, in jail in 2006-2007. and then when president obama ordered his demise in november 2011, he was an operational figure and was an active enemy of the united states of america. then you come into the hassan deal, which is what the fort hood issue is about, because al- aulaqi was not at fort hood. the connection was the e-mails from him to have signed and whether they should have caused a more intense effort -- from him to hassan, and whether they should have caused a more intense effort. the sign is asking him at one point of bounce -- hassan is asking him at one point about

fairly mundane issues. but there was reason why this could have taken a different tone. if one had -- if one's instincts might have taken you in that direction, and that is what this really is about. it is about the judgment call that got made, right? >> correct. >> but he is just one of thousands of people the mailing -- so the first thing is when you have a circumstance where you have thousands of people interacting, and that you also kind of connect up where these strings tied together. and that is being fixed by the recommendation of the webster commission. the bureau agrees with that recommendation. >> correct. >> and the software and everything to make that work together has been put in place.

this is very important. there is a tendency here to confuse national security with politics. this is not politics. i think what we have to do as a committee is to focus in on the efforts that have taken place over a number of administrations, one in which he was let go, and the other in which he was sent on to his afterlife, but the difference is that in both cases, people were acting based on the information they had at the time and acting in the best interests as they perceived it of the citizens of our country. i again want to thank the chairman. i agree with the chairman that we want to know a little bit more about the release and why the warrant was withdrawn, but there is no reason to look at

this under any other basis other than that there is a difference between this character in colorado -- he was stopped for traffic violations or something a year ago, but at that point he was not someone who was gathering 6000 rounds of ammunition and automatic bands to -- or semiautomatic to go into a movie theater. there are points along the process on which judgments are made based on the information at hand. they could be different judgments made, and i think you agree, i know you agree, that there should have been a face- to-face interview. how long had he been in the military at the time of the fort hood incident? >> i would have to go back and check on that. >> he had been there for many years, right? >> a number of years. that is correct.

>> so, you know, of the situation as we see it today, we're looking at it in the fullness of a rear view mirror and which we have all this information and it is a little bit different than going at it on a current knowledge bases. i think the chairman and i would be willing to sign on to his request that we have more information about the warrant being withdrawn. >> thank you. i generally -- we generally agree on this. he may be right. he may not. my own feeling, and it is an opinion, is that al-aulaqi was a bad guy from the beginning.

another potentially san diego cigna again contact -- significant contact was al- aulaqi. did you know he went to school on your tax payer dollars? did you know that? he had a scholarship. >> i knew he had a scholarship and went to school in colorado. >> we do not know how orlando -- or when they met. they may have met or at least talk to him the same day they moved from san diego -- to san diego. they reportedly respected him as a religious figure and developed a close relationship with him. he left san diego in 2000 and by 2001 had relocated to virginia.

he eventually showed up at the mosque in virginia, an appearance that may not have been coincidental. we have been unable to learn enough about their relationship to reach a conclusion. then there is more. so, you know, in closing, if we could have a briefing with regard to the report on the number in the military. secondly, if you have your budget people, and tell the committee if you need the reprogramming so that you can follow through on that one system. third, if there is anything in next year that is out -- dealing -- that we can, because this year will be put together over the august break. fourthly, i want to sit down and see the person in the washington

field office that made the decision. i guess the question i would have about this is given -- and webster was really silent. i think it is poured in for people -- given the fact that webster was silent on the political correctness, did it play a role, did it not, have you gone back internally and done an internal evaluation of the people involved, privately, to ask them? because what is in somebody's mind might be different than what the reality was. maybe somebody said i was lighted, but maybe they were slighted because the person was looking the other way. i think it is important to ask the agents involved both in san diego and in washington, did anything that was going on make them reluctant to act? and lastly, what have you done as an agency, agency-wide to make sure that fbi agents do not have this in addition to move as

many other members have reference and to do something so that we can prevent the next fort hood or the next 9/11. do you want to discover that before we end? >> so, internally, to answer your question, the first one, all the individuals were -- >> but asked that specific question because the webster report does not really put that to rest, to ask. >> again, i think we just disagree on that point. >> show me then. go to the point and show me where it says the. >> it does not. >> well then how -- this is the report that we're operating on. >> i think the facts -- 9 >> did judge webster call you and tell you that there was no political correctness involved? >> sir, if you look at the decision that was made and the criteria laid forward as to why

the decision was made, i think it lays out why the task force officer made that decision, at least in the opinion of those .hat's did the investigation i believe that if they would have found it, there is no reason for them not to put it in the report. >> but it is not in the report. they did not say clearly there is not. in fact, there is an inference that it may very well have been. >> ok. >> have you done an internal to ask other people outside? does an fbi agent that i talk to, is here she feeling is great reluctance because my career could be over or is there some sensitivity now that the bureau wants them to do what they should be doing to make sure we never having another forehead. i think if you sat -- another

for ted. -- fort hood. >> i think if you sat through the sessions with each individual in the field and their executives, you would see that in his fbi, political correctness is not tolerated. he expects us to follow the letter of the law and constitution and to turn over every rock and every lead, so i do not believe that is the issue here, sir. i believe that the commission would have seen it. they would have gone down that path. >> well, maybe and maybe not, and i guess we will end with this. you had an assistant, we see a transcript to said, i'm on the mailing list on my blackberry for care.

care is a group that the fbi is supposed to have no involvement with. i get 10 e-mails a day from them. they were undoubtedly a co- conspirator in the holy land foundation. we want to make sure your men and women do not feel reluctant to do with the need to do to prevent another 9/11 or fort hood. these take back to the men and women of the bureau our great respect of the job that they do and we want to make sure if they can do it in a way that they do not feel restrained so if there is a budgetary thing i hope you will come here, nor should they feel encumbered by being politically correct. >> mr. chairman.

>> we will have some questions to follow up. and the last thing is to make sure a washington field office person talks to me. >> first of all, if i am -- if you felt in any way like i was attacking you, i apologize. i just want to ask one more question. you mentioned all these investigatory branches of the which i also have high respect for, as you do. but one thing i really believe is endemic in the military is the perception that soldiers have that certain things, if they bring them up, hurt their career. i will stay away from this for just a second and say that a perfect example is psychiatric treatment when you come back from war. we have spent literally millions and millions of dollars convincing our soldiers if you have something wrong, please tell us. it will not hurt your career.

but they believe in their heart of hearts it would. and i believe this political correctness issue at least place among the average soldier even up into the officer corps as a possible career killer. you mention that you talked with some at the department of defense and others. have you worked out procedures where if the fbi has a suspicion that an officer or enlisted man in the military -- if the question is raised, like in this case, in somebody's mind, they can contact the 0 d and say we have a question here -- department of defense and say we have a question here? inquiryif the fbi's came rather than the average shoulders -- soldiers