once said rules of road are important for people to understand basically, what's allowable and what's not. and in fact that could be, that is in fact liberty enhancing. once you kno the rules of the >> you are not dealing with chaos. that is it the least nine a question of regulation and versus not regulation. if you are going to have regulation, you have to think about the problems you are going to solve. one of the major problems coming of the crisis is trying to do your best. to see to it, the kinds of activities that were just described are what economists call-externalities'. firms should be free to fail. you cannot ultimately micro-

manage our reform takes risks. or tell them this is a better judgment -- and must has a negative externalities'. and you are trying to contain the negative effects that the firm will have on others. that is what the dodd frank tries to do. to take the example of too big to fail, and going back to the question you posed, does the legislation provide the framework or you can deal with the situation like that? it does. the entire logic of that title to the of the resolution provisions, it is as follows, if there is a firm whose insolvency is going to have consequences for the financial stability of the united states -- the federal

reserve, the secretary of the treasury, and the president, so, it is a very collaborative accountable process. and it has an entire mechanism allowing for a variety of different approaches to the firm. using both liquidity measures and other measures. to try to contain the problem. so it does not have the collateral effects that we saw in the example of lehman brothers and even going back to ltcm. that is how the legislation tries to deal with the issue. i would respectfully disagree with joe. and his assertions that the dodd frank does not address the too

big to fail problem. >> well, let me phrase it this way. and i want to start out with ken this time. one of the things about glass- steagall is that it changed the world. it said it, we are going to split these countries up. if you are an investment bank any info, at your this kind of company you are a commercial bank and you will be protected but you cannot do anything dangers. it changes the structure. actually worked pretty well for 50 years. dodd frank, it seems to me, except the world as it is. and tries to settle on the margins -- i am under selling it, but it does not fundamentally change the nature of how wall street operates, how it makes money. seems to me that the jpmorgan example is a good example of how nothing at, at its core, has

really changed. i want to ask you, ken, do you think the incentive structure on wall street needs to change? and if so, how to do it? and i want to ask joe the same thing. >> i do think the incentive structure needs to change. in the dodd frank, there's a call back provision for listed companies. a clawback means that want to have earned a big bonus, someone can come and get it. that is not quite enough to discourage risky behavior. if i do not have $5 million and i can put it in my pocket and hope for the best, you know, that does the solve the problem. i think that the real problem is short-termism a big emphasis on speed. i think this needs to change.

i do not think dodd frank has solved the problem of too big to fail. i think that when you talk to practitioners in the area, they say the institution goes down, it is a living will. we will do this and that. the problem is, is never one institution at a time. you have got to address the issue. you can put a ceiling on it. you can say that it is just, for example, 800% of base. or you can tax it. so that people cannot turn out to reduce the amount of money in short periods of time. what did you think of -- what to think about the incentive structure? >> you began by talking about the extent to which, when you started in the business, there were mostly private partnerships. or own money was a risk, notice the shareholders' money. >> the result -- is like allowing them to play with the house's money and las vegas, and

if they win, they take the money home. if they lose, the house loses the money. that is basically what happens in a lot of cases. i spent a lot of time at morgan stanley working with a risk editors guy. he came in to take over city after the debacle. he said it is the traders against the house. that was his warning. on the other hand, it is kind of hard to regulate greed and and people's ambition. and entrepreneurialism spirit and their desire to do better every day than they did best -- yesterday. you have to ask result, what is

the price of failure. in the airline industry, it is pretty simple. the chief safety officer is the pilot. that is why you see them walking around airplanes before they get in the. and they fly to where they want to go. they have got a pretty good safety record. that is a regulated industry. i would be focused on, what is the price of failure for an institution. and there is a danger there of reacting jpmorgan has a law so people get into this barkleys mode and let us take out the ceo. screen and for democracy and the middle east. the careful what you wish for. it is not necessarily going to be better people coming along if you do that. having said that, your of the folks on what's the price of

failure, and you have to focus on that the shareholders getting wiped out. which i think is the model you all are filing with -- you are following with the fdic. the senior debt holders that wiped out and the companies are forced to sell assets. all with a view toward protecting taxpayers from coming in and telling the institution out. but i think to sit around and say, you know, you can make $500,000 a year, but you can't. or you can make $5 million a year, he makes 25 million a year. but you, lloyd bling find, cannot. lloyd blankflein.

>> i think the financial sector is different from every other sector. i think a widget manufacturer is constrained by space and time. you can have a factory and you can have three shifts. but there are so many tractors or batteries or things you can make. but what i think about the financial sector is that it is a place where the rubber never meets the road. there is no rubber and there is no road. the fact is that you can move almost unlimited amounts of money in extremely short periods of time. i think we need to treat the financial sector differently than other sectors in the economy. how to treat it? i think we would make an attempt to change the culture, and tell

people you can work on wall street their regulated institution. but you will earn a money over time. and it is not going to be based on risking the balance sheet in a given year. one of the problems with regulation generally is that it has to be ubiquitous port you create and a black market in other places. i am not sure how to deal with that. but at we are going to change the culture, if we are going to change short-term greed into long-term greed or make a place where you realize you are doing the kind of could you are supposed to do, which is of a society's resources where they need to be allocated. and create liquid markets, we are going to have to make changes that dodd frank did not

address, because it addressed the symptoms and not the underlying cause. >> before i move on, then a curious what you think about the whole idea of the importance of changing incentives, and whether the regulatory framework does that or not. i think it is a really important issue. when you see what is going on in recent years, it is not really look like incentives have changed all that much, there is all of the toxic assets that grew up in 2008 that do not exist right now, and that is mostly because they blew up, not because they think anything is inherently wrong with them. and that is a very important point. let me make a couple observations. i think that -- let me pick up on something that joe mentioned. i think the failure it is a very

important point. i think correctly mentioned that dodd frank not only addresses it with respect to potentially the precise resolution mechanism -- but also from management, too. there will be consequences for management. there's management overseeing the failure of the firm that will have a difficult time getting another position in the financial services industry. going back to your point about incentives, before the incentives, this is what you do after failure. the point that ken raises is

before a failure, had to lessen the probability of reckless rick taking. i think the new. as a nation and rules an attitude that they have, and even possibly management in the financial-services industry today, although that i am not quite sure about. there are capital rules. rules around risk-management. supervision around risk management. joe, you mentioned -- is risk adverse. maybe risk at terseness of a kind is going to be given the capital rules, the liquidity rules -- maybe those

are going to be the kinds of breaks that people -- that are going to diminish the kind of risk taking that took us where we were a couple of years ago. there are a number of different speed bonds, or what ever you want to call them, and shock absorbers that you can put into place to try to achieve what he was describing before the fact. now, whether that ultimately substitutes for someone's judgment, that is a more difficult question. i do not know that is the case. pande, can you -- what is it about compensation that you can do? the legislation addresses some of that in the form of callbacks for instances when a public company has to state

their financials. there are provisions where the bank regulators have authority to around excessive pay for managers of financial institutions. there are certain measures on a pay provisions giving shareholders more of a voice. there are those kinds of measures that have been put into place. but under the structure of our corporate law. how much the agent that is bank managers and financial institutions being public companies. how much they are paid under state and corporate law is a matter of the shareholders and what they decide. but the legislation does. and in number of different mechanisms to address precisely what ken is talking about. >> a couple of comments. first of all, if you look at the performance of financial

companies these days, they do not look anything like they did during the go-go days of the early part of this century. so, companies that were then burning 20 and 30% return on equity are barely earning 5% today. for two reasons, one that, there are certain businesses that they are not allowed to go into, into their capital. stricter capital rules have been imposed on them. and that then has a derivative out, which is the shareholders are sitting there, as they should, watching their investment decline in value, seeing the declines go down.

there then saying, hey, your comp ratios are too high. there's plenty a market force that put downward pressure on the compensation at the large institutions because the returns that they were earning 10 years ago are not there. secondly, there's a new force at work in the market for, it is called shareholder activism. it is a group of people, and mention them here in no particular order, orchestra . who basically buy shares and the company and do things that to the traditional investors, who might be thinking the same thing like fidelity, or any of the

fathers, but do not, you know, go to management and threaten them, and raised the roof if something is going on they do not like. i think, if the low returns continue and compensation at the take institutions to not come down quickly enough, because they are coming down, i think it is an industry that is right for shareholder activism. right now, i think that they are being held off because of the, what is caused on wall street, the black hole. when people wake up and they find out that an institution can lose $6 billion on a trading position, that makes a typical activist investor think once or twice before they want to take the plunge and wonder what they are getting into. on the other hand, they did file

a 13d on a firm that was drawn by late partners bruce, and i think he has not spoken yet as to what he wants to see happen. but i would not be surprised -- if you focused on compromise ratios. they are not in a lot of those businesses. to summarize what i just said, i think market forces are coming to bear on these big institutions, because their returns are down. that will drive the comp ratio is down. and it is shareholder pressure. and there's the potential for shareholder activism. >> there's a lot of anger. it is almost four years later. on the one hand, there's still an enormous amount of anger in the country at wall street and wall street firms. on the other hand, there's a lot

of anger on wall street aimed at the president. and i guess i wanted to ask you whether you think, whether you think that anger is justified either way? >> i think there is a new want answers to both questions. as far as the -- of the country goes towards the bankers, is justified, but it is not exclusive that -- the blame is not exclusive to the bankers. there were many constituencies that were part of the problem. the people who sold the loans that should not have been made. the ratings agencies. the fact that wall street did what it does, and to keep all of the blame on the bankers seems to be unfair.

as to the other way round, i do not get it, i think democrats always have a tough time on wall street. i remember when ted kennedy was on the rise. and the silly jokes that tore made among us. i think that bill clinton did not get his due for all the things he did for the e economy. in my own personal criticism of president obama, he made some priority choices about what he would fight for that i would not have made it. but i do not think wall street's criticism of obama is a totally fair. he has moved down the populist road, because he is after boats. but in general, i think both sides are being unfair. >> do you have a thought on this, joe? >> i think ken is right, most

people on wall street tend to be on the financial conservative side of things. but you could argue that there was not a lot of financial conservatism and the bush a demonstration. and i think there were a lot of people on wall street that were critical of the fiscal policies there. but i think there is a little bit of, not to be trail, but a let down on the part of a lot of people. the president had tremendous support from people who might traditionally have not supported a democrat. 3.5 years ago. and i think his, and all of those that i talked to, and i will not bother with the refrains four years ago, they

thought well, he said that, but he will not really do that. i think they learned disappointed that instead of moving to the center, he seemed every time he was under pressure, lurches more to the left. the thing that troubles and lot of people that i know on wall street. and that is that his tendencies seem to always veered towards the left rather than towards the center. i think that is, it is not so much that he criticized wall street for their behavior, because a lot of people they have not even had their come up ins yet. but on the so many issues, he seems to be very far removed from the center. and i think that just troubles a lot of people that had supported him for years ago. i do not know if he will regain

their support. but those that i know that i am close to, they are pretty convinced they will not support him this time around. but it is a ways off. >> would you like to respond? >> i will make observations. i firmly support the president. i just want to address the to the questions that you mentioned, but maybe in a different way. i think that one of the things that happened four years ago was a decline in the trust with respect to the financial system. there is no question. even financial institutions when they dealt with each other, remember when the credit markets were frozen in 2008. people did not know whether they can trust the risk-management of another financial institution to

lend them money. what kind of relationship they would have with them. and a lot of the dodd frank legislation and the policies that the president and secretary kenneth r. have pursued, the strength testing, and trying to restore the trust among financial institutions and a society, generally in financial institutions and how well- managed and sound they are going to be. i think you are right, i think there was a decline in trust. i think the policy of this administration has been to try to restore that trust. >> one thing our country has done much better than europe is -- the capital of our banks. our banks are much healthier than almost any bank in europe.

and i want to shift gears and asked my panel for their views on the eurozone crisis. whether it is salvageable. weather is life-saving. what have destruction it could rot if it came to that. >> i think it could be pretty bad, myself. >> it is obviously something that is of serious concern. the financial stability oversight council oppose the report mentioned that -- ben bernanke mentioned it in his testimony before congress as something that is -- with respect to economic growth crime forward in the u.s. and the secretary of the treasury -- the president, they

are all engaged. i do not think there's any question of significance. a couple of points we would make an addition to your assessment, the europeans have come a long way since august 2011. from being in a place where we were not sure where there were had a, i think they have made a in thedous stride direction in which they are heading. there will be bombs in the row, but there is an outline for bringing together some of the banking regulation -- there will be bumps in the road, but there is an outline for bringing together some of the banking regulation. so all of those are extremely

positive finds. i think, you know, there is a natural, unless something is done, you do not know where it will end up. but a relative basis of reference is where we were september 2011. >> tying the specter previous question about the president, i think, in fact, the president has done quite a good job on the economy in terms of getting things back on an even keel. i think his treasury department is first rate, far from top to bottom. i think they have been favorably disposed to business and the financial sector in an appropriate way. but the president tends to get blamed for everything. it rains the president gets

blamed. when the crisis first broke out, a friend said to me, this is like trying to get 30 hank paul sons to agree with 30 nancy pelosis. my impression is that uncle merkel allyson to move a little bit. -- is that angela merkel is starting to move a little bed. it. i think the president had a good team on the case. i am with you. if they do not. i do not think the uncertainty has been discounted in the markets. i think a pyrotechnical blow up

of europe will suspect our plans and a major way. >> i am not sure what the united states can do about it. it is a european problem. what it does, it makes the united states, with its problems, look relatively attractive to people around the world. you know, i have a fundamental view of life. and that is if there is a blown out there somewhere, and other words, someone has borrowed money, it gets paid back, or somebody loses. everything that has gone on, has sort of been the movement toward preventing someone from losing it. with good reason. if you mark things down to what

they are worth, and the institutions are worthless. there is this dance going on. trying to figure out this problem of life. loan is not paid off, someone will lose money. some traditional people would argue that the answer is not to print money. on the other hand, that has been going on for decades now. there is no stopping that. i think there is little for the united states to do, except root for a good outcome, which i think the will eventually get to. the operative is probably worse than -- the alternative is probably worse. >> of a situation that to are basically not in control of, in any way shape or form. that could blow up on you.

that is life. we have been going for a while here and wanted to see if there are questions from the audience. are there ifmics that you hand out? no, yes? let us start there. let us get a microphone a. >> bitar four microphones up here. >> ifok. >> ok. please basket in the form of a question. thank you >> is true capitalism at work on wall street? the attractiveness of the industry should draw some much competition that no company could get too big to fail.

if it did fail, the penalty would be on the company and its stockholders, not on the public. since those two tenants are not working, i would say capitalism is not alive and well on wall street. for their evidence of that is that the corporations are too big to fail. they are too big to regulate. the man in charge of regulating, he said he was not even aware that he was catching a break from his bank on his own the mortgage. if the person in charge of regulating the banks did not know that -- let me finish here in the final piece of evidence is that when something goes wrong on wall street, the question is coming, the ceo, listen you can have a question without evidence. the ceo comes to the congress,

and he says, i have no idea that happened. so too big to fail, they are too big to regulate. and they are too big to manage. here is my question -- what is the conclusion? >> is not just too big to fail. it is too complex and interconnected to fail. i could have imagined a piece of legislation that says you can only have toatal footings of x on your balance sheet. you are right. the essence of capitalism is creative destruction. if there is no destruction of -- we say and the private sector, bad sectorflows down help. you get a bad a problem to the ceo and he gives it to the senior vice president who gives

it to the vice president the visit to the associate, and the associative finally solves the problem. but in the financial crisis a round of the raw, ad stuff flows uphill. because the whole system was at risk, governments around the world had to step in an address the problem. in a sense, the questioner is right. it is not true capitalism at work. anyone disagree? next question. >> let me just finish on a couple of things. the point of the question you raised are in -- there are important ones. about size and consequences. and risk taking. and i tend to agree with a lot of what ken says.

but i would not necessarily discount the competitiveness that exists on wall street and our financial system. i think the banks compete every day for a number of different lines of products, on the institutional or consumer side. is not mean we should not be policing them all of the time vigorously. you know, i am keenly aware of the importance of both having a competitive playing field, but also making sure that there is no anti-competitive behavior to distort the market. these are very important points that are raised. we should be constantly policing them. >> yes, sir. >> the press secretary of the

treasury, under fdr, was a man who was president of killed hall. i thought that fact should come out. my question to you is that fdr came in with a clear idea, and the secretary was right behind him, came in with a clear idea huge change. there was a lot of information out there. is the problem that we have had the result of the fact that we have not had the same clarity of who was at fault. who was at fault and what needs to be done. >> you know, the committee, it went on for a long time. it is not like people woke up in 1929 and said, we have a problem

and we know how to fix it. it took a while. also, however that our problems were four years ago, they were a whole lot worse back then. . fdr did as president was called a bank holiday to stop the run on the banks. and the legislation that follows established things like the fdic, which by the way, fdr himself did not even like. and there was a much lower regulatory framework. and a deeper need for the creation of rules that did not exist. which is not to say, i am not a total fan of dodd frank.

i do think it is overly complex and so on. but i do not really think it completely is parallel to say that we should have followed the track that they followed. >> i guess the last two questions, you know, it implies certain things. and that is that it is not the same world as 1930, it is not the same world as 1950, and i do not think people today would want to trade the way they live today for the way that people used to live. that is one point i would make. secondly, just about all institutions are a lot larger today and a lot more complex, whether it is ge, that used to be a relatively simple and now has way over 50% of their business out of the united states, or a financial

institution. and this is the point i was trying to make early on. i cannot think the regulators can ever keep up with the way in which these institutions more and evolves. and i agree that you need to have rules of the road and try to please them as well as to ken. but ultimately, let there be a high price for failure. you do not want it to the -- you wanted to be a prize that the boards of directors pay, the owners', management, shareholders, with that hanging over their head, that should modify, were pleased mold their behavior to achieving the objectives that policymakers want to achieve. >> yes, sir? >> i want to ask about consequences.

let us take the movie inside job. i think it won an academy award. and just take all of the characters and their response will for the financial crisis. you have to the leading professors, when is the dean of the major business school in new york. and they did some bad things. they were oking bonds. and they commit to this. they lied on camera. but they were ok'ing those bonds. of those two faculty members appear still on the cnbc as if there are no consequences. >> could you let me respond? >> what to the academics did was embarrassing. and nobody has really taken on

the academics before it the way the guy in the inside job did. it is not really illegal. having said that, i have written a novel onumber of columns. i feel one of the failures has been a failure to prosecute big fish who helped bring the system down. [applause] and to this day, there has been an incredible lack of action on the mortgage fraud and so on and so forth. i think that is a failure of this government. i am not going to ask you to agree or disagree. but i do feel strongly about that. one of the consequences is that if you create a company that systematically writes fraudulent

mortgages, someone ought to go to jail. [applause] i once asked the justice department anyone from countrywide on any level of four down had been prosecuted. the answer was no. >> even the board of trustees at a business school cannot take any action, it is if the movie did not exist. one other question, if i may, i have been watching the fcc for 30 years. every year, the republicans always tried to cut down the budget year after year. and finally, when you have a case of of madoff and you see what happens when you have insufficient funds, have a good enforcement staff, you think the consequences and the 2008

election or the consequences and wall street of a regulated community, regulation is a good thing. how can the very people who probably invested and made off and are upset that there was not enough regulation still sku so far to the right against regulation? >> i sometimes, say that on capitol hill, the financial crisis is like the eighth season of a dfallas. -- dallas. one of the ways of the battle is being fought between democrats and republicans is that democrats are trying to push forward on dodd frank and republicans are trying to

squeeze the budget of the regulators. to make it more a difficult to carry out these regulations. that is a fact. >> let me ask you a question, joe, you are calling for criminal prosecution of various wall street figures. without naming names, and obviously fraud and something that people should go to jail for. is there anything besides fraud that you think the leadership of the financial sector or should be criminally liable for? >> i think that is a really hard question. i do, for the fifth book i roche, there were certainly people all who knew that they were creating aaa credit says a dutch were full of junk.

and pushing it on their own balance sheets. was the fraud? i think that is a hard call. over a thousand people went to jail during that crisis. >> i asked the question because, sometimes what happens in life is that there is a shift in the popular sentiment. and all of a sudden, what was within the guidelines is outside of the boundaries. i remember when i was in my at most active years on wall street. we have a thing called structured finance. these guys who were attracted science level of intelligence -- to interpret the accounting rules r and accountingules to get to the most favorable treatment. and that meant selling very close to the line. and then at the sentiment

changed and they were dogs, and some of them got into trouble. i think one of the problems with this idea of criminal prosecution is that it is easy to agree that when the people sold crap and called it gold, if they knew it they should be prosecuted. but there was so little done by lawyers and accountants, ratings agencies, and this and that, to grab one of these people -- you have to grab someone who was egregiously in the the wrong, i would think. >> one of the reasons is that some people would argue it all started with pressure from the political class to do certain things that to these creative people figured out how to do,

and make money in the process. if you, one of something like this happen, if there is plenty of blame to go around. it is not just someone running a wall street firm that is to blame. some of comes and that wanted to make loans and marginal neighborhoods, and these guys are rocket scientists and figure out how to do it. you know, i think ultimately, you watch all of that laundry out, and there are a lot of people who got subsidized loans or mortgages that will not look good. i think that is part of the problem. part of the reason it is all washed out is because they do not know or the roads will lead. some people do not like it leading to their back door. >> in our methodology of

corporate democracy, the of buck its ups of the board of directors. one of the lehman brothers crisis, where was the board of directors? shouldn't they have replaced the ceo before the problem -- but to of countervailing issues. you cannot -- if you for the whole board and jail or you prosecute them, who will want to serve on the board of directors? >> and is more fundamental than that. when we started this session, i mentioned that there is a long history to where we got to where we are. but gm is sitting here in the front row. he can attest to the way that firm used to run, and all of the other wall street firms used to run. it was a different world.

they different risk profile. there is not a pressure for quarterly performance of public firms are subject to. once you transform an industry from a private ownership, or people's own money is on the line every day, to public ownership with permanent capital, and all of the pressures for performance, it is very hard for a regulator to vote mata to our. the balding man is going on in these companies. and that -- to a monitor every single thing and that is going on in these companies. he tried to address. and sort of looked at it from

that vantage point. it will be hard to go back to the glass-steagall era. there was crisis all of the time on wall street. one pilot business school, there were firms -- there were dozens of firms. and from time to time, they went under. but it was not an hour shaking event, other than for the people who worked there. that is not to the world we live in today. >> and the little time we have left, i want to ask each one of you, ken, looking out at what is going on over there, and thinking about, whether slowing

down is going to be a problem for us. and more directly, about our economy, do you see signs of hope. where you think we stand? >> well on the china, i am looking for some serious near- term -- i think there housing markets -- basically they picked a low hanging fruit. they had a model of investing and stimulating the economy to achieve capital. everyone thinks china is about cheap labor. and it is or was. but it is also about cheap capital but they get from this financial repression. so people with the money in the bank. they earn-interest rates on edge. and that money is funneled into the economy. and roads, bridges, tunnels are built. housing is built. google move from the countryside to the city. and productivity moves up.

and the chief environmental input has been used. i think they are going to have to go through a period, and they are trying to slow down the housing bubble so they can start protecting housing for the people. china is a powerhouse. but they have got a lot of problems to solve a. and the party is feeling very insecure. >> what is your take on our economy? >> i think that we are feeling very insecure. we have trillions sitting on corporate balance sheets. we cannot print our way out of this problem. we have got to find a way to stimulate the economy and get the velocity of money up. in the fundamental problem i would see as one of political economy.

you have 8% of the electorate that has not decided. but presidential candidates are the battlegroundgra states. i think one of the problems we are feeling is that we have a president who came in on a bold change platform. we did not get to that. and the economy is just above the zero growth. the jobs are not there. i would personally look for some political baldness. i laughed whe -- i would personally look for some political boldness. >> first of all, i just want to mention that we have had a

positive job growth. it has not been enough for sure. but just so we are all on the same page. part of it is the phenomenon -- timothy geithner alluded to this and one of his interviews, we have put europe hanging out there. that may be having an impact. we also have some of our fiscal issues. and we need to put to the house and corridor. there are certain major or uncertainties out there.

the clearer the picture becomes, i think that would help. >> i hate to be mr. downer, but if why not? americans tend to be impatient. i feel in my lifetime, they have become more into instant gratification. and, you mentioned something happened four years ago. it started more than four years ago, but the bottom-line results of what happened is that a lot of wealth was wiped out for the middle class. and i relate that to people who were from italy that i knew. the religious limit their mortgage payments. and that was basically the

savings account for the average american citizen and. that system remained in place until this crisis. there's only one thing that happened and that did not happen to my parents. when the average american will of the end of this nest egg that they thought they had did not exist. when you have that amount of wealth destruction, it does not get cured or overcome overnight. affects people's behavior and buying habits and the like. i do not think there is a messiah out there that is going to come along and get us out of this slow return to normalcy, whatever that is. i think that is one of the reasons you are not hearing any one making any bold claims. having said that, to say you are

going to raise taxes is pretty bold. most people do not want to hear that. there are a lot of things that could be done to incentivize people to behave in a certain way, like repatriate earnings that exist in american organizations, they bring them back and invest in united states. a lot of college kids i talked to today cannot find a job. you could provide an incentive for organizations to hire college graduates. but i think we need to keep in mind, all of the time, that this was a very profound event that had very fundamental impact on the net worth of the average american family. and it is going to be a long time before that is recovered. >> the colony on the moon would be -- the stimulus plan -- we are out of time.

i would like to think you all for being here. [applause] this has been terrific. thank you so much. >> several live events to tell you about. the education department posts a second day of a forum on bullying. that is on c-span 2 at 8:30. and at 39:30 on and, we will hear from hilda solis about jobs in the latino in a few moments, today's headlines and your calls live on "washington journal." at 10:00 a.m. eastern, more on the dnc platform drafting committee. in 45 minutes we will be joined by bloomberg reporter cheyenne hopkins will talk about banks still rollback tarp bailout money. money. reid wilson