than an hour. >> thank you and good morning. john, i wanted to begin by saying thank you. thank you for your service. i think someone in your position does not hear that a lot. partly because of the feelings in the general public. we will get to that. let's talk about aviation security. the big question. we can break it down from there. how safe are we when we fly? how do you assess the threats? what keeps you up at night? >> thank you. thank you for having us here

today. for everybody else. i think the context for what we do is importantth. the tsa was created in the aftermath of 9/11. we are safer now than we have ever been. we are part of a global supply chain. i will talk about cargo a little later. passenger security is what most people care about. how we engage with our partners throughout the continuum for national security. i see tsa as part of a national security mission. we have heard about the last couple of days, the cia, and the intel and law enforcement services in forming what we do on a daily basis. locally with the fbi.

the law enforcement officers and sheriff's deputies. all of that information comes in. it comes into tsa every day as far as the classified grief that i get. we take that information and translate it into something that we can help prevent the next possible attack. we are at the other end of a continuum. all of the great work we have heard about in terms of dod, removing safe havens, all of that. the things that have been contributed to the place where we are today. we can talk more about that. we know we face an adversary regardless of how much they have been affected through the dod and other actions. we know they are continuing to try to come up with innovative designs, concealment, and

deployment techniques. >> they are still very keen on airlines. it is such a spectacle. 9/11 had such a demonstration affect. let's talk about those threats. what does keep you up? what kind of threat of a most concerned about? >> the focus is domestically from the standpoint of the workforce. people v meet -- who you meet. there are 275 airports around the world to have nonstop flights to the u.s. we check the standards for all of those airports. a minimum they have to have before we will allow passengers and cargo to come to the u.s. we make sure that is passing. one of the challenges and one of my concerns is that sometimes,

for whatever reason, it could be something like negligence, or as bad as an insider. someone who may be taking a pay off. they except it think they are allowing a drug shipment to come through. that is what i am concerned about. as we heard yesterday, you focused on aviation and there is that, at least by al qaeda, that interest in trying to do something in a plane, whether it is a passenger, a suicide bomber, whether it is a cargo let resawed the fall of 2010. dollars, whatever we have spent it just in the u.s. in the industry in terms of trying to raise the bar to detect and deter terror, they will have succeeded. we saw from the magazine after

the human cargo plot, they said, it only cost them $4,000 to devise and chips those devices -- ship those devices. the u.s. government and the industry spent a lot of money to try to make sure that they were not successful another time. >> that is a pretty good return on the investment. having them spend that money. let me ask you about how tsa has responded to these threats. i wonder if i can put the question this way -- there is a public confidence and public appreciation problem for tsa. i wonder if part of that is because the public might get the sense that you are primarily a reactive agency. they have the printer cartridges. someone tries to like a shoe on

fire, we have to take off our shoes. there is a liquid threat, and we have to take our liquids out. it seems like we are one step behind. is that fair? >> i think it is in the 10 year history from the standpoint of trying to develop the predicted intelligence we did not have on 9/11 where actions could be taken to detect and deter. >> do you net? >> we are much better situated. there is no guarantee. in terms, there is no 100% guarantee. i am a strong proponent of that. a risk-based intelligence approach to aviation security. to that point, i think we have to focus on how we can take the intelligence that is so much more robust and with

improvements in technology, how can we make better decisions in terms of pre-screening people so we can expedite their physical screenings? i think the one size fits all construct after 9/11, we have to treat everyone as a possible terrorist. we have progressed with the technology and intelligent. we have moved away from the one- size-fits-all construct. we saw the two million passenger who has gone through a project. -- pre-check. we can pre-screen them. we are operational in 19 airports. 35 by the end of the year. i know some people have been through the pre -check.

i think it is helping redefine the image of tsa. a number of other things we're doing internally. to move away from the one-size- fits-all construct. >> i want to take a step away from aviation security and asked about the procedure. most people in this room travel a lot. they would eventually qualify. if we were to look around, we are a pretty much in the script. i wonder if -- a pretty homogenous group. i wonder if you are concerned about a two-tiered system exacerbating what we have in this country, the sense that the insiders have the game rigged. that there are two systems and that is hurting confidence in

institutions. >> only slightly. i am focused on how we can do it in the most efficient way. the focus is, how can we make sure that everybody has the highest level of confidence that when they get on a plane, there is not a suicide bomber or something in a checked bag that could bring the plane down. most people look at the aviation security and have high confidence. everybody agrees on that. that is a goal we need to focus on. the question is, how do we best execute on that mission? i have heard a lot of opinions of -- from a lot of people on how to do that. there are some great ideas. i welcome those ideas. it really gets to, we have differentiated between

passengers for a long time. when i traveled, i would go to the ticket counter and show my credentials. they would give me a form to fill out. i would philip outcome but it would sign it. i would take it to the exit leg. -- i would fill it out. they would sign it. i would take it to the exit leg. i would get on the plane armed. i thought, it cannot expand that? we started with the airlines. if you have been flying for years, it is possible you are a terrorist. it is much less likely. we are not in the business of eliminating all risk. we are in the business of managing risk. as we try to do that, the more we can learn about somebody ahead of time. what that allows us to do is

spend more time on those who are selected. as others have mentioned, it is the unknown. we know everybody's name, date of birth, and gender. beyond that, not much. and that you are not on the watch list. i want to make sure that we can focus on the unknown. while improving the physical screening experience for the passengers while expediting their screening. >> we will let the chips fall where they may. let me come back out of left field and ask you on the other side, as part of the risk-based security intelligence, do you profile on the basis of ethnicity, country of origin, religion? if not, why not?

>> the short answer is, no. we do not do that. >> why not? >> we try to determine everything about a person as possible based on their willingness to share. because of the constitutional system, we do not do that. other countries are very successful in using profiling. there is a fair amount of debate on that question. would we be better if we profiled? i do not think so. one of the things i saw when i first came over, a terrorist has no face. the idea it may be someone from 9/11, it could also be a 24- year-old son of a prominent banker and a foreign country who is african who may not meet somebody is profile.

what profile do we use? is it the israeli model? if the fit this category, the better plan on the three hours. -- if you fit this category, you better plan on three hours. that works under israel's laws. 11 million passengers a year. we have 12 million zero week in the u.s. the scale of it, the professionalism, the work force, having already served in army for two years. the bottom line is, we do everything we can to differentiate, not profile, based on intelligence. >> when you think about the risk-based security you are trying to install, looking forward, when you think of the data capabilities that are coming on line, how did those

two meld together? hug you apply the risk-based model? -- how do you apply the risk- based model? >> it is all voluntary. when i talk about the strategy, it is based on a voluntary system other than the watch list. if you make a reservation for an airline ticket, you are agreeing to have your name put against the terrorist watch list. that means what the focus is on trying to identify, not only what the airline has in terms of frequent fliers or what we have because somebody has signed up for a global entry program. it is one way you sign up. even if you are not a frequent flier, if you want to sign up you do that through the global entry program. you just need to have a passport. given those structure is, what

we are looking to do is expand the tsa's pre-check concept more broadly. i mentioned the 2 million passengers as of yesterday. longer term, i would like to see more people going through more pre-check deciated lanes so we can focus on higher risk. recognizing there is no guarantee. >> you want to get people into the pre-check line, because you know who they are. >> the more we can do that -- two years ago, i looked at, i did not see the current contract as sustainable long term. either from a resource perspective or an engagement with the traveling public. those who control our budget. that is what this is all

designed to provide more effective sharing. >> let's talk about the insider threat. in this country and in britain, we have had examples of people who are employees of the airlines or airports who have been involved in plots. given the sheer scale, the number of employees involved in civil aviation, what is the nature of the insider threat? how much cooperation the you get from airlines and airport authorities in addressing what seems to be a pretty big vulnerability? >> it is a concern for everybody in the industry. it is something we focus on to try to identify somebody who may pose a threat. that is where we are largely dependent upon the entire

community, the law-enforcement community, which has come in the past, identified insiders before the airlines. i can think of several examples. those who may have connections with others who are a concern. that is based on someone who has said, you'd better take a look at this person at this airline or airport. that is something that happens on a not-infrequent basis. when we are talking about a global supply chain, a global passenger chain, the one weak link can be a challenge for all of us. >> how you address that? in the united states, you have better partnerships with the airlines. how do you address the

potential we clink? a baggage handler in pakistan or russia or wherever? >> that is the challenge. we do it through the partnership with the aviation security counterpart. also, being informed by security intel services. the example, going back to the cargo plot, being shipped out of yemen. whether there was an insider, that is still debatable. it was outstanding intelligence, in this case, by another service, that gave the tracking numbers for those two packages. but for that intelligence, those packages were on route to chicago. it is that type of information ionalziing operat

that is critical for us. the same thing goes for the insider threat. the belief is that the host a service would identify and take appropriate action. if not, it becomes a challenge. >> it raises the question of cargo. you touched on it earlier. this is another area where it seems there is a significant vulnerability. you cannot examine every piece of cargo going on an airplane. how'd you address the cargo vector? >> it is a vulnerability in a different way. there is a whole different screening protocol. in the u.s., all cargo and all checked bags are checked through explosive detection equipment. that is the confidence we have

in the u.s. if that equipment only identifies a couple of explosive chemicals -- depending on what type of equipment you are talking about. hundreds overseas. here in the u.s., it is calibrated to detect the most common types. what we found with the underwear plot part two, a different type of explosive had been used in the previous one. we have gone back and read calibrated all of the equipment. even working with our canines to have them trained to detect this different type of explosive. when we look at the international -- the global supply chain, the issue is, what is the capability of the coast

airport in terms of detecting explosives? we just signed an agreement with the eu where we recognize the eu national security program. instead of the tsa going to inspect and validate the cargo program, it was a huge of the taking. the eu took on the responsibility of establishing a national program. we recognize that. that is a way we move forward in partnership to say, how can we love all our resources and not try to be the one agency or department that does all things at all places at all times with all people. >> a couple more and then we will open up the questions. the tsa is still a very young

organization. it came from a career in the fbi. compare and contrast. i wonder if you have a moral problem sometimes. everytime you turn on your computer, it is a do not touch my junk stored. -- story. the poster kids for everything that everyone resents. had the force this organization going forward? >> -- how do you forge this organization going forward? >> the tsa is just 10 years. there are a lot of challenges. that is through training, for example, all officers are going through tactical communications

training. they had not had. it is customer service. we were talking in terms of what targets. how can you be escalated -- you de-escalate the situation. the human response is to get agitated right back and say, i am in charge. the offices are just about done with that training. we have also started tsa academy at the federal law enforcement training center. we started the first class is for supervisors. we have over four thousand supervisors, some of whom had not received any leadership training. they had not received any mentoring, training.

immature organizations -- we also do not have an office of professional responsibility, opr. deconstruct after 9/11 -- the construct after 9/11 was a director heading each airport. they would give out discipline based on what they thought was appropriate. there was no standard system. i brought over an opr trainer. we set that up. use the reports about someone being fired, that is under this construct. all of these things are designed to encourage better customer engagement, passenger engagement.

>> last question before we open it up, this is one front in the struggle between nation states. the united states and multinational killers. who is winning? >> clearly, we have had success, the u.s. government, in terms of not a repeat of 9/11. since 9/11, imagine the shoe bomber. -- you mentioned the issue bomber. two russian airliners were brought tdown. 90 people killed. we look at the liquids plot from the u.k. in 2006. the cargo plot. the most recent underwear plot. the detection capabilities

depend on where the person would have gotten through the global airline system. we have these threats. the question is, how can we keep it situated to mitigate or manage risk without trying to eliminate risk. everyone assumes risk. they are assuming some risk. the idea is, how can we mitigate or manage the risk. >> just to follow up, we have foiled plots. there are other consequences. the money, you mentioned. tens of billions of dollars. the sense that america has lost some kind of pride or some kind of personal autonomy. the fear that the shadow that we live under. are they accomplishing the goals they have of disrupting our

society? >> it is a debatable point depending on what perspective you want to take. clearly, there have been significant changes since 9/11 as to how we go about preventing another catastrophe. there is a huge interest in doing that. i think where people disagree, people can always disagree, on how do we best do that. i think the answer is not going back to pre-9/11 days. it is working smarter, more efficiently. what we're doing with the security initiative, those of you with children 12 and under, those of you who know people 75 and older, for those people 75 and older, we did a fair analysis with great help from the bureau. to say, where are terrorists?

based on age, we made the decision to do expedited things for children 12 and under. members of the military, they are part of the pre-check program. we will be expanding that. the great facilitator of that. we have all of these initiatives to try to move away from the one-size fits all. to give the public greater confidence. >> ok. let's open it up to questions. there are microphones at each side and in the back. let's start right here. if you could identify yourself. fire away. >> good morning. i am with ibm.

when we think of tsa, we think of the airports. i heard a story that someone had been stopped on the road. is that someone you are planning to do more of? is it connected to airport security? are there any of the things you anticipate doing? >> something is not right with that. we do have a visible protection response. they partner with state and local law enforcement. some 97% of our budget is focused on aviation security. a small amount is focused on surface transportation. buses, trains, passenger trains, trucks, things like that. what we do is partner with the local agencies and state

agencies to do the teams which are designed to be random, and predictable -- unpredictable shows of law enforcement. we know from the fbi, the briefings, in the u.s. and the u.k., terrorists are deterred by three things, a visible police presence, canines, and cctv. we know from the london bombers, cctv, they did not care about. one of them looked at that camera. he said, it did not matter. he was going to be dead. it was like, so what. we will do surveillance. in washington, d.c., if they see

no police presence -- next tuesday, there may be a team that has 10 to 20 people. >> airport security, do you need to redefine that out where? i was in libya, saudi armory's looted. -- i saw the armories looted. >> it is not an issue in the u.s. that we have seen. we do not know of any in the u.s. it is a concern. perimeter security, from time to time in the u.s. -- in utah, we had a pilot who was wanted for murder. he was able to get into a small regional jet. he was not able to take off.

he caused some damage. >> you need to beef up the perimeter security. >> the airport have the responsibility for it. we help them with it. we set the standard. they do it. >> next question. >> my daughter lives in london. she tells made the bricks use irish of identification. -- brits use iris identifi cation. >> in certain airports they do. any metric is good. proving that the person who has access is that person. it is not a help for what that person is thinking. i use the example of an investigation i worked on in the fbi. the flight took off from jfk.

it crashed on the coast of rhode island. i helped lead the recovery effort. the bottom line was, we found the forensics that showed why -- the explosion. the co-pilot took the flight down. there were 30 egyptian officers on board. the belief was he wanted to kill those officers. iris scans would have proven he was the co-pilot. it is why we have moved to known crewmembers. the most known and trusted people on the flight. if we cannot trust them, we are in trouble. over 27 dozen times a day we do trust our lives to the flight crew.

we want to expand the use of biometrics. it can be very costly. the question is, who pays for it? is it on the u.s. tax payers? the employees pay for it? >> you like it. >> i love it. it is a question of the cost. >> how about over here. way in the back. what's good morning. i am with boeing. we are in support of risk-based screening. you like to have something that is more like global entry and less like frequent-flier. people can get into frequent- flier programs without a background check. what are you doing about trying

to look at a hybrid of global entry. i know you do not want to make it $100. a lot of business travelers are willing to pay money. if they are traveling within the u.s., to get into a system and do the background checks and be able to do that. what a year looking at with respect to some type of hybrid system? with background checks, fingerprints, things that are not in a frequent-flier program. >> we're working on that. the expansion of the security provision, particularly as it relates to pre-checks. we have been in discussion with several companies including one airline that are proposing something where they would bear the cost. the question is, is it a fee

that the u.s. would be charging? all kinds of things, it takes years. what we're interested in is private-sector proposals. that looking at some melnow, would do that. the passenger would bear the cost. we see that as a key enablers for the expansion, the broad expansion. >> it does raise the question, the two-tiered system where you can buy your way into better treatment. you can buy your own government. >> $100, that is for five years. $20 a year. if the fly once a year, even if you never fly. at $20 a year, it is hard to argue that is an onerous cost. that is our position.

>> fair enough. this gentleman right here. >> good morning. good to talk with you again. a question for you on funding. it is a challenging environment. two things. one being the explosive detection systems that were deployed after 9/11. they are 10 plus years. there should be recapitalization effort. if you can give us color on the funding issue. the air cargo screening. funding for deployment of systems. you have to forfeit 50 airports. -- have 450 airports where they might be deployed. if he could give us some information on that. >> the recapitalization is a key issue with the life cycle coming

to what was originally proposed as the useful life cycle. what we are finding is some of the equipment is doing well beyond the life cycle. we did a budget presentation on monday. the budget year goes into effect october 1 a year from now. there will be continued funding. it is a question of what level. same thing with what we are doing in terms of the air cargo. the funding is there, it has been. it is at reduced levels. as is the government budget in terms of being reduced. i do not know for 13 or 14 yet. the belief is that those key technology enablers will be

maintained. they have to be, otherwise we grateful abilities which is not good for anybody. >> -- we create vulnerabilites which is not good for anybody. >> did you get support for your budget request? >> yes. it is interesting. there is a lot of focus. on how we can do a better job. when it comes to a budget, there is support for those things we described. when it is all said and done, there is a realization, these are key issues we need to make sure we did not greet vulnerabilities on -- create vulnerabilities on. >> fallen upon the budget question, it seems the other side of the coin is taking an internal look at the 21 levels

of security. which ones are the most effective. can you speak to that? >> for those who have followed, we talk about 20 different levels of security we have. 17 of which are primarily tsa responsibilities. the intel is one of the key ones. for the last year, there has been an efficiency review at tsa. all the things we had been doing. one example is our behavioral detection officers. they engage or observe passages. a classic example, a bdo would have been useful, on christmas day, 2009. he was walking to his date with his bomb. what i would have loved it is to

have an officer in plain clothes off to the side. a uniformed officer walking towards him. he sees the canine, bought officer, what i would have loved is to see, how does this person respond to that? does he continue walking, knowing that there is probably vapor coming off? the officer might observe something? that is the whole premise. in two airports, we have taken that to the next level based on some best practices to do what we call a program. some of you have been through boston logan. you have had a brief conversation with an officer about your travel and plans.

the whole idea is, how can we learn more about people. it is not so much about what your answer is, it may be intrusive to some people. you can decline. it is more how the person responds. critics say, you have not cut any terrorist. that is true. we are not aware of any terrorists trying to get on flights. there was a report a couple years ago that said, the program does not work because there have been 19 or 20 terrorists, 24. these terrorists, almost all, we're not bomb throwers. the finance there is going to raise money to send back to whoever.

that person is just a businessman or woman who is going to do their work. it is different from a terrorist who is going to blow up a plan. there are different manifestations. that is one example. we do a number of different things we are looking at to try to provide the most effective security. the review is still ongoing. along with the review of our headquarters structure. we have done some real reorganizing to create better efficiencies. a realization that our budget is less than it was last year and will probably be less next year. >> this gentleman right here. >> another budget question, what do you see happening to the level of the 60,000 strong labor force? >> 60,000 is not only the front line for us, the management for

that, it also includes federal air marshals. they are a part of tsa. and all of the different components. we have 47,000 security officers. about 14,000 of those are part- time. if you travel a lot, when it is really busy, monday and friday, we have a part-time workforce to cover those times. noon on a wednesday, it may not be so busy. we do not have as many people's back at that time. that is one of the responsibilities we have. one of the challenges is to try to professionalize the work force, more part time, people may say, that makes more challenges. it is not that simple.

some of our offices are part- time, some are full time. right now, the budget is focused on becoming leaner, more efficient, how we deploy that workforce. there is no discussion about reducing the size. there have been questions about -- i had a hearing six or seven weeks ago where the chairman of the committee of oversight ask what we would do with a smaller workforce. my response was that would be a challenge. >> you feel you are immune from work-force cuts? >> i would not say immune. our current budget envisions full staffing. 14 looks, that is all -- yeah. what's next, right there. -- >> next, right there.

>> i am very concerned about the protocol. i assume it is a lot different than a regular airport. as the former owner of a plane, it seems like you got in and just took off. >> the general aviation area is under review. we are not talking about the 1%, we are talking about the 1% of the 1%. when you fly on your own, whatever it is, the fact is there are different levels of security. we have tried to address that through rulemaking. we work closely with industries. there is a rule in process that will address a sign, which come of vulnerability, perimeter

security, locks on the plainnes. when that is published, we will get comments and move forward. in it is in and nobody's best interest to have an airport -- it is not good for the industry, the airport, anybody. the industry has been very responsive in terms of voluntary issues. we identify it vulnerabilities. here is what you should do, generally. it is not in the form of a regulatory action. . time,see from time to that can be an issue. the access to the large, wide bodied planes with extra fuel, that is our highest concern. the fact that somebody might get

into a small cessna, that is not a good thing. from an over all u.s. government and industry perspective, what is a return on investment from time to lock down every airport as we do for commercial aviation? that is part of the dialogue. >> you are willing to tolerate a greater risk due to potential consequence? >> it is a recognition that we cannot guard rognition that we cannot guard against all things, all places, all times. we can do more to try to do that. the cost to the taxpayers and the industry would be high. there is the question of, what is our return on investment. >> the people affected have a lot of clout.

>> they may. everybody in this mill you has a lawyer. i hear a lot of lawyers. [laughter] then i wake up and start the day. [laughter] that is my opinion. some are very vocal. >> be right back here. this lady here. >> i am the spouse of an active- duty marines. my question is, i have had the opportunity to fly from japan here, i have noticed that they did not require us to take out shoes off -- our shoes off because they have a device we can go through. if we have bottled water, they are able to put it in a device that can detect what they are looking for.

why do not have this? is this in the works? >> let me start with the liquids. the issue with the liquids came in after the 2005 plot. we have bottled liquid scanners in the u.s. we have nearly 1000 of those. it does cause additional time and processing. it slows down the checkpoint for passenger and causes additional work. we can do that. we do that for medically necessary liquids. those that can exceed the 100 milliliters, 3.4 ounces. we are working with the industry and technology to improve that so it can be a more expedited fashion of doing that. we are working with the eu in

terms of trying to facilitate the flow of those liquids and particularly perfumes and liquors. tamper evident bags. i have a meeting on monday with the eu and canadians and australians. that is one of the issues we will be discussing. on the issue is, there is different technology. there is not technology that allows for the full range of security screening other than for metals -- metal objects. in terms of explosives, whether it is c4 or tatp, there is no good technology that allows for the efficient detection. it is a policy matter. in the eu, s theyhoes to stay

on -- they allow shoes to stay on. with our high confidence passengers, you are allowed to keep your shoes on. we are working on expanding that. right now, we are in the process. it is not there. >> why do we have to take our shoes of domestically? what is the risk? >> it depends on whether there is another richard reed who has decided, let's exploit something that was tried previously. probably, it would probably be on a regional jet. the question is, what risks are we willing to take? if it is that flight that is

blown up because of somebody with a shoe bomb, and you are on it, that is not a good thing for you. as we saw with the liquid plot, oftentimes, it is not just looking at onetime. we're looking at multiple flights and multiple venues for the maximum effect. if you have wanted, that is a terrible thing. if you have won two -- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, that is a problem. we get to where we have high possible conferencing technology or we get to the person and the technology then we make different policy decisions. >> ok. a few more here. the gentleman here. >> i know this is a topic on

aviation security, but i would like to address the issue of real security. i am always pleasantly surprised how relaxed and easy it is to get onto a train at union station. it is so easy for summit to put a bag on a train, get off the train and have -- for somebody to put a bag on a train coming get off the train and have the train blowup. what would do differently if there is an explosion on a seller gone to new york? >> that is a good question. it gets to the heart of where the risks. from what we have seen overseas, from the madrid bombing, what we have seen in india and pakistan in terms of rail -- there have been more people killed and injured in rail attacks than in aviation

over the last 10 years. so the focus is what could we do differently? there is a lot we could do. there has been a fair amount of discussion. we could do similar screening at the railways as we do checkpoints. there is not a lot of appetite for doing that. what makes real trouble so efficient and easy and positive is the idea of published schedules that are predictable. but then you have the open architecture. the ability to get on and travel basically unhindered. you will probably see viper teams working with amtrak. but those qualit .

because 9/11 involved aviation in the u.s., that is our major sector. as we look at rail safety, there are a lot of things that are done, could be done more, but at significant cost and that is a public policy debate that congress and two administrations have decided not to invest heavily in that area. >> this gentleman right here. if seems like the benefits of pre-check have an artificial joint. is there any thought about changing that? >> we have addressed several folks. if your pre-chat then you walk through a metal detector as opposed to the head -- the body scanner.

to exploreg different where is that may include the body scanner as part of a pre-chuckling. it is more difficult to do that. -- pre-check lane. it is more difficult to do that. it is not resolved yet. >> i want to follow-up on the body scanning, particularly the back scanner device. we are a country that is over- tested medically. there is concern about radiation exposure that we have in all kinds of places. how do respond to critics who say, in particular the back scanner device, is expensive -- is excessive to exposure of radiation to the public? >> before deployment been continuing, done by whether it is john hopkins, fda, some

other studies that have been done saying that the exposure is so minimal but it is the equivalent of flying a 30,000 feet. on a cross-country flight, how much radiation you get, the three-minute exposures would you get when you go through ait. you'd have to go through 5000 times in a year just to make that minimum safety standard. you have to go 15,000 times in one year. they are receiving much more naturally occurring radiation. the whole idea between having two types of technology is trying to get beyond the current technology to get to a

breakthrough technology to detect a small thread with the dust alarm revolution possibility and not be dependent upon one technology and one manufacturer exclusively. out of the 750 or so we have around the u.s., all have been or will be converted to automatic target recognitions. >> to cloud the private area. >> manner woman, midgetman or woman, it will be the same. >> do you -- man or woman, it will be the same. >> do you store these images? >> no. >> promise? >> yes. [laughter] >> on the question about by country, you answered about individuals. does that mean that mogadishu

vs. barrett vs london, there is no change in white -- vs beirut vs london, there is no change in what you pay attention to? >> in terms of travel patterns and histories and things like that for non-u.s. citizens we may look at it. it is not profiling, but if you have been to yemen six times -- the times were bomber is a good example. he had been from where he lived in connecticut and new york five times over the past several years -- he is from pakistan. is that an issue? not necessarily. but they would be added to the watch lists as a selectee or derogatory intel and they will

be made no fly. in terms of generics, it is more -- it is not profiling based on ethnicity or race, but based on behavior patterns. >> so the trip wire would be repeated trips to pakistan, for example. >would it be repeated trips to ireland? quite possibly. we know there have been. -- >> possibly. we know there have been. the whole risk-based german intelligence is just like that -- risk-based driven intelligence is just like that. is this summit we should be focused on based on travel patterns or history or something like that? -- is this someone we should be focused on based on travel patterns or history or something

like that? we are clearly a beneficiary of the law-enforcement community and the homeland security infrastructure. we are a hybrid agency. we have some law enforcement and federal air marshalls. we are a hybrid because we are also a regulatory agency. >> right back there. >> i would like to revisit the congressional help you are getting. the stories are somewhere between 88 and 108 subcommittees and committees in congress and that oversee this. knowing that you're not going to criticize the congress having an oversight role, being an tsa andrator anin the being a regulator, having to report to so many and how you

resolve it? >> well -- [laughter] obviously, congress has a key role in providing oversight. all of those things the art are important as their representatives of the american people. we have to respect it. we spend a lot of time ipreparig for briefings that are really important for us. we had the chairman of one of our appropriations committee come to one of our facilities where we test all new technologies prior to it being deployed. in the post-9/11 narrett,

getting something in pushing it out, that is not -- post-9/11 and, getting something i pushing it out, that is not the way. some jurisdictions have tried to bring us in. but the deputy secretary is here and speaking later. i think she can probably speak far more comprehensively for the department than tsa. we appreciate trying to engage -- some of you have called witnesses on panels alongside tsa or a second panel and that provides some of that perspective and concept that they might not have otherwise. >> we will take a couple more questions.

i want to follow-up on one thing in particular. that is a surgically implanted explosives, how do you detect and stop it? >> that came from yemen last summer, the summer 2011, where they were looking at ways to defeat our current regimen, including the body scanners, which would depict or pick up anomalies. the intel was that they would in plant explosives in people so they could get through any type of security. fortunately, we have not seen that. there has been some follow-up reporting on that from the summer of 2011. we have worked with our international partners. ithere are some things you have to be doing, some of it within guidance and some of it with regulatory action.

that includes making an assessment and resolution of any concerns for somebody who may have had recent surgery. it becomes a very challenging proposition. >> it would defeat her current machinery. so you have to look at the intelligence to defeat it. >> the two things that we would have on a surgical implant, there would possibly be some type of a port that the initiator could be injected through with a syringe and do it that way. but the other possibility is to avoid detection, somebody behaving strangely and have a typical tap down.

>> we have time for a couple more. >> yesterday, there was a number given saying that there were over 800,000 people in the united states with top-secret or elevated clearance or more. by definition, they have had pretty good background checks. given that you now have the pre- check population that you don't have to worry about making counterintelligence targets and treat people differently and in the interest of trying to maximize the energies of the staff you have, has there been any consideration using all of that background on those people, many of which are in this room and have frequent-flier status, to reduce the time you spend on that particular population? >> yes. in fact, we have taken that up and we are in agreement with general clapper to have current

members in u.s. government employees, something that is on an agency-based decision. we have two or three agencies that are included. other agencies are joining. is all voluntary. -- it is all voluntary. it is optional. the beauty of it from my perspective is that the information that that person is a traveler is imbedded in the bar code. the member of the intel community -- the security officer at the checkpoint knows whoever you are.

there are no interested groups of people and individuals that we want to continue to expand to. that is where the private industry input will be critical. >> ok, the last question. >> i wanted to find out what you learn specifically from the british case, the ba worker getting specific e-mails that were admitted in british courts asking detailed questions about where does he work, what kind of access did he have to cabin crews and made a big point of discouraging him from meeting to join him in yemen. but there was a very interesting amount of court records on that. i was curious if you had any comment.

>> yes, the situation is that he was looking for a trusted insiders. and through a couple of cutout, he found it in british airways and they had an exchange of information. to your point exactly, he did not want kareem to be an operative himself, but to be recruiting others. that all was identified. with some help of the u.s. community, the recruitment effort was identified and the appropriate steps were taken. and the two people that he contacted were handled within the system. to me, that is another example where intelligence is a key to enable us on the front before anyone is able to get to a checkpoint or have an insider opportunity to do something bad.

>> do you have the sense that they are very hungry to get inside? >> absolutely. yes. that is the challenge. not so much in the u.s., but overseas. >> thank you very much. thank you once again for your service. best of luck to you and your team. [applause] [applause]