americans that were murdered by these cowardly terrorists. we all have a unity of purpose to make sure that we do protect our homeland, hard and our defenses, and again, i appreciate the witnesses being here today. with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> tomorrow on "washington journal", national education association president dennis van roekel offers his reaction to the chicago teachers strike. bill bennett discusses the president to campaign. and the washington institute has the latest on the anti-american protests in the middle east. "washington journal" live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. deputy energy secretary admits there were security lapses at the y-12 national security

complex in tennessee. on wednesday, he told the house energy and commerce subcommittee on oversight and investigations that corrective measures have been taken to prevent future incidents. officials say that in july, three individuals, including an 82-year-old nun, a past security fences and vandalize the building where nuclear material was held. this is two hours and 10 minutes. >> good morning, everybody. welcome our witnesses to the oversight and investigations committee. today's subcommittee on oversight investigation will review challenges to safety and taxpayers to worship in the department of energy's nuclear weapons complex. doe is responsible for maintaining the most dangerous materials on the planet, including nuclear warheads.

this is one area that must have affected oversight. -- effecitve oversight. this committee to the work of this subcommittee has a long history of bipartisan scrutiny that the oversight and management of the contracts charged with running doe's nuclear operations. lessons from past investigations and related gao, inspector general, doe's oversight should guide our bipartisan review of the current situation. my colleagues, chief among these lessons is that independent and effective oversight is simply essential and necessary. the safety and security risk involved in overseeing the nation's nuclear facilities are enormous. this committee must be vigilant about maintaining the exhaust of oversight the committee has traditionally had in this area. doe, through its national

nuclear security administration or nnsa, manages programs that involve high-hazard nuclear facilities and materials. the most sensitive national security information and complex construction environmental cleanup operations that pose a substantial safety, public health, and environmental risks. interestingly, all of these programs are carried out by contractors, both at the national level and the weapons production facilities. these contractors and their federal managers spending billions of taxpayer dollars on dangerous nuclear projects require rigorous oversight. today, we will review what doe has done in recent years to reform its oversight program. i welcome our witnesses from doe, the doe inspector general and the gao that will help us examine in this important issue. when government vigilance is not sufficiently rigorous, problems

occur. a case in point is the security failure at the y-12 national security site this past july. by all accounts, contractors and site managers failures at y-12 allowed one of the most secure it -- serious security breakdowns in the history of the weapons complex. the y-12 is but the latest in a string of failures. over the past decade, we have seen security breaches and management failures at los gao testimony will remind us all of over one 5- year periodin which 57 incidents occurred, more than half that involve the release of data that posed the most serious threat to the united states security interest. in another example, investigated by the subcommittee in 2008,

the national lab gave itself a passing mark on its own physical security. the nnsa federal on-site managers gave it a passing mark, too. only when doe's office of independent oversight actually tested the security independently was it evident that homeland deserved the lowest possible rating for protective force, performance and for physical protection of classified materials. on the safety front, the experience has been no better. from 2007-2010, the lawrence livermore lab had multiple events involving uncontrolled worker exposure to beryllium which can cause a debilitating lungometimes they fatal condition. a lab determined it was compliant. it took an independent department oversight review to determine the contractors program violated the

regulations. now this past may, the inspector general reported another national laboratory had not held its managers accountable for implementing an important system for preventing and reducing injuries. neither contractor or the federal site manager had addressed problems identified in this program for more than a decade. for more than 20 years, gao has designated a doe contract management oversight related to the weapons complex as high-risk for flock -- fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement. we have seen examples of this multibillion-dollar cost increase and schedule delays in important nnsa construction projects. in the meantime, directors of the national laboratory and others claim that federal oversight is too burdensome and interests of and that's doe should back off. our friends at the armed services committee has moved legislation to the house that

would dramatically limit doe' ability to conduct independent oversight over as program management and the contractors. i recognize that nsa has not been delivering all that is expected, but this committee, given its jurisdiction and a longtime policy interests and effective doe management has to diagnose the problems for itself independently. we need to identify what works and what does not work and identified a clear path to ensuring safe, secure operations in the interest of taxpayers and on national security. with that, i recognize the ranking member. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to echo the chairman's remarks about this subcommittee having a long bipartisan history of asking tough questions about the safety and security of our nation's nuclear facilities. i am pleased we are continuing this work today. i am glad that members of the

said committee had the chance to develop a greater understanding -- members of the subcommittee had a chance to develop a greater understanding of how nnsa is doing and to learn what can be done to improve the security of those who live or work near those facilities. i have been on this committee for almost 16 years, since that time we have had almost 20 -- over 20 hearings on nuclear issues at our national lab. many of the witnesses here today are regulars in front of this committee. i know the importance of safe and secure nuclear facilities. and i know what is at stake when something falls through the cracks or when the contractors at the sites are not being carefully watched. 10 years ago, this subcommittee began the first of a series of hearings of shocking security issues at los alamos in new mexico. the chairmen will remember the trip we took their to look at the facility and to see the lapses.

what we covered were serious pervasive issues with the management culture and the security and safety of the site. we attacked those problems head- on, demanding answers and forcing nnsa and doe to work harder to secure their facilities. as a result, the agency implemented new security procedures and increased oversight of the lab. but obviously, nnsa has more work to do. frankly, this committee has more oversight to do. in recent weeks, we see new safety and security issues are rise at two locations. late last month, lost alamos la b informed the public they were investigating a spread of a writ elected material, tech-99, by employees and contractors at los angeles. doe and indicated there was no danger of public contamination, approximately a dozen people were exposed.

this safety labs comes on the heels of a bizarre security breach at the y-12 facility where and 82-year-old nun and two and others were able to vandalize a supposedly secure building detain dangerous nuclear material. these safety and security incidents show clearly the need for strong and robust oversight from this committee and others of security issues at our nuclear facilities. in 2004-2005, our willingness to bring serious nuclear safety issues into the public view and demand that doe be held accountable for their actions made it different. doe is better than it used to be. there is an entire office dedicated to the health, safety and security of all facilities. but recent events tallest there

is more serious work left to be done. -- recent events tell us there is more serious work to be done. it is necessary to make a strong oversight role of work nnsa facilities. from this committee to the office of health, safety, and security, to the inspector general, to the defense nuclear safety security board and other outside organization, strong oversight from agencies and groups forces nnsa to take better care of our nuclear facilities. without oversight, serious issues will not be identified and fixed and the results could be disastrous. i cannot think of any reason why we would want to decrease our oversight of these facilities, inhibit the ability of oversight to reduce site actions, or reduce accountability for those responsible for keeping nuclear site safe. at a time when terrorists and hostile nations have an ever- increasing pool of cyber weapons, we need to constantly

adapt and focus our efforts to protect nuclear facilities. i hope this hearing will provide them with information that colleagues on both sides of the aisle need so that we can come together to improve the safety and security of these nuclear facilities. there have just been too many close calls to ignore. constant vigilance is required when it comes to our nation's nuclear facilities, there can never be enough oversight. that is why i appreciate your holding this hearing today. >> i thank my colleagues and i recognize the gentleman from texas, mr. barton. >> thank you. when an 82-year-old passcifist nun kissing the inner sanctum of our weapons complex, you cannot say job well done. she is in our audience. would you please stand up? we want to thank you for pointing out some of the

security problems. while i don't totally agree with your platform you are espousing, i do thank you for bringing out the inadequacies of our security system and thank you for being here today. mr. chairman, that young lady brought the holy bible. if she had been a terrorist, lord only knows what could have happened. we have had numerous hearings in this sub committee and full committee on security at our national laboratories and especially our weapons complexes. apparently, that message is still not going forward about what needs to be done. what does not need to be done is to give contractors a pat on the back. if there is ever a time for more

aggressive oversight, this is it. i applaud you and the ranking subcommittee member for doing that today. with that, i yield to mr. terry the balance of my time. the lady may sit down if she likes. >> i have to congratulate the contractors of nnsa for accomplishing something based upon their mind boggling incompetence that has not happened here in a while and that is uniting republicans and democrats. in our desire for change and reform and more oversight, the security of u.s. nuclear weapons stockpiles cannot be overstated. nnsa was created to keep the doe from being overstretched. all of their duties were left with contractors with low oversight, could or would be

done. last five years has seen a deterioration in security at the complex's as a result in a decrease in contract . the taxpayer owns these complexes and they have not gotten their money's worth. failures in both the safety of the laboratories and protection of the weapons themselves have been repeated across the complex. i believe there is bipartisan support for more oversight. . .

. .