.

>> i think in -- first of all i should say whether a land line or cell phone, you are just as likely to be a to victim of robocalls. that in and of itself does not protect you. there is some hope beyond the items steve mentioned -- for reasons completely unrelated to

robocalls, the federal communication commission simply has mandated cell phone carriers do much better job of passing on valid signaling and numbering information. that may well also be helpful in some circumstances to provide traceable information, even the existing system simply because many of the smaller actors have generally for a variety of reasons unconnected to today's topic had incentives to hide the originating telephone number is now have other reasons beyond robocalls to stop -- to deliver better information. in the longer term, i do not think we are talking a decade here, we have the opportunity to do much better on the back and side of the system. we need to tackle that quickly

before there is another legacy problem. one thing that i have learned is, if you do not bill that in, there is always a reason we see that. we have this equipment. we can no longer change it. it is too expensive. we cannot upgrade it. we need to do that before we get into the situation again. >> can you say a little bit more about how we build it in? what are the steps we can take to do that? >> in general, i believe we need -- it is a two part problem. right now you have no ability -- the good guys have no ability to prove they are legitimate holders of a telephone number. anybody here has registered a domain name or a certificate for an organization?

i suspect if you people have. you can go to a provider with relatively little effort and you can get a registered web address. it is not national security level secure, but it keeps out many of the bad guys as far as pretending to own a domain name that they do not. we cannot do the same thing with telephone numbers. we are trying to see if we can get to a model where telephone numbers have a method of proving that upstream and downstream entities when they place a call. that requires a number of cryptic mechanisms already available in the protocols but have not been applied yet. >> there are more secure a mechanisms that have been designed for voice over ip that have not yet been used.

one reason they will come into some use is unlike e-mail, phone companies like to get paid for the service. if you are running a voice over ip company, you want to make sure you are getting paid. just knowing who made a call a load is not enough unless they are trying to impersonate somebody well known by the social security information. i get lots of phone calls from people i have ever -- i have never heard of. yes, even from countries that seem to export bank accounts. the phone company wants to get paid. there are privacy preserving cryptic techniques -- basic, you are responsible for this. stop it. much better than we do with the mail today. >> i have two questions that deal with challenges. i would tell you what they are.

it might relate to each other. how the protect consumers while allowing automatic informational calls that they want and need such as fraud alerts, package delivery. a different question is, in an era of authentication and trace back, how do you insure civil privacy? >> the second part is there are cryptographic mechanisms that can be used. i do not go into the details right now, but you can think of the collar's phone number as being in a sealed envelope -- collar's phone number as being in a sealed envelope and only unsealed at a court order. i have to get three different parties to agree to unseal this in order to do it. it is not going to help if it is a totalitarian regime.

it will help in a place where there is the rule of law. >> unless we stop illegal robocalls, all of the desirable and necessary means of mass notification will also fall by the wayside because people will no longer pick up the phone when they do not recognize a number or we will end up with techniques -- filtering techniques that we will have a difficult time distinguishing between a legitimate call such as a school closing call or a reverse 911 type of system that has become very popular and life-saving and the card holder services calls. >> one more on that. and authentication like your password in your authorization, what you are allowed to do when you prove your identity, if you have a legitimate robocall, they are allowed to make these calls.

you can get agencies registering with the fcc saying, i wish to be qualified to make these calls under the following sets of rules. they will get credentials letting them have a telephone network if they are qualified. they can be revoked if they violate the laws or regulations. >> once you can identify that you can think of bonding and other techniques that we have. both on the public and private side. you can imagine you have your own faltering type of service that a third-party providers. -- filtering service. conform to the agreed upon codes of conduct, i as a consumer can decide which ones i want to do. it is much easier for what i signed up for these type of services. that is what i often do.

with the school district, you often sign up ahead of time. you can implicitly at those despite mechanical things happening in the background even without government intervention, there might be ways to facilitate such wide listing as long as the party split along and as long as you have trust will authentication. >> this is a question we received from two different people. could you elaborate as to what a consumer receives more robocalls of the press 1 to try to determine the identity of a robocall? >> my guess would be that they have found generally speaking that indicates that the person is a real person as opposed to an answering machine or an office somebody and it may be

somebody you actually is not even enough to believe it makes a difference. that might be a qualifying characteristic as well. the general anticipation is that it indicates that you are much more willing to actually listen to the end of that as opposed to it hanging up when rachel introduces herself. >> we have a couple of questions from in the room and e-mail that relate to other panels coming up in the day. i will hold those for the moderators of those panels. the last question, will the power. slides be made available after today? the answer to that is, yes. they will be posted online so you can have access to them. some of the info graphics will be available for people in the room today outside on the table. with that, i will turn it over to the next panel. let me thank the chief

technology officers. [applause] i will turn it over to my colleague robert to introduce the next panel. >> you guys can come on up. good morning. i am robert anguizola. in case you do not know, our division handles the policy work and enforcement around the "do not call" list and tsr provisions that inhabit a legal robocalls. it is my pleasure to introduce

our industry panel. is our representatives of the telecommunications industry that have been kind enough to share their challenges dealing with robocalls. hopefully, we will also be able to provide some ideas for a path forward. our first panelist is kevin rupy, senior director for policy for u s telecom. that is the broadband association. it is the premier trade association representing service providers and suppliers for the telecom industry. next is david diggs, vice president of wireless internet development for ctia. that is the wireless association. he represents the wireless communications industry. our third panelist is brad hermann, founder and president

of call-em-all. that is a company that offers automated dialing services. we have somebody who is actually responsible for placing some robocalls. he will talk about how some are legitimate, and hopefully his company is not making any of the illegal ones. without further ado, i represent our panelists. -- at present our panelists. >> thank you for that introduction. thank you everybody for being here today. i will just open up -- there we go. i will just open up with a few points. i am kevin rupy. i want to thank the ftc for

having this important panel today. we are thrilled to be a part of it. we completely understand consumer frustration and concern on this issue. our members are fully aware of it and they are sympathetic to it. similarly, as much as this is an issue for consumers, it is an issue for our members as well. these robocalls do indeed have an adverse impact on our company's networks. fourth and finally, u.s. telecom and its members have been working on addressing the robocall issue through various working groups. we will continue to do so, and we look forward to working with the ftc on this and enter the feature. three points on what i will talk about today. -- in the future.

i do not think we should be surprised that on the previous panel, two gentlemen who were technologists, doctors and former engineers with at&t did a great job of describing the it circuit switched network. they covered a lot of ground. i will tee it up by talking about where we have come from and where we are going. as was discussed, the voice network has transitioned from this circuit switched voice network to a broad band enabled boys' network. this is basically what we are talking about. -- the voice network. i would note to this slide is sort of a historic slide. it is a snapshot of the early

1990's. there is really two things that i would like you to take away from the slide. this circuit switched network, this original phone network was a closed system. voice services were generally provided by local exchange carriers or long-distance carriers. when we have the passage of the 1996 act, we had the introduction of competitive local exchange carriers who were also connected to the network at both the local and long-distance level. and we brought and wireless with the advent of mobility. the key. i want people to take away is that it was a closed system -- the key point is that it was a closed system with a finite number of providers. the second thing is that at the time, these companies were providing plain old television

and -- telephone services. there was not in the internet evolved in this circuit switched network. these networks are evolving. they are changing. what we have now today is basically this. we no longer have this sort of finite universe of a voice providers. we actually have a myriad of companies with the first technical backgrounds providing police services. -- voice services. we now have interconnected providers. we have autodialer companies. we have a vast ecosystem whereby voice services are

delivered over the network. the key thing to remember here, the pspn is still there. it is still there. it has been subsumed by the internet. what that means is that whether a company is a circuit switched company or an internet based company, that the police service can transit either through the internet and through a gateway to the pspn. that voice service can get to the consumer. i put the big auto dialers company out there just to show the path. that path whether from a web based autodialer company or it can go through the pstn.

with that, when you talk about the stake holders of in the robocall environment, i will not go through that in great detail. as i was talking with some people earlier, there is a lot of stakeholders out here. we have voice, isps, the robocall customers, the autodialer companies. i would know there are subsets and there. even with autodialer companies, there are companies that just do software development. some of manufacture equipment. others provide this bundled service to consumers. anybody from automobile shops to zoos. there are a lot of stakeholders in this robocall environment. with that, what are we talking about when we talk about robocalls? i kind of like to think about it

in a traffic light analogy. green, yellow, red. i think is so great that brad is here to talk about call-em-all because it is important for consumers to understand there are legitimate companies and robocalls that come to consumers. if you work from left to right on this slide reflected in all mass calling the events, there are many that fall into the drink category. these are important and legal. these are things like school closings, 911 calls, weather alerts -- important calls that can be accomplished through the robocall environment and technology. and we have in the middle area practical and legal automated calls. these can be political messages.

i am getting called by obama and mayor romney all the time. it is that time of year. utility service reminders. these are practical and legal. then you get to the right hand column that is malicious and a legal. fishing calls, focused nuisance attacks, these are where the bad actors fall. please keep in mind all three of the categories, not an exhaustive list. this is one important way to bring all of this together. my previous slights and that last slide. we need to understand the different perspectives on these events. there is what consumers see and what service providers see. consumers are seeing all of the different types of robocalls. they understand what they are getting.

my kid's school is closed. got it. johnny has his dentist appointment tomorrow. i cannot forget that. rachel from card holders services. they are in that position to see and understand which robocalls they are getting. our member companies operate network operation centers. what they see is just a mass calling event. they cannot delve into what specific type of call that is. all they are seeing is basically this massive spike in traffic. there are certain characteristics involved with the mass calling events. they are highly localized. there will be through central areas. they are tremendously high volume. they are extremely brief. they last a matter of minutes. there is absolutely no advance warning on these calls. basically a massive incident

over a brief period of time and then it is over an it is done. this is an important thing to understand, sort of perspective. with that being said, i do not want to imply that our member companies are passive observers to these incidents. that is simply not the case. there is a lot that they are doing when these incidents occur. it is noted on the previous panel. there are some limited -- there are some limitations. just as an example, host the event, a lot of our carriers well basically reconstruct the events. they will investigate. if they receive a call for multiple consumers complaining about it, rachel just called me. that is an indication that we have to look and see what we can figure out.

through the network operations centers, they are doing things like traffic different -- forensics, as calling investigations. if the vent warrants, oftentimes carriers will initiate legal actions at the federal level. that says state, but it is at the federal level. the work with law enforcement to pursue some of the bad actors through the subpoena process. a rather important thing that the carriers are doing the, they are working in standard setting grids and best practices groups, groups like the alliance for telecommunications solutions. this is where the industry stakeholders' come together and figure out best practices, procedures, and standards whereby we can find consumer center solutions to some of the robocall issues.

last but not least, legal limitations was mentioned on a previous panel. in a connection -- privacy plays a big role in this. last but not least, there is a technological arms race component to the issue. it can be like a game of -whack- a-mole. that is it for me. i am happy to turn it over. >> as noted, i am david diggs with ctia. we represent carriers, and -- infrastructure providers. the odds are they your wireless

carrier is a member of our organization. on that note, the first presentation, there was some discussion around wireless carriers like to get paid. please feel free to turn your readers up to lout. i do not want to stand between you and our member companies in a billable even to. i do want to cover a couple of points. i want to point out that wireless is different than the land environment on a couple of things. who is allowed to call a wireless device? it does not cost the consumer anything to answer the phone that entered the kitchen, that

model is referred to as calling party pays. on the other hand the wireless industry initially evolves with a charge for any call that you got on your wireless device. while there were some trials of the calling party plays, in the main part if you hit the send button to receive a call, the meter was running on that. for that reason, the consumer protection act of 1991 specifically put in a provision to port -- forbid robocall a to mobile devices. i will second the torrent of calls to the home phone on a swing that state. i am i getting does on my mobile device. the ethical robocall

organizations are respecting that. there is some debate about what it constitutes, but in general that has been less of an issue for mobile customers. finally as i have already spoke to the exemption for political or charitable does not exist for mobile. i want to talk and basically echo a theme that you have already heard a couple of points on. i would speak about this in terms of the historic telco or ladline or the telcos and lanolin operators also provide your mobile service. -- land line operators also a provider of mobile service.

there is over one century of work that has been done a denture the regulatory arena -- in the regulatory arena for the traditional telephone companies around privacy. around pii and all of these things. it has reached a point to where it is in the dna of these historical operators to protect the traffic that they carry from point a to point b. it is sacrosanct with and that. -- within that. the calls are transported from point a to point b. we do not listen to them. we do not stick adds in them. that is the sort of thing that is a key provision to the way it works. there are innovative services that come from the new innovators, voip and other

providers that said, maybe there is a different way to do this. if i could get the service for free, i would be willing to -- i would be tolerant of some other services that are mixed in there. there are services that will inspect the traffic, be that voice or text and served as in that. that is fine. the difference -- the problem we are struggling with in some regards is, ok, but it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck. it has a phone number that is 10 digits. there is something different going on here. how do we notify consumers that this is not your father pose a telephone call. this could be something different. -- father's telephone call. how do we distinguish something that could be exactly the same.

in the past there was a trusted closed network of those who could provide telephone services. that is no longer the case. you get into the six degrees of kevin bacon game with finding out that they resell the number to somebody else. you get three or four degrees of separation. the mystery to the traditional operators is, i do not know where i am trading traffic with. this is not at the consumer level, this is operator to operator. there are numerous -- as far as i can tell -- competing solutions for identifying the who is the owner of that telephone number. we talked about that earlier. there is, in fact, a finite list of telephone numbers and in the united states. there are 10 digits. you're all familiar with them. that is a finite universe. that is administered by an

incredibly complex -- i will not talk to this led other than to put it up here. we spent about half of an hour on what the dotted-line meant in this thing. this is the north american council, north american portability, etc.. that is just there to illustrate that it is a very complex question. who it is that can draw down phone numbers and how they are identified. i will go backwards here. the only other point is about how -- i think the next speaker will come up here and hit this region get used to be it was pretty hard to provision of phone number. yeasty have to go through a telephone company to do that. that is a lot of -- you used to have to go to the telephone

company to do that. that is no longer the case. i can change it. it does not cost a lot of money. it is a potential source of pain for consumers and for the operators alike. i do not have anything else, so i will turn over at this point. >> and good morning, my name is brad herrmann from call-em-all. we are an automated phone call company. neither i urge anyone from my company is ritual from cardmembers services. we also made very few political calls. -- rachel from card member services.

i went to give you a few more examples for what a legitimate robocall company does. we send out messages on behalf of soccer and football leagues that practice or fields are closed. we do school closings. i could go on for days with examples. it may be an apartment complex calling all of the residents to let them know water will be shut off between 10:00 in new. here is one with a business example. you may have a manufacturing facility with 1000 employees working three shifts. you need to notify everyone on the second shift that we are starting an hour late on the third shift today. we are running an extra shift on saturday. there are thousands and thousands more of exempt -- thousands and thousands more examples like this. when people get one of these messages -- if you get a message

the soccer game is cancelled for tomorrow. you do not usually hang up and said, "what a terrible robocall that was." i do not think people use robocall to describe that call. but it is the same thing. that is why i am here today. i have been asked to walk through two scenarios with the. what these big network diagrams that they have walked through, what they mean to me who is just one little block on that diagram. what do we do to stop unwanted robocalls at the end. where people are entering into the network? we will start walking through that. the first example is what i call old school robocall in. what i want to do with each of the examples is, let's think of somebody who was to call a

couple of million people. in the old school robocall scenario, it was a much more permanent structure that you had to set up. you were going to be investing a significant amount of capital into specialized hardware and equipment. you were then going to need -- you cannot just plug into a few phone lines into the back of it. that would take weeks. you had to order t1 or something with a lot of ports and the lines to come in there. this takes 60 to 90 days to set up and come with contracts and commitments to use them. that is not something that you could just set up, slam a bunch of people with unwanted calls and run away. it was something bigger than that. what we have see moving forward is the voice over ip robocall. that is not really require special equipment.

just a nice big internet connection with chicken get in a few days. this is bigger than an internet connection at home. -- that is something you can get in a few days. you are not looking for a programmer that has specific hardware, software that a specialized. it becomes a little bit more generic. you still need to know what you are doing, but it becomes easier. the lead time goes down 2 days in this scenario. did you take a company like mine that perhaps the service up. we all use them for many different things. we wrap it up. our clients cannot use and api or web service to initiate calls. if you walk down the street to any university and grab the young computer science guys, say i need to make 1 million calls. if you want him to randomly generate them, he will say, no

problem. i can start getting these. we have watched the additional capital requirement go from something very significant and a big investment all the way down to basically nothing as long as you can afford the permanent rates for the calls. the development time has gone up to ours. that is the situation where we are today. that is what it means to somebody on our end who wants to make these calls with the way the infrastructure has evolved. there are a few things that stay the same. you always have to have a way to drop the calls on to the network. the other thing is that you are going to -- these up there are businesses that need their cut of it. it has not gone down to free. what has changed is the upfront capital requirements and the time requirements. now that this is easy, i would

like to tell you a little bit about what a company like mine does to prevent these calls from getting on the network. what i am showing you today is just a subset of what we really do. i do not want to spell it all out. these illegal guys are actually very smart and are probably out listening. we are going to look at this and you will say, that is common sense. but it is hard work, and there is a lot of programming that when in behind it. we went through a 12 month cat and mouse game with some of these phishers trying to make -- they wanted to call millions of people. we have done a pretty good job of blocking them out. fifth we have empowered employees that listen to messages before we approve them and go out.

that sounds pretty simple. a lot are the greed of messages -- they are green the messages. it is and emergency, a weather service, a university that needs to let students know there is a shooting so everyone needs to stay indoors. there is a lot in the yellow area, too. our employees listen to them. i tell my employees, the underlying thing as we call people who want to be called. you can tell just by listening to one of these messages whether it sounds fine or not. if it is pastor jones just reminding everybody we have the three services easter sunday at 9:00, at 10:00, and 11:00. that is pretty easy. that is no problem. he is obviously calling his congregation. there is a lot more that we find

in the red. i categorize them two ways. they are the obvious phishers. the obvious garbage. those people stuck out like a sore thumb. also filter out a lot of what i call unintentional unwanted robocalls. a small-business owner that has his customers' phone numbers and he feels he has the right to call them because they have done business with him. what we have to do is explain, no, you cannot do that. they have to give you a written permission to receive promotional messages from you. we are sorry, and quite frankly they get mad at us a lot. we blocked a lot of that every day. we are out there having to educate people on what they can and cannot do. in another way is simply just asking questions. where did you get these from

members from? people either have a good answer for it becomes obvious. obviously, kevin's organization and david's organizations cannot do this with their customers but we can. that is what we try to do to stay on the up and up. because you can spoofs the caller id, and we do put our client pose a color id's on the -- client's caller id. if it is a dead end and nobody picks it up, it is walmart red flag that we can do to shed the people down. -- it is one more red flag where we can shut these people down. what we can do is monitor optouts across the range of our clients. we have tens of thousands of

clients using our service. we have an idea of what norms are. when we make a broadcast on behalf of a client, if they have an out liar -- outlier in terms of who is opting out, we can figure it out. that is some highlights of what we are doing the, among other things, to try to keep these robocalls off of your cell phones and home phones. when i am talking about this, i am just one organization. this is just my view. and what we have done. the biggest violators -- i would assume rachel from cardmember services is not coming through a company like mine. these are people who do not care about the laws. they are basically doing what

ever they want to do. we have to be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water. we can have all kinds of regulations and can mandate all of the things we do to every company that we are aware of, but i do not think that would stop rachel from cardmember services. that organization does not care to follow the laws. that is one of the reasons i am here to try to represent the good things happening within the industry. thank you for your time. >> thank you so much. our first question is, you have posed a lot of challenges. what do you think can be done to bring down the number of bad robocalls that are brushing consumers? that is to anybody. >> i will jump on it.

i do not think there is any single solution to the issue. i think when you look at a lot of the issues that are out there today, such as robocalls, you have to look at it holistic lead. -- holistically. i know the ftc has done a lot of great work. no member companies are doing a lot of great work. i think it is is important for consumers to understand that while there may not be perfect tools out there, there are things they can do to limit the impact of the calls. as an example, use caller id. if you do not recognize the phone number, do not pick up the phone. do not press one or two. i think that is important.

the last two things i mentioned to address the issue, i think targeted enforcement against some of the bad actors. that is always a great thing to go after these guys. things like this, things our members are involved in, working corrected -- collectively with stakeholders to try to find solutions. i think brad is right. it will not go away. we have to work collectively to at least address the issue as best we can. >> i was excited to hear authenticating the users on the initiation of calls. that is the kind of thing -- i would be the first person standing in line. authenticate me.

we want to represent ourselves as people doing the right thing. that is exciting for me to hear where things are going. as far as individuals go, an individual consumer is hearing from me saying, we are maintaining client do not call lists. other things, you are hearing advice not to opt out, just to hang out. -- just to hang up. i would say, if it is an obvious ridiculous -- if it is rachel from cardmember services. hang up on it immediately. if it is your school calling and you do not want them to call you, opt out. no problem. you have to use a little bit of intuition on his calls to determine whether this is a legitimate call you care not to receive, in which case go ahead and opt out.

if it is garbage, hang up. >> i must be the only guy in the room who has not yet gotten a call from rachel. they have seen my credit report i suppose. i, too, until the earlier discussion -- in the earlier solution, the solution will come in a technological form of a fully authenticated identifier. i mention it in my portion of this that part of the challenge is identifying as an operator, who is sending me this traffic? that is often difficult to determine. i will spare you. i am pleased that groups like adis are working to find so

there is a way when i am receiving traffic from some organization that if it does go road in some way, i have a path to go back to the operator and say, you have a problem here. >> the next question comes from the audience. it is directed to the industry representatives. if what kind of risk is associated with the network congestion caused by robocalls? >> it can be significant. you have these instances of mass calling evens. whether they are legal or illegal, depending on the volume or the location of where the call is taking place, the time of day, whatever factors, they can have an adverse impact

on the networks so a consumer in that area who may be trying to make a call is unable to complete the call because network capacity is sort of maxed out. it can be a significant factor. there are times when due to a mass calling even, some carriers may actually have to file with the fcc saying, we experience a network even tear that was a problem. >> i think if there is network blockage, that is blocking the robocaller, too. they will figure out a gating rate on their calls that will keep their traffic at or below some threshold that would be problematic to permit them to be

able to make the calls. they can distribute -- the internet being anywhere, they can drop that down on any number of switches on the network. i suspect because that is a problem for them as well as consumers that that is something they seek to mitigate as well. the size of the wireless pipe as it were relative to that of the wireline pipe is a fraction. as an industry, we are always very concerned about bandwidth and spectrum and there's issues. it is something that has not been a particular played on the wireless industry. -- played -- plague on the wireless industry. >> they want you to speak about

the economics and the money associated with robocalling and specifically what cm and dips are and how industry members can make money that way. >> there is obviously a lot of different ways and these robocallers are making money. i think what the questioner is referencing their -- it is also referred to as line identification data base. the way that works is the carriers will maintain a database for caller i.d. numbers. when a phone number gets called, that caller identification number gets pushed to the person receiving the call. that is why you see the caller

i.d. number. who ever is maintaining the database gets paid for pushing back call to the recipient. the network operator basically pays that fee. it is seven hundredths of a cent. would you multiplied at times tens of thousands of millions of calls, it can add up. that is what they are referring to. it is one of many ways these guys are making money. >> anybody else on the panel want to add to that? takes us fromtion profits to penalties. should there be higher penalties for illegal robocalls? is there some way we can increase the cost of engaging in illegal robocall and?

-- robocalling? >> i can speak to that. the penalties are $500 per incident and $5,000 for an intentional robocall to somebody that should not receive one. i think those are sufficient enough. i have seen cases where one phone call led to a class action lawsuit that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend only at the end to be disregarded and settled for a pittance. i assure you -- when i tell you my employees are -- if you have any doubt throw it out. the numbers are massive. if you think about $500 per phone call -- left side recall

10,000 people of the interest will district -- let's say week called 10,000 people in a school district, the numbers become silly. i think they are allowing the fifth class actions to be filed on a single phone call -- they are a little much. >> i would just add, i think the penalties are pretty stiff. you could ask a question about, is there an effort to damp up the enforcement of tcpa violations. i think that would be desirable to everybody. >> can we arrange for that? the next question is directed to call-em-all. do you keep a blacklist of the

red operators so that they can be recognized and so you do not have to deal with them in the future? >> yes, we do. but how are the authentic -- authenticating themself with us? in e-mail address? if we make them click on an e- mail address. but as we already talked about, it takes anybody in this room 2 -- 3 minutes to set up an e-mail address. there are several other things that they do that indicate to us other red flags. i do not want to go into it because i do not want to tell them how to beat us. we spend a lot of engineering time putting things in place. we have a blacklist of e-mails not to use and a couple of other things. >> the rest of the questions i have are better directed to our

law enforcement panel. do we have any other questions? >> i could not get into this room today without a driver's license, and going through a metal detector. why your clients and your customers --[indiscernible] >> when we have driver's licenses and things to get into this room, how do we now read a clients with an e-mail address. when they sign up, there is far more than an e-mail address that they provide. they give us a physical address, a credit card. we look at all of those things as a whole and listen to their messages. you are looking at all of it. we have screens set up for our

staff to use to show all of it at once. they are all college educated people. it paints a bigger picture than just an e-mail address. my last answer might not have been clear enough to paint the picture for what we are really doing to identify these people. >> thank you very much. it is now time for our first break. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> good morning, i am with the federal trade commission division of business practices. i moderate and the second panel of the morning and it is law enforcement.

we have a very distinguished set of panelists. to my eliot -- immediate left is greg zoeller. to his immediate left is will maxim. to his left is eric bash. we will do a slightly different format for this panel. i will ask a series of questions and ask each of our panelists to respond to them and i will preview for you exactly where we will go and where ribble spent most of our time. i want to lay out the nuts and bolts, what is the state of the

law and the legal parameters in which robocallers, legitimate and illegitimate, operate under and after talking about that we will talk about complaints and what we see on that front. we will then spend the bulk of our time talking about law enforcement challenges. let's kick us off and let out the legal parameters. -- lay out the legal parameters. >> good morning, everyone. i will talk about what the telemarketing/sales rules say. telemarketing