>> thank you very much for coming to this important hearing today. when i served as the legal advisor for the national security white house in the first bush of ministration and the state department, i was in the white house situation room on 9/11 and i spent 08 years of my time dealing with many of these same issues. now both the bush and obama administration's have determined that the killing of targeted al qaeda leaders is lawful under certain circumstances. let me start with u.s. law. the president's legal authority derives from the authorization to use military force after september 18, 2001. congress should update this 12

year-old law. military and intelligence personnel defending against the terrorist threats to reface one decade after 9/11. including u.s. citizens. of course in addition to the statutory authority granted by congress, the president has broader authority to take necessary actions to defend the united states against terrorist threats. the targeted killing of american citizens, certain constitutional rights under the fourth and fifth amendments, even when they are up said the united states. the extent of those rights is not clear. what amount of process is due to an american outside the united states before being targeted by

his government? i agree with the principal conclusions of the white paper that reportedly summarize the law as applicable to killing an american citizen who is a senior operation al qaeda leader. i agree that a senior al qaeda leader outside the united states does enjoy the constitutional right of due process. i also agree that it is sufficient due process for a senior informed government official to conclude that the individual poses an imminent threat of violence against united states before targeting an individual with lethal force. i do not think that it should be required before the u.s. government uses people for the first against american citizen who is a senior leader outside the united states. congress may still want to

specify the conditions and processes for targeting an american. these processes should reside inside the executive branch with inappropriate notice to congress. through drone strike or other means to kill al qaeda leaders under certain circumstances. rather than use force arbitrarily, they need to be aware the sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. the u.s. will lack credibility if it criticizes other countries, like russia or china who used drones on killings with which the u.s. disagrees.

other countries becoming increasingly alarmed of the number of u.s. drone strikes, the u.s. has a strong interest in demonstrating to our allies that drawn strikes are consistent with international law. there are likely to stop sharing targeting information and may see other forms of counter- terrorism operations. administration officials need to work harder to explain and defend the legality of this program. the speech was given by officials to remain very voluble. in the and the administration needs to be more transparent about who they are targeting and the procedures applied to limit

collateral damage. the obama administration should be able to release after the fact the name of administrations of some of the people targets -- the name of i want to end with a plea for more bipartisanship. republicans and democrats may not always agree, but these issues should not be used to divide the american people. we all faced a common threat from terrorism and need to work harder to find bipartisan solutions to these difficult problems. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman, distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today.

let me come straight to the point. the constitution does not require judicial process in the narrow circumstances for the reasons stated in the white paper. however, i believe a limited and carefully calibrated judicial role would be permissible as a constitutional matter and desirable as a matter of policy. how might this be the case? there are two very distinct scenarios at a rise. the classic scenario when we talked about armed conflict is that of a soldier in the field who encounters a situation that requires an instant judgment as to whether someone is an enemy or shots should be taken. judicial involvement would be grossly impact -- but that is not the end of the story. we are speaking the sporting excuse we of the situation where the government is intentionally targeted a specific ad dignified

person, unlike the classic armed conflict scenario i described, the scenario at issue here is a two-stage process with very different question that issue. for better or worse, there have been a flood of leaks that have given us a fair sense of how this process unfolds. at stage one, the question whether the available intelligent suffices to establish the nominated individualist notionally within the scope of the government's asserted target of 40. if so, that opens the door to the use of force later on it should that be used. time sensitive questions do arise as to whether the person being observed is denominated target. then, whether the circumstances will allow for an attack to be desirable or lawful. stage two is akin to the classic scenario i first described.

stage one is quite different. it is no accident that based on what took place in the obama administration at stage one, it a set -- resembles what has been assembled already. local parties way in and what the intelligence revises to prove and regarding the notional legal boundaries. judicial involvement would be much less intrusive than it would be a stage to. while i don't think it's possible to say the fifth amendment due process clause requires the adoption of a review for the stage one issues, there is no current way to get that issue until congress acts. i think the interest of the individuals involved may not be

the senior operational al qaeda leaders. a judicial review at stage one would otherwise race. let me clarify what a judge could be asked to do in this stage one review. there are two elements to this. one would be to confirm or clarify the law with respect to which u.s. persons could be targeted. this could result in the white papers position, perhaps it would result in a narrow view, but the judge could make that determination. whatever the result of the legal inquiry, it would be to determine whether the information before to suggest a particular american in the scope of that authority is sufficient to that task. the categories defined in terms of membership of the enemy force which is what goes on at the

guantanamo habeas proceedings currently, the court could consider that question. if instead, the test is something along the lines of the white paper test, it would be more complicated. the court could consider the persons or the senate -- organizational links, position in the organization, as to eminence, if you met a strict temporal definition, which is now the white paper is talking about, it sounds like a stage to determination that could only be decided at a time exigent moment. that could be assessed at stage one. in contrast, it's not something judges could not intervene with or review at stage one. i am out of time, so i will close by noting there is an

objection, the article 3 jurisdiction could not extend to an export a proceeding. it's not obvious the courts have the power to do this but the analogy to the system is a good one. we will hear more about this from my colleague in a moment. suffice it to say, there is little prospect of testing the orders issued in the end and it's always done on an expert the basis. thank you where patients can afford to answer your questions. >> thank you. >> thank you. on the question of when the united states may lawfully target alleged american terrorists overseas, i want to explain and defend the legal rationale underlying legal

targeting of a u.s. citizen in the narrow circumstances of a person who is a broad and believed to be senior operational leader of al qaeda and its forces. the ability to kill one of its own citizens is one of the most awesome and terrifying powers of people and its government. the power to do this without judicial check is anomalous in a society that provides for judicial review of council -- cal with lesser exertions of power. john d. bates, who presided over a case wrote how is a judicial approval is required when the united states decides to target a u.s. citizens overseas for electronic surveillance? judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the united states decides to target a citizen overseas for death. yet there is something equally terrifying, i would suggest more

terrifying, about a government to protect its people from ongoing attacks from citizens overseas. in dealing with major al qaeda figures to hold american citizenship, the obama administration has confronted a slippery slope with not one, but to distinct bottoms. down one side lies a government that can do terrible things without justification or oversight. on the other side is a government powerless to confront real threats to the safety and lives of its real citizens while terrorist figures operate from sanctuaries in the mcgoverns basis. it is not enough to avoid sliding down one of these slippery slopes. u.s. policy must avoid both. without the background, let's consider the targetting power the obama administration is not claiming with respect to

americans overseas. it is not claiming the authority to target any such american citizens, only an american citizen who is a senior operational leader of al qaeda or one of its co-belligerent forces. it's not claiming the authority to target even such a senior operational terrorist if the capture is a feasible alternative. it is not claiming the of 40 to target an american citizen who poses no imminent threat to american lives. it is not claiming the authority to act without compliance of the laws of war. given this restrictive posture, it is not surprising there is only one reported case of u.s. forces actively targeting a specific american citizen with lethal force. the administration's view of this matter has four subsidiary components, each one correct. first, the united states is in a state of armed conflict with al

qaeda and its associated forces. second, and this armed conflict, the united states is lawfully entitled to target the enemy with lethal force. third, there exists no general immunity for targeting of citizens to sign up to wage war against their own country. fourth, whenever the constitution of due process may require before targeting a u.s. citizen, these requirements are more than satisfied by a rigorous judgment that a person meets the administration's narrowed test for targeting. to understand why this position must be correct, consider a domestic hostage situation. in such a situation, even law enforcement will use targeted killings and it will do so without judicial pre approval when the threat of the hostages is an equally serious. nobody takes the position that

such actions constitute extrajudicial killings. i submit the case that truly meets the administration's legal tax is not a profoundly different from this hostage situation. a mounting chorus of critics has insisted judicial review must be a feature of the legal framework that authorizes the targeting of american nationals. what ever -- this is an extremely difficult question, one. is very clear. current law simply does not provide perspective for judicial involvement. it is hard to fault the attorney general for failing to bring the case for perspective review before a court that does not exist. in summary, the obama administration has taken a measured in syria's position concerning the targeting of

american citizens overseas, one that reserves the right to target while leaving open the question of the minimum criteria for targeting to be in less dire circumstances if it's a position that's neither radical nor surprising and ought not raise concern the administration is claiming undue presidential power. thank you for this opportunity. >> thank you. >> it is a pleasure to be back before you again. i want to start where we left off, which is i do think, although we might disagree about the circumstances, there are some circumstances where the government is allowed to use lethal force against its own citizens. that's not to say it's a good thing or something we should be happy about but it is an important starting point. thequestion isn't really

government has the power to do something but when. so much of the focus among commentators has been on this judicial review question, not as a sideshow or because it say process for the larger conversation but the concern is are these operations being carried out in a manner that passes legal scrutiny? put another way, how can we be sure, given the pervasive and secrecy that surrounds these operations, that the circumstances, criteria, whatever the law we believed to exist is has actually been satisfied in an individual case? in this regard, the white paper is curiously silent. it suggests a review -- i don't disagree there are concerns that will arise from a review but what i would like to do in my remarks today is explain how congress could provide a far

clearer or far less problematic remedy that would allow these issues to be resolved by judges by creating a cause of damage after the affect. the only answer to the hard questions raised by targeted killing is to allow the court to intervene. just as courts to win the law enforcement officers usually go forth where they feel compelled to do so. let me explain how this could work using very -- using various examples. with regard to creating a cause of action, when congress enacted the foreign intelligence surveillance act, one of the provisions was an express cause of action, even for a secret surveillance program, where they are made behind closed doors. it provides a cause of action

for damages, but i would not get that excited. even for secret governmental operations. there would be other obstacles that would get in the way. the state secrets privilege that the obama administration has followed in his predecessors in invoking in these kinds of cases. there have been various proposals in the last four or five years to curtail the state secrets of privilege. whether you follow the model of the state secrets or not, it would be easy for congress by statute to provide procedures pursuant to which these issues could be resolved well effecting governmental secrecy. one could model those after the classified act which this congress passed involving classified information. one could also look to the

guantanamo habeas cases where the courts have fashioned an ad hoc form of the procedures to allow for those disputes to be resolved even with classified evidence. the model is not to allow individual litigants to see but to allow counsel who have not disclosed a single item as part of the hearing. you have questions about sovereign immunity. congress provided a way around that for certain tort claims against the government where communist -- or congress feminized federal officers. any time and operation falls within the scope of action is carried out within the scope of that officer's employment. this could be followed here. this begs the harder question. what would courts be leaving on the merits? we have four or five hearings here. let me start with the

proposition that this is a question courts are not incompetent of handling. courts routinely look backwards after use of force to decide whether an officer feared for his life. they routinely looked through hindsight even though there are concerns of hindsight bias. if we could reach some consensus on how to resolve these claims on what the law should be going for, it would not be hard to power chords with the benefit of hindsight to entertain these claims. in a famous case, a justice suggested the increase of power doesn't come in a day. it does come slowly from unchecked disregard of the restrictions even the most disinterested assertion of authority. it seems to be these targeted operations by the executive branch present the legislature with two choices -- congress

could except with limited screen or oversight the executive branch's claims these operations are carried out lawfully and with every element to it accurize accuracy and open the door to an check this regard of which the justice warren. or -- at which the justice warned. or before a neutral magistrate guaranteed by the constitution's salary and protection of so long as the interest and secrecy are protected and so long as operations are consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states, what does the government has to hide? i want to make one last point. there is only been one reported case of an operation targeting a u.s. citizen. if reports are to be believed, only three u.s. citizens have been killed in these operations. but if one listens to senator gramm, there are as many as 4700

casualties, 4700 people have been killed by american ground strikes. i'm sure many of those strikes were legal. it's possible most of them were illegal. but it's important to keep in mind as we talk about drones and accountability for the government, we are just not talking about a terrorist. >> thank you. i will begin the questioning with you. the administration of white paper tries to establish where an american citizen who is a " senior operational leader of an al qaeda or an associate force of al qaeda poses an imminent threat, and captor is not feasible, the u.s. can target and kill them." according to the white paper, eminent threat and the feasibility of capture are not well defined. do you see any problems with a lack of specifics in these definitions? >> thank you, mr. chairman.

the white paper is a 15 page summary of what is a much longer legal opinion. most members of congress have not seen the entire legal opinion. having been both in the executive branch as a lawyer and the council to a senate committee, i understand the state of play. i think the administration, while perhaps not providing the very opinion provided to the president's need to be as forthcoming as possible on these very issues about evidence. i agree with a point in the white paper that imminence cannot mean a terrorist is about to push the button tomorrow and that's the only time you can target him. when we're dealing with terrorism and nuclear weapons programs, there has to be a longer lead time. the administration has tried to explain that in both the white paper and the attorney general + speech, but that is a controversial thing.

for me, it's extremely troubling to our allies, at what point do they say they're going to target some of this concept of cement is redefined to be a broad concept? >> let me take a step further. congress has already required the military before targeting american system for surveillance. as was consequences than killing them, even a foreign country. why shouldn't that requirement extend to a targeted killing? >> this is one of the great ironies that the broad conceptual level -- why is it that to conduct electronic surveillance of an american, the executive branch has to go to court, but to kill an american, they don't? the reason is, 30 years ago, congress was concerned about electronic surveillance of americans and said we want to

set very specific parameters before the executive branch does that. congress could do that in this case and that something this committee ought to think about. i do believe this may be a solution in search of a problem. the united states is not out regularly killing americans. but a -- >> but it's good for the congress to make sure they are not. >> even if foley one american has been killed, if congress on behalf of the american people is killed, i think congress could reasonably pass a statute that says not to require judicial review -- because i think that's too difficult, particularly in an armed conflict, but to specify the circumstances that the executive branch has to satisfy before they target an american and then require some notice and reporting back to congress. that is the check and balance. >> let me go on and since my

time is limited. does the white paper provide enough information about why the administration believes and has the authority to kill american citizens abroad? would note that you have collateral damage and you have to pay attention to that there. this is not a senior operational leader of al qaeda killed in the same attack. i'm not saying his son is or is not, but it's a legitimate question when we know he faces the same demise. >> it is possible that the committee has not been able to

see and we have seen there is as substantial exploration to the foundations of affirmative 0 authority. there is a fair amount of detail even the white paper and the core claim is the 2001 authorization for use of military force is pertinent here. the more interesting question is what about the threats of a similar magnitude, similar threats to american lives that don't arrived within an al qaeda nexis? a dozen years removed from the 2001, the nature of the threat environment the united states faces as in all -- has evolved considerably and it's not enough to simply say the threat is al qaeda or gesture in the direction of associated forces.

we have to ask if there is a need for a clear statement. the white paper is careful to identify a distinct head of authority, and that is the article to authority of the president to defend the nation when faced with threats to american lives. >> let me interrupt you because my time has expired. >> allotted to respond about the hostage situation. collateral death is a distinct possibility in a hostage situation and it is one of the background principles that make the analogy so precise, the possibility may accidentally kill some of the hostages.

no. 2, the collateral deaths of u.s. citizens -- >> that is a case where the events of the danger to those hostages is very real. >> correct. the possibility of imminent danger -- >> you don't necessarily have that with someone driving around yemen in an automobile. >> yes, but you have the possibility of imminent death to people on the airplanes he is allegedly putting on -- >> i am not defending him and any way, but i want to know we can do to protect american citizens. >> can i just respond to that? the answer has to be rigorous procedures. whether those rigorous procedures -- you want rigorous procedures on the side of making sure the target is the person you think he is and making sure you have identified rigorously

the person who is acting as a lawful target. you'll also are rigorous procedures that are consistent with a loss of war and minimize collateral damage. >> i am going to interrupt because i want to turn to my colleague and i have exceeded my time. >> very briefly, the only thing i would add is that it is very important, especially for this conversation, to keep in mind we're dealing with different scenarios of different categories of cases. the answer to your question is going to change whether the justification is classic self- defense for there is a clear and evident threat to u.s. persons, a hostage situation, or an operation that takes place not as part of self-defense but as part of the broader international armed conflict between the united states and al qaeda where there are operations. respectfully, i believe we will have very different answers

depending which category we're talking about. >> the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the constitution subcommittee and the gentleman from york for five minutes. >> thank you. my first question, i must give credit to david korn, if i could read the question he posed. imagine russian president letter been used missiles to kill thousands of enemies throughout asia and eastern europe. imagine further he refused to acknowledge any of the killings and simply asserted in general terms that he had the right to kill anyone he secretly determined was the leader of the chechen rebels or associated forces even if it posed no immediate threat to russia. how would the united nations complete this report? >> thank you. as i alluded to in my opening

remarks and at greater length went into in my written remarks, this is a problem. it could happen were the four state department -- the poor state department spokesman is going to have to stand up after russia or china has used a drone against a dissident in the next country in the state department lot to explain why that was a bad draw on strike in comparison to the united states that only conducts a good unlawful drone strikes. this is extremely important for our government, both congress but primarily the executive branch to lay down as precisely clear rules for the use of drones. >> that's fine, but isn't the case that if russia, china or someone was doing what is positive, that we would condemn that out of hand and say this drum strike was ok and this one wasn't? >> if russia or china was being

attacked by a terrorist group that was indisputably opposing -- >> the chechens attacked them at one point. >> and if the chechens were posing imminent threat to russia and the country they were in was unwilling or unable to prevent that threat, i think we would have to acknowledge russia's right to defend itself. >> on something mr. bollinger said -- he said we need to process, but not judicial process -- we need to process, but not judicial process. i don't understand how that can be considered to process. let me ask the following question. the white paper says we can attack senior operational members within the procedural laws of war. i don't understand why we need a

senior operational terrorist. i don't understand why it has to be posing an imminent threat. think the analysis is completely different. either this person is an enemy combat and or he is not. if he is not an enemy combat it, is subject to normal criminal law and we ought to have normal due process. if he is an enemy combat and, he does not need to process. process. need to how do you determine if he is an enemy combat it? whether he is senior not come i don't care. under a loss of four, if he is an enemy combat and, he's a legitimate target. but who can determine that under what standard of what president we have to and on what grounds? -- what president -- on that what president?

>> you have just taken a position that is far more permissive with respect to targeting than the obama at ministration's position. >> i said you have to determine if he is an enemy combatants. >> i understand. you have suggested a narrower process to determine a broader category. hamathe obama administration dos not assert the right to target any national overseas to make it in a lot of work category of belligerency. it will target people only when they are in imminent -- and admit threat or senior leader his captor is infeasible. you are taking a view that is much more inclusive of more possible targets but with a concern about the lack of process on the judicial side. i think it is a very legitimate

question, what processes this body wants to impose for making those determinations. my only point is there is nothing particularly extreme about the substance and the addition -- a sensitive position the administration has taken and under current law, which is the law it confronted this case, which is the case that gave rise to these memos and the first place, there is no basis for judicial process at all. there is no forum in which to take these questions. >> all i would say is that i share your concerns that due process is not a requirement. i was surprised to the attorney general say that. due process is not necessarily a requirement of pre-deprivation. >> what? >> pre-deprivation.

there are circumstances or the government is allowed to act and we will review afterwards whether they acted with safeguards. it's not necessarily that there should be pre-deprivation, but a requirement that at some point some neutral magistrate is required. >> can i just ask you to comment on the question i posed -- under laws that generally, if someone is not an enemy combat it, you cannot target him in any way without due process. if he is an enemy combatants, the consequence flows from there. someone was wearing a uniform in 1944, it's safe to assume he is an enemy combat. in the absence of that, how do

we determine and -- >> article 5 of the third geneva convention and creates a requirement that when there is doubt about the status of a belligerent, there is this be a hearing. there is some requirement that at some point, it doesn't have to be before you act, but at some point, is reasonably possible, you are sure that the procedural safeguards you have implemented have produced the right person. that is what led to the decision in 2004 saying that we need more due process. >> thank you. i recognize myself for five minutes. i listened to the testimony here and we have gone into this decision making process. i go back and reflect on the constitution and the commander in chief. even though there is a little political tension over this

issue, i know what to disempower our commander-in- chief from protecting americans wherever we might be and neither do i want to delay his decision to act. we are confronted with this question, if we're going to review the decision, we either give carte blanche to kill an american abroad out of this executive branch or we define those conditions year by this congress and then we ask for a review, prospective it concerns me too much because that delays the response. retrospectively there goes to congress or the judicial branch of government. that's the question before us, the definition -- i would say it's got to be retrospective and not prospective. i would prefer we review it by some form rather than handing over were fighting to the

judicial branch. that has always concerned me. the politicization here in this congress, that's the balance. i would ask each of the witnesses to go down the line and way judicial or congressional review. >> i don't know why you couldn't have both processes operating side by side or individual victims have recourse to the course and his body as is normal oversight function. i don't know why they should be mutually exclusive. i think they serve differently -- different purposes and i don't know why it has to be either or. >> with regard to security? >> the guantanamo habeas cases are good examples for all of us. these are cases where the government's arguments were about classified information

being disclosed to the public. even though there have been five or six dozen habeas cases since the 2000 decision, i am unaware of any instance where an item of classified information was disclosed and appropriately. >> i would agree with that. >> i am instinctively opposed to prospective judicial review of these questions. i think that congress in the form of its intelligence committee, its eighth and essential statement about what the committee has done in a way of reviewing these strikes. some of that is already going on. i find the written statement on the attraction of post hoc review to be a very interesting

document. it has a lot to recommend it and i commend it -- i recommend it to the committees. i think it has written assessment, he has wanted to narrow perspective review which i viscerally opposed. narrowed down to its final levels. i largely agree that there is opportunities in both spheres. >> would it be your opinion that prospective review would delay that? i fear that it could and i fear the temptation on the part of the executive branch would be to throw lots of things to whatever judicial tribunal was created to get cover for things and you

would end up with a substantial and unanticipated dialogue between what ever tribunal you created and the executive, and the way it was done in many ways in the context. >> i agree there should be as much transparency as possible. the hard question is, the role for the judiciary. i endeavor in my remarks to show that i come down in favor of prospective rather than post talk, but only with a respect to a narrow set of issues that i don't think should be reviewed, including issues that are time sensitive, whether the person in your sights at the fleeting moment is to you think it is,

whether capture is feasible, those are features that i don't think our fit subject for judicial review. that would include the alleged membership of the individual and the organization in question and their role within the organization and i say this only on the assumption where we are in a situation where it's not an accident to determine that right now. >> you have to decide if it is a frequently that congress needs to -- we have only had one example. it is a serious example. congress could legislate the criteria of who should be targeted. you may put it more specifically. in the procedures that would be

required for targeting inside the executive branch. i would not require pro perspective or a retrospective judicial review. the checks and balances and our constitutional system where reporting to congress, there was a long lead time with the targeting of mr. awlaki. if congress does, we as agreed. we think this guy is exercising his first amendment rights, the executive to take that into account. after, if the executive rent has targeted americans, i do not see why the executive cannot report that to congress. that is the check and balance. we are talking about an armed conflict situation. tying the president hands before or after the judicial review if an armed conflict

decision as commander-in-chief, it is a serious problem. >> prospective if possible and retrospective if necessary. i yield to the gentleman from virginia. >> the determination has to be made that the target is a senior operational reader of al qaeda, imminent threat, capture not feasible, consistent with laws of war. does the white paper talk about the standard that is used whether it is beyond a reasonable doubt or moral certainty preponderance of the evidence or there is a standard not clearly erroneous? where is the standard? >> i do not think the white paper goes out of its way to say.

he cause the white paper disfavors judicial review. >> what evidence can be of any rules as to what evidence can be considered? >> there are no legislatively imposing the rules of evidence. >> can hearsay be considered to ascertain whether or not the -- >> there may be well internal and classified executive branch rules. >> we are talking about the rules we will go by. is there any prohibition against hearsay being considered? why is it not considered admissible in a court of law? >> it is considered unreliable. >> that can be considered to put someone to death? >> or is nothing that suggests that it cannot be.

>> judicial review we have had situations where the hostage situation is imminent and ongoing. is there any problem with a prospective judicial review if feasible? and post hoc if not. >> the legal concern is there is a question about whether there is adversity in the judicial proceedings. in this context, you would have a problem if this government have this application to a judge with no one representing the other side. congressman, view could turn

into death war where judges feel pressure to defer to the government without adverse counsel visitation. in the concepts of front prospective review, judges can see what happened. >> how long are people on the list? >> we do not know. it appears to be the case that mr. awlaki was targeted for some extended amount of time. cards if you are on the list for an experienced time, at some point, someone could have wandered over to an independent review.

>> mr. awlaki's family did. there was a lawsuit on behalf of mr. awlaki and the d.c. court before the operation that ended terminating his life. it was dismissed on a series of procedural grounds. there was an attempt to do that. >> what recourse is there for someone who is on the list by mistake? >> the government suggested that if he wanted to turn himself in, they would oblige him. when it is public that the government believes it has the authority to kill a person, they could think to turn themselves in and contest it. >> is jill kelley the only method? >> this is not just about drones.

it is used for any number of military hardware to conduct killings. >> handguns. >> it is not about drones per se. i make it easier for the government to conduct these operations than conventional technologies. >> is their rationale for killing them overseas? what if they are found in the united states? >> one of the critical considerations is the feasibility of capture. the federal government will never take the position that it is in feasible to capture an individual within the territorial united states. the government could claim the authority in exceptional

circumstances to use legal force against a u.s. citizen. law enforcement officers do with all of the time. that circumstance will not arise because you will not satisfy the infeasibility of capturing. i do not mean the government would not claim such force in another context. >> the gentleman from arizona. >> thank you for being here. i was struck right the chairman of the committee's juxtaposition between surveillance and the drone strikes. i will have to begin my comments by suggesting that as we look back when the administration of a serrated the

bush administration for waterboarding situations. the drone strikes are something that they can move forward to. it seems there is more than a subtle difference between waterboarding and blowing someone into it eternity. the hypocrisy is profound on this front. i expect certain cognitive dissidents and certain unwillingness for this administration to hold himself constrained to the truth. for those of is who are committed to protecting the constitutional way of life, we have to focus narrowly on this phrase, "due process." that has to be our definitional

tasks. there are none of us that would say we just need to do away with due process. we have due process in this country. if there is an imminent threat and the degree of the imminent is taken into consideration, the due process exists because of that conditionality. i would like to see if we could find consensus as to what critical elements should be in any congressional outlining of due process here and whether there should be some significant putative measures built into that kind of

guideline to keep an administration within the trap of just track of what befits our constitutional premise? >> i cannot resist receiving the criticisms from people on the outside to address your point about hypocrisy. i have been supportive of the obama administration's counterterrorism policies. i would have liked to have seen some of them acknowledge that maybe some of these issues that they claimed we were making huge mistakes on the four are more difficult than they acknowledge. we see little of that acknowledgment. i am here to give the same kind of bipartisan support to this administration that i would have liked seen some of them given to us on these difficult

counterterrorism issues. due process does not mean judicial process. it can mean judicial process. the constitution never said judicial process. it says you cannot be deprived without due process. what is the process that is due? in a situation where we have an armed conflict, a war, the process i think this congress can say is to say an american can only be killed who fit certain criteria. it has to be a senior al qaeda leader. the executive branch has to review this and reach high confidence that the person reaches those criteria and were possible has notified congress in advance if that is possible and afterword.

i would guess that the panelists would say we could agree on those criteria if congress were going to legislate and if there is some judicial role or not. but i appreciate your answers across the board. >> we have to be careful that it is not that due process is a requirement of judicial process. the way to ensure the government has provided the process that is due is not to simply take the government's word for it but to provide review. this court can look to the jurisprudence that the supreme court has articulated. with regard to what kind of due

process is to an american citizen, even one that takes up arms against the united states. there is a lot we can learn with regard to the balance we should strike in those circumstances. if this committee is serious about codifying the standards, there is precedence to base that on. >> are there putative elements and those guidelines for a government that fails to follow them? a prosecutor's case collapses if he does not do miranda rights. >> i suggest you can divide a damages regime. there will come a point where a government officer may break him in loss if they act with gross negligence. it would be a significant step

in this to provide and create civil remedies. that would have a salutary effect on the government's practice. going further would run into the question of who would prosecute that case. would the government be interested in prosecuting its own officers? >> we do that all of the time. >> it is true in the military. it provides for court marshaling of our service members. civil remedies may be appropriate. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from puerto rico for five minutes. >> i have questions based on your prior testimony. i have noticed that some of you

have asserted that the obama administration's taking a limited targeting authority with respect to american citizens. do you believe that the obama administration consistent with article ii of the constitution could have asserted a broader targeting authority? if yes, in what respect? >> i am interested in understanding whether you believe the administration has gone to the outer limits of its article ii powers. if not, in what ways has it not? >> i want each of you to comment. >> the administration probably has not gone to the outer bounds of what its constitutional powers would be. none of us know what those bounds are. the administration has taken a

very restrictive standard. instead of saying that the only americans that could be targeted would be those who are senior operational al qaeda leaders, the administration could have said under the constitution that any american who had taken up arms against the united states as part of an armed conflict could be targeted. if this was a traditional war and there were german americans, we would not have said that the only german- american who had taken arms would be a person who was a senior leader who posed an imminent threat. the president would have broader authority. the administration understands this is a serious power they are asserting to kill an american. they have taken a limited reading. >> i agree.

it is noticeable that the administration's formulation in the white paper and the attorney general's speech is al qaeda- specific. it does not have to be. if we are talking about the duties of the president to defend the nation in a case of imminent threat. that came from another extremist group. that power would still be there. >> the administration could take a more robust position under the a.u.m.f. the d.c. circuit has said in the habeas corpus that it is enough to justify detention.

the administration could take the view that an american who is part of enemy forces is lawfully targetable under the laws of war and under the a.u.m.f. what it has said his it has addressed a specific case, which is the case of anwar al- awlaki who is found to be a senior al qaeda operational leader whose capture was not plausible who posed an imminent threat and whose targeting would be lawful under the laws of war. it asked a question which is, is it lawful to target this guy? they limited their answer to that question so as not to take on bigger questions and more difficult questions and they needed to and that moment. a limited that answer to that question to those three circumstances.

that leaves a lack of ancillary questions like, what about the non-operational senior leader who poses imminent threat? what about the operational senior leader who does not pose an imminent threat? what about the u.s. citizen foot soldier? those questions are left open. there is no claim of authority to target such people. >> the gentleman is recognized for an additional minute. >> i went to clarify since my comments have been quoted a number of times that i was not suggesting that we should broaden its targeting criteria. i was suggesting that none of this make sense until you determine if someone is an enemy combatants.

that is the first russian that -- the first thing that must be determined with some sort of due process or neutral process. >> there are two baskets of questions. one is the substantive criteria for targeting and one is the procedural dimensions of how you determine whether someone is and that substantive criteria. you described a broad criteria for targeting and suggested that your anxiety about u.s. targeting process vis-à-vis citizens was on the procedural side or the people were or in that narrow basket. what the administration has done is exactly the opposite of that, which it has defined a narrow substantive basket and it has no known procedural or

public procedural -- >> however narrow or broad the basket question you have to answer that question first question are you and enemy combatants and have the procedural due process? >> all of the members of the panel would agree. >> may i confirm with that? this is based on mr. chesney's comments. the obama administration's formulation requires that there be a link with al qaeda before you can do any targeting here. is that correct? >> the way it is formulated right now, the policy requires a link to al qaeda? >> it is careful to say that it is making a claim of authority to attack where there is that senior al qaeda link. it is not written in a way they are denying the authority of

the way. how broad is that? >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas. >> i would like to get back to basics. this may trouble mr. nadler. i will probably agree with him. do not make me nervous. and the big scheme of things, when this came to light, myself and the gentleman from south carolina wrote a letter to eric holder asking for specific constitutional authority and tracking it to the activities of drone strikes against americans overseas. he did not get an answer. we have sent a letter subsequent to that when we got more information on february 8. we still have not received an

answer from eric holder. there is no one from the justice department here with their battery of lawyers. we have not gotten one that would tell us the constitutional authority for killing americans overseas that fit these criteria. i would like to introduce those of these letters into the record. >> they will be made part of the record. >> my background is a judge. i believe in judicial review. i do not buy the argument there is not enough time to get some judicial review. 22 years of experience. judges working with law enforcement can move fast under all of the serious examples you

have talked about. i do not buy we have to let prosecutors to judicial review. they work for the executive branch. that is my perception on that issue. the points are -- who fits these criteria? who makes the determination that that person fits the criteria? senior-level executive branch person yet to be named -- that troubles me. who is that person? we do not know. i do not think that is the authority of the executive branch. who makes that determination? then, that person is allowed to be on the kill list. mr. chesney, university of texas, congratulations. two daughters there. you made the comment that if there is a judicial review, it

is a good idea to review it when the person is put on the kill list. i am troubled with the concept are put on the kill list, killed, and then we have a review after that to see if it is lawful. it does not do the dead guy much when we find out we made a mistake. i do not like these people. they need to be dealt with about crimes against america. i have asked you to weigh in on this to help us improve the system. you have to get judicial review to listen to a phone conversation with an american overseas. you do not need judicial review to come from overseas. do you think we need some kind

of judicial review at the outset of living this person on the kill list? >> it is a good idea. it can be done if done carefully. the key to doing it carefully so it addresses the interests of the citizen and the imperative of protecting the country that rests on the president shoulders is to this act are great the questions may ask. we do not want judges interfering in questions about should we pull the trigger. that is not the fact presented by these specifically identified kill list scenarios. as we know, there is a considerable amount of time. there is a distinction between deciding as the person in the taxable category in general and whether a particular attack should be carried out.

>> we have been talking about one individual. what if the individual is caught in one of the countries where we suspect al qaeda is a jumble they are everywhere. what if the individual is caught in one of the countries where we suspect al qaeda is? they end up in france and we can go after them? >> if you have someone in france, united states, mexico, captor is going to be feasible. >> i know my time is feasible. is that discretionary with the executive branch? is that policy or is the written law? >> the problem with the uncertainty is that we do not give clear, written law.

>> may i add something to that? >> when you are talking about potential legal force operations in allied countries or countries other than pakistan, yemen, molly, you are -- mali, you are talking about a situation with the of the constraints come into play. what causes those operations to be permissive is the consent of the government to do those operations, which presumably canada and france are not going to give our a finding that they are either unable or unwilling to manage the threats that the individual poses, which their

law enforcement capacity would make it difficult to make. >> if the gentlemen would yield, i will yield to buy additional 30 seconds to make it. i would be pleased to yield to the gentlewoman from california. >> i have a few quick questions. i am trouble to the theme memoranda that allegedly provided the legal basis for this have not been shared. maybe any of you cannot answer it, but if you can, i would be interested. what conceivable reason would there be for the obama administration to not shared these memos and what are the consequences for not sharing these memos? if anybody can answer that, i

would like to hear. >> i would take a stab at defending the administration on this after having spent four years as a white house lawyer. this was the privately given to the president of the united states. just as this committee is about to rely on the information given to you by mr. raymer. >> this is the committee that has oversight means -- responsibility. >> to the extent they have not made clear what their legal analysis is, absolutely they owe you a full explanation. >> what you can do and what you

should do are sometimes different. it strikes me in this case that this is one of those cases. if you take a look that the authorization for use of military force, which all of us voted for the with as those of us who were here -- which all of us all take for, those of us who are here -- are we to believe that everybody on this list was responsible for the 9/11 attack? is that the rationale? >> all four of us agree with you. the 2001 aumf, which is only 60

words long, is now very long in the tooth. the extreme government solution would be for congress to work with the executive branch to revise that aumf. it is completely unclear about who it covers and where it covers it. >> it is as unclear as you suggest. this is a limitation. there were big arguments about it. there was a prior draft that was much more expensive and it was narrowed. the president has the right to keep his legal advice confidential. that is a longstanding principle.

questions are raised as to whether the executive is complying with the law. if he feels he is, it was be -- would be a positive thing for the administration to share that legal theory with this committee and with the american people, who i think have doubts that are substantial. if it can not be made clear, we have another problem to deal with. >> to the extent that the administration's legal theory remains mysterious to congress, the administration should be up here to explain and put down in

writing what they can. of the americans who are dead, every single one of those fell within the aumf. the president of the united states is allowed to receive a particular memo on a particular day and rely on that. >> i was not a huge fan of the bush administration, as many of my colleagues know. we actually did get access to their memorandum laying out their rationale. i thought it was poorly written and misadvised, but we've received that and i would expect no less from the current president.

>> i would like to express my frustration at the d.o.j.'s absence today. some of my colleagues know that i worked there and i have plenty of friends there and i respect their work. not responding to a letter from some guy from south carolina -- i really do not understand responding to judge poe's letter, but i do not understand them not sending anyone. my questions are going to be directed to them. i do not need a d.o.j. memo to tell me you can use lethal force to repel an imminent threat. i did not need them to tell me

that. police officers should folks all the time, private citizens shoot folks who are invading the homes of the time. non-citizens can shoot a united states citizen without having to go to a judge beforehand. there is review afterward, both a criminal and civil. i did not need the department of justice to tell me that. i also did not mean the department of justice to explain to me that in times of war, you deny meeting judge picking your targets for you. at time of war, you do not need a judge picking your targets for you. there are two references in this memo where the target of a

lethal operation, a u.s. citizen who may have rights under the due process clause of the fourth amendment's. if the fifth amendment attaches and the fourth amendment attaches, the as a u.s. citizen who enjoy the full complement of constitutional protections? if not, why not? whichever law professor -- i would pick the one who gave me a bad grade in con law, but he is not here. would the eighth amendment applied? >> the background that this white paper is based on is critical to this question.

>> i just want to know if a u.s. citizen enjoys the full panoply of constitutional protections when they are traveling abroad? does the fourth amendment apply? >> i will lead to an actual constitutional professor -- >> do i have to comply with miranda? >> the supreme court says and it held it does not apply abroad for non-citizens. >>i am talking about citizens abroad. do they or do they not -- >> the short answer is yes. >> so the eighth amendment applies and the six amendment applies. >> courts have said the rights may vary in their scope.

>> this is where i'm headed. how is the analysis different if it is a u.s. citizen who meets the criteria if it is in south carolina rabin and some or else? -- instead of somewhere else? can you take out an american citizen on american soil? if not, why not? the only thing we get to hang our hat on is the feasibility of some senior level d.o.j. official who decides whether it is feasible or not to capture me. that is of little consolation if you are dead. is there criminal review? >> if the government wants to indict one of its officers for violating a criminal statute, certainly.

>> who would do it? that would be the executive branch. we have not had much success getting the executive branch to enforce laws against itself. in the two years i have been here, we are 0-3. i am out of time. i would love for the department of justice to come and explain to us with this analysis is equally applicable to american citizens on american soil. the feasibility of capture is of consolation to me if it is the only thing protecting us from this operation. >> the issue was extended and

it will stand open. the chair recognizes the gentleman from florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you said earlier in your testimony -- you spoke of the need to of clear and international rules. what would happen if that were taken by other countries? i had to excuse myself to take another meeting. this conversation we are having about constitutional protections in how this drone program against al qaeda functions under our constitution is of the greatest import to this committee. the issue you raise is a good one. what are the international

rules. who says to them and what standards would be in place? let me let you elaborate a bit. >> i am delighted that you ask that question. the judiciary is concerned about the protection of americans in this hearing. 3000-4000 of the people who are dead are not americans. they do not have constitutional rights. the rules that would apply to them would be international. the bush and obama administrations have tried hard to clarify that are conforming to international laws to make sure they are not killing people in assassinations and murders. that said, no other country in

the world has come out publicly and said they agree with our position. that is an unsteady place for the united states to be. i wanted the lead to states to appear around the world to be acting in accordance with international law. the obama administration has a certain this and i believe they are. most other countries do not agree with this and are beginning to accuse us of violations of international law. the united states needs to clarify those rules. there are lawsuits in pakistan and the u.k. suggesting the sharing of intelligence information with the american government may actually constitute war crimes. that is making british intelligence officials nervous. that is being closely watched throughout europe. >> in order to address these

issues going forward, both because of potential actions the other nations may take that would put up with state department spokesmen in a difficult situation to deploy those while standing up to the drone program we utilize -- what are the standards that would be put in place? tell me what that regime looks like and where does it come from? >> i spent four years as a legal advisor in thousands of conversations with european allies, many of whom are in this room listening to what the bush administration was doing. the obama administration, which never expected to be in the same position of having allies around the world accusing it of illegal activity, these to go to

the same effort. he rules would be to say, it is enough to start with a treaty. but to agree on a basic legal principles such as, a country can use lethal force against terrorists in another country who is threatening an attack if that country is unwilling or unable to prevent that threat. in most cases around the world, 190 countries, those countries are able to present that threat. they can arrest the person. in four out of five countries like yemen and pakistan, we want to get countries to use lethal force to kill someone. we can get there, but it makes other countries uncomfortable. they will not agree. >> the unlikely position that would point to this hearing and

the debates in this country, you are having a hard enough time coming to terms with this idea at the earliest stages of the potential that drones will offer -- you are having a hard enough time coming to terms under your own constitution and now we are going to have a broader discussion internationally and you are going to suggest to us what we should and should not do. i am not sure we are at the point where that compensation can take place. >> it is difficult.

the bush administration had to explain that it was lawful to detain people without trying them. this is actually much more aggressive. the obama administration is not just detaining them. they are killing them. we need to work hard to explain to a country committed to the rule of law why and what we are doing is legal. it is nice to have this hearing here, but we need to go around the world and explain. >> think you all for your testimony. but the scientists agree a little bit with the characterization that this is

limited. it is limited in the d.o.j. is saying, we have sufficient grounds. they do not say there will be more restrictions. you agree with the fact that they based their analysis that there is article 51 of authority. >> the administration would always take the position that it has the authority under article 51 an article to that it can defend the country against an imminent threat. that raises the question of what an imminent threat is.

if tomorrow hezbollah prisons and a present, imminent threat even though it is totally outside of the aumf, we can counter that with lethal force. >> with the example of libya, there was no congressional ulceration for us to get engaged in libya. i think the aumf activates the president's war powers. the fact that this congress has authorized that means a lot. the logic of this logic only applies to senior al qaeda leaders. you have to make analyses that apply to different facts. we can start with mr. bellinger. no aumf for libya. it was an international coalition. if there was an american citizen who travel to algeria and joined the pro-gaddafi army and was a major operational leader in bringing arms into

libya that would fight the resistance and american forces and our allies, based on how you read the memo, to you think this provides justification to engage an american citizen in that instance? >> under the memo, probably not. under your facts, the person would not be a senior al qaeda leader. >> if they limited it to that, why isn't so important? if the aumf is not critical, is there a logical distinction between those two if you to not think the aumf is critical? >> there are a lot of us who wonder how it can possibly be that all of this use of force in countries around the world

against people who may have only been 10 years old in 2001 still falls under the aumf. it is a good set of questions as to whether this the administration would rely on the president's constitutional authority to strike someone who did not fall under the aumf. >> in addition to the authority of rising, it is lawful under the other principles of u.s. and international law, including constitutional responsibility to protect the nation. i agree with that. in a situation like libya where it is an intervention of choice, it did not propose an imminent threat to the lead to states, how does this firmer applied to american citizens? >> suppose we had a resident of fighters stationed at an air

force base in libya? if an american citizen goes to algeria to take up arms on behalf of pro-gaddafi forces, is it an attack on u.s. forces station there? >> i agree with that. someone who is across the border in a jury who is doing logistics -- >> we have not talked about international law. it would be relevant what the what was true in libya was an international conflict that would justify a u.s. military force. there were serious international problems. >> one of the oddities of the white paper, and it is an area for this committee is to follow up with the administration about what the word imminent is doing. is it to get over domestic

constitutional curdles or whether it is an attempt to get around domestic criminal prohibitions as an affirmative defense against the murder of americans overseas or whether it flows through some of and need. it is there as a self-imposed constraints. some of the questions you are asking, the answers would be different depending on what the word eminent is doing. i talk about this the little in my written statement. it is an area that is what this committee pushing the administration for some clarification on. >> thank you and thank you, mr. chairman.

>> the chair recognizes the gentleman from texas, mr. gohmert for 5 minutes. >> this is an exceedingly important topic and we appreciate you being here today. obviously, the justice departments folks are busy doing something else other than having oversight. i wish they did not need it. these issues a deeply troubling. my friend, former judge ted poe, is a big believer in due process. m&a that is one of the issues. people brought up the issue of al awlaki been killed in yemen. i think it is good to look at what if scenarios before those scenarios happen. we know al awlaki had led

prayers for muslim congressional staffers here on capitol hill. can you foresee a time when someone like al awlaki was on a hit list and finishes when he was doing in yemen and gets back into the united states? if there is concern about imminent attack while he was in yemen, could there be those same concerns? when would it be possible for someone on the hit list, as he was, to be hit in the lead to states proper? >> the al awlaki case will someday be the subject of a wonderful book. if he had made it back to the

united states, there is no dispute that the proper way to handle them would have been for the fbi to arrest him and for him to be prosecuted in u.s. federal court. >> my question was not on what was proper. my question was the possibility of someone on the hit list being found in the lead to states. a man was arrested at dulles airport. he had been close to the clinton administration and have worked with the bush administration. he is doing 23 years in prison. what would be the prospect that someone gets back into the

country and, from a political standpoint, their arrest could be politically embarrassing. what if you have someone working closely with the president. we had a member of a known terrorist organization meeting in the white house last year it even though secretary napolitano could not answer that she even knew that was happening when it was in the papers. by the time she gets into the city and she says he was vetted 3 tons. there are things that could be proven so politically embarrassing that if somebody gets back into the lead to states, someone might look for a way to see that they never

testify. we are talking hypothetically. i would like to know what of the possibilities of something like that happening. >> nothing in the administration's white paper suggests that would be lawful. i would hope that in the administration, republican or democrat, faced with such a situation, would behave like patriots and would proceed according to the law and the constitution. i would hope this committee in the event that did not happen with consider it under its impeachment power. >> when no one from the justice department cares to participate, then what? we find them in contempt? not everybody under political pressure acts like patriots.

what if your contention is that there is an imminent attack? it is plan that he helped set institution up in yemen and we need to take him out? >> the gentlemen's time has expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. what steps could be extended and plans to take to allow corporate congressional oversight and informed public debate? i leave that to all of you. >> the administration needs to be more open in their legal analysis. we are happy to be set in spain

to help you out. i believe it is incumbent on this demonstration to explain and answer your questions. i think the executive branch could work with congress to craft a narrowly tailored law that would specify the circumstances under which an american can be targeted and the notice process to congress. the main thing the executive branch could do would be to work with congress on legislation that does not tie the hands of the president. i will go back on the judicial

review point. we are talking about an armed conflict. the gentleman from texas is no longer here. we are talking about a situation where the president is dealing within the armed conflict. it is inappropriate to insert judicial review to cut the president's hands. >> active participation in oversight efforts by this committee and others is critical. i echo what have already been set on that point. there are substantive and

procedural issues driving all of this. it would be useful for congress to express that it was willing to do so as to what the substantive grounds started to an american would be. i am the one who is most in favor of a permissible. we have an array of views here. >> one thing the administration could do is to cut more and more about what the use would look like. starting with the president's speech, the administration talked a lot about the underlying legal regime, not at the level of granularity that most people would want. i encourage them to be more

granular on that point. it is a procedural hole. not the substantive content of who you can target. they have been pretty clear about that. they have said little except to say there are rigorous internal tax. i would like to see them talk more about what those internal systems look like. almost everything we know is the result of press coverage has and leaks. it is time for them to have something substantial to say on this subject. >> i do not have much to add to

my colleagues. the lack of any sort of detailed explanation on the procedural process. if there are reasons why the intelligence led us to discover those facts should be kept classified, that is one thing. why is the bureaucratic process undertaken? i do not think it is a matter of national security. >> i fully understand your point and i appreciate it. i think it is necessary. the idea that that process would be analyzed in a vacuum without the exigency of circumstances is something that would be a debate.

i understand your wanting it. under the present climate, it is almost impossible. >> the is a lot of merit to that point. there is an additional factor about the litigation environment the administration is in. within the bureaucracy, people are constantly worried about the incremental affects of foia litigation. everytime you consider same x, you know you will get a brief filed the next day the says, you have confirmed x. we want 2x. there is some kind of safe harbor we could create that does not discourage the administration to make disclosures to this body.

>> i have listened to johnson case where he got into this crazy habit of sitting with his cabinet deciding with the bombs were going to land. it is an insane process and you are engaged in war. i do not have to make that point to all of you. you have watched the same process that we partakes of here where we argue how many fit on a pinhead. look at all of the due process these guys get. these are enemies of our country. we hope that when someone is

elected from our side or the other side, that they used the discretion of their office is pretty broad in wartime with all of the merits we expect of someone who serves in that role. thank you for fighting for these issues. it is important. >> mr. chairman, i yield back the balance of my time. thank you. >> thank you. the chair recognizes the gentleman from georgia, mr. collins. >> we do argue about things like the number of angels on the top of a pinhead. justice decided not to show up. instead of engaging in the

conference, they chose not to come. it is interesting about your comments about being in the bush administration. my grandmother used to say, do not criticize anybody too hard because you might be in their position one day. i believe the administration does not want a definition of eminent threat because that have to define what is imminent and when is it going to be applied and in what areas will it be applied? i would agree the if they were in the united states, they would fall back on feasibility.

i am not sure that is true. not in our society today. i have distinct concerns. how long can this administration or the following administration keep this argument why? how long is this going to last, especially when we have shut down the war in iraq. as someone who has served in iraq -- how long can they depend on this? >> my colleague wrote an op-ed in the washington post. it warned the amuf was growing stale. more recently, we published a paper on you and the growing threat is the beyond aumf and the problem is more imperative. >> they can do the process of judicial review if they want a

standard review. i have a question about that. the issue that comes to my mind is, we did not have this review right now. there is a veil of secrecy. there is no one to nine the article to privilege. there is no one denying the article 2 privilege. it is likely going to my 14- year-old saying, what is your decision making process? damages never make you whole completely. we would not indict one of our own. my colleague made his comments.

who would be at fault? we will throw the lowest person under the bus. where would you stop in culpability? which is stocked with the president's? >> it would depend -- would it stop with the president? >> it would depend on who was the one who made the decision that had the legal error in it. even though this guy was only as his guest house, that is enough to decide he is senior leader of al qaeda. congress could write a statute

when the damages piece on it would not depend on who is at fault. we would not point that one guy who is just doing his job. >> we know how that is going to play out in administration politics. one to state it again. the administration today had a chance to do what this president has said overall, he wants to have an open administration that reflects the priority of his administration and his people. this did not happen.

they took a forfeit the day. there are ways to do this. simply ignoring a sitting committee and saying, we have other things we want to do, that is the concern i have. this is why this committee needs to have oversight and needs to have the administration actually show up to the game. with that, i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman for his pertinent comments send a thank all of the members of this panel. i, along with the gentleman from georgia, the gentleman from new york, are troubled by the fact that we have not had

cooperation from the administration in terms of producing important documents we need to conduct our oversight properly, or a witness on behalf of the administration to testify. we will continue to work together to conduct the oversight necessary and to take the next steps that may be necessary. in the meantime, we probably will have additional questions for each and every one of you. in a moment, i will ask for unanimous consent to allow members to ask questions. this concludes today's hearings. all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional questions or materials for the record. the hearing is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

>> on monday, vice president biden, kirsten gillibrand, and others speaking about u.s.- israel relations part of the american israel public affairs committee annual meeting. live coverage begins at 9:30 a.m. monday morning on c-span2. the house and senate are back on monday. they will begin work on a stopgap bill to keep the government fend in -- funded through the end of the year. the continuing resolution is expected to come up for debate and a vote later in the week. live coverage dollhouse in c- span. -- live coverage of the house on c-span. the senate voting on district court nominations. also coming up for a vote, john

brennan to be the director of the cia. next, testifying on the impact of the automatic spending cuts known as sequestration. this portion from the house appropriations committee is just over two hours. >> the hearing will come to order. to our witnesses today, after a long time in the congress dealing with national security, i continue to be a tremendously

impressed with the leadership of america's military. you represent the leadership, and i can tell you it's really exciting to be in the same room with all of you. you have and your predecessors have built a tremendous national security program. we are trying to keep it like that. we're trying to make sure our readiness stays high and their troops are well taken care of, whatever equipment and training they need to do the mission there called on to perform. with allly great to be of you today. i had intended for this hearing, when we first invited you to come, to go in a little different direction. where will we be five years from now, 10 years from now from the

standpoint of the threat that appears to be growing especially in north africa out from the standpoint of adequate equipment? i think time has overtaken are issues today. we find ourselves with sequestration upon us. there's not much time left to fix it. the one thing that appropriators must do has to do with a continuing resolution. i am frankly very concerned that the continuing resolution, should it be extended for the balance of the fiscal year could cause a lot of damage to our readiness, to our training, to our preparation, to our troops.

i want to introduce it general re odierno, marine commandant james amos, mark welsh, and the national guard bureau who sits with the chief and we can say congratulations to you. thank you for being here. before i yield to mr. rogers, i want to yield to any opening statements. then we will move right on into the subject. >> thank you very much. i appreciate you mentioning the continuing resolution because people are very focused on sequestration, which is a fundamental problem. the fact is we are governing this country by looking

backwards. i join the chairman in joining -- in welcoming the five gentleman before us. i appreciate your time, york that it, and your service. we look forward to hearing of your expertise. mr. chairman, have a longer opening statement will simply conclude by saying i'm appalled that all of us are meeting here today and not having a hearing on fiscal year 2014 budget and the incredible amount of time you have had waste dealing with these issues that that chairman, the members of this committee and the staff have had to wait dealing with this issue. i also believe that since this is a complete abdication of congressional responsibility to be a check and balance and make

financial decisions and i regret congress the longer legislates but lurches from crisis to crisis. i deeply appreciate you bring us together today to try to resolve the issues around us and yield back my time. >> thank you. this is a't mind, little change in their usual routine. i'm going to ask you hold your opening statement until mr. rogers makes his opening statement. he has a meeting with the speaker at leadership in which she is trying to persuade them to understand the importance of not carrying forward on another six months. if that is ok with you, i would recognize chairman rogers to has been working hard to put this program together.

>> thank you very much for holding the hearing. also for the recognition and allowing me to go before the witnesses speak. good morning and welcome to the committee. this hearing is critically important. this week, our national defense will face serious and dangerous sequestration and cuts. as well as potentially damaging constraints if the current defunding structure is simply extended for the remainder of the fiscal year. twin threats -- first the cr that will hit on a 27 the next month and then sequestration. today, want to focus your attention on the cr and what you

need for the balance of this year, whether it is a date change only or whether it is incorporating the defense bill and va bill that passed the house overwhelmingly and was agreed to buy the set. we want to try to substitute those two bills for the balance of the year which would give you a lot more flexibility than you now have. it is not within his committee's power to solve sequestration at this time. it is within our jurisdiction to try to lose some the change and allow the department some funding flexibility in order to do its best with what it has. two weeks ago, as the chairman said, i proposed a plan to craft

a continuing resolution for the entire government that would include a full year defense appropriations bill. these two individual bills have bipartisan support. they were conference with their democrat and republican counterparts in the senate and they have been completed at laying there since december. if enacted, this package will avoid a government shutdown while prioritizing department of defense and veterans programs and ensuring much needed funding flexibility in what you do. it is absolutely imperative that you do this and saving a lot of money. i know the chairman shares this goal and i sincerely applaud his leadership on this subcommittee and his unwavering support for the people and missions of this military.

it is crucial the committee receive the best information possible regarding the department of defense funding challenges under both sequestration and the cr. we wanted to hear that directly from you. for several of view, this is your first time testifying before this subcommittee. we look forward to hearing directly from you and hopefully and shackled from the gag order, i don't have to tell you the members of this subcommittee no you come representing thousands of our service men and women and their families. by acknowledging their service, dedication and sacrifice to the country they live in and we reaffirm our commitment to providing them with the tools, training, and support necessary to carry out vital security missions throughout the world.

it is under that yoke of responsibility that our nation and the government face unprecedented fiscal challenges, particularly for the department offense. like many of my colleagues, i believe sequestration is both terrible politics and a terrible policy. it will have a devastating effect of important programs and services, most notably taking its toll on our service men and women and our defense capability. the president's sequestration approach represents a haphazard, negligent, and indiscriminate approach to governing. an abdication of leadership, if you will. as you know, leadership is about making choices. tough choices. sequestration is about not

making choices. i had hoped our commander-in- chief would put forward an alternative to this near-term disaster, but we are still waiting period last year, the house voted twice to resist these across the board cuts to only have the white house criticize and disparage. these cuts will gravely impair the defense department's capabilities troop training and supply lines, research and development efforts and our overall readiness. today, it is my hope we can have an honest and open dialogue to discuss the very real impact of the pending sequestration exactly where cuts will occur, and the fourth steps the military is taking to mitigate these effects. no question, cuts can be made in

each and every apartment, but this approach will lead to more cost, less, and less 21st century security, not war. secondly, the department of defense is wrestling with the possibility of a yearlong continuing resolution. as i said before, while final decisions have not been made, i am proposing to include a completed defense and a report in an agreement for the balance of the government for the balance of the year. in order to protect critical functions of our defense and help ensure our country's safety in these uncertain times. this proposal would have the benefit of saving billions of taxpayer dollars. under a street date extension, without these bills attached, billions in potential savings would be lost for unnecessarily

wasted. for example, savings from closing out programs that have exceeded their usefulness will not be realized. new multi-year procurement which save time and money would not be permitted. program delays or disruptions for hundreds of programs will result in price increases. it is clear this nation is facing very hard choices. it is up to congress to pave the way for our financial future and up to the committee to do what we can in the short term to make the most of a difficult situation. that is one reason why it is essential we hear what you have to say today. i want to encourage you to be as frank as you can. these are frank times. the deadline is upon us. decisions will be made in hours

on the future of the country. i urge you men of expertise and leadership, people who are used to making decisions, to let us know the basic facts so we can make the right decision with you. on to the business at hand. i know this is unorthodox, but i have to leave shortly. i want to be sure we get the answer to the following question from each of you, yes or no. would you say it is critical that congress pass a full year defense appropriations bill for fiscal 13? so when it comes time for the answer, i would hope we could hear -- could i even asked for a

hand right now? >> that's fine, it is your time. >> let me ask the question. >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> you are saying that it is critical the nation's defense that we pass the cr with the house and senate passed appropriation bill for veterans? >> yes, sir. >> yes, that is correct. >> yes, sir. >> yes, sir. >> yes, sir. >> >> -- >> i will be able to carry this into the meeting with leadership in just a few minutes. >> thank you very much for the effort you made to this package together. we have been trying to get the defense bill on the floor for final consideration for a long

time. the full committee has joined with us and i yield to you. >> thank you very much. i would like to say to chairman rogers to i know believes in regular order, if we could sit down, just a couple of us, we could work something out and come up with a fair solution. and glad to see you shake your head on that one. at -- we could do it that way. it is an honor to be here and i would like to thank chairman young and the ranking member and all the members of the said committee for holding hearing. the topic is timely and with three days left before three -- before sequestration occurs, congress needs to work together to avoid across-the-board cuts which risk our economic recovery

and national security. if it would help, i would say it again -- it is essential we avoid this disaster is proposal, excluding sequestration in the last few years, congress has reduced discretionary spending by more than 1.5 trillion dollars. even after we made such deductions that discretionary spending is on a path to be at the lowest percentage of gdp in the last 45 years. we face additional costs of -- additional cuts through sequestration. the priorities for national defence to education to biomedical research cannot absorb an additional $1.5 trillion dollar below. i don't believe anyone on this subcommittee wants across-the- board cuts.

though we are approaching the deadline, congress could prevent $85 billion in cuts from occurring by passing a balanced approach this we that closes tax loopholes, tram's entitlements, and minimizes growth in future spending. as we listen to the testimony on the grave impact on each service, we should keep in mind the overall economic impact. the cbo projects -- projects the sequestration will cut economic growth by one-third. cut economic growth by one third. a study from george mason university projects a loss of dollars -- of 2.140 million jobs. now is not the time.

for the department of defense and all the other agencies, the effects of sequestration could be compounded by the effects of a continuing resolution that does not update budgetary priorities. our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines can be called upon at any time on any day to defend our nation. we have a responsibility to set aside our ideological differences and provide them with the resources they need. i would also like to take a moment to think general grass and his response to that guard after super storm sandy. we're so appreciative. but new york national guard deployed approximately 4000 soldiers to assist first responders with equipment, supplies, search and rescue, and cleanup efforts.

due to sequestration, new york alone is looking at a furlough of 12,000 defense employees and a reduction of her $108 million for army base operations. this could hurt the ability to maintain a top much worse. i look for testimony for our witnesses and i don't think we should lose sight of our shared goal of working together in a bipartisan way for the future of our country, for the strength of our economy, we must prevent sequestration. >> thank you very much for your statement. thank you for being here. you know very well that this subcommittee has always approached it responsibilities in a very non-political way. we appreciate your statement on

that attitude. we're going to regular order now and i would invite the general to make any opening statement you would like to make and respond to chairman rogers worry your own statement. we're here to hear from you because it is essential you and your forces have what is essential to keep the station strong. >> thank you. thank you very much for allowing us to be here and have this very important discussion. nearly 18 months ago, i was asked to be the chief of staff of the army, to run this army, had asked to provide my best military advice that i will do that today as we discussed this very complex issue. the last several years to

theater level. i know what it takes to ensure that our sons and daughters are prepared for war. know what it takes to grow leaders and our army. i know what is required to send soldiers into combat. i have seen firsthand the consequences when they are sent unprepared. i have -- i began my career in the 1970's in a hollow army and i will not end my career in a hollow army. every day, you dance across the globe remind us that we live in the most unpredictable and dynamic security landscape that i have experienced in my career. on light post-conflict drawdowns in the past, we do not see any peace and stability and a dividend of our future. instead, the army has almost 60,000 people deployed in afghanistan and another 22,000 deployed in other places with in the middle east, kosovo and other places and more than 91,000 stationed across the globe. it is these very soldiers who

suffer the most under these budgetary cuts. we simply do not know when we will be asked to deploy soldiers to fight again but history is very clear on this subject -- we will ask them to deploy. our men and women again will ask to provide security for this nation when it is at risk. we owe it to them and the american people to insure that our soldiers are ready and when we ask them to respond to the next war for the next crisis, the next natural disaster, that is our charge together to ensure they are ready to respond. in my opinion, the greatest threat to our national security is the fiscal uncertainty resulting from the lack of predictability in our budget cycle over the last several years. in addition to the $170 billion in cuts to the army levied by the budget control act of 2011, the combination of the continuing resolution, a short

fall in overseas contingency operations funds for afghanistan and the sequestered in fiscal year 2013 has resulted in an $18 billion shortfall to the army's operation and maintenance accounts. as well as an additional $6 billion cut to all other programs. all of this will come in the last seven months of this year. our top priority is to insure that our forces in afghanistan and korea have the resources required to execute their missions. these cuts will have grave consequences and immediate impact on the readiness of our remaining forces. we will curtail training for 80% of our forces. this will in due shortfalls across critical specialties including aviation, intelligence, engineering, and their ability to recruit new soldier's into the army. sequestration will impact our ability to provide properly trained soldiers in afghanistan

in 2014. it will have significant near and long term impact on u.s. special operations command. and their ability to support special operations. we have directed an immediate army hiring freeze and we have terminated an estimated 3100 term employees. we will furlough 21,000 civilians for up to 22 days. we supplied 22,000 employees that represent 60% of the army work force at medical treatment facility, three times that of our sister services. the civilian furlough will mean an hour soldiers will experience degraded access to medical care. we will cancel third and fourth quarter depot maintenance. there will be a significant

delay in equipment for divisions and an estimated $3.36 million impact. if sequestration is implemented, over 10,000 employees could be affected next year. civilian furloughs, 75% reduction on base funding and elimination of contract will strain our ability to protect our army family programs. it sequestration is implemented, we will be forced to reduce funding for our schools, day care centers, family assistance and community service programs, family and substance abuse counselors and tuition assistance for our soldiers. for 2014 and beyond, sequestration will result in a loss of at least an additional 100,000 personnel soldiers who are active army, the army national guard, and the u.s. reserve. combined with previous cuts that already been approved, this will result in total reduction of at least wanted 89,000

personnel from the army. it will probably end up being higher than that, closer to 200,000. a reduction of 40% of the army's strength will a quake -- will equate to a reduction in combat teams in base installation infrastructure. sequestration will result in delays to everyone of our 10 modernize -- major modernization programs. since 2008, the total army budget will have been reduced by over 45%. sequestration would be greater than 50%. that is a number greater following any war we have been all but since world war two. in my opinion, sequestration is not in the best interest of our national security. it will place an unreasonable burden on the shoulders of our soldiers and civilians. will not be able to execute 2012 strategic guidance and we are compromising the future

readiness of the joint force, the army, and their ability to provide for the security of our nation today. i understand the seriousness of our country's fiscal situation. we will continue to do our part but we simply cannot take the readiness of our force for granted if we do not have the resources to train and equip the force, our soldiers, our young men and women are the ones who will pay the price potentially with their lives. it is our responsibility and as the department of defense and congress to ensure that we never send soldiers into harm's way that not trained, equipped, well-led and ready for any contingency to include war. we must come up with a better solution. i will just add that over the last week, we have done a detailed analysis of how we would implement the $18 billion shortfall in 2013 which includes $6 billion in continuing resolution -- 5-$7

billion in oco shortfalls for afghanistan and $6 billion for sequestration. all those things i just mentioned, we're still $4 billion short to pay the bill. there will be more things we will have to do that we are trying to figure out. this is very serious and ask your assistance in helping us. any help to include the flexibility that would help us eliminate the $6 billion shortfall would be significant for the army. it would solve 1/3 of the problem we have today. thank you very much for allowing me to testify >> thank you very much. i want you to know this committee -- we are pushing hard to try to break through some of the walls we have to break through because we agree and we understand what you are telling us. one of the purposes of this

hearing is to make the point as often as we can for those higher appointees who can pay attention to what you are telling us that what we are hearing from you. thank you very much, sir. admiral greener, we would love to hear your view from the chief of naval operations. >> good morning, distinguished members of the committee, i want to package for the opportunity to testify and to have a discussion with you today. when i last appeared before you, i declared there were too important qualities of our never forces -- we will operate for the at the maritime crossroads of the world. we will be where it matters and we will be ready when it matters. this remains our mandate. the navy and marine corps are uniquely qualified to respond immediately to crises to assure allies and build partnerships

and to deter aggression. these qualities and their values are at risk by the fiscal uncertainty we now face. our near-term concern is that -- is degraded current readiness caused by a combination of sequestration and the lack of an appropriations bill and fiscal year 2013. this is not just a 2013 phenomenon. without congressional action, it will have an irreversible and debilitating impact on our navy's readiness for the rest of the decade. in the near term, will not be able to respond and the way the nation as expected and depended on. we should make that decision consciously and deliberately. three symbolic but not all inclusive examples of this near-term impact are the delays of the deployment of the carrier strike a group harry truman. there is the delay in the overhaul of the carrier abraham lincoln and the delay in the initial construction of the

carrier john f. kennedy. these are just carriers. it impacts ops, maintenance, construction read off the bat. these represent the kinds of decisions will have to make over the coming weeks. it will not come without significant consequences to our people, the defense industry, and to the local economies. the $8.6 billion shortfall that confronts us in our operations and made into account has compelled us to cancel ship and aircraft maintenance, reduce operations, curtail training for forces that will soon deploy, and notify 100 city -- 100,000 employees of a furlough. this will enable funds for continued operation of forces that are currently forward deployed but we will have inadequate surge capacity at the appropriate readiness level where it matters and when it matters. we need an appropriations bill for this fiscal year that will allow the department to distribute resources in a deliberate manner.

alternatively, if a year-long continuing resolution is inevitable or the result, we definitely will have the means to realign funds across our program to provide funding for the most critical operations. the light and reallocation of resources result in irreversible actions such as ships and aircraft maintenance and training cancellations. we have lost $600 million in february because of irreversible opportunities and for the month of march, if we don't have that opportunity to reallocate funds, it will be another $1.2 billion and it continues to grow as we go through the summer. i know this committee is dedicated to men and women of our military and their families but our folks are stressed by the uncertainty about their jobs, their operational schedules, and, more

importantly, their future. i appreciate the opportunity to testify and have a discussion on their behalf and i am proud to represent these dedicated people and their sacrifices. thank you in advance for your efforts in this and that of this body to try to avert this readiness crisis. >> you so very much for a very important statement. we have met with you off and on on that very issue of having been able assets and what all the other services really need. i am anxious to hear from the marine corps, sir. >> thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the impact of continuing resolution and sequestration on your marine corps. as i said here, there are five of us and we represent over 180 years of service to our nation and defense of our nation.

we take that responsibility seriously as you do in your committee. as a member of the joint chiefs of staff, sequestration by its magnitude, its timing, and its methodology will have a devastating impact on our nation's retinas both short-term and long-term. combined with the effects of the existing continuing resolution, sequestration creates unacceptable levels of risk in four main areas -- first, risk to our national strategy. second, restore our forces. third, risk to our people and lastly, risk to the united states of america. regarding risk to our national strategy -- maintaining a sound international economic system and they just international order are the foundations of our nation's defense and strategic guidance. the effects of disruption to

this global order can be seen in a volatile energy prices, flood and global markets, unacceptable sovereign behavior, and economic decline. failing to provide leadership in the collective security of this global order, will have significant economic consequences for the people of america. if fiscally driven latin american leadership and for the engagement will create a void in which old threats will be left unaddressed and new security challenges will no doubt find room to grow. there should be no misunderstanding -- the combined effects of continuing resolution and sequestration will have a deleterious effect on the stability of global order. the perceptions of our enemies and the confidence of our allies. restoration viewed solely as a budget issue would be a grave mistake. in fact, it would border irresponsibility. our collective actions in the next few months will be scrutinized on a global stage where even the perception of

disruption of our nation's willingness to protect its global interests can and will have strategic consequences. regarding risk to our forces -- a linkage between resources and readiness is immediate and visible. the scale and agnostic implementation of sequestration will have devastating impact on readiness. sequestration will leave ships in port, aircraft grounded for want of necessary maintenance and flight hours, modernization programs canceled, and units only partially trained after 12 long years of combat will be left unattended. because of our special role as america's crisis response force, marines place a high premium on readiness. i have done everything within my authority to preserve the tenets of a ready in court. i will continue to do so. i have kept the point units already but only by stripping

away the foundations of a long- term readiness of the total force. the short-term adaptations are possible, the enduring effects of these decisions puts the future health and retinas of the force at risk. by the beginning of next year, more than 50% of my tactical units will be below acceptable levels of readiness for deployment to combat. in a very real sense, we are eating our seed corn to feed current demands leaving less to plant for the long-term capabilities of the force. this pattern inevitably leads to a hollow force. it's impacts are already being felt under the continuing resolution. the most troubling and immediate risks are those that sequestration imposes on our people. sequestration does not heard things, it hurts our people. the qualitative edge of the american service member is a fundamental advantage that defrayed shapes our forces from our enemies. the quality of comic edge will be severely eroded by the impacts of sequestration leave america's men and women with them -- with inadequate

training, the critical and, and reduced survivability. military pay and plans have been exempted in this round of sequester, the quality of life for the all-volunteer force and their families will inevitably suffer as we reduce family programs and installation maintenance. our civilian marines will likely be impacted. 95% of our civilian work force is employed outside of the national capital region. they are the guards at our gates, our financial experts that build and manage their budgets, our acquisitions specialists, the therapists who treat the wounded, the experts to repair or equipment and the teachers to teach our children. the economic impact of these families and their local communities are put at risk by short-term furlough and long- term termination. protecting our ability to keep faith with our families and our wounded warriors is a top priority in my court. even the best, the most sacred

of responsibilities, will be increasingly placed debt risk under sequestration allow me to articulate one more risk -- the risks to our nation. in the final analysis, sequestration potentially asks the most from those who have borne the supreme sacrificed for the effects of frustration or the next 10 years will threaten the foundation of the all-walter force, putting our nation's security on a vector that is potentially dangerous. it will dramatically shape perceptions of our government as an employer and as a customer thereby reducing confidence throughout our institutions. these are strategic matters that demand our immediate attention and i urge this committee to consider the full range of risks created by this legislation and continuing resolution. i ask for your assistance and in getting them to the extent possible. thank you and i look forward to the opportunity to answer questions. >> thank you very much. your insistence on the word

'risk' is something you and i have talked about for quite some time. we've got to get rid of the risk and the uncertainty as it relates to our national defense. i can tell you that having worked on this committee for a long, long time, we want to eliminate those risks. we are trying to get our message through and what you all are telling us today is helping with that effort to break the wall and get the message through. thank you so very much. jet -- general welsh. >> thank you for allowing us to attend this hearing, all of us consider this an honor to be here. i would like to add my thanks to the subcommittee and a greater committee for the tremendous work have done over time in supporting our military forces. you understand the context of

this discussion which is why i think we are happy to be here today. i agree with everything you have heard already and i will not be labour the point you have heard. sequestration of an abrupt and alarming impact on people, retinas, infrastructure, and eventually, modernization of the air force sprayed it represents a two $0.4 billion reduction in 2013 and the effects every account and every program. if that occurs, it will significantly undermine your air force readiness and responsiveness today. it will impact our civilian work force in the coming months. its impact on modernization will affect our future capability. the cuts will force an involuntary 22-day furlough for up to 180,000 air force personnel and that meant 31.5 million man hours of lost work for the remainder of this fiscal work not to mention the personal impact on those individuals and their families. it will result in loss of over

200,000 flying hours. let me explain what that means -- we will protect flight operations in afghanistan and other contingency areas and protect nuclear deterrence in flight training but roughly 2/3 of our active duty, our fourth duty will scale down home training in march. they will drop below acceptable readiness levels by mid-may and most will be completely non- mission capable by july. that will require at least six more to return to the present trend levels beginning in october, assuming we have funding to do so. it will cut 30% of our remaining weapons systems sustainment funds making us postponed airplane engines grayback club that will take years to recover from. strategic agility and responseiveness is jeopardized with the many strategic abilities we have. sequestration of an immediate effect on our ability to respond to multiple and current

operations around the world, something we have been asked to do. longer-term, sequestration cuts air force modernization programs and that will impact every one of us. the program disruptions will raise unit cost and delay delivery of validated capability to the fighters in the field. the air force is long overdue for reconstitution following two decades of wars. our inventory still includes aircraft from the 1950's and are forced is as small as we have ever been since becoming a separate service in 1947. we now find ourselves stuck in the space between readiness and modernization. we need your help to get out. i urge you to do all that is necessary to avert the arbitrary cuts of sequestration and pass an appropriations measure for the current fiscal year. if sequestration is inevitable,

i applaud the efforts we have already heard to grant as much flexibility as far as reprogramming authority and other restrictions that limit our flexibility to medicate the signet impact of sequestration and a year-long continuing resolution. this is an unusual budget environment and i believe unusual measures are worth considering this year. thank you again for allowing this to be here and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much for your statement. we appreciate what you have to tell us. we will pay strict attention, believe me. i like to introduce a general greass. in today's world, there are many things we're doing that we could not do. general grass, understand the importance of the organizations you lead. >> thank you, it is a real

privilege and honor to be here today to represent a 460,000 army international guardsmen. in my 43 years serving in a military uniform, mostly with the national guard, i witnessed a transformation from a strategic reserve into a premier operational force. the army and international guard capability, compatibility, combat experience, and operational relationships with all of our military services has been incredibly valuable to our nation, our states and territories and the district of columbia. the current complex fiscal environment marked by the promise of a year-long continuing resolution and combined with the threat of sequestration puts the readiness of this operational force at risk. th